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R478

The United States Senate

Goodwin

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED
DN 3/2/77
BY EC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, July 10, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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AHRARD: amt

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, July 10, 1975

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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Governmental Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:02 o'clock p.m. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan, David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

The Chairman. We will come back into order.

Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?

Do you swear that all the testimony you are about to give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Goodwin. I do.

The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has been some problem in connection with your appearance here today and that there are some notes that you have that you feel you need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought with you. Is that the case?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful. They have been in storage for several years and I just had no access to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They were notes -- my files and everything have been in storage for several years. I've had no access to them. And they consist of the files that I brought from the White House with me.

The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the staff and shown certain documents that the staff believes will be pertinent to your testimony?

Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.

The Chairman. And do you believe that you are prepared today to give us testimony relating to Mr. Trujillo or do you

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1 believe that you need to or ought to review those notes before
2 you give any testimony?
3 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm of course fully prepared to testify
4 to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think
5 probably in the case of the Dominican Republic, the documents
6 have been adequate. I think there's a good chance that going
7 through the files may very well add something to my recollection
8 of Cuba and Castro.
9 The Chairman. Well I will have this suggestion to make.
10 We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and
11 then -- how long will it take you to get your files and review
12 them and come back fully prepared to give us your testimony on
13 the other issues?
14 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it will take a day or two. It is
15 possible I will not be able to get access to them until Monday
16 morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello
17 and find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine.
18 But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.
19 The Chairman. So that if the Committee were to give you
20 that opportunity, would you then get those files, review them,
21 and respond to the request by the Committee that you appear the
22 first of next week to testify?
23 Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly.
24 The Chairman. We are most anxious to complete the record
25 and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly

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accomodate our need if you would cooperate.

Mr. Goodwin. I would be glad to.

The Chairman. All right.

With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?

Mr. Schwarz. I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't have a chance to get together. I thought we were going to have a chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to speak to you but I do know some of the material, and perhaps we can work on the material.

Before we do so, could you state your full name and your address please?

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. GOODWIN

Mr. Goodwin. Richard M. Goodwin, 1536 32nd Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Mr. Schwarz. And as a matter of course, we tell all of our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?

Mr. Goodwin. I already have too many lawyers.

Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional rights are?

Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the Dominican Republic in the winter and spring of 1961?

Mr. Goodwin. I came into the White House as Assistant Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin American affairs policy statements in the preceeding campaign. I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until I left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a daily basis with President Kennedy and his activities in Latin America which included what was happening in the Dominican Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepared cables that went to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that you are interested in, and I was with him every day on something connected with Latin America.

Mr. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary

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1 material, would you recount for the Committee your understanding
2 of what the United States government policy toward the Dominic
3 Republic was in the winter and spring of '61 and what actions
4 were taken to implement that policy.

5 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of the
6 policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in
7 accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -- decided
8 to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican
9 Republic and the situation which you know arose was precipitated
10 by the attempted assassination of President Betancourt by the
11 President of the Dominican Republic.

12 So that from that point on when we came in, the feeling
13 was, first of all, of course that Trujillo was even more
14 at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress than
15 had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other
16 relations, that Trujillo's time in office was probably
17 numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade
18 which was often in great domestic difficulty had been the
19 concept of American support, it strengthened Trujillo against
20 his opposition.

21 At that point our policy became one of trying to anticipate
22 at least, the fall of Trujillo. Of course the Castro thing
23 was very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern of
24 the President, the one thing he didn't want was for Trujillo
25 to go and a Communist leader to come in. So I think the policy

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1 was to keep up our economic and diplomatic pressure to hope
2 that when Trujillo went, however he went, whether violently or
3 peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would
4 be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of
5 the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keep in
6 touch with and help out and keep communications open with
7 the potential successor groups, and it was very hard to
8 pinpoint.

9 Mr. Schwarz. What steps did you take during the period
10 of time you were involved, or prior thereto, if you know
11 about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident
12 groups?

13 Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from
14 policy statements, the use of USIA, the use of economic
15 pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile
16 groups principally in New York and elsewhere. A certain number
17 of limited covert operations, some [redacted] Dearborn
18 of course was one of the principals, his principal instruction
19 was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was
20 zealous in this because he disliked Trujillo intensely himself
21 and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups.
22 And I read through the sort of overall planning papers, and I
23 think they fairly reflect that range of operations.

24 None of them were terribly effective.

25 Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the [redacted]

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what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorization was provided [redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Eisenhower.

Mr. Schwarz. And that was at a meeting of the Special Group?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't know because they didn't let me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really know the procedure.

Mr. Schwarz. When were the [redacted] passed?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. I became aware of the

Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of people had

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1 tried and most of them, they were all dead. It was a very
2 risky business. It's not the kind of thing they would want to
3 try with a .38.
4 And I think also, I mean nobody, I think -- as I say, we
5 had no particular anticipation that this or any other group
6 would be successful in something that nobody had been able to
7 do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.
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24 My knowledge of it was on the basis of the message --
25 The Chairman. Is there someone that can help Mr. Goodwin

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1 with the documents?

2 Mr. Schwarz. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1,

3 a document consisting -- dated May 13, 1961 and headed

4

5

6

7

8

9 Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and

10 that's where, I guess, I found out about it.

11 (The document referred

12 to was marked Goodwin

13 Exhibit No. 1 for

14 identification.)

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(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin, this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.

Would you read into the record the second paragraph?

Mr. Goodwin. "At one point during the meeting, the Vice President asked about [redacted]

Can you tell me if this his memo I'm reading? I'd like to know.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottom of the page, do they help you decide whose memo it is?

Mr. Dennin. I believe we were told by Secretary of State Rusk that it's Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what the U stands for.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is an inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen. I thought that I wouldn't have made it. I had no purpose in making it. And this is --

The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?

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[redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I -- my first knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requested [redacted] I don't know any more than that.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Mr. Goodwin. This is my source of knowledge. I may have learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.

Mr. Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, [redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. Now I would like you to testify in answer to a series of questions as to what you were or were not told.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

against Trujillo. But they, of course, were interested in assassinating Trujillo, involved as they were in a very life and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered --

[redacted] by blockading the road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress. And that they intended to do it whether or not they received

[redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got reports of assassinations about to occur almost every two or three weeks in the White House. There is a long gap between wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -- but at all times, continually, up into May, there was the very

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Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know what you were informed about the intentions of the dissidents. You didn't answer my question. You said you were frequently informed about assassination plots all over the world, but specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you or were you not informed that the Agency had been told by the dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not they received the

Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. I wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you mean Dearborn, or --

Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency in this instance?

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[redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. Was it your impression that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic [redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the instructions given to Dearborn were carried out, and all instructions from the President went to Dearborn.

Mr. Schwarz. Apart from instructions from the President, was it your impression [redacted] that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Goodwin. My impression was that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic, subject to very close supervision from Washington.

The Chairman. Dearborn was the --

Mr. Goodwin. He was the Consul. We had no formal relations.

The Chairman. He was the Consul?

Mr. Goodwin. Right.

Wasn't that true?

Mr. Schwarz. The paper record makes it look quite likely [redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. They should have told the President. We sent all of our messages to Dearborn.

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[redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in here somewhere in the paper.

(Pause)

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question.

[redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. I know now.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?

Mr. Goodwin. No. I knew, when the issue arose in May that we had -- [redacted] but the precise method by which they were brought in I never asked about.

The Chairman. I am having a little difficulty following.

We began with your being told that it was the policy of the previous Administration to encourage dissident groups and do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of President Kennedy [redacted] that obviously had occurred after President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you first

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learn?

Mr. Goodwin. On the 13th of May when we requested from the White House a briefing paper [redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from whom?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for the President.

Mr. Schwarz. [redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. [redacted]

The Chairman [redacted] and that briefing paper has been identified for the record?

Mr. Goodwin. That is correct.

The Chairman. All right.

[redacted]

Was it then your understanding that this was President Kennedy's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. No.

The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received that information?

Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator, and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinction

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5 Our response to this briefing paper was immediately to
6 try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic
7 and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks,
8 instructions to the Consul about the nature of future relations
9 with dissidents, because the President felt that things
10 might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the
11 Dominican Republic.

12 So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I
13 said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to
14 push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen
15 next, because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than
16 a Communist leader. And secondly, that the United States
17 not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in
18 the telegram that was --

19 The Chairman. All right.

20 Now when the President told you that those were his
21 two concerns, what action was then taken to implement the
22 President's policy?

23 Mr. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to take
24 and set aside the original instructions from the State
25 Department and at the President's instructions, I typed up the

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1 telegram which is here in my handwriting, which was to go and
2 did go, slightly revised to --
3 Mr. Schwarz. All right. Let me mark the one in your
4 hand as Exhibit 3.
5 (The document referred to
6 was marked as Goodwin
7 Exhibit No. 3-A for
8 identification.)
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Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -- you know how to do this as well as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-B and 3-C.

Mr. Goodwin. In which I personally added in the course of rewriting --

The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators' books where these documents appear?

Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3-A?

Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.

(Pause)

This xerox of my raw, personally typewritten draft appears on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.

And then page 256 is the final. And the same page, 242, page 237 and 242.

The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message that went out?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?

Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.

The Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed?

Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guess, but they are both my drafts. I received a draft from the State Department, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden the State Department on my own, and adding to it two major points aside

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from rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, and the second one was to say in the final version, "However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is overriding and most prevail in doubtful situations."

That was inserted at the instruction of the President, a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State Department draft, and it finishes again with -- it says, "Clearly, at the present time we are unable to [redacted] [redacted] We feel that the [redacted] would serve very little purpose."

(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 3-B for identification.)

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The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it before it was sent by State?

Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.

The Chairman. But you said that the State Department changed the language.

Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft which I changed and redrafted. Now that is here too, including a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their draft.

The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that you believed accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.

The Chairman. It was shown to the President?

Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Very well.

Then, reading the first paragraph, "The President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception. You are not to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups."

Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.

There was a proposal made in the State Department version that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case they managed to take over the government and there was some kind of fighting that they should request help from Venezuela,

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Columbia, a few of our allies and therefore we ought to prepare them in advance for such a request. The President thought that putting such a document in their hands would amount to a declaration of war and wanted it struck.

The Chairman. All right.

Then the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that you continue to work" -- well, before we go on with the second paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, "The President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception."

Now, what were those contingency plans that had been discussed?

Mr. Goodwin. They have them here, I believe. I think -- this is a very thick document, where you have a series of contingency plans, it discusses here. "The paramount interest of the United States is to assure that Castro-Communist elements not take over." It says Trujillo is weak, and then it is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the weakness of the Trujillo regime, and it goes into [redacted] which, I think probably -- is that your principal interest at this time?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sets forth all the [redacted] Recommendation A of the United States, not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform pro-U.S.

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tape 5b

dissidents that if they succeed on their own and form an acceptable government we will be glad to come in and help them and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing --

The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?

Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.

The Chairman. But if he were assassinated, it would have presumably been the result of an action by a dissident group to overthrow his regime?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. All right.

Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message -- the President's message to Mr. Dearborn, "We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable. However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

Now that language, it has been suggested by some members of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoiding any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, "however

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1 we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political
2 assassination, since the U.S. as a matter of general policy
3 cannot condone assassination. This last principle is over-
4 riding and must prevail in doubtful situations."
5 Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves
6 to the interpretation that your primary concern was that the
7 United States should not get caught?
8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because
9 I think, to me, the plain meaning of the words and as I
10 understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S.
11 association with political assassination. That means not
12 be associated with the process of political assassination in
13 any form.
14 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?
15 In that same vein, if I could interrupt for just a second,
16 is it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the [redacted] had
17 already been dispatched?
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24 Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this telegram?
25

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Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination, two days before the assassination.

Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards in a heavily armed car.

Also, if I might add, Senator --

The Chairman. Just to understand what you have said, as the author of this instruction and having conferred about

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it and having shown it to President Kennedy, are you testifying that it was your understanding that the meaning of that sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr. Dearborn a prohibition against involving the United States in an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Trujillo?

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my first draft, I did it in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul; because I used the very word disclosure, you can see here, and I crossed it out, in my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you changed it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it's not very grammatical, it's ambarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't read the handwriting on the xerox.

"However we also must not" -- something -- "permit any danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political assassination or intervention in the Dominican Republic," it says or intervention. All that was struck.

Senator Baker. That sounds like exactly what the Chairman asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please don't get caught.

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why I changed it, Senator, to read "However, we must not run risks of U.S.

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1 association with political assassination since the U.S., as a
2 matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination."
3 Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it to
4 be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this
5 document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to me like
6 the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught
7 the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.
8 Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this
9 time.
10 Senator Baker. Nor was I, at that time.
11 I need reassurance, and I think the record does, that the
12 coincidence of that this cable, this wire, going out, say two
13 days before the assassination, [redacted]
14 [redacted] under
15 the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.
16 This witness says it does not. There is no evidence to
17 the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need
18 to pursue the issue any further.
19 Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Senator --
20 Senator Baker. And it also, as Smothers points out, that
21 there was another communication saying destroy anything you've
22 got, all those communications except this cable.
23 Mr. Aaron. That is standard practice. That is the standard
24 practice for [redacted]
25 Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines

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And then it was the basis of that briefing paper, which obviously the Dominican Republic was not the first matter on President Kennedy's agenda when he came into office, on the basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sent this telegram.

The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call off any further involvement by the United States government in an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The President was not that anxious to see Trujillo thrown out.

Senator Tower. That doesn't totally answer the question.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm sorry.

The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony,

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1 that you had been advised in May that certain [redacted] had been
2 transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had
3 expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.
4 Mr. Goodwin. Correct.
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24 Senator Tower. Well, it says here in number 3, it says,
25 continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support of their

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position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn from this is that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead and have the other guys on, because their position would be to assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is saying, let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support for what they are doing.

Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our support for what they were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office we wanted to be our man, that is correct. And so we were going to support and try to retain relations and say we would support, which is not a difficult thing to do, as you know, any group that might take office and be moderate and pro-United States. That was all we were interested in, was having a pro-American government.

Senator Schweiker. Well, there are two other references here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, "In case of assassination or overthrow" -- obviously you still had a reference there, whether initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we f[redacted] would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure in participation in an assassination attempt," and that is scratched out, and says "assassination attempt," meaning that there was -- to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate

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1 since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.

2 So what interpretation? I mean, this is rift here with

3 assassination propositions, and the fact that you have "ultimate

4 disclosure," fear of ultimate disclosure of participation,

5 meant that certainly there was something already afoot, that

6 ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this

7 pass through.

8 Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did,

9 it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away,

10 but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there

11 were many groups, a continual flow of groups, of information,

12 that there were various groups planning to assassinate

13 Trujillo.

14 Senator Schweiker. Well, if that's what it meant, then

15 why did you delete it?

16 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --

17 Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why

18 in fact did you delete those four words, "ultimate disclosure

19 of participation?"

20 Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell me what page you're reading

21 from?

22 Senator Schweiker. Page 3.

23 The very words that you interpret one way were in fact

24 deleted, which shows to me that you meant them another way, or

25 they wouldn't have been deleted, and you substitute two words

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for it.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --

Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they were words that were going to give exactly the impression you are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, we were afraid of being found out and what we didn't want was any association with the assassination attempts, so the reference to disclosure was struck and the words association were inserted.

Senator Schweiker. But you still call off -- you still left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempts. That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had other language, that says "ultimate disclosure of participation" which implies to me you were concerned about other things you were doing and things that had already been programmed and an operation that you were as much concerned about those being -- or you wouldn't have changed the language to still say the same thing with that one distinction about something else being afoot. I don't --

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I changed it, I believe, Senator -- I mean it's hard to be held responsible for language that was rejected because it was inaccurate. The problem was not one

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of disclosure, the problem was we did not want to be associated with assassination. That's why I struck it out.

Senator Schweiker. You changed the language, but the first part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, we feel the [redacted] would serve very little purpose and expose the United States. So while you changed the language, you had the same condition there that you were not going to supply those arms.

Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --

Senator Schweiker. But why were you not concerned about the other language, because --

Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other language was that, well, we were worried about being found out, when in fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be involved. So I struck the implication.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why was the communication of our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have been any closer to this plot would have been to become one of the dissident group. They told him everything they did, down to and including when the car was coming down the road. And we knew that, didn't we?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his instructions was to keep in very close contact with these dissident groups. I wouldn't be surprised if they dropped by

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and if they told him everything they were planning to do. But it's a long jump between saying you're going out and kill Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.

But I was not aware, as I can remember, that he had any kind of detailed information.

Mr. Smothers. His messages back to CIA, in fact, convey those details, don't they?

Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these -- none of them that --

Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that the dissidents intended to use the [redacted] and [redacted] and other materials they had themselves, but intended to use the [redacted] we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in precisely the way he was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know that before you wrote the telegram, or not?

Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I'm responding to is a request that says we can't do it [redacted]

Later on they said to Dearborn, I mean he did tell me that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, we'll do it, [redacted] I mean, that might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying, [redacted] I don't know why anyone would take on

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1 [redacted] I wouldn't have thought that, if I thought
2 about it.
3 President Kennedy went to Paris a week or two later. When
4 the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by
5 surprise, so that Dearborn had detailed knowledge of when it
6 was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- he called
7 an emergency meeting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent
8 to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announced
9 by Pierre Salinger.
10 But this instruction, the President told me he wanted to
11 make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in
12 assassinations.
13 Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record shows -- I think
14 you've testified to this -- that toward the end of the Eisenhower
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1 suggested --

2 Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to

3 inform dissidents of U.S. support for their position."

4 Senator Mondale. In other words, if I were one of those

5 dissidents and I got that from the United States pursuant to

6 this earlier agreement, I would feel encouraged to believe that

7 I had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, and

8 that we weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our govern-

9 ment was not really neutral, that it encouraged them.

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16 Why didn't we say or communicate to them we want you to

17 stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you

18 to know that we will have nothing to do with it?

19 Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more

20 point --

21 There was a similar telegram sent just before Diem was

22 assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and

23 I appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're

24 worried about human life, if we're worried about correcting a

25 policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion,

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1 the way to really disassociate it is to say stop, and that is
2 really what I don't understand.
3 Mr. Goodwin. Well, let me say, Senator, first of all,
4 that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's
5 minds. There is no doubt that we hoped that Trujillo would be
6 overthrown. Not only was their no doubt, but there was a
7 unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it
8 be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hope that it
9 might happen. And that occurred ever before we took office and
10 we were in full agreement with it.
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15 range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that
16 Trujillo was going to be overthrown one way or another and
17 not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassi-
18 nation because -- in fact, it would seem at that time to be the
19 most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and
20 protected, ordinarily. They knew more about it than we did.
21 And when that happened, which we favored that happened,
22 because we felt that the establishment of a democratic regime
23 in the Dominican Republic was something not only beneficial to
24 the United States and to our policies. I mean, when we're
25 talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life,

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the man was not only a Fascist, but he was a murderer. He used to have a freezer room in the back of his house where he would take people and show them the bodies of enemies.

But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we wanted to be associated with the new government.

Senator Mondale. I understand, but the argument is made with respect to that last telegram that it was a fig leaf telegram designed to cover our tracks should assassination occur and you argue, and I think persuasively, that you intended much more than that, you intended to make it clear that we were not supporting the assassination, [redacted] were not going to be used.

If that was our intent, and I take it that it was, why we didn't we go one step further and say please communicate to these dissidents who have every reason to believe [redacted] that we may be supporting the overthrow, including assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.

Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of the business?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I suppose, clearer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted to. It was not going to be us that dealt with him in this fashion.

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Senator Mondale. Yeah, but see, if we were completely neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate Trujillo that's their business. I agree with it, that's none of our business.

But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day before the job is done and not telling anybody. It seems to me you should say, boys, I'm out and I don't want you to do it.

The Chairman. I've changed my mind.

Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.

Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that's been described to us where people were beyond control and you couldn't communicate with them after the forces had been set in motion.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, I don't know that there ever was any statement that those [redacted] that were authorized on January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequent, for [redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. Well, there were scores of those, and whether they reached you or not is a separate and important question, but there are four or five examples of communication [redacted]

Senator Mondale. Well, you see, that could be important,

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because if your understanding was as you have just described then the telegram makes more sense. But if in fact we were implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --

The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I think it's very important to understand this matter, to look at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having received the instruction, the following -- now this is at Tab J, book 2 of 2, the second J.

It says -- first of all, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.

The Chairman. It says: "One, I believe we can hold pro-United States dissidents, although with some grumbling on the basis set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tell them you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr. Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.

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I read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a different message than the one you say you intended to send.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, to me, Senator, Paragraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear.

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4 So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure,
5 quite clear, in what way he misinterpreted the telegram.
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[redacted]

Now I would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn anticipated at least the real possibility of assassination attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommending [redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I would agree with a good part of that, Senator, although I think that there were assassination plots simmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this in fact took place. And I think he was concerned that the assassination would be unsuccessful, [redacted] There was nothing, I think, in the telegram that was sent to him that denies the possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of Dearborn's, [redacted]

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[redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt anyway, [redacted] He thought the attempt might be abortive, and if so, he thought that all Americans or people that worked for him or with him would be in danger.

The Chairman. Then you would have to agree with me, wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt was imminent.

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's clear. Yes, I think it was.

[redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's right. That's absolutely true, because I think he believed that there was a serious attempt in the offing, as indeed there was, and he was absolutely right and he was doing his job well.

I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of the telegram, is that I sat in the office with President Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which I did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, because he cannot testify to that matter, so it's not a question of reading the text so much as deciding whether or not I'm telling the truth

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about that instruction.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --

Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. We have to explore whether something went wrong in the communication process, and I want to put some information in front of you and then see if you can help us explain what, if anything, went wrong.

Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.

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7 Mr. Schwarz. They are.
8 Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand,
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22 he had established or any directions that he had given, immediately
23 said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting
24 involved in assassinations. They can do what they want, but
25 we are not going to get involved.

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Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that, and that is what you thought you had done?

Mr. Goodwin. I would phrase it a little bit differently, Senator, which is to say I would say there were people who wanted to assassinate Trujillo [redacted] I said, yes. He said -- this is a paraphrase -- you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or President Kennedy, I mean, he said, well, let's make it clear. And if you compare my draft with the State Department draft, I was overriding, as they point out, because their draft says, we're trying to get this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have to send his message instead. They would rather blame me, of course, than the President.

It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condone assassination. It does not say cannot condone being caught at assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And I did that because he told me to do that.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

He wanted to make it absolutely clear when he found out that anybody who wanted to assassinate Trujillo in the Dominican Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the United States would have nothing to do with it [redacted] this is why he said we do not want to condone assassination or be associated with it. And that's why I wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.

Senator Tower. Well, may I ask you, then, what you interpretted the meaning of the first sentence in number 3, "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position?"

Mr. Goodwin. They were -- their position was that, what they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and replaced by a moderate government. We supported that position, as did

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1 the other members of the Organization of American States, and
2 we wanted to make it very clear that we did support that
3 position, and we wished them well in their efforts to establish
4 that position and if they did we would recognize their govern-
5 ment and send them assistance, which we did.
6 As a matter of fact, we took much greater efforts to
7 get rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the
8 assassination than anything that preceeded it, including bringing
9 the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad
10 Trujillo at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Instead
11 of carbines and pistols, we brought in destroyers, aircraft
12 carriers and Marine battalions so that they would know what
13 the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they got
14 out.
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25 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question in

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1 that respect?

2 The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that,

3 although that is a philosophical argument.

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Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acts. In any event, I do want to return to this.

This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to yours.

Mr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took place, President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we looked at indicates, there was a meeting at which Vice President Johnson was interested in finding out what had happened and you had a review of this, and discussed in that review that the

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1 [redacted]

2 Now, after that review, were any steps taken to make, as

3 a matter of more general, governmental policy, the policy which

4 is expressed in the telegram you drafted at President Kennedy's

5 instruction?

6 Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.

7 (A brief recess was taken.)

8 The Chairman. Do you have any more questions?

9 Mr. Schwarz. I don't have any more questions.

10 The Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you

11 can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enlighten-

12 ment?

13 Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination?

14 The Chairman. On the assassination.

15 Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through

16 all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have

17 something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do

18 think this is pretty complete.

19 The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again early next

20 week, on the Cuban phase of your testimony.

21 Mr. Goodwin. And Duvallier.

22 The Chairman. Mr. Dennin, they've been up all night,

23 would like to ask two questions.

24 Mr. Dennin. Well, when you said there were no more

25 questions, I just raised the possibility and you discussed it

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about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held after the assassination before he came back, at which the whole matter was discussed, initially with Vice President Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last one, with President Kennedy.

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We had, of course, a series of emergencies. We had an emergency meeting, and cabled the President who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who was the son of Trujillo, from taking over, and we didn't know where he was, at first, it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at least indicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found he was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to detain him, but it was too late. By the time we found out, he had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to Cuidad Trujillo, and I believe there was some effort made to bluff him off by sending messages to the plane in flight, diverting it to some American airport, but he didn't do that, and he landed and took over. And I think the principal aim of our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle, Hector -- and I forget the other fellow's name -- out of there so that the kind of moderate government that we wanted could be installed.

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And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make various inducements like he could take his money out, it was discussed that if he would leave peaceably, but what finally happened was when McNamara moved the fleet in over the horizon and an Air Force General bombed the palace, that was the end, he got on his boat and left.

The Chairman. Air Force General?

Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Force General.

He decided that was an easier target than the American fleet.

The Chairman. Was the bombing done at our instruction?

Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't believe so. I was trying to remember that, but I don't believe it was. As I remember, it was quite a surprise to us that this fellow had taken the initiative. The moving of the fleet was intended as sort of a threat that if they didn't get out we might come in and get them. There was no, however, no, at that point, no country attempted to do that, just to scare them. And the fleet was actually cheered in the Dominican Republic, a very rare occasion.

But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make himself dictator and two of his own officers arrested him. They all had been trained in American military schools.

Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to the telegram We had Dearborn's reaction. We will read into

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[redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. I think it's accurate and it also reflects Dearborn's own disappointment that --

Mr. Schwarz. [redacted]

Mr. Goodwin. [redacted] disappointment, which is understandable.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Tower?

Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Chairman, I'd rather wait till the return of the witness.

The Chairman. Yes.

Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to meet with the staff so that the pertinent documents that will

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1 up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be
2 reviewed. We're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We
3 want you to be fully aware of whatever documentation we have
4 so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the
5 policy at the time.
6 Mr. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and
7 then duplicate it.
8 Mr. Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the
9 staff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony
10 Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?
11 Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and
12 getting the things out, I think it will be safer Wednesday, if
13 that's not too inconvenient.
14 The Chairman. Wednesday?
15 All right. Thank you very much.
16 (Whereupon, at 6:35 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed,
17 to reconvene at 8:30 o'clock a.m., Friday, July 11, 1975.)
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