

Agency Information

AGENCY : CHENEY
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10112

RECORD SERIES : GENERAL SUBJECT FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : INTELLIGENCE--COLBY TESTIMONY/SSCIA 5/23/75

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM COLBY, MAY 23, 1975

DATE : 05/23/1975
PAGES : 118

SUBJECTS :

HARVEY, WILLIAM
HUNT, E. HOWARD
KENNEDY, ROBERT
LANSDALE, EDWARD
LAS VEGAS
LAW ENFORCEMENT, WIRETAPPING
MAHEU, ROBERT
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ORGANIZED CRIME
ROSELLI, JOHN
WARREN COMMISSION, INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM
ZRRIFLE
[Restricted]
PROUTY, FLETCHER
GIANCANA, SAM
EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY
EDWARD, SHEFFIELD
DULLES, ALLEN
DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM.
CUBELA, ROLANDO
CUBAN EXILES
CONSPIRACY THEORIES, THREE TRAMPS
COLBY, WILLIAM E.
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
CIA
CHURCH COMMITTEE
BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT
BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
AMLASH

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The United States Senate

5 of 5

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Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLE

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

178-10004-10213

178-10004-10112

Friday, May 22, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

William E. Colby,
Director, CIA,
-- accompanied by --
Scott S. Breckinridge, Jr.,
Deputy Inspector General,
Enno Knoche,
Assistant to the Director,
George L. Cary,
Legislative Counsel

3

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

Colby Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, cardboard-backed
photographs, deemed marked in an off the record
discussion early in the transcript.

Colby No. 4

31

Colby No. 5

50

Colby No. 6

110

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1
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3
4 TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY,
5 DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 - - -
7 Friday, May 23, 1975
8 - - -

9 United States Senate,
10 Select Committee to Study Governmental
11 Operations with Respect to
12 Intelligence Activities,
13 Washington, D. C.

14 The Committee met, pursuant to notice at 9:15 o'clock
15 a.m., in Room 407, The Capitol Building, Senator Frank
16 Church (Chairman) presiding.

17 Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,
18 Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Mathias and
19 Schweiker.

20 Also present: William Miller, Staff Director, F.A.O.
21 Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
22 Counsel; William Bader, Professional Staff Member.

23 - - -
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Chairman Church. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Scott Breckinridge is accompanying the Director this morning and may be called upon from time to time to testify.

For that purpose, Mr. Breckinridge, will you please stand and be sworn?

Do you swear that all the testimony you may give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Breckinridge. I do.

Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning this morning.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Colby, did you have some things you wanted to supply to the Committee?

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1
2 ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTT S. BRECKINRIDGE, JR., DEPUTY
3 INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENNO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE
4 DIRECTOR, AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

5 Mr. Colby. I have an answer to a few of the questions
6 that were raised at the meeting the other day and there are a
7 couple of clarifications I would like to make.

8 One, with respect to the security investigations in the
9 United States. The question was asked whether we ever used
10 private investigators, and I said we normally used our own
11 investigators. We have some relationships with private
12 investigatory firms which provide cover for our investigators
13 and, secondly, we have a few firms which we own which are
14 proprietary, if you will, whereby our investigators appear to
15 be private.

16 I said that in the past it is clear that on occasion we
17 did ask for private investigator firms to help us to some
18 degree. It was usually the one that was giving us cover, and
19 for reasons of overload we asked them to have their own people
20 to do a few of the investigations.

21 My General Counsel says that this is illegal. I have a
22 strong question about its propriety, if not legality, and I
23 am undertaking to review this matter to see whether we can not
24 just eliminate that practice entirely, continuing the proprie-
25 tary and continuing the use of private investigators as cover

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1 But I did want to clarify that. I think I mentioned it
2 last time that there have been occasions on which this was
3 done.
4

5 Chairman Church. Mr. Colby, would you in connection with
6 your review of this matter supply the Committee with the spe-
7 cifics in those cases where the Agency has in fact engaged
8 private investigators to do Agency work?

9 Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. I
10 confess this may be a tough job to locate every case but I
11 certainly will do my best.

12 Chairman Church. Will you provide the Committee with the
13 opinion of your Counsel with respect to the legality of such?

14 Mr. Colby. I will.

15 Chairman Church. Such use of private investigators?

16 Mr. Colby. Yes.

17 Chairman Church. And then I would ask the staff also
18 furnish the Committee with a brief on that question so that we
19 are fully advised with respect to the law.

20 Mr. Colby. Right.

21 The second subject, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mondale asked
22 for our command and control regulations for the approval of
23 covert action projects. These were supplied to the staff on
24 the first of May and are available to the staff.

25 Thirdly, I was asked if Mr. William Harvey was removed

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1 from the Agency because of his involvement in the assassination
2 plans against Prime Minister Castro.

3 The facts are that in June 1963 he was assigned as our
4 Chief of Station in [] and in February of '67 he was
5 reassigned to CIA Headquarters. He retired voluntarily under
6 our retirement system on 31 of December 1967.

7 If I may, there is a reason why he was taken out and if I
8 could go off the record and mention that to the Committee. It
9 is a matter of his privacy.

10 Chairman Church. Very well, off the record.

11 (Off the record discussion)

12 Mr. Colby. Back on the record.

13 Senator Schweiker asked me whether Howard Hunt or James
14 McCord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of
15 President Kennedy's assassination on 22nd of November '63.
16 Howard Hunt from July '62 to August '64 was assigned as a
17 Section Chief in the Division of Plans Directorate, which is
18 now the Operations Directorate at CIA Headquarters, which had
19 no responsibility whatsoever for Mexican operations.

20 Senator Schweiker. What were those dates again?


21 Mr. Colby. July '62 to August '64.

22 Senator Schweiker. Wasn't he at some point in Mexico
23 City and in charge of that office?

24 Mr. Knoche. Way back in the '50's he served in Mexico
25 City. Way back. He was not in charge.

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1 Mr. Colby. He was a case officer then.

2 Senator Schweiker. So that is the period you are saying
3 he had no jurisdiction in any way with Latin America or Mexican
4 Affairs.

5 Mr. Colby. No, he was in what we call, and we have since
6 changed the name, to Domestic Operations Division at that time,
7 our operations here in this country, and that is a whole
8 different subject I would have to explain some day.

9 Mr. McCord from June '62 to June '64 was assigned as a
10 CIA Security Officer in the CIA station at [REDACTED]
11 and he had no responsibilities for Mexican operations at that
12 point.

13 Senator Morgan last time asked what information was given
14 to the Warren Commission concerning Agency assassination plans
15 concerning Castro, and I have been advised our records do not
16 indicate that the Warren Commission was provided with informa-
17 tion on this subject.


18 Allen Dulles, of course, I would note, who was the CIA
19 Director until the fall of '61, was a member of the Warren
20 Commission, but beyond that fact I have nothing I could offer.

21 And then who made the decision not to provide it, if none
22 was given? Our records do not indicate that there was a CIA
23 decision on this matter not to tell the Warren Commission.

24 I could add that I believe the relationship with the
25 Warren Commission was handled by one of our staffs which

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1 quite likely
2 I cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation
3 system was such.

4 Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who
5 was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and
6 the Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Colby. To my knowledge it is Mr. Raymond Rocca.

8 Chairman Church. Where is it now?

9 Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year.
10 He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is
11 retired. I think he is retired. I believe he is still in
12 the Washington area.

13 Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.

14 Mr. Colby. Still working with us to help on the transi-
15 tion of the whole counter intelligence program.

16 Chairman Church. Why did he retire?

17 Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and
18 the facts of that case were that I had had some professional
19 differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the
20 way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the
21 Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a
22 higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the
23 Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various
24 occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and
25 took a number of functions away from it. The liaison with the

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endeavored to open up the Israeli account to a better relationship with our other Near Eastern activities. We debated this over many months and on several occasions. We could never really agree to it because he insisted on the importance of retaining it where it was.

Mr. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israeli who were involved in it.

I believed there was inadequate coordination in the Arab areas.

Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compartmentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and I set as my time limit for this discussion the end of December because there were some very substantial retirement benefits that people would loose if they stayed after that point. Then unfortunately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I said I would offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence doctrine, he could stay working with us. He did not have to

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1 retire. If he wished to retire the opportunity was there. He
2 chose to retire. I insisted that I talk to him before the
3 Seymour Hirs- article appeared. I knew it was coming. I
4 didn't know what it was going to say. I wanted to make clear
5 between him and me that the decision was based upon our long-
6 standing discussion of how to run that particular activity.

7 The question then came up who would be his successor and
8 Mr. Rocca was his Deputy. There were two other officers who
9 were possibilities. One of the officers, Mr. Hood, had said
10 in early December that he planned to retire at the end of
11 December. The other two, Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler, were informed
12 that they would not be the successor Chief of that staff. They
13 were offered a chance to stay on in their then current jobs.
14 They chose to retire. All four of them agreed to stay with
15 us on a consultant basis over the next several months to help
16 us on the transition of new leadership into that job, and they
17 have done so.

18 Chairman Church. Well, without getting off the track, I
19 just have one further question here in connection with Mr.
20 Angleton himself.

21 Is it true that he is still being paid as a consultant?

22 Mr. Colby. I believe it has dropped off, Mr. Chairman.
23 He did help us for three or four months but I believe that it
24 is terminated. It is about time to terminate it, I know, and
25 whether it is on this particular date has been terminated.

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1 we set ourselves about six month period where we would have
2 to --

3 Chairman Church. There is no plan to retain him indefi-
4 nitely?

5 Mr. Colby. Absolutely not. It was to help us get over
6 this transition and phase him out.

7 Chairman Church. Very well.

8 Senator Mondale: I asked for vouchers on payments with
9 respect to assassinations?

10 Mr. Colby. I am looking for that. I don't have an answer
11 for you yet, Senator.

12 The request was also made whether we had any information
13 concerning plots to assassinate Chou En Lai. We have reports
14 of two such examples, incidents, both conducted by the Chinese
15 Nationalists without our prior knowledge and without our
16 participation.

17 One in April 1955, an Air India aircraft crashed at
18 sea off Indochina after departing from Hong Kong. Several
19 Chinese Communist delegates for the Bandung Conference were
20 on board and it had been rumored that Chou En Lai would be on
21 the aircraft.

22 On the 11th of January 1956, the British Colonial Office
23 in London issued an official statement reporting they had
24 evidence that the Chinese Nationalists had bribed a Hong Kong
25 airport employee to place a time bomb on the airplane. The

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1 and the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employee
2 had fled to Taiwan. We had nothing to do with that incident
3 and frankly heard about it after it occurred.
4

5 In the fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist official
6 informed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National planned to
7 assassinate Chou En Lai during his visit to Cambodia in
8 November '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest of
9 the Chinese Nationalist officer sent to Phnom Penh to supervise
10 the attempt. We learned of this after it had happened and we
11 had nothing to do with it.

12 We had a relationship with the Chinese Nationalists
13 Intelligence Service over the years and they clearly have done
14 things without our knowledge or involvement, and in a number
15 of areas, but we have also worked together on some areas.

16 These are two that were separate.

17 Also I was asked to look at the photographs of Howard Hunt
18 and Sturgis that appeared in Newsweek some years ago. We
19 obtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'clock.
20 We had not had it before. We had a copy of the Newsweek
21 edition.

22 These are photographs of Howard Hunt in 1949, 1950 and
23 1961. This is the only photograph we have of Mr. Sturgis.
24 It is taken out of the Newsweek.

25 We have had no connection with Mr. Sturgis and so we have

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1 the same photographs, so it is subject to the problems of it.

2 We had our photographic experts and analysts and so forth
3 look at these two individuals here who were picked up. We
4 examined them in considerable detail, and talking about the
5 '61 Hunt photograph, comparing it with this, and this is the
6 photograph, Newsweek photograph. You will see that there is a
7 lot of sort of fundamental differences in the kinds of
8 appearances they have, different characteristics of the
9 individuals.

10 With respect to Sturgis, of course, we are not as confi-
11 dent because we don't have as good a base to work from in our
12 comparison but at the same time we see differences there also.

13 Now, we further looked, had one of our disguise people --
14 we obviously have people who can disguise you -- the red wig
15 episode. It wasn't red, they insist, it wasn't ill fitting.
16 That is the thing that they get upset about. But they say that
17 it would not be feasible to have them actually in a disguise,
18 have these individuals actually in this disguise, that it is
19 too big a jump, it differs.

20 Senator Huddleston. How about the size of the individual,
21 are they pretty close?

22 Mr. Colby. These two are. He looks like a shorter man
23 from the surroundings. And Hunt is about medium height, rather
24 than this short.

25 Mr. Knoche. Hunt is five feet ten and a half inches.

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1 ... as the kind of analysis and they really
2 were able to do a pretty good job on Hunt and, what they do is
3 identify certain key points, make measurements and put adjust-
4 ments, the same thing we do for the satellite photography in
5 terms of these measurements, and things like that, and compare
6 it in that sense, and their conclusion is that clearly this is
7 not Hunt. They are absolutely confident that this photograph
8 is not Hunt. They are less confident that it is not Sturgis
9 because of the base on which they are operating, but they think
10 it is not.

11 I point out that this analysis was done overnight, about
12 3 o'clock in the morning. This is Sturgis.

13 Mr. Schwarz. And to the right?

14 Mr. Colby. This is a newspaper photograph of Hunt, a
15 recent one. These are sort of Agency photographs of him when
16 he was an employee.

17 Senator Hart Of Colorado. Were those men ever identified
18 by the Dallas Police?

19 Mr. Colby. They must have booked them or something if
20 they carried them in. I really don't know. If they took them
21 in I would assume they would have had to book them.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. What are these pictures on the
23 lower right and left?

24 Mr. Colby. These are the blowups of the particular
25 photographs.

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1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Not the one you had earlier?
2 Mr. Colby. They are different.
3 Senator Hart Of Colorado. They are different angles?
4 Mr. Colby. This is reversed.
5 Senator Hart of Colorado. They are different photographs?
6 Mr. Colby. It is reversed.
7 Senator Hart Of Colorado. No. They are not A and B even
8 reversed.
9 Mr. Colby. They can do that kind of a turn through the --
10 Senator Hart of Colorado. They can twist the photographs
11 around?
12 Mr. Colby. They can make it appear at a different angle.
13 Senator Hart of Colorado. B at least is a totally dif-
14 ferent pose. They turned his mouth down. His eyes are closed.
15 They have really done a job if they changed B to that lower
16 right.
17 Mr. Colby. They can change them, honest.
18 Let me get my brief on that and I will answer that
19 question.
20 They magnified them to the same scale using the eyes and
21 mouth. The contrast and texture differences were minimized,
22 continuous tone photographs employed and angular compensations
23 were made to offset errors incident to the different heads.
24 They can mix them around in that kind of fashion.
25 Senator Schweiker. Were these men detained? If they were

1 detained maybe there are photographs from their detention.

2 Were these men arrested?

3 Mr. Colby. At the time we have had to work on this we have
4 just looked at the photographs.

5 Senator Schweiker. I assume that is where they are going
6 to be detained.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Wasn't the same analysis done for the
8 Rockefeller Commission about two months ago? In other words,
9 there has been an analysis at least once before last night,
10 hasn't there?

11 Mr. Knoche. Not by us.

12 Mr. Colby. Perhaps by someone else.

13 Chairman Church. Mr. Director, that is a different
14 photograph.

15 Mr. Colby. It does look like it.

16 I will answer that question next time I come up.

17 Chairman Church. All right. How can we follow up on the
18 identity of these two people in connection with the Dallas
19 Police? Would that be done through the FBI?

20 Mr. Colby. FBI. I could ask or you could ask, it might
21 be better if you ask.

22 Chairman Church. Well, I think we should. I think these
23 should be marked as Committee Exhibits and staff should be
24 instructed to follow through with the FBI to get what further
25 information there may be about the photographs and these two

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2 Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photograph, the
3 supposed Oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?

4 Mr. Colby. I don't have that with me. It is in the
5 Warren Commission published report. It is in there.

6 Senator Schweiker. It is in there?

7 Mr. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in order to
8 conceal where it was taken but it was --

9 Senator Schweiker. It is in the Warren Commission?

10 Mr. Colby. Yes, it is in the Warren Commission.

11 Just one additional matter.

12 Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to
13 you, Mr. Colby, before I forget it. You have made reference
14 to the Israeli account and the special way that it had been
15 handled under Mr. Angleton. Before we finish our review with
16 you of covert operations we would like to have a more detailed
17 statement of that matter.

18 Mr. Colby. Right.

19 Chairman Church. And I think you should prepare to
20 discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask
21 you in connection with it.

22 I just wanted to give you notice.

23 Mr. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a
24 covert action but that is all right, no problem, I will cover
25 it.

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1 CHAIRMAN CHURCH. All right. At some point then in our
2 investigation?

3 Mr. Colby. Sure, no problem.

4 The only other one thing I would like to suggest for the
5 record, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the discussion of the
6 attempts made against Mr. Castro, in no way justifying them.
7 My position on this is quite clear. I do think it important
8 to put that exercise in the context of the times, which was
9 the times of the Bay of Pigs, which was a decision made by
10 the Government. The Cuban missile crisis, and following that,
11 a program approved by our normal covert action approval mecha-
12 nism to try to generate an overthrow of Mr. Castro from within
13 Cuba by assisting various groups to go in with sabotage and
14 by putting economic pressure on the country, and so forth.
15 That went on for a number of years after the 1961-62 episodes
16 and I think it does put a cover of policy attitude toward Cuba
17 and toward Mr. Castro that is an important factor in evaluat-
18 ing the thing, without in any way justifying the particular
19 attempts to assassinate him.

20 Senator Hart of Michigan. But was there any evaluation
21 done at or about the time of that Cuban missile crisis?

22 Mr. Colby. There was an evaluation done after the Bay
23 of Pigs, a rather intensive Investigation Internal Security
24 Branch Review of the activity and then the Cuban missile
25 crisis came along shortly thereafter before anything very much

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1 get going. Thereafter, however, a number of programs were
2 conducted, which I am sure the Committee might want a general
3 summary of. I am just giving you one sort of a paragraph
4 summary of it, which were aimed at putting economic pressure
5 on Cuba in the hopes that this would put pressure against him
6 and lead to its disorder and problems there and, secondly, to
7 encourage revolutions, sabotage and so forth, from within
8 Cuba through a variety of programs of propaganda, support of
9 exile movements, landing of teams on the coast, things of this
10 nature.

11 Chairman Church. The difficult with this is, as I see it
12 although what you say is true, once an agency begins to engage
13 in assassination attempts the disease spreads. Your own
14 testimony shows it spread at least as far as the Dominican
15 Republic and we are going to get into closer questions on
16 other matters such as Lumumba and Chile.

17 So that I don't think this issue can be confined really
18 to the emergency that did in fact exist between the US and
19 Cuba and the seriousness of that emergency at the time.

20 Mr. Colby. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I am against
21 it and have been against it for a long time, but nonetheless
22 I think in fairness to the people involved at that period I
23 think it is important to give total context.

24 Chairman Church. Yes.

25 Mr. Schwarz.

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2 to determine, assuming internally the CIA might have contemplated
3 additional efforts to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs,
4 after the missile crisis, it would not have acted unless directed
5 by the very highest authority, would it?

6 Mr. Colby. That is not that clear, Senator Hart. I think
7 the evidence we have is that the then Director was not aware
8 of some of these activities and, therefore, one would have a
9 very difficult time saying that it was pursuant to a specific
10 authorization. It was consistent with an overall policy which
11 was the point I was saying, but nonetheless I think the spe-
12 cific action we cannot say was approved even within the Agency
13 at the Director level.

14 Senator Hart of Michigan. Is there any indication that
15 the Director, who did know of at least an earlier attempt --
16 is there any indication that following the Bay of Pigs, or
17 following the missile crisis, he explicitly brought the sub-
18 ject up for review?

19 Mr. Colby. There is one documentary evidence that Mr.
20 McCone dictated in 1967, I believe it was, in which he recounted
21 being informed of a meeting, of an inter-Agency meeting at
22 which the subject of assassination was raised, and he made a
23 particular point of indicating after the meeting -- he was
24 not at the meeting; I believe, but he heard of the meeting and
25 he made a particular point of saying he disapproved of this

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1 and did not agree with it, to the other members.

2 Senator Hart of Michigan... Who was at that meeting McCone
3 heard about?

4 Mr. Colby. That was the meeting we were talking about at
5 the last session.

6 Mr. Schwarz. You brought up a new document which was Mr.
7 McCone's dictation of recollection of '67.

8 Mr. Colby. Yes; I think you have that.

9 Mr. Schwarz. That I have not seen. I know we do not
10 have that.

11 Mr. Colby. I am sorry, I thought you did.


12 Mr. Schwarz. Could that be supplied?

13 Mr. Colby. No problems, yes. This is our document and --
14 Chairman Church. Will you supply the Committee with the
15 document?

16 Mr. Colby. Yes.

17 Excuse me, I beg your pardon. He states in '67, at one
18 of these meetings, about this time, I recall a suggestion made
19 being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime,
20 including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion
21 stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as
22 the US Government and CIA were concerned. The idea should not
23 be discussed nor should not be discussed nor should it appear
24 in any papers.

25 Senator Mondale. Mr. Colby, the other day when you



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1 testified there was a memorandum that you gave us from I think
2 Mr. Osborn, which objected to a memorandum by General Landsdale
3 which referred to assassinations of political leaders, in a
4 memorandum regarding Operation Mongoose, which was Cuba. And
5 it referred to an attached memorandum which I think you said
d msl 6 was the property of the FBI.

7 Mr. Colby. Of the National Security Council.

8 Senator Mondale. NSC.

9 I gather you have a copy of that, but you don't feel
10 authorized to let us see it?

11 Mr. Colby. I do have a copy of it. The understanding
12 we have had with the other agencies is that each of us gives
13 our own material but we refer to the other agency for any
14 documents belonging to the other agency.

15 Chairman Church. Well, it is very difficult for the
16 Committee to operate that way. I think that since the Committee
17 is entitled to this information, that when it is pertinent
18 and as we proceed in our hearings from one subject to another,
19 we ought to be able to secure the information without having
20 to go back through executive channels.

21 Mr. Colby. May I undertake to get the permission to give
22 it to you? I will undertake to do this today.

23 Chairman Church. Any observations that the Committee
24 wishes to make on this kind of a problem?

25 It is the first time it has come up.

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1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Is this the understanding we
2 have had or not?

3 Mr. Schwarz. It has been a total frustration to the staff
4 and I am very happy it has come up here because we get chased
5 around the corner by one agency to another. It is called the
6 "third agency rule." It was intended to have nothing to do
7 with Congressional hearings. Obviously, it had to do with
8 declassification to the public, and it has happened to completely
9 delay our ability to get information because we go at one agency
10 and then they determine that it really isn't their document
11 or it mentioned some other agency, and then we have to go to
12 the other agency..

13 This is an example of how frustrating it is.

14 Senator Mondale. Have we tried to get this document from
15 the NSA?

16 Mr. Colby. No; this particular document had just come up
17 on Wednesday --

18 Senator Schweiker. Does the counsel have any suggestions
19 as to what he feels the Committee position should be in this
20 area to enable him and staff to do an effective job?

21 Mr. Schwarz. I think the Committee's position ought to be
22 that pertinent information should be produced by any agency
23 that possesses it, and if they wish to inform another agency
24 that they are doing it, then that is their business. But I
25 think they should have to produce it if they possess it.

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1 Senator Mondale. Apparently this memo from McCone refers
2 back to the meeting about which Osborne memorandum and the
3 Lansdale --

4 Mr. Colby. The series of two or three meetings at that
5 time, yes.

6 Senator Mondale. I think this is very important because
7 apparently this was a meeting at which McNamara and Rusk were
8 present, and apparently McCone was present, so we had all of
9 the top principals.

10 Mr. Colby. At least one of them.

11 Senator Mondale. And they discussed assassinations at
12 that meeting. And then Osborne came back with a memo which is
13 now part of the record.

14 Mr. Colby. I think it is Edwards in that case. Harvey,
15 excuse me.

16 Senator Mondale. Harvey. He came back with a memo which
17 the Director supplied, objecting not to the assassination but
18 to putting it in writing.

19 Chairman Church. Of course what we don't know is whether
20 the assassination or subject of assassination that came up at
21 this meeting was conjecture or whether it had to do with a
22 revelation of actual attempts that had involved the CIA or
23 that it had to do with an ongoing assassination effort by the
24 CIA.

25 Senator Mondale. Yes.

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Chairman Church. All we know is the subject of assassinations apparently came up in the course of the meeting.

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, as one of the agencies involved, if I could offer one explanation for the Third Agency Rule even in this circumstance. And I am particularly interested in this because sometimes our documents have material whose sensitivity is not apparent on the face and we assume that this will be handled in certain compartmented channels, and if it gets out of the compartment it might give problems that the individual at the other end wasn't aware of. That is the basis for the rule. The thought being go back and ask the originator, and he has a feeling for that and could make the particular case if something particularly sensitive is involved.

Chairman Church. I would suggest, Mr. Colby, without binding the Committee to a precedent, with respect to dealing with the Third Party Rule, that in this case you undertake to secure from the NSA --

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairman Church. -- its permission to turn this particular document over to the Committee so it may be made a part of these hearings.

Mr. Colby. I will endeavor to do that today, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Morgan. I am going to inquire from Senator Mondale what memorandum were you reading about McCone and the group being present?

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1 Senator Mondale. We have a memorandum, it is right here,
2 from Mr. Harvey. Do I have the wrong one?

3 Yes, it is dated, I will show it to you, in which he
4 objects to --

5 Chairman Church. What is the date of it?

6 Senator Mondale. 14 August 1962.

7 Senator Morgan. Do we have that?

8 Mr. Schwarz. It was shown to us on Wednesday, marked
9 or deemed marked as part of the record, and returned to the CIA
10 who returned it to us today.

11 Mr. Colby. I have another copy of it.

12 Senator Mondale. It refers to a meeting in Mr. Rusk's
13 office at which presumably McNamara and Rusk, I gather from the
14 later memo, and McCone were present, and it says this.

15 "I called Lansdale's office and in his absence pointed out
16 to Frank Head the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this
17 type of comment in writing in a document. The words he objected
18 to were including liquidation of leaders. I advised him as
19 far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining
20 to this and would participate in no open meeting to discuss
21 it."

22 I read that to mean we will go ahead and do it but we don't
23 want anything in writing and don't want to be in a meeting where
24 it is going to leak. That makes a lot of sense. No living
25 politician wants to be associated with an assassination, ever.

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1 if he wants someone assassinated. I think that is common sense.

2 That is why I think these documents are so crucial.

3 Chairman Church. Of course they are crucial and we must
4 have them.

5 The ambiguity, however, that we have yet to clear up is
6 in the third paragraph, Senator Mondale, where the memorandum
7 reads the question of assassination, particularly of Fidel
8 Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at a meeting of
9 the special group augmented in Secretary Rusk's office in
10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in
11 answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject
12 which has been made a matter of official record, the subject
13 being the question of assassination.

14 Now, that leaves us still without any documentary proof
15 that it was revealed at this meeting that the CIA was in fact
16 engaged in an effort to assassinate.

17 Senator Mondale. Was Lansdale working for the CIA at
18 this time?

19 Mr. Colby. Pardon?

20 Senator Mondale. Was General Lansdale working for the
21 CIA at this time?

22 Mr. Colby. General Lansdale was Assistant to the Secretary
23 of Defense, not CIA, at that time.

24 Senator Mondale. Had Lansdale been with the CIA?

25 Mr. Colby. He was with CIA in about 1952 to about 1955,

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1 more or less.

2 Senator Mondale. During the Philippines --

3 Mr. Colby. During the Philippines and in Vietnam at that
4 time. Then he left CIA. He was a regular Air Force officer
5 all this time but he was assigned to CIA for the time he was
6 in the Philippines and the time he was in Vietnam. He then
7 reverted to the Air Force and was an Assistant to the Secretary
8 of Defense until about 1964 or 1965. Then he went out to
9 Vietnam where he was an Assistant to the Ambassador, not
10 working for CIA. We were associated with him but he was not
11 a CIA officer at that time.

12 Senator Mondale. Do we know what his job at the Pentagon
13 was?

14 Mr. Colby. It was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
15 I can't tell you exactly what the job was entitled but
16 he was active in the Secretary of Defense's participation in
17 a variety, you might call it a 40 Committee type of operation.
18 I think he probably was most cognizant of the various 40
19 Committee --

20 Senator Mondale. If he were involved with that, he
21 would have close liaison with all members of the 40 Committee,
22 including the CIA?

23 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

24 Chairman Church. I would like to call your attention also
25 to this sentence.



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1 I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on
2 this point and the special group augmented in not expecting
3 any written comments or study on this point.

4 There, again, the ambiguity.

5 It is within the range of the possible that one of the
6 ongoing efforts of the CIA was in fact raised and discussed.

7 It is also possible that the question of assassinating
8 Fidel Castro --

9 Senator Mondale. Do we have those notes?

10 Chairman Church. I was going to ask that.

11 And that it was agreed that no study or review of this
12 should be submitted as an abstract matter, should be submitted
13 in written form.

14 So we are left without an answer to this question.

15 However, with respect to the notes that are referred to
16 here, can you tell us whether those notes exist?

17 Mr. Colby. I don't know of any, Mr. Chairman.

18 Chairman Church. He said he took careful notes.

19 Mr. Colby. I don't know of any but I certainly will look.

20 Mr. Breckinridge. When we reviewed this problem in 1967
21 we found no such notes.

22 Senator Huddleston. Let me inject a thought or two along
23 this line.

24 It seems to me like one of the things we are going to have
25 to determine as we go along is as to what extent there was or

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1 there is a standard operating procedure of your Agency an
2 effort not to make notes, an effort for certain individuals
3 not to have certain knowledge by design.

4 For instance, I was reading your memorandum here dated
5 1 June 1973 in which you are reporting on a meeting that occurred
6 You make a point to say that you briefed someone orally. The
7 word "orally" is in there -- assuming that for the purpose
8 someone should know that you did not put anything in writing
9 or you did not give him a written report.

10 You also say that I personally managed to avoid gaining
11 any knowledge of what precise actions were taken.

12 I think a reasonable inference there is that there is a
13 deliberate on your part here -- and maybe this is standard
14 operating procedure -- for you not to get specific information
15 so that you always will be in the position of not knowing some-
16 thing.

17 Mr. Colby. I don't recognize the reference. Certainly,
18 I think in past years there were situations we did not want
19 to commit to writing.

20 There is a great deal of effort made by us to what we
21 call compartment information so that it is known only to certain
22 people and not known to others. The compartment is still to
23 be open at the top, however.

24 There are things that I purposely try not to know. I don't
25 want to know the name of an agent in the Soviet Union. I have

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1 absolutely no desire to learn his name because I don't need
2 to know that information.

3 Senator Huddleston. Here we are referring to action in
4 this case and not individuals.

5 Mr. Colby. I don't recognize that. I could perhaps put
6 it in context if I could see the memorandum.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Perhaps we ought to mark that memorandum.

8 Senator Huddleston. Memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby.
9 I thought it was by Mr. Colby.

10 Mr. Colby. I am sorry.

11 Senator Huddleston. Someone within the Agency apparently
12 is informing you about something and the subject is special
13 activities. I don't see a name on it.

14 It has information in it about both the President and
15 Attorney General being involved in briefings.

16 Mr. Schwarz. I think for convenience of reference we
17 ought to mark it as an exhibit.

18 Let's number as today's number, and we have put in the
19 three charts so far, and we will call this, which is the 1
20 June 1973 memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby, subject special
21 activities, from stamped pages 00457, 00458, and 00459, of
22 the so-called 694 pages.

23 (The document above referred to was
24 marked Colby Exhibit No. 4.)

25 Mr. Colby. I recognize what that is, Senator Huddleston.

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1 The reason it was addressed to William E. Colby is we
2 were going through that period in the middle of 1973 where I
3 was technically, I guess, Director of Operations but had been
4 nominated to become Director. This was the kind of thing that
5 normally would be addressed to the Director but we had an
6 Acting Director, General Walters, but it was pretty clear I
7 was responsible for making the machinery run and we had a lot
8 of things around the Agency addressed to me and signed by me.

9 I believe this follows a conversation I had with a Mr.
10 Walter Elder, who was an Assistant to Mr. John McCone -- he
11 was Executive Assistant when he was Director -- I think Mr.
12 Elder told me that there were certain things that he knew of
13 in the background that related to this effort of identifying
14 various questionable activities of the Agency, and I asked
15 him to go write them down so we could get them into the
16 Inspector General's report.

17 Senator Huddleston. The only question I raise, I don't
18 want to get off into the contents of a particular memorandum,
19 but the context with the area you were pursuing, just whether
20 or not standard operating procedure would require at times
21 there be a deliberate avoidance by certain people in the
22 Agency of facts and whether or not there is a great body of
23 decisions that are made and implemented without anything written
24 down, so that there would never be any documentary evidence
25 of it?

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1 Mr. Colby. Well, I think that you certainly can say that
2 there is an avoidance by a lot of people of learning things
3 that they are not authorized to know. I mean the more loyal
4 in a sense of our employees, say that they have authority to
5 know what is going on in, say, Cuba, they don't have a right
6 to know what is going on in, say, China, and they rather
7 carefully keep themselves from learning what is going on in
8 China. I think that is a prevalence.

9 I think the question you are asking, however, is whether
10 we are trying to keep activities off of paper and it is pretty
11 clear that the assassination story was essentially kept off
12 the paper.

13 And I would think that is about the only one. No, the
14 drug thing. I assume some of that was kept off of paper?

15 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

16 Mr. Colby. The lesson that I have frequently given to
17 my colleagues in the bureaucracy is that however hard you try
18 to keep it off of paper, you will not succeed in a bureaucracy,
19 somebody will write it down and, therefore, it is a totally
20 feckless exercise to pretend that you can keep it secret by
21 not writing it down. But the fact is there were situations
22 in which a conscious effort was made in the past to keep things
23 off the record.

24 Senator Huddleston. To sum up, you, as Director, with the
25 exception of individual names for which there would be no

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1 particular value to you and no advantage to you knowing, except
2 for that you make no deliberate effort not to know about
3 operations?

4 Mr. Colby. No. As a matter of fact, I take the opposite
5 position, Senator. I say that to my subordinates and have
6 reiterated a number of times, I cannot be subjected to surprise.
7 You have got to let me know the things I ought to know. And
8 I have undertaken the same obligations to my oversight committees
9 for example, that I am responsible getting to them before
10 they hear about it some place else.

11 Senator Huddleston. The other is in this inquiry. Can
12 the Committee expect that every effort will be made to supply
13 to us information about various things, even though they may
14 not be written down?

15 Mr. Colby. You have my commitment to that effect.

16 Senator Huddleston. Going further and looking through
17 the files for notes and documents?

18 Mr. Colby. It is my hope, Senator, that I can help you
19 on this investigation rather than defending myself against you.

20 Senator Huddleston. That is all.

21 Mr. Colby. That is what I would like to have the relation-
22 ship, that I am trying to help you do this investigation.

23 Chairman Church. We want such a relationship and we
24 are trying to work it out.

25 Mr. Colby. I know you do. You have said it a number of

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1 times and I agree with you.

2 Chairman Church. Now, Senator Mondale.

3 Senator Mondale. The memorandum from John McCone that
4 we received this morning, dated 14 April, 1967, is addressed
5 to the Director.

6 Was McCone an employee or related with the CIA at that
7 time?

8 Mr. Colby. No, he left in 1965.

9 Senator Mondale. So this was a memorandum from a person
10 no longer with the CIA, as former Director to the current
11 Director, which begins "no memorandum can be located covering
12 the August, '62 meeting."

13 That is the one that earlier says the question of
14 assassination was discussed. However, it is highly probable
15 that one exists.

16 Now, I would like all documentation, records, and notes
17 that bear on the question of what McCone was referring to,
18 because I get the impression that the then Director, Mr. Helms --

19 Mr. Colby. Yes.

20 Senator Mondale. -- was reviewing the question of documenta-
21 tions and records affecting that meeting, or the question of
22 assassination, and I think we need to know what transpired,
23 what was happening then, what kind of responses he received.

24 Mr. Colby. We will certainly give you that. I can give
25 you a basic explanation.

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1 This exercise stemmed from the revelation in Jack
2 Anderson's columns, I believe, of our relationship with the
3 Mafia figures at that time. This then generated the request
4 to Mr. Breckinridge to do an Inspector General's report of
5 this whole subject, which he did, and which we will certainly
6 make available to this Committee.

7 In the course of it, and with the publicity, Mr. McCone,
8 who does maintain an occasional contact with the Agency, he
9 is a friend of it and an ex-Director -- I see him every now
10 and again and try to sort of keep him up with what is going
11 on in general terms without getting into political or sensitive
12 matters or anything -- but he does maintain this contact and
13 I am sure that somebody made contact with him or he made contact
14 with the Agency about the Jack Anderson column, and that then
15 generated this particular memorandum.

16 Senator Mondale. And there was an Inspector General's
17 study done at that time?

18 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir; and you will get access to that.

19 Senator Mondale. Can we have documentation as to how
20 it was originated and the response to what was done?

21 Chairman Church. Yes, we should have that information.
22 And I might say that you are aware, no doubt, that charges have
23 been made that documents have been destroyed in the CIA which
24 may have been connected with the general subject of CIA
25 involvement in assassination efforts.

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1 Can you tell this Committee whether, to your knowledge,
2 documents have been destroyed?

3 Mr. Breckinridge. I think we can talk in terms of what
4 we know is there.

5 On the Castro assassination, the involvement with the
6 Mafia, there were a few memoranda in the Office of Security,
7 and I think you have copies of those.

8 On the second phase of that, there are practically no
9 records at all and our investigation at that time was made
10 entirely on interviews.

11 Based entirely on interviews, an attempt to reconstruct
12 that activity.

13 The final action which involved a Cuban by the name of
14 Cubella --

15 Mr. Colby. This was the Cuban major we discussed last
16 time.

17 Mr. Breckinridge. Started in the minds of the people
18 who were involved, was an attempt to generate an internal
19 political action, revolt, and the records are very full because
20 there was no attention on the part of the people who were
21 involved at that time that that would be an assassination in
22 the sense that the original work with the Mafia was engaged in
23 and there is a full record and that exists today.

24 In the case of the Dominican Republic, this developed later.

25 Let me finish.

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1 I will go back to the Cubella case.

2 In the instance of the Dominican Republic, the record
3 was very full then and it is still very full today. I am
4 certain that record is complete.

5 Again, in the minds of the people who were involved, they
6 drew a line between the support they gave to the coup group
7 and conscious association with assassination as such. Those
8 records are complete and those records were developed at the
9 time and they were retained. It was in the period of the
10 Mafia was involved where people knew the purpose was assassina-
11 tion.

12 The records are practically non-existent and I believe
13 they never existed.

14 Harvey, who conducted the second phase of that, at the
15 time of our investigation had a handful of cryptic notes that
16 only he could interpret. We couldn't interpret them. And
17 it is my understanding that those notes no longer exist. They
18 were retained by him and he brought them in at the time that
19 we were questioning him. He was then on sick leave prior to
20 retirement. Those notes were totally unrevealing.

21 I think that those records are in the same state today
22 that they were then.

23 There were none in the Castro affair except the results
24 of our investigation involving the Mafia.

25 The Cubella case is full. That case did progress to the

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1 point that on the very day of President Kennedy's assassination
2 a man was meeting with Cubella in Paris, and in response to
3 Cubella's request offered him an assassination device that at
4 the time of the investigation we understood he accepted but
5 I have since been told he did not accept. It was a ballpoint
6 pen converted into a syringe for injecting poison.

7 Subsequently, arms were handed to Cubella by a Cuban
8 refugee in Madrid, in the very early part of 1965, and two
9 catches were put down by boats off Cuba for Cubella. I think
10 he may have recovered one of those but not the other. The
11 records on that are pretty complete.

12 So, generally speaking, on those things where the Agency
13 was involved, with the exception of the association with the
14 Mafia, where from the beginning the intent was assassination,
15 the records are complete, and I think that if people look at
16 those they will find this is so.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Is the understanding that all records dealing
18 with this subject, whether they are in Inspector General
19 reports or underlying documents, would be produced for our
20 inspection?

21 Mr. Colby. Yes.

22 If I may ask only the Committee's consideration of the
23 normal treatment of compartmentation and some discussion of
24 possibly some individual names in it that we would hope that
25 we might be able to handle very privately, or necessary, or even

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1 leave out. But the normal procedures.

2 Chairman Church. Very well.

3 Now, Mr. Schwarz.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Just to tidy up one matter.

5 Let me mark as Committee Exhibit 5 the John A. McCone
6 to the Director memorandum of April 14, 1967.

7
8 (The above mentioned document was
9 marked as Colby Exhibit No. 5
10 for identification.)

11 Mr. Schwarz. Might I come down with you on this document
12 and we will look at it together?

13 Mr. Colby. I have a copy.

14 Mr. Schwarz. As of April, 1967, Mr. McCone was no longer
15 at the Agency, was he?

16 Mr. Colby. No.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Was he then in his position with ITT, or
18 did he have some other position?

19 Mr. Colby. I really don't know.

20 Mr. Schwarz. In any event he wasn't at the Agency?

21 Mr. Colby. That is right.

22 Mr. Schwarz. The thing that is curious about this memo-
23 randum, with respect to the state of the record, is paragraph
24 one, which reads as follows:

25 "No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962;
however, it is highly probable that one exists."

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1 Now, Mr. McCone, was not in the Agency, is writing a
2 memorandum to the Director, who was in the Agency, referring to
3 a search by or on behalf of Mr. McCone.

4 Now, did Mr. McCone have documents outside the Agency,
5 or how do you explain?

6 Mr. Colby. I don't believe he has any documents. I have
7 never asked him. But I don't believe he has any documents
8 outside of the Agency.

9 Mr. Knoche. Mr. McCone wrote me that memorandum while on
10 Agency premises. It was during a visit to the Agency and he
11 had the benefit of his ex-staff assistant, Mr. Walter Elder,
12 helping him in doing a little research in this connection.

13 Mr. Colby. All that says is that they hadn't located it
14 by then. I think we have located some since that time.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on a question of Senator Hart
16 of Michigan, he asked you whether there had been evaluations
17 in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, and then you
18 testified about evaluations post-Bay of Pigs and rather continual
19 evaluations of the subject of Cuba. But I take it those were
20 not evaluations or re-evaluations of the subject of assassination.

21 Mr. Colby. All I can say is I think that question is
22 a little obscure.

23 I know that after the Bay of Pigs failure there was an
24 investigation made of the whole episode, and in the course of
25 that a discussion of what we were then to do and a program was

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1 developed. And I am speaking at second hand here. But a program
2 was developed of keeping some economic pressure on Cuba, and
3 that was a national policy, not just a CIA -- keeping an
4 economic pressure on Cuba and continuing to support the
5 various elements which might eventually lead to a change in
6 the Cuban government through some overthrow or otherwise.

7 I think some propaganda programs were kept up, some exile
8 activities were kept up, some training of teams to be infil-
9 trated into Cuba were kept up, some sabotage operations were
10 continued. And those continued over the following several
11 months.

12 Right after the 1962 missile crisis -- I cannot identify
13 right offhand here any particular review of that -- but I
14 know that that was a subject of 40 Committee consideration at
15 various times.

16 Whether that included assassination or not I cannot say.

17 My guess, as I say, is that if John McCone didn't know
18 about it, it was not covered in those discussions because it
19 would be very hard to cover them without his being involved.

20
21 Chairman Church. Are you telling us that the much publi-
22 cized investigation of the CIA, which took place following the
23 Bay of Pigs fiasco, and as I remember this review was ordered
24 by the President in order to determine what had gone wrong and
25 why, and it was a matter of great urgency and importance to the

1 government at that time -- are you telling us that in the
2 course of that review the Agency's involvement in the assassina-
3 tion efforts against Castro never came to light?

4 Mr. Colby. I just don't know, Mr. Chairman. That is
5 the answer I have to give you. I do not know.

6 I believe the Inspector General report after the Bay of
7 Pigs does not mention it, does it?

8 Mr. Brackinridge. No.

9 Mr. Colby. The report of the Committee that looked into
10 it, General Taylor, and the Attorney General and somebody else
11 there were three members of it -- maybe Mr. Dulles. I don't
12 believe that report mentioned it.

13 Chairman Church. Do we have a copy of the Taylor Report?

14 Mr. Colby. I think it has been made available. Or is
15 that a third agency problem?

16 Mr. Schwarz. That is another frustration. That one has
17 been denied to us on the theory that it is part of the Kennedy
18 Library and, therefore, we have to go through another channel
19 to get that.

20 Does the CIA have a copy of the Taylor Report?

21 Mr. Colby. I don't believe we do. I know we looked for
22 it a couple of years ago and at that time I was told we didn't
23 have it.

24 I hate to say here under oath we do not have one, but I
25 know I tried to get ahold of it and was told a couple of years

1 ago that we couldn't have one. But there are lots of drawers
2 in those safes in that building.

3 I am not trying to evade the question. I am trying to
4 say I don't think we have one. It could be.

5 We have a copy of our own Inspector General's report
6 at that time.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Does that contain any mention of the
8 assassination subject?

9 Mr. Colby. No, it does not.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Do you find it puzzling that the CIA doesn't
11 have a copy of the report designed to review its activities
12 in the Bay of Pigs, a report that led to substantial Presidential
13 changes in the instructions with respect to your jurisdiction?

14 Mr. Colby. Yes.

15 Mr. Schwarz. I mean, it is an important document --

16 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Schwarz. -- relating to the CIA.

18 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

19 Senator Schweiker. I wonder if Mr. McCone has a copy?

20 Mr. Colby. I would doubt it.

21 Senator Schweiker. That is why he came in, because of that?

22 Mr. Colby. Roughly, yes.

23 Chairman Church. In the course of the investigation that
24 took place, this investigation that led to the Taylor Report,
25 that took place in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.

1 Were records kept, that is to say --

2 Mr. Colby. Of contributions?

3 Chairman Church. No. Did the investigation involve
4 written records? Did it involve testimony taken under oath
5 and transcribed? Is there raw material relating to that
6 investigation to which this Committee could gain access?

7 Mr. Colby. I don't know the answer to the question, Mr.
8 Chairman. Maybe Mr. Breckinridge can help us.

9 Mr. Breckinridge. I am not familiar with that study.
10 I am familiar with the approach that was taken at the time
11 within our organization when the Inspector General -- I was
12 not involved in that study but I have heard it discussed
13 how they approached it.

14 Their understanding of the Bay of Pigs problem was the
15 overall invasion plan and organization for that and concentrated
16 on that.

17 By way of explanation for the omission of reference to
18 the assassinations, so few people knew about it, and I think
19 it came to no one's attention -- simply did not discover it
20 at that time. And it may not have been by way of explanation,
21 not a justification. It may not have been associated in the
22 minds of the people who did know about it with the inquiry
23 into the military operation.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel knew about it and he was certainly
25 the main architect of the Bay of Pigs; right?



1 Mr. Breckinridge. Right.

2 Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Dulles, at least the records we
3 put in on Wednesday, knew about it and he was substantially
4 involved in the Bay of Pigs. Those gentlemen surely would have
5 been questioned by General Taylor and Attorney General Kennedy -

6 Is that fair?

7 Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume so.

8 Mr. Colby. Certainly, yes. But again, if the focus was
9 on the military operation, it might have been that that other
10 operation was not involved in it.

11 Mr. Schwarz. The record further shows that on May 7, 1962,
12 a meeting was held with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in
13 which the contemporaneous document describing that meeting
14 indicates that he was not told that there was a continuing
15 and ongoing operation, but rather was told of something which
16 was not called an assassination but was called a project. He
17 was told of something which was referred to in the past tense;
18 is that right?

19 Mr. Colby. It was in the past tense. Whether there was
20 any other discussion in that meeting on this subject we just
21 don't know.

22 Mr. Breckinridge. I think I can interpret what happened.

23 The people who briefed Attorney General Kennedy are the
24 ones who knew about what we call the first phase of the operation
25 with the Mafia.



Colonel Edwards, who was Director of Security, under whose supervision the first portion of that activity was carried on, had withdrawn from it.

The operation, when it was reactivated later, was reactivated on a compartmented basis, and Colonel Edwards did not know about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Even though it continued to involve the Mafia until early 1963?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct. Colonel Edwards no longer knew what was going on. So when he briefed the Attorney General he did not know that this second operation, this reactivation of the operation that had formerly run under his responsibility -- he did not know that it was ongoing.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was responsible for the selection of Colonel Edwards and General Counsel Houston as being the persons who would go to brief Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure I know that.

Mr. Schwarz. It would have been someone of higher authority within the CIA; is that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. We have tried to determine.

Mr. Houston, if I understand it, feels that he would not have done this unless he thought the Director knew.

Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

Mr. Breckinridge. Knew that he was going to do this. But he did not talk to the Director about it.

1 I gather that it is not all that clear in Colonel Edwards'
2 either at this point in time.

3 Mr. Schwarz. So someone selected these persons to go
4 and brief Attorney General Kennedy, number one.

5 Number two, they did not know the plot for assassination
6 was ongoing, although in fact it was?

7 Mr. Breckinridge. Correct.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Number three: therefore, Attorney General
9 Kennedy was given the impression that whatever was going on
10 was over; is that correct?

11 Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is correct as I reconstruct
12 it.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Can we determine then who was responsible
14 for selecting those persons to brief Attorney General Kennedy,
15 instead of including in the group other persons who knew that
16 the Mafia part of the assassination attempt was ongoing?

17 Mr. Breckinridge. I don't think that we can now.

18 As I say, there is no written record.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Who could it have been? Who was in a
20 higher position of authority, in a position to make a decision
21 as to who should brief Attorney General Kennedy?

22 Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume that Mr. Bissel could
23 have.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Was he still in the Agency in May of 1962?

25 Mr. Breckridge. I don't know. I think he may have

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1 left by then.

2 May I reconstruct because much of my understanding is based
3 on my analysis of what happened and not on clear facts.

4 The FBI approached Colonel Edwards when their investigation
5 and incident in Las Vegas eventually produced his name, and
6 his conversations, I think, were with the General Counsel at
7 that time. I cannot reconstruct beyond that so I really can't
8 give you an answer to the specific question. But the initiative
9 came from the FBI. Colonel Edwards and Mr. Houston discussed
10 it. Mr. Houston, I have been told, believes that the Director
11 must have known.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Which Director are we talking about?

13 Mr. Breckinridge. Whoever the Director was at that time?

14 Mr. Colby. By that time.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Of what agency?

16 Mr. Colby. CIA. That would have been McCone.

17 Mr. Breckinridge. He operated on the assumption that Mr.
18 McCone knew.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

20 Mr. Breckinridge. Knew that they were going to brief the
21 Attorney General.

22 Mr. Schwarz. About?

23 Mr. Breckinridge. The record on this is very unsatisfactory
24 and I can't clarify it for you because we have been trying to
25 find out when Mr. McCone first learned of it after the fact,

1 as it was.

2 When people discussed this with one another, what they
3 conveyed to one another accurately as to what it was they were
4 discussing, the record is simply not clear and I don't think
5 that we can reconstruct that satisfactorily today.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Is Mr. Edwards still alive?

7 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, he is.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Houston is still alive and is in Washing-
9 ton, D.C.?

10 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McCone is still alive and is in --

12 Mr. Colby. California.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Was Mr. Helms the successor to Mr. Bissel?

14 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's leave a place in the record
16 where we will insert it was either Mr. McCone or Mr. Bissel
17 who had the job of Deputy Director for Plans in May, 1962.

18 Mr. Colby. It certainly wasn't Mr. McCone.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Helms or Mr. Bissel?

20 Mr. Colby. Yes.

21
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1 Chairman Church. You see, the state of the record ^{right}
2 now suggests a cover-up, another cover-up. It suggests that
3 those who were selected by the higher authority in CIA to
4 brief the Attorney General had knowledge limited to an attempt
5 on the life of Castro that had been concluded.

6 It further suggests that they had no knowledge of continuing
7 efforts then underway, even though presumably their superiors
8 did have such knowledge. This leaves the Attorney General in
9 a position of being told about the past program and not being
10 told about the present program, and we know that he later said
11 to certain assistants of his that he had put a stop to
12 assassination attempts on Fidel Castro and he may have been
13 left with the impression, as a result of this meeting, that
14 there were no further attempts. He may have said he wanted no
15 further attempts. We don't know. But clearly he was not told
16 that there were further attempts then underway.

17 Senator Morgan. Were we told yesterday or the day before
18 yesterday that he knew of the Cuban majors' operation?

19 Mr. Schwarz. We were not told that.

20 Mr. Breckinridge. I cannot clarify the question completely
21 but I can introduce a little bit more.

22 When the discussion occurred Mr. Houston did go and talk
23 with General Carter, who was then the Deputy Director --

24 Mr. Schwarz. Which discussion are we talking about now?

25 Mr. Breckinridge. The discussion about going to the Attorney

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1 General.

2 To go back, how the question arose, and it goes far afield,
3 John Roselli, who was the Chicago member of the Mafia who
4 arranged the introduction of Giancana to the Cuban syndicate
5 head, through whom they initially tried to run this operation --
6 Giancana had a personal love affair with a well know entertainer
7 who was then in Las Vegas, and she was suspected by him of then
8 having an affair with another well known entertainer.

9 Giancana went to Robert Maheu, through whom these introduc-
10 tions were first made --

11 Mr. Schwarz. Introduced to the Mafia personnel?

12 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

13 Mr. Colby. Between CIA and the Mafia.

14 Mr. Breckinridge. And asked Maheu to arrange to have the
15 room of the male entertainer in Las Vegas bugged. They hired
16 a private detective who then did this. The roommate stumbled
17 on the equipment, the private detective was arrested, and the
18 FBI investigative trail led from the private detective to Maheu
19 to Giancana and eventually to CIA. Giancana had insisted that
20 Maheu help him because he had helped Maheu with the introduction
21 to the head of the Cuban syndicate, and Maheu had then agreed
22 to get a private detective to do it.

23 So this arose in the context of a domestic violation of
24 wiretapping laws and the FBI was investigating it on that basis.

25 Because the trail led to Giancana and Roselli, who was a

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1 third member of the syndicate involved in this, both of whom
2 were high on the FBI list, as they progressed towards developing
3 a prosecution, they came to Colonel Edwards, the FBI did, and
4 said what is your position on this. The position of the Agency
5 as stated by Colonel Edwards was we did not want them prosecuted
6 because it would expose what he understood to be this operation,
7 and I guess the time sequence gets a little fuzzy in my mind.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell the Director of the FBI the
9 nature of the operation, or simply he told him it would concern
10 some sensitive matter?

11 Mr. Breckinridge. He told him it was an intelligence
12 operation in country, and the Mafia was being used for that
13 purpose. So in the discussions as it progressed, it dealt with
14 the wiretap prosecution. Colonel Edwards in discussing it
15 with us in 1967, according to our notes, said that they briefed
16 the Attorney General all the way, but at that time Colonel
17 Edwards, I think by the time they did it, Colonel Edwards thought
18 it was over. So the Attorney General and the FBI were not told
19 the complete story.

20 Mr. Schwarz. They weren't told the most important part
21 of the story, and that was that it was continuing.

22 Mr. Breckinridge. They didn't know that, that is correct.

23 Chairman Church. So you have here two violations of law.
24 Apart from what was told to the Attorney General, you have two
25 violations of law. One, the wiretap, it was an illegal operation.

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1 We may have three. Second, it is certainly an activity that
2 the basic law prohibited CIA from engaging in, domestic activity.

3 Mr. Colby. CIA was not involved in the wiretap.

4 Chairman Church. As I understand it, the CIA was involved
5 because it engaged a private --

6 Mr. Breckinridge. I am sorry.

7 Chairman Church. Maybe I misunderstood.

8 Mr. Breckinridge. We didn't learn about this until after
9 the FBI found out about the Mafia involvement in that wiretap.
10 This was done by a private detective hired by a private businessman
11 at the request of Giancana.

12 Mr. Schwarz. CIA agents had committed the crime, in this
13 case, but not on behalf of the CIA.

14 Mr. Breckinridge. No, no.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Isn't that accurate?

16 Mr. Breckinridge. No.

17 Mr. Colby. I wouldn't call Giancana an agent, getting
18 back to our definitional problems.

19 Mr. Schwarz. CIA associates.

20 Mr. Colby. CIA instrument. We had a contact with Giancana,
21 obviously, and with Maheu. They decided on their own to do
22 this wiretapping, or bugging, or whatever it was, without our
23 prior knowledge. They got caught. Then they said if this is
24 fully investigated and brought out, it will bring out the CIA
25 collaboration on the other subject, and then decision was made

1 to go and brief the Attorney General to the degree briefed.

2 Chairman Church. After which the Justice Department dropped
3 the case?

4 Mr. Colby. It was dropped.

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1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Was the CIA not concerned that
2 Giancana may have told something about this Cuban operation to
3 the female entertainer who also may have told the male
4 entertainer?

5 Mr. Breckinridge. No. If I understand what happened,
6 and I am now describing what Mr. Maheu said, and I get this
7 from having read some files at the Department of Justice
8 recently -- when Mr. Maheu tried to explain to the FBI his
9 position and tried to provide a rationale for doing this, he
10 said I thought there was a leak in Chicago and I wanted to have
11 the room of this entertainer bugged so I could find out if
12 Giancana had leaked.

13 The FBI gave this the kind of credit I think it was entitled
14 to. They didn't pay much attention to it. This was something
15 he tried to develop to justify his involvement.

16 There is no indication that there were any leaks from
17 Chicago that we know of, something that he would know of, and
18 there was no instruction on our part for him to do such a thing,
19 and it was for another reason Giancana asked him to do it.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. As far as you can tell from the
21 record, the CIA was not concerned that Giancana and his female
22 friend, or her male friend, may have blown the Cuban operation?

23 Mr. Breckinridge. No.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. It was purely who was sleeping
25 with whom?

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1 Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is still the case.

2 I would like to add one further thing. That prior to going
3 over to brief the Attorney General, the general counsel did
4 go speak to General Carter. General Carter said that he
5 understood --

6 Mr. Colby. General Carter was Deputy Director of the
7 Agency at that time.

8 Mr. Breckinridge. -- he understood the situation and
9 in due time might brief the Director. We don't know that he
10 did brief the Director, who was then Mr. McCone. Our notes
11 written in 1967 say there is no indication that General Carter
12 was briefed on the full details of the assassination plot.
13 So while he did approve their going and briefing the Attorney
14 General about this association with the Mafia, there is no
15 indication that he was told the full story then either.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Then in August of 1963, the document that
17 you provided for us last time, Mr. Helms did know about the
18 ongoing operation; is that correct?

19 Mr. Breckinridge. I think by then he knew that the
20 operation was going.

21 Mr. Schwarz. He sent to Director McCone the memorandum
22 which had been prepared concerning the meeting with Attorney
23 General Kennedy, which indicated that the operation was completed.
24 So the inference from that paper record is that Mr. Helms was
25 concealing affirmatively from the Director of Central Intelligence

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1 in the same way as somebody had concealed from the Attorney
2 General the fact that the plot was ongoing.

3 Is that a fair characterization?

4 Mr. Colby. I don't know.

5 Mr. Breckinridge. Could I see the memo?

6 Chairman Church. The memo uses verbs in the past tense.

7 Mr. Schwarz. The cover memo from Helms to McCone trans-
8 mitting a copy of the memorandum concerning the May, 1962
9 meeting with Attorney General Kennedy.

10 Mr. Breckinridge. May I say first I don't know. I
11 just call your attention to the third paragraph.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Of the memorandum from Director Helms?

13 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. He was then D.D.

14 Mr. Colby. The basic memorandum, of course, merely
15 referred to a sensitive CIA operation and then in Mr. Helms
16 in the paragraph says I assume you are aware of the nature
17 of the operation discussed in the attachment.

18 Again, this was an attempt not to refer on paper to what
19 it was.

20 Mr. Schwarz. But the attachment refers to it in the
21 past tense.

22 Mr. Colby. I agree.

23 Senator Morgan. Who is this memorandum from?

24 Mr. Colby. The memorandum we are discussing now of
25 August 1963 was to the Director from Mr. Helms. It attaches

1 a copy of the briefing of the Attorney General in May, 1962.

2 Senator Morgan. Mr. Brackinridge, the transcript or report
3 that you were reading from a few moments ago, who prepared
4 that?

5 Mr. Brackinridge. This was prepared by another inspector
6 and me in 1967.

7 Senator Morgan. When you say there is no indication that
8 he knew, that is just an assumption on your part, that you
9 don't have any positive evidence?

10 Mr. Brackinridge. That is correct.

11 Senator Morgan. The truth is you sort of suspect they
12 all knew what was going on. Don't you think that is true?

13 Mr. Brackinridge. No, not necessarily.

14 When we conducted our investigation we interviewed the
15 people directly involved in the operation, those that were
16 available, and tried to reconstruct what happened with them.

17 We interviewed different people. I did not interview
18 Mr. Bissal. I did interview Mr. Harvey.

19 We submitted this report to then-Director Helms, one copy
20 only. We did not interview him.

21 Where his name appeared in the course of our inquiry we
22 put it in our report so that he would see how the record appeared
23 to people who approached it as we did.

24 The extent of the knowledge of these different people is
25 not easy to reconstruct nor fair to assume.

1 I can't answer your question.

2 Senator Morgan. In other words, if you didn't have
3 evidence that they did know, you just assumed that -- you
4 didn't assume that they didn't know, you just said there is
5 no evidence?

6 Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

7 Senator Schweicker. Let me ask the question another way.

8 The documentation you collected and what you do have
9 positively, who was the highest ranking official, according
10 to your records, who knew?

11 Chairman Church. According to the positive documents
12 that you have of knowledge.

13 Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me say we did not have
14 documentation. It was based mostly on interviews, this
15 period involving the Mafia.

16 The highest person that we understood that knew during
17 the first phase with Mr. Bissel. That we clearly did know
18 about it. There was discussion at one point in which Mr.
19 Bissel, Colonel Edwards, the two of them, met with Mr. Dulles
20 and had a conversation in which I can best say there was
21 doubletalk as to what they were discussing.

22 It is open to question how clearly this was stated to
23 Mr. Dulles and whether or not Mr. Dulles understood.

24 At the time that we were making the inquiry it was our
25 opinion that Mr. Dulles probably knew, but I can't put it beyond

THE END

6 1 that.

2 Senator Schweicker. He left the Agency in 1961, as I
3 recall.

4 When was your investigation?

5 Mr. Breckinridge. Our investigation was in 1967.

6 And our discussion with Colonel Edwards, who described
7 this meeting when it occurred in 1960, left us with the impression
8 while they had met with Mr. Dulles, that the conversation was
9 not in precise terms. As Colonel Edwards said to us, we
10 didn't use any bad words, which meant they didn't use the
11 word "assassination," but they discussed an operation against
12 Castro in such terms that he felt that they had conveyed the
13 message to Mr. Dulles. But there is room for doubt.

14 Senator Schweicker. Once Mr. Dulles left the Agency, who
15 then became the highest ranking person to know, according
16 to your investigation?

17 Mr. Breckinridge. If Mr. Dulles did in fact understand,
18 he would be the highest person at this point.

19 Senator Schweicker. At this point. But he left the
20 Agency in 1961. Five years of assassination attempts went
21 after that.

22 You conducted an investigation in 1967. What did that
23 period show as to who was the highest ranking person who knew?

24 Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. McCone did not know until much later
25 until after it was all over.

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1 Mr. Colby. He knew in 1963.

2 Mr. Breckinridge. About a past event.

3 Mr. Colby. There was still activities going on.

4 Mr. Breckinridge. That is right.

5 Chairman Church. Can we get the answer first?

6 Mr. Breckinridge. Excuse me. I can't give you a more
7 precise answer because sometimes the record that we were able
8 to reconstruct is not precise and in some instances not at all
9 clear. We were left with some uncertainty.

10 Senator Schweicker. Wouldn't that be the key issue of
11 your whole investigation, and you mean to say you can't tell
12 me?

13 Mr. Breckinridge. No, sir.

14 Senator Schweicker. I am flabbergasted.

15 Mr. Breckinridge. Let me describe the investigation.
16 We were doing the investigation for Mr. Helms as the Director.
17 Mr. Helms' involvement was something known to him and we
18 submitted our description of what happened to him. We did not
19 interview him in the course of our investigation. We did not
20 interview Mr. McCone. We did interview the other parties who
21 were available to us. But when we gave it to Mr. Helms the
22 assumption was that he could complete the gaps.

23 In this sense, ordinarily, when we conduct an investigation,
24 a general investigation, we would conclude with recommendations,
25 and in this instance we did not. We reconstructed as well as



1 we could what happened. And the report went one copy only to
2 Mr. Helms who held it. We had only one discussion. The
3 Inspector General then may have had others. We had only one
4 discussion with him, which was when we gave him the first
5 portion of the report, because we investigated three different
6 assassination plans, as we described them then, and our discussion
7 with him had to do with the approach we had taken, and we
8 said that we simply undertook to reconstruct what had happened
9 as best we could reconstruct it.

10 So we were reporting to Mr. Helms what we had reconstructed
11 without having interviewed him as such. It was in one copy
12 only, and quite frankly in 1967 we expected that it would
13 have no purpose other than to tell him what the situation was
14 for decisions as he felt appropriate.

15 Senator Mondale. Now, you say it is not clear whether
16 Dulles knew, but yet there is a memorandum from Osborn to
17 the Executive Director dated 2/15/72, which states, I quote:

18 "Individuals who were aware of this project" --

19 That is the Mafia project --

20 "were Messrs. Dulles, Bissel, Colonel King, Colonel
21 Sheffield, Edwards, William Harvey, James P. O'Connell, and
22 attorneys for Robert Mahen."

23 Mr. Brackinridge. Mr. Osborn is writing that on the basis
24 of his understanding of what Colonel Edwards had to say.

25 Our discussions with Colonel Edwards left us with this uncertainty

sh 9 1 Colonel Edwards believes that Mr. Dulles understood the
2 conversation. He also said that he engaged in doubletalk so
3 that there was room for misunderstanding.

4 Mr. Schwarz. I show you a document stamped 0012, headed
5 John Roselli and ask you what it is.

6 Mr. Breckinridge. This is a memo prepared in the Office
7 of Security describing John Roselli, who is the first of the
8 members of the syndicate who was used to arrange the introduction
9 to the head of the syndicate in Cuba.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And written when?

11 Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure. I suspect it was written
12 in 1973 but I would have to check.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Does it refer to a Castro assassination
14 attempt involving the Mafia?

15 Mr. Breckinridge. Does the word "assassination" appear?
16 I think it refers to the Mafia.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any doubt, in fact, this is
18 referring to the assassination effort involving Maheu, Roselli,
19 Trafficante, in connection with Castro?

20 Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

21 Mr. Schwarz. And does this document prepared by the
22 Office of Security state "the DCI was briefed and gave his
23 approval"?

24 Mr. Breckinridge. It does.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And who was the DCI in August, 1960?

h 10 1 Mr. Brackinridge. That was Mr. Dulles.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Now, therefore, either Mr. Dulles did approve
3 which the document says, or somebody wrote a document in
4 connection with the investigation which irresponsibly says
5 Mr. Dulles approved. Which is the case?

6 Mr. Breckinridge. I don't think that either is necessarily
7 the case.

8 The understanding of the Office of Security is that Mr.
9 Dulles does know or did know. The question that was raised
10 in the course of our inquiry was that the nature of the meeting
11 as described to us raised a question of doubt. That we did
12 not resolve.

13 Chairman Church. I think if we accept your testimony
14 that there was at least an element of doubt as to whether or
15 not Mr. Dulles knew of the connection between the CIA and the
16 Mafia, and its purpose, to assassinate Mr. Castro, let's get
17 back to Senator Schweicker's question. After Mr. Dulles left
18 several more plots were formed involving the CIA and having
19 to do with subsequent attempts on the life of Castro.

20 Now, what does your investigation show and what can you
21 tell us with respect to the highest officials in the CIA,
22 following the departure of Mr. Dulles, who may have had knowledge
23 of these ongoing operations?

24 Mr. Brackinridge. When the operation was renewed I think
25 it is clear that the Director at that time did not know.

h 11 1 Senator Schweicker. And who was the Director at that
2 time?

3 Chairman Church. When was the operation renewed?

4 Mr. Breckinridge. The operation was actually reactivated
5 in April of 1962. It was planned to be reactivated prior to
6 that but the employee who had responsibility for it did not
7 get free until April of '62 when he actually reactivated it.
8 There is no indication that anyone above the level of Mr.
9 Bissel in 1961, at the time that this was discussed, there
10 is no indication that anyone above his level knew that it
11 was to be reactivated. This officer, Mr. Harvey, then took
12 it over and attempted to run it again through the balance
13 of 1962, after April.

14 Mr. Schwarz. He did that at the instruction of Mr. Helms,
15 did he not?

16 Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. Helms became aware of this at a
17 later point.

18 The confusion, as perhaps we discussed the other day, Mr.
19 Helms signed off on a project that was originally initiated
20 by Mr. Bissel called ZR Rifle, and ZR Rifle was a project that
21 Mr. Bissel was quoted as saying was at the urgency of the
22 White House. It was made no more specific than that. We
23 don't know where in the White House.

24 ZR Rifle was described as an executive action capability,
25 a capability to permit assassinations if someone called for

12 1 them.

2 Mr. Harvey was given the responsibility of this by Mr.
3 Bissel and originally it continued as a separate action from
4 the Castro operation, but Mr. Harvey was also given that
5 responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became
6 wedded.

7 Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Rifle
8 as a project. ZR Rifle had a dual purpose that has not been
9 clarified by our inquiry. It apparently was in fact used for
10 the stated purposes, as far as organizational activities went
11 along, which was to steal codes, and Mr. Helms, when he
12 approved the project, authorized accounting on certification,
13 which meant that rather than the usual vouchers supporting
14 expenditures, that the officer involved would simply certify
15 that the money had been spent and this would be accepted.
16 It had a project amount of some dollars, \$7500 - \$10,000 --
17 some of it to include the salary of an agent, some to include
18 operating expenses.

19 So Mr. Helms' main appearance in the approval of ZR Rifle
20 does not necessarily equate with the date when he became
21 familiar with the Castro operation.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Because of the dual purpose of Rifle, Rifle
23 means both, rifle files and used rifles?

24 Mr. Brackinridge. It may mean either or both.

25 Mr. Colby. It is supposed to disassociate but sometimes

1
13 2 there is that kind of association.

3 Mr. Breckinridge. I told you that I would look for when
4 Mr. Helms' name first clearly appeared and I haven't done that.
5 I was out of town yesterday.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have the memo of February 1962
7 when Mr. Helms, according to Mr. Greer, Inspector General,
8 "authorized William Harvey by memo to handle the project on
9 a special basis"?

10 Mr. Breckinridge. Do I have a copy of that memorandum?

11 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

12 Mr. Breckinridge. It is in the files and we can retrieve
13 it.

14 Chairman Church. Mr. Bissel was the Deputy Director of
15 Plans. The record would indicate that he knew of the re-
16 activation of the operation to assassinate Castro in April of
17 1962, and Mr. Harvey, I take it, was assigned that duty?

18 Mr. Breckinridge. If I may go back, it was in the fall
19 of 1961.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. November 1961?

2 Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is probably correct. It
3 was in the fall of 1961 that Mr. Harvey was given this assignment
4 by Mr. Bissel. I think Mr. Bissel left in 1962. I am not sure
5 of the dates, So Mr. Bissel would have known at that time.
6 But I am not sure after that.

7 Chairman Church. Helms succeeded Mr. Bissel as chief
8 of operations?

9 Mr. Colby. Deputy Director of Plans.

10 Chairman Church. Deputy Director for Plans.

11 Your record shows that Helms had knowledge of the ZR Rifle
12 operation, which, among other things, was to develop an executive
13 capability -- whatever that means. Presumably that means a
14 capability to conduct an assassination if and when authorized
15 by proper authority?

16 Mr. Breckinridge. That is my understanding.

17 Chairman Church. Is that your understanding?

18 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

19 Chairman Church. Do your records show that, or is that
20 based upon what has been revealed through your interrogation?

21 Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me go back and clarify, then
22 I will answer this question, if I may.

23 Mr. Helms approved ZR Rifle, which the record shows has the
24 responsibility of stealing codes, essentially.

25 My understanding, from my interviews, is that ZR Rifle had

1 also the responsibility for executive action capability. That
2 is a difficult phrase.

3 The record does not show that Mr. Helms knew when he approved
4 the project that it had this dual role. So from that point of
5 view, I have a record that shows what the project was supposed
6 to have been as far as its open description, though classified,
7 and the result of our interviews with Mr. Harvey which tell the
8 other story about executive action capability. So it does not,
9 the record does not show that Mr. Helms at that time knew what
10 that was.

11 Chairman Church. If Harvey knew that it had this other
12 aspect, who would have told him to develop such a capability, if
13 it were not his superior?

14 Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a logical conclusion, but
15 I was distinguishing what the record showed and what our interviews
16 developed.

17 Chairman Church. Didn't you ask Harvey in interviewing
18 him whether or not Helms had told him to develop this capability
19 as a part of the ZR Rifle?

20 Didn't you ask him who told him to develop this capability,
21 or did he do it on his own?

22 Mr. Breckinridge. Your question is a very proper one, and
23 my difficulty is with the record which goes back to what Bissel
24 instructed Harvey to do.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Before Helms took the job, Bissel told Harvey

1 to take charge of the Castro assassination project?

2 Mr. Breckinridge. Bissel told Harvey to create the executive
3 action capability.

4 Mr. Schwarz. But he also told him to take charge of the
5 Castro assassination project using the Mafia; isn't that
6 correct?

7 Mr. Breckinridge. Now, there is no record except the
8 record that came from our interviews on this score. All I
9 am trying to do is draw the distinction between what the record
10 shows and what our interviews developed, and there are gaps
11 in that.

12 Chairman Church. Your interviews show that Mr. Bissel, who
13 preceded Helms, told Mr. Harvey to develop an executive action
14 capability, which was a capability to assassinate if and when
15 ordered; right?

16 Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

17 Chairman Church. And your records show that Mr. Bissel
18 also instructed Harvey to take over the Castro assassination
19 attempt, which was connected with a continuing relationship
20 between the CIA and the Mafia?

21 Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a correct assumption,
22 yes.

23 Chairman Church. Now, when do your records show that Helms
24 became aware of Harvey's whole assignment as given him by
25 Bissel?

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1 Mr. Breckinridge. I don't have the accurate date. We have
2 the 16 August 1963 memorandum. I promised Mr. Schwarz that I
3 would try and find the date, and I was out of town yesterday
4 and simply didn't do it. But I have to go through the record
5 to find the earliest date that we have, and I simply have to go
6 into the record to dig this out.

7 Senator Schweiker.. Do your records show the date of when
8 the actual latest assassination attempt was finished?

9 Mr. Schwarz. For Castro?

10 Senator Schweiker. Yes. When was that timeframe, roughly?

11 Mr. Breckinridge. You are talking about the Mafia connecti

12 Senator Schweiker. No; I am talking about when did we
13 finally cease and desist in attempting to assassinate Castro,
14 from your records?

15 Mr. Breckinridge. Let me, if I may, and I don't mean to
16 confuse the issue -- the Mafia connection from beginning to end
17 was an attempt to assassinate Castro. The operation was called
18 off finally in the Spring, perhaps February, of 1963.

19 Senator Hart of Michigan. What year?

20 Mr. Breckinridge. 1963.

21 Mr. Schwarz. That is the Mafia part?

22 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir. The Cuballa Association has a
23 different origin.

24 Chairman Church. First, who called off the Mafia operation

25 Mr. Breckinridge. As near as I could tell, Harvey.

1 Chairman Church. Harvey?

2 Mr. Breckinridge. Harvey. Harvey decided that it couldn't
3 succeed. Harvey was leaving the country for a foreign assignment
4 and in conversation with Roselli -- Roselli was the man who was
5 in the Mafia through whom the Agency had continued to work --
6 and Roselli agreed that nothing was happening, nothing could
7 happen, and it should be called off. We don't have a record
8 that Harvey went anywhere for approval. This doesn't mean that
9 he may not have discussed it, but I don't have the record of it.

10 So Harvey in his conversation with Roselli, terminated the
11 operation.

12 Senator Hart of Colorado. The memo which we saw at the
13 last session, which I don't know we officially have, Mr. Colby
14 made it available to us -- was a wrap-up of the whole thing, or a
15 memo to the files, and I can't recall now who did it.

16 Mr. Schwarz. That is the one referring to the meeting
17 with Robert Kennedy that we spent some time looking at.

18 Senator Hart of Colorado. That was the Sheffield-Edwards
19 memo which say with the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion
20 operation, no further attempt was made with the Mafia. It tied
21 it directly to the Bay of Pigs.

22 Mr. Colby. That was the first phase. There was a second
23 phase that followed with the Mafia.

24 Chairman Church. We now know from what you have said that
25 Harvey called off the Mafia connection, and we don't know whether

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1 that was done with the knowledge or authority of anyone more h
2 placed in the CIA.

3 Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know.

4 Chairman Church. All right, after Harvey left the country
5 who was then assigned to undertake the subsequent efforts again
6 the life of Castro?

7 Mr. Breckinridge. This brings us to Senator Schweiker's
8 question. A man by the name of Orlando Cubella, who had been
9 met in Mexico City by the Agency in 1961, who had been one of
10 the leaders of the anti-Batista groups and held the rank of Major
11 in the Cuban army, that is the highest rank they have, Cubella
12 was an M.D. and had been a youth leader and attended youth
13 conferences around the world, and was met first in Mexico City,
14 and later he was met in Scandinavia on several occasions. And
15 the conversations during these various meetings had to do with
16 Cubella's desire to have a change in Cuba, and the attempt on
17 the Agency people who met with him to explore his ability to
18 substitute a government as well as be able to overthrow the
19 existing government.

20 These conversations were very general, exploratory, and
21 non-productive.

22 In one of the early meetings with Cubella, he talked about
23 eliminating Castro, and the Agency employee used the word
24 assassination, which was reported back as being an offensive
25 word to Cubella, and instructions were issued that Cubella was

1 not to be given a mission of elimination of Castro or anyone
2 else.

3 He was met in October of 1963, at which time he made the
4 proposal that he wished to have weapons with which to commit
5 an assassination, and this proposal was rejected.

6 He continued to speak in these terms, and finally, I cannot
7 give you the level of approval -- that might be at the level
8 of Mr. Fitzgerald -- and I don't recall which job Mr. Fitzgerald
9 had then, whether he headed the Cuban Task Force or whether he
10 had become --

11 Mr. Knoche. He replaced Harvey.

12 Mr. Schwarz. He did meet with this man and gave him a
13 weapon or poison pen with which to kill Castro?

14 Mr. Breckinridge. Fitzgerald did not give him the pen.

15 Mr. Schwarz. But discussed the subject?

16 Mr. Breckinridge. I was considering the question of
17 level of authorization, and I don't recall. I would assume

18 Mr. Fitzgerald was the highest level of authorization that I
19 know of.

20 Chairman Church. And Fitzgerald's position at that time?

21 Mr. Breckinridge. I was questioning whether he had -- he
22 had three jobs in fairly quick succession. Whether he replaced
23 Harvey as head of the Cuban Task Force, then he became Chief of
24 WHM, the Western Hemisphere Division, and then he became for
25 a short time Deputy Director of Plans. But he died of a heart

1 attack. I don't know whether he had at that time -- it would
2 be in October of 1963.

3 Mr. Colby. I think at that time he was either head of the
4 Cuban force or Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.
5 Chairman Church. Will you get that for the record?

6 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Breckinridge. The decision was taken to try and give
8 Cubella some instrument. A ball point pen was designed that
9 could be used as a syringe. Because Cubella was a doctor, the
10 pen was given to him in Paris on the 22nd of November, 1963,
11 with the suggestion that he use it.

12 Chairman Church. By whom was the pen given?

13 Mr. Breckinridge. It was given by a case officer of the
14 Agency. In fact, Cubella refused to take it. When we wrote our
15 report, we thought he accepted it, but I've since learned he
16 refused it. He said it was not practical.

17 Because he was a doctor it was suggested that he could
18 acquire the material to put in the pen, but he refused to accept
19 it.

20 Conversations continued, and finally the Agency arranged
21 to put down two caches at sea off the coast of Cuba, one of
22 which had weapons in it, one of which had just general equipment.

23 Senator Schweiker. Could either of those involve the story
24 that appeared in the press under Colonel Prouty's statement?

25 Mr. Breckinridge. No, sir.

1 Senator Schweiker. Did that come later, Colonel Prouty?
2 Mr. Breckinridge. We still don't know what Colonel Prouty's
3 statement refers to.

4 Mr. Knoche. Prouty's allegations go back to 1959.

5 Senator Schweiker. What?

6 Mr. Knoche. 1959, late 1959 and early 1960.

7 Mr. Breckinridge. We arranged to have a Cuban refugee
8 leader meet Cubella in Spain, at which time he gave him an
9 additional weapon. That would have been in February of 1964,
10 I think.

11 Chairman Church. What kind of weapon was given to him?

12 Mr. Breckinridge. It is my recollection it was a rifle.
13 I am not sure of that.

14 Cubella continued to have conversations and meetings from
15 time to time as he came out of Cuba, and finally in the middle
16 of 1965 the decision was taken to cut off contact with him
17 because there were serious questions about the security of his
18 organization.

19 He was arrested, I think. I think I have gotten my dates
20 right. It is subject to correction. He was arrested in the
21 early part of 1966, and tried, made a confession, had a public
22 trial, which was reported in the press.

23 I wonder if I might check those dates?

24 Chairman Church. Surely.

25 While you check those dates, perhaps Mr. Colby could



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1 explain how it was during this period that Cubella was able
2 to return to Cuba and travel to Europe.

3 I assume he was able to return to Cuba?

4 Mr. Colby. He was a Cuban officer at that time, and
5 apparently loyal to Castro. He would go out on various trips
6 and things like that, and we would meet him there.

7 Mr. Schwarz. He was the man who met with Mr. Hunt in
8 Madrid?

9 Mr. Colby. He met with a friend of Mr. Hunt. A Cuban exile
10 met Cubella in Madrid. That is when the weapons were handed
11 over.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Was Mr. Hunt in Madrid at that time?

13 Mr. Colby. Yes.

14 Mr. Breckinridge. No, because this man by the name of
15 Artimo, met Cubella in Madrid in December of 1964, and in
16 February 1965 he made the delivery of the weapons. Hunt was
17 not assigned there until the middle of 1965, after this was
18 over. We don't know where that story came from.

19 Mr. Colby. Hunt and Artimo are very close, and he is the
20 godfather of one of their children, and things like that. He
21 may have told him about it.

22 Chairman Church. During this period you have described,
23 when these various contacts were made with Cubella, who was
24 the highest officer within the CIA who had knowledge of these
25 contacts and who authorized them to be made, as far as your

1 investigation shows?

2 Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know the level at which the
3 contacts were known. I would assume that the continuing contact
4 were known at a high level, but I have to assume that, and this
5 goes to a point when Senator Schweiker was asking the question
6 at the last time. This is the last instance that we know of
7 in which assassination was involved.

8 Senator Schweiker. That is, both your records and your
9 interviews indicate that this was the last known activity,
10 according to your investigation?

11 Mr. Breckinridge. That was specifically related to
12 Castro.

13 Senator Schweiker. And that date was when?

14 Mr. Breckinridge. Well, our contact with the Cubella group
15 was broken off in June of 1965.

16 Senator Schweiker. June of when?

17 Mr. Breckinridge. 1965.

18 I don't want to confuse you, but I would like to introduce
19 a consideration that relates to this.

20 Chairman Church. Before you do that, I have asked what
21 your investigation shows is the highest officer who knew and
22 under whose authority these continuing contacts were made, and
23 you said you assumed it must have been known to higher authority.

24 Mr. Breckinridge. I said that about the contacts. About
25 the contacts, I assumed this was known fairly high in the Agency.

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
1 Chairman Church. The contacts and their purpose?
 2 Mr. Breckinridge. This is a distinction I want to make.
 3 The people who were involved, and this is difficult --
 4 but their statement of state of mind, and your interpretation,
 5 may be different things. But the people who were involved
 6 considered that the purpose of the association with Cubella was
 7 he was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a
 8 man who represented a dissatisfied element, he had people who
 9 agreed with him, and the hope was that this could be developed
 10 into a group in Cuba that in some way could replace the govern-
 11 ment..

12 The conversations with Cubella were really not productive,
 13 and Cubella wanted demonstration of support, tangible support,
 14 and the conversations progressed to the point that he wanted
 15 equipment with which he could commit and assassination.

16 In the minds of the people who dealt with him, the question
 17 of assassination was not uppermost, so much as it was to give
 18 him a material demonstration of support.

19 I don't mean to be trite, but the United States or the
 20 Agency has in the past provided weapons of one kind or another
 21 to people, paramilitary. In the minds of these people, however
 22 credible to you this distinction is drawn, so assassination
 23 became a consideration, but assassination had not been the
 24 objective.

25 I am sorry, one more point.



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1 The point at which they began to provide weapons to him
2 should have required higher level approval. I don't know what
3 the level of approval was.

4 Mr. Schwarz. It should have under the normal procedures?

5 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

6 Chairman Church. At one point a meeting took place and an
7 agent of the CIA gave him a ballpoint pen that had been speciall
8 designed to camouflage a syringe, and gave it to him with the
9 recommendation that it would be filled with poison and used to
10 kill Castro.

11 Are you saying that the agent may have done this without
12 the knowledge of the Director or the Deputy Director for Plans,
13 someone high in the Agency?

14 Mr. Breckinridge. No; I am saying there should have been
15 authorization. I don't know the level of that authorization. I
16 merely tried to draw a distinction because it is a question raised
17 in my mind, it was raised by Senator Schweiker's question -- when
18 was the last attempt of assassination?

19 This developed to the point where assassination was
20 involved, and this was the last such interest that we know of.

21 Senator Schweiker. Are you saying after the incident that
22 Senator Church just asked you about, at that point the emphasis
23 shifted from assassinating him to replacing him?

24 Is that what you are trying to tell us, or did I misconstrue
25 that, too?

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1 Mr. Breckinridge. No; I am confusing the issue by trying
2 to describe the state of mind of the people who were involved i
3 the operation.

4 Chairman Church. We don't even know who were involved. Y
5 tell us that.

6 Mr. Breckinridge. As far as I know, Mr. Fitzgerald would
7 be the highest level that I know was aware of this.

8 Chairman Church. What was his position? We are back to
9 that.

10 Mr. Colby. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

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tape 1

1 Senator Morgan. Is he dead?

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2 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Breckinridge. The problem that you are having, which
4 is one that we have, is reconstructing certain aspects of this,
5 quite frankly, and we have attempted to reconstruct it by the
6 record, where the record supports it by interviews, where the
7 interviews can fill gaps, and it was of some interest to
8 try to get from the people involved their rationale. The
9 rationale is difficult, complex, and I have tried to convey
10 that because it was brought to my mind by Senator Schweicker's
11 question.

12 Mr. Colby: If I could help interpret this from a cultural
13 pattern.

14 I think the point is that we located this major, he
15 looked like a very promising contact within Cuba who could
16 possibly replace Castro or bring about his disposition, and so
17 forth, just remove him without any specifics.

18 In the course of the conversations, the 1963 meeting with
19 the ballpoint pen took place. We don't have any clear record
20 as to who authorized that particular aspect of the relationship
21 concerning the ballpoint pen. The fact that we then went on
22 with him until '64 and '65 with the offers of weapons fits
23 into the general support of that effort and doesn't necessarily
24 coincide with the deliberate attempts to assassinate him,
25 although it could, and our records don't clearly indicate one

1 way or the other on that.

2 Chairman Church. A cache of weapons delivered on the
3 coast of Cuba hardly constitutes an arsenal by which it reasons
4 could be assumed that the government can be overthrown. It
5 does, however, fit into a scheme of providing the major and
6 his cohorts with a capability of assassinating the Cuban leader
7 Mr. Colby. It also coincides with the possibility of
8 the first step toward additional arms.

9 I am not denying it, Mr. Chairman. I am saying that the
10 records don't clearly indicate it, and this gets back to Mr.
11 Schwarz's original question to me -- can you define "assassina-
12 tion"?

13 I would respectfully request that I don't get into that
14 because there is a question as to when you are supporting armed
15 action and when you are committing an assassination.

16 Chairman Church. All right. During this whole period
17 we understand that the Director of the CIA, who was Mr. McCone,
18 had said he had no knowledge of these ongoing activities.

19 Mr. Colby. I would imagine that his testimony that he
20 did not know of an assassination would be consistent with my
21 comment as to the weapons being given in support of armed action
22 but not the specific assassination plans. I don't know that
23 but I am saying that is a possible explanation of the difference
24 between those stories.

25 Chairman Church. We will have to question Mr. McCone much

1 more closely on that point.

2 But you are unable now to tell us in connection with these
3 later activities whether or not there was specific knowledge
4 of their connection with the assassination purpose, above the
5 level of Mr. Fitzgerald?

6 Mr. Brackinridge. At this moment I cannot.

7 Senator Morgan. May I pursue a line of questions for just
8 a few minutes?

9 First of all, Mr. Schwarz, this document, Exhibit A, who
10 prepared it?

11 This is the original rough draft that was prepared only
12 by the typists?

13 Mr. Schwarz. That is the Ken Greer document.

14 Mr. Colby. Prepared by one of Mr. Brackinridge's
15 associates, Mr. Kenneth Greer.

16 Senator Morgan. What was the purpose of the preparation
17 of this document?

18 Mr. Colby. It followed the 9th of May, 1973 directive
19 by Mr. Schlesinger for a report on all questionable activities.
20 These were gathered together by Mr. Greer and the other members
21 of the Inspector General's office and a summary of them was
22 provided to me to use to brief the Chairman of the two committees.

23 Senator Morgan. This was the best information that the
24 Agency was able to obtain at the time?

25 Mr. Colby. That was the information available to the

1 Inspector General at the time. I think I would say it was abl
2 I don't think we instituted an aggressive, positive investigat
3 We rather collected what we had available.

4 Senator Morgan. Well, there have been assassination
5 attempts or efforts on the part of the government. There's no
6 question in my mind. The question I want to pursue is that
7 in the document marked here Exhibit A, project ZR Rifle, it
8 stated that early in the Kennedy Administration, "the White
9 House urged Richard Bissel to create an executive action
10 capability."

11 That is a general standby capability to carry out
12 assassinations.

13 Now, that was the primary purpose of ZR Rifle; is that
14 your understanding?

15 Mr. Colby. It was one of the purposes of the ZR Rifle
16 project.

17 Senator Morgan. And it was done at the instigation of
18 "the White House"?

19 Mr. Colby. We have one record which states that Mr.
20 Bissel made this statement without further precision.

21 Senator Morgan. And where is Mr. Bissel?

22 Mr. Colby. Mr. Bissel, I think, lives in Connecticut now.

23 Senator Morgan. Now later on we find that this project
24 continued on under a man by the name of Bill Harvey, did it
25 not?

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1 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

2 Senator Morgan. And then on June 27, 1973, he wrote
3 a memorandum to the Chief FI staff.

4 What does FI staff mean?

5 Mr. Colby. A foreign intelligence staff.

6 Senator Morgan. Stating that the original justification
7 for employing Q.J. Winn no longer existed and raised the
8 question of his termination?

9 Mr. Colby. '63 was it?

10 Senator Morgan. June of 1963. He was terminated in
11 April of 1964?

12 Mr. Colby. Yes.

13 Senator Morgan. Now there is no doubt in your mind but
14 what this project was known by the Director of the CIA?

15 Mr. Colby. Approved by the Director. I don't think we
16 can say for sure.

17 Senator Morgan. Mr. Colby, isn't it a reasonable assumption
18 that if a project of this magnitude was to carry out the
19 assassination, it would not be created without the approval
20 of the Director of the CIA?

21 Mr. Colby. It better not be created without my approval
22 now, I will guarantee you.

23 Senator Morgan. It certainly is not reasonable to assume
24 that even in 1961 it would have been so created?

25 Mr. Colby. I would think that the general idea. Whether

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the specific project or not but the general idea is so significant, and that is the indication that Mr. Dulles did know of this act at the time. Whether it was specifically brought to the attention of his successor I could not actually testify one way or the other.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Colby, can you make any more sensitive a project at the CIA than one of assassination?

Mr. Colby. When Mr. Schlesinger came in I made sure he was aware of anything I knew.

Senator Morgan. And this being true, aren't you satisfied in your own mind that all your directors were aware of this project ZR Rifle until such time as it was terminated?

Mr. Colby. That is a conclusion, Senator. I can't give testimony on that.

Senator Morgan. It is a conclusion, but you are an expert.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator Morgan. You are the Director of the CIA and you have had the experience and knowledge of the history of the CIA.

Let me ask you, based upon your history, the history and the knowledge of the CIA that you know of, have as Director, and you have gained as Director, aren't you satisfied that every director knew of this project?

Mr. Colby. In the face of the statement by Mr. McCone that

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1 he did not know of it, I find that statement difficult to
2 challenge.

3 I agree with you, he should have known about it, but I
4 could not say for sure that statement is not accurate.

5 Senator Morgan. One final question. Mr. McCone left
6 the Agency when?

7 Mr. Colby. In 1965.

8 Senator Morgan. I won't ask any other questions except
9 for the record I would like to say this so I can remember why
10 I was pursuing this later on.

11 I asked these questions not to try to show the assassination
12 plan, because I think that has already been established, and
13 if that is all we are after we can move on to something else.

14 But the thing that does concern me is that if this project
15 continued on until and past the time that President Kennedy
16 was assassinated, then it raises a question in my mind as to
17 whether or not Castro himself may not well have known about it
18 and whether or not the President's assassination may not have
19 been a part of a recrimination plan and it may just open the
20 door to whether or not later on we should decide to look into
21 that.

Tape 22 That is the reason I have followed that line of questions.

Chairman Church. Senator Hart.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Colby, in connection with ZR Rifle, I think you testified or your associate said this was a multi-purpose operation, including stealing codes, and the development of the capability of what euphemistically is called executive action.

In your professional judgment, and with your history of your background in the Agency, does it make any sense to you that a major operation, a major intelligence gathering operation of the sort of stealing codes, which I assume means from other governments, would be mounted under the direction of a man about whom all I know is that Mr. Harvey has a background of something like a soldier of fortune, and funded at the level, I should say, of \$7500 to \$10,000?

Does it not suggest to you that stealing codes was in fact an internal cover for what was explicitly an assassination operation with unlimited, non-voucher financial capability?

Mr. Colby. No, not that it is purely a cover.

In the first place, Mr. Harvey had a very successful tour in Berlin where he ran the Berlin tunnel operation, which was one of our major successful intelligence operations.

Mr. Harvey was a very colorful figure who had his lifestyle, which is different than some others, but he had been very effective at that, and very adventuresome in that category of signals intelligence and a very venturesome idea of that nature.

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1 He was in the assignment of Chief of the FI Division staff.
2 That staff's major function is to conduct the signals intelligence
3 work which must be done in the clandestine service.

4 It handles our efforts today to penetrate into foreign
5 code rooms abroad, and things of that nature, and it involves
6 the breaking into of safes and things, all that complicated
7 material.

8 Now, the thing that puts it together with this "capability"
9 executive action, is the high degree of compartmentation of
10 this material, that kind of a project. In other words, a
11 code-breaking, a stealing operation, obviously that is to be
12 kept very, very secret. If you get caught in it, it has all
13 sorts of very bad diplomatic implications, and so forth.
14 Therefore, there is a system of very sharp compartmentation of
15 the work of that particular group.

16 You also are dealing with some very venturesome people
17 who are willing to crawl into somebody else's code room and
18 take the chance of getting caught.

19 So, given you have a man who had some good technical
20 experience, who is a venturesome type himself and is running a
21 program which is not too far off the requirements of high
22 compartmentation, and a very high risk kind of operation, and
23 therefore, for Mr. Bissel to have selected Harvey to carry out
24 this project seems to me that it is compatible that he could
25 be running code-breaking projects, or code stealing projects,

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1 as well as this other activity.

2 Now, in the lifestyle at the time, not mentioning the second
3 one, this gets back into the recordkeeping that we have been
4 discussing. It was not to be put on the record although to be
5 done. That is a perfectly proper hypothesis, it seems to me,
6 but to say that the code stealing was only a cover I think is
7 probably an unwarranted conclusion.

8 Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the level of funding
9 of \$7,500 to \$10,000?

10 Mr. Colby. That is not very much money for that kind of
11 an operation.


12 Senator Hart of Colorado. Precisely. I think it is too
13 little.

14 Mr. Colby. No. For a capability of that nature, it is
15 largely a staff operation. In other words, you use your own
16 staff officers. You may hire an agent or something, but I don't
17 think you can draw much conclusion from the actual number on
18 the figure one way or the other.

19 This might not have been the only such project. You know,
20 an assassination project would cost you more money than that,
21 too.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. Absolutely.

23 Mr. Colby. I find it hard to say that that is the only
24 amount of money involved. I think you get into a situation
25 where additional money would be put into either of those kinds



1 of activities. I wouldn't get hung up on the bureaucratic
2 aspect of the number of dollars.

3 Senator Hart of Colorado. So Mr. Harvey, if the decision
4 were made to try to liquidate a foreign leader, and Mr. Harvey
5 found the instrumentality, the individual to do that, and that
6 required \$100,000, all he had to do was come back in and say?

7 Mr. Colby. He could get it.

8 Mr. Schwarz. I think we should have the record reflect
9 two things. The two gentlemen talking are not eyewitnesses to
10 what we have been talking about.

11 Second, and related to that, for us to pursue this matter,
12 we must have, and must have right away, the better evidence
13 which is in the possession of the CIA, which is at least the
14 Inspector General report of 1967; and more importantly than that,
15 the interview notes reflecting whatever interviews you had
16 with whomever you interviewed at that time or later.

17 Mr. Colby. These we will make available to you to the
18 extent we have them.

19 Mr. Breckinridge. We retained no notes. We kept only the
20 one report that we submitted to Mr. Helms at that time, the one
21 copy. When he left the Agency he returned it to us.

22 Now, the files on the Cubella affair and the Trujillo affair,
23 exist, and they are available.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Can we have it understood that, Mr.
25 Breckinridge, you will as you did with the initial material,

END OF REPORT

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1 come down sometime early next week and we can go over it and
2 so forth?

3 Mr. Colby. Sure. If we can just have the same sort of
4 normal ground rules about the papers.

5 Chairman Church. Sure. They always apply unless --

6 Mr. Colby. I know.

7 Chairman Church. -- unless we say differently.

8 Mr. Schwarz. No, just following up one more thing on
9 Senator Hart's question of some time ago.

10 Would you determine with respect to five different periods
11 of time whether, first, there was any internal evaluation
12 within the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether or not
13 the assassination attempts should continue and, second, whether
14 there was any discussions with persons outside of the Central
15 Intelligence Agency as to whether or not the plot should continue
16 and the period of time would be the initial authorization, which
17 was March 1960, after the Bay of Pigs, during the missile
18 crisis. And, parenthetically there, will you state whether it
19 was possible Castro might have been assassinated pursuant to
20 an ongoing plan during a period of time when the United States
21 and Russia were close to a nuclear confrontation. The next
22 case is John F. Kennedy's assassination.

23 Finally, at the time of the break-off in June of 1965,
24 which I believe was Mr. Breckinridge's testimony, was anybody in
25 higher authority told that the operation had been broken off?

END OF RECORD

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1 Because that will bear upon whether anybody in higher authority
2 had authorized or requested the operation.

3 Mr. Colby. Yes, fine.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Can I pick up then on another subject which
5 we just barely touched on last time, Mr. Colby?

6 This is related to the question I asked you about the use
7 of criminal elements.

8 Senator Mathias. Before we leave this, I have one question.

9 Chairman Church. Senator Mathias.

10 Senator Mathias. In light of the fact this poison pen was
11 actually proffered on the 22nd of November, 1963, is there a
12 scintilla of evidence -- and was proffered to a Major in the
13 Cuban Army on active duty -- is there a scintilla of evidence
14 that anyone in the Cuban Government had any knowledge or suspicion
15 prior to that date that this was a project that was planned?

16 Mr. Colby. There is certainly no evidence that anyone
17 had that information with respect to the Cubella operation.

18 Mr. Breckinridge. No.


19 Mr. Colby. The second phase of the Mafia operation had been
20 wrapped up by then, I think.

21 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

22 Mr. Colby. The individual in Cuba involved in it had
23 take asylum, I think.

24 Mr. Breckinridge. No, the sequence is a little different.

25 Mr. Colby. A little later:



1 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. There were people who reportedly
2 were sent into Cuba, a team of three people -- and I said reported
3 because we were working then through a Cuban exile leader.

4 They had the assignment of recruiting additional people to
5 carry out such plans as might be developed. We never knew what
6 happened to those people -- whether they came back -- only that
7 they were sent in.

8 But if you are looking for a possibility of knowledge of
9 an assassination plot, conceivably those three people could be
10 the source of it, but not that the United States Government was
11 behind it.

12 Senator Mathias. But it is conceivable that Castro and
13 his government could have come upon some evidence that some
14 plot was afoot?

15 Mr. Colby. He certainly could have cross allegations, and
16 you really must assume that various of the other kind, even
17 independent activities, or the first phase of the Mafia program
18 could have produced allegations of attempts against him with
19 the comment that CIA or the United States was behind it. The
20 possibility of that kind of allegation is just almost infinite.

21 Senator Mathias. Particularly considering the nature of
22 the instruments that were being deployed?

23 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Breckinridge. There is another consideration.

25 Chairman Church. You really haven't told us on the record



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1 until just now, in response to Senator Mathias, just what the
2 second phase of the Mafia connection for assassination Castro
3 was. We really haven't had the detail except as you gave it
4 to Senator Mathias.

5 I wonder if you could complete the record on this second
6 phase. Give us all the information that you know about that.

7 Mr. Breckinridge. Before I do, one additional consideration

8 The Cuban exile community in Miami was engaged in a great
9 deal of plotting of its own and a great deal of hyperbole, and
10 it is safe to assume that Castro also had reports of assassination
11 schemes or threats from that group. So there is one more source
12 to that sort of thing.

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2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

Senator Morgan. Where is Cubella now? Is he still in prison?

Mr. Breckinridge. In jail on the Isle of Pines.

Senator Morgan. Are we sure of that?

Mr. Breckinridge. I asked somebody the other day and they said that is where they think he is.

Senator Morgan. I just wondered whose agent he really was.

Mr. Colby. He has been in jail for a long time if he was Castro's.

Senator Morgan. You testified he was able to go in and out of Cuba fairly frequently.

Mr. Colby. He was an associate of Castro's, there is no question about that, but he had an independent relation with us that finally got picked up. I think that is important, Mr. Chairman, that we try to keep his name out of any published documents for that reason. There is no use getting him in more trouble.

Senator Schweicker. That is for sure.

Chairman Church. There is no argument on that score.

Would you please furnish us with all of the details as to the second phase of the Mafia connection?

Mr. Breckinridge. We will give you more accurate detail when we give you the report, but I will recite now the best that I can recall.

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1 Chairman Church. Before you do, would you just explain
2 exactly what the relationship between CIA and Giancana and
3 Maheu was because that is not clear in my mind.

4 Would you develop for the Committee that whole relationship?

5 Mr. Breckinridge. Robert Maheu used to work for the
6 FBI and he resigned from the FBI and opened a private investiga-
7 tive firm here in Washington and CIA used him from time to
8 time for certain kinds of support activities.

9 Chairman Church. What kind of support activities?

10 Mr. Breckinridge. On one occasion he obtained a female
11 companion for an important foreign leader.

12 Chairman Church. What other kind of support?

13 Mr. Breckinridge. In the early days -- and this becomes
14 an embarrassment. As nearly as I can reconstruct, the people
15 who knew him decided to put him on a retainer in the Office
16 of Security, which they did for awhile, until he was so
17 successful he said he no longer needed the retainer, which he
18 didn't do much to earn. He later got involved representing
19 one of the Greek shipping interests and we were given the
20 results of some of the information that he obtained from that
21 where there was a fight between Niarchos and Onassis. We
22 think he may have had some involvement in another foreign
23 leader's companionship when he was in this country. I don't
24 have the details. I think we can probably reconstruct it for
25 you.

1 Chairman Church. Can we have the file on him?

2 Mr. Breckinridge. I think we will provide one on that.

3 We have one, yes.

4 Chairman Church. Very well.

5 Mr. Breckinridge. When Maheu left Washington and moved
6 out west, I think first to Los Angeles, later to Las Vegas,
7 where he became associated with the Hughes organization, and
8 when the question arose about getting an introduction to the
9 Mafia, because they did have gambling interests in Cuba at
10 that time, the Office of Security, Colonel Edwards was asked
11 if he could establish a contact, and he went to Maheu, or
12 had someone go to Maheu, to see if Maheu could make such an
13 introduction.

14 Maheu knew a man by the name of Johnny Roselli, who
15 lived in Los Angeles, who had the concession for the icemaking
16 machines on the strip in Las Vegas, and he arranged, Roselli
17 arranged an introduction to -- the CIA actually arranged,
18 our man didn't meet Giancana, I don't believe, arranged an
19 introduction, but Giancana who in turn arranged an introduction
20 to a man by the name of Santos Trafficante.

21 Trafficante was the head of the Cuban gambling interests
22 and Castro had allowed them. First he had closed them, then
23 he reopened them hoping to attract tourists. And Trafficante
24 travelled to and from Cuba.

25 Giancana served only as the introduction to Trafficante.

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1 This was all done through Roselli.

2 Our people never -- they all dealt with Roselli, who in
3 turn deal with the others.

4 Roselli was in essence a cut-out or served as the middle
5 man. Roselli was never paid for his services.

6 Giancana clearly knew eventually the government association.
7 Roselli came to know of it, though initially he was introduced
8 to the CIA person as a man who worked for Maheu on an assignment
9 by a private client.

10 So initially the cover story was Maheu's private client
11 who had an interest inside Cuba. Giancana never really was
12 involved subsequently.

13 He did arrange -- it was Trafficante from then on -- and
14 Trafficante had a source inside Cuba who had an office, had
15 a position in the Office of the Prime Minister. He was believed
16 to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that
17 he was to insert into Castro's food. The pills were sent in
18 to this man. What we did not know at the time was the man
19 had lost his job and lost his access and the pills were returned.

20 Mr. Colby. That is the first phase.

21 Senator Schweicker. Would you date that?

22 Mr. Breckinridge. That would go into the early part of
23 1961, March-April, 1961.

24 Mr. Schwarz. The pills were given as part of the first
25 phase to a second person in Cuba; is that correct?

END OF RECORD

1 Mr. Breckinridge. Just before the first phase ended,
2 Roselli, through Trafficante, was introduced to another Cuban
3 exile leader in Miami by the name of Anthony Varona. Again,
4 his name is a sensitive matter.

5 Varona was the leader of one of the groups that was being
6 supported by the CIA as part of the preparation for the Bay
7 of Pigs.

8 Varona was unhappy with his association, with the associatio
9 with the CIA. He felt he had not been given enough money.
10 Varona had previous contact with the criminal element in Cuba
11 and he was approached by Roselli with Trafficante's introduction
12 to take on this mission.

13 Roselli's story was that he represented some private client
14 who had interest in Cuba. The Roselli identity was apparant,
15 as was Trafficante's.

16 Varona said he knew someone who was in a restaurant that
17 Castro frequented and then the pills were transported again.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Could you state for the record who made the
19 pills?

20 Mr. Breckinridge. The pills were made in what was then
21 the Technical Services Division of the CIA.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Had they ever made such pills before?

23 Mr. Breckinridge. Not that I know of.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Had they ever used Botulinum as a poison in
25 any way before?

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1 Mr. Breckinridge. On one previous occasion Botulinum
2 had been considered for use on cigars that someone had hoped
3 to get to Castro, and eventually that never got off the ground.
4 This was a scheme that was never approved and never went forward.
5 I know of that one instance in which it was considered.

6 Botulinum was made into pills and these pills were taken
7 again to Cuba. Castro stopped going to the restaurant where
8 this man was. The Bay of Pigs occurred and the operation
9 was called off.

10 When Harvey took over and then reactivated the second phase
11 in April of 1962, they went back to Varona, and one of the
12 strange things is that Varona started off with the repetition
13 of the original restaurant approach, which I think caused
14 some question as to the gap between what we were told and
15 what was happening.

16 Varona after this didn't materialize. Varona then stated
17 that he had sent three men into Cuba whose job was to recruit
18 additional people for such plan as may develop. He later
19 planned to send in three more people. We don't believe they
20 ever went. The missile crisis intervened. There were a number
21 of delays and we don't think they ever did go in.

22 The first three men, if in fact they did go in -- we
23 don't know who they were, we don't know what they did, we
24 don't know whether they came out or not.

25 As a matter of interest, the man who was to go back --

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1 Chairman Church. It is possible they went in and could
2 have been captured by Castro?

3 Mr. Breckinridge. It is possible.

4 The question that Senator Morgan asked earlier, what they
5 could have known -- these men we don't believe could have known
6 the actual backers of the operation, because Varona was dealing
7 with a member of the syndicate with whom he had previous
8 connections. The people who dealt with Varona felt that Roselli
9 was discreet and careful.

10 But those men could have been captured. They could have
11 supplied the interpretation that they might not have known.

12 Nothing came of the operation, it was called off, but
13 essentially that is the first and second phase.

14 Chairman Church. These three men were to be sent from --
15 Mr. Breckinridge. They were Cuban exiles.

16 Chairman Church. To be sent in from the United States?

17 Mr. Colby. From the United States.

18 Chairman Church. And why is it you don't know whether or
19 not they were sent?

20 Mr. Breckinridge. The question exists in my mind. I
21 am not sure it exists in other people's minds.

22 As I reviewed the record, when we got the record back, in
23 preparation for these inquiries, I was struck by the fact that
24 Varona had told us at the very end of the first phase that
25 he was using this restaurant, and when a year later the phase

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1 was reactivated, the same story was used and already had been
2 proven not to be so.

3 Later he talked in general terms about the three men and
4 I began to develop some reservation in my mind as to whether
5 or not Varona had in fact told us the truth.

6 That is purely speculation on my part.

7 Mr. Colby. This is a problem we live with in the intelligence
8 business. When you are not able to be in direct contact, for
9 good reasons you are subject to fabrication, particularly if
10 there is some money involved.

11 Chairman Church. Did the CIA, in connection with phase
12 one or phase two, pay any of these agents for their services?

13 Mr. Breckinridge. In phase one I think we paid expense
14 money. In phase two we gave money to Varona.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And to Roselli?

16 Mr. Breckinridge. We paid expense money for Roselli.

17 Mr. Schwarz. You paid him money to buy guns?

18 Mr. Breckinridge. I was going to tell the gun story.

19 Varona wanted money and guns and some of the equipment that
20 he specified could be obtained only from the United States
21 military. And the equipment that was acquired at that time
22 did not include that kind of equipment. It included equipment
23 that could be obtained from other sources and excluded U.S.
24 military equipment. It was provided through the assistance
25 of the [redacted] A U-Haul truck was picked up and delivered.

1 I know.

2 - Mr. Breckinridge. The first man who had the job in the
3 Office of the Prime Minister, this man did get kickbacks from
4 the criminals. I think that must be the one you remember. He
5 took refuge in the Venezuelan embassy and stayed there until
6 1964. He finally was given safe conduct to pass out. The
7 Mexican embassy took over from Venezuela. Cuba broke diplomatic
8 relations. He continued to be a political refugee in that
9 embassy until the fall of 1964.

10 Chairman Church. What was Varona's motive for participating
11 in the plot?

12 Mr. Breckinridge. Varona was one of the exile leaders
13 who wanted to overthrow Castro. He wanted more financing than
14 he had. He would cooperate with anyone.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to pick up on the discussion
2 we had.

3 Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz has five minutes more, and
4 we will conclude, and I would like to ask the Committee to stay
5 on for ten more minutes for an executive session.

6 Mr. Schwarz. In the discussion we had on the use of
7 criminal elements, we have dealt with the Castro operation.

8 In the middle of the book supplied to us by Mr. Breckinridge
9 earlier this week, there is a discussion about the Lumumba
10 operation, and the Agent Q. J. Win.

11 Now, is it a fact that Q. J. Win was the agent, or asset,
12 however you would refer to him, who apparently was considered
13 for the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which never took place;
14 is that right?

15 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Now, is it accurate that Q. J. Win operated
17 in Europe trying to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency
18 could use in safecracking operations?

19 Mr. Colby. This is what is reported, and it is quite
20 possible.

21 Mr. Breckinridge. The record indicates that.

22 Mr. Schwarz. And is it further so that one of the CIA
23 officers who first met Q. J. Win in Luxembourg, was on a
24 trip overseas to find safecrackers and document suppliers?

25 Mr. Colby. Yes, that is what it says.

1 Mr. Schwarz. Now, just as a matter of historical record,
2 is the OSS the predecessor of the CIA in some sense?

3 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Is it correct that "Lucky" Luciano was used
5 to help the OSS in connection with operations in Italy during
6 the Second World War?

7 Mr. Colby. I don't know, but I have heard that story
8 as well. It is an extensive story but I don't know the facts.

9 Mr. Schwarz. For the record, Mr. Luciano was a Mafia
10 figure who had been deported from the United States, or was in
11 jail in the United States?

12 Mr. Colby. Was in jail, I guess, and was later deported
13 after the War.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with the instructions which
15 you issued in 1973 concerning activities outside of the Charter
16 of the CIA, you received, as we went through the other day, a
17 report from the Inspector General leading up to that in May of
18 1973?

19 Mr. Colby. That is right.

20 Mr. Schwarz. And was part of the report that the CIA
21 had itself conducted for local police departments in Washington,
22 Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria, during the period 1968 and
23 1969, a series of classes in items which included basics in
24 surveillance, photography, basic audio and countersabotage; and
25 in addition, this is what I particularly call your attention to,

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1 locks and picks and surreptitious entry?

2 Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Schwarz. I am now reading from pages 225 and 226 of
4 the 694 pages, which I will mark as Exhibit No. 6.

5 (The above-mentioned document was
6 marked as Colby Exhibit No. 6
7 for identification.)

8 Mr. Schwarz. Is it the fact that, for example, between
9 October 7 and October 18, 1968, the CIA conducted a course for
10 the Washington Police Department in the subject of surreptitious
11 entry?

12 Mr. Colby. It was included in that, yes.

13 Mr. Schwarz. What was the purpose of conducting such a
14 course?

15 Mr. Colby. We had a relationship with various police
16 departments around the country. They from time to time would
17 like to learn our knowledge of certain subjects that are quite
18 unique to the CIA. There are a number of things that we have
19 to do in CIA which are quite frankly outside the norm of most
20 other agencies of the Government.

21 Chairman Church. Doesn't surreptitious entry refer to
22 illegal entry?

23 Mr. Colby. Going in secretly, that is what it means.
24 Entering secretly in some fashion or other, yes.

25 Chairman Church. That is an illegal activity for local

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1 police, is it not?

2 Mr. Colby. Presumably, yes.

3 Chairman Church. Why is CIA conducting courses teaching
4 local police illegal activity, i.e., to conduct illegal operations?

5 Mr. Colby. I think at that time, Mr. Chairman, that was
6 at the request of the police department of that area, that they
7 were interested in this thing, and there is a defensive element
8 of it. In order to know how to protect against something, it
9 is well to know how it is actually conducted.

10 Chairman Church. Do you construe this activity to be
11 within the law, the basic statute which restricts your domestic
12 activities?

13 Mr. Colby. I don't think it is a violation of the law,
14 Mr. Chairman.

15 I did give some directive on that in 1973, that we not
16 engage in this anymore, in compliance with the spirit of the
17 amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
18 Act, which says that CIA will not provide support to the LEAA
19 in its assistance to local police departments. And as far as
20 I was concerned, that is a policy that they don't want CIA in
21 touch with local police departments.

22 The fact of sharing our knowledge of techniques with a
23 local police department does not in my mind get us into actually
24 conducting domestic police activity. There is a difference
25 there.

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1 Chairman Church. Yes. But apart from the technical
2 question of your jurisdiction, when you engage in teaching local
3 police departments how to conduct break-ins, surreptitious
4 break-ins, you are teaching them how to break the law.

5 Mr. Colby. You are teaching them how the law is broken.

6 Chairman Church. That is right.

7 Mr. Colby. Which can be useful to them in their knowledge
8 of how the law is broken, the techniques that are feasible.

9 Chairman Church. Or can be useful to them in knowing how
10 to break the law?

11 Mr. Colby. It could. It is an item of information that
12 they can use in any way they wish, either properly or improperly.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any situations where govern-
14 mental officials, either state, local or Federal, have in fact
15 engaged in break-ins within the United States?

16 Mr. Colby. I know of certain situations related to foreign
17 intelligence operations where access to appropriate targets has
18 been obtained either through subterfuge of pretending to be a
19 workman or something of that nature, and I think in that history
20 there are some cases of actual break-ins.

21 Now, I assure you, Mr. Chairman, we have been conducting
22 break-ins abroad. There is no question about that. That is,
23 we train our people to be able to do that.

24 Chairman Church. That is not the question I am raising
25 with you.

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2 In other words, these courses, it is my impression, were
3 generalized discussions of techniques. They were not particular
4 handholding on conducting a specific operation.

5 I think I am accurate in that statement.

6 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Colby, just a couple of quick questions.

7 First, with regard to the files, memoranda or diaries you
8 might have of former directors, are those still on Agency
9 premises? Do you have those matters still there that were
10 left by former Directors?

11 Mr. Colby. Certain ones we do. I don't know of any that
12 we don't have.

13 As far as I am concerned, they are Agency property, and when
14 I leave I am going to walk out without any paper.

15 Mr. Smothers. With respect then to the inquiries you have
16 made with regard to information in the files on assassinations,
17 have these inquiries extended to an examination of those files
18 of former Directors?

19 Mr. Breckinridge. In one or two instances on specific
20 points we have made inquiries. We have not gone through the
21 files in general for that purpose.

22 Mr. Colby. We have gone through that collection I know of
23 Mr. Helms' files. I don't know of any specific set of files
24 called Mr. McCone's files.

25 There is an executive registry where my correspondence is

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1 kept, for instance.

2 Mr. Smothers. What I am searching for is the situation
3 where the generic classification of materials might somehow
4 have not been complete enough for us to get particular knowledge
5 and I was wondering prior to our next meeting if a search
6 oriented with respect to the issue of knowledge might be a
7 fruitful exercise?

8 Mr. Colby. Knowledge by previous directors of specifics
9 on this topic?

10 Mr. Smothers. Yes.

11 Mr. Colby. I think it is easy for Mr. Helms. I think
12 we have gone through his files. I don't know of any separate
13 set of files on Mr. Dulles or Mr. McCone. We will look.

14 Senator Mondale. There is a reference to John McCone's
15 files in one of the memos that I looked at this morning.

16 Mr. Colby. I will check that, Senator.

17 Chairman Church. That is a good point, and I am glad you
18 have raised it.

19 I think we will conclude the hearing at this point with
20 the understanding, Mr. Colby, we will be back in touch with you.

21 Mr. Colby. Surely. Many times, I think, Mr. Chairman.

22 Chairman Church. Yes.

23 I ~~think~~ that next week we will not have any formal meetings
24 of the ~~Committee~~, owing to the recess, but we will then, I
25 think, we are going to have to go into tri-weekly meetings,

1 beginning after the recess, so we can step up the pace for the
2 investigation.

3 Senator Mondale. If they could get the Lansdale memo.

4 Mr. Colby. I will do that this afternoon.

5 I would like to add two things that have come to my attention
6 on the subject of assassinations, both of which are allegations,
7 both of which have been knocked down.

8 There was an allegation, some man has alleged that he was
9 working or conducting an assassination in Colombia, and we have
10 looked into the specifics of it, and there is absolutely nothing
11 to it. I thought I would mention it. I have the facts here
12 and will include them at some time.

13 There is another allegation that one of our officers
14 had some knowledge of an attempt against Chou En-Lai, and he has
15 written me a note that points out that it is impossible for that
16 to have happened because he wasn't in the place at the time.

17 Chairman Church. Since they are allegations into which
18 you have inquired, I think you should make the papers available.

19 Mr. Colby. I will make sure the staff gets those.

20 Chairman Church. Thank you very much.

21 Mr. Knoche. Could I point out, I think we have the answer
22 to the photographs.

23 There were seven of these photographs taken at different
24 angles at the same time, but absolutely different time intervals,
25 during the time that the police had these men in custody.

2 Mr. Knoche. I am not sure. I am not certain for that
3 particular board that you were looking at.

4 With the blowup, they took this one of the seven photographs
5 which gives the best opportunity to look at the face.

6 Mr. Colby. So they were separate photographs.

7 Chairman Church. Yes.

8 Mr. Knoche. I will be glad to leave that with you if you
9 would like to have it for your file.

10 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee
11 recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

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13 Photocopy from
14 Gerald Ford Library
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TOP SECRET