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YURI IVANOVIICH NOSENKO -- Resumed

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Tuesday, June 20, 1978

U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 6:20 o'clock
p.m., in Room 1-D, Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency,
Langley, Virginia, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman of
the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Burke, Fithian,
Devine and Sawyer.

Also present: G. R. Blakey, G. Cornwell, M. Goldsmith,
R. Morrison, E. Berning, M. Jackson, J. Smith, K. Klein and
S. Brady.

The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

At this time the Committee will resume its sitting. We are still in executive session by virtue of the resolution
adopted by the Committee this past evening.

At this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Anything further?

Bring the witness in.

Let the record reflect that the Committee has resumed its sitting and at this time the witness, Yuri Nosenko, is back before the Committee once again.

Mr. Nosenko, I admonish you that you are still under the oath that you took last night.

TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOICH NOSENKO.-- Resumed

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And at this time, then, the Committee will recognize the counsel for the Committee, Mr. Klein.

Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good evening.

Mr. Nosenko. Good evening, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us that after the assassination you had an opportunity to be present when Oswald's file was brought from Minsk, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to read the entire file at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. How much of the file did you read?

Mr. Nosenko. It was simply looking, page by page, first part of the first volume.
Mr. Klein. You went through the first part of the first volume, page by page?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you go through any of the other volumes?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us that an officer named Matveev took the file away to prepare a summary?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you know who wrote that summary?

Mr. Nosenko. The summary was written by the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

Mr. Klein. Do you know who, in particular?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not know.

Mr. Klein. And did you ever have an opportunity to read the summary that the First Department prepared?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; I didn't see it.

Mr. Klein. The Russian word "spravka", does that mean —

Mr. Nosenko. Is summary, right.

Mr. Klein. And why were you not able to read the summary that they wrote?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, the file was taken in the First Department. I was working in the Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. Did you make any attempt to read it?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Was it at all unusual that with all your
involvement in the case you did not have an opportunity to
read that file?

Mr. Nosenko. It was the decision of the Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate, given big importance to this question,
that a resume will be prepared by the most prestigious depart-
ment, American Department, and that is why we couldn't even ask.

Mr. Klein. You didn't even ask to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. So it was not unusual that you were not
allowed to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it was not unusual.

Mr. Klein. You have testified before this Committee that
the KGB did not allow Lee Harvey Oswald to defect because he
was uninteresting. You have testified the KGB did not even speak
to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you
decided he was not interesting without speaking to him.

Do you know what year Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet
Union?

Mr. Nosenko. 1959.

Mr. Klein. In 1959, approximately how many Americans
wanted to defect to the Soviet Union or requested permission to
defect?

Mr. Nosenko. There was a defectionist, I remember, one
of the employees, one of the workers, who was helping to or-
organize the American Exhibition in Moscow, Mr. Webster.
Mr. Klein. Without giving particular names, how many Americans would you say asked permission to defect in 1959?

What would the number be?

Mr. Nosenko. These two were known to me -- Oswald and Webster.

Mr. Klein. From 1955 to 1960, what would be your best estimate as to how many Americans asked permission to defect to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I heard, there I think was one only.

Mr. Klein. One other, meaning three altogether.

Mr. Nosenko. One besides Oswald and Webster, what I know.

Mr. Klein. Three?

Mr. Nosenko. Three.

Mr. Klein. Of the three, was Oswald the only one turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you know any other defector who was ever turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Allow me to tell, as you have seen, and you told yourselves, how many Americans are defected. It is a very rare occasion and KGB prefers defection when they are planning, they want, these types of defectors, they like and invite those people who can
give them certain information which is valuable.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall telling this Committee yesterday
that up until 1960 the Seventh Department was recruiting
left and right?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

Mr. Klein. And that you recruited a woman in Utah who was --

Mr. Nosenko. I simply had given example of this recruit-
ment which took place up to 1960. When Seventh Department was
recruiting and giving files to the Intelligence Service, First
Chief Directorate, not asking them before, is it person will
be for them valuable or not.

Mr. Klein. And that KGB officers were getting bonus
and promotions when they induced people to recruit?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. And despite that, Lee Harvey Oswald, when
he asked to defect, you turned him down without even speaking to
him, to find out if he had any information; is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, we had quite a few recruitments in '59,
a very big amount of them in '59, very interesting, much,
much more interesting -- professors and teachers -- and
even was a COP from CIA. we had quite a few recruitments,
and Oswald was nothing on this base, on this foundation.

Mr. Klein. Would the KGB have any interest in an
American student?

Mr. Nosenko. As I told you yesterday, KGB interested in
students, but particularly those students who are studying the Russian language, Russian history, Russian economy.

Mr. Klein. And would they have any interest in an American who had strong anti-American views and who was a professed Marxist? Would they have any interest in that kind of person?

Mr. Nosenko. Here were are coming to a very interesting and sensitive question. From mid-1950, by the order of Central Committee Communist Party, Soviet Union, KGB was prohibited to make any approachment and recruitment of members of the Communist Party of the West.

Mr. Klein. I am not asking about a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Nosenko. Your question is, and if he is some type of Marxist here, the question maybe he is possibly a member of Communist Party, and to check it for KGB very difficult if he is a member of Communist Party or not of his country.

Mr. Klein. Would they ask him if he is a member of the Communist Party?

Would they check it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they would not ask him.

Mr. Klein. They wouldn't ask him?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Would the Soviet Union be interested in someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?
Mr. Nosenko. It depends. If he was corporal, private, is no big interest. If he was officer, maybe they would be interested.

Mr. Klein. The fact that he worked with the equipment wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; it is not enough because they had sources.

Mr. Klein. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air base where U-2s took off and landed?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir; it would be very interested.

Mr. Klein. It is your testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was a student, who was a professed Marxist, who had --

Mr. Nosenko. Students? I never heard that he was a student.

Mr. Klein. -- who had been a radar operator and had worked on a base from which U-2 airplanes took off and landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I understand your position, but we didn't know that he had any connection with U-2 flights. That is one thing.

And if you, Mr. Klein, are basing on what was written by Mr. Epstein in the book, it is a little bit from the air taken ideas. Mr. Epstein even telling that how important
for KGB to know about such base -- that base. We knew it
in '50's when I worked in GRU at the Navy, in 1950, '51, '52.
We knew every base and in Japan, at this Atsugi Base, and we
knew what kind of airplanes had been. We didn't know about
U-2, no. Sure, it is very interesting, but when Oswald
applied, requested to stay in the Soviet Union, we didn't know
a word about his knowledge, anything concerning U-2 flights.

Mr. Klein. And you didn't ask him if he had any kind of
information about that when he wanted to defect, is that
correct?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. And you told us that one reason that no one
was working on Oswald was because all of your people were
concentrating on the American Exhibition in 1959, is that
correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. Not only American Exhibition,
there were other tourists and among them were interesting
targets, very interesting targets.

Mr. Klein. You told us yesterday that things didn't --

Mr. Nosenko. I can explain you why, because an American
Exhibition in Moscow was by the information which KGB had,
I don't know how much it's right, how much it's wrong, but it
was suspected quite a number of people from American intelli-
gence community who were working on American Exhibition in
Moscow, and when the work is going on against such targets,
it is not one officer, it is a big amount of people involved on each case, because it is very serious target.

Mr. Klein. Do you know what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko: No, sir, I do not.

Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. Without objection.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-2 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at this document --

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Did counsel want to identify for the record how the document has been marked?

The Clerk. JFK-F-2.

Mr. Klein. Looking at this document, does it say on the top "Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department, Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you recognize that type of document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes. It is from Department of giving Visas and Registrations, which is working under auspices of Directorate of Internal Affairs of Moscow City.

Mr. Klein. And does this appear to be an authentic
Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Looking at Number 8, does it say what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union for the first time?

Mr. Nosenko. October, 1959.

Mr. Klein. October what?

Mr. Nosenko. October 16, 1959.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Without objection.

Would the clerk indicate for the record?

The Clerk. JFK-F-3, Mr. Chairman.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-3 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at the newspaper article clipping, on the right hand side, with the heading "U.S. Fair in Soviet Jammed at Close," do you see that?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And what is the date of that story?

Mr. Nosenko. The date is September 4.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that the American Exhibition ended on September 4, more than a month before Oswald came to the Soviet Union?
Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I would like you to ask when Americans who were working for this Exhibition left Moscow.

Mr. Klein. I will ask you another question. Yesterday, when I asked you if things got back to normal once the fair ended, did you say yes?

Mr. Nosenko. No, till they were leave the Soviet Union. No. They are the same targets. Okay, you are right, it is closed September 4th, but does it change the importance of these people against whom KGB was working? They were still in Moscow.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall yesterday my asking you, did things in your department get back to normal once the fair ended, and do you recall saying yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I meaning fair ended when left all the people involved in work on American Exhibition, Americans when they left, and they were staying quite a long time after it was closed. It was closed for visits for Soviet citizens, but it took quite a time for them to leave.

Mr. Klein. You also testified yesterday that Lee Harvey Oswald was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union after he said that he was going to kill himself if they sent him home. You told us that he slashed his wrists and two psychiatrists examined him and both found him mentally unstable.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. What was the point of having the two
psychiatrists examine him?

Mr. Nosenko. I think simply to be assured that it was right found decision, concerning this person. Two independent.

Mr. Klein. After they examined him, the decision was made to let him stay; is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. It is not because of the examination he was allowed to stay, Mr. Klein. You are a little bit mixing things. He was allowed to stay because KGB and Soviet Government had come to the conclusion if this person will kill himself it will bereaction in newspapers, which can in any way hurt the starting, the warming of Soviet-American relations.

Mr. Klein. The Soviets were worried he would kill himself in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, if they would not allow him to stay.

Mr. Klein. Could the KGB have taken him and put him on the next plane out of Russia and thereby ended their whole problem with Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. It is a very sensitive question. He can jump out of car. If he decided, if he is mentally unstable, you don't know what he will do.

Mr. Klein. Do you think the KGB didn't do that because they were worried he might jump out of the car or do something like that?

Mr. Nosenko. Simply a mentally unstable person, they...
Mr. Klein. They would rather keep him in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they would rather prefer they washed their hands, Mr. Klein; they are not making decision, KGB. In Soviet Union decisions are made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and General Secretary and Politburo, not by KGB. KGB a servant of the Politburo and Central Committee Communist Party.

Mr. Klein. Going by the facts as you have told them to this Committee --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. -- why wasn't he put on a plane and sent back to America?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB washed their hands. Then from Intourist it was given information Ministry of Foreign Trade; Ministry of Foreign Trade reported to the Soviet Government. As I said, I assumed the Chairman was surely asked; he told his opinion of the KGB, and up to the Soviet Government how they would decide.

Mr. Klein. Could he have been brought to the U.S. Embassy and told them he is an American, "You take care of him; we don't want him"?

Mr. Nosenko. It can be done, sure. It can be done, but it wasn't done.
Mr. Klein. Instead they elected to allow him to stay indefinitely in the Soviet Union and they have to worry about him every single day, what an unstable American would do, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. They didn't allow, KGB didn't allow. Soviet government allowed.

Mr. Klein. The facts as you have testified to them are that the KGB allowed this mentally unstable person to stay in Russia, and they sent him to Minsk to live and work in a radio factory. Then the KGB allowed this mentally unstable individual to marry a Soviet woman, and then this mentally unstable individual was allowed to join a hunting club where he had access to a gun.

Can you think of any other cases in all the time you worked in the KGB where a mentally unstable person was treated in this kind of manner?

Mr. Nosenko. I told you I do not know any other cases of mentally unstable, excluding one code clerk, American, was also mentally ill; he was delivered in Soviet Union. I heard it. I never have worked with him, I never have seen him. And the thing is, I am sorry, but you are putting and stressing a number of questioning, and it sounds so peculiar. What does it mean, KGB allow him to marry?

Mr. Klein, in the Soviet Union there is by degree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. a law allowing marriage of
Soviet citizens with foreign. A foreigner can marry a Soviet citizen, by the law. There is not a thing that KGB can in any way try not to give, not to make it possible, but this is in cases when the person who is marrying a foreigner worked in some sensitive place, let's say, in missiles, rocket industry production, was in process of any place of his working seeing classified material. In these cases, KGB will try to put different type of fences. But it is unlawful. In accordance with Soviet law, marriage is allowed; he doesn't need to ask permission of Soviet Government or anyone. And his wife, Marina, wasn't working in any place which was sensitive from the point of view of Soviet security.

Mentally unstable it doesn't mean that he is raving mad; it is mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. You testified that not only was Oswald not spoken to when he first said he wanted to defect but even after the decision was made to allow him to remain in the Soviet Union, still nobody from the KGB spoke to him, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You also testified to the extensive resources that were devoted to put physical and technical surveillance on Oswald. You told us the men involved, the time involved, the facilities involved?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you find great contradiction --
Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. -- in the fact that, on the one hand, you put all these resources into following Oswald around, trying to see who he talked to and what he does and, on the other hand, you don't even have a person go and talk to him and ask him, "Tell us your background; tell us about yourself."

Is there any contradiction?

Mr. Nosenko. Even in the United States, yes, sure, for you, for me just now American citizens, yes, sure, but there, no.

Mr. Klein. They don't talk to people there?

Mr. Nosenko. They can talk and cannot to talk, but I don't see contradiction there. Anyone, any foreigner who will be staying, even if this defector not on his own, but, let's say, KGB pushed him to stay, to defect, he still will be watched and on him will be put this same type of work that was put on Oswald, not less.

Mr. Klein. You talk about their society is different than ours. Is it unusual that they allow an American to defect and live there without ever questioning him, to ask him if he is an intelligence agent?

Mr. Nosenko. On the contrary, no doubt, let's say he was intelligence agent, what he will tell them that he was sent with mission as intelligence agent? Why to scare him? Let him live how he wants. We will be watching him. He
will show by his behavior, by his action.

Mr. Klein. They purposely don't speak to him; is that your testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. In this case they didn't speak with him because he didn't present interest for the KGB and because he was mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. You testified that you read the reports of two psychiatrists who examined Lee Harvey Oswald at the hospital after he cut his wrist, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. You said both found him mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us in great detail how this decision was made to have these psychiatrists examine him.

I would ask that this document be marked for identification.

The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. It will be JFK-F-4.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. P-4 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Have you ever seen that document before?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I haven't seen it.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the Soviet Government
provided certain documents to the Warren Commission in 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I wasn't aware of this.

Mr. Klein. Looking at that document in front of you --

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. -- is that a hospital record?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, sure. It is a hospital record.

Mr. Klein. And whose hospital record? Does it have a
name on it?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. It is from Botkin Hospital.

Mr. Klein. Whose name is it?

Mr. Nosenko. Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Does it say what date he was admitted?

Mr. Nosenko. Discharged, admitted 23rd, discharged
28th.

Mr. Klein. What year is that?

Mr. Nosenko. October of 1959.

Mr. Klein. And does it have on the bottom the diagnosis,
why he was in the hospital?

Mr. Nosenko. Incised wound of one-third of the left
forearm.

Mr. Klein. And that date, October of 1959, is that when
Oswald first came to the Soviet Union and cut his wrist?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you dates, sir. I do not
remember.

Mr. Klein. You have in front of you the other document
which told -- Number 8 -- what date he came to the Soviet Union.

Is that still there?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. This is admittance to the hospital and dischargetment.

Mr. Klein. Number 8?

Mr. Nosenko. Arrival, October 16.

Mr. Klein. And the date on the hospital admittance is what date?

Mr. Nosenko. Twenty-third of October.

Mr. Klein. And would you turn to the hospital admittance form, the one I just gave you, to the third page, please?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says "History of Present Illness"?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I don't see.

Mr. Klein. On the third page?

Mr. Nosenko. I have the third page.

Mr. Klein. It has Number 6 on the top of the page, but it's the third page on the document.

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, Number 6, History of Present Illness. Yes. Just a second.

Mr. Klein. Would you glance through that and would you tell us if this is the hospital report from when Lee Harvey Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to Botkin Hospital?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
Mr. Klein. Now, would you turn to the next to the last page. It has a 13 on the right hand side.

Do you see that page?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. The next to the last page.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says, two-thirds of the way to the bottom, "Psychiatric Department" underlined?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you read what is said under that?

Mr. Nosenko. "His mind is clear; perception is correct; no hallucination or deliriums. He answers the questions legible and logically; he has a firm desire to remain in the Soviet Union; no psychiatric symptoms were noted; the patient is not dangerous for other people; his condition permits him to stay in Psychiatric Department by an order of the Assistant to the Chief Physicians, Dr. Kornika. The patient is transferred to the Seventh Ward."

Mr. Klein. Is there anything in there to indicate he is mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see.

Mr. Klein. Does that report indicate that he was normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see what I have seen. But this you receive from the Soviet Government, and if you think you received the true things, what was in file, you are wrong.
Mr. Klein.

Mr. Klein. And that document, according to you, is that not an authentic copy?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB can prepare you any document. Take the material, or ask the doctors who are cooperating with KGB and they will prepare you any document.

Mr. Klein. I am not asking you what they can do. Are you testifying that this document is not authentic, it is not the document?

Mr. Nosenko. This document never was in the file of the KGB.

Mr. Klein. So --

Mr. Nosenko. This I testify.

Mr. Klein. -- it is your testimony that the KGB sent us a phony document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You testified before this Committee that there was periodic physical surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald which was ordered by Moscow, to be carried out in Minsk?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. And you testified in detail about that, and you told us how the physical surveillance consisted of following Oswald for a month or month and a half at a time, and there were a number of people that would be involved, is that correct?
Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. It was a big operation?

Mr. Nosenko. Big operation? No, it's not a big operation.

Mr. Klein. There were a number of people involved, weren't there?

Mr. Nosenko. It is not a big operation. It is routine. In KGB it is a routine, nothing serious. It's not an operation even. It's surveillance, it's not an operation.

Mr. Klein. And have you ever stated that the only coverage of Oswald during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors and associates and review of his mail? Have you ever stated that was the only coverage of Oswald in Minsk?

Mr. Nosenko. I stated before, and I stated it to you yesterday, and I state now, that the order was given, and I have seen it -- to cover him by surveillance periodical, to cover him by an agent watching in places of his living, places he is working, control over his correspondence and control of his telephone conversations.

Mr. Klein. My question is, have you ever stated that the only coverage was checking at his places of employment and his neighbors and associates, and not say anything about periodic, physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I cannot tell you what I stated. I was
for quite a big period of time, quite a few years, interrogated, by hours, and in different types of conditions, including hostile conditions.

Mr. Klein. That was by the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Where they asked questions in such form which later my answer will be interpreted in any way, however they want to interrogate us.

Mr. Klein. That was by CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. And I cannot tell you what I did say. I cannot remember dates. You must understand, it's hundreds of interrogations, hundreds.

Mr. Klein. This period that you are telling us about, you were questioned by the CIA during that period, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure.

Mr. Klein. Were you questioned during that period by FBI?

Mr. Nosenko. I questioned by FBI in February, yes.

Mr. Klein. At this time I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. The clerk will indicate for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. Exhibit JFK-F-5.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. P-5 for
Mr. Klein. These hostile interrogations you just alluded to, did they lead you to state other than the truth to these interrogators?

Mr. Nosenko. I was answering questions which were put to me.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever not tell the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I was telling the truth.

Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Just a moment. Before you you have a Federal Bureau of Investigation report, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention to page 29 of that report.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. The last paragraph, beginning with, "Nosenko stated" -- it's underlined. Would you please read that paragraph to us?

Mr. Nosenko. "Nosenko stated that in view of instruction from the KGB Moscow, no active interest could be taken in Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB in Moscow. According to Nosenko, no such approval was ever requested or granted, and based on his experience, he opined that the only coverage of Oswald during this stay in Minsk
consisted of periodic checks of his places of employment, inquiries of neighbors and associates, and review of his mail."

Mr. Klein. Did you make that statement?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. What do you find here wrong?

Mr. Klein. Does that statement say anything about physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it didn't.

Mr. Klein. Did you forget to tell them about the physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. Maybe I forget; maybe they didn't put; I do not know.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to agents Poptanich and Gheesling on March 3rd and 4th, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you. I do remember the date, no. I remember I was speaking with agents from FBI.

Mr. Klein. When you spoke to them, did you recall that they spoke to you at that time, March 3rd and 4th, about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I told you, they were speaking with me about Oswald, but I cannot tell you the date when.

Mr. Klein. Was it in March 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. They were speaking with me -- February and the beginning of March of 1964.

Mr. Klein. And did they tape the conversations?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, they were taping all conversations.
Mr. Klein. Did the agents make notes when you were talking?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did they ever show you those notes?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the statements you were making to them were going to be written down in to a report?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever have an opportunity to see the report?

Mr. Nosenko. No. The only one which was sent to the Warren Commission, this I have seen.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the report would be put in your file?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that report would be shown to a committee such as this investigating the assassination?

Mr. Nosenko. I didn't know that it would be created, the Committee, because it was 1964.

Mr. Klein. You didn't know that?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Did you know that this Committee -- in 1964 -- will be existing in '78, '77?

Mr. Klein. And were you telling them the truth when you told them that the only coverage of Oswald, and listing these things and
not telling them about the physical surveillance, was that the truth you told them?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I told them that there was done the work against Oswald; it was ordered, passive type of work, it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an approach, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive.

Anything when enters besides whatever is done, contact, approaches, recruitment, attempt to recruit, it is immediately called active.

Mr. Klein. Looking at that report, did you tell them about the physical surveillance which you told this Committee about yesterday?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not see here, but I have no doubts. I do not know. Maybe I didn't mention that this date you said, maybe. I didn't mention but I was telling them about surveillance.

Mr. Klein. Didn't you tell us that you always told the truth and told everything you knew when you spoke to the FBI and the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you, "Was there physical surveillance?" --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I will answer yes, it was.

Mr. Klein. -- you would have answered yes?
Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You also testified before this Committee that in accord with the orders from Moscow that there was technical surveillance, and you told us in detail about how they tapped his phone and they would record it and make copies of it and gave it to a certain person.

Again, drawing your attention to page 29 of that same paragraph, does that say anything about the technical surveillance that you told us about?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you forget?

Mr. Nosenko. But, if you ask, even an agent of FBI, I doubt it, no. In KGB control of correspondence, control of telephone, it's not big deal. It's giving order to control a telephone can be given by Chief of Section, not speaking of Chief of Department, not speaking of Chief of Directorate, and not speaking to receive a warrant from the judge. Control of correspondence can be signed, permission to put control over correspondence can be done by the Deputy Chief of Section even.

Do you understand what I want to tell you, it is absolutely considered, KGB, nothing important.

Mr. Klein. Is it a big deal to check periodically at someone's place of employment and talk to their neighbors? Is that a big deal?
Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. But you told them about that, didn't you?

Mr. Nosenko. I tried simply to describe what kind of, not to take active -- what does it mean, passive type of coverage of the target?

Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you was there any technical surveillance, then would you have told them?

Mr. Nosenko. I would have said they were told, even word for word, in this document said not the technical surveillance. They have a certain terminology. Let's say surveillance, it's called to lead the measurement N/N, and to control telephone to lead the measurement M.

Mr. Klein. If they would have said, "Was there any technical surveillance of Oswald?" would you have said "yes"?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. You also testified to this Committee that the KGB would have had to have known about Marina Oswald, you said, by the end of the month they would have a batch of papers?

Mr. Nosenko. You told me, if she had seen him, you something mentioned, 15, 13.

Mr. Klein. Because surveillance was on Oswald, they would have had to pick her up?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you it was in the moment when
he was seeing her or not. You said assume that he met her
16 and 13, and it became known to KGB through surveillance. I
said by the end of month that at least something will have on
her, who is she, where she is working, where she studied, where
she work.

Mr. Klein. They would know that through the surveillance
on Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. The fact will be known through surveillance;
then through other outfits of KGB they will find whatever
possible on her.

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question
and did you give the following answer:

"Question: Why wouldn't she -- referring to Marina -- have
been investigated when she first met Oswald?

"Answer: They did not know she was a friend of Oswald
until they applied for marriage. There was no surveillance
on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Were you ever asked that question and did you give that
answer?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember my questions, and
answers.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for
identification, please, and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record
the number appearing on the document.
The Clerk. JFK-F-6.
(The document referred to was
marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-6 for
identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at that document, have you ever seen
it before?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. You have never seen that before?

Mr. Nosenko. I never have seen it before.

Mr. Klein. And is that a report that says on the cover,
"Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Followup Report on the
Oswald Case; Source: AEDONOR." Was AEDONOR your code name
at one time?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

Mr. Klein. "Date of Interview: 3 July 1964." Does it
say that on the cover?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And turning to the very last page, page 18.--

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Does it say, "Thomas A. Ryan"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. "SR/CI/KGB"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever hear of a man named Thomas A.
Ryan?
Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know a man Thomas A. Ryan.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to a man named Thomas Ryan?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you turn in this document to page 9. On page 9, the last question and answer, would you read the question for us, and read the answer?

Mr. Nosenko. "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?"

"They didn't know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marriage. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked that question and did you ever --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, sir. But if it is, it must be asked and I this answered.

Mr. Klein. Was that the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I remember, those conditions in which I was asked, better ask where I was in this period of time, what conditions I was kept, and what type of interrogations were going on.

Mr. Klein. Did you tell us yesterday that you always told the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. -- when you spoke about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Was this question relating to Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I was answering what I could.
Mr. Klein. Is that the truth, that they didn't --

Mr. Nosenko. It's how it is put, how it is put. You see, again, why wouldn't she have been investigated. Here must be question was in this form. The investigation, not the checkup of her, but, let's say, invitation for conversation, something of this kind, it's some kind of here misunderstanding on both parts, that would be mine, and interrogator.

Mr. Klein. It is an inaccurate transcript?

Mr. Nosenko. I consider many, many things are inaccurate.

Mr. Klein. Is that transcribed accurately?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Klein. That answer, do you think it is transcribed accurately, that that's your answer?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I can only explain only one thing. Let's say there was KGB found out that he had an acquaintance, Marina Prusakova. They were not married. They didn't know -- they didn't apply for marriage. What kind of first will be investigation? Checkup in archives of KGB of Byelorussia, and on the basis, whatever kind of material on her will be found. Let's say, if she was ever on trial by militia, under arrest. If militia had any material, they can expand further. They can also send checkup in the place of her -- one, it's in one order, to give us the picture of the character of the target, check on him in place of his work and check in place of his living,
in one order.

But more, farther investigation, the true investigation --
this is called checkup -- will be studied and they will start
when they see something, let's say, suspicious in behavior of
Oswald and this his connection.

In case of Marina, when they found out that they are going
to marry, sure, they will be more, farther investigation,
thorough investigation; but before it will only be checkup.
From this point of view I was answering this question.

Mr. Klein. Let me make it simple.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. If the question was asked exactly as it appears
here, "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first
met Oswald?" would this be your answer? Is that a correct
answer as it appears here?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, it appears here, but I do not remember.
Sure, I answered and this was question, but, gentlemen --
Mr. Klein. Was this true? This says "There was no
surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her" -- is that
right or wrong?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered, yes. It is right.
It is written here.

Mr. Klein. You remember answering that?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. How do you know you answered that?
Mr. Nosenko. You are giving me official document.

Mr. Klein. You have no recollection of answering this?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not have any recollection of interrogations.

Mr. Klein. If you answered that, were you telling the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. I don't know. I answered. Must be. This is how I answered question.

Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that the KGB decided to have Lee Harvey Oswald examined by two psychiatrists. You told us about how it was decided, who decided it, where it was decided. Then they found Lee Harvey Oswald to be mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Have you ever been asked the following questions and given the following answers:

"Question: Did the KGB make a psychological assessment of Oswald?

"Answer: No, nothing, but at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he is not normal.

"Question: Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?

"Answer: I don't think so. There was no report like this."

Mr. Nosenko. No, I told that there was opinion of
psychiatrists that he was mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. Is what I read to you correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know whether it is correct or
wrong. I am answering you what I know.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever make a statement like that?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember statements for five years,
interrogation.

Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention to the Ryan
Report.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Page 7.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Would you read for us the first and second
questions and answers, please.

Mr. Nosenko. "Did the KGB make psychological assessment
of Oswald?"

"No, nothing. But at the hospital it was also said he
was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was
mad, just that he was not normal, mentally unstable."

Mr. Klein. Please keep reading.

Mr. Nosenko. "Did the hospital authorities conduct any
psychological testing?"

"I don't think so. There was no report like this.

"What was the Soviets' opinion of Oswald's personality,
what kind of man did they think he was?"
"KGB thought he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he is not normal, that he should leave the country."

Mr. Klein. Did you say anything in there about two psychiatrists examining Oswald and about reading their reports which said he was mentally unstable? Did you say anything about that there?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember what I said to them; but I would like you to find out the conditions in which interrogations were done, how it was done, by what procedures, when two interrogators are seated. I never knew any names -- they never announced me names -- one playing part of bad guy and other good guy, and it starting slapping then, not physically but I mean, psychologically and in conversation, turning question upside down, however they would like, then this leave, another one will start in softer way.

Mr. Klein. When did this --

Mr. Nosenko. And I would not trust any of their documents in those periods of time. Up to 1967 when we started from the beginning, to work, Mr. Bruce Solie. That is the one thing. Second, my knowledge of language was very poor in '64. I didn't understand many questions, and none of them, excluding Mr. Deryabin, knew Russian language and Mr. Deryabin was asking me only questions concerning my biography and this type of question, but nonoperative questions.
Mr. Klein. Do you have any recollection of being asked these questions and giving the answers that you just read to us?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I told you, and I will tell, I do not remember their questions, and I do not remember my answers; but I tried to be truthful with them. Then was period of time when I have seen that they were simply was laughing at me; I rejected to answer questions, and whenever they were asking, I would answer, "I do not remember, I do not know, I do not remember."

Mr. Klein. These answers, do they say "I do not know, I do not remember" or do these give responsive answers?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not trust this document prepared by people in those years.

Mr. Klein. Is it your testimony that these might not be accurate questions and answers?

Mr. Nosenko. My opinion -- I cannot tell you exactly, I say might be.

Mr. Klein. You testified --

Mr. Nosenko. One more thing: If we are going into this, a number of interrogations, I was under drugs, and on me was used a number of drugs, and I know that, and hallucinations and talking during night and sodium and everything, even many others, and a number of things were absolutely incoherent.

Mr. Klein. This hostile interrogation that you have been referring to, when did it begin?

Mr. Nosenko. Arrested me 4th of April, 1964, started
interrogate me in two days. They interrupted -- I don't know --
interrogate a month, two, made break; then again, then again
period of no interrogation; then again interrogations, up to
24 hours, not giving me possibility to sleep.

Mr. Klein. And this was all after April 4, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

That is why I will not take as a document anything what
concerns interrogations in hostile, absolutely hostile,
situation.

Mr. Klein. You testified in detail yesterday about the
cable which you saw which was sent from Mexico City to the First
Chief Directorate in Moscow, and you testified that you actually
read that cable and that it told that Oswald was in Mexico City
and he wanted permission for visa to come to the Soviet Union.

Do you remember reading that cable and describing it for
us in detail, how long it was?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say to anyone that after Oswald
went to Minsk, the next time you heard of him was in connection
with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
for a Soviet reentry visa, and you did not know how Mexico City
advised Moscow of the subject's application; your knowledge
resulted from an oral inquiry of your department by M.I. Turalin.

Did you ever say that, that you did not know how Mexico
City advised Moscow of Oswald's application?
Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember. I am telling you what I have seen, cable, what was told through Lieutenant-Colonel Alekseev to tell to Turalin the opinion of Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 30 of the FBI report in front of you.

Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.

(Pause)

Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. On the top of page 30, read for us the underlined section on the top, beginning "The next time" --

Mr. Nosenko. "The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in connection with Oswald's application to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa. Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department by Turalin, Service No. 2, Counterintelligence in Foreign Countries, First Chief Directorate. Nosenko recalled that Turalin had orally contacted Vladimir Alexseev, Chief of Sixth Section of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect to Oswald. Nosenko's department had no interest in Oswald and they recommended that Oswald's request for reentry visa be denied. Nosenko couldn't recall when Oswald visited Mexico City in connection with visa application."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say this to an FBI agent?
Mr. Nosenko. Must be I said it, it's here in document.

Mr. Klein. It says in here that Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. Did you say that?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be; I said this in this way.

Mr. Klein. And did you tell us that not only did you know how they advised them by cable but that you read the cable?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I recollection.

Mr. Klein. Did you tell them the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. I was trying to tell what I remembered.

Mr. Klein. And this FBI report which you just read from, would you look back on the first page and would you tell us the date of that report?


Mr. Klein. March 5, 1964. Is that before April 4, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. That was before any hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And at that time you said that you did not know anything about the cable, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered them, how I remembered.

Mr. Klein, I have a question. Do you understand from what psychological turmoil a person, passing who defected, do
you understand that it is necessary time, time to settle psychologically, he doesn't know how he will be living, what he will be doing, and at the same time a person feels attitude on the part of those who helped him to come CIA? I felt something going on.

Mr. Klein. You testified to us today that you didn't know how wrote the summary of Oswald's file in the First Department because you never had an opportunity to read it. Did you ever tell anyone that Fedroseve and Matveev, F-e-d-r-o-s-e-v-e and M-a-t-v-e-e-v of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, took the file and wrote a second "spravka", which you told us was a summary?

Mr. Nosenko. Summary.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be I told, it is again right, because you see, not Fedroseve -- Fedroseve was Chief of First Department, American Department, and I will repeat what I told you yesterday. Matveev has come to take file, but surely Fedroseve who is Chief of American Department, he had given call to Chief of Seventh Department. He was involved in this; that is why I mentioned him. He was Chief of First American Department.

His deputy, Colonel Matveev, has come, and not alone; with him was a couple of officers, has come and told that Gribanov ordered and Fedroseve giving call to Department, we must take it, and took. Who of them wrote, I do not know, no doubts that Fedroseve and Matveev were participated in the preparation of documents.
They are responsible for First American Department.

Mr. Klein. So you have an idea of who would have written, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. American Department, no doubts that this two will be participating or correcting.

Mr. Klein. But you didn't read that summary, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember reading the summary.

Mr. Klein. Did you read it? Do you have any recollection of reading it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I haven't seen summary.

Mr. Klein. Are you positive that you didn't see that summary?

Mr. Nosenko. I have seen summaries in the file of Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Are you positive you didn’t see the summary written by the First Department after they took the file away?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember seeing. As I told you, I haven't seen it.

Mr. Klein. You testified that Oswald was considered normal prior to the time he cut his wrist, and even told us that you were surprised, you had no indication he would do something like that.

Were you ever asked the following question, and did you give the following answer:

"In what way was the Oswald case handled differently from cases of other American defectors?"
"Answer: The main difference is that he was not to be allowed to stay. He was considered to be not normal."

Mr. Nosenko. This is what cases I know, who were staying.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal, referring to the period before he tried to commit suicide?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; but if I said it, it's not right because we didn't know that he was normal or not normal. Up until the moment of he cut his wrist we started to suspect.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember.

Mr. Klein. Well, if you would have said it, would it have been correct?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it would not be correct, because he cannot be considered abnormal. We didn't know anything up till he cut the wrist.

Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that you were present at a meeting with the Chief of the Seventh Department Chief of your section, Major Rastrusin, at that meeting, it was decided that Oswald should not be given permission to defect. You told us where the meeting took place, told us who was there.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. You told us that Krupnov was not even in the
Seventh Department at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Krupnov appeared a little later.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anyone that on the basis of your evaluation of Oswald, you instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through Intourist interpreter that Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa?

Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember. If I said it, it was wrong, not right, because Krupnov started participation only in this case when Oswald was allowed to stay. In the moment when Oswald arrived in Soviet Union, when he went in hospital, Krupnov was still not in Seventh Department. He very soon appeared later. Then it was wrong. If I stated it, it was wrong.

Mr. Klein. Directing your attention to the FBI report in front of you, I would like to draw your attention to page 28.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Beginning with the underlined section beginning with the first "On the basis" in the second paragraph, would you read this?

Mr. Nosenko. "Nosenko and Krupnov on the basis of this information, concluded that Oswald was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared somewhat abnormal."

Mr. Klein. Not that, the second paragraph, "On the basis of" --
Mr. Nosenko. "On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of Oswald, he instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through the Intourist interpreter Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa, and thereafter seek reentry as a permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember saying this. It can be that simply misunderstanding, and, you see, this is not transcription from the tape. It is, I will say a summary, and I do not remember. But, if I said this, it is not right because Krupnov didn't participate it in the beginning.

Mr. Klein. Also it says --

Mr. Nosenko. It was participation of Rastrusin.

Mr. Klein. Also is it correct when it says in there that you made the decision and --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't make decision, being Deputy Chief of Section.

Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there --

Mr. Nosenko. I could say my opinion, yes.

Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there about a meeting to determine what to do, or does it say that on basis of your evaluation, you told Krupnov to do it?

Mr. Nosenko. It's not right. I said only that Krupnov
appeared later. This period, what we are discussing here, was
Rastrusin involved, decision cannot be done on my own, being
Deputy Chief of Section, decision cannot be done even being
Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, at least it
must be on the level of Chief of Department.

Mr. Klein. So it is incorrect, is that what you are saying?
Mr. Nosenko. It is incorrect, and Krupnov -- I do not
remember.

Mr. Klein. You told us, when I questioned you about the
fact that you didn't tell the FBI that there was physical
surveillance, the last question I asked you, if they would have
asked you if he was physically surveilled, would you have told
them, and you said yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure. I will say.

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question
and did you give the following answer:

"Was he physically surveilled" and that is referring to
Minsk, and you answered "No, there was none"?

Mr. Nosenko. It was not right, because it was order given
and he was under periodical surveillance.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 9 of the CIA
document in front of you, Memorandum for the Record.

Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.

Mr. Klein. The Ryan Report. I draw your attention to page
9.
Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you read the first question and the first answer?

Mr. Nosenko. "Was he physically surveilled?"

"No, there was none."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever give that answer to that question?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; it's not right, the answer.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this tape, which is marked 3 July '64, Reel No. 66, be deemed marked for identification.

The Chairman. Indicate for the record the marking.

The Clerk. JFK-F-7.

(The item referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-7 for identification.)

The Chairman. We will recess for about five minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. The Committee is back in session.

During the recess the witness made a request of the Chair that he be permitted to make a brief statement prior to counsel for the Committee resuming interrogation.

The Chair is going to grant that request and recognize the witness at this time for such statement as he would like to make.

Mr. Nosenko. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I arrived in the United States in 1964, 12th of February. I felt something was going wrong because the attitude on the part of the officers from CIA who was dealing with me, I felt was going wrong, by a number of remarks, their behavior. Besides, I was in a psychological process. It's a very big thing, when you are coming to live in a new country. I left the country where I was born, never mind, my defection was strictly on ideological basis, but still psychologically is very big thing and very serious thing.

A very short period of time, April 4, I was invited on check-up for the doctor, and this check-up turned to be arrest. Arrested was in very rude form, nobody beat my physically, no, but in rude form, trying to put dignity of the person, of human being, down, kept in very hard conditions. I was smoking from 14 years old, never quitted. I was rejected to smoke. I didn't see books. I didn't read anything. I was sitting in four walls, metal bed in the center of the room and that is all.

I was hungry, and this was the most difficult for me because how I tried not to think about food. I was thinking about food because all the time I want to eat. I was receiving very small amount, and very poor food. I was sitting some kind of attic; it was hot, no air conditioning, cannot breathe; windows -- no windows, closed over. I was permitted to shave once a week,
to take showers once a week.

From me were taken toothpaste, toothbrush. The conditions were really inhuman, conditions in this place; and later transferred in another place, which is now I know where it was, the second place, where certain house and the same very, very Spartan conditions; three and a half years. Besides that, on me were used different types of drugs and sleeping drugs, hallucination drugs, and whatever I do not know, and don't want to know.

What I want to tell you, the arrest was done illegally, without due process of law, without -- in violation of Constitution, which was found by Rockefeller Commission. It wasn't mentioned, my name, but simply nameless defector, who was over three years in extremely Spartan conditions.

Interrogations were done sometimes 24 hours, not giving me an hour to sleep. Interrogations were in very hostile manner. Simply, what I would say were rejected. How long I will be, why it is without due process, no warrants; "You will be eternally, 25 years." How long we would want you to keep. That is why I consider all interrogations, all materials, which concerns this period of time are illegal, and I am not recognizing them and don't want to see them. And I am asking you not to ask questions based on this interrogations, including trying to play the tape during this interrogations. For me it's difficult to return back. I passed through hell. I started new life in
'69 only because I was true defector. I never raised this question with correspondents. I never went in press, because I am loyal to the country which accepted me, and I didn't want to hurt the country.

I didn't hurt, even to hurt, the intelligence, the CIA.

I didn't consider the whole CIA was responsible. Were responsible several people, for this. Thank God they are not working there anymore. They are out. If I will go in press, if I would be telling about these inhumane conditions, I will hurt not only the agencies, the intelligence service of the U.S., I will hurt the interests of the U.S. Who would like to defect, reading in what conditions and what treatment defectors is receiving.

Sir, I prefer that you be using materials when it was started humane relations with me, which was started at the end of '67. I still was under arrest but I was transferred from the extremely Spartan conditions, and with me started to work Mr. Bruce Solie, who passed through the whole life, through all cases, through everything. People who were talking with me before were coming with what they were told, how to approach to me, how to treat me. They have come with made opinion, before whatever I will say yes or no. That is why I consider it is all unlawful documents in the period of interrogations done by anyone in CIA. up until the end of '67.

The Chairman. Is there anything further, Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

(Pages 53 thru 78, being Committee business only, are excerpted.)
Mr. Blakey. Shall I inform the witness?

The Chairman. In light of the time situation and our original intention of trying to wind up by 10:00 p.m., the Chair thinks perhaps we ought to try and invoke a five minute rule so that everybody gets a fair opportunity rather than to proceed informally and extend this matter over a long period of time.

Anyone have any objection?

All right, bring the witness in.

(Whereupon, at 8:43 o'clock p.m., the witness returned to the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Let the record reflect the fact the witness has again returned to the witness table and, Mr. Nosenko, at this time counsel for the Committee has concluded his questions to you and at this point in time the members of the Committee would like to be able to pose questions to you with reference to your testimony here yesterday and this evening. Is that agreeable to you, sir?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

The Chair at this point would invoke the five minute rule. The Chair will begin the questions.

Mr. Nosenko, you are now a citizen of the United States, you are now an employee of the CIA, I understand as a consultant, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. On private contract. I am not an employee
of the CIA. I am on a private contract, used as a consultant on counterintelligence of the Soviet KGB.

The Chairman. And in that capacity, sir, are you paid an annual salary?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am paid an annual salary.

The Chairman. And what is that salary?

Mr. Nosenko. $35,000.

The Chairman. And --

Mr. Nosenko. It is the last year, because it was cost of living.

The Chairman. I see. In that capacity, do you contract out also to other persons or other organizations?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

The Chairman. This is your sole income?

Mr. Nosenko. Only one sole income.

The Chairman. Has the CIA given you anything else of value other than a salary, that is, a home, anything of that sort?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. And in the book published, written by Epstein was mentioned CIA bought me home. No, sir, I bought home on my money, nobody bought me a home, no.

The Chairman. You also now are remarried and you have --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am married. I am American citizen, I have five stepchildren and six grandchildren.

The Chairman. You now have a passport? Do you have a
passport as a --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I have a passport, which I once used
for week where

I was talking with

concerning my knowledge of the Second Chief Direc-
torate, KGB in general.

The Chairman. Is that the only country to which you have
taveled since your defection?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I have traveled on behalf of the
Central Intelligence Agency also for the last four years. I
was in countries. And I never received or demanded or
asking any special fees for consultations with all

never.

The Chairman. Have you ever returned to Soviet Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Never once in Soviet Union from 1964 and
hope will never see it again.

The Chairman. And how long have you now been a consultant
for CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. I was from 1969, from April 1969, when I was
released from detention arrest.

The Chairman. Now, will you clarify for us when you first
were placed under arrest?

Mr. Nosenko. Fourth of April, 1964.

The Chairman. And on what date had you defected?

Mr. Nosenko. I defected 4th of February of 1964 in Geneva,
Switzerland.

The Chairman. And when you were placed under arrest, where were you placed in detention?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know, it was somewhere around Washington, close to Washington, where I was '64 and beginning '65, approximately. I don't hear any radio, I didn't see any newspaper, I do not know, didn't know anything what happen in the world for many years.

I know that it was by car from Virginia where I was staying from 12 of February '64, I was taken by car for visit to doctor, and it was 30, 40 minute drive, it was in this area, but then in approximately after a year and maybe 13 months, a year and one month, roughly, I was transferred in very peculiar conditions, was put under shackles and handcuffs, blindfolded, put in the car, and don't know where I was going, only I heard, passing through city, I couldn't understand, I couldn't see anything, then I heard airplanes, I understood that I was somewhere in airport, and once I was scared to death, I think I was thinking they were returning me to the Russians. Well, they put me in airplane --

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, my time has expired. I want to recognize --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know the place, sir. I know I only now found out reading the book of Daniel Schorr that I was in up to the end of '67. That is what I found out from
the book.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, one thing that comes through very strongly in your testimony is that it is a hard life to be a defector. I think to the average mentality we think it would be good for a country to welcome a defector, but to the intelligence mentality apparently a defector is immediately suspect, and you have recounted your treatment here, and apparently Lee Harvey Oswald, from your testimony, was greeted somewhat like this in the U.S.S.R. His treatment was much different from yours.

One thing he was not an intelligence agent, of course. But you have indicated that he was kept at arms' length by the KGB. The impression I get was the mere fact of being a defector caused the KGB to be less interested in him than if it was someone they had recruited?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Preyer. Although he was kept at arms' length by the KGB, in the sense that he was not contacted, it does appear that he lived very well there, relatively speaking. He certainly lived much better than you lived in your early years. That he was given a job in Minsk, he was given a pension, which is something that seems extraordinary in this country, from the Red Cross, and apparently pretty good housing conditions
in Minsk.

Is that typical way that a defector would be treated in
Russia, is "at arm's length"?

Mr. Nosenko. Every defector will be watched but, sir,
when you mentioned what he received being in Russia, it is very
little. I can give you only one example. When defectors
Martin and Mitchell, employees of NSA, who cooperated with KGB
abroad, and then they defected to Soviet Union, they received
extraordinary help. It is not like Oswald. Oswald is nothing.

Mr. Preyer. The amount of money?

Mr. Nosenko. The amount of money and other things,
extraordinary.

Mr. Preyer. For Oswald were not extraordinary?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Preyer. You mentioned the other three defectors that
you had known of. What sort of treatment did they receive?

Mr. Nosenko. I will tell you what Martin and Mitchell --

Mr. Preyer. Were they two of the other three?

Mr. Nosenko. These two, for example. I can mention others,
what I heard, I never work with them, what I heard. Martin
and Mitchell, by decision of Soviet Government was given them,
to each one, $100,000 on their account, was given apartment,
not like Oswald received, but real good apartment, so-called
classless society, living high class. Each one was given car,
each one received life pension a month of 5000 Soviet rubles
up to death. And each one was helped with work. Both were
assigned with some type of research work where they had given
position, let's say Martin was given position of researcher.
But amount of pay of his was analogical to the amount of pay
of the Director of this Institute, besides what he is
receiving of pension. This is the treatment of those defectors
whom they want, who had given them valuable information.

In case of -- excuse me -- was Annabella Bucar defected
something early '50s. She was working in American Embassy in
Press Department. She also received, in spite of the fact
was making very good money in the Soviet Union, she was working
for Moscow Radio, she was receiving life pension of big amount,
amount approximately what in Soviet Union is received by Deputy
of Minister, of Ministry, of this or that industry.

Mr. Preyer. But the defector who was not giving informa-
tion?

Mr. Nosenko. Now, he will be given a little bit something,
pension like was Oswald, to Oswald given pension. I don't
know what was given to Webster, a worker, who was defected in '59
and by the way, in very short period of time he decided he
doesn't like the life in the so-called Soviet paradise. He
wanted to return back home, but if he received it will be
analogical to what Oswald received, not more.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine.
Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Were you solicited to be a defector?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. No, sir.

Mr. Devine. Why did you defect?

Mr. Nosenko. I defected because I for years of my life has come to number of conclusions that the whole society, the whole system, is dictatorial system, nondemocratic system, the true police state system, and especially working the KGB opened eyes for me. My defection was strictly on ideological basis.

Mr. Devine. Had you been out of the Soviet Union prior to your defection?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Other than to Geneva?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I was in England twice, then I was passing through a number of countries, staying day, two, France, Belgium, Holland. I was in 1960 in Cuba.

Mr. Devine. You were a married man in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. Had a child?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, two daughters.

Mr. Devine. Were you having some domestic difficulties?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I tried in 1960-'61, I tried to arrange to go to work abroad with my family, and in the last moment it fell down, and I understood I cannot go abroad with family,
and that is why when I contacted CIA in '62, I -- psychologically
I was ready, ideologically was ready and psychologically ready
to defect, but the question of family was bothering me.

Mr. Devine. But not enough to keep you there?

Mr. Nosenko. Not enough to keep me there. And in '64
I have come knowing that I will never return.

Mr. Devine. You were willing to abandon your family?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, because I didn't see possibility
to take family out. I was living the last four or five years
as a man with two souls, split personality, one I must show
and was showing, as good KGB officer, as a good Communist, as
a patriot of the Soviet system, the Soviet Union, and the other
part of me, the true part I am not believing in what I am
telling, I am not believing in the system, I do not like it,
I do not want it, and I consider what phony things are going
on because I was working in KGB, I knew it. I simply couldn't
more tolerate to be with this double split personality.

Mr. Devine. How did you dispose of your children and your
wife in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. The thing was psychologically, my had, had
in my mind. help me. My mother was rather rich, after death of
father, she was very rich woman and she had a lot that will be
enough not only for my children but their children and grand-
children. From the point of view of material they will never
suffer.
Mr. Devine. Yes, but as a defector would there not be reprisals taken by the Soviet Union against your family?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, before the death of Stalin it could be taken drastic measures against the family, but after the death of Stalin, from middle 1950s, quite a little changes took place in the Soviet Union, and the family will not suffer.

Another thing, oh sure, will be certain things which they cannot achieve. Let's say my brother who studied later in the same Institute what I finish, Institute of International Relations, he will never have possibility to go abroad, but he will never be put in jail, can never be exiled from Moscow, the same, nothing happened with family.

Mr. Devine. The fact that you were a KGB man didn't your defection cause some irritation among those in power over there?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Devine. Did they want to get you back, didn't they want to get even with you?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, and they are looking for me.

Mr. Devine. But they took no reprisals against your family.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Devine. How do you know that?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I do not know exactly, but you see, there were some defections before. The family didn't suffer like it was, let's say, in '40s and maybe up to death of Stalin.

Mr. Devine. Were those KGB defections?

Mr. Nosenko. Even from KGB.
The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. Burke?

Mrs. Burke. Well, I would like to go back a little bit after you decided to defect. I think you had a number of conversations with the American Embassy, was it, or was it CIA, during those ten days that you were in touch, where you negotiated whether or not you would in fact defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I contacted CIA in '62 and --

Mrs. Burke. In '64?

Mr. Nosenko. In '64, when I arrived in Geneva, on second day I mailed a cable, and I knew -- a prearranged addressed, and I knew that in two days somebody in appropriate place and appropriate time will meet me from CIA.

Mrs. Burke. And they met you --

Mr. Nosenko. They met me and I was meeting them every day, visiting, and when I had free time, visited secret address in Geneva.

Mrs. Burke. All right, during those times you were meeting them, did you negotiate in terms of what your situation would be here in the United States if you defected, or where you would go?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I put a question that what amount of salary I want, that will find for me job. This I negotiate.

Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss whether or not you would be imprisoned?
Mr. Nosenko. No, it never come to my mind that they would imprison me.

Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that -- I think you told us you had some information you would well to them for a certain amount of money.

Mr. Nosenko. It's in '62.

Mrs. Burke. In '62 you said that. In '64 you didn't discuss any sale of any information?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, on the contrary, for the period of '62 -'64, I tried to get as much as possible information, not only to come what I knew where I participated in the department where I worked but to find out as much as possible what can be valuable to the American intelligence and I had come with some luggage.

Mrs. Burke. All right, well, during the time that you were talking to them about what your salary would be, the circumstances of your defection, and I assume you told them what your rank was, some of the things you worked on --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. -- did you tell them you worked on the Oswald file?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, I can mention. I do not remember, honestly.

Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss Oswald at all with them during that period?
Mr. Nosenko. I must, sure, mentioned this fact because, no, it happened such a thing. I must mention. But I do not remember. I cannot tell you what questions were, what my answers were.

Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that the Soviet Union thought that Oswald may have been a United States agent?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I certainly -- it would be -- anyone treated. Oswald, or anyone from the United States who come to live on his own decided to defect, or they contacted him before, they will still will be suspected in a possibility that he is an agent of American intelligence, and also this fact.

Mrs. Burke. And is this the reason that you gave him why he was not allowed to remain in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. The reason was that they didn't want him to stay because, KGB, because they didn't consider him an interesting target, an interesting person who has valuable information.

Mrs. Burke. I know that. In fact, I remember you saying something about a person would only be interesting under certain circumstances, one of which would be if they came in as a tourist and they applied a very short time before they arrived.

Mr. Nosenko. Oh no.

Mrs. Burke. And they were an add on to, for instance, the tour.

Mr. Nosenko. Right. Right.

Mrs. Burke. Now, from what that report shows, it shows that
Oswald received his visa in two days to come to the Soviet Union. So he would be automatically suspect, and he would be automatically what you would call an interesting person.

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no. In this case, you see, Oswald even didn't receive a visa in United States; he received it passing through Europe.

Mrs. Burke. Through Helsinki?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, in Finland, where it's process was easier than it will be in the United States. He simply bought a tour and he received, managed to receive visa.

Mrs. Burke. Let me just ask one other thing.

Did you tell them any of your, aside from the ideological, why you wanted to defect? For instance, did you tell them anything about this promotion you thought you had when you went to, was it, Gorki?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. But then you --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I didn't tell them. I simply said that my position, because with me, it was documented, I lied. I said my position was Lieutenant Colonel. It wasn't true. It was false statement. The same false statement was concerning recall telegram when I wanted to push the defection process.

Mrs. Burke. My time is up. May I just ask one question? Were you upset when you didn't get your promotion after they had --
Mr. Nosenko. No, no ma'am. I still didn't receive it.
It was sent on signature. You see, they are signing, not
immediately when they are received. Personnel Directorate
gathered from all over the Soviet Union, from all KGBs and
comment on signature to the Chairman, twice, three times a
year. They were simply gathering in and didn't get enough
materials. I do not know. Maybe it was signed in January. But
up to my leaving, nobody informed me that it was signed. I
didn't -- wasn't rejected.

The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mr. Dodd?

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if you might let me ask you -- let me start back
here, very quickly. One of the very first questions you were
asked last night by Mr. Klein, was the way Mr. Klein worded
the question, and I will ask you to expound on it if it is a
correct recall on my part.

Mr. Klein asked you or stated that you arranged for your
transfer to the American section of the KGB. He used the words
you arranged for your transfer to that section. Is that an
accurate statement? Did you want to be in that section? Did you
specifically ask to be in that section?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it wasn't accurate, it wasn't right.

Arrangement was done in work form. I was working after finishing
Institute in GRU, Navy Intelligence, and being in 1952 New Year,
in Moscow on New Year on a short leave, I was in company where
it was one of my friends with whom I studied at the Institute.
He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But his father-
in-law was high ranked General of MGB, in those years was
called KGB, and he asked me what I am doing, this General.
I said that I am working for the Navy Intelligence, GRU.
Do you like this work?
I said no, because I am not using what I received
education.
Would you like to work in MGB?
I said, if it will be with the use of my disciplines
which I studied at the Institute, why not? That is all. And
in March after death of Stalin this general was appointed the
First Deputy Minister of MGB of Beria. He remembered this
conversation and several days after death of Stalin I was recalled
to MGB which was called MVD in this period of time, in March of
'53 and was assigned to Second Chief Directorate. This is what
true statement.

Mr. Dodd. When you sent to the safe house or whatever it
was in Geneva, in 1964, by your own admission you lied to the
agent there in that you stated you had received a telegram
issuing your recall back to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. Therefore, it was that important that they
accept you immediately.
Did you show anyone a telegram?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir. There wasn't any telegram.

Mr. Dodd. Did they ask for a telegram?

Mr. Nosenko. No, but, sir, what happened, I started to meet them in January, had passed three, four, five, six, seven days. I am afraid of that any moment my Chief of the Second Chief Directorate will be returning from France.

Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you that, Mr. Nosenko. My question to you is, were you asked whether or not you had a copy of the telegram that you had received from the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. And I -- if I was even asked I couldn't give them because I cannot take it. It would be secret cable.

Mr. Dodd. You have answered my question.

You stated last night that -- and this might have been a supposition on your part, but I am curious about it -- you stated that it was your feeling that the intelligence community in this country considered you a dispatched agent in 1962. Is that something that you felt in 1962?

Mr. Nosenko. No. It's --

Mr. Dodd. A reflection back?

Mr. Nosenko. A reflection back. No, no, sir.

Mr. Dodd. You, by your own statement, again have received some very rough treatment, inhuman treatment, to use your words, living under spartan conditions, and I am sort of brushing over
this very quickly, between 1964 and 1969. Certainly you
couldn't have been very pleased with the way you were being
treated by a country that you had defected to and offered to
give information to. So for a period of that '64, to '69,
five years, you went through a rather rough period in your life?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. Why did you go to work for somebody who treated
you like that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I, even was five year there, I didn't
consider that it was decision of the whole CIA. I didn't
consider that -- I didn't blame the whole CIA because it
wasn't the question decided by the whole Agency. It was
decided question by several persons who were I consider simply
in this period of time sick, mentally sick, not ill, but
were simply in fear, in scare, in mania as if KGB penetrated
everything.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your statement to me that for five
years, while you were incarcerated in almost solitary confine-
ment, that you thought that this was the individual acts of a
couple of employees of this Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Not employees.

Mr. Dod. Without the approval of the very highest
authority in this Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I have seen Chief of Soviet Russia
Division, Mr. David Murphy. He was a high ranking man. It was
his decision, decision of Mr. Angleton, decision of Mr. Murphy, and when they are coming to Director, and I know, from my life, they can report in the way how they will report it, and the Director will accept because they are responsible people, they are sitting in this place. He is not going into details, he is not going and studying, he is not going himself visiting. The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. First, have you received any compensation for the period during which you were held in jail?

Mr. Nosenko. I received in several years later, I put the question, I want to be paid for every year which I was unlawfully arrest, the amount of money which we have agreed, with taken taxes and whatever American citizens are paying.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you get that?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, and on this sum of money I bought the house.

Mr. Sawyer. I see.

I will tell you what bothers me about your testimony, very frankly. You stated that they would be very interested in a member of the American intelligence community that they could even compel to defect. Here you had a willing defector, a guy who said that undoubtedly that he didn't like America, and that he did like Russia, and he wants to defect, and nobody even interrogates him, according to you, as to what exposure or
experience he had. He might have worked in the missile silos, he might have done anything, but nobody asked him, and that he lives there for a period of, a long period of time. Here is a guy that is totally willing to talk. It is not like approaching somebody who doesn't want to talk to you or that might not want to talk to you. And here is a fellow who was a radar operator, experienced to some degree, and I don't know to what degree, but apparently the Russians don't know to what degree either, because nobody asked him, but they didn't ask him even about that, and it is very rare to have one come.

I have listened to Radio Free Cuba, where they air all kinds of propaganda, and this guy would have been certainly good for propaganda when he loved Russia and hated the United States. And I just, with those circumstances, I very frankly find it almost impossible to believe that they did not thoroughly interrogate him at least.

Mr. Nosenko. They never considered him an interesting target. It was known that he served in Marine Corps.

Mr. Sawyer. What I am getting at, how did they know whether he was an interesting target when they never even asked.

Mr. Nosenko. They judging by what they know about him what in questionnaire he filled and plus what they found out from interpreter on him. He said to interpreter, he served in Marine Corps, he finished his years of service.
Mr. Sawyer. But he might have been a cryptographer in the Marine Corps. He might have been as an enlisted man, he might have been a cryptographer and know all our codes and code methodology that might help break codes and that sort of thing, but nobody ever asked him. That is what I don't understand. And I can't believe it, very frankly.

Mr. Nosenko. I understand, sir, but I am telling you he wasn't considered interesting target, and --

Mr. Sawyer. But they didn't have any facts to know whether he was interesting, and here is a guy that wants to talk to them.

Mr. Nosenko. But the judgment made on each person to work actively against him on the basis of his questionnaire. If in questionnaire will be said he is, let's say, professor, teacher, let's say he is working for the government, any department, but for the Federal Government, or he is an officer sure, on him will be paid attention.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, all right, we can drop that for a minute.

But now, he got a visa in two days in Finland. I happen to have been in Finland four years ago and wanted to get a visa, a sort of a last minute decision, to go to Leningrad, and I was told there is a minimum of 30 days before you can get a visa. Now, to issue him a visa in two days for Russia, that is very unusual, apparently, so they must have had some
interest in getting him there.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, what I know, there wasn't any interest
to get him. He managed to get this visa.

Mr. Sawyer. All right.

The other thing I am curious about is when they interrogated
you so carefully here, why someone like Oswald, a known defector
and who could well have been now a Russian intelligence agent,
comes back to the country, apparently CIA or FBI, or nobody
paid a bit of attention to him, and let him wander around the
country with a Russian wife at will.

I have used up my time.

The Chairman. Okay. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nosenko, as I piece it together, there are four
possibilities for this Committee to believe. Let me sketch
out what those possibilities are.

One, that you told the truth in 1964, but you are now
misleading this Committee.

Two, that you told an untruth in 1964, basically your
statements in 1964 were not true, but you are telling the truth
now.

Three, that in fact you were dispatched here by the KGB,
or the Soviet Government, because of apparent but unreal
connections between the Soviets and Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. Obviously the USSR would need this for obvious reasons. They would badly need this for all sorts of international reasons.

And finally, the fourth option is that you were dispatched here by the Soviet Government and the KGB because there was an actual connection between the KGB and the assassination of President Kennedy.

These are the items which I have picked up in the last two days that would tend to lead some people to believe the last of the four, or at least the third to the last of the four, either that the KGB dispatched you here because they needed it for political reasons, though they were not involved, or they dispatched you here because in fact they did collaborate with Oswald.

First, Oswald goes to Russia. You say he is rejected, but they grant him a pension, however small.

Second, they grant him the pleasures of a hunting club, even though you said earlier he was mentally unbalanced, and you are allowing him to use a gun.

Three, they allowed him to marry in Russia.

Four, they gave him a job.

Now, in -- not talking about the time when you were under stress and incarcerated, but just talking about the two months prior to that -- the FBI questioning, and the prearrest
story makes no sense.

The rejection of Oswald's offer to defect makes absolutely
no sense to me.

Mr. Sawyer has just pursued that momentarily. I think that
can be rejected by us, by reasonable people, prima facie. I see
no reason to accept that part of your story whatsoever.

The exposition, taking you off to worry about the exposi-
tion, and so forth, was demonstrated a fraud.

No reprisals against your family. Nobody was working
against Oswald, you said, yet later on you said you had seven
to eight large files, you only read the first portion of one
file. You said no KGB ever talked to Oswald regarding
letting him defect. The reason you gave us for that was that he
slashed his wrists and you concluded he was unstable. Yet prior
to that discovery of his instability, you granted him a visa
in two days and he asked to be permitted to defect prior to
slashing his wrists, and therefore you had to make the decision
prior to slashing his wrists, prior to knowing that he slashed
his wrist, that you were going to reject him. That doesn't
hold water either.

Finally, you said in your testimony American defection was
very rare. All the more reason, if it only happens once every
year or a couple of times a year, or three times between '56
and '59, it is totally incredible to me that he would not have
been interrogated. No reasonable person can believe that story.
You said he was not interesting, you were not interested in him, the KGB rejected him. Despite that, you were "recruiting right and left all kinds of people to assist in the espionage operation."

Now, all of these things, Mr. Nosenko, leads me to be very, very disturbed by your story because it simply just on the face of what you told us last night and tonight, can't possibly be true.

In the first place, you remember too much now. You remember too much in the way of details after 15 years. Therefore, I have great difficulty accepting any of your story.

We as a Committee of the United States Congress are charged with trying to assess what actually happened in the assassination of President Kennedy. That is the central story. You have not helped us very much. You have confused the issue. In fact, by your testimony you have led at least this member to wonder whether or not you are still working with the KGB.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I will permit the witness to answer.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman said his opinion. Do you ask me any question?

Mr. Fithian. I would just like to have you tell me why I shouldn't believe that you were dispatched here by the KGB, in the light of just the points I am making, in the light of the enormous differences, not in the CIA interrogation under
duress, but in the earlier period when you were not under that
kind of duress. It doesn't wash with me.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if you want me to defend myself, I can
say only one thing. I never done from the first day in the
United States anything directed against this country. I tried
before I have come, when I contacted '62 the CIA, and has come
in '64, I tried to get as much as possible information. I
am the source who told concerning existence of microphones in
American embassy in Moscow. I am the man who have given, I
don't know, 300 cases --

Mr. Fithian. We are only concerned --

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is very hard to follow Mr. Fithian's comments because
I would like to shift gears a little bit. BUT you indicated
to our Chairman that you now act as a consultant to the CIA.

Is that your only job?

Mr. Nosenko. It is the only job.

Mr. Edgar. In the course of acting as consultant to the
CIA, do you have access to talking with CIA employees from time
to time who contact you and who assist you and protect you and
give you some of the direction for your consulting?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
Mr. Edgar. Have you ever been in a conversation with any of the agents of the CIA about who might have been responsible for having you detained on April 4th, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Edgar. -- 1964.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Edgar. You indicated earlier you thought it was a man by the name of Murphy.

Mr. Nosenko. Murphy, Chief of Soviet, former Chief of Soviet Russian Division, and Chief of Counterintelligence, former Chief of Counterintelligence of the CIA Mr. Angleton because it cannot without him be decided.

Mr. Edgar. Do you know of any other KGB agents or other defectors who were held in those very same conditions?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know.

Mr. Edgar. Were there any other prisoners held nearby that you could hear or --

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I was in solitary absolutely confinement, no prisoner, nobody I could see.

Mr. Edgar. Yet you are still willing to be a consultant to the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. I am -- no. Sir, I am consultant only on the base, on my knowledge what I know about counterintelligence work of the KGB.

Mr. Edgar. Well, you have suggested to the Committee that your statements given to the CIA in 1964 cannot be considered
reliable because the statements were given under duress, and prior to our recess a few moments ago you indicated that you felt that the tapes and the FBI and the CIA interrogations of '64, '65, and '66 should not be considered as reliable statements.

Is that not correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, because I considered the whole arrest was unlawful, without due process of law, illegal arrest, what was the finding as unlawful by Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

You were held under those spartan conditions and you indicated that those statements would have to be unreliable.

Now, I have three specific questions, then, to ask you. Have you ever told the CIA that these statements could not be considered reliable?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure, when we started, they change the situation, they moved me from spartan conditions, started to talk with me as a human being, to treat me as a human being.

Mr. Edgar. Did you go on a point by point correction of any of those statements you previously made?

Mr. Nosenko. It wasn't in the form of simply returning to document, it was case by case, whatever concerns me, my biography, my work, whatever cases I knew, whatever cases I was involved, all questions were raised by 20, 30 times each case, when it was reevaluation of all information given by me.
Mr. Edgar. And it is your testimony that after 1967, '68, when those interrogations took place, you gave accurate, truthful statements?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, whatever and how good I recollect, at the best.

Mr. Edgar. And those statements of '67-'68 should be considered by this Committee as the absolute truth?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Edgar. And nothing but the truth.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. And it is clear to you that all the questions that were raised about Oswald were also raised in 1967 and '68?

Mr. Nosenko. Everything was raised in this period.

Mr. Edgar. If, then, this Committee discovers inconsistencies in your statements that you made in 1967 and '68, after your incarceration and the illegal period that you talk about, if we find inconsistencies between that statement and the statements you gave us last night and tonight, which should we believe?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if --- you must believe --- not you must it is up to you what you believe. But, sir, let's say was read to me by Mr. Klein a question, that I said when I said concerning Oswald, I did not mention physical surveillance. It is a big operation. It is nothing big in the KGB to put under surveil-

Top Secret
or correspondence. I could maybe something miss, you see, when I mentioning. I do not have such a brilliant, brilliant mind that immediately like photographic memory, immediately return word and word. I simply was describing that it wasn't active work, that there wasn't planned recruitment, there wasn't planned approachment, contact. There was type of passive work which is called in KGB to watch him and what is it, agents, control of correspondance, and explaining this, I simply, I could miss that he was under surveillance.

You can return to this and tell me, uh-huh, you told in '67 you didn't mention that he was under surveillance. It is not a contradiction.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Nosenko, in reply to Mr. Sawyer's question, you indicated you were paid for the period of time that you were under arrest, that it was a lump sum payment I suppose?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What amount of money was that?

Mr. Nosenko. Something about, oh, about $80,000.

The Chairman. About $80,000?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

The Chairman. Any other sum in addition to that were you paid?

Mr. Nosenko. I think I received about $15,000 or $20,000 when I started on my own to live, to buy furniture. I received,
yes, in the beginning, in '69, in April. But this lump I received in '70, '71. '71.

The Chairman. So that the record is clear, you received $80,000 for the period of time you were under arrest.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. In order to get started again, you were given an additional $15,000, and that was in 1969.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Since 1969, to the present time, you have received $35,000 --

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.

The Chairman. Would you --

Mr. Nosenko. They started, when they released me they started to pay me in the beginning $16,000. Then they raised each year, $2000, two and a half thousand were raises. I only received $35,000 this year, '78, from October of '77, approximately.

The Chairman. From October '77 to the present time you received $35,000.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Can you give us some indication of how many days you have worked during 1978?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I am working at home besides coming here when they need me, at least twice a month, and spending a week, approximately, besides traveling when they are
sending me the last few years abroad to talk with friendly

I am also working at home on my own. I am studying Soviet periodicals, Soviet magazines, Soviet newspapers. I am making certain researches, I am trying not to lose what is going on, what changes taking place in policy.

The Chairman. Would it be fair to say that you sort of set your time and that no one else sets your time?

Mr. Nosenko. When I am out of this area, yes, at home, I am myself setting time.

The Chairman. And during the last year, how many weeks would you say you have spent here at the Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Not at the Agency. They are meeting me in other places. I am very rare visiting this place, only if they invite me for a lecture or about KGB counterintelligence. But I am meeting them when I am in this area, under certain conditions, in certain places where they need me.

Well, one monthly, twice I am coming. Let's say I am spending about 12, 13 days a month here, it can be in some cases seven, eight days a month, but in main the last period of time I am coming, the last years, I am coming almost twice a month.

The Chairman. For how long?

Mr. Nosenko. For a week, five, six days.

The Chairman. My time has expired.

Mr. Preyer?
Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, your testimony has been considered a major piece of evidence, and was so considered by the Warren Commission as rebutting any Russian connection with the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald, and I think the key part of your testimony that we are concerned with, not so much the question about any inconsistencies in it, but are you right on the big question, namely, was Lee Harvey Oswald a KGB agent?

I want to mention, I have been a little surprised by your testimony, by the gaps in your knowledge of Oswald, and really how little you knew about him. For example, when he went to Minsk, he was transferred out of your oversight, I take it, and as I understood you, you did not know he was married until later on, and did not know he had gone back to the United States.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman, if I was staying and working '60 and '61 period in the same Seventh Department which sent file on Oswald in Minsk, I would know, but I was working in First American Department.

Mr. Preyer. Right. Now, I am not questioning you about that. The question I wonder, that that brings to my mind is, if Oswald had been a KGB agent, are you certain you would have known it? In other words, if you didn't even know he was married, didn't even know he had gone to the United States, couldn't he have been a KGB agent in that period without your knowledge, or are you certain --
Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't, you are absolutely right, I couldn't know. But in '63 when happened assassination of the President, when it was mentioned that Oswald shot the President, when it start, demanded the file back from Minsk, when started conversation with Minsk, started in KGB investigation, detailed approach. This is what --

Mr. Preyer. So you convinced that seeing the first section--

Mr. Nosenko. Seeing the first section in which the most important material in the whole file will be this in first section of the first volume.

Mr. Preyer. Were the rest of the sections of that file, incidentally, wire -- telephone taps?

Mr. Nosenko. It will be information from agents in second part. In third part will be from telephone conversations, from surveillance. In fourth part, photocopies of letters, different mail, when they checking Soviet connections, Soviet friends of Oswald.

Mr. Preyer. Well, on this question of your knowledge of Oswald and being in position to know about him, you knew about the cablegram from Mexico yet you did not know he had gone back to the United States. Is that because you had moved to--

Mr. Nosenko. Again, I returned in Seventh Department and I was working '62, '63, up to '64 in Seventh Department and the cablegram has come in Seventh Department. Seventh Department was started against Oswald in '59.
Mr. Preyer. Have you read a lot about the Oswald case in recent years?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I read several books, what appeared. I only didn't read the last book which was written about Marina Oswald by Mrs. Priscilla Johnson. Why? Because I knew that I would appear here, that the staff of your -- your staff will be talking with me. I didn't wanted something to get -- I can, you know, mix what I knew and something to use what I got from the book.

Mr. Preyer. I just wondered if you had read about the Mexican cable, and perhaps through the years may have been --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I never have seen that it was mentioned Mexican cable. I have seen that he visited Mexico, in Mexico visited Soviet and Cuban embassies. This I have seen in books, this fact.

Mr. Preyer. If I have got one more moment, Mr. Chairman, to change the subject, one of the things that struck me is that when you defected, as Mrs. Burke mentioned, in Geneva, in 1964, very shortly after the Kennedy Assassination, I get the impression that the CIA or American forces to whom you defected, did not have much to say about the assassination or was not --

Mr. Nosenko. They are -- I mentioned must be Oswald, the asked. But they were asking different, whatever cases I can immediately give them, names, when recruited, his position,
from what country, this they were interested, as much as possible
to take this type of information. They asked me about Oswald.
I told them what I knew.

The Chairman The ; time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. I don't want to know where you live, but
do you reside in the general area of the nation's capital?

Mr. Nosenko. I was living in this area up to 19 -- middle
of 1973, but FBI gentlemen -- I didn't mention, I also meeting.
FBI people when I am here, not only CIA, but they are not paying
me anything. FBI people inform me that they have information
that KGB trying to locate me. Then it happened in the area
where I was living in Maryland up to 1973, I was in a
shopping center, and on me was coming a Soviet from KGB. I knew
his face, and this whole -- I immediately reported this and
we decided that for me better to move from the area where
Soviet diplomats, KGB officer working under cover of diplomats
are freely traveling and can spot me.

Mr. Devine. That person didn't recognize you?

Mr. Nosenko. I immediately turned and went, turned my back
and went in another direction.

Mr. Devine. Have you been contacted or in touch with
anyone from the Soviet Embassy here in Washignton?

Mr. Nosenko. Only in 1964, the Soviet Embassy in
Washington demanded to see me after defection.
Mr. Devine. Did you see them?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, in the State Department, in presence of American diplomats, I have seen for five, say seven minutes, Consul from Soviet Embassy and interpreter, another diplomat.

Mr. Devine. What did they want with you?

Mr. Nosenko. They ask me how could I do it, and do I understand the importance of this thing, that I defected from the country, and I said, gentlemen, nobody pushed me on this question, it is absolutely my own decision, and decision of free will, which I made long ago, and without any return. Then they told me now we know how to treat you, and what do you think about your Soviet citizenship.

I said, it's automatically, I am rejecting it. I do not need. And on this I finished conversation.

Mr. Devine. They made no threats of reprisals against your family back there?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no. They later only, Mr. Congressman, they later sent two letters, one from wife and another from my mother. These letters were delivered by them. They visited American embassy in Moscow and had left these two letters. These letters were sent by American embassy in Moscow to State Department, State Department had given to CIA, CIA had given me these letters. I answered one short note that my decision is final, decision ideological and in spite of all
my love to the family, and in spite of my respect to the
memory of the father, I can repeat that if he was alive I would
also would do the same, that is all.

Mr. Devine. Getting back to one of Mr. Stoke's questions
about the amount of money paid to you for your years of
incarceration, the fact that they gave you $15,000 or $20,000
which you used for furniture and so forth, were there any
strings tied to either of those funds, the $80,000 or the subse-
quent amount?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no.

Mr. Devine. That you would not contact the press or
anybody else about this?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it never was mentioned, never.

Mr. Devine. No strings attached?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Devine. Finally, do you have any knowledge of any
connection with Oswald and the assassination of President
Kennedy?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Devine. From your connections in the KGB at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Whatever I said, nothing more. I do not
know anything.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. Burke.

Mrs. Burke. I have just a few random questions. You
mentioned Priscilla Johnson's book. Did you by any chance
while you were working in the American tourist area, did you
have any occasion to investigate her coming to Russia or did
she come during any of that time as a student?

Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson?

Mrs. Burke. Yes.

Mr. Nosenko. Why, yes, her name, she was a correspondent
in Moscow working, and KGB didn't like her dispatches and they
made very, very rude operations against her. They --

Mrs. Burke. What did they do.

Mr. Nosenko. Huh?

Mrs. Burke. What did they do to her?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, they wanted to get rid of her from the
Soviet Union. They didn't see possibility to recruit her. They
didn't see any possibility to find or to create compromising
situation. They didn't like her dispatches which they were
anti-Soviet. Then they decided to get rid of her, and they
made such an operation in restaurant where she had dinner in
evening. They put drugs in her liquor, which she was drinking,
wine or vodka or whatever it would be, and she was absolutely
drunk. And she was delivered in local regional, one of the
regional little -- it's not clinic, it is where they deliver
drunks to spend night. And they put her there and made photo
pictures of her being drunk and other women drunk laying there
and published an article and put even a picture. And surely
she was immediately recalled by her agency or her newspapers for which she was working.

Mrs. Burke. Do you think that is the wrong Priscilla Johnson?

Mr. Edgar. If the gentlewoman would yield, are you sure that you are talking about the same person?

Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson, yes, this correspondent, yes.

Mrs. Burke. Let me ask you one other question.

When she was there, did she interview Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I know it is now reading here the books. I didn't know that she interviewed. I only found out it with living in the United States, with reading books.

Mrs. Burke. That she interviewed him. That didn't show in your file?

Mr. Nosenko. I didn't read her book -- this is what in some other books mentioned that she had interviewed him.

Mrs. Burke. Let me ask again about Oswald in Minsk, and first of all, can American tourists go to Minsk easily?

Mr. Nosenko. Minsk is open city, yes.

Mrs. Burke. It is an open city now. Was it an open city then?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. And when he was there, of course, I realize that you don't know and you did not keep up with what he was
doing there, but in reading that file, in the first few
pages or anything, did you notice anything in terms of his
contacts with Americans, or did you notice anything at all
that was extraordinary about him?

Mr. Nosenko. No, there wasn't. For the whole his period
of time there wasn't found any indication on suspicion,
suspicious meetings or anything suspicion concerning his contacts
with Americans.

Mrs. Burke. Let me -- As I understand it, it was fairly
routine that everyone's phone would be tapped, so that that
was not --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. -- your information that that would be
nothing unusual.

You know, there is one thing that is bothering me, and
that is the inconsistency and the greater detail that is present
today than in your earlier statements.

Could you give us an explanation of why there is more de-
tail today?

For instance, in your earlier statements I noticed you
refer to the interpreter as a tourist, the tourist guide, as
just a tourist guide or an interpreter? Today you referred
by name to that person. And again, the two psychiatrists --

Mr. Nosenko. I don't know even now name of this inter-
preter. I do not remember name.
Mrs. Burke. I see. I thought --

Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter, I never mentioned.

Mrs. Burke. You never mentioned the interpreter?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I do not remember her name.

Mrs. Burke. It was just this officer Rastrusin?

Mr. Nosenko. Officer, yes.

Mrs. Burke. He was -- but he was the one that found -- wasn't he the one that found Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. No, this is the officer who reported about him.

Mrs. Burke. He reported it, but he didn't find him?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, interpreter found him with administration of the hotel where Oswald was staying.

Mrs. Burke. Oh, I see.

Mr. Nosenko. You see, interpreter has come in the morning to take him or has come to take him to city, to show him, as interpreter on a guide, on a tour. And she was waiting about 20, 25, 30 minutes and was concerned.

The Chairman. Time is up. One more.

Mrs. Burke. All right, just one more question.

When Oswald arrived, then, he didn't speak very much Russian, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I didn't hear that he spoke in Russian.

Mrs. Burke. I see. Were there any notations at all in the file -- what is your understanding of his fluency in Russian
during the time of his stay?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, during time of his stay surely he started a little bit to talk, but it wasn't very, it wasn't good Russian. It wasn't even --

The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mrs. Burke. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to just pick up on that line of questioning, if I could, with you, Mr. Nosenko.

Correct me if I am wrong, but as I understand it, Oswald, you were aware of Oswald's desire to defect. There was a decision, and in fact he was informed through his Intourist guide that his request had been rejected.

Is that correct so far?

Mr. Nosenko. Is in general, but it wasn't in this ways told to him. It was in so-called, you know, soft manner. It was explained to him by through Intourist --

Mr. Dodd. That he would have to go through his embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, that Intourist not dealing with this question. He must go through this, this, this procedures.

Mr. Dodd. Okay.

Now, you, at the time of this, of Oswald's request, you were working in the Seventh Department of the Second Directorate which was involved with tourism?
Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. Okay. Could you tell me what would be the normal operating procedures within the Soviet Union if a tourist were involved, say, in a car accident with an Intourist guide. Say a Frenchman was involved in a car accident. Assuming it was not his fault, someone hit him, what happens? Do they notify immediately the French Embassy, what steps do they take in order to deal with that individual?

Mr. Nosenko. I would assume, sir, that he will be, sure, he immediately will be taken in polyclinic, will be informed his embassy.

Mr. Dodd. Those kind of steps.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. If you had made a decision that Oswald should not be accepted in the Soviet Union, and if you find him in his room with his wrist slit, why don't you then contact the American Embassy and notify them that you have an American on your hands who just tried to kill himself?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, he wasn't an employee of American embassy.

Mr. Dodd. He was a tourist, though.

Mr. Nosenko. A tourist.

Mr. Dodd. And I just asked you about a Frenchman who might be a tourist and get in a car accident, and you said you would take him to the hospital, you would notify the embassy. Why
don't you take Mr. Oswald to the hospital and notify the
American embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. Nobody knew that he would cut wrist.

Mr. Dodd. No, but you found him with his wrist cut.

Mr. Nosenko. Right. He was delivered in hospital.

Mr. Dodd. Why didn't you notify the American embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. He wasn't dying, he wasn't serious, they
made transfusion and put stitches. It is -- I am telling what
I think why it was.

Mr. Dodd. You understand my problem here. You have got
someone who you don't want to accept him. You have already
made a decision that he shouldn't be allowed to defect. You
walk into his room and find him with his wrist slit, it would
seem to me that this guy has already indicated just by that act
alone that he is not playing with a full deck of cards, and
you decide then that you are going to accept him because you
are worried that it might cause some embarrassment after Camp
David.

Mr. Nosenko. No. But the question to inform the Embassy,
it must be passing through such stage. Intourist itself cannot
contact the American Embassy.

Mr. Dodd. No, obviously.

Mr. Nosenko. No. They must contact their Minister of
Foreign Trade which in its turn putting question to Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet
Union can contact the embassy.

Mr. Dodd. Let me jump onto something else quickly in the time we've got.

You knew that Lee Harvey Oswald was a Marine?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. You knew by your answer to Mrs. Burke's question a minute ago that Oswald had a student's knowledge of Russian?

Mr. Nosenko. When he was living in Minsk, not before, before he has come. No.

Mr. Dodd. You didn't know that?

Mr. Nosenko. No, when he was living in Minsk, when he was in daily contact with Soviets working at the plant and having friends.

Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had been a student of Marxism?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had given the U.S. embassy his notice to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I know that he visited embassy and after was, he was told that he will be allowed to stay, after this.

Mr. Dodd. You were not aware at that time that he contacted through Intourist and eventually your office and made it known that he intended to defect or wanted to defect, you were not aware or your department was not aware that he had
already notified the American embassy that he intended to
defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.

Mr. Dodd. You were not aware of that.

Mr. Nosenko. No. He wasn't under surveillance. We
didn't know. When he was going alone without interpreter, we
didn't know.

Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you how you know. I just asked
you whether or not -- he didn't tell you that?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Nobody from KGB talked with him.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. When Congressman Devine asked you how you
knew your family was okay or that they hadn't invoked any
reprisals, I didn't get the answer.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I asked Mr. Solie in '69, '70, once
I asked, anything about my family?

Mr. Sawyer. Mr. who?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Bruce Solie, CIA officer who was in
contact with me, '69, '70. He answered me that they are all
right, everything okay. But he didn't went in any detail
and I never returned more to this question. But there is another
point, sir. Besides the father's position, after he died, she
was receiving, she received pension, and besides that, for
the years --
Mr. Sawyer. How did you know she died?

Mr. Nosenko. Father died, I said. Father died in 1956. After father's death she received a pension.

Mr. Sawyer. I understand. You went through that before.

I noticed here though, when he slashed his wrist, the psychiatric examination report here by the doctor says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian, so he must have spoken Russian, you know, to whatever degree, when he went there. I thought you said you were always interested in someone who can speak Russian or has studied anything Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. Who specializes in any field of Russia, who will be working for the United States government.

Mr. Sawyer. But here is a guy at that time, when he first came there, within a matter of days after, the doctor says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir --

Mr. Sawyer. That would have keyed interest right there, wouldn't it?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if we knew that he studied in Columbia University, in Yale University --

Mr. Sawyer. Well, it says right --

Mr. Nosenko. In Russian Institute.

Mr. Sawyer. It says on the report, this was on the 21st or the 23rd or 25th of October, a week after he arrived, it
says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian. So you knew he spoke Russian at that time. And yet that was one of your criteria.

Mr. Nosenko: Well, sir -- I'm curious.

Mr. Sawyer. Something else I am a little curious about. Apparently, coming here, wanting to defect, wanting to leave America, wanting Russia, here is a guy that if he didn't know anything would be apparently capable of going back to the United States at the behest of KGB in areas of the country that Russian diplomats and so forth, KGB people weren't allowed to go and dig up information for them and come back. Here is a guy you didn't have to threaten, he volunteers. And it seems strange you wouldn't talk to him or be interested in him just from that point of view.

And how -- and another thing that greatly bothers me, how did you know that he, being in the Marines, you knew that, but how did you know he wasn't a cryptographer or how did you know he wasn't stationed in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a guard or as a messenger or a clerk, or that he worked with U-2s, which apparently he did. Why would the KGB not at least find these things out, with a guy that wants to go to Russia, wants to be a Russian?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I only can repeat you, when on him was received the first information about his arrival, checkup was made on him. There wasn't any existing material in KGB, any
knowledge about him. He never was before in the Soviet Union.

In judging by the question --

Mr. Sawyer. Why weren't they asking, why wouldn't they ask, that's the question. Why wouldn't they ask?

Mr. Nosenko. They are not --

Mr. Sawyer. Apparently they knew he could speak Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. -- asking Americans approaching.

Judging by the questionnaire, they decided, the KGB decided, Seventh Department, he is not an interesting target.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, why would a person like this not even be interesting for something like the Tokyo Rose, on some kind of propaganda program where he could say how bad things were in the United States, and why he didn't want to stay there anymore and how great they were in Russia, like these propagandists do?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I am telling you why it was decided, and how KGB was thinking about him.

Mr. Sawyer. I yield back the balance of my time.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I just now got this report. I wonder if I could let Mr. Edgar go ahead of me?

The Chairman. The Chair will recognize Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a series of questions which I hope most of which
will be yes and no kinds of questions.

Did you conduct in the KGB a program to compromise and recruit journalists?

Mr. Nosenko. I was working, when I started to work in the KGB in 1953, the first year I was working against American correspondents.

Mr. Edgar. But the KGB, not you personally, but the KGB did have a policy of going against journalists and trying to compromise them, yes or no?

Mr. Nosenko. Trying to recruit or compromise them.

Mr. Edgar. Did they censor all the journalists' notes that they could gather from the journalists? Did they censor the notes before they allowed the story to go out?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. Priscilla Johnson interviewed Oswald on the 15th of November, 1959. Would the KGB have looked at her notes from that interview?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, they are censored not by the KGB, but there is special -- it is government organization was censoring this. Some materials are coming to the KGB, some are not coming.

Mr. Edgar. Well, she reveals in her article that he was a Marxist, that Oswald was a Marxist and a Marine Corps radar man. It would seem to me the KGB would have discovered that in November of 1959.
Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I didn't know this in those days.

Mr. Edgar. Do you know a correspondent by the name of Arlene Mosby? 

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I heard such a name, Mosby, a woman who was a correspondent.

Mr. Edgar. In the earlier questioning of Congresswoman Burke, you were not confusing Arlene Mosby with the treatment of Priscilla Johnson?

Mr. Nosenko. I think it was Priscilla Johnson, the case which I described, I think so. I think so, it was Priscilla Johnson.

Mr. Edgar. How do you know?

Mr. Nosenko. What I heard from colleagues who were in KGB, who were working against correspondents.

Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely clear?

Mr. Nosenko. And then there was an article in --

Mr. Edgar. You are not absolutely --

Mr. Nosenko. In literary newspaper, I think it was, not in Pravda, Izvestia, but in Literary Gazette.

Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely certain?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I think it was Priscilla Johnson, as I said.

Mr. Edgar. But it could have been someone else.

Mr. Nosenko. An American correspondent, woman.

Mr. Edgar. Are you certain that after 1967 you sat down
with the CIA and corrected your earlier statements about Oswald, yes or no?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. We have only a few pages of written testimony, some three pages that you gave, and in fact, in the beginning part of that testimony, you indicate that you don't want to go through it again because your earlier testimony will stand for itself. I am paraphrasing what you said.

Were the notes and the recordings of those corrections made and kept by the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, Mr. Bruce Solie talking with me every day for a period from the end of '67, the whole '68, 1968, '69, every conversation he was recording. But he never has come and showed his notes, transcriptions or anything. He was returning to every case, to every aspect by 20, 25, 30 times.

Mr. Edgar. But specifically on the Oswald case, would it be correct in our assuming that it was more than three pages of notes on specifically Lee Harvey Oswald after 1967?

Mr. Nosenko. If he was raising questions concerning also Lee Harvey Oswald.

MR. Edgar. We have some information that Bruce Solie --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, Mr. Solie.

Mr. Edgar. Stated in a deposition that there is nothing on Oswald other than the three pages.

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot say how many pages. I know
that he was passing through all cases, all questions, with me for the period almost two years.

Mr. Edgar. Who other than Bruce Solie did you talk to about correcting your earlier statements?

Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't correcting them. They were correcting, they were talking returning back to every case.

Mr. Edgar. One final question.

Mr. Nosenko. And also besides Mr. Solie, were people coming from FBI with cases in which were interested for them.

Mr. Edgar. One final question. You stopped our hearing about an hour ago and were concerned about our playing the tape and bringing up old memories, and I respect the fact that you are very patriotic in coming before this Committee and helping us.

Would you be willing to sit down with our staff and go through a series of written questions which outline specifically for you the contradictions of your 1964, '65, '66 and early '67 timeframe, with the statements that you made in '67, '68 and '78, and indicate in a yes-no manner which statement, laid side by side, is true and which statement is false?

Mr. Nosenko. If it is the wish of the Committee, sure.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian?

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Nosenko, do you remember when it was that the FBI first interviewed you concerning Oswald?
Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember dates, but --

Mr. Fithian. It was between February and April?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, right.

Mr. Fithian. The information we have is that it was early March, the first week in March. Is that about right?

Now have you talked to the FBI about that testimony at any time since then?

Mr. Nosenko. Gentlemen, on many, many times I have seen FBI, many, many questions raised. I cannot -- about this testimony, no, no.

Mr. Fithian. About the Oswald testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. About Oswald were asked questions, but not about this testimony. I do not remember about this testimony.

Mr. Fithian. My question is, there is a written transcript summary of your testimony to the FBI taken on March 5th, 1964.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Fithian. My question is, have you at any time since then visited with the FBI about this testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir.

Mr. Fithian. Now, next, when -- what is your understanding as to when Oswald first offered to defect, when you first knew, when the KGB first knew he was interested in defecting?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot give you a date.

Mr. Fithian. All right.

Well, he filled out an application --
Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no application, in oral form. He told the interpreter in oral form.

Mr. Fithian. This was the Intourist?

Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter of the Intourist.

Mr. Fithian. And then the Intourist came to the KGB?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, and it immediately was informed to KGB that this American applies, wants to stay, said to interpreter.

Mr. Fithian. And then you reviewed the file?

Mr. Nosenko. It was several pieces of pages what we had on him. It wasn't even file.

Mr. Fithian. But you reviewed whatever applications --

Mr. Nosenko. Right. No it wasn't application to stay. He in oral form told the interpreter that he wants to stay Soviet Union.

Mr. Fithian. You reviewed the pages that he had filled out for the visa and any other sheets that you had?

Mr. Nosenko. He didn't -- yes, these documents, yes, for the visa, questionnaire and --

Mr. Fithian. Yes. What I am trying to get at is what did you have in front of you physically, knowledgeably about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. What I remember, it was it was several pages only, was questionnaire, was form of document from Intourist received how long his tour and how many days. There was checks of Oswald in archives of KGB to forms. There was information from Intourist who work with Oswald and
Mr. Fithian. All right. Let me just stop you here.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. The forms in there by the KGB were filled out based on what information?

Mr. Nosenko. On his name, what he supplied who he is, when he was asking visa.

Mr. Fithian. But they conducted no check, no search?

Mr. Nosenko. It is in the archives of KGB, if he ever was in Soviet Union, on him there will be something. If he wasn't in Soviet Union but he was known to intelligence service —

Mr. Fithian. But you didn't have any record on that.

Mr. Nosenko. Nothing.

Mr. Fithian. And so the final question is that the only thing that you had to judge -that he was an uninteresting subject was what he had told the Intourist guide?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Fithian. That is the only substantive thing?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, and his questionnaire for who he is, his name, whatever he filled about himself. That's all.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair has one additional request from one member, for one additional question.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. I just have one additional question, and that is the $80,000 you got for compensation and the $15,000 or $20,000
you got later, that was net money after whatever taxes or whatever it was --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, after all taxes were taken.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Mr. Dodd?

Mr. Dodd. I just wondered for the record, I wondered if, Mr. Nosenko, you could tell us when you arrived in this country on February 12th, 1964, between February 12th, 1964 and April 4th, 1964, where were you in this country?

Mr. Nosenko. February 12 of 1964 and April 4th, I was staying in house in Virginia. I do not know address.

Mr. Dodd. Did you go -- did you travel at all?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Dodd. No vacation?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, I went in March on week to Hawaii I was.

Mr. Dodd. Were you on your own?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, with guards.

Mr. Dodd. It was a relaxed period for you and just a chance to rest?

Mr. Nosenko. Chance to get a little bit rest.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that this is the normal way that defectors are treated when they come to this country?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

Mr. Dodd. Just one last point, Mr. Chairman, and that is
with regard to the American exhibit, as a result of a statement by Mr. Klein which I understand you did not disagree with, the American exhibit ended on September 4th, 1959? That's when the termination of the exhibit was?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, he showed me an article.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that employees that worked during the exhibit stayed on for a period of time after that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure, to it will be disassembled, this is the whole process is going on. It is closed for visitors to visit, to look.

Mr. Dodd. How long a period would that have been, a week?

Mr. Nosenko. No, more.

Mr. Dodd. More?

Mr. Nosenko. More, sure.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, with reference to your earlier comments this evening regarding what transpired during your period of isolation, which you described as extreme spartan conditions, I would like to make this request of you. I think the record ought to in a very graphic way portray those conditions under which you were subjected during that period of time, and while you are complying with Mr. Edgar's request and working with the staff in terms of the contradictory data, would you also agree to work with the staff in terms of seeing that the record has a complete and accurate description —
Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. --of all the conditions which you underwent during that period?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Did you have some?

Mr. Cornwell. Following up on the question that Congressman Dodd just asked you, the staff, in an attempt to determine how long it took to disassemble the exhibition, checked with a knowledgeable employee who was involved in that process in the State Department and were informed by that person that the exhibition was disassembled and the persons who were operating it had left by October the 4th, approximately 30 days after the exhibition was terminated.

Would you disagree with that information?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I cannot disagree. I do not remember. I do not know, even, when they left, no, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Anything further from the Committee?

Now, Mr. Devine, do you have anything?

Mr. Devine. No. He is under continuing subpoena.

The Chairman. Under the rules of the Committee, Mr. Nosenko, any witness appearing before our Committee is entitled at the conclusion of his testimony to address the Committee for a period of five minutes for the purpose of clarifying anything
for the record or making any statement he so desires, and I want
to at this time afford you that five minute period to make such a
statement, if you so desire.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I consider
my appearance, invitation to appear at Committee, as I told also
the same applies before, my meetings with the staff of the Commit-
tee, I consider it honor, great honor for me. I will try to
answer whatever I remember, whatever I know as only truth, and
but the truth. And you would like to see me appear at any time,
I am at your disposal and I will try to give you the only things
what I know.

    The Chairman. Thank you.

    That is the completion of your statement, sir?

    Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

    The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, on behalf of the Committee and
the United States Congress, I want to express our appreciation to
you for having appeared here and having given this Committee the
benefit of your testimony. At this time I would remind you of
the terms of your agreement to work with our staff and provide
further information to the Committee, that you will continue
under the oath administered to you by this Committee.

    Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much for your appearance
here.

    Mr. Nosenko. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. You are excused.

At this time, there being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting is adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 10:17 o'clock p.m., the Committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

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