



Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10131-10335

RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014733

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : [Restricted]
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/28/1978
PAGES : 65

SUBJECTS :

CIA, METHODOLOGY

[Restricted]

OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
MEXICO
MEXICO CITY

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/21/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 8

TOP SECRET

Stenographic Transcript Of

ORIGINAL

HEARINGS

Before The

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy
of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF HERBERT MANELL

Washington, D.C.

April 28, 1978

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

Official Reporters

300 Seventh St., S. W. Washington, D. C.

554-2345

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

LaFrance
dog

1

FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1978

House of Representatives

Subcommittee on the Assassination
of John F. Kennedy of the
Select Committee on
Assassinations

Washington, D. C.

Deposition of

HERBERT MANELL

called for examination by counsel for the subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee
on Assassinations, Room 3370, House Office Building Annex II,
2nd and D Street, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at
1:00 p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public
in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on
behalf of the respective parties:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, Counsel

DAN HARDWAY, on the staff of the Subcommittee

TOP SECRET

000913

1 TESTIMONY OF HERBERT MANELL

2 Whereupon,

3 HERBERT MANELL

4 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,
5 was examined and testified as follows:6 Mr. Goldsmith. Will you please state your name and
7 occupation for the record.8 Mr. Manell. I am Herbert Manell, Staff Officer of the
9 CIA.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been with the CIA?

11 Mr. Manell. Twenty-seven years.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Manell, have you read the letter
13 dated March 23, 1978, from the acting DCI to the Chairman of
14 the committee?

15 Mr. Manell. I have.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that letter?

17 Mr. Manell. I do.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Under the committee's rules, Mr. Manell,
19 the witness has a right to receive a copy of the deposition
20 that he gives to the committee. However, by virtue of the
21 arrangement that we have worked out with the Agency, the
22 Agency has asked us to obtain a waiver from each witness,
23 from each Agency witness, a waiver of the right specifically
24 to receive the transcript. You may have access to it to review
25 it for accuracy, but you may not have the right to actually

1 receive it. That is to say, we are asking you to waive the
2 right to receive the transcript.

3 Are you willing to waive that right?

4 Mr. Manell. Do I have to waive that right?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Absolutely not. However, if you do
6 not waive the right, we will not have the deposition.

7 Mr. Manell. I will waive the right, then.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. You are testifying here today without
9 subpoena and freely?

10 Mr. Manell. I am.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of background, the committee
12 is mandated to investigate the assassination of the President,
13 who did it, was there a conspiracy and to evaluate the per-
14 formance of the investigative agencies, specifically the CIA
15 and the FBI. Do you understand that?

16 Mr. Manell. Yes.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you located in Mexico City in
18 1963?

19 Mr. Manell. I was.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. What was your position at that time?

21 Mr. Manell. I was head of the Soviet section of the
22 station, of the CIA station in Mexico City.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. What were your general responsibilities?

24 Mr. Manell. My responsibilities were basically two-
25 fold; one being counterintelligence monitoring and to negate

1 the activities of the Soviets; secondly, to attempt to
2 recruit Soviets.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you involved in any of the sur-
4 veillance operations that were mounted against the Soviets?
5 By surveillance, I mean the tap operation and the photo-
6 surveillance operation of the Soviet Embassy compound.

7 Mr. Manell. I was not personally involved.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. You just received the information
9 that came from that operation?

10 Mr. Manell. Yes.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Before we get into more detail, who
12 was the station chief in 1963?

13 Mr. Manell. Win Scott.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann Goodpasture an employee of the
15 station also?

16 Mr. Manell. She was.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. What were her station responsibilities?

18 Mr. Manell. She had many responsibilities. That
19 included being an assistant to the chief of station. She
20 was also a person who had some type of responsibility for
21 collecting the photos that we obtained of Soviet Embassy
22 activity, and I think she was also involved to some extent
23 in the telephone tap operations that we conducted against
24 the Soviets in Mexico City.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say she was Win Scott's

1 right-hand person?

2 Mr. Manell. That is a question of definition there, and
3 I don't think it is a fair question.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did she have a very close working
5 relationship with Mr. Scott?

6 Mr. Manell. She certainly did.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Did he rely on her a lot?

8 Mr. Manell. They relied on many of us quite a bit.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Did he rely on Ann Goodpasture a lot?

10 Mr. Manell. Yes, he did.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned Miss Goodpasture was
12 involved in some way in the photo-surveillance operation.

13 Mr. Manell. That is right.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the extent of her responsi-
15 bilities?

16 Mr. Manell. I can't really define it too well at this
17 distance in time. I don't know whether she actually managed
18 the people who took the photographs. That might have been
19 her responsibility. It might have been someone else's.
20 But she certainly did handle the finished product at the
21 station.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. By handling, you mean she reviewed the
23 photographic tapes?

24 Mr. Manell. That is right.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. After that operation, what was her

1 responsibility?

2 Mr. Manell. I can't really tell you. I can't remember
3 whether it was her or someone else. She might have been an
4 alternate officer in that type of support operation. I don't
5 think she was the principal. I am not sure.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Tom Keenan was the
7 principal?

8 Mr. Manell. At one time, I think he was.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann the person who brought the
10 transcript into the station?

11 Mr. Manell. At times, yes, I believe she did, but I
12 am not entirely sure. Tom did that also, and

13 also did that.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Before we proceed, I guess there is one
15 other question I should ask you.

16 Has anyone from the CIA contacted you in any way in
17 reference to your testimony before the committee today or in
18 reference to the interview that you gave us about a month ago?

19 Mr. Manell. Yes. I was contacted by legal counsel,
20 who gave me advice to be absolutely forthcoming in my
21 testimony, and he said exactly what your letter says here;
22 that the secrecy agreement is waived for this day's session.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Any other contact?

24 Mr. Manell. No.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I also take it that during the half

1 hour lunch break since your wife testified this morning,
2 you did not discuss the substance of this in any way?

3 Mr. Manell. Just briefly. In no significant way.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you discuss the questions that
5 were going to be asked in any way?

6 Mr. Manell. No.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the telephone tap opera-
8 tion, approximately how many phones were tapped?

9 Mr. Manell. I can't recall, but we had telephone tapped
10 in the Soviet Embassy at their commercial section, their
11 consular section, the embassy proper, and their military
12 attache office.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. That is what was referred to as their
14 liaison operation; is that correct?

15 Mr. Manell. Yes, it was.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. There was a unilateral operation?

17 Mr. Manell. Yes, there was.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Did that cover a different phone?

19 Mr. Manell. My recollection is bad on that. I
20 believe that the unilateral telephone taps were placed
21 exclusively on the residences of Soviet officials. That is
22 my recollection.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the coverage constant with regard
24 to these telephone taps?

25 Mr. Manell. The coverage was constant within the embassy,

1 except I think that from time to time, we might have taken
2 one tap off one line and put it on another. As far as the
3 unilateral taps, they were not constant. They were placed on
4 an individual for a length of time to gain information about
5 him, his habits, his family, his contacts, and then taken off
6 and placed on someone else.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. By constant, what I mean is while the
8 tap was in operation on a particular phone, it was con-
9 stantly in effect? Whenever the phone call came in the tap
10 would be triggered?

11 Mr. Manell. Indeed.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the policy decision as to which
13 phones would be covered?

14 Mr. Manell. Well, it was basic practice that all of the
15 phones that we did have covered in the embassy were just
16 covered naturally and normally because that is what we
17 wanted to have reporting on. As far as changing from one
18 line to another, it would have been a mutual agreement between
19 myself and Win Scott, or Win might have decided to change a
20 line.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. When were the people actually involved
22 in the operation itself, Tom Keenan, [redacted] Goodpasture
23 involved in those types of policy decisions?

24 Mr. Manell. Tom Keenan I don't think was ever involved
25 in that policy decision. I don't believe [redacted] was

1 involved either. As far as Annie, I am not sure, but I
2 doubt that she -- she could have been involved in making a
3 suggestion like that, yes.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the tap operation, what
5 product did you actually receive? In other words, what was
6 the take from that operation?

7 Mr. Manell. Well, the take was both in Spanish and
8 Russian. Russian when a Soviet communicated with another
9 Soviet in another part of the embassy, or a Soviet at his
10 residence or somewhere outside the embassy communicated with
11 someone inside the embassy. The Spanish product was, of
12 course, when a native called in to the embassy or when an
13 official called out.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. You would get, in effect, a Russian tape
15 or a Spanish tape of a particular conversation?

16 Mr. Manell. That is right.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be done with the tape?

18 Mr. Manell. It was first reviewed by my wife --

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Before that, it would be transcribed,
20 would it not?

21 Mr. Manell. It would be transcribed first in Spanish.
22 The Russian language portions were indicated so that our
23 Russian language transcribers would transcribe it. At one
24 time we had a transcriber in the embassy proper in our sta-
25 tion to transcribe it. After that man's departure, I believe

1 that all Russian language translations were done outside the
2 embassy.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Were the transcripts that you received
4 literal translations or transcriptions?

5 Mr. Manell. They were supposed to be literal, but I am
6 sure that shortcuts were taken when a non-essential or unin-
7 teresting conversation took place, but each conversation had
8 to be transcribed.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Where would the transcript be filed
10 after being reviewed?

11 Mr. Manell. They would be filed in our office, in our
12 registry.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Would any of the transcripts be sent to
14 CIA headquarters?

15 Mr. Manell. Rarely.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Eventually, were the transcripts taken
17 from Mexico City station and sent to headquarters?

18 Mr. Manell. Rarely. It would only happen if there
19 was a rather important and interesting excerpt that we thought
20 headquarters needed or headquarters would have asked for.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, they would not?

22 Mr. Manell. As a matter of routine, they certainly were
23 not sent to headquarters.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. In speaking of files, what kind of
25 attitude did Win Scott have towards files?

TOP SECRET

11

1 Mr. Manell. His attitude was that most everything
2 should be kept, recorded, filed, crossfiled, indexed. He had
3 a penchant for having materials that some of us considered
4 even unimportant be filed. His was the most complete
5 registry, probably, anywhere in the world, outside of head-
6 quarters.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you served at other stations so
8 that you could make that comparison?

9 Mr. Manell. Yes, I have.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. As station chief, was Scott very compe-
11 tent and demanding?

12 Mr. Manell. He was both.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Approximately how much time would pass
14 from the moment that an intercept came in until a trans-
15 cript was received?

16 Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly right now, but I
17 would imagine possibly two, three, four days at most.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. It might take somewhat longer if it
19 needed to be translated from Russian into English?

20 Mr. Manell. Yes. The transcript would then go out
21 with the original tape to our transcriber.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the photo-surveillance
23 operation, who regularly reviewed the photographs that came
24 in?

25 Mr. Manell. Annie Goodpasture.

TOP SECRET

923

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Stepping back for a moment, after the
2 transcript came in, who reviewed those at first, when they
3 came in?

4 Mr. Manell. I think Annie always took an interest in
5 reading the transcripts, but the actual responsibility for
6 reading, analyzing the transcript at the early point of my
7 stay in Mexico was the responsibility of my wife, Barbara
8 Manell.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. I should indicate that we are always
10 going to be discussing 1963 unless I mention to the contrary.

11 So your wife would read the transcripts. Would she
12 decide to whom they would be routed?

13 Mr. Manell. Yes, she would, and I would also. But it
14 was her primary responsibility to do that.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Now on the photos, who would review
16 them when they came in?

17 Mr. Manell. Annie Goodpasture would review them. I
18 might make mention, though, with regard to the review of
19 telephone tap transcripts, I believe, and I certainly
20 remember, that before the assassination of President Kennedy
21 and certainly during the period of the latter part of the
22 summer of 1963, my wife was not working eight hours a day and
23 not coming in every day necessarily into the office.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you make mention of that?

25 Mr. Manell. Because you asked the question of who

1 regularly reviewed the transcripts. In that case, I would
2 review them.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question; who would
4 review them in your absence.

5 Mr. Manell. I would.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Would those transcripts be reviewed in
7 chronological order?

8 Mr. Manell. Most likely.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. How many hours a day was your wife
10 normally working?

11 Mr. Manell. During parts of the tour in Mexico, she
12 worked eight hours a day. At times, less than that.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Specifically the period of late summer
14 1963; early fall?

15 Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly, and I haven't dis-
16 cussed this with her and I don't know what her recollection
17 is. But I know she was not working regularly during August
18 and September of that year.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. When you say she was not working regu-
20 larly, do you mean she was not coming in every day or that
21 she was coming in every day but not working eight hours?

22 Mr. Manell. It was that she did not work eight hours
23 and she did not necessarily come in every day, as I recall.
24 But then again, my memory is vague about that. I know she
25 was not working full time.

TOP SECRET

14

1 Mr. Goldsmith. I guess at this point, for the purpose
2 of the record, you did mention before that you did discuss
3 with your wife during lunch in some way her testimony this
4 morning.

5 Mr. Manell. Principally I asked her whether she was
6 dealt with courteously. That was my principal question.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What was her response?

8 Mr. Manell. She was.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. I certainly hope that was the case.

10 Mr. Manell. It was.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Did your wife mention to you that we
12 had asked her about the transcripts?

13 Mr. Manell. Yes, but with no elaboration.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. She did not discuss the substance in
15 any other way with you?

16 Mr. Manell. No. So, you see, there might be a variance
17 between what she said and what I say because it is a question
18 of recollection.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. It seems there was a
20 procedure whereby, as a general rule, your wife would routinely
21 review the transcript or you would review the transcript
22 when she was not there.

23 Was there a similar rule for the take from the phot-
24 surveillance operation?

25 Mr. Manell. No, there wasn't.

TOP SECRET

926

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

2 Mr. Manell. Ann Goodpasture generally felt that this
3 was her area of responsibility. While my wife and I had
4 access to the photographs, it was mostly when Ann thought
5 there was something important to show us that we saw the
6 product or when we felt that we had to review the product of
7 a certain day or certain hour to confirm or deny certain infor-
8 mation we had that we asked to see and did see whenever we
9 wanted the product for the particular period.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, you did not
11 review those photographs?

12 Mr. Manell. True.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. What coordination, if any, was there
14 between the tap operation and the photo-surveillance opera-
15 tion?

16 Mr. Manell. I don't think I understand the question.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Were the two operations tied in toge-
18 ther in any way?

19 Mr. Manell. They certainly were if they were oriented
20 against the Soviet Embassy.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. More specifically, if something of
22 interest came up on the transcript or tape and that person
23 indicated he was going to be showing up at the embassy,
24 would the practice be for the tap operation people to contact
25 the photo-surveillance people?

TOP SECRET

16

1 Mr. Manell. If you are talking about people who
2 actually did that kind of work on the outside, no, that was
3 compartmented.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. How would that happen?

5 Mr. Manell. As far as directing what those people on
6 the outside did, that was coordinated within the embassy
7 from my section to Annie or to Win or to someone substitut-
8 ing for Annie.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. So the people from the tap operation
10 would contact Goodpasture or Win Scott?

11 Mr. Manell. It was not necessarily just the tap opera-
12 tion because it is a little bit misleading. For example, I
13 was running several double-agent operations and would
14 know beforehand when a meeting was to take place between the
15 Soviet intelligence officer and my agent.

16 To confirm at least a small part of what my agent told
17 me, I would very often want to know when that Soviet
18 officer exited the embassy that particular time and when
19 he returned. So it was not merely from telephone tap
20 materials that we directed activities of the photographic
21 surveillance, for a number of other reasons. Or, for
22 example, I might be working on a Soviet, for any number of
23 reasons, I might find it interesting or think it
24 would be interesting to find out when he returned to the
25 Soviet Embassy or whom he might contact in the Soviet Embassy.

TOP SECRET

928

1 Mr. Goldsmith. In this case, how would you get that
2 information to the photo-surveillance people?

3 Mr. Manell. Probably through Ann Goodpasture.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. If the tap people -- getting back to
5 my original example -- wanted to communicate information to
6 the photo people?

7 Mr. Manell. There were no such things as tap people.

8 You mean the recipient of the telephone tap product,
9 for example, myself, would ask Annie Goodpasture to -- well,
10 you see the question is not actually entirely logical,
11 because normally photographic surveillance would be continu-
12 ous. I don't remember at this point the days of the week
13 they might not have been conducted. Possibly the weekends;
14 I am not sure. Possibly one day over the weekend. Certainly
15 it stopped after dusk.

16 I am sorry, I have lost the trend of your question.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I will try to redirect you.

18 If you have a person working in the tap operation who
19 transcribes tapes and he realizes, hey, this is something
20 important, and the substance of the conversation is someone
21 of interest is saying he is going to the Soviet Embassy.

22 Mr. Manell. This person would be on the outside, anyway,
23 transcribing, and not in the station. If anything was of an
24 emergency nature, the person was instructed to call for a
25 visit from an officer. The officer would get the message and

1 come back to the station and discuss whatever that message
2 was with the responsible officer -- say, the responsible
3 officer for the Cuban operation or the Soviet operation or
4 for the satellite operation -- and then action would be
5 taken, most likely in conjunction with the discussion with
6 Win Scott.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. There was a procedure for expediting
8 matters?

9 Mr. Manell. Indeed there was.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Would the person contacted by the
11 Spanish transcriber be Ann Goodpasture?

12 Mr. Manell. It could be Ann Goodpasture; it could be
13 other people, such as Tom Keenan or

14 Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned the scope of the phot-
15 surveillance coverage. Do you know whether the coverage was
16 constant during daylight hours, or was it coordinated with
17 the working hours of the embassy compound?

18 Mr. Manell. I can't remember. I would tend to believe
19 that it was constant. Possibly, however, they might have
20 taken off for lunch, but that should not have been the case.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of the photo-
22 surveillance operation? By that, I mean what subjects were
23 they trying to take pictures of?

24 Mr. Manell. There are two different types of photo-
25 graph operations. One was to take photographs of non-

1 Soviets visiting the Soviet Embassy, and the other purpose
2 was to take photographs of Soviets meeting with other
3 Soviets within the embassy compound so that we could, using
4 that method and others also, attempt to identify whether
5 they were intelligence-connected.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. On the non-Soviet visiting the embassy
7 compound, was a picture taken of every one?

8 Mr. Manell. Yes.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. A picture would be taken of every
10 subject entering or leaving the compound?

11 Mr. Manell. I believe so.

12 I must qualify it to say that I was never in charge
13 of that activity. The only responsibility I had for that
14 activity was when I had a particular interest and requested
15 certain attention be paid to that interest.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Keeping that qualification in mind,
17 is it fair to say that essentially pictures would be taken
18 of everyone and then later on the photographs that were
19 obtained would be reviewed in light of the purpose you have
20 just stated?

21 Mr. Manell. Yes.

22 I would like to add one other statement to that.

23 Win Scott, our chief of station, was the type of man who
24 always wanted more, rather than less, done in every respect.
25 So, in connection with the question of whether there would be

1 constant activity in monitoring the entrance and exit of
2 people in the Soviet Embassy, he always wanted more, rather
3 than less.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was the photograph of
5 Lee Harvey Oswald ever obtained at either the Cuban Embassy
6 or consulate or the Soviet Embassy compound?

7 Mr. Manell. To the best of my recollection, I don't
8 believe a photograph was obtained.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, was Win Scott
10 happy about the failure of the surveillance operation, the
11 photo-surveillance operation, to pick that up?

12 Mr. Manell. I haven't got a clear recollection of it,
13 but I would assume he must have been very unhappy about it.
14 I do know that we thought we had a picture of an American
15 who could have been Lee Harvey Oswald. It turned out that
16 this man was not Oswald.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. When did you think that this person
18 may have been Oswald?

19 Mr. Manell. Probably on the day of the assassination,
20 when we reviewed our product.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. According to the transcripts that we
22 have reviewed, it appears that Oswald made at least five
23 visits either to the Cuban Embassy or consulate or to the
24 Soviet Embassy compound; a total of five visits.

25 Does it strike you as surprising that, in light of five

1 visits having been made, he was not picked up?

2 Mr. Manell. I can't verify, and I certainly can't
3 agree that five visits were made.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. I summarized that essentially, because
5 I wanted to save time. If you went through each trans-
6 cript, it would indicate that in fact, according --

7 Mr. Manell. That is your analysis, not mine.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. When we get to the transcripts, we will
9 go into that with you. We will take that step by step at
10 that point.

11 Mr. Manell. I can make this statement. I remember
12 that on the day of the assassination, when we got information
13 from the radio that Lee Harvey Oswald had assassinated the
14 President, my recollection that day was that Lee Harvey
15 Oswald was the man who had had contact with the Soviet
16 Embassy, had contact by phone. And I certainly didn't know
17 he had visited the Soviet Embassy.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Who at that station thought that the
19 station had a picture of Oswald?

20 Mr. Manell. I can't remember that exactly. I would
21 assume it would have been Annie Goodpasture.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. When was information obtained by the
23 Mexico City station reported to headquarters? By that, I
24 mean what type of information would be reported to head-
25 quarters and in what form?

1 Mr. Manell. You are covering the waterfront there.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I can narrow that down. I will be
3 pleased to. No problem.

4 Mr. Manell. Would you want to restrict that to the
5 question of Americans?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if I can get it this way.

7 Would all information being sent to headquarters be
8 sent to headquarters by means of a cable?

9 Mr. Manell. No.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. What other forms?

11 Mr. Manell. By dispatch.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Dispatch and by cable would be the
13 two essential forms?

14 Mr. Manell. Yes.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. On what basis would you decide to send
16 that information to headquarters by means of a cable, as
17 opposed to dispatch?

18 Mr. Manell. Once again, I think you are covering the
19 waterfront, because you are asking me to talk about all
20 types of operations that the station engage in. It would
21 be very often a question of just what operations were
22 engaged in, whether it merited dispatch reporting or cable
23 reporting.

24 Sometimes you would use one criteria and sometimes
25 another. One section would use one criteria and one section

1 would use another with respect to whether to use cable
2 traffic or dispatch traffic.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us talk about the Soviet section.
4 Is it fair to say that routine information would be sent by
5 means of dispatch?

6 Mr. Manell. Not necessarily. It depended on inter-
7 pretation. For example, I would, at times, report by cable
8 the results of a meeting between a double-agent and a
9 Soviet agent, even though there was no priority interest or
10 real necessity for immediate receipt of that information at
11 headquarters. Just a form that I preferred, because you
12 could do it in a sort of shorthand rather than do it with
13 long, descriptive reporting in the dispatch. Dispatch
14 required more writing, so sometimes preference would be for
15 cable reporting just for that reason alone.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any objective criterio that
17 governed whether a cable would be sent or a dispatch?

18 Mr. Manell. Indeed there would be. If there was
19 anything of emergency nature or anything of great signi-
20 ficance, you would report it by cable.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. That would be the general rule, but
22 are you saying that the mere fact that something was sent by
23 cable does not necessarily mean that it was urgent?

24 Mr. Manell. Exactly. You are perfectly right.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Once a cable is received at headquarters,

1 what is done with it?

2 Let me backstep. Who receives the cable at headquarters?

3 Mr. Manell. It depends on the subject matter.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. In your particular case, then?

5 Mr. Manell. Once again, it depends on the subject

6 matter. In my case, with respect to the Soviet operation,

7 it would be recieved by the host division. In this case, it

8 was called "WH" division, Western Hemisphere Division.

9 Secondly, it would be received by the interested division in

10 Soviet operations. It would then have been called, I guess

11 it, was called the SR division at that time, Soviet Division.

12 Additionally, depending on the material, it could be

13 received by other elements of the agency. For example,

14 counterintelligence staff would receive it.

15 Then I can't go further, but distribution was certainly

16 wider in most cases.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Who would determine that the distribu-

18 tion would be wider? The sender or one of the recipients or

19 both?

20 Mr. Manell. It was both, because the sender had certain

21 cyrptonyms at the head of the cable which would indicate

22 not merely the subject but the distribution.

23 For example, one cyrptonym would necessarily indicate

24 that the CIA staff, the counterintelligence staff, received

25 the material in addition to all other interested elements of

1 the Agency.

2 There are also restrictive cyrptonyms, such as if the
3 matter was occasionally sensitive, the sender could restrict
4 the distribution at headquarters. On the other hand, as
5 far as how the headquarters element distributed cables, I
6 can't particularly speak for that.

7 Then again, the cyrptonyms gave the people who formu-
8 lated the distribution just how wide a distribution it would
9 have.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, has anyone from the
11 Inspector General staff ever interviewed you concerning Lee
12 Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City?

13 Mr. Manell. Never.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Concerning the photo-surveillance
15 operation?

16 Mr. Manell. Never.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Any operation whatsoever in Mexico
18 City?

19 Mr. Manell. No.

20 As a matter of fact, I was perfectly surprised that I
21 was one of the last people ever interviewed about the
22 assassination because, after all, my wife and I were
23 responsible for the first message sent from the station.
24 Everybody else was intereviewed before me. The Inspector
25 General, no one in the Agency ever talked to me about this

1 operation.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. The first time you were formally
3 interviewed about it was --

4 Mr. Manell. -- by you.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the 1977
6 Inspector General's Report which, among other things,
7 evaluated the surveillance operation and attempted to explain
8 the question that arose by virtue of the photograph being
9 connected in some way with Oswald, and it turned out the
10 photograph was not Oswald?

11 Mr. Manell. Not at all.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. In order for information contained in
13 the cable to go to one of the higher-ups, the head of a
14 division, DDO, for example, how would it get to him? Could
15 the sender designate that?

16 Mr. Manell. Yes.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Otherwise, if the cable went to
18 Western Hemisphere, could that person say, "This sounds
19 important; let me send it on up"?

20 Mr. Manell. Yes.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Would he do that directly or would he
22 have to go through higher levels; go to his boss and then
23 go to the next level?

24 Mr. Manell. It could be either way. It depended on
25 who reviewed the cable and who made the decision. If an

1 analyst or desk officer reviewed the cable and wanted it
2 sent to DDO, he would certainly do it through channels;
3 through his branch chief, for example; possibly go to the
4 division chief or chief of operations and make that sugges-
5 tion and have it sent to DDO. Or if that type of decision
6 started with the division chief, he would send it directly
7 to the DDO or someone in another division or recipient of
8 the cable to make that decision.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be any objective criteria
10 for deciding what goes up to the top, or would this short
11 have been a subjective decision by the particular individual
12 involved?

13 Mr. Manell. It would be a subjective decision.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to the tape, do you know
15 whether anyone in the Mexico City station ever did a voice
16 comparison of tapes for the purpose of determining whether
17 the tape contained Lee Harvey Oswald's voice?

18 Mr. Manell. No, I don't think that was ever done. I
19 don't believe it could have been done.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

21 Mr. Manell. Tapes are normally erased after a certain
22 number of days. So in the case of the Oswald transcript,
23 which was absolutely unimportant -- not absolutely, but
24 relatively unimportant -- at the time of receipt, there was
25 no reason to keep that tape or designate it for retention.

TOP SECRET

28

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the tapes be erased?

2 Mr. Manell. So that they could be used over again.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. So that if Oswald contacted the
4 embassy in late September or early October about the time of
5 the assassination, you are saying the tapes would have been
6 erased routinely?

7 Mr. Manell. Indeed.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to refer your attention
9 to CIA No. 208. 208 refers to the page number of the docu-
10 ment that the Agency provided us. This is paragraph 4 of a
11 cable dated November 23, 1963. Could you read that paragraph
12 to yourself?

13 Mr. Manell. Yes.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. In that paragraph, it says that the
15 person who did the transcription indicates that Oswald is
16 identical with the individual who contacted the embassy on
17 September 28th. Do you know on what basis the transcriber
18 was able to make that statement?

19 Mr. Manell. Yes. The transcriber, the Russian language
20 transcriber, Mr. Tarasoff, was a very capable man, a man
21 very interested in his work.

22 I believe that he could recall with exactness that was
23 Oswald who called in previously, because Oswald's Russian was
24 faulty, and he would have remembered that.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether anyone went to

TOP SECRET

001000

TOP SECRET

29

1 Mr. Tarasoff after the assassination and asked him whether
2 it was Oswald on each tape?

3 Mr. Manell. No, I don't recall.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you do it yourself?

5 Mr. Manell. I don't remember. And I did not write
6 this cable.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. That cable was sent by
8 Goodpasture?

9 Mr. Manell. Yes, it was.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at these transcripts
11 now.

12 I draw your attention to CIA No. 13. Would you please
13 read that.

14 Mr. Manell. Yes.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Could you describe what CIA No. 13 is?

16 Mr. Manell. A man by the name -- a man who identifies
17 himself as Lee Oswals and speaks with a guard at the Soviet
18 embassy, saying that he was at the embassy last Saturday and
19 states that the embassy person had promised to send a tele-
20 gram to Washington.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Now CIA No. 13 is a transcript of a
22 conversation involving someone who identified himself as
23 Oswald?

24 Mr. Manell. Correct.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. It is dated October 31, 1963.

TOP SECRET

~~001001001001~~

TOP SECRET

30

1 Mr. Manell. Yes, it is.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the name Oswald
3 first came to your attention by virtue of this transcript?

4 Mr. Manell. I am not sure, but I guess it is the
5 first time.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Was this particular contact considered
7 to be unusual or routine?

8 Mr. Manell. Routine.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

10 Mr. Manell. During the summer period, particularly, or
11 toward the end of the summer period, a relatively large
12 number of Americans, for various reasons, made contact with
13 the Soviet Embassy. This appeared to me, when I had the
14 information reported, to be just another case of an American
15 contacting the embassy, for no significant reasons.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. In each case that an American contacted
17 the embassy, would a cable be sent to Washington?

18 Mr. Manell. Yes, indeed.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. In that case, there really should be
20 a cable in Washington for every American for whom at least
21 you were able to get a tentative identification?

22 Mr. Manell. Correct.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. If you weren't able to identify anyone,
24 you would not bother to send a cable?

25 Mr. Manell. Correct. That was a standard procedure

001002

~~001001~~

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

31

1 at the station.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though this was considered
3 routine, the information would be cabled up?

4 Mr. Manell. Exactly.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would it not be dispatched up?

6 Mr. Manell. Because it involved an American person.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying then that it was a
8 standard procedure for dealing with Americans, and part of
9 that procedure involved sending a cable?

10 Mr. Manell. Indeed.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. What was your response, if any, after
12 seeing this transcript?

13 Mr. Manell. My response, or my reaction or my recollec-
14 tion; what is the question?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. What action did you take in response --

16 Mr. Manell. The only action I took was the action my
17 wife took, was to send a cable to Washington summarizing the
18 information that we had on Oswald and his contact with the
19 embassy.

20 In addition, and it was also our practice, we sent
21 memoranda to interested elements of the embassy. We also
22 asked our headquarters for trace of an American. That was
23 general procedure.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. By trace, you mean a name trace?

25 Mr. Manell. A name trace.

001002

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

32

1 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to look at CIA 177
2 and tell me whether that was a cable that was sent to
3 Washington. Was that cable sent to Washington, D. C.?

4 Mr. Manell. The first cable?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. In response to the transcript that
6 appears in CIA No. 13.

7 Mr. Manell. I am not sure who wrote this cable.

8 My wife wrote this cable. Yes, that is the first cable.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the cable that would have been
10 sent in response --

11 Mr. Manell. I must be wrong, because it says here
12 there was no local dissemination of the information.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I don't know if you are wrong or if
14 you are just confused based on documents you have reviewed.
15 We will go into that later on.

16 In fact, I think there was dissemination, and you will
17 have a chance to clarify that.

18 Mr. Manell. I am not sure there was dissemination.
19 The last paragraph of this papers says no local dissemination.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. We will go into that.

21 The second paragraph of that cable makes reference to
22 a photograph. Was that a photograph of Oswald?

23 Mr. Manell. We don't know.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever seen that photograph?

25 Mr. Manell. Yes. The photograph was not of Oswald.

001004

TOP SECRET

1 The assumption was made here that it could have been Oswald
2 because a male who appeared to be an American entered the
3 embassy on that date, but there is a correction above the
4 date 1 October to read 2 October. So that is confusing to
5 me at this time.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. But that correction could have been
7 put in at some later time.

8 Mr. Manell. It could have been.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the cable, as it went
10 out, reported a contact on 1 October?

11 Mr. Manell. That is right.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that the second paragraph
13 makes an assumption that the photograph was of Oswald?

14 Mr. Manell. It makes an assumption, only an assumption.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, was that
16 in fact a photograph of Oswald?

17 Mr. Manell. No, it wasn't.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how that particular photo-
19 graph was selected?

20 Mr. Manell. I don't recall exactly, but I would assume
21 it was selected because it was obtained the very same day
22 that Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the selection of the photo-
24 graph?

25 Mr. Manell. I can't recall whether it was my wife or

1 it would have been Annie Goodpasture.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Miss Goodpasture
3 checked the Cuban photo production materials?

4 Mr. Manell. I have no idea.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Refer to CIA No. 13. The person who
6 identified himself as Oswald said: "I was at your place
7 last Saturday" -- which would not have been October 1st; it
8 would have been September 28th. Yet the cable reports a
9 photograph taken of someone October 1st.

10 Mr. Manell. Correct.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any way that can be explained,
12 or is that just an extension of the assumption?

13 Mr. Manell. Just an extension of the assumption. It
14 is not knowledge that the photo of a male entering on the 1st
15 of October is identical with the person who phoned the Soviet
16 Embassy and said he was Oswald.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. If the contact by Oswald occurred on
18 October 1st, why did it take one week to get the cable out?

19 Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly, but it probably
20 took some time for the people who got the information to have
21 it transcribed from the tape.

22 Secondly, since there was a Russian language portion
23 to that tape, this would have to have been collected and sent
24 out to our transcriber. That, again, may have delayed the
25 receipt of the information at the embassy.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure I follow the difference
2 between the second part of the explanation and the first.

3 Mr. Manell. Well, there were these steps in getting
4 the product to the station. Number one, the material is
5 taped.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

7 Mr. Manell. Those people who handle the tape do not
8 transcribe. It is sent to the transcriber for transcription
9 of the Spanish portion. Indication is made on that Spanish
10 portion that there is a foreign language. Assuming that they
11 believe it is Russian, the material would then be collected
12 by a station person who, in turn, would send it out to our
13 Russian language transcriber.

14 Finally, the reason for the delay of perhaps a day or
15 perhaps two days in sending it to headquarters may be this.
16 The information, when received by us at the station, was not
17 significant information or important information. There would,
18 therefore, be no need to work on it ahead of other cases and
19 materials of greater importance.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever discussing sending
21 this cable out with Dave Phillips?

22 Mr. Manell. No. He has no connection, no direct
23 connection with my operation.

24 I would like to emphasize for the sake of clarity once
25 again that while cable traffic may be considered the method

1 for sending significant information to headquarters, it
2 is not necessarily so.

3 Further, that in this specific case, a cable was used
4 to send this information to headquarters only because it
5 concerned an American, not because it concerned a matter that
6 was considered to be of importance.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Could this procedure regarding Americans
8 contacting the Soviet Embassy be, in effect, not just at the
9 Mexico City station, but virtually every CIA station where
10 there was a Soviet Embassy?

11 Mr. Manell. I can't speak to that. That was the
12 procedure at Mexico City.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. What about other stations that you
14 worked at?

15 Mr. Manell. Well, I would personally send the informa-
16 tion to headquarters by cable of an American contacting the
17 Soviet Embassy, yes, for a number of reasons. But to say
18 that this was standard CIA practice worldwide is something I
19 can't speak to.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. When the photograph referred to in
21 paragraph 2 was selected, do you recall whether Goodpasture
22 ever said "I think this is Oswald"?

23 Mr. Manell. I can't recall that.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it likely that what would have been
25 done is simply to have reviewed the photo production materials

001008

1 for the purpose of taking out every non-Latin person and
2 then of those who were not Latins, who could not be identi-
3 fied, it turns out this is the only one who could not be
4 identified and therefore, this must be Oswald?

5 Mr. Manell. Well, that is an involved question, but I
6 can say that it is rather simple to distinguish between an
7 American, a normal-appearing American, and a Mexican. So
8 let us talk about what was taken out of the batch because
9 of that indication that it was an American on that particular
10 Friday. I will go further and say that the people we
11 employed to photograph persons entering the Soviet Embassy
12 believed they could spot an American easily, and they made
13 it a practice to certainly photograph that person and bring it
14 to our attention. One of our responsibilities was to assist
15 the FBI in identifying people who might become Soviet
16 agents, particularly in America.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Could you now review CIA Nos. 14 and 15.

18 Mr. Manell. Yes.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Is that a transcript of a conversa-
20 tion that took place on September 28, 1963?

21 Mr. Manell. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. It involves a party speaking from the
23 Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy; is that correct?

24 Mr. Manell. That is correct.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I notice there is some routing indication

1 on this. Does your name appear anywhere on this?

2 Mr. Manell. My name is not on there. However, I
3 should have seen this. My wife -- I probably saw it because
4 the handwriting giving the routing indication is that of my
5 wife.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Did your wife give you all transcripts
7 to review or did she select only those that she thought were
8 most important?

9 Mr. Manell. It depended on how busy I was.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. When, if ever, was the man speaking in
11 this particular conversation identified as Oswald?

12 Mr. Manell. Probably after receipt of the 1 October
13 transcript, CI No. 13.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say that?

15 Mr. Manell. He is not identified here, is he?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. No, he is not? Do you have any reason
17 to believe that he was linked after receipt of the 1 October
18 transcript?

19 Mr. Manell. That is what confuses me, because when the
20 cable was sent to headquarters, it referred only to the
21 October 1st transcript. There is no linking in that cable to
22 this transcript of the 28th of September.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. The cable of October 8th made no
24 mention of any contact with the Cuban Embassy.

25 Mr. Manell. That is correct.

001010

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Reading that transcript, is it clear to
2 you that Oswald made three visits on September 28th to the
3 various embassies? He is calling now from the Cuban and
4 he indicates that he had been at the Russian earlier, and he
5 is going back to the Russian; therefore, a total of three
6 visits.

7 Mr. Manell. Well, there are two visits and the assump-
8 tion that he will go back to the Soviet Embassy. It is
9 merely an assumption.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, by the time the October 8th
11 cable went out, this had been linked to Oswald?

12 Mr. Manell. By the transcriber.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. By the transcriber.

14 What about you and your wife?

15 Mr. Manell. I can't recall that.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the earliest time
17 was that you did make this link?

18 Mr. Manell. No, I can't. Once again, let me tell you,
19 to clarify that point, the cable that went out on the 8th
20 reported relatively insignificant information. I would not
21 necessarily have made the effort to do all the research
22 necessary to determine whether this man had made a connec-
23 tion with other embassies. And I may not have paid much
24 attention to the cable that went out on the 8th of October.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. However, the transcript of October 1st

1 does say the same man who called a day or so ago?

2 Mr. Manell. Yes, it does. And if these things were
3 reviewed in chronological order, it is possible that at that
4 time, the connection was made.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA Nos. 17 and 18 on
6 the translation.

7 Mr. Manell. Right.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. When you are finished with that, will
9 you turn the page and read the transcript relating to that
10 conversation of the same day, CIA No. 20, for the record.

11 Mr. Manell. Right.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Now the two transcripts you have just
13 read are dated September 27, 1963. One conversation was
14 4:00 to 5:00 p.m.; the other one I think was 4:26 p.m. in
15 the afternoon; is that correct?

16 Mr. Manell. Correct.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. From the conversations contained in
18 those transcripts, is it clear that the man involved is at
19 the Cuban Embassy and he had been at the Soviet Embassy
20 earlier?

21 Mr. Manell. Correct.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Before we go on, we know that, accord-
23 ing to the transcript, if Oswald had been to the Embassy a
24 total of four times and if, in fact, he did return to the
25 Soviet Embassy, as he said he would in the September 28th

001012

1 conversation, he would have been there a total of five
2 times. Is that a correct statement?

3 Mr. Manell. Correct.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. When were these two transcripts from
5 September 27th first linked to Oswald?

6 Mr. Manell. I can't recall. I find this rather con-
7 fusing because my recollection of the interview with you at
8 my headquarters, I didn't remember these at all.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying you saw these at your
10 headquarters; to your memory, this is the first time you
11 saw this particular --

12 Mr. Manell. I can't say. I am surprised by this.
13 The only thing I recollected before I looked at the files
14 and before my interview with you was only the 1 October
15 transcript. So all of this, I don't say I didn't see these
16 before. I do recall, however, at some point -- and this is
17 probably after the assassination that perhaps it came to my
18 attention or perhaps before -- my memory is not clear on
19 this. But getting to the reason why the cable of October 8th
20 was sent the way it was was because my wife undoubtedly only
21 had that information of the 1st available to her.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Or if she had the earlier transcript
23 available, she did not make the connection?

24 Mr. Manell. Correct.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 183.

001013

1 Mr. Manell. Once again, I don't necessarily want to
2 repeat myself, but having sent the cable of the 8th of
3 October to headquarters, that in a case such as this one
4 satisfied our requirement; meaning that we have identified
5 the contact of an American with the Soviet Embassy. We have
6 made it a matter of record and have no indication that the
7 matter is of importance; therefore, it wouldn't necessarily
8 prompt us, with all the other important things we were doing
9 at this time, to devote additional effort to be complete
10 about that relatively unimportant matter.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look now at CIA 183. I
12 believe that is a cable dated 11 October 1963 from CIA
13 headquarters to Mexico City station.

14 Why don't you skim that briefly for content and if I
15 have a specific question on the substance, I will draw your
16 attention to it.

17 Mr. Manell. All right.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Was this the cable that headquarters
19 sent in response to the request for a name trace on Oswald?

20 Mr. Manell. Yes.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that paragraph 1 refers to
22 Oswald as probably identical with Lee Henry Oswald; is that
23 correct?

24 Mr. Manell. Yes.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. There is an arrow pointing to the word

001014

1 "Henry" and next to the arrow appears the word "sic" which
2 is underlined.

3 Mr. Manell. Correct.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe it is Mr. Scott's handwrit-
5 ing?

6 Mr. Manell. Correct.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Were these marginal notations made at
8 the time that the cable would be received?

9 Mr. Manell. Yes.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. By writing the word "sic", was Mr.
11 Scott indicating that he was aware that Oswald's middle name
12 was not Henry?

13 Mr. Manell. Not necessarily.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. What explanation would you have?

15 Mr. Manell. I don't really know. The only information
16 we had was the first and last name.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Scott ever give you an indication
18 that he knew what Oswald's middle name was?

19 Mr. Manell. Absolutely not.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that paragraph 2 of this
21 cable describes Oswald as a former Russian defector; is that
22 correct?

23 Mr. Manell. Defector to the Russians, correct.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of having received informa-
25 tion about Oswald having defected to the Russians, did that,

001015

1 in any way, enhance the significance of his visit to the
2 Soviet Embassy?

3 Mr. Manell. Yes.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did that occasion any further response
5 by the Mexico City station regarding Oswald?

6 Mr. Manell. At the moment, I can't recall. What we did
7 do was pass this information from headquarters to various
8 elements of the American Embassy.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. At that point, would it have been
10 necessary to have gone back to check the transcript? For
11 example, the October 1st contact involving Oswald at the
12 Russian Embassy, the telephone call; the transcriber wrote
13 in brackets "The same man who called the other day." At
14 that time, would either you or your wife or someone else that
15 you know of have gone back to check the transcripts to see
16 if, in fact, the same person had been found on the tape
17 earlier?

18 Mr. Manell. I can't recall. Thinking about it at the
19 moment, if, for example, I only felt there was one trans-
20 cript, there wouldn't be any incentive to go back and see
21 whether there were others.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. But the 1 October transcript did say he
23 had called a day or so earlier?

24 Mr. Manell. That is right. I can't recall what I did
25 at that time.

001016

TOP SECRET

45

1 Mr. Goldsmith. From the state of the record as it was
2 October 11th, headquarters had not been apprised of the
3 contact at the Cuban Embassy?

4 Mr. Manell. Correct.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether they were ever
6 apprised of that contact?

7 Mr. Manell. Afterwards, yes.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the assassination?

9 Mr. Manell. I don't believe so, but I wouldn't know.

10 I am not sure of whether they were apprised of it or not.

11 My belief is that they were not until after the assassination.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. If they had been, there would be a
13 cable to that effect, would there not?

14 Mr. Manell. Surely. There would have been a cable
15 and not a dispatch.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 182. That
17 is a routing slip that went with the cable from headquarters,
18 October 11th cable from headquarters, and I believe Mr.
19 Scott's handwriting there indicates "Please set up a 'P'
20 file"; is that correct?

21 Mr. Manell. Correct.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. The P file is a local personality file?

23 Mr. Manell. Correct.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when Oswald's P file was
25 set up?

001017

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

46

1 Mr. Manell. Probably on that date. Now it is interest-
2 ing to indicate, by the way, that Mr. Scott indicated the
3 P file should be set up in the name of Lee Henry Oswald,
4 even though he had written "sic" to the identification of
5 the man by headquarters as Lee Henry Oswald. He had no
6 argument with the identification, evidently.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Noted. Thank you.

8 Referring now to CIA No. 19, which is one of the
9 transcripts from September 27th, at the bottom it says
10 "Copy, Oswald 'P' file."

11 Mr. Manell. Yes.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. When would this have gone into his
13 P file?

14 Mr. Manell. Where does it say that?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Here.

16 Mr. Manell. This is my handwriting. It could have
17 been -- I don't know exactly when. This is my handwriting,
18 however.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been before the assassina-
20 tion?

21 Mr. Manell. More than likely.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. It would seem that before the assassina-
23 tion, Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy on September 27th
24 had been noted.

25 Mr. Manell. Yes.

001018

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

47

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Will you look at CIA No. 185. That
2 cable requested headquarters to send a photograph of
3 Oswald. To your knowledge, was one ever received?

4 Mr. Manell. No, I don't believe a photograph was
5 ever received of Oswald.

6 Who wrote this cable? I am curious.

7 I wrote that cable.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. You do not recall receiving a photo-
9 graph of Oswald?

10 Mr. Manell. No.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, after the assas-
12 sination, Charlotte Bustof found a photograph of Oswald?

13 Mr. Manell. I have no idea.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back for a moment to CIA 183,
15 paragraph 4 indicates that information concerning Oswald
16 be disseminated to other feceral agencies, does it not?

17 Mr. Manell. No, to other elements of the embassy.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, you are correct.

19 Why would they make that indication? Was that routine
20 procedure?

21 Mr. Manell. It was routine procedure to send it to
22 the FBI other than the embassy, but in this case it would
23 help me out with the cryptonym, who was T. P. Elide.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. That was the embassy.

25 Mr. Manell. Odyoke was what?

001019

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

48

1 Mr. Goldsmith. I&S. I can tell you which ones were --
2 Mr. Manell. O.D. Urge?
3 Mr. Goldsmith. I think I know how we can solve this.
4 Let us look at No. 187. No. 187 is the memo that was sent
5 by Mexico City station to the Ambassador. At the bottom of
6 the page it lists the various agencies who received it
7 locally.
8 Mr. Manell. Correct. Okay.
9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that an unusually wide dissemina-
10 tion?
11 Mr. Manell. The only question I have would be that of
12 why I&S got it? Otherwise, Naval Attache, because this
13 was a former Marine. There is that connection there, the
14 legal attache, because the legal attache is the normal
15 recipient of this kind of information.
16 Sometimes we did it to the embassy, depending on the
17 case. So it boils down to my question as to why I&S got a
18 copy of this or why headquarters asked us to send them a
19 copy. That is my only query about this.
20 Mr. Goldsmith. When was the cable received; the 11th?
21 Mr. Manell. Was that a weekend that followed?
22 Mr. Goldsmith. The 1st of October was a Tuesday.
23 Mr. Manell. I am talking about the 11th and the 16th.
24 Mr. Hardway. That would have been a Friday.
25 Mr. Manell. There again, you see it did not become

TOP SECRET

001020

1 something of great significance that we would have imme-
2 diately felt we had to do it fast.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to CIA No. 181, which is the
4 headquarters copy of a cable that was sent, it indicates
5 that Thomas Karamessines was the releasing officer.

6 Mr. Manell. Yes.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Was it unusual for someone as high up
8 in the organization as Karamessines to be the releasing
9 officer for a cable of this kind?

10 Mr. Manell. Yes, except that there might have been
11 some reason that could easily explain it. For example, while
12 the information is not necessarily significant, yet there was
13 another significant piece of information that people at the
14 desk might have wanted the DDO to see. It could be as simple
15 an explanation as that.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know, receiving a cable at
17 Mexico City, who the releasing officer was?

18 Mr. Manell. Not at all. We don't have any indication
19 at Mexico City who writes the cables or who releases cables.
20 Who wrote this cable?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustof.

22 Mr. Manell. It was normal for a person who was an
23 analyst or a desk officer, as she was for the Mexico City
24 branch, to prepare a terse reply. It was certainly normal,
25 I would think, to have elements of the counterintelligence

1 staff coordinate the cable. It was normal, certainly, for
2 a member of the counterintelligence section of the Soviet
3 division to coordinate a cable.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. One question about paragraph 5. I
5 believe it requests that any further contact for purposes of
6 identification should be indicated to headquarters.

7 Mr. Manell. Right.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, does that help you
9 in any way as to whether anything was ever communicated to
10 headquarters?

11 Mr. Manell. No.

12 Let us go further to address ourselves to the question
13 about Mr. Karamessines and why he released the cable. I
14 can't really explain that. Otherwise, we see that it was
15 sent out as a routine cable.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. How do you know that?

17 Mr. Manell. Because otherwise, you would have seen the
18 precedence of either priority or immediate. Certainly you
19 don't see any restrictive indicators on the handling of this
20 cable. It doesn't even indicate that it is a counter-
21 intelligence matter in the heading, and it doesn't give the
22 restrictive indicator of an important counterintelligence
23 case, such as Rybat, or that cryptonym is a restrictive
24 indicator for any type of cable, if you need to restrict the
25 information, and that is not on here, either.

1 The reason I am going into this at length is apparently
2 you find it extraordinary that Mr. Karamessines signed off
3 on this cable. I can't explain it, but I want to go further
4 to say that the preparation and transmission of this cable
5 indicates that there was no urgency or undue significance
6 attached to the information.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. At any time that you are looking at
8 these documents, feel free, as I see you do feel free, to
9 give us any clarifying information.

10 Again, for purposes of clarification, prior to the
11 assassination was any action taken by the Mexico City station
12 in reference to the Oswald matter other than sending the cable
13 to headquarters on October 8th and the dissemination that
14 was instructed?

15 Mr. Manell. Nothing, to my knowledge.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back for a moment to the
17 matter of the photograph, if Oswald, in fact, had gone to the
18 embassy a total of five times -- for purposes of argument --
19 and making the assumption he did go back when he said he was
20 going back, does it strike you as unusual for the photo
21 people to have missed him five times?

22 Mr. Manell. Yes.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any explanation for that?
24 I realize the photo operation was not under your control in
25 any way, but do you have any possible explanation?

001023

1 Mr. Manell. Yes, I do. The Mexicans who manned the
2 photo facility and did it day after day, year after year,
3 could conceivably not be performing their work as they were
4 required to perform it. To me, that is the most straight-
5 forward explanation for the fact that we didn't receive a
6 photo of Oswald entering the Soviet Embassy.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if any of them were dis-
8 missed as a result of the failure to obtain a picture?

9 Mr. Manell. No, I have no knowledge of that.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA No. 138. This is
11 a cable dated November 22nd. The third paragraph indicates,
12 among other things, "Forwarding soonest copies of only visitor
13 to Soviet Embassy 20 October who could be identical to
14 Oswald."

15 Do you know whether the date 20 October is correct or
16 incorrect?

17 Mr. Manell. Probably a mistake. I think I wrote this
18 cable. I am not sure.

19 There is a correction on the following, right here.
20 I wrote this cable. Obviously it was a mistake on my part,
21 trying to get this information out as fast as I could.

22 I did, as you see, put in an immediate precedence on
23 the transmission of this cable. As I said before, I linked
24 the name Oswald that we heard over the radio with the Oswald
25 who had contacted the Soviet Embassy; and therefore, I sent

1 this cable out as fast as I could on the 22nd of November.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. On the 22nd of November, you read that
3 one Oswald contact?

4 Mr. Manell. Yes, I did.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Manell, CIA No. 183, the headquarters
6 cable, contains a description of Oswald in paragraph 1.

7 Mr. Manell. Yes.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. After receiving this cable, were you
9 aware that the photograph to which reference had been made
10 in the cable of October 8th was not a photograph of Oswald?

11 Mr. Manell. I can't recollect what I believed at that
12 time.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. As of the day of the assassination,
14 you thought that there was still a possibility that there
15 was a photograph of Oswald?

16 Mr. Manell. Indeed. As I recall, we tried to get that
17 photograph to headquarters as fast as we could. As it turned
18 out, it wasn't necessary to send it. But that was our
19 intention.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA No. 184. This
21 was a cable from headquarters dated November 23rd. The first
22 paragraph instructs you to review tapes and transcripts
23 since the 27th of September.

24 Mr. Manell. Correct.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that indicate that headquarters

001025

1 was in some way aware of Oswald's contact with the embassy
2 on September 27th?

3 Mr. Manell. It certainly does.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how they would have been
5 made aware of that?

6 The reason I ask is because we have reviewed cable
7 traffic and have not seen any cable traffic informing them
8 of that content.

9 Mr. Manell. No. There is something I can't explain,
10 and I am trying somehow to get an explanation for it in my
11 mind.

12 As I told you before, normally the station did not
13 forward raw transcripts to headquarters. That would have
14 been one way for them to know the 27th of September contact.

15 You say there is no other traffic?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Based on our review of the file.

17 Mr. Manell. Or visit or contact by Oswald earlier
18 than the 1st of October to the Soviet Embassy? This
19 leaves me certainly at a loss for an explanation.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that that would have
21 been done telephonically?

22 Mr. Manell. Not likely.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

24 Mr. Manell. You don't telephone classified informa-
25 tion to headquarters, normally.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible -- and I do not want to
2 put words in your mouth -- that headquarters knew about
3 the contact of September 28th and that they instructed
4 you to refer to the conversation, the contact of the 27th,
5 just for purposes of extra insurance?

6 Mr. Manell. I can't comment on that.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA No. 197, speci-
8 fically paragraph 3.

9 Mr. Manell. What date is this cable; the 23rd of
10 November?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. It is a cable dated November 23, 1963.
12 Address your attention to paragraph No. 3.

13 Let me ask you whether this cable corrects the date
14 that you had incorrectly reported in the earlier cable.

15 Mr. Manell. Yes, it does, to 1 October.

16 Who wrote this cable?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe the author of this cable
18 was Ann Goodpasture; is that correct?

19 Mr. Manell. That is correct.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the second paragraph of
21 CIA No. 198, which is the Mexico City copy of that cable.

22 Mr. Manell. Yes.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. The language in that paragraph indicates
24 that the station could not compare the voice of Oswald because
25 the first tape of his voice or his conversation had been

1 erased prior to the receipt of the second contact.

2 Mr. Manell. Correct.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. The way that is phrased suggests,
4 however, that at that time, November 23rd, there was still
5 one tape in existence. In other words, it does not say all
6 tapes reporting Oswald contacts had been erased. It says one
7 tape was erased prior to the receipt of the next one.

8 Mr. Manell. I would not give that importance or make
9 the assumption you are making. It is not completely phrased
10 in the cable. It merely says "station unable compare voice
11 as first tape erased prior receipt second call." That is
12 all it says.

13 I don't see how you can conclude the way you conclude.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Please don't misunderstand me. I am
15 not intending to offer any conclusions.

16 Mr. Manell. No, but you are indicating that a second
17 tape was kept and not erased.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. What I want to do is ask whether the
19 language there suggests that in fact that was the case.

20 Mr. Manell. I am saying it was not the case; probably
21 not the case.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to understand,
23 Mr. Manell, that we are conducting a thorough review of
24 the files and the cable traffic and we are obliged to address
25 every question that arises based on that review.

TOP SECRET

57

1 Mr. Manell. I am sorry, but I felt you were drawing a
2 conclusion.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand your position. I just
4 wanted you to understand mine, that is all.

5 Mr. Manell. Right.

6 I wonder if I might make a short statement at this time.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

8 Mr. Manell. From the questioning by you, I am led to
9 believe that you may have the suspicion, certainly the con-
10 cern, that there was a separate communication sent to the
11 station by headquarters about Oswald of which you have no
12 record.

13 To the very, very best of my knowledge, there was no
14 separate communication sent to the station with regard to
15 Oswald. Certainly if there was a separate communication, I
16 never had any knowledge of it.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

18 What about the reverse of that; separate communication
19 from the Mexico City station to headquarters?

20 Mr. Manell. Firstly, I doubt that there was, because
21 in some fashion I would have become privy to it. Second,
22 once again, I certainly know of no separate communication not
23 appearing in the record here that was sent by Mexico City
24 station to Washington.

25 Is that perfectly clear, that there was no side

TOP SECRET

001029

1 communication, to my knowledge, from either headquarters
2 to the station or from the station to headquarters?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. I certainly understand your answer,
4 yes.

5 Turning back for a moment to the question of the
6 erasure of the first Oswald tape prior to the receipt of the
7 second. My understanding -- and we can check the appropriate
8 cable for confirmation of this -- is that the normal time
9 lag for the erasure of tapes was two weeks. If that is
10 correct, it would seem that the normal lag period did not
11 apply in regard to the Oswald contact.

12 In other words, the first contact was September 27th
13 or September 28th. The next contact was October 1st, and
14 the first contact tape was erased well before the two-week
15 period had elapsed, if in fact the cable is accurate in what
16 it reports that the first tape was erased prior to the receipt
17 of the second one.

18 Mr. Manell. You are correct in assuming that there
19 would have been, just for mechanical reasons, the existence
20 of the first tape in its original form prior to receipt of the
21 second one, because the transcription process couldn't have
22 been completed, since it involved the Russian language,
23 until after the second call was made. You are correct there.

24 I would just suggest here that perhaps in the heat of
25 writing an immediate cable on the 23rd of November, the

001030

1 language by Miss Goodpasture wasn't absolutely clear. I
2 think that the only thing she wanted to convey here, reading
3 into this, is that no voice comparison was made because we
4 don't have certainly on the 23rd of November either tape
5 available.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, she wasn't necessarily being
7 completely accurate when she said the first tape was erased
8 prior to the receipt of the second.

9 Mr. Manell. I would say that the sentence does not
10 convey her intention.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, do you know of any
12 action on the part of anyone at the Mexico City station
13 indicating that that person withheld information from the
14 authorities at CIA headquarters concerning Oswald's visit to
15 Mexico City?

16 Mr. Manell. No.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I have nothing further, Mr. Manell.

18 I would like to thank you very much for being here.
19 I also would like to say I am sorry if we inconvenienced you
20 today.

21 Mr. Manell. It wasn't your fault.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, customarily when we call someone
23 to a hearing, a person is given five minutes at the end of a
24 hearing to make a statement. We have called you here for a
25 deposition in lieu of a hearing. If you would like an

001031

TOP SECRET

60

1 opportunity to make a statement on the record, please feel
2 free to do so.

3 Mr. Manell. Your questioning leads me to two assump-
4 tions. One, that either at headquarters or at the
5 station there was a communication that is not part of the
6 record that you have. To the very best of my knowledge, I
7 believe you are incorrect in having that assumption because,
8 firstly, I know that I have no direct specific knowledge to
9 support that assumption.

10 Secondly, I believe that in some fashion I would have
11 become privy to that fact if it indeed existed.

12 The second point I would like to make does not bear on
13 what you asked me today, but what you asked during the
14 interview. I was led to believe that you had suspicion that
15 one agency of the government knew that another had more
16 contact with Oswald prior to the assassination than is a
17 matter of record and that perhaps another agency was covering
18 that up.

19 Here again, I certainly have no information to bear out
20 that assumption. But in this case, I wouldn't necessarily
21 have had the means to become privy to that kind of informa-
22 tion.

23 I think that you place emphasis on the fact that
24 Mr. Karamessines signed off on the name trace cable from
25 headquarters to the station on the 11th of October. That, I

001032

TOP SECRET

1 find strange, but then again, I think that by thorough
2 investigation on your part, you could easily determine
3 the reason for it.

4 So, rather than have it become an important concern or
5 reservation on your part, I think that you could nail that
6 down one way or the other with a minimum of investigation.

7 That is it. That is the end of my statement.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much.

9 (Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)

10 I have read the foregoing pages
11 1 through 61, inclusive, which
12 contain a correct transcript of
13 the answers made by me to the
14 questions therein recorded.
15 Signature is subject to
16 corrections.

17
18
19
20 Herbert Manell

21
22
23
24
25 001037

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken Albert Joseph LaFrance, shorthand reporter, and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Albert Joseph LaFrance
Notary Public in and for the
District of Columbia

My commission expires:

November 14, 1980

001034