

Note to Myself

Box 23  
F-15  
#3

Ask what project file [ ] placed

Ask who found [ ] items in Dec. 1965

Ask what if any actions taken when it was found.

Ask: identity of CIA informant, Nov. 24, 1964, agent (X)

Identify agent who wrote Nov. 24, 1964 (X)

Go Back to text for Q. ibids

Now call HQV => [get // bulletin  
activity  
in appreciation]



DO NOT REPRODUCE  
RETURN TO CIA

Dearest team leader, a.k.a. ZRSHARIC;

Please read my Elena Sano write-up.

I feel it flows well now! (except Dec 25  
Thomas memo summary) I can still shorten  
each section so that it <sup>deals</sup> ~~relates~~ only with  
Oswald - alone + Oswald - activities in Mexi  
but the interesting aspect of the Write-Up is  
the CIA jerking us no theory.

Beginning with p. 29

What Committee did to investigate story

Results

Analysis

Conclusions

3) ~~Reported and received from the Central Intelligence Agency letter of 2/4/76, to the Senate Intelligence Committee Agency - a copy of this letter~~ <sup>Review of the</sup>

Did the Central Intelligence Agency Write the Senate Intelligence Committee that no Investigation <sup>of</sup> the Cuban Nov. 22, 1963 flight was conducted?

<sup>after a</sup> <sup>2/4/76 letter</sup>  
A careful review of the Central Intelligence Agency letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee <sup>H.S. Committee</sup> has determined that the Senate Intelligence Report's interpretation of the letter is misleading. The Central Intelligence wrote the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. [CIA letter to Senate Intelligence Committee, 2/4/76.]

Did the Central Intelligence Agency Further Investigate the Report?

The Central Intelligence Agency (conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights), <sup>[Participated]</sup> filing cable reports to Headquarters. There was one (unilateral CIA surveillance team that observed arrivals and departures of Cuban flights), reporting any unusual incidents (and providing copies of flight manifests) (ibid p. 11) (The Mexican authorities also had a surveillance team of its own at the airport, which provided to the CIA photographs of passengers and copies of passenger lists) (ibid p. 11). Additionally, (a telephone tap operation (Lions) against the Cuban Embassy) provided transcripts of conversations (with the Cuban office)

to a reported five-hour delay of a Cuban flight from Miami City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, November 22, 1963. [Senate Intelligence Committee Report, April 13, 1976, p. 30] The most intriguing aspect of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival, at 10:30 P.M. EST of a <sup>Cuban</sup> four-engine aircraft, which deposited one unidentified passenger who boarded the aircraft without Customs clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. (Ibid. ps. 40-41) The Senate Intelligence Committee write that the Central Intelligence Agency "had no information indicating that a following investigation was conducted to determine the identity of the passenger and had no further information on the passenger, and no explanation for why a following investigation was not conducted. [Ibid. p. 61]

The ~~an~~ Senate Intelligence Committee Report raises <sup>the</sup> major questions: did <sup>the</sup> Central Intelligence Agency write the Senate Intelligence Committee that no investigation <sup>was</sup> conducted; <sup>did</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Central Intelligence Agency ~~do~~ <sup>conduct</sup> further investigation <sup>of</sup> the report?; what were the results of the investigation?; and, were they given to the Senate Intelligence Committee?

In an attempt to answer the questions posed by the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, the House Select Committee on Assassinations has done the following:

1) Conducted an extensive review of the Central Intelligence Agency files that pertain to the November 22, 1963 Cuban flights.

2) Requested <sup>Review</sup> a copy of <sup>the</sup> ~~an~~ extensive review of <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~past~~ <sup>past</sup> ~~actions~~ <sup>actions</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> the November 22, 1963 Cuban flights. <sup>1977</sup> <sup>CIA</sup> Staff Report and <sup>attached</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>attached</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~November 22, 1963~~ <sup>November 22, 1963</sup> Cuban flights.

b) The Cuba flight departed at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the "alleged" arrival at 2130 hours of a private flight with a secret passenger. c) The departure at 2035 hours also contrasts further with ~~the alleged time of the Cuba flight~~ <sup>the Senate Intelligence Report which stated that the</sup> Cuba flight departed at ~~2200~~ <sup>2200</sup>.

Were the Results of the Central Intelligence Investigation given to the Senate Intelligence Committee?

Unfortunately, the Senate Intelligence Committee was only given the informant reports. The Central Intelligence Agency never allowed <sup>the Senate Int. Com</sup> them to review the [S. FIRE & L. ENVOY] records. Hence, the Senate Intelligence Committee <sup>relying solely on the</sup> ~~could not have~~ ~~reached the conclusions reached by the HSCA~~ informant's allegation, <sup>not reported</sup> ~~could have written~~ the allegation any differently.