

DRAFT 11/1/78  
Betsy Palmer

Box 23  
Folder 24  
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JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANA (JURE)

In a Miami press interview on July 23, 1962, Manuel Ray Rivero announced the formation of JURE, an anti-Castro Cuban exile group designed to unite all the popular splintered factions outside Cuba into an effective working organization.<sup>1</sup> Other key leaders involved in the new organization included Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Ramon Barquin and Justo Carrillo.<sup>2</sup> Although Ray felt the Cuban Revolutionary Council was no longer effective, he attempted to receive financial assistance from it until JURE gained momentum.<sup>3</sup>

As its opening promotional salvo, JURE issued a "Declaration of Principles." It called for free elections, the restoration of human rights and social justice, new economic development programs and agrarian reform, breaking relations with the Soviet bloc, restoration of legitimate property, proscription of the Communist Party and release of political prisoners.<sup>4</sup>

Ray's group was considered an "autonomous" anti-Castro Cuban group by the CIA.<sup>5</sup> The concept of autonomous operations was conceived by Walter Rostow, State Department counsel.<sup>6</sup> Rostow proposed a "track two" approach to Cuban operations to parallel regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams.<sup>7</sup> This approach would enable the CIA to give financial aid, advice and

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guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such as Ray.<sup>8</sup> Autonomous operations were approved by the CIA in June, 1963.<sup>9</sup>

The "Rules of Engagement" under which the operations functioned set forth the following guidelines:

1. Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals dedicated to the idea that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans inside and outside Cuba working in concert.
2. If the effort to overthrow the Cuban regime became too costly in human lives, the U.S. would withdraw financial support and would not consider resumption at any future date.
3. All operations had to be mounted outside the territory of the United States.
4. If ever charged with complicity, the U.S. government would publicly deny any participation in the group's activities.
5. The CIA's presence and direct participation would be kept at an absolute minimum. An experienced CIA liaison officer would be assigned to each group to provide general advice, funds and material support.
6. No fixed time schedule would be given to these operations.<sup>10</sup>

Possibly because of this loosely structured control over JURE, the CIA had the day-to-day activities of the group closely monitored by individuals identified in CIA files only by cryptonyms. JURE member, [redacted] for instance, was in frequent contact with an individual identified as (AMTAUP/2) and supplied him with a variety of confidential information about JURE which (AMTAUP/2) reported to the CIA. From this source the CIA was able to learn about the substance of Ray's meeting with Robert F. Kennedy in September 1963;<sup>11</sup> Ray's negotiations on behalf of JURE;<sup>12</sup> secret JURE meetings;<sup>13</sup> allegations that the Governor of Puerto Rico was purposely sidetracking an FBI and INS investigation of illegal arms possessed by JURE;<sup>14</sup> JURE animosity toward Manuel Artime and the MRR;<sup>15</sup> and the location of JURE training bases.<sup>16</sup>

Manuel Ray himself was personally critical of the CIA and told one JURE associate that he thought CIA agents "...were more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration." He maintained that, "The Kennedy Administration would end but CIA agents always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of elephants and they never forgot or forgave."<sup>17</sup>

During a JURE meeting in Miami in August, 1962, Ray claimed that JURE had arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic; a B-26 airplane, territory available for training in Costa Rica; and support through indirect means from the United States.<sup>18</sup> According to an FBI report, JURE was considered one of the five major exile groups with clandestine

assets<sup>19</sup> and the CIA was interested in the group because of its potential for infiltration into Cuba.<sup>20</sup>

Because of its size and Ray's dynamic leadership, JURE seemed destined for a role of some importance in the anti-Castro movement.<sup>21</sup> The group set a target date of October 31, 1962 to raise \$100,000. The money would be used to recruit new members, begin a propaganda campaign against Castro and purchase arms and supplies.<sup>22</sup> Within a year, JURE had membership delegations in 12 cities in the United States, a chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delegations in foreign countries, mostly Latin American.<sup>23</sup>

In August, 1963, JURE planned to sabotage a power plant in Havana<sup>24</sup> and Ray requested that the CIA cache certain high explosives and grenades inside Cuba or San Juan.<sup>25</sup> The plan was code named "Operation Bola"<sup>25a</sup> and Ray's case officer recommended the request be granted in order to test Ray's capabilities.<sup>25b</sup> Ray acquired a 25-foot boat for infiltration and exfiltration purposes and expressed a desire to purchase another vessel which would enable him to extend operations along the south coast of Cuba.<sup>25c</sup>

Plans were made with JURE to deliver military equipment brought by a CIA vessel and transferred to JURE which would transport the material into Cuba.<sup>25d</sup> The operation, originally scheduled for November 23, 1963, was moved up two days.<sup>25e</sup> The CIA boat, Rex, completed the cache and kept the appointed area under surveillance for 3 days.<sup>25f</sup> The JURE boat failed to make the scheduled pick up<sup>25g</sup> and Ray offered no satisfactory explanation for this failure to perform.<sup>25h</sup> Ray claimed the

vessel was low on gas which was a doubtful explanation.  
The Agency noted that the ship was able to arrive at Puerto Limon,  
Costa Rica, on November 27 as scheduled. <sup>25j</sup>

Ray was not physically scheduled to be on the boat  
during Operation Bola, <sup>25k</sup> his activities during the latter part  
of 1963 being political in nature. He was, at this time,  
conferring with Robert F. Kennedy <sup>25l</sup> about the Cuban situation <sup>25m</sup>  
and travelling extensively in Latin America seeking support  
for JURE. <sup>25n</sup>

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No documentation has been found to substantiate the success or failure of any of the JURE raids or infiltrations during this period, but by January, 1964, the organization had gained enough strength to induce several other Cuban exile organizations to merge with it.<sup>26</sup> The largest of these groups were the Ejercito Libertador de Cuba (ELC) and Cuba Libre.<sup>27</sup> The ELC's union with JURE brought to the organization former veteran rebel army officers in exile and had the potential of giving

JURE the best military expertise and support in the entire exile community.<sup>28</sup>

Carlos Zarraga of Cuba Libre became the JURE Chief of support<sup>29</sup> and was responsible for acquiring most of the JURE arms and the large supply of explosives which were stored in Miami and Puerto Rico.<sup>30</sup>

Manuel Ray again began formulating plans to infiltrate Cuba in March 1964.<sup>31</sup> He planned to accompany two teams of commandos into Oriente Province and, once successfully inside Cuba, initiate continuous bombings of strategic and non-strategic targets.<sup>32</sup> Ray's plans, however, were delayed and a new target date of May was set.

Ray's serious of purpose was open to question at the time because he permitted persons from the media on his infiltration attempt.<sup>33</sup> Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-Life magazine, planned to accompany Ray,<sup>34</sup> as did Tom Duncan, then a Life photographer.<sup>35</sup> Rogelio Cisneros received word on May 30, 1964 that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators had developed motor trouble.<sup>36</sup> Ray's group was arrested by the British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau.<sup>37</sup>

Ray's failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his credibility within the anti-Castro community. Some exiles felt his grand infiltration scheme was a publicity stunt and others considered it a joke.<sup>38</sup> JURE members were confused and undecided over how to defend Ray.<sup>39</sup>

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Another episode in May, 1964 compounded JURE's problems. Rogelio Cisneros had obligated \$50,000 of JURE money to an El Monte, California, arms manufacturing company for weapons to be shipped to Florida.<sup>40</sup> The Revenue division of the Treasury Department, planning a raid on the arms company, asked the CIA if it had any knowledge of this purchase,<sup>41</sup> which was illegal under U.S. laws. Working under the "autonomous operations" guidelines, the CIA denied any involvement and advised JURE to make use of one of its Latin American connections to facilitate the shipment outside the U.S.<sup>42</sup>

At this point, there began a general disintegration of JURE membership.<sup>43</sup> Rogelio Cisneros informed the CIA on August 24, 1964 that he was resigning from the organization. He contended Ray was incapable of directing both political and military activities.<sup>44</sup> Then another key leader, Carlos Zarraga, resigned in September.<sup>45</sup>

JURE was given \$75,000 by the CIA during the period of October 1st to December 31st, 1964. The money was meant as a final payment to help JURE move its activities outside the United States.<sup>46</sup> The CIA had reached the conclusion that the JURE books should be closed permanently.<sup>47</sup> Ray's liaison officer noted at the time: "If Ray is successful in Cuba he will not need our help; if he is not, our help won't do much



good. He is honest and at least the money will be largely spent for the purpose he wants to achieve. Whatever Ray may ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated. We have played the game in a manner beyond reproach." <sup>48</sup>

JURE continued in existence until August, 1968 <sup>49</sup> but was relatively ineffective in its latter years.

FOOTNOTES - JURE

1. CIA/DDO, JURE, Volume I, Cable to Director (from San Juan) 7/25/62
2. CIA/DDO, Manuel Ray Rivero (Ray) Volume VIII, Information Report, September 1962
3. CIA/DDO, JURE, Volume I, Information Dispatch, 7/11/62
4. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume VIII, Junta Revolucionario Cubana - Declaration of Principles
5. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XVI, Memo to Director from Chief/WH Division, 9 July 1964, Subject: Chronology of Concept of Autonomous Operations and Summary of Financial Support to Manuel Artime.
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. Ibid
11. CIA/DDO Ray Volume X, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 9/11/63
12. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XI, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 10/11/63
13. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs from CS/JMWAVE, 10/21/63
14. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 1/10/64
15. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XIII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 1/30/64
16. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XIII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 4/26/64
17. CIA/DDO Ray Volume IX, Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from Chief of Station, JMWAVE, 7/22/63, Subject: Manuel Ray Rivero's Opinion of CIA
18. CIA/DDO Ray Volume VII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 8/15/62
19. HSCA 005990, p. 4, FBI File #97-4546, Section 1 - Correlation Summary 5/30/63
20. Ibid, Item 2, page 4

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21. HSCA #009974, Item 9, FBI File #105-114543-5, JURE, U.S. Army Intelligence Report, #2215 217; 24 September 1962, Subject: Jure Established - classified SECRET
22. Ibid
23. HSCA #009974, p. 12, FBI File #105-114543, Volume 1, Serial 46
24. CIA/DDO Ray Volume X, Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, 8/2/63, Subject: Meeting with Ray
25. Ibid
- 25a. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to JMWAVE from Director, 12/3/63.
- 25b. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume X, Memo for Record from A. Rodriguez, Subject: Ray Contact Report 8/23/63.
- 25c. Ibid.
- 25d. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume X, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 9/11/63.)
- 25e. CIA/DDO Ray Volume X, Cable to JMWAVE from Director. 11/18/63.
- 25f. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from COS/JMWAVE, 12/13/63, Subject: Operation Bola.
- 25g. Ibid.
- 25h. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to JMWAVE from Director, 12/3/63.
- 25i. Ibid.
- 25j. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, 12/13/63.
- 25k. JFK Document #009005, p. 7.
- 25l. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 10/11/63.
- 25m. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume X, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 9/7/63.
- 25n. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XI, Cable to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from JMWAVE, 10/22/63.

26. HSCA #006468, pp 3-4, FBI File #97-4546, Section 2
27. Ibid
28. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XII, Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, 2/12/64, Subject: Meeting with (AMBANG) (Ray)
29. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XII, Memo for Record, 2/12/64
30. CIA/DDO, Zarraga File, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 4/21/64
31. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XIII, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 3/28/64
32. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XIII, Memo for Chief/WH Division from Alfonso Rodriguez, 4/13/64
33. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/6/64
34. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XIV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 5/20/64
35. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/3/64
36. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Intelligence Information Cable 5/30/64
37. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/3/64
38. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/6/64
39. Ibid
40. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XIV, Memo for Record, 5/20/64 from Samuel Halpern, Subject: JURE Purchase of Arms
41. Ibid
42. Ibid
43. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XV, Cable to Director from JMWAVE, 6/6/64
44. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XVII, Memo for Record, 9/11/64 from Alfonso Rodriguez
45. CIA/DDO, Zarraga File, Field Information Report, 9/23/64
46. CIA/DDO Ray Volume XVII, Autonomous Operations - Operating Plan
47. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XVII, Memo for Record, draft, 9/22/64 Alfonso Rodriguez
48. Ibid
49. CIA/DDO, Ray Volume XVIII, Cable dated 1/4/69, CITE WH/Miami, #2233