180-10144-10174

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Fldr. 10
Doc. 3

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TAB B: CIA Rep. on the Inquiries

2 b. SSC report, to considerable extent describes AMLASH operation concurrently "The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assas. of JFK, in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the WC

c. questioning aircraft flights on 11/22 & 11/27/62 to Havana
see "Unidentified Air Passenger" folder

Travel to & fr USSR 1959-1962
11/26/63 cable DIR 85133, 26.11.63, sent to (Paris, Rome, Madrid, [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], Brussels, The Hague, London + Ottawa) - requesting any scrap info which bears on JFK's assas.

replies on 11/27/63:

19-1	[redacted] 2299	(IN 68739),	11/27/63
	(ROME) 1235	(IN 68802)	"
	(OTTA) 1275	(IN 69005)	"
19-6	[redacted] 3469	(IN 69041)	"
	(LOND) 6097	(IN 69100)	"
	(OTTA) 1277	(IN 69233)	" 1111938
19-4	[redacted] 4490	(IN 69290)	"
	(MADR) 9789	(IN 69328)	11/28/63
	(BRUS) 8739	(IN 69852)	11/29/63
	(ROME) 1258	(IN 70111)	"
	(PARI) 1770	(IN 74234)	12/5/63
	(PARI) 1833	(IN 77148)	12/10/63
	(PARI) 1845	(IN 77397)	"

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(4)

RETURN TO CIA
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(LOND) 6097 (IN 69100) 11/27/63

4 (London) reported that British journalist claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in 1959 – Santos (Trafficante), living in luxury in jail, Santos visited frequently by Latin Amer. gangster Ruby

(OTTA) 1277 (IN 69233) 11/27/63
(Ottawa) reported delight of Cuban embassy staff over JFK death + instructions from govt to cease looking happy in public

19-4
[redacted] 4490 (IN 69290) 11/27/63
14-4 [redacted] reported Soviets shocked – blame assas. on extreme right-wingers

Other than above, initial responses produced no other info

11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to (Hague +) (Frankfurt) on Oswald travel back to USSR
12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to (Berlin) (Frankfurt), (Bonn) + (The Hague)

(BONN)	5579	(IN 73338)	12/4/63
(HAGU)	5110	(IN 73378)	"
(MUNI)	8316	(IN 75065)	12/6/63
(STUT)	5545	(IN 76758)	12/9/63
(ESNT)	1400	12/9/63	

1111939

above reporting produced details about Oswald's travel from USSR thru Germany + Netherlands enroute to US in June 1962

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5 No evidence found through these queries + related queries tying the S.U. to Oswald's assass. of JFK

II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963

Cable to Mexcy on 11/28/63 DIR85655,
"We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban Installations and [redacted]

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63
Please follow all leads + tips - Question of Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63
continue watch of Soviets + Cubans for comments, propaganding about the case. "FYI only, Soviet Intel in India had letter sent to [U.S. Government] leaders demanding full investigation of case."

11111940
(HMMW-12193), 17.12.16 12/17/63
7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mexcy station commending them on job well done
"Your (LIENVOY) data, the statements of Silvia DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing"

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III Gen'l Collection Requirements

7 DIR 84608, 22.11.63
all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ saying look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. — Be on quick alert while new Pres. takes over the reins."

8 "Were there relevant or significant information on the subject (of JFK assas + Oswald) it would have been reported either in response to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources."
If one believes that there was a conspiracy, w/ Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously
9 would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken."

comment in HQ dispatch to Mex City Sta on 12/17/63 — (IN 11111941 MW-12193, 17.12.63) re limited reporting from other stations
"... this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's life ..."

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in contrast to SSC report, citing extensive U.S. intelligence network in Cuba, IOR says that

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9 There were no penetrations of CASTRO's inner circle where any info on subject (JFK assassination) would exist,

10 However, assets in Cuba did have reporting requirements

IV. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mystery passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

11 7 flights of 11/22 + 11/25 to Cuba from Mexico were passenger flights –
7 flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/1 passenger – the man referred to in Book V SSC.

CIA (conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights), filing cable reports to HQ,
(CIA had surveillance team, [redacted] [redacted] who provided photos of passports, + copies passenger list)

Also have (LIEN VOY telephone tap) against Cuban Embassy (of transcripts of conversations w/ Cuban office + Mexican Airport Control Office.)

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11/22/1963 Flight

12 Book V of SSC Final Report states CIA could not explain, at time of SSC hearings why no record of follow-up on 11/22/63 flights. " In fact, the SSC was advised

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12 that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the (surveillance noted above), which bears directly on the subject

13 "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight fr Mex Cy to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter"

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 flight in CIA passing report to FBI & FBI not doing followup investig. for WC

15 IGR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report on other position

1) Mex Cy Sta did not cable HQ that man looked suspicious. There was a 12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227) which reported the man had crossed at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63, what registered at hotel in Mex Cy on 11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63 & was only passenger on Cubana flight that night - good photo of him taken at airport

11111943

2) dispatch followed (HMMA-22579, 12/5/63 reporting info & enclosing photograph & containing following:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious

15 also internal memo in Mex City Station — see Memorandum for the Record, 12/3/63 which stated that the man was reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 (Monterey Base) Cable 3/19/64 (MNTY) - 0829 (IN 43193) — info on Cuban American of 11/27/63 flight had by agent [of Mexican federales]

" The following should be noted about the report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement that he "was involved in the Kennedy assassination"; it states that he entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa, Florida)." 1111944

17 Mex City Sta response to [Monterey station] cable contributes to confusion on the episode. When Mex City Sta received cable, the Deputy Chief of Station replied

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17 Cr MEXI - 8740 (IN 43940) 3/20/64
that the information in (Monterey) report "jibes fully w/ that provided Station by (Mx Cy source) 4 December 63".

"The mistake of that cable cannot be explained away, but wrong it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more info. on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources w/ access to info concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available & such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities."

TAB C CIA Operations against CUBA

4 "While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indicating what was known then by those actually involved (in Cuba operations & supply of info to W.C.), as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary - which has been suggested by some - would require a unanimous conspiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities."

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7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 – Operations to Split CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK operation)

(Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez)
(Enrique Cayardo Rubera)
Cuban exiles – developed operational concept to overthrow the CASTRO govt – know as the Leonardo Plan

8 (Moreno) assoc'd in Miami
Jorge Ayburuzyc Volsky
Cuban citizen of polish origin
married Cuban national after WW II
reportedly imprisoned following B.P. govt
reportedly avid Castroite

Leonardo Plan was discussed w/Pad Szulc
Szulc claimed he got contacts – it was
through his intercession that Leonardo
Plan gained govt-level support & approval
↓ Richard Goodwin was Szulc contact at WH
Volsky & Szulc met Robert Hurwitch
1 State Dept official to discuss the
plan – he presented the idea to CIA
CIA assigned it to Miami Station &
became known as AMTRUNK

→ 4/17/63 – Szulc tells Hurwitch that Miami Station gave Volsky assurity to decide if operation to proceed not consistent CIA intentions

9 early Sept 1963 – AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence
officers in CUBA
1) [Miguel A. Díaz Dalgue] 05 11111946
2) [Ramon Guiz Hector Robello] 05
3) [Moreno Orozco Basulto] 05
[illegible] was reportedly close to AMLASH/1

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10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate (Moreno) from operational details of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion + poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully recruited in Cuba but no progress in establ'g. or any capability for action

11 Szulc + Volsky considered to be highly suspect - re security considerations

12 also Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez
Castro had Rabel set up Cuban
13 Marine Corps - held job until 1960 when appt'd Chief of Rural Housing defected to US in 1962 - [recruited by JMWAVE Sta + used in AMTRUNK activities] - returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. Was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison but released in July or August of 1967. "There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven."

14 I G R says very little planning + concrete progress in AMTRUNK during JFK's life

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New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

14 —

15 "While Orta (Juan) was reported in early 1961 as being used in CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationship w/him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of info. on the Cuban leadership."

16 —

17 It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro gut re gambling, Orta's availability for assass attempt was understood to be due his last payoff ~~to~~ he had received from gambling interests. "One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling authorities as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

18 Rosselli tells CIA he knows Cuban exile leader Tony Varona (Dem. Revolu. Trust)

received CIA support 19 "... it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

1111948

20 As late as 6/10/64 - it was reported that Mian gangster elements were offering $150,000 to assass Castro - this could explain why Varona so available when approached by Rosselli

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20 In '67 IGR, notes that one officer ~~[illegible]~~ said that the program reactivated in 4/62 & had been shut down following B.P in 4/61 - he felt that something was ongoing in interim. "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way" ... "In a sense ~~the~~ CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction."

21 Considerations:

1. ~~Indep~~ Possible crim syndicate opns re Castro prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. ~~Co~~ May have continued after B.P 4/61 shutdown & be ongoing in some form when reactivated by CIA in 4/62

2. Frank Sturgis may have had contact w/ crim syndicate. Could
22 have been used by syndicate in its activities

3. Sturgis prob'ly knew Orta. However, Sturgis not in Cuba when Orta given assassin's role. But Sturgis may have fabricated his story for Miami group

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25 Antonio Veciana - never CIA employee but was connected w/ ALPHA-66, Cuban exile movement. He proposed Castro assas to CIA on 3 occasions 12/60, 7/62, 4/66 & was rebuffed each time.

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Agent Messages in 61 re Castro assass

26 5 agent messages made reference to plan to kill Castro a proposing same. 3 related to same operation, 2 were separate proposals. No indication that these resulted from separate CIA initiative. LA Division prepared summary of messages forwarded to Review Staff on 8/8/75. Records of Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. Subject not covered in Church committee interim report.

27 B messages: relate to same plan

1st, 3/27/61 sent by agency asset (AMBRONC/5) re proposed sabotage of electric company in Havana - coordinate w/ attempt to kill Castro at public appearance (as in accordance w/ Gen'l Plan) no record of message answered

2nd 3/29/61 - (AMBRONC/5) sends 2nd message plan scheduled for 4/9/61, message answered on 3/30 agreeing to plan - addressee gen'l issue but didn't comment on proposal to kill Castro

3rd 4/5/61 - presumably from (AMBRONC/5) persons he had been directed to contact only had arms for 50 men. Said to carry out 4/9/61 plan would make it impossible to maintain clandestine org. in Cuba

"your meeting and decision. If it does not come that date we are lost." No indication message answered

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The 4 agents named in plan

28

① (AMBRONC/5) - a) 201 file opened on 7/15/60
POA issued 12/18/61
[OA] issued 1/31/62
debriefing on Nov 1960 -
indicates that he had contact
w/ plotters against CASTRO &
claimed to have allegiance to
invade ~~Amch~~ simular plans. Infiltrated
on 12/9/60 - exfiltrated
on 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated
3/3/61
exfiltrated
4/19/61
Sold mission was to org. resistance
groups

(c) infiltrated
12/17/61
exfiltrated
3/29/62
still same mission

(d) infiltrated
5/2/62
(arrested [5/24/62] DG + executed [5/30/62] DG
reported to never admit was CIA agent

29 [redacted])

11111951

② (AMCOAX/1) - (AMBRONC/5) asked to contact
him re gen'l plan for 4/61

a) POA - 1/5/61
mission was to org. paramilitary acti-
vities in Cuba
infiltrated
2/61
exfiltrated
7/61 following B.P

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29 (b) infiltrated
7/29/61 same mission
arrested
(8/17/61 09 [— serving 30 yrs term 08
in McGovern's book])
③ (AMPUG/1) — another (AMBRON) contact
for 4/61 plan
a) recruited in 9/60 + infiltrated then
received airdrops in 12/60
returned to U.S 5/15/61 following B.P
b) infiltrated
4/29/61 — mission to org. resistance groups
+ conduct sabotage
arrested (7/61 + 09, 08 [redacted])

30 ④ (AMPANIC/7) — another (AMBRONC) 4/61 contact
a) was a "walk-in" on 4/15/60
POA — 1/30/61
MOC since 8/12/60
mission to org. resistance in
Havana + Pinar del Rio
b) infiltrated 3/3/61 09, 08
arrested (4/23/61 + [redacted])
c) was infiltrated on 8/60
infiltrated 11/60
(prior to POA) 11111952
mission was sabotage + assassin.
of prominent Cuban communist
members in Castro entourage
records indicate his functioning
in Cuba at that time

31 his case officer says assassin was not authorized
any assass effort would be on (AMPANIC's) own initiative

4/90

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TAB D AMLASH OPERATION

1 1977 IGR says actual nature + sign. of AMLASH is more def. than Book II

Book II suggests that AMLASH may have been Castro agent w/ provocation mission that would justify LHO retaliation + in alternative Amlash was a security risk by which details of plotting could have become known to Castro, providing same provocation + whatever the reasoning Amlash should have been reported to W.C.

"We believe that neither these applies. The character of the relationship between CIA and Amlash/1 prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for Amlash/1 to feel that he had any tangible
2 CIA support for plotting against CASTRO. Whether one is inclined to see Amlash/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63
5 Comment 11111953

"It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time — nor was he ever for that matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA relationship with AMLASH/1

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5 had made no real progress, although he was viewed as an operational contact w/ potential. One a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship that he had w/ the CIA the critical period, for purposes of the paper, is therefore between 5 September and 22 November 1963

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLASH case officer approved AMLASH as chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom to may find persons susceptible to long distance + covert discipline — Cable also spells out long range requirement prior to action based on Amlash possible internal organization

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meeting w/ Amlash "Amlash still feels there only two way accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, Amlash still awaiting for US reveal plan of action

I GR comment - actual reference to "inside job" did not specify Castro as suggested in Book II as p 14 but directed to more gen'l ? of how to bring about change - not w/ specific consideration of Book II

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10 "The fact remains that whatever views Amlash/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts or any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amlash/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 – Amlash case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amlash even tho Amlash told Amothip he does not "intend to see your friend again"
(Station) officer in Paris) had been in contact w/ him, 2 of whom participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 – case officer cables HQ that Amlash claimed to have "necessary people and equipment inside (Cuba) to accomplish overthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"

11

Amlash wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance. Cable indicates that Amlash determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

11111955

Des Fitzgerald planned meeting - D.F. to rep. self as personal rep of RFK + assurance of full U.S. support. There is a change of the president got in Cuba

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11 10/29/63 - Amlash meets w/ Fitzgerald in Paris. Case officer also at meeting

12 11/13/63 - Case officer memo summarizes meeting of D.F w/ Amlash
US support only after real coup effected + group involved in position to request U.S. support.
U.S won't commit to isolated uprising

13 D.F in 1967 IGR recalled that Amlash repeatedly requested high powered rifle w/ telescopic sights or other weapon to kill Castro from a distance, D.F. stated he rejected the request.
Case officer memo said nothing of operational nature discussed at Fitz. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of Amwhip meeting in New York re Amlash reaction to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting -
Amlash happy about policy but not fact that wasn't given technical assistance for operational plan.

14 If Amlash doesn't get advice and materials from U.S got technician he will become fed up + we'll lose progress made

Comment Book V at p. 18 characterizes Amlash feelings re Fitz. meeting as unclear - IGR says this not true as corroborated by above contact report

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Travelers

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11/19/63 - Fitz. approves telling Amlash that he would be given a cache inside Cuba, to include high power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Amlash tells CIA officer he plans return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ cables (Paris) to delay Amlash departure to permit one more meeting which Amlash requested

On same day, Amlash agrees to delay departure its something interesting. Case officer said couldn't assume it but it was a meeting Amlash requested.

16 IGR comp This is highly speculative evidence of indication that Amlash might receive specific support he requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets w/ Amlash in afternoon

conclusion "... there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life Amlash/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for most of anything. Were he a provacateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against CASTRO

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Tab E - Material Forwarded to W.C

Tab F - Mex Cy Coverage of Oswald Visit

Intel. Sources on Oswald's Visit to Mex City '63

1. Unilateral Coverage

umbrella type project { LIPSTICK - multi-line phone taps
3 photo sites, mobile surveillance team + mail intercept operation

LIFEAT - telephone taps - by [redacted] 08
[redacted] - handled by case officer
Mex + Mex-Amer recruited agents

3 photographic site subcrypts under LIPSTICK

managed by a Mex agent { LIMITED - fixed site directly opposite Soviet Embassy
LILYRIC - alternate photo base on same street as Limited front gate
LICALLA - southside of Soviet Compound backdoor - get good ID photos of Soviet personnel

2 closed down when Slotimer received word that photo of the "unidentified man" was being released by W.C

Film collected 3 times/week from Limited and Lilyric sites
Licalla film processed on outside by the agent like the above

3 mobile surveillance done by American staff officers - had team of 6 recruited agents - team could be activated by radio from Limited site whenever someone of interest left the ~~station~~ Soviet Embassy

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1/gs

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3 [redacted] mail intercept; Lubright — handled by American case officer

[redacted] Coverage

unreliable [redacted] as was the nature of [redacted] at the time

4 telephone tap [redacted] called Lienvoy run by [redacted] - 30 lines on the at one time listening post. In 61 Station chief became project case officer on LIENVOY

Oswald Coverage

[redacted] asked for telephone number of Soviet, Cuban + Satellite Embassies [redacted] — we disconnected on [redacted] connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines, and 1 Yugoslav line — recorded, transcripted

Lee monitor made short summary for Station chief of interesting conversations time lag of a day or two

5 Boris Yarosoff did Russian translation translations run about a week behind date of conversation. All transcripts made in Spanish or English since this is all Sta Chief could read + because he scanned these transcripts for operational leads

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9/gp

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6 Ann Goodpasture started screening all photograph as soon as station learned that Lee Oswald had phoned Soviet Embassy

8 Oswald came to attention of listening post operators from tap of Soviet line. It was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel wanted to review the photograph coincidentally w/ the typed transcript.

Tab G

Selected Newspaper Stories w/ Comment

(G 5) - Comments on Ronald Kessler's Wash Post article of 11/26/76 re CIA w/held details of Oswald's call

2 memo - 1) J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 for DDP Helms Subject: CIA Disclosure of Info on LHO date 10/10/63

2) Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64 re Info developed by CIA on LHO activities in Mexico 9/28-10/3/63

3) Letter to Helms 2/10/64 from Rankin

4) Memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from Helms - re Info on LHO Mexico Activities 9/28/ - 10/3/63

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Tab H + w/ CIA comments

1. Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleging CIA activity in Dallas in 1963
2. " " " 1/20/77 alleging CIA tied to false Oswald story
3. Norman Kempster story 1/1/77 alleging CIA w/ held data on Oswald
4. Clare Booth Luce involvement w/ Cuban exiles
5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleging CIA w/ held details of Oswald telephone calls, w/ report on handling of documents
6. John Giskko story 11/13/76 alleging Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy
7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA + Castro
8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing LHO in 1960

1111968