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Background

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In April 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Book II) which in essence faulted the CIA ~~and to some ext~~ for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its ~~personal~~ attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's findings is ~~[illegible]~~ detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

(SSC)

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, ~~advised~~ the Warren Commission that the CIA had no

P7 Book II

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00021.75 evidence of a foreign conspiracy".

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect" that Book V ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posited in the
SSC Final Report. However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognises the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow response to the Warren Commission's quest for all possibly relevant information. ["Relevancy" is, of course, the "buzzword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that; "

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time.

..... The Agency should have

p 10
1977 ~~Final~~
Report

taken broader initiatives, then, as well."

It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA with regard to the significance of the CIA's Castro assassination attempts and to resolve the parties ~~their~~ controversy as to the operations ~~their~~ importance. ~~Rather,~~ Instead this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all ~~the~~ facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-63. Certain inferences and conclusions ~~of~~ will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivations ~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate participants in the operations.

to the work of the Wrenn Commission

0002180

Involvement of Organized Crime in CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.+
[1967 IG Rpt. p. ; Interim Rpt p 74; see note 1]
Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim", O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Maheu+ who had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive covert operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.
+[Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Interim Report]

Although Maheu and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Maheu and Rosselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1960
[Interim Report p 75]

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[Comment: Maheu seems the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Rosselli for several reasons. In an office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that", Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one John Rosselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a 'high ranking member of the syndicate' and controlled all the ice making machines on the Strip! Maheu reasoned that, if Rosselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

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Comment

Confirmation of ~~our~~ the earliest Maheu-Rosselli contact is found in Rosselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Rosselli write-up] from Maheu to Rosselli

Comment

Maheu and Rosselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950. Including Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to discuss further details

[Interim Report p76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Inspector General's Report places the meeting at the Plaza Hilton on 14 Septem 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussions took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment

Tony de Varona admits going to NYC at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [Testimony of de Varona, that his visit had an assassination motivation]

p.3 ?

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, "Sam Gold", who knew the Cuban crowd".

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both Giancana ("Gold") and Trafficante ("Joe") is ~~[illegible]~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. Accordy

?? to the 1967 I.G. Report, the entrance of Giancana took place (1) during the week of 25 September 1960 - ....
[1967 I.G. Report, p18]

In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p.76, does not fix a date certain for Giancana's initial appearance but it was "certainly prior to October 18." (p76)) because of conflicting evidence between the 1967 I.G. September date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the introduction in November 1960. As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned that Giancana had been introduced to Maheu "prior to October 18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap accurred on October 30, 1960; and (2) DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro (?) [FBI memo, dated 18 Oct 1960 from Hoover to Bissell, Interim Report, p79]

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[Comment: Each of the dual reasons listed in the Interim Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately below.]

[Comment: Although the 1967 I.G. Report stated

that" Maheu pointed out "Bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Bold" or Joe", the Interim Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "the Support Chief, who was using the name "Sam Olds," said he had met "Sam" and Joe, once, and then only briefly [O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Interim Report p 7]

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Comment

Conflicts appear also on several minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Rosselli know from the beginning that the operation was CIA?

a) O'Connell stated that Maheu told Rosselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Rosselli testified that Maheu told him that O'Connell was CIA [Interim Report p 26]

Also, footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Rosselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Harvey, that "I am not hiding I know who you work for".

The importance of Rosselli's recognition of CIA ~~was~~ involvement is that it is doubtful if Harvey and Trafficante

could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Rosselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some Bunnen interests of Wall Street that had.. nickel interests and properties around Cuba... (Rosselli; 6/24/75 pp 9, 17)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that (4.) "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? ..... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings".

If Anderson's sources for this article were Rosselli and ~~[illegible]~~ William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of Phase I, it is another ~~[illegible]~~ example of serious discrepancies which exist between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Rosselli.

3) The alleged ~~[illegible]~~ "surprise discovery" by Mahin and O'Connell as to the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~[illegible]~~ although it is

possible that the Senate Committee Staff overlooked the specific Miami newspaper

Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included pictures of Roncona and Trafficante thus ~~[illegible]~~ graphically showing Maheu and O'Connell ~~[illegible]~~ the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Parade magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that ~~[illegible]~~ O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ~~ex~~ post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were delivered to Rosselli et al until approximately March 1961, whatever the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Parade article. In Interim Report R77, Ft I

The principals in Phase I of the operation ~~[illegible]~~ also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Maheu described Roncona as playing a "key" role,

0002189 (Mahuu, 7/29/75, p.34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination", Rosselli downplayed Bioncoma's part to that of a "back-up" man (Rosselli 6/24/75, p15) ~~All of the individuals who~~ [Whether Rosselli received a "message" from Bioncoma's murder four days before Rosselli's Senate appearance is open for question]. Rosselli's Senate characterization of Bioncoma's role as minor ~~is in~~ contrast to his alleged recruitment of ~~description of~~ Bioncoma's due to his "knowledge of the Cuban crowd" which the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficante(s) involvement in Phase I is even more jumbled by the available evidence. The 1967 I.G. Report and Senate Interim Report ~~[illegible]~~ state that "bold" identified "Joe" to Mahuu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there" [I.G. Report p19; Interim Report, p 77]. To support the description of Trafficante as a "courier," the ~~1967 I.G. Report~~ Interim Report quotes p.19 of the 1967 I.G. Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havanna on syndicate business"

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0002190 Comment

This factually unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records of other agencies. As an example, State Department files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport in Cuba on October ?, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February ?, 1960. (See Trafficante file, State Dept). ~~Now this record~~ No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and Dept~~ maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during the period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante recalled ~~maintained~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release from prison. (Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct. , 1978) His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the red by mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in the~~ during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.]

By the time of the Senate testimony of Rosselli, however, Trafficante role had diminished to a point

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even below Giancana's. He had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate conversation between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Interestingly, Trafficante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the facts as they were being reported in 1963 of the principals.

[Comment:
The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~especially to~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier or interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not regularly cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.]

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~they~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplistic, straightforward approach of shooting Castro but this plan was vetoed

by Giancana. In a comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink... Trafficante (Joe: the courier) was ~~[illegible]~~ in touch with a disgruntled Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister Castro. The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests but had since lost that source of income and needed the money." [F.G. Report, p 25]

Comment

The observations quoted above of the 1967 I.G. Report are extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill approach originally agreed with Giancana, not the Agency; a point

0002193 which is crucial to the final conclusions presented below. Secondly, Trafficante is identified as ~~providing~~ having access to and providing for the putative assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent which his self-saving role description of "interpreter." His ability to recruit Orta apparently ~~is~~ was directly tied to his ~~of~~ former gambly empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all his illegal conduct ~~for Trafficante~~ both during and after his Cuban days. [See Trafficante profile.]

Comment

Speculation concerning Ortas role arose during the ~~a~~ Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News. Sturgis was quoted as saying, "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana)

What was disturbing to the

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writers of the 1977 Report was the fact that Orta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassinatn plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's, Norman Rothman (See Rothman Profile). Coupled with Sturgis' alleged mob relationships, is the allegation that Sturgis had a role in ~~[illegible]~~ inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Orta in recurring gambling kickbacks."

A second aspect of Miskil's ~~[illegible]~~ news series concerned a claim by Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 in attempting to poison Castro which dovetailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Bronconcas electronically surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some dink or food of Castros" (Memo, Hoover to DCI SAA. DDP. 10/18/60.

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The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

pr It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities.

Additional consideration:

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own ?? anthony prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been ongoing when CIA reactivated plan in 1962 April

2. Syndicate operators could have had activities such as those in New York Daily News stress in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation w/ Orta, it was not CIA's; could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Minn in 1965 after Orta settled there

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Neither the 1967 I-G Report or the SSC Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency received the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli [Interim Report, p 80]. The chain of custody, according to the 1967 I-G Report was for the lethal pills to be delivered from Rosselli to Trafficante. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Rosselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February - early March 1961 [Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 80]

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported the version of Joe Shimon whose story was that the money and pills for the operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by "Maheu, Rosselli, Trafficante, and the Cuban". [Interim Rpt p 81] Shimon's story is filled with vivid details which are documented on p 82 of the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question as his accounts are not shared by anyone else connected with the plan nor is his relationship with

0002198 Rosselli, Giancana, or Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971 which fixed the date of the passage of the poison at the Fountainbleau by Rosselli as March 13, 1961 and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta could or would not, attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leaks" to Anderson and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Orta's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Orta "lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while ~~the~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington". . . It would seem though, that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro [~~IA~~ 1967 Ib. Report p. 27]

0002199 With the failure of Orta to produce the desired results, the project was at a standstill until, once again, Santo Trafficante assumed command. Rosselli [illegible] that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement ~~[illegible]~~ might be able to accomplish the assassination Σ ~~[illegible]~~ 1967 DG Rpt, p. 29; Dnteur Rpt p80.

Comment:

The exile leader was, of course Tony de Varona, ~~[illegible]~~ who was the subject of speculation in an FBI memorandum of 18 January 1961 associating him with receiving financial aid from American gangsters for anti-Castro activities which [illegible] the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction ~~[illegible]~~ into the CIA mob plots, de Varona was already being funded by the Agency through the Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in CIA planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was imminent.

Interest in Varona was also very expressed in 1960-61 by Mike McKeany whose advertising agency was ~~[illegible]~~ SECRET engaged in promoting Varona's image in collaboration with McKeany's friend

00022LO "Chirri" or "Chilli" Mendoza (Mendoza is described in Trafficante's FBI files as a close Cuban associate)

Completing the picture of support for Varona is the promotional efforts of the Dino and Eddie Cellini, McCarty and Lansky abusiness associates, who were reportedly working through a Washington D.C. public relations firm, Edward K Moss and Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations and was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini benefactors with the understanding that their group would have "privileged treatment" in the Cuba of the future. Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful" [1967 IG Report p.30]

The Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a meeting in Miami in ~~[illegible]~~ approximately 1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts to ~~[illegible]~~ "educate" the American people about Castro, which may be a euphemism for anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transport

??

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varona, probably independent, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~[illegible]~~ multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine turmoil. de Varona was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors [See Varona testimony —]

Although de Varona has no specific memory of meeting Trafficante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interpreter" in several meetings attended of de Varona, Rosselli, Giancana, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante family partner from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during the 1960s. Trafficante claimed that Rosselli had previously recruited Gener but this appears unlikely in view of Trafficante's long-standing friendship with Gener in Cuba. and Rosselli's admission to

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O'Connell that ~~[illegible]~~ Trafficante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated, Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: ~~Parallelly~~ Parallelling the situation at the Senate hearings during 1975 when Rosselli's description of Trafficante's role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~the~~ his "courier" characterization ~~[illegible]~~ in 1960-61 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trafficante's "interpreter" statement, is the recent interview with Gener who agrees with the Trafficante's Committee testimony that he was an interpreting with de Varona only for Rosselli. ~~[illegible]~~ The net result in both instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure (~~[illegible]~~ CF. Fonzi interview with Gener, May? 1978 and Trafficante testimony, Oct? 1977]

~~However, the meetings with Varona came to pass,~~ the

If ~~Confusion~~ ambiguity exists as to the specifics of the introduction of de Varona into Phase One of the Castro assassination plots, more ~~[illegible]~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Varona's ~~[illegible]~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, the I G Report indicates that de Varona ~~attempted~~ a second poison mission before the Cuban invasion but Rosselli was positive that only one

attempt, (Orta's) was made. He was also positive that he
0002203 delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Varona which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~[illegible]~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating "that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that... (de Varona) was the contact in the United States who arranged for... [Orta] ... to administer the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills from Rosselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time [See Varona transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots while ~~[illegible]~~ continuing his post on the Revolutionary Council. However, "Steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective" [1962 I.G. Report, p 32]

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, and, it was not until, April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Rosselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". [I.G. Rept p 33] The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discove~~ has not been uncovered, but Rosselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Varona ~~was~~ was to provide the ~~[illegible]~~ individuals who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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seriousness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fast. In Phase One, Rosselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the modus operandi and the ability of the ~~[illegible]~~ putative assassins was deliberately vague. After ~~[illegible]~~ Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the lethal material was to be introduced into Castro's food [which involved] an asset of Varona's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." LIQUIFY FRY P41 By June 1962 after ~~the~~ Varona had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had personally sent the pills into Cuba, ~~[illegible]~~ "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned

work for Pearson and did know that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintance with Morgan. - Morgan also fought with Pat Coyne of VSC

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their names or anything about them"
[1967 DO. Report p513]

Comment

As the 1967 DO authors correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" posing opportunity ~~with the same plan that Edwards~~ was familiar in that Edwards had described quite the same plan". The fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

(1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or

(2) the mob had been using di Varona before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or

(3) di Varona was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime

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Second

The cast of underworld

characters changed. Harvey had insisted that Mahue and Broncano be dropped from the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's "interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names Barcia-Boney and Boday.

Comment

"Maceo's" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history without any attempt made by the Agency to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely "to bed" ~~to~~ ~~two~~ with ~~three~~ two of the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes Maceo as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~[illegible]~~ drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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? The termination of the CIA-mafia was plots slow and undramatic. Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to Harry that the pills and guns which had been delivered to Varona in Miami in April had arrived in Cuba, and an unidentified three-man team had been dispatched in June to execute the plan [Interim Report p84]

? During September 1962, ~~and~~ Rosselli related to Harry that de Varona ~~[illegible]~~ readying a second three-man team who were "supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate Castro's body guard. During this period the 'medicine' was reported as still in place and the three men of the first team safe [1967 I.G. Report, p51] However, the second team never made Cuba and a series of alibis were constructed during December and Jany 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona supposedly collected $2700 for the maintainence of these individuals from Rosselli who had received the payment from Harry. [1967 I.G. Report p52]

In mid-Jany 1963 both Harry and Rosselli agreed that "nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future" [1967 I.G. Rept p52] Rosselli was instructed to ease his way out of touch with Varona which he personally did. The last meeting between Harry

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and Rosselli occurred in Washington D.C. on June 1963. when he was Harvey ~~guest of~~ overnight guest. Hence their meeting ostensibly was not during related to any assassination plots.

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CONCLUSION

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The available evidence suggests ~~that [illegible]~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way." On a ~~[illegible]~~ base, CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction? (1977 IG Rpt p 208)

in part,

?

The relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Giancana ET SUR:

"... Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin to be on three occasions ... Giancana claimed that everything has been prepared for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some kind of food of Castro." (1977 IG Rpt p 195)

Comment

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Although the reported meetings between Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana

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are subject to different interpretations,

it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties ~~by~~ until sometime after October 18, 1960 the date of the FBIS intercepted conversation of Biancana.

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The poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Bioncana's request, were not ready for delivery until late Feby - early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Bioncana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison plan in progress, using a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer its support. The mob was then in a perfect position. If their ~~personal~~ private plot actually worked and Castro died, then the Syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against ~~the~~ CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their intrigue ~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position ~~is~~ would be that ~~they~~ were only attempting to execute the wishes of their Government.

Additional Comment

The actions of Bioncana's "hired hand", Richard Cain ~~can not be~~ raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission

0002212

to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Broncoria's payroll, Cain's approach to ~~assist~~ the CIA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community is appears a little more than ~~significant~~ coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (~~and~~ one story), and to "buy" influential Cubans in Havanna ostensibly for el-Pueblo Prio (second story) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Broncoria to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain could be the "arrain to be" when Broncoria referred to in the FBI memo of ~~[illegible]~~ Oct 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[Tie in memo on Cain with Salerno's view which is ~~sy~~ strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of Oct 30, 1960. Mahue needs to be questioned on this point]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. Interestingly, Cubela

was the former head of the Directorio in Cuba when he was a major power in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture" ~~which~~ a directive which is subject to personal interpretation including the fact that the CIA was a willing participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain now the chief investigator for Cook County Sheriff's Office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in April 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the assassination rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of ~~[illegible]~~ the potential Assassin(s)

In describing the potential poisoner, Orencia spoke of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Orencia can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit ~~a Cuban in~~ one of Castro's Cuban mistresses due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles

0002214

It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman, and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arrive at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McLaney) cinescorted on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for ~~to~~ a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has been previously discussed. However, one intuitive point is that she was also Charles Tourine's mistress and, thus could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative and Lorenz was not asked about her relationship with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment

Juan Orta, the ~~a~~ man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former receipt of gambling "hick bucks".

One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to guage the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the 1967 FBI Report 2 page 25

Orta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 26 Jany 1961, which planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Orta recupted for the pills in late Feby-early March 1961 and "kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 FB Rpt p 27]

If the MOB was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his position of accessibility.

?? the other possibility also exists, i.e. that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to give to de Varona when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the MOB was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there also~~ the same possibilities exist. If Harvey and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into an "ongoing operation, then it can ~~it is~~ ~~[illegible]~~ be assumed that the MOB relationship with de Varona, which pre-dated the CIA participation according to the FBI memos of 21 Dec 1960, and 18 Jany 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs with the resumption

0002216

of the CFH's participation, funding and material support could, once again be returned to the Agency although de Varona would continue to deal through his mob contacts, Rosselli and "Macco."

True to the loose structure of Phase II in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harry upon Rosselli's word ~~and~~ that activities were actually being carried out, the Agency's lack of intent or ~~in~~ ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the ~~[illegible]~~ speculation arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being solid businessmen, Trafficante, Lansky and others from Cuba casino owners must have realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, the evidence shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic and a new opportunity for ~~holiday~~ ~~[illegible]~~ operations in Florida with the tremendous influx of Cuban exiles. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide-open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era ~~of~~ even if Castro ~~[illegible]~~ and all his Communist associates could be eliminated.

~~So although~~ Despite the relatively

0002217

useful business sense in continuing the assassination attempts against Castro in a substantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along." First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was provided full logistical support for Varona. Secondly, there was the mounting pressure from the ~~[illegible]~~ FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look at the record shows the employment of ~~this~~ this strategy ~~[illegible]~~ at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1. Robert Maheu

- Quarry of Long Committee subpoena in 1966 [Interim Report, p 79, note 3; Interim Edward P Morgan
- solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Organization [Hughes was definitely told of the project by Maheu in Nov. 1960, and was himself interested in an alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred later when Maheu was Hughes principal agent] [Interim Report, p 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony?
- Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971 on office of Security file on Edward P Morgan]

2. John Rosselli

- availing criminal prosecution [Interim Report, p 85, note 4,
- use in ~~[illegible]~~ legal memo in March 1971 to attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~use~~ attempts to delay deportation hearings with DNS which included

0002218

Jack Anderson's personal intervention with FRS (See Anderson Interview; ~~and~~ CIA Rosselli file; ~~re~~ CIA Office of Security file re Edward P. Morgan)

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat for him" by claiming the tap was a result of the CIA plots.

- Early 1962, intervention with FNU Farrell of INS re possible deportation [See Tab C, Rosselli CIA File, stating that mf Edwards, Osborn, Aigleton Rocca, & Houston know]

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963 [1967 I.G. Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967, Sam commented that Rosselli and Giancana have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation". He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Rosselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people" (1967 I.G. Rpt p 131)

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Notes re Jack Anderson "Castro Retaliation" Theory,

0002219

March 3, 1967
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Article

Source:

1967 I.G. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients (p126)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has failed (p126)

?! - Impact

The Rosselli-Gaunon contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly distinctly. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Gaunon may also know this (p127)

- Mahieu

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does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative

002221

client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Rosselli and urge discretion

- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is only found in Phase Two: the three-man team

Comment

Not necessary since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and only briefed Rosselli on the concept in Phase Two or Rosselli just didn't mention the 3 man team to Maheu or O'Connell during Phase I

Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point -

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help - Ep 125

Since Agency c/n figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Rosselli is drinking too much and talking to Morgan who is also drinking and talking to Green again & [and Pearson]

Comment

Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordies: the story of the pills

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting. (P 127)

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Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed".

I-G speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 62 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which was attended by Harvey. (P 112)

[RFK was not present]

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosselli or someone in his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident"

[Memo in Office of Security file re Morgan

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Intertel

Mr. Al Pease (former CIA & now with Intertel) said Maheu & Anderson together on some oil mix deals. ... Recent exposure of Anderson re Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Maheu using his son Peter, as an intermediary.

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Pease' theory is that Mahen probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Intuitd w/ n want CIA stuff to embarrass Hughes)

- Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahen because of his past involvement with CIA [Memo in Security File re Morgan]

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

?? - Harry had contacts with Rosselli in November - December 1967 and Jany 1968 following Rosselli convictions.
- 17 Nov 1970
Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who requested Rosselli that Rosselli faced deportation and would blow stay. DCI decided to ignore threat and Mahen agreed.
"Mahen further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally.

5. 19 Dec. 1967
- Series of conversation instigated by Harry on Rosselli's behalf to get CIA intervention directly or at least discover how good cov't case against Rosselli was.
- Calls from Rosselli began on October 6 Harry.. Rosselli knew what Agency had done for Mahen with Sen. Long because Ed Morgan told

Rosselli:
- Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Giancana (primarily the August 1963 Chicago story by Sandy Smith)
Rosselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967
- O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Pearson story
- Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase I operation due to Agency delaying on Long committee subpoena.
- Maheu visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maheu) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes.
- Maheu denied discussing with Rosselli latter phase of mission & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962
- Rosselli met Morgan through Henk Greenspun in the 1950s
- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Rosselli met with Gaum in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~[illegible]~~ impression that Rosselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances
- Rosselli under pressure from FBI drinking heavily & had a 19 yr old girl
- Believed Morgan had done some

John Hansen SECRET
Review of Office of Security File June 16th

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade Cty investigators for information on 8 Cubans:

1. a. Ramon Don Estevez
b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
c. Luciano Nieves
d. Jose De La Torriente
e. Jose Quintana
f. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo
g. Manola Artimes
h. MILASH

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in Roselli (SSCF) testimony.
Two names mentioned in a 9 Dec 1970 office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on Roselli or Giancana

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect between Roselli & Agency officials up until approx. 1971.

ix. O'Connell has already been interviewed by Dade Cty.

x. Office of Security has no such evidence that Cuban Fuentes Sierra may have been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area during time of his death

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Nieves

c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro plot; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station

- August 1965 entered US
- Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shinnon

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shinnon knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

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30 August 1976 request by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FBI Offc.

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Orta

Was an official of the Castro Gov circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Orta was originally selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Varona

When Juan Orta was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Varona be used. Roselli contacted Varona. de Varona was to use

0002227

assets of his m to carry out the mission
Varona also reportedly used his sm. in-law
to assist him in this effort but there is
no identifying info in regard to the mi in-law

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in
Miami, known to Harvey as "Maceo",
who also used the names Garcia Gomez
and Godoy. Harvey was unable to
identify Maceo, who was described as a
Cuban who spoke Italian.

4. No info in regard to death or
517-339-3523 violence threats against Roselli or
Cuban in (b) or Maher, Bencomo - Trafi,
Simon, or Morgan in (c)

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agny was aware that Roselli
intended to expose his participation in the
plot should we not intervene on
his behalf. The DCI decided to
ignore his threats and take a calculated
risk as to the consequences that may occur
w/ the disclosure of his story. This was
subsequently done by Roselli or someone
on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson
details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject. Inter Tel

- Morgan had been engaged by Hughes Tool probably thru Maheu's efforts. Al Pease former Agency man & Intertel now, said Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials, that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement w/ CIA

[redacted] - in 1962-64 was in touch w/ Maheu & simultaneously working out details of a [redacted]

For past services Morgan had been paid mill.

On May 10, 1971 Mr. Pease said Maheu & Anderson are involved together in some oil mix deals. Intertel looking into this & all other such similar matters to trace the source & disposition of funds. Recent exposure by Anderson re Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robt. Maheu using his son Peter as an intermediary. Pease's theory is that Maheu prob. that such publicity would 'scare them off'. The Intertel staff is aware of a series of contacts & meetings between Peter Maheu and Jack Anderson or a member of his staff.

0002230 Memo 19 Nov 1970

For: DCI

Subj Roselli, John

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Col. Sheffield Edwards to determine if the office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro

5. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while visiting Vegas. He only knew him casually thr. clients, but was given to understand that he was a "high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and controlled all of the ice making machines on the strip. Maheu reasoned that, if R was in fact a member of the class, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban family interests.

6. Maheu to approach R who knew M as a pr exec. handling domestic & foreign accts.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru M's pressure, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the Cuban crowd." No money requested or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Maheu introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fontainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was identified

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to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade

9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving high-back payments from the gambling interests, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Antony Verna ... had become disaffected w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given $10,000 for organizational expenses & $100 for communications

7 [illegible]

SECRET

Secy [illegible] R & R on [illegible] to [illegible] in writing. At our report [illegible] dropped.

17. May 1962 Harry took over as Case officer & it is not known by this office whether R was used operationally from that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967

18. 2 Dec 1968 R convicted of Fuar [illegible].

19. Harry reported to Office of Security his contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968. It was his belief that John w/ n [illegible] the Agency for assistance in deportation unless he actually faced deportation. R expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Maher called O Connell to advise that Maher's attorney, Ed Morgan, had recvd a call from Tom Waddin who stated appeal exhausted & R faced deportation. If someone did intercede on R's behalf, he would make a complete exposé of his activity w/ Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCI briefed & decided not to assist R. Maher was so advised of Agency's position & he was in complete agreement w/ our stand. He further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally.

Andrew [illegible] June 18, 1971

[illegible] Cantor, last team on a

SECRET

rooftop; last of Feb or first of March 1963

C002[illegible] March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his contact at Fontainebleau

OL02[illegible] - a few weeks later Castro ill

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on Chi racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that G had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba". However, the Chi gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation - Harry & Howard Osborn

2. The first involved Dir of Security the subject of our last broken conversation i.e. J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case against him; & whether or not the Agency plans to consider any possible intervention on his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the policy of "sitting tight" might be alright, but that he felt it would be a simple matter for the Dir to see Hoover personally & determine on an unofficial, earnings basis what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harry trying to find out validity of case for passage to Morgan, Harry to work for Morgan

0002236

11 Dec 1967

1. Harry requested lunchen meetings w/ Papich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1967 R calls Harry. Who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Jim Angleton & Harry intid R as "Mr. Ralston.

28 Nov spent 11 hours at Bethesda

4. According to Harry, County Club. R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worried re indict which he brought.

- R said he had not seen Bruneau since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R d/n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

6. Joly told Harry re lunchen meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1966 & beef meeting O'Connell had w/ Moler & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Far East

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, the Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the indict "held". If it is not a good case, that Harry will tell Joly & he will rule it out.

10. Harry indignant at Nigeria his intent was more than to protect Agency.

0002237

He had only the highest regard for Agency and the way we had handled his problem

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. but Harry refused to serve as R's attorney

- R wondered why Agency could not do as much for him as it did for Maher. Ed Morgan knew what Agency did for Maher w/ Sen. Long & had told Joliffe about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & better re Maheu indicating Maher would "sell anyone down the river to protect his own neck."

- Dor had sent Harry a news clipping re use of bananas. R said leak came from Sen. Kennedy's office when he was still AG

Flyer Orig Maheu

28 April 67

O Cancel - Morgan allegedly contacted some high-place officials in Ariz indicating he had a client who had been involved in an operation against Cuba.

~~Maheu~~ Maheu recalled & said he had told Morgan when Agency delayed on Long subpoena.

2 Maheu verbally upset & add if he had been identified as client source

0002238 publicity on his relationship w/ Hughes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 196 & never discussed latter phases w/ R

6. Mahn - R met Morgan thru Greenspun in 1950's when Morgan doing legal work for Las Vegas Sun.

R & Morgan in Vegas simultaneously in March. Jim Garrison in town" it was Mahn's recollection that these individuals spent some time together. He was under the impression that Joly sought legal advice from Morgan but did know nature of their conversation.

7. Claud R had deteriorated rapidly, dentistry; 19 yr old girl & arrested by Sheriff Daniels for fail to register. R pretty pressure for Mahn to have his friends.

8. Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson & did know that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintanceship w/ Morgan.

Morgan tight w/ Pat Cayne for NSA.

9. Knows Joly having problems w/ the FBI but did know details.

10. It is evident that Mahn is deeply concerned about possibility of being identified w/ Castro project but phased cooperation even to denying involvement

002238

Sen Long Maher

S. Lenhen, Long's personal Atty, told him that Maher involved in Agency.

7 June 66

Maher reported by Morgan is dealing w/ St Louis Atty, a personal friend of Long, re Maher's appearance.

3. Fensterwald. had identified Sam Onam, etc by name to O'Connell & Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois & a couple of his technicians were aware of Maher's tie-in w/ Francina.

31 May 1966

Maher asked if "Sam prank" was in the wind

12. Morgan had assured Maher that he knew Long's personal atty who exerts great influence on Long. They flew to St Louis & then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald wanted Maher as his "ace in the hole" in that Maher's clients have great appeal for T.V. Also that Maher and Ont just enough to hide behind. Unless Long says no, Fensterwald would proceed

13. Maher clearly became obligated to

Sam thru a series of circumstances that were pressed at our request. The then A.G. RFK was orally briefed on the background that led up to Mahri involvement & a Top Secret document funded to Justice Dept which served as a backup of the briefing

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1967 I.G. Rpt

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p3 Each phase is a reflection of the shifting prevailing Govt attitude toward the Castro regime

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by inflaming his behavior or by altering his appearance

b. August 1960 to April 61

Plots aggressively pursued; viewed by at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime culminating in BOP

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Aug 60 was called off after BOP & remained dormant for several mos.

d) Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pursued vigorously in era of MONGOOSE

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis & collapse of Project MONGOOSE, aggressive scheme begun Aug. 60, revived in April 1962, were finally terminated in early 1963

p6 Drew Pearson column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has evidence:

a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed

b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

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5. If syndicate conducting its own operations, tends to reinforce thought that details would have been characterized by discretion or security despite FBI Oct 1962 report.

pa8 Final Report recognizes that mob plots have no relation on a precaution theory

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Rulz – Trafficante

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro or proposing such action. Three of the messages related to the same operation the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative.

AMBRONC/5 (01) arrested 29 May 1962 and was executed 30 August 62. He has been reported as never admitting that he was a CIA agent. His name not given to McCone. Three other were

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1/PV

AMLASH

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SSC

1) inference that AMLASH a Castro agent with the mission of provoking a plot against Castro so that Castro had justification for retaliation,

or

2) AMLASH so indiscreet the details could have been known thus provoking Castro

whatever, should have been reported to WC Agency - the character of the relationships between CIA and AMLASH II, prior to Oswald's assumption of Pres Kennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for AMLASH II to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro.

.... there was little for him to report or leak".

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August 1962 and Sept 1963 when he was not contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the critical period, sic is therefore between 5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963

Cf p 13 Final Report

Reason for hiatus is that AMLASH I/n leave Cuba; he was recontacted due to his potential.

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Cable on Sept 7th says "AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always be a control problem.

... is best approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert disposal

Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH was viewed as potentially important, he was also viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, requiring careful but long range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue

p3-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, presents AMLASH as an assassination plot
o. inference is that Castro Sept 7th speech might have been a result of leak by AMLASH

p10 "the fact remains that whatever views AMLASH may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time

Fitzgerald meeting - stated he rejected high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights

14 Nov AMWHIP reported that AMLASH satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He c/n understand why he had not been given "certain small pieces of equipment which presented a final solution to the problem" . . .

Comment

In essence he /AMLASH/ was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p18) to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 interpreted the put off by Fitzgerald.

Later Aug 1964 FBI Report stating that AMLASH unhappy with CIA response and A.S. Kennedy had refused to support the plan.

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. the cache

0002248

could, if he requested it, include.. high-power rifles w/ scope..

19 Nov. AmLASH tells CIA he is returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him to delay for 1 more meeting.

AmLASH agrees "if it is smoothly intensity"

p 19 SSC speculates that this is fast indicator he might receive specific support Agency - at best a piece of highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

[Fails to mention pen w/ Blackberry Point

on the road.]

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p 26 "A"

"unknown of AMLASH 1963 association w/ the CIA"

As info at least 1½ years after death of JFK; no idea of 1963 CIA ties w/ AmLASH which were very inconclusive

c CIA twice (first in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to US gambly syndicate members... The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed of gambly rep. to a Cuban exile leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the exile leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

pf "... while the events described by Drew Pearson did occur & are subject to being patched together as tho' one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unfounded."

p18. "During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell & Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Maheu pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or Joe"

p19 At that time the gambly casinos were still operating in Cuba & Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami & Havana on syndicate business

SECRET

p.24 Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

0002252

(Comment - Giancana was fairly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival & escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Traf. (Joe; the courier was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta who was then Office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister (...) The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to receive hickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income and needed the money)

p27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Traf. Rosselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba. Orta is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them. According to the gangsters, Orta got cold feet.

SECRET

Comment Orta lost his position in P.M.

office on 26 Jan. 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami & Washington.
He took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy
0002254 April 1961 ...
... It would seem tho', that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro.

p 30. The Cellini brothers were believed to be in touch with Varona. Thru Moss and were reported to have offered Varona large sums of money for his operations against Castro, with the understanding that they would receive privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future". Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff approached Varona and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro & that they would pay big money for the Comm't.
Rosselli said as a loyal Cuban he would & whatever he could & would never develge the operation]

p 31. R was to deliver money to Varona for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards remembers 25,000; Bannerman recalls 20 25,000

p 32 Rosselli gave the pills and money to Varona, whom Rosselli dealt with under a pseudonym. Little is known of the delivery channels beyond Varona

p. 32 Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 6 but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was revived April 1962, Harvey took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have received the pills, but he has no specific recollection of having done so.

p. 49. Roselli needed Gian. & Traff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Varona. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate)

p. 51 June 1962 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. perhaps using the pills.

SECRET

0002256

Harvey never learned their names or anything about them.

p 52 Harvey says Roselli wasn't bridling himself. He agreed with Harvey that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p 62(a) RFK - I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime - with gangsters you will let the Attorney General know before you do it? Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 66. The Attorney General's copy of the memorandum for the record of that briefing (May 62 by Edwards [Houston]) is in Archives of the AG's office.

p 67. Chicago Sun-Times Articles of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Giancarlo never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept drive to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his ruse of co-operation w/ another govt agency"

Article puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961

Reports McBurn bugging incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent tailing Gran who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone? I'm one of you!

Gran pictured as being approached by CIA but declining

0002258

AMLASH

p79 - DR took Presidential Palace which they refused to surrender to Che; later died to Fidel

- Cubela believed to be one participant in assassination of LtCol Antonio BLANCO Rico, head of Batista's military intelligence

- DR quite apart from 26th of July but signed a unity pact

⇒ ... Agency was primarily interested in keeping Cubela active in [redacted] PRON program directed against Cuban military leaders, while resisting his pleas for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and infor furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cubela's case officer, do not wholly support those recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubela's plotting.

p87 16 Sept 1963

Cubela wrote Tejedero - "I don't intend to see (be interested) your friend again," which you should tell them," so they don't

make the trip: I want to get away from politics completely".

pg 2 Sandy says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

The Drew Pearson Story

a) Published Details	The Facts As We Know Them
Robt. Kennedy may have approved an assassin plot	Not true. He was briefed on Phase One after it was over - He was not briefed on Phase 2
b) three (3) hired assassins were caught in Havana; one still in prison	R tells Harvey on 21 June 62, that Vanna says 3 men in Cuba. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually dispatched. None of the announced captures and executions during this period fits this team

Castro heard enough at ~~[illegible]~~ to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. He is reported to have

SECRET

this reportedly has come out in the Garrison investigation. It was also stated by Castello in the Phillipines under direct interrogation. We have no indept corroboration of any sort. (No that Garrison met w/ Rosselli in Las Vegas in March 1967)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beaubouff apparently to be used as a person by Bannon to show Oswald a CPA agent & was to be used to assassinate Castro. Bannon alleges he has letters signed by CPA reps or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain [illegible] to work with Cubans for assass. of Castro. This memo is intended to record that such letter never existed & therefore could not be in Bannon's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain alm Robert Scully Cain
Richard Scalzetti
DOB Oct 1931 Chicago

FBD memos
- 21 Dec 1960 mob financing exts
- 18 Jan 1961
identifies individuals

- Identity of WI ROGUE

- April 61 to April 62 [illegible]
- "something going on"
independent of Agency.

- RFK security called on 4 March 67
to obtain memo; already knew article
of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65
Bangs in Madrid & claims groups
in Cuba ready.
Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 Arrests in Cuba
Trial refund only to late fall 64 & early 65
w/ Artime meetings

SECRET

10 June 64 "Pepin" Bicaldi Rum approach The WAR

SECRET

0002266

O'Connells interview of Malone in May 196

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SG contained in material previously released for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib
  Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain
  - Fall 1960, contact in Chicago
  - Summer 1961 Mexico City
  - April 1962 Mexico City
  - 4 June 62 deported
  - 19 Aug 63 Chicago
  - 26-30 Aug 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami
  - 12 Sept 63 DRE arms purchase
    - told to get out of picture
  - 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 Nov 63 - Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907 S. Spaulding under direction Michael Crilley
- LHO purchased rifle March 63
- Story suspicion LHO in Chicago 1963 April.

SECRET

1. Ramon Don Estevez Dominguez
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936

2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
DOB 12 Jan 1918

3. Luciano Nieves

4. Jose de la Torriento

5. Jose Quintana
DOB 3 Oct 45 replace by manage

6. Joaquin Antonio Cortuyo DOB 10 Jan 43

Edward Pierpont Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

TAB B (2-9-78)

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for School of Advanced Dist Studies & John Hopkins Univ.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out; legal advice transmission of funds in connection w/ DDO projects.

∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Personnel

Resorts Int. #591 727

Wallace Groves OS file # 473 865

- assoc w/ Meyer Lansky

- Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp w/ Albert Whisant (#633 974) and John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to DeMar, Cain in Mexico 1961 into 1962

- 1964-65

SECRET

JOHN HORNOCK
9 FEB 1978

SECRET

0002269

7-Mar-35
St Paul, Minn
36 yr

Bradley Earl Ayers
Eglin AF Base Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

[redacted]

Campus of Miami U.
Ruth; Harvey, Robinson (Rep) Big Dader

Training sites
Palo Alto Key
Upper Key Largo
Card Sound on edge of Everglades

Security Approval
Date 10 Aug 1964

Reference 23826 (DDP/WH/SH

Case No. 366085

Request For Personal Action

Serial No
366085

Nature
Separation Return to Parent SVC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations:
DDP/SAS
U S Field Office
Forward operation Station - JMWAVE
Paramilitary Branch Section III
Resistance CRC Indep Pol Groups

SECRET

SECRET 0002270

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic bearing ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Div. D, 1502L Bldg only

- Personally approved of DD Plans

Harry
Chief FI/Div D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of QJWIN for ZR RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category & by your certification

2. Salary 7500 per yr; $7500 in addition to salary

3. Memo to be considered in lieu of project & constitutes authorization for all travel per diem; operational & other expenses

4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan — Roselli — Mahue — Gaumer

Marchin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Anderson

1) Prior to Aug 60

2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOP)

3) April 61 to late 61

4) Late 61 to late 62 (Cuban missile crisis

5) Late 62 to mid 63

SECRET

SECRET 0002271

Roselli op started in Sept 62
(Mahrer to Roselli to Giancana)

AG briefed 7 May 62

Taylor became chairman of ICS
on 9 Aug 62

Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy,
Goodwin, Gilpatrick, Lansdale,
Murrow, McCone

Memo For Record
Rept at request of DCI; assigned
to IG on 23 March 67
The one stayback been copy (IG)
all notes, & other derived source material
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chief WH (Davison)
From Dor of Security
Subject: WH (Security Project

Final accounting of moneys expended on
a sensitive project of interest to DDIP, chief WH
& Dor of Security.
Disbursements.
25 Sept 1960 thru 70 Cutout 6900.
6 Feb 1961

SECRET

SECRET

0002272

11 Feb 1961 To Principal Agent 19 00
31 Jan 1961
14 Feb 61 Commo Expenses 1,043
26 Sept 1961
thru
12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3 IG Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crises Oct 62 & collapse of MONGOOSE, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1960; revived in April 1962, was finally terminated early 1963

Two other plots were originated in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them.

p 7

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) wherein McNamara broached subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MONGOOSE memo by Lansdale

Sec (c)

31 Jul 64

Discussion at Special Group of a Clandestine Services memo of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. Exile & had no involvement

Missing page

and Jose Luis

p 2 Gonzalez Gallanetta Press Release 9 March 1966

- purpose of contact for intelligence; no truth to $100,000 payment

- Jorge ROBRENO, Alberto BLANCO Ramirez, Carlos Tepedino

SECRET

Note in ~~[illegible]~~ with Dan Hardy.

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bissell only persons knowledgeable; Edwards then briefed Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahern called O'Connell & pointed out Parrott sector shrug bold & Joe (Presumably 1st time, Mahern & O'Connell knew names.)

Joe a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there accord to bold

Traff making regular trips to Havana

7 Jan '59 - casino closed

13 Jan 59 - Castro announces re-opening

17 Feb 59 - Cabinet announces opening

30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P 23 Technical Chief TSD

4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish poison to be admitted w/a pin (which Cornelius Roosevelt said was supplied to Gary Powers (2) bacterial matrix in liquid or (3) cigar (4) handerly

P29. March April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Traff knew a man high up in exile movement. (Varna)

Rpt from FBI suggest how Traff

SECRET

C002274

Lucas Varona:

a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangsters financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro

b) 18 Jany 1961 associates V. with these schemes; V had hired Moss as a fund-raiser

---

CIA had interest in Moss but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

Mach (1959) for use in NE Denver as 24

[redacted]

- Nov 62 by CA Staff under JR MAJOR

[redacted]

Roselli to deliver $ to V. Estimates vary but Estertine says 10,000 + 100 of communication as per Secty memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev.

p32 Front o hearing involved in B of P. Steps taken to end his participation in syndicate plan but apparently ineffective.

People who knew:

1. O. O - original man to pain
2. A V -
3. Son-in law of HV.

2/PV

Phase 2 SECRET

0002275

Harry briefd by authority of Bissell in Feb 1961 in connection with a general stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem w/ 05 (Arnold Silver) & Sidney Gottlieb so both parties probably cut in to Cuba project.

Helms briefd on general concept but not on ongoing Cuba plot.

QJ WIN recruited by (Arnold 05 Silver) for use in Congo; Justin O'Donnell permitted out.

2R RIFLE covered as a FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop a capability to enter safes & kidnap couriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses application of 2R RIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Feby March 62

- March 62 Harry takes over Castro
- Harry view -

came to think of Castro operation & 2R RIFLE as being synonymous.

- Exec Action as synonymous w/ QJ WIN
- 2R RIFLE / QJ WIN refered to Exec Action

2R RIFLE alone meant Castro

Harry's interpretation

SECRET

2 PN

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing
(Personally handled Castro operation & d/n use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE)

- Memo of Harry after he left Task Force W & going to Rome on 27 June 1963 to Chief FI / Staff that original reason to keep QJ WIN no longer existed & suggested termination.

- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show termination by [redacted] Station on 21 April 64.
- there is no indication in the file that the Exec Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE / QJWIN was ever used)

Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until Harry met Roselli & re activated April 62.
- Edwards only contact w/ RFK over McGuire wiretap
- 14 May 62 - Harry called Edwards & indicated he was dropping Roselli from further use

p43 Harry - took over a "going" operation. since he described plan for getting poison to a favorite Castro restaurant the mechanics were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one I

- O'Connell thinks "something going on" between April 61 & April 62 but c/n remember

0002277

April 8th Agency
- Harry met w/ Rosselli & O'Connell
- O'Connell positive Maheu there
(Harry says he would have remembered Maheu; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agency; not since '52 when Harry sent to Berlin.
- Edwards deliberately did not mention Maheu when he first briefed Harry

p45 O'Connell out by June 62 when he was assigned PCS to [redacted]

p47 18 April 62 O'Connell gets pills for Rosselli meeting w/ Harry on Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he cd n remember when V reactivated.

Harry specified that Gran not to be brought in for ~~the~~ 2nd phase & believes Rosselli hound requiem.
Rosselli rep'd that Gran asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" Gran - "Too bad"

p48 Macco - unlikely a V associate named Antonio MACEO Mackle who Harry probably would have known. Also, it's clear Macco was "Rosselli man".
Rosselli essential to 2nd phase as a contact to Varona.

p 49. When the pills were given to [illegible] Rosell
Vana requested arms and equipment needed for
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

V requested arms & support & Rosell
passed word to Harry. With help
of Shackly, chief of TMWAVE,
about 5 M of weapon & equipment.

April 1962

a) explosives
b) detonators
c) 20.30 caliber rifles
d) 20.45 cal. handguns
e) 2 radios
g) 1 boat radar

Harry & Shackly rent U-Haul,
& put truck in parking lot for
delivery to Macio, V, or V's son-in-law.
Harry & Shackly set up watch as
do Rosell & O'Connell.

Shackly not aware of plan.

p 50 May 62 - Rosell reported that the pills were in Cuba & at the
restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.

June 62

V had ~~sent~~ dispatched 3 man team to Cuba
Sept 1962

Harry saw Rosell in Miami on
7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team
of militia men assigned to penetrate
Castro's body guard but never happened.
"Medicine" reported ~~safe~~ still in place and first team safe

Sept 62 - Jan 63

p 51
Militia men
prised to
take off

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - 6 Jan
& saw Rosell & Macio several times. Gave
Rosell 2700 to V for expense of 3 militia
men who never left (in Fla Keys)

Delay due to
a) conditions inside
b) Oct missile crisis

Feb 63

Harry left word for Macio in
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked
as if deal off. (Just how Harry left this
word for Macio is not clear)

SECRET

0002279

April May 63
Helms approved a last meeting w/ Harry & Roselli before Harry left for Rome.

People who knew
P55 Bruce Cheever (Harry's deputy 1962) knew Harry meeting w/ gangsters in Reno in winter of 62

May 62
Shef Edwards & Lawrence Houston briefed RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to prosecute wiretap case but wanted to be informed if Agency ever dealt w/ "gangsters" again
RFK asked for a memo of the meeting via a phone call. memo prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.
NO briefing of McCone, General Carter, or Helms

RFK not told that Phase II had begun; that V had pills & arms in late April.

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms; advises against briefing McCone & General Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli is not going to be used

Comment
RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67 to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

of Pearson article of 7 March 62 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helms had lunch w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He did not leave a copy.

1954-55 Maheu hired by Niarchos to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipment. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connell rept'd that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Maheu stated he might brief his attorneys & Morgan re past activities.

10-11 August 62 SECRET

(Wainwright) 03 Tepedino & Cubela in Copenhagen & (Wainwright) 03 used "assassinate" & Cubela insisted on "eliminate"

14-23 August 62

03 Cubela, Tepedino, (Wainwright) 03 & (Earle Williams) from Madrid; met in Paris.

Cubela given S/W training & supplies; shown a demolition demonstration.

Refused to be polygraphed.

(Williams) 03 cables that no physical elimination missions be given as a requirement but he might do it on his own initiative. Headquarters strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given Cubela, &c.

5-8 Sept 63

Brazil - met by (Wainwright) 03 Tepedino & Nestor Sanchez who became case officer.

Cubela claimed 2 S/W messages but only 1 recvd. Afraid of postal censorship.

That highly of Ramon GUIN Diaz AMTRUNK-10 who was lucky Miguel DIAZ Isalguer (AMICE-14) who had been sent to recruit GUIN

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brazil Cubela flew to Paris & was going to tell Castro after the fact

6/PV

AMLASH SECRET

0002281

9 March 61 03

P78 (Jack Stewart) - Mexico City Station met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos Tepedino AMWHIP 1, a long-time fund. Cubela even (Stewart) from Havana where he was once assigned. 03

Cubela and leader of DR an elite group of leftist students signed in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Orta wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off as report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans.

(Comment:

Fact of 3 name-links with Mob & Cubela - but unknown if Cubela an asset of Mob in Cuba.)

Other two links are even more nebulous

~~15 June~~ 14 August 61

Message from airline stew (girl friend) to Tepedino that Cubela going to Paris & wanted to talk with a friend of Stewart. No indication of any meeting.

SECRET

15 June 62

Lucia Echevarria Bianci told an asset (AMCONCERT-1) that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

2/PV

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Tepedino

0002283

27 June 1962

Tepedino approach FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they know Tepedino to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tepedino dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61, so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on reasons for defection were w/ Chivarrias.

30 July - 6 August 62 03

Wm Wainwright met w/ Tepedino a jeweller in NYC & both went to Helsinki. Cubela talked into being recruited "in place" & not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries; kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet Ambassador.

7-9 August 62

Meetings in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tepedino in Helsinki.

SECRET

c/pv

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cubela who had written Tepedino in NY that he did n want to continue.

CIA had to tell [redacted] 24

[that contacts were for purposes of deflection. [redacted] Cubela under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy cables that Cubela insisting on meeting w/ RFK; convinced Cubela going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out U.S. support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgerald, chief SAS, going to Paris & got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cubela that U S would have no part in attempt on Castro life.

Written record from Sandy is contrary

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cubela would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request.

22 Nov 63 SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting pen w/ ~~Blacke Leaf~~ ~~[illegible]~~

Sandy says Cubela accepted pen but stated he would not take it to

1/PV

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287 Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK 10 [2 high-powered rifles w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 20 lbs C-4 [illegible]] farm. As they left meeting, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he recvd an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that everything is "off" but nothing in AMLASH file.

Cubela w/ a take S/W with him to Prague

1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba

19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tepedino had been briefed to meet Carlos Jorge ROBRENO margy who has message from Cubela.

p97 3 May 64 - Robreno says Cubela wanted a silencer

30 August 64

Artime recvd info from Madrid that a group of dissident members of Castro regime wanted to ~~[illegible]~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Artime sends Alberto BLANCO Romaring.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artime agrees to talk to AMLASH-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Artime

thinks if AMLASH-1 is chief of dissident group we can forget about operation
4 ~~Dec~~ 64

Sanchy prepares a memo for 6570 for Artime to maintain contacts w/ dissident groups reps in Bhagy. Artime does
6-7 Dec 64

Sanchy meets Cubela in Paris & was ~~told~~ going to continue his plans
Told U.S. could not be involved.
10 Dec 64.

Artime d/n know nor Cubela that CIA in direct contact with each. Rather SAS continued to put both men together.

CIA d/n want to put selected weapon in ~~[illegible]~~ Cubela's hands directly but could do it thru Artime.
27 Dec; 30 Dec (2nd time)

Cubela & Artime meet in Madrid. Artime reports to Sanchy that Cubela had requested a silencer for FAL rifle but Americans w/n give him one.

Artime to come up w/ silencer or different rifle in Cuba.
11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ silencer & Belgian FAL rifle w/ silencer from Artime's secy SECRET both weapons come from ~~[illegible]~~ U.S. & are now in Madrid.

Confiscated

12 Feb 65

SECRET

0002289

Artime has weapons delivered to Cubela in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source is friend of Tepedino's who telephones him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Dorrube arrives in Madrid from Cuba & intended to a station-officer.

Publicly close friend of Cubela; & claims to be in touch w/ group of military leaders plenty to eliminate Castro.

Jailed in July '62 for rep. Traff as lawyer for Copie Hotel. Traff - ex manager

(Another name - link

June 1965

Victor ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former PM trainee who was terminated as a malcontent on 20 March 1961, contacted INS who buyed FBI on 3 June 65.

Esperanza stated he had received letter from a friend in Paris urgy him to meet w/ Alberto Blanco who had a message from Cubela who wanted it delivered to CIA

Message - Cubela in a position to kill Castro & would CIA & US Govt be willing to support them. If "yes", then details on what he needed.

SECRET

$10,000

Cubela had wanted money in Paris on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & upset -

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave him two.

0002290 Tepedino 7,00 in NYC.

SECRET

23 June 1965 headquarters sent cable terminating contact. "Convincing proof that entire AMLASH, Group insecure", terminate ASAP

1 March 66 - Cubela & Guin arrested for activities w CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarreta, Alberto Blanco Romarey, Juan Alsina Navarro. confined

Also appears - Guillermo Cienhill Alvarez, Hugo Herrero Vidy

Gonzalez Ballarreta 03 - attache in Spain contacted by [redacted] 32 in US Embassy in Madrid.

Cubela meets w/ Artime in Spain in Feb. 1965.

Artime sent Gallego to US to get telescopic sight & silencer. Delivered to Blanco Romarey who delivers it to Gonzalez Ballarreta then to Cubela the day before he left Madrid.

Seyd in Cubela's residence were

Tasco telescopic sight, FAL rifle +.

9 March 66

Castro sents personal letter that death sentence not be asked.

10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

SECRET

Silencer did not break; I threw it away because it was burning my hands

2/IN

I spoke to Fidelin Jenny. He opened the doors to me but I did not have the courage to tell him

C002291

SECRET

(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to Europe in late 64 & early 65 to meet w/ Artime. No mention of March 61 then Nov 65 contacts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out, Castro would have little excuse to lenny, & probably imprudent to execute someone in inner circle.

Special Group (Augment)

2 high-level interagency meetings where Castro assassinatory discussed

18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)

State: Dean Rush, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwitch

White House

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFK absent)

Defense:

McNamara, Gilpatrick, Lemnitzer, Lansdale

CIA - McCone Harvey

USIA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson

Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrotts note d/n mention assassination but McCone & Harvey remember McNamara ~~[illegible]~~ raising it & Murrow commenting.

McCone raised exception & McNamara "heartily agreed"

SECRET

Lansdale wrote memo on 13 August to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, & Wilson which

SECRET

Probably Pearson's info re a high-level meeting was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Maheu in May 67 & wrote a report:

1 - Maheu briefed Morgan on Phase I

2 - Never heard of Phase II from Roselli or anyone

0002293

3. Roselli steered to Morgan by Greenspun

4 - Maheu suspects Roselli is client of Morgan

5 - Roselli dentry hearing; Morgan in Vegas recently "indisposed"

6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas in March. Been with Dn touch w/ Roselli, so was Morgan

It is Our impression that Greenspun also involved in the conversations.

p122 and to confirm Point finger to Roselli as source of info & Morgan as Pearson's source.

p123

Summer of 62 - Edwards, Maheu, & Roselli had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli he informed RFK of Roselli's contributions.

Pearson's story seems to rely on 2nd phase. Could be Harry if only 1 source.

Probably from 2 sources:

State Dept meeting + mob operation so Roselli chief suspect.

E & Robt Maheu were the only non IA participants with immediate knowledge of the Robert Kennedy project

SECRET

Inference: Roselli dentry too much & Morgan dentry & talking to a newspapermen friend (Greenspun

Lansdale memo assigned briefing papers for various subjects related to Cuban operation. A portion excised from CIA copy of memo was "orderly elimination of leaders"; Lansdale reportedly tried to raise assassination of Castro w/ Harvey over next several weeks but Harvey declined

0002292

At least 5 people in Lansdale's office knew MONGOOSE & Lansdale intent in assassination as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room of White House.

McBurg Bundy, Vance, McNamara, Thomas Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion of Cuba

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jessup as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DDP to Dor re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 to pass. Cuban exile; Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch, Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He approached JMWAVE for US participation. Refused outright

19 August 64

DCI (McCone) to Bundy - re FBI interviews w/ all participants

SECRET

C002294 Publicity has not run its course:
a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
b) Gaunn has not revealed full case; CIA should be prominently displayed when he does
c) Puerto Recan in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay includes 1 detail found only in Phase II - the 3 man team.

---

p26 Put in its best light - that there is no ulterior motive in spreading the story

p127. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Gaunn may also know this.

p129. Mahen reports that Traff in jail in Tampa. Rosselli is persona non grata in Las Vegas, being required to register with police any time he is in town. None of them would have compunctions about dragging in his CIA connection when he was pushed by law enforcement authorities. Bronconi has already done it when the FBI was crowding him in 1963, Rosselli appears to be doing it in his conversation with Morgan & Gaunn.

P 131. Papich - 3 May 1967
Commented Rob has CIA over a barrel

SECRET

SECRET

Tab A

0002295

24 July 75 memo

Santos Trafficante

4. ST delivered poison pills to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, TS suggested another candidate (cancelled re BofP)

- Makes formerly contact employee w/ office of Security
- Rosselli convictions

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Friars Club

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff
No 838-75
9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-10 Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on contingency exec action capability)

5. Who is Torvella (yet another (alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIROGUE 01 operational aliases?

- who was (WIZARD 14) (John Stein's memo)
- 2 Aging officers who contacted WIROGUE DDO
- Want Talk w/ John Stein & see WIROGUE file by Walt Elder

SECRET

Memo SECRET 5 May 1967
Subj - Wm K. Harvey 0002296

1. ~~Helms~~ Bill ~~Harvey~~ contacted Papich to report to Papich some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his co-op to FBI. He expressed to Papich — — —

Missing

16 May 67

Tab B Attention Edward Cohen Firm Gambino re Dade Co. 7 April 77

Morgan ~~associated~~ w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Edward Pierpont Morgan
DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain
AKA - Richard Scalzetti SS 357-22-333
1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Com. on advice of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daly Diary by Maggie Daly - rumor ~~that~~ Assassination planned earlier FBI of Cuban group

SECRET

1 Sept 67 issue of Life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marino, a henchman of Marcello, at Las Vegas hotel. Garrison denied knowledge of Marino's connect to Marcello.

TO Chief SRS
Subje. Cairo 9 Oct 1967

TAB B

Info re meeting of Fair Play under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo ESCOBAR who was "one of Horace Speeds" (SAS) leads obtained from Ralp PEREZ (44426 Speed III (199499)

Escobar recruiting Cubans for Commit Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1978 VCI for Doc of Secret
Roselli, Johnny
9 Aug 1976 SECRET
Blind memo Subj: Johnny Roselli

0002298

Tab B & C

Additional info re Traff, Roselli, & Giancana contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Breckenridge re Arthur Ballette & Fred Hauenstein

1. 12 Jan 1961 Maheu told FBI he recommended DuBois to an LA atty whom he w/n disclose

2. A Hay is James Cantellon per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview w/ Cob. Edwards who said he contacted Maheu in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut out" for Giancana. Giancana gave every indication to Maheu he would attempt to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974
Memo: Chief Western Hemisphere Division
Subj: Salvatore Giancana & Richard Cain
Re: Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31 Dec. 1973
Richard S. Cain # 272141
DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Accurate Laboratories. a P.I. firm

CIA contacts

A. Fall 1960 SECRET 0002299

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office & volunteered info on Cuban exile groups in Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohmann of Chicago Field office re a Mr. Krouzanky who was negot w/ president of Panama to investigate Communism.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staffer identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Agency reps. Winston Scott & Warren Dean in Mexico City says he had an investigative agency w/ branches in Chicago & LA which he used to provide training to Mexican Govt Agents

F 4 June 62

Deported from Mexico for loaded revolver brass knuckles & impersonating a Mexican official & working

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic Club & Adolphus Club by Horace Speed WH Div staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office

He would like to work overseas for CIA

Cain worked for Cook Cty Sheriff & ~~pa~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago area & would provide info on underwater activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra

H. 26-30 Aug 1963

Cain infore the Student Directory, a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoyo's interest in purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRE people who had purchased arms. (Horace Speed) via Warlington & Chicago told Cain to get out of the picture

K. 1967.

FBI investigating Cain's arms w Mob & recommend CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico City; then disappeared 1 May 1972 says he was going to Latin America. Involved in illegal arms deals (international) & on various occasions stated he was CIA

M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines pilot ed. Cain as skyjacker who faced him to Honduras. 5 May 197-

C/PV

SECRET

27 Nov 63 0002301

By Robt B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 907 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Criley, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Pres. discussed

3. LHO purchased rifle in March 1963

Sheriff's office had not established LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officers of UPI

4. Sheriff Olgelvie did like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba; If they developed anything definite they would probably inform FBI

~~Could not read~~! "that early in 1963 the Chicoms took over operation in US for Fair Play

---

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call c/A re report Guevara used to get interface from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Buthman but to someone in Buthman's office (Justice

SECRET

0002302

SECRET

Breckenridge memo to Dade of request

1. Persons in Sec A of paragraph 3 is contained in over 50 volumes of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarters in Section C
   B1 is Artime; Also used by Mafia in cast to operation

Detectives have already interviewed a Cousin who is retired.

Tab C

1. Ramon Don Estevez Dominguez (shorty) DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family DOB 12 Jan 1918
3. Luciano Nieves (shorty)
4. Jose De La Torrente (shorty)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45
   reported a replow by mayor to Rouble
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 45
7. Manuel Artime

SECRET

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974
Meeting w/ Terry Lenzner

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Comp.
- O'Malley knew Hughes as client of Mullen's; this information picked up in course of a cordial relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Free Cuba Committee.
Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan
- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt possible impact on cover placements caused consternation.

- ~~Hunt~~ approached O'Malley for an individual having locks & surveillance entry skills
- Thomas C. Amato apparently referred job.

- Houston
- Early 62 intervention w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible deportation of Francisco
- only people who knew were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET 0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use disaffected personnel in armed forces in Cuba.

Early '63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez & Enrique Cayardo Robera developed Leonardo Plan to Overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/ Jorge Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Presumably USSR 1940's & then in Polish Air Force under British Command. Married a Cuban & arrived in Miami May 61.

Volsky contacts Tad Szulc & meet with Goodwin & Hurwitch (State). CIA assigns plan to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK

early '63

Never progressed very far & by Sept 63 had 3 sources including Guin

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from AMTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was going to appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Szulc.

Had some contacts but no real action capability; In '65 Guin & Diaz arrested.

Szulc & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba in 195-60

SECRET

Jose Ricardo RABEL Nuney

suspected agent who defected Dec 62 & joined AMTRUNK; returned to Cuba on his own

x in 65 to exfiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but fired in 67.

Accusator RABEL a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibility -

HMTRUNK might have been an ingenious Cuban plan from the beginning. Only action was laying caches & some infil & exfiltration.

Mob.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Meskil.

- quotes Sturgis on assassinator attempts including using Juan Orta to bomb Castro. "I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US)"

Sturgis' id of Orta, prior to its disclosure by external investigator, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security wrote memo in 1975 noting connection betwn Sturgis & Rothman in 1960 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News stories)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that mob had their own plan

- Lorenz claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Varona

SECRET

000 0
0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960
- MOO support for exiles
FBI 18 Jan 1961
V. recevy some of that support

Sturgis could have learned of Orta's role after Orta settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report
14 August 1964 would a statement by a person jailed in Cuba w/ Traff.

Other Proposals

1. May 1975
Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he was given a rifle & a mission to kill Castro.
Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed
2. May 1977 Anderson column re Antonio Veciana
On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, April 66) he proposed to C/A the assassination of Castro
In 1970 report he made a proposal to an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved same group of agents

SECRET

so probably same plan 0002308

1. 27 March 1961 AMBRONC/5

Plan to sabotage electric company on Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with affirmative answer on 30 March but no comment on assassination

3. 5 April 61

Only arms for 50 men; would try 9 April but needed military aid.

a) AMBRONC infiltrated several times & finally executed 30 August 62 after May 62 arrest. Reported as never admitting he was CIA; & not mentioned in McGovern Book

b) AMCOAX/1 ~~both~~ then persons in

c) AMPUB/1 touch w/ AMBRONC

d) AMPANIC/7 & mentioned in McGovern book; Doug 38 yr sentences

All 3 people sentenced prior to B of P & none had assassination mission. Only AMBRONC mentioned "hit"

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy] claimed he had plans for mission w/in 30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was untrue & (Moratori) unknown.

06

SECRET

2/PN

SECRET

5. 3 May '61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary Recovery Movement saying they would try to hit Fidel today"
- Reply was "Lay low"
- Maybe AMPUG 1

Tab D

AMLASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.
- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963
- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intell performer: but approach as chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

Book V leaves inference that Castro's speech to Dan Harker after AMLASH leak but CIA had not proposed anything at that time. & Mr meet until 3 Oct 63

p 3-4 Summary & Findings

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov he was requested to delay until Fidel arrived "if something interesting" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico

SECRET 0002310

Purpose was to determine significance of LHO's contact w/ Soviets.

AMLASH/1 name was included.

But in reference to contact betw a member of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural attache. NOT a report of a contact between AMLASH/1 and the Soviet

"A" role - clearly did not know of AMLASH 1963 associations w/ CIA

Table E

24 Nov 63 Subj. Cuban Precautions following Assassination of Pres Kennedy

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63
Acting on FBI request, Agency requests Alvarado be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj - WILSON, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SCG)
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,612 (SR/CI/R)
Photo of individual clsef resembly LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI-3/781,841 (CI/R&A)
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI-316/01446-64
VIADUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964
His Comments on 7 Photos Forwarded

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21, 1978

1977 D.G. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Book 0

The criticisms of the CIA are based on series of presentations of how various investigations had been handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exerted a negative influence on the quality of their support for the W.C. investigation

"It places particular ... investigation p 2
they should have ... facts ... p 7
Certainly ... information, p 7

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into retaliation against Pres. Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this theory should have been pursued and accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the WC) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal.

SECRET

Agency views the provocation theory in the Final Report & press form of "the

result of an evolution in perception.
i.e. Provocation existed in '63 from both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, along with the array of US Cuban program.

"The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

Review by Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~ who knew details of 1963 & 1964 operation for the most part are no longer available. Primary reliance on records.

CIA has now conducted such a review - looking at "the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where they theoretically could have started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, altho' it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation thing rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of Pres. Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this action (whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy had

he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored!

Tab C

AMLASH The Agency had only a tentative relationship with this man during Pres. Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report - intrigy to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in this paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pres. Kennedy's death the relationship ~~to~~ with AMLASH II was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could ~~[illegible]~~ learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p14 New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Meskil in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturgis as follows:

"The third Carrasco-Castro scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said. "I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (American embassy in Havana).

"He (Sturgis) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, altho there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

"Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1964. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

Same news stories and one 13 June 1976 discuss a possible relationship between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Alonso Rothman as a gamble partner of Trafficante. Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975; noting

SECRET

0002316

a connector between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Preferred that Sturgis reported to have had a role in gambling and Ortas' availability due to his "lost payoffs." One could deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connection with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling organizations.

June 1976 Stry also reports claim by Marita (Marie) CIA Lorenz that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re poor pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Bracamonte." "This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the delivery of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until Feb 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own."

SECRET

In fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to B of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassinatn. The 1967 DG Report refers to two FWD reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1960, indicates support by the criminal underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 Jany 1961, suggests that Varna was one of these recency that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... As late as 10 June 64 another gangster pilot in Miami area for 150,000.

Speculation that when reactivation in April 1962 can officer felt "there were somethy already "ongoing."

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. . . .

In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contributions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.