180-10146-10036

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

1977 IGR

AMTRUNK operation starting in 1963 sought to develop a capability to spur dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was reviewed by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to the CIA.

Little concrete progress during JFK's life in 1963 CIA w/drew from its more bizarre schemes believed to be compromised

Poss ?'s about security compromise due to involvement of personalities who are sympathetic to Castro - Cuban sympathizers, including probably many pro-foreign agents

IGR speculates that AMTRUNK's inability to develop any substance till long after JFK's death suggests that it was unlikely to have provoked Castro at that time to use assas as retaliation

"a full review of the operations that pertain to the President's assassination must include the CIA's not agreed to give any support to AMLASH 1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate Castro"

"[illegible] CIA officers [illegible] the relationship between AMLASH 1 and [illegible] for [illegible]

10146-10036

7 known only that there was an ongoing covert assassination that already had not progressed to the point that it constituted the base for the postulated provocation"

IOR knew + denies possibility that actual C.I.A. plotting w/ anyone significant which may have provided CASTRO w/ postulated provocation for the JFK assas.

Items Selected by the SSC for Cuban Comment

8 reference to reported 5-hour delay of a Cuban airlines flight from Mexico City, awaiting arrival & expulsion passenger

* see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

IOR says flight on ground approx 4-hrs + at departure 1 hr before alleged arrival of the private aircraft

FBI investigated another man who departed on another Cuban flight - info was not furnished for use in SSC report (source of), "a negative report that caused him to be dramatized as a full grown one to be highly suspect"

also SSC emphasis on cable from Mex City station replying to 11/23/63 urgent query from CIA HQ asking for info on activities of Oswald in Mexico City

cable DIR 84555 (23 11 63)
MEXI 7054 (IN 67234)

24 November 1963
Mexico City, get his complete activities here and

5 a memo containing w/ the subject of a December 1960 meeting
9 between funding of Cuban Embassy w/ a
Soviet, meaning was reference to be read
by AMLASH/1 Ltr 2 Feb + March 1961
" By any event, the meeting in December
1960 was prior to President Kennedy's
inauguration, which means it get
further from any possible relevance to the
subject matter. It really is not difficult
to understand why the reference to
AMLASH/1 'A' name did not lead to detailed
research about him."

2 gen'l conclusions
① "the SSC Final Report contains
numerous factual errors, both
in the extensive treatment of a
selected operation (AMLASH) and in
a number of separate incidents that
it presents."
② "while one can make the point
in principle that the Warren
Commission could have well
broadened its review to include
the anti-Cuban programs
of the U.S. Government, in trying to
make the case for that concept
Book II of the SSC Final Report
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

11 "It would have served to enhance the credibility of the Warren Commission's effort had it taken a broader view of the matter (e.g. normal avenues of investigation). CIA, too, could have enabled it to perform its more general task — the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination became very known at the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then as well. That CIA employees at the time felt — as they obviously did — that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a second, concerned review."

11111937

"It must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964

TAB B : CIA Pap on The Organizers

2 h SSC report, to conclude that
observers AMMASH operation inaccurately
"The Report assigns a characteristic that
it did not have during the period
preceding the assas of JFK in order
to support its SSC view should have
been reported to the WC

c. questing aircraft flights on 11/22 & 11/27/63
to Havana
see "Unidentified Air Passenger" file

Travel to & fr USSR 1959-1962 —
11/26/63 Cable DIR 85133, 26.11.63
sent to [redacted]
- requesting
any paragraphs which bear on JFK's assas

replies on 11/27/63:

[redacted]

(IN 68739), 11/27/63
(IN 68802) "
(IN 69005) "
(IN 69011) "
(IN 69100) "
(IN 69233) "
(IN 69290) "
(IN 69328) 11/28/63
(IN 69352) 11/29/63
(IN 71148) 12/5/63
(IN 77148) 12/16/63
(IN 77317)

[redacted] (CIN 69100) 11/27/63

4 [redacted] reported that British government official claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in 1959 – Soptic (Raymond), Lewis in Cuban jail, Santos visited frequently by both American gangster Ruby

[redacted] (CIN 69233) 11/27/63

[redacted] reported delight of Cuban embassy staff over JFK death & instructions from Cast to cease looking happy in public

[redacted] (CIN 69240) 11/27/63

[redacted] reported Soviets shocked – blame upon ultra extreme right wingers

6 Ltrs letter above, initial reports produced no other info

11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to [redacted] Frankfurt re Oswalds travel back to USSR

12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn & [redacted]

BONN 5579 (CIN 73338) 12/4/63

[redacted] 5116 (CIN 73378) "

MUNI 8316 (CIN 75065) 12/6/63

[redacted] 5545 (CIN 76758) 12/9/63

[redacted] 1400 12/9/63

11.111939

above reporting provided details about Oswalds travel from USSR thru Germany & Netherlands

5 No evidence found through these queries + related queries tying the S.U. to Oswald's actions of JFK

II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963

Able to Mexcy on 11/25/63 DIR85655

"We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other persons may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies and your liaison w/ Mexicans

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63

Please follow all leads + lines - Question of Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63

Continue watch of Soviets + Cubans for comments, propaganda eggs about the case. "FYI only, Soviet Embassy in India had letter sent to [U.S. Government] leaders demanding full investigation of case."

1111940

HMMW-12193, 17.12.16 17/17/63

7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mexcy station commending them on job well done

"Your LIEWOY data, the statements of Silvia DURAN and your analyses were ... [illegible] ... your characterization of the case, blanketing out the really ... [illegible] ... spectre of 'foreign backing'"

III Gen'l Collection Requirements

7 DIR 84663, 22, 11, 63
all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ saying keep sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. — Be on quick alert when new Pres. takes over the reins"

8 "Were there relevant & significant information on the subject(s) JFK assas & Oswald it would have been reported ~~&~~ criteria responses to the expression 1 general content, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources"

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, LHO / Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there would

9 ~~that~~ would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence generate reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken."

comment in HQ dispatch 11111941 to MEXICO CITY
on 12/17/63 - HMMW-12193, 17.12.63
re limited reporting from other stations
"... the policy dictated by the facts of
the case would be ...

In contrast to SSC report, existing documents indicate that

9 There was no penetration of CASTRO's group and when any info on subject (JFK assn) would just,

10 Navcon, vessels in Cuba did have reporting requirements

II. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mystery passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

11 Flight of 11/22 + 11/25 to Cuba from Mex City were passenger flights -
Flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/1 passenger - the man referred to in Book II 55c.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights, filing cable report to HQ
CIA had surveillance team, and did the Mexicans when provided pres of passports, + ~~crew~~ passenger list

+ Also have LIEN VOY telephone tap against Cuban Embassy + transcripts of conversations w/ Cubans office + Mexican Airport Control Office.

11.11.1942

11/22/1963 Flight

From [illegible] report a CIA contact would explain [illegible] with regard to [illegible] flight [illegible]

12 that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject

13 "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight fr Mex Cy to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and misled the SSC and summary thereafter"

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 flight
re CIA passing report to FBI & FBI not
15 doing follow up investig. for WC
ISR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report re-
with position

1) Mex Cy Sta did not cable HQ that
man looked suspicious. There was a
12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227)
which reported the marked crossed
at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63,
that registered at Hotel in Mex Cy on
11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63
& was on passenger on Cubana flight
that night - good photo & him later
at airport 11/11/1993

2) dispatch follows MEXI-22537, 12/5/63
reporting info & comments from Lopez
& contains the following:
"Source stated the Cuban and Cuban
[illegible] Embassy [illegible]
[illegible] Mexico [illegible]
[illegible]

15 also internal memo in Mex City
see Memorandum for the Record, 12/3/63
which stated that the man was
reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 [redacted] Cable 3/19/64
[redacted]-0829 (IN 43193) - info
re Cuban American 11/27/63 flight
had by agent of Mexican federals

" The following should be noted about
this report: it misspelled the
man's name; it copied a bare statement
that he "was involved in the
Kennedy assassination"; it states
that he entered Mexico "afoot"
from Laredo, Texas (according to the
SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded
that he entered by automobile); it
asserts that he stayed at the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates
and times of his registration and check-
out at a specific hotel in Mexico
City, where he stayed, was known); it
gave an incorrect member for his passport;
and, it stated that his Mexican tourist
card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when
it was known to have been issued in
Tampa, Florida)." 11111944

17 Mex City to Director re Mexican
tourist cards. Enclosure to conform the
report. When Mex City sent second
cable, the Deputy Chief of Station Mexico

Sheet

17 Cr MEXI - 8740 (TIN 43940) 3/20/64
what the information in [redacted]
report "jibes fully w/ that provided
Station by ONE Cy source/ 4 December
63".

"The mistake of that cable cannot
be explained today, but wrong
it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not
collecting more info. on the man is
not well founded. At had no
real avenues w/ access to info
concerning him. When a defector from
Cuba becomes available & specific
information he was queried and the
results were provided the authorities."

TAB C CIA Operations against CUBA

1 "While CIA provided considerable
material for the investigation (see Tab E)
that more was not reported is a meaning-
ful indication of what was known then
by those actually involved in Cuban
operations (supplying info. to W.C.) as
distinguished from what might be hypo-
thesized at a later date. To contend
to the contrary - which has been
[illegible] 4 Dec 1963
suggested by some critics against a
background of suspicion of plotting [illegible]
acting employees of CIA [illegible]
whom there is no proof was [illegible]
[illegible]

7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 — Operations to Split CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK Operation)

Mario Antonio Marano Lopez
Enrique Caycedo Robaina
Cuban exiles — developed operational concept to overthrow the CASTRO govt - known as the Leonardo Plan

8 Marano associate in Miami
Jorge Agbunag ye Volsky
Cuban citizen & polish origin
married Cuban national & well reported, emigrated following B. P. go to reportedly work Castroite

Leonardo Plan was discussed w/Pad Szulc
Szulc claimed he got contacts — it was through his interest in the Leonardo Plan gained gvt-level support & approval
Richard Bissell was Szulc contact at WO HQ
Volsky & Szulc met Robert Maheu
I stated I got word to discuss the plan — he presented the idea to CIA
CIA assigned to Miami Station became known as AMTRUNK
→ 4/17/63 — Szulc tells Howard that Miami Station of your Volsky-CIA friends is cooperating to promote not [illegible] coup
9 Early Sept 1963 — AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence sources in Cuba

1111946

1) Marano & Caycedo Contacts
2) [illegible] Antonio Lopez
3) Manuel Reyes-Bermudez
Marano reportedly close to RFK/LBJ/MM

10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate Moreno from operational details of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion & poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully recruited in Cuba but no progress in establishing any capability for action

11. Szulc & Volsky considered to be highly suspect - re security considerations

12. a/k/a Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez
Castro had Rabel set up Cuban

13 Marine Corps - left job until 1960 when appt'd Chief of Rural Affairs defected to US in 1962 - recruited by JMWAVE Sta & used in AMTRUNK activities - returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. Was arrested and sentenced to 30 yrs in prison but released in July & August of 1967. "There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusation where are from."

14 FBI Days very little pertinent current progress in AMTRUNK during IFK's life

11/14/97

New Considerations in the Syndicate Operation

"While Orta (Juan) was reported on Aug 1961 as being used on CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationship w/him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source info. on the Cuban leadership."

It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro post re gambling, Orta's availability in assassination attempt was understood to be due his last payoff [illegible] he had received from gambling interests. "One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling industries as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

Possibly tells CIA he knows about exile leader Varona from Revolutionary days

"... it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

HH 11948

As late as 6/17/64 — it was reported that [illegible]

525-1800

20 Dr. [redacted] noted that one officer [redacted] and that the program reactivated in 4/62 had been shut down following B.P. in 4/61 - he felt that something was ongoing in interim. "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way" ... "Presence CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to US material contribution, was also supplying an aura of official sanction."

21 Considerations:

1/ Possible Indep crim syndicate operations re Castro prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. May have continued after B.P. 4/61 shutdown & been ongoing in some form when reactivated by CIA in 4/62

2. Frank Sturgis may have had contact w/ crim. syndicate. Could have been used by syndicate in its activities

22 3. Sturgis probably knew Orta. However, Sturgis not in Cuba when Orta given assassination role. But Sturgis may have fabricated his story for Miami group

Agent Messages re '61 re Castro assassination

26 5 agent messages made reference to plan to kill Castro & programming same & related to same operation, 2 were alternate proposals. No indication that these resulted from separate CIA initiatives. LA Bureau prepared summary of messages forwarded to Review Staff on 8/8/75. Pending Review Staff do not know how this paper was handled, subject not covered in Church committee interim report.

27 B messages: relate to same plan

(1st) 3/27/61 sent by agency asset AM BRONC/5 re proposed sabotage of electric company in Havana — coordinate w/ attempt to kill Castro at public appearance (as in accordance w/ Gen'l Plan) no record of message answered

(2nd) 3/29/61 - AMBRONC/5 sends 2nd message plan scheduled for 4/9/61 message answered on 3/30 agreeing to plan — address gen'l course but didn't comment on proposal to kill Castro 1111950

(3rd) 4/5/61 - presumably from AMBRONC/5 person he had been directed to consult only had time for [illegible] Stated that as of 4/9 plan [illegible] make it impossible to [illegible] Castro [illegible] Cuba

[illegible] meeting and [illegible] 26 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The 4 agents named in plan

28

① AMBRONC/5 - a) 201 file opened on 7/15/60
POA issued 12/18/61
OA issued 1/31/62 -
debriefing in Nov 1960 -
indicates that he had contact
w/ plotters against CASTRO -
claimed to have allegiance to
make similar plans. Infiltrated
in 12/9/60 - exfiltrated
in 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated
3/3/61
exfiltrated
4/19/61
Sole means to ag. resistance
groups

(c) infiltrated
12/19/61
exfiltrated
3/29/62
still same means

(d) infiltrated
5/2/62 -
arrested 5/22/62 & executed 8/30/62
reported to have contact w/ CIA agent
29 name not in Mr Stevens book given by Castro

11111951

⑥ AMCOAX/1 - AMBRONC/5 used to contact
him re gen'l plan for 4/61

a) POR - 1/5/61
re: contact for ag. planning purposes
while in Cuba

infiltrated
6/61
exfiltrated 7/61 following B.P

SECRET

29 (6) recruited
7/29/61 same mission
arrested
8/17/61 – along 30 year term
in McGovern book

(3) AMRUG/1 – another AMBRONC contact
for 4/61 plan
a) recruited in 9/60 + infiltrated CZ
received endorsement in 12/60
returned to U.S. 5/15/61 following B.P
b) infiltrated
6/29/61 – mission to org resistance
groups
& conduct sabotage

arrested 7/61 + 30 year term
name in McGovern book

30 (4) AMPANIC/7 – another AMBRONC 4/61 contact
a) was a "walk-in" on 4/15/60
POA – 1/30/61
MOC name 8/12/60
mission to org. resistance
Havana + Pinar del Rio
b) infiltrated 3/3/61
arrested 4/23/61 – 30 year term
in McGovern book
c) was infiltrated on 8/60
infiltrated 11/60
(prior to POA) – 1111952
mission w/ sabotage + assassin.
& permanent Cuban commitment
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
in Cuba at that time

[illegible]

TABD AMLASH OPERATION

1 MTOR any actual relation of AMLASH to met dy than Book II

Book II suggests that AMLash may have been Castro agent w/ provocation mission that would justify HHO retaliation & in alternative Amlash was a security risk by which details of plotting could have become known to Castro, provoking same provocation & whatever the reasoning Amlash should have been reported to W.C.

"We believe that, no matter how applic. the character of the relationship between C.I.A and Amlash/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for Amlash/1 to feel that he had any tangible
2 C.I.A support for plotting against CASTRO. Whether one do inclined to see Amlash/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63

11111953

5 Comment

" It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at the time [illegible] Operational Approval was designated for the purpose. By the end of August 1963 the C.I.A. collaboration [illegible] AMLASH/1

5 had made no real progress, although he was viewed as an operational contact w/ potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by C/A. On terms of the relationship that he had w/ the C/A the critical period, for purposes of the paper, is the one before 5 September and 22 November 1963

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLASH case officer. apparently AMLASH as chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom he may find persons susceptible to long distance + covert discipline — Cable also spells out long range requirement prior to action based on Amlash possible internal organization

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meeting w/Amlash "Amlash still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside GOC or invasion he realistic enough realize latter not option, According AMWORLD, Amlash still awaiting for US reveal planned action

[illegible] to know [illegible] Book II page [illegible] give you? [illegible] about change [illegible] Book

10 "The fact remains that whatever words Amlash/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his C/A contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the reasons for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amlash/1 by C/A officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 – Amlash case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amlash. Upon this Amlash told Amembassy he does not "intend to see your friend again"
Station officer in Paris had been in contact w/ him, & who participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 – case officer cable HQ that Amlash determined to have "necessary people and equipment inside (Cuba) to accomplish overthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"
11

Amlash wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance & Cable indicates that Amlash determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

1180155

End Attempt to arrange meeting w/ RFK to assure self of promised moral RFK assurance full U.S. support within a change of the Heart of Castro in Cuba

11 10/29/63 - Amlash meets w/ Fitzgerald in Paris. Case officer also at meeting

12 11/13/63 - Case officer memo summarizing meeting 7 D.F w/ Amlash US support only after real coup effected + group involved in position to request U.S. support. U.S won't commit to isolated uprising

B D.F in 1967 IGR recalled that Amlash repeatedly requested high powered rifle w/ telescopic sights + other weapon to kill Castro from a distance. D.F. stated he rejected the request.
Case officer memo and matters of operational nature discussed at Fitz. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of Amethyst meeting in New York re Amlash reaction to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting. Amlash happy about policy but not fact that wasn't given technical assistance for operational plan.
If Amlash doesn't get advice and materials from U.S. get assistance he will become fed up + we'll lose progress made

14

Comment Book II at p. 18 [illegible] 1111956
Amlash [illegible] in Fitz. meeting
as unclear - IGR says this not true
to be corroborated by above contact report

11/19/63 - Duty officer telling Amlash what he would be given a cache inside Cuba, to include high power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Amlash tells CIA officer he plans return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ cables Paris to delay Amlash departure to permit one more meeting which Amlash requested

On same day, Amlash agrees to delay departure - it's something interesting. Case officer said couldn't assure it but it was a meeting Amlash requested.

16 FBI now - This is highly speculative evidence of indication that Amlash might receive specific support he requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets w/ Amlash in afternoon

Conclusion - There is very ~~indication~~ evidence that during President Kennedy's life Amlash/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for murder/anything. While he ~~was~~ probably reported to contact, ~~and~~ he was merely told [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Synopsis Sections of Book II

17 View of SSC as to why AMLASH should have been examined by WC is stated at p 5 of the Report

FBR disagrees saying Amlash w/out substantiation prior to JFK's death

18 Incorrect to say CIA endorsed Amlash's proposal. No agreement w/ Amlash / a commitment to him and even if Castro learned of contacts w/ them there was nothing to learn beyond fact of contact relationship was tenuous w/no support promised to him for what was explained.

at p 68 SSC outlines position on agreement plots

19 "...we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility - not already considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry - that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the Amlash operation by the SSC Report."

11/11/1959

"we find to not entail a denial that Cuban operations other than Amlash have been taken by the Warren Commission to threaten Castro program of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities."

19

p 4 [4th p 19]
SSC Final Report - attributes
Fitzgerald saying that
U.S would support a coup &
[gave gen'l assurance that
U.S would help in bringing
about the coup
attributed to case officer testimony
20 which doesn't jibe w/ 1963 memo
in subject

ISR says Fitzgerald assurance? support
contingent on efforts to a
change in govt in Cuba

21 re to CIA case officers who were
responsible for investigation
at time of WC — saying knowing
of Artlack operation would have
affected investigation — ISR says
" it is likely the views elicited
from CIA employees in 1975
probably were responsive to
representations by SSC staff
members as to what the operation
involved, as distinguished from
what it actually was "

21

Interview CIA Officer re: investigation
read Dr. Gifford's testimony, interview
memorandum

The AMLASH # case officer

same w/ appropriate staff

interview 67 FBI Officer & retrieve
docs
also

21 p. 249 Book II – reference to 67 IGR
wherein case officer AMLASH
ordered to break contact w/
Amlash due to Assassination of JFK
77 IGR says 67 IGR states that
case officer got cable from HQ saying
"everything was off" – but case
officer didn't testify that reason
for everything being off was JFK's
assassination.

22 Off Cable mentioned – it may never
have been sent being case officer
miscalculation. IGR Day 2
Memos in Book II don't support its
existence

11/11/1960

f.n. 30 | p. 17 Book II – ? of Amlash's security
not until after JFK assassination was ? ?
security ? sufficient concern for CIA
to have terminated him

22 Amlash as provocateur – Welch and
Armstrong – about 10 years & 3 years
retired – The Ghost Soldiers Amlash
was not fired by CIA until 3/61 – 11/64

23

p 269 Book II - re Ambash name as
known contact of Soviets
in Mex Cy - Ambash
real name in lieu of
name on the Mex Cy cable
above noted as basis for Book II
discussion of why Ambash name
in list did not lead to identification
of Ambash operation

24 Ambash name brought up by Soviet
embassy official and Cuban cultural
attache in 12/63 re Ambash planned
press conference in Mex Cy 2/61-3/61
not a report of contact between Ambash
and the Soviet which was subject of
inquiry -
the 12/63 memo cites the question for
relevance to subject because of for
Kennedy inquiry.

p 72 of Book II re 7/64 FBI report
concerning C/I meeting w/Ambash
FBI report says meeting was to plan
Castro assas. - badly mixes
time & events - substantially post
date JFK death & not relevant to
WC inquiry

25 p 75 Book II re relationship of Chief SAS/CE
to this focus
re relocation uncertain. Book II
says he operates re Castro cases by
Ambash full play despite efforts
[illegible]

25

p 68-75 Book I re what CIA knew about Angleton, what was understood and conclusion that should have been drawn

IGR says Book I overlooks moderate quantity of Angleton relationship during the period in question

26 p 78, 79, 105 Book V re Cuban exile designated A who informed FBI + CIA in mid-65 of Angleton activities + Angleton involvement w/ CIA. IGR says if read Book V carefully it is clear that 'A' was unaware of Angleton 63 assoc. w/ CIA

1) info was 1½ yrs after JFK case
2) informant had no knowledge of earlier CIA / Angleton relationship

27
28 "At the time of the 1967 FO report there was no sense of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that toward the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was informed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an [illegible] plot [illegible] the Warren Commission [illegible] the SSC Report [illegible] both conspiracy and misleading."

TAB E — Material forwarded TO WARREN COMMISSION AND FBI

Listed here are reports and other papers submitted to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation) and the Warren Commission.

4 sections to the list

E.1 Dissem to Outside Components

E.2 Dissem data to W.C. SEE

E3 Dissem to FBI on Rumors & Allegations
E4 Memoranda to W.C.

E 2 Dissemination of Reports to CIA Staff

18 "Some CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, allcable traffic (interalia) including dissemination by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Additionally, Cable dissemination were released by CI/LIAISON. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Some CI Staff released all log-from CSCI's, and dissemination sheets from CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log; the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's.

18 Dissem. of Material to W.C

NOT C.D.'s

19	C.D.	Date	Date	Subj	DDP
	100	12/13/63	1/21/64	memo from Helms to J.A. Rankin re: Draft Ltr for Submission to Soviet Govt	
	300	1/21/64			
	1091	1/22/64			
	321	1/25/64	2/5/64	note from Karamessines to Rankin w/attach (including draft Soviets letter, on yellow)	
	347	1/31/64			
	361	2/5/64			
20	1182	2/18/64	2/18/64	memo for FBI	

28 22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 C.D. 1273
Memo from Helms, DDP to Rankin
Subject: Apparent inconsistencies in Material Furnished the Commission by CIA and the Department of State

29 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the Commission by the CIA

32 13 Oct. 1964 DDP 4-5275
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Public. of docs furnished to Commission by CIA

	DOC. DATE	DOC NO.	ORIGINATING OFFICE
1	1. 11/23/63	DIR 84915	(WH/3)

Info relative to telephone call on 9/28/63 to Soviet Embassy in Mex Cy. Request FBI

2

Tab E Material Forwarded To W.C

Tab F - Mexico Coverage of Oswald Visit

Info. Sources on Oswald Visit
to Mexico '63

1. Unrelated Coverage
   - LIPSTICK - mobile surveillance
     3 photo sites, mobile surveillance
     tech + mail intercept operation
   - LIFEAT - telephone tap -
     - handled one type
     + recruited agent
   - 3 photographic sets submitted
     under LIPSTICK:
     - LIMITED - [illegible] to quality of prints
       Soviet Embassy
     - LILYRIC - alternate photo type coverage
       sites in downtown Mexico City
     - LICALLA - Synchronization of Soviet Commercial
       backdrop - get good ID photo
       of Soviet personnel

2. closed down when Station received word
   that photo of the "unidentified man"
   was being released by W.C

   Film collected 3 times/week from
   limited and Liligun sites
   Licalla film processed outside
   by the agent liaison asset

3. mobile surveillance done on [illegible] American
   staff officers - had team of 6 recruited
   [illegible] to accomplish
   [illegible] from Mexican police [illegible]
   [illegible] left the Soviet Embassy

3 unilateral mail intercept; Kubright — handled by American case officer

Liaison Coverage

unilateral because as was the routine of Mexican Services at the time

4 telephone tap w/ Mexican called Kidnap run by Mex office - 30 days on the telephone cleaning post. In 61 Station chief became project case officer as LIENVOY

Oswald Coverage

Mexicans asked for telephone number of Soviet, Cuban + Satellite Embassies to do Kidnap stop — we drummed on unilateral line toward discovery Mex connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines, and 1 Yugoslav line — recorded, transcripted

Also monitored made short summaries of Station chief of interesting conversations time lag of a day or two

5 Boris Yaroshoff and Russian translation translations run about a week behind date of conversation. All transcripts made in Spanish or English originals by all Station staff could read + because the ordered the transcripts for operational [illegible]

5 Am investigative chronology of all photographs as soon as obtained learned after Lee Oswald had joined Soviet Embassy

6 Oswald came to calling duties post operator from tap on Soviet line. He was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was one delay because Station personnel wanted to review the photograph coincidentally w/ the typed transcript.

Tab G

Selected Newspaper Stories w/ Comment

(45) - Comments on Ronald Kessler's Wash Post article of 11/26/76 re CIA w/ key details of Oswald call

2- memo - 1) J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 fr PPP Helms Subject: CIA Discovery Info on LHO date 10/10/63

2) Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64 re Info developed by CIA on LHO activity in Mex. City 9/28-10/3/63

3) Letter to Helms 2/10/64 from Rankin

4) Memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from Helms re Info on LHO Mex. City activity 9/27 - 10/3/63

Tab H X w/ CIA comments

1 Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleges CIA activity in Dallas on 1963

2 " " " 1/20/77 alleges CIA told to false Oswald story

3. Norman Kalgepoth story 1/1/77 alleges CIA w/ fold date on Oswald

4. Clark Booth Lane environment w/ Cuban exile

5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleges CIA w/ held details of Oswald telephone calls, w/ report on handling of docum

6. John Hankie story 11/13/-76 alleges Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy

7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA & Castro

8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing Hitler in 1960