180-10146-10048

Vol II

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez 201-332665

Memo for Record, [redacted]

From: Lawrence F. Baxter

Subj: Meeting w/ LITAMIL-9, 27 Dec 63

"Litamil-9 reported on the recent firing of Teresa Proenza Proenza and this was made the subject of 2 cables to HQ's in view of the importance in the AMROD operation (see MEXI 7613 and MEXI 7625)

MEXI 8932 IN 59445 11 Apr 1964

To: DIR

1. Subj ref, Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, is one of two top priority Mexi targets for recruitment. Cotta is Code Clerk. Station planning pitch soon.

11112108 Memo for: C/WH/3 Mex

Subj - Rogelio R. Lopez / debriefing report #59 of Amming-1

Ref: [redacted] 1611 26 April 64

1. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez is a CUBA (PSI) operative in Mex City. He was the predecessor "Eduardo" Carmona and "Joe Ortiz".

2. ...

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2 Rodriguez has the following description: age approximately 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky build, blond hair & a reddish complexion.

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Target Personality Data Form
opened on Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Loose Docs / RRL

HMMA-18861, Dispatch 17 Apr. 1967
To: C/WHD
From: COS/MXLy
Subj: Operational / Linnick's relationship w/ Osmin Fernandez Concepcion aka "Oswaldo," concerning Guatemalan guerilla activities.

at P6 under COMMENTS

2. "Linnick has been cautioned to be extremely careful in his approach to and departure from the safehouse & to double check himself carefully en-route. He is well aware of the need for such precaution and has assured his Case Officer that he is observing all precaution possible. (A new safehouse has just been obtained for the study (the operation) Linnick also has been instructed again to stop seeing Jane Cobb

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since she has proven a definite danger to the operation especially since Gutierrez, according to Kirkuk's version has dodged responsibility for failing to properly support the Moreno 13 November group by implying that "infiltration" of the Party was responsible for the capture of that group and that June Cobb knows too many Party secrets through her association w/ Kirkuk. Kirkuk once again has promised to stop seeing her and has admitted the validity of our past attempts to get him to stop his affair w/ her. He also has been cautioned against letting this relationship w/ Cobb alienate Gutierrez.

~~[illegible]~~

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Vol. I of the 201

AMOOHIP/201 - 267956

Eyes Only
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Memo for: C/WHD for Cuba
Subject: Capinosa Allegations

1. Sensitivity: Regardless of accuracy, they
A. represent a problem because of their having been presented to other govt agencies;
B. in view of matters touching on U.S. security, are delicate and could have unfavorable repercussions if repeated to newsmen by the complainant or his associate (whose independent, previous threats were of greater potential embarrassment);
C. affect the reputation and the security of our personnel at Madrid and Paris

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2. Action: In view of the foregoing, the allegation
A. should be put in proper perspective i.e. not ignored because of the potential embarrassment but considered in the light of what we already know (Almost all of the allegations of previous charges and reports are known well to both the Madrid and Paris stations & to Hdqs. offices)

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concerned w/ the AMLASH group, whose members' reliability, reputation and good faith are questionable, yet two of the things — about Earle and "Tota" and about AMWHIP-1 and Carrillo — are new.]

B. should be treated so as to protect us against any charge of laxity and so as to establish the facts but, at the same time, treated so as to avoid attributing to them more importance than they deserve.

C. should be kept in mind as examples of other charges which may be bandied about and reported by the AMLASH group to other governmental agencies or to other governments or to news media (In the last connection recall the implied threat of publishing ODYOKE responsibility as reported previously by [redacted] 3716 IN [redacted] 38634 3/86.34):

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D. should be examined together with all the other available reports so that we may

(1) clarify our own position and work out a report to all the AMLASH group (and other concerned

AMWHIP);

2) sort out which people, if any, are worth our time in the future;

3) take appropriate solutions, including interrogation and polygraphing, to clarify doubts and then, when necessary, terminate those who are working ~~against~~ for us but are not worthwhile;

4) tighten up our own operational and security procedures in connection w/ the AMLASH group

3. Preliminary Analysis: As pointed out in a preliminary analysis of the AMLASH complex, made in March 1965 when I was preparing for travel to Madrid in connection w/ the QUHOPS-1 case: "... There is no convincing evidence that the group is working either for or against the regime of Fidel Castro. Reports on their contacts w/ us and their discussions among themselves are at variance. In 1962 Fidel Castro reportedly learning that they were plotting against him, talked to AMLASH and seven members of his group

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to enlist their support against Aníbal Escalante Dellunde and the communists in Cuba. Possibly they are playing both ends against the middle. They certainly have been and are in contact with the two ends." The following comments are keyed to matter raised by Esperon:

A. The AMLASH conspiracy - as detailed by [redacted]-3716 (IN 28634) on 6 April 65, QUSPORT-1 reporting on a meeting of the AMLASH group, including AMWHIP-1 mentioned the following significant points:

1) Rubottom was criticized for "fooling around for years" w/out helping and for jeopardizing the operation.

2) The group was to be prepared to denounce ODYOKE as responsible if the operation fails and believed that the resulting scandal would make the Bay of Pigs seem insignificant, and

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3) AMLASH-3 was in touch w/ Cuban Intelligence as established by code messages which he exhibited.

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As reported by [redacted]-1532 (IN 82939) on 4 June 65, based on meeting w/ Esposito, the problem seen by [redacted] is that "the AMLASH circle is wide and each new friend of whom we learn seems to have knowledge of the plan." I believe that the problem is a more serious and basic one. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the present memorandum, Fidel Castro himself reportedly knew as far back as 1962 that the group was plotting against him and knowing it, enlisted its support. Here we cannot rule out the possibility of provocation. Assassination, obviously, is a dangerous game, not merely to the plotters in a physical sense, but to a sponsoring government which may suffer severe political repercussions at home and abroad if its involvement is made known. In the instant case, the risks of exposure of the ODYEK hand would appear high whether the provocation

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not. Considering the individuals who are involved directly, their contacts w/ KUBARK officers, and their reported plan to expose ODYOKE, persisting in the plan could be highly embarrassing to KUBARK. (This is even more the case now that Coppinger has talked to ODENVY and ODURGE, although fortunately the tenor of his complaint was that KUBARK had not given adequate support to the plan.

B. The contacts at [redacted] and the matters affecting the [redacted] The "recruitment" of Maureen had been the subject of an exchange of cables between [redacted] and HQS and of discussions at HQS between WH/C and WE (See [redacted]-1071 (IN 66557) and DIR-106955). The annoying thing in this connection now is that Coppinger has talked about it to ODENVY & ODURGE and the danger that, if he is induced, his story about this (and the other matters) could reach some curious newspapermen. (On this connection, it appears

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that the questionable decision to put Maurice in touch w/ the AMLASH group was made w/out the knowledge of STOCKWOOD) Esperisa did not report any criticism of the KUBARKERS at Paris but it is evident that the AMLASH group knows more about them than we might wish. What is new and of concern from Esperisa about matters in Paris is his story of AMWHIP-1 and UNSNAFU-19 dealings. The questions raised about AMWHIP-1 are of mutual concern also to HQ'S which has been running him and MADRID which he has visited often. (On the occasion of my previous trip to Madrid

~~11112108~~ on the QUHOPS-1 case, Harvey had voiced his doubts about the whole group and specifically about AMWHIP-1 and his connection w/ UNSNAFU-19.)

11112118 At issue are two basic points, the knowledge on the part of UNSNAFU-19 about KUBARKS connection w/ AMWHIP-1 and the charge that AMWHIP-1 has been

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defrauding KUBARK in the jewelry transaction. Also to be kept in mind is the fact that ODENVY has an office in Paris which well might have been informed of the allegations and which might have been asked for comments — although ODENVY policy always has been to stay away from any investigation of other government agencies unless specifically directed by the Attorney General to investigate.

C. Criticism of the [redacted] criticism of the [redacted] by the AMLASH group is not new. Amlash 2 and 3 were [redacted] and wanted direct contact, but the [redacted] has had reservation about seeing them. [redacted] has been involved indirectly because of reporting by its sources about and involvement of [redacted] targets w/ both the AMLASH and AMLESPEAD operations (both handled from HQs) (See [redacted]-2932 (IN 72256) and [redacted]-2998 (IN 73094) (WHERE KYBAT).) Meeting among QUSTOMS, QUSWIFT, AMWHIP, and AMLASH

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figures produced conflicting reports which previously were discussed at Madrid and at HQS. Insofar as GROVERY himself is concerned, it must be kept in mind that he is a natural target upon whom the AMLASH group would be inclined to focus its complaints. With regard to the specific complaint about "Tota", Grovery has identified her as QUSWIFT-7 and has reported that no [redacted] ever had contact w/her.

4. Further involvement of ESPINOSA:
On 10 June ODENVY notified KUBARK at New York that AMLASH-2 had telephoned ESPINOSA to ask whether he had succeeded in contacting "the proper people" i.e., responsible KUBARK representatives and to request notice of the resulting arrangement.

5. AMWHIP-1: Our plan calls for making his approach to obtain PRS information and to obtain clarification of the role played by those involved w/

him in the AMLASH operation. His dealings w/ UNSNAFU-19 also will be covered. Following this, and LCFLUTTER examination is planned. This may help to determine whether he has been truthful in his reporting.

Harold F. Swanson
WH/C/SP

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