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King Kong, Pedro

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ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER
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	4 Aug 59	201-259120

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FORM NO. 237
1 APR 55

Replaces Form 20-4
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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO UNWA-
TO INFO	Chief, WE Division 16-4	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	201-559120
FROM	Miami (YARLEY)	DATE	4 August 1959
SUBJECT	Report on Miami Base Involvement in Arrival of Pedro DIAZ Lanz in the US	RE "43" - (CHECK "1" ONE)	
ACTION REQUIRED	None	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY	
REFERENCES:			
<p>1. This office was first informed of the arrival of subject in the US on Wednesday, 1 July 1959. However, since it was not yet clear what the CIA role would be, there were no instructions as of that time.</p> <p>2. On the afternoon of 2 July I was informed by LEBANOW that although no clear indication had yet been given as to the ultimate disposition of subject, I was to attempt immediately to contact him, conduct a preliminary interrogation, and to render to him whatever assistance I judged to be proper. Within a few minutes of that conversation with LEBANOW, I received a call from Mr. Edward AHRENS, District Director of I&NS, who said that he had subject and the other members of his party in custody and offered me access to him for whatever purposes I considered appropriate.</p> <p>3. Before going to I&NS I checked in with the FBI to see if they had yet interrogated subject and if so to what extent and along what lines. I discovered the Bureau was at that very time interrogating DIAZ and had completed a rather thorough interrogation, all of which was immediately reported to Washington. I then proceeded to Mr. AHRENS' office and was introduced to DIAZ and his party, which was comprised of DIAZ; his wife Tania, Sergio DIAZ Bruell, and Carlos ECHEGOYEN.</p> <p>4. I spoke briefly with DIAZ alone, primarily for the purpose of determining his disposition toward cooperation with US officials and intelligence people particularly and to determine whether or not he was in possession of any documents which might be of value. With regard to the first, he stated that he had every intention of cooperating fully with all US officials and that he was eager to make known his own views on the Castro government. With the exception of a copy of the statement which he had released to the press prior to leaving Cuba, he was carrying no documents. I then talked to him about his immediate plans and he said that he was placing himself completely at the disposal of US officials but that he was concerned about his brother Marcos and was hopeful that he could conceal his whereabouts until information was available of Marcos' situation. I also discussed with him the effect that the measures being taken at that moment to find him might have on the general population. He said that he felt that the impact of these measures would be very great since it would make the people realize how serious the government there viewed the resignation of a senior official based on charges of Communist tendencies in the government. In deference to these feelings on the part of the subject and being at the moment still unsure as to the ultimate handling of him, it seemed desirable that his presence in the US not become public information for the time being.</p> <p>5. I discussed this with AHRENS and asked what his intentions were with regard to retaining or releasing the party. He said that under normal circumstances BRUELL, who is an American citizen, would be released forthwith and that the others would be paroled as soon as the paper work was completed. I pointed out to him the desirability of keeping this party under wraps and asked if he would be willing that they remain in the I&NS offices overnight, during which time I could make arrangements to remove them to some other secure place. AHRENS said that, insofar as he was concerned, he was willing but that he would have to "make a check". It is assumed that he telephoned Washington or some other superior office, but in any case in a few minutes said that he would be willing to do as I asked provided I would prepare a statement requesting this action, to be signed by the four members of the party and by myself. The following statement was prepared and signed: "We the undersigned request that in the interests of our personal safety be permitted to remain on these premises over night." (In the light of what came after, it might be well to remember that had not this action been taken, DIAZ and his party would have been released and almost certainly he would have been exposed and immediately subjected to press interviews.) Having taken this step, I became preoccupied with a) rigging the facilities for keeping these individuals overnight; and b) preparing a plan to move them the next morning. Not wishing to allow any member of</p>			
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<p>this party to leave the premises, the situation was complicated by the fact that the boat which Sergio BRUELL and Carlos BUEGROYENI had chartered and in which they had made the trip to pick up DIAZ and his wife was overdue one day and was at that moment still anchored in Biscayne Bay unattended and with no lights. It was necessary therefore to release BRUELL for the purpose of returning the boat and paying the charges. He returned within several hours presumably without incident.</p> <p>6. I then contacted ⁰² <u>CDALM</u> to determine whether or not he was able and willing to assist in holding this party for a period of perhaps several days. He immediately agreed to assist and was then informed of the identities of the people. <u>CDALM</u>'s situation is particularly adaptable to this sort of activity since he lives alone in a well appointed two-bedroom apartment in a reasonably secluded area and only rarely has any visitors. In addition to this, he was a likely choice because he is well known to and trusted by DIAZ. To lend further assistance to this plan and because <u>CDALM</u> and <u>CDAROR</u> are virtually inseparable both in their business and socially, <u>CDAROR</u>'s assistance was also enlisted.</p> <p>7. Later that evening (this is still 2 July) in a telephone conversation with AERNS, I learned that he had been instructed to defer any action on subject and his party pending further instructions. He indicated to me rather vaguely that "other people" were interested. I then learned from LEBANOW that the Army was sending an officer-Major OTTO--to interrogate subject. I then had to inform <u>CDALM</u> that our timing was set back for moving the party and asked him to stand by for further instruction.</p> <p>8. On the morning of 3 July I met with Major OTTO and another representative of the Army (whose name was not recorded), to discuss with them the next moves to be taken. In accordance with telephone discussion with LEBANOW, I explained to OTTO that our understanding was that the Defector Committee had agreed that CIA would undertake custody of subject for the purpose of moving him to a place suitable for interrogation by the whole of the intelligence community but that in the meantime subject would be made available to any member agency of the intelligence community. OTTO, who struck me as being a rather pompous officious individual, said that this was not the Army's understanding at all and that, so far as he was concerned, the person was in the custody of I&NS and that the Army had obtained clearance from them to interrogate DIAZ. I said I realized of course that I&NS did have custody and that whatever was done with DIAZ at this point would have to be with the consent of I&NS, but that based on the understanding that CIA would have responsibility I had gone ahead and made plans for moving DIAZ to another location with the ultimate aim of moving him out of this area to some more suitable location. I explained that time was an important factor and in this connection asked OTTO how long he thought his interrogation might take. His answer was, "I don't know--it might take two hours or it might take two days." I pointed out to OTTO that I had made no attempt to interrogate DIAZ, and that I considered it necessary that something be done to relieve DIAZ of the obvious emotional and physical strain he was under before any further interrogation. I informed OTTO that when DIAZ learned that he was to be interrogated by still another group (he had already talked to the FBI, I&NS and Me) that he had reacted negatively and at one point said that he didn't feel that he wanted to talk to anyone else whatsoever until, "I get to Washington". OTTO seemed unimpressed with this and said that he wished to interrogate DIAZ immediately. Without recounting all that passed between myself and OTTO, which was considerable, it should be noted that his interest in this situation seemed more centered on the posture he assumed with CIA representatives and the prerogatives of the Army than in the value of an immediate interrogation of DIAZ. After a good deal of nitpicking at things I proposed, it was finally agreed that, if during the period of interrogation by OTTO it became necessary to remove DIAZ and his party from the I&NS office premises, OTTO would be fully responsible for security and that at the conclusion of his interrogation DIAZ and his party would either be returned to the custody of I&NS or to me at a point and a time on which we could agree and I&NS would approve. Throughout this session with OTTO, he many times repeated a pat little phrase, "We are here to work with CIA, not for it."</p> <p>9. This of course was all knocked into a cocked hat later that day (and before OTTO had an opportunity to meet with DIAZ), when AERNS received instructions that there were to be no further interrogations of DIAZ by any agency pending the arrival of I&NS' Robert E. SCHOEENBERGER, Associate Deputy Regional Commissioner, from Richmond. AERNS told me that he was expecting SCHOEENBERGER to be in his office on the morning of 4 July and I arranged to contact him there at that time. Before</p>		
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that next meeting with I&NS I was informed by LEBANOW that CIA's tentative plan was to take DIAZ from I&NS here, to hold him in a secure place, that he would then be moved to another area in the country, put through an intensive interrogation by the intelligence community, and then removed to a foreign area where he would be surfaced. LEBANOW's instructions were to continue with the plan for holding DIAZ and to inform I&NS people of this tentative plan and stated that General CABELL was expected to discuss the matter with General SWING sometime during the day of 4 July and it was expected that I&NS would be instructed to hand DIAZ over to me. I conveyed this to SCHROEDER when I met him on the morning of 4 July. He seemed entirely receptive to this idea and seemingly his first inclination was to proceed along those lines without delay. On further reflection, however, he decided that he should wait until he got those specific instructions from his headquarters but voluntarily placed a call to Washington to try to speed this up.

10. The complications which then set in by reason of the different versions of what passed between General CABELL and General SWING and the appearance on the scene of a representative of the Eastland Committee are well known to both LEBANOW and SEARON. Apart from the difficulties encountered in holding together the plan to hold DIAZ and his party, local relations with the I&NS were in danger of being jeopardized because they were informed through their channels that CIA had claimed that it was being denied access to DIAZ. It should be made clear that I&NS cooperation throughout was excellent, that I had access to DIAZ at any time that I wished, and in fact worked out with AHRENS the plans for both retaining him at I&NS offices during the night of 2 July and for removing him thereafter. (Addendum: The incident apparently has not impaired relationships with I&NS, for cooperation from them has continued to be excellent.)

11. After it began to be clear that CIA was not going to be involved in the movement of DIAZ, Schreiber nevertheless kept me constantly advised of DIAZ's whereabouts and assured me at any time I wished I could see him. There was no occasion for me to see DIAZ, and I was finally advised on the morning of 3 July that DIAZ and his wife, escorted by SCHROEDER, had departed Miami for Washington by train at 10:00 PM on 7 July. With the departure of DIAZ from Miami and the statements made by I&NS to the press on 3 July regarding the admittance of DIAZ to the US, the interest of this office in the case came to a close.

Kargley
PATRICK I. KARGLEY

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