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Hicks file

13 November 1960

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Marmel Ray and Ward Collins in the latter's apartment (110 West 120 Street, New York City) on 22 November, 1960.

PART TWO OF THREE

1. Note: This meeting had been called by me in order to discuss the existing situation at sea, various concerns regarding our future relationships with the MRF. (See Memorandum For the Record dated 21 November 1960, OIR 12552, OUI 4556, and Collins' memorandum to C/MIA, 9 November, 1960; also see FACI 1774, 18 and 6 which states that Hunt obtained Varona's concurrence on 21 November to discuss the status of the PAD's controller.)

2. The meeting was started by me telling Ray that I had received a somewhat garbled message concerning a certain operation on the Isle of Pines. How serious an undertaking was this and what, practically, was involved? (Generally, this question was posed pursuant to information by C/MIA, and in line with C/MIA's memorandum to me.) Ray informed me as follows:

(a) There are two garrisons stationed at the Isle of Pines with whom his organization has contact. One garrison is commanded by a [redacted] who could count on approximately 100 men to follow. [redacted] also has approved [redacted] to trustworthy officials under his command (whether these officers were military or civilian Ray did not know) which were ready to assist in anti-destroyer activities--the second garrison was located at the Punta del Norte and was primarily a coast artillery installation. Ray did not refer to the name of the commanding officer.

(b) Quite separately from the above, Ray's people are in contact with a (ms) [redacted] who is the [redacted] where Huber Katos is incarcerated. According to Ray's information, [redacted] says, [redacted] may be of help in arranging the escape of Katos. A formal court is to arrive in Haiti on 21 December and that Katos seems to trust [redacted] and has given [redacted] his wife and son visit him at the prison--he okay to utilize [redacted] in efforts designed to liberate Katos from prison.

(c) In considering the situation outlined in (a) and (b) above, Marmel Ray's military planners felt that a single garrison could be formed since the MRF planners believe that, in the event of a successful attack, the two garrisons on the Isle of Pines will defect, their other troops and a good part of the population of the Isle of Pines, under the new command, is much more loyal than can be seen. The MRF also felt that the Isle of Pines was a

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operational, as probably not being...
This would concern reports of Castro's...
used during prior or during the...
reported about Castro's ground...
only three roads or passes leading into the...
crossed. These roads, the...
secured by...
the... could be for... capture and...
The... could... approximately...
to... in...
... a number of...
... would be...
... also...
... would... and
... strategic locations.

(d) The... that 27...
that... for rotation in the very
... a Sunday to the
... operation.

3. After the... by... for the following...
support:

- (a) Our support to and/or advice on how to neutralize Castro's air force,
- (b) Intelligence for screening coastal army and air fields,
- (c) Delivery of anti-air craft artillery and continuing re-supply for anti-Castro rebels after the operation has begun, and
- (d) Maps prepared by the Aerial Service Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (1)

4. Without rating my... at the above request I asked whether or not... facilities at his disposal and whether or not his people... able to receive, handle, and use any supplies which might come their way. I also asked what specific types of weapons the... thinking of and what kind of ammunition re-supply would be needed for... already in the hands of anti-Castro Cubans in the area. It became clear that... have the answers to these questions... should be referred for further discussion to the "technical level," i.e., Colonel... and the staff.

5. At this point of the conversation I began to... the implementation of the Headquarters decisions reached in regard to the... support of the... I said that I wanted to repeat comments I had made previously to... that the... could not afford any... of anti-Castro efforts that an administrative and supply... had been established for... time, and that this... the... would have to be utilized to the fullest in... of this... by

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undoubtedly know that Smith was also the military adviser to the PRD; any shipments would undoubtedly carry the PRD label and in all likelihood ID-prepared, anti-Castro literature would accompany such shipments; pilots and planes utilized in such an undertaking were PRD assets and identified as such.

6. PR's reply to this was somewhat as follows: while the PRD thinks it controls these pilots, Bander should at least realize that the pilots who were working formerly for Cubana Air Lines really belonged to the MRP. In any case he, Ray, and the MRP would accept the proposed arrangement because it would not imply that the PRD is politically beholden to the PRD; it would simply indicate to the people inside Cuba that the MRP was utilizing all resources to obtain the equipment necessary to overthrow the regime. Naturally he was not enthusiastic about this formula but he could live and cope with it.

7. I told Ray that I would have to get in touch with our military people in order to find out whether or not we now had sufficient data on hand on which to base a decision. (Comments: C/M/L was briefed telephonically by me on the foregoing and on additional aspects of this meeting which are recited in part two of this Contact Report. C/M/L and I felt that we did not have as yet sufficient data to make any commitments; C/M/L instructed me to advise Ray that:

(a) Either the MRP should submit a detailed plan which we would consider on the basis of which we would then decide whether to be of assistance or not or;

(b) The MRP could go it alone, and ask us for some assistance after the operation has been launched and we would make our decision on the basis of existing circumstances.

Above was transmitted to Ray who indicated that the MRP did not desire to go it alone and that he would instruct Berguin to immediately contact Smith in Miami to work out a coordinated operational plan.)

8. At this point at the meeting, I felt that the time was ripe to make the \$2000 payment (by broker check) and to advise Ray that another \$7500 would be available to him via Juan Pardo, an FBI controller. I repeated what I had said previously about duplication and followed the approved lines contained in my 19 November 1960 memorandum to C/M/L. Ray and Chibas' reactions were not unexpected; they rejected this particular funding proposal. (Comments: for additional details and other items covered during this meeting see pages two and three, "Contact Report, 22 November, Meeting with Ray and Chibas.")

CYRIL D. BROWN
C/M/L/ta

GD:ash

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