

July & Aug. 1962

Summary of Contacts with
AM-HIP/1 and AMLASH/1

HELSINKI:

1. Events of 30 July 1962.

AM-HIP arrived in Helsinki on 30 July 1962. He called HBFINCH according to plan, and after his second call (due to his hotel porter's abysmal understanding of English), Fallucci established contact with AM-HIP without further difficulty. The meeting took place in the restaurant of his hotel, The Vaakuna, and later in his room. We had not at this time located AMLASH, so the time was spent briefing AM-HIP on the local scene, and on his conduct with AMLASH when they met. The meeting lasted about one and a half hours.

Later the same day we called AM-HIP at his hotel to report no progress in locating AMLASH. Feeling it advisable to keep AM-HIP occupied, we took him out to dinner at Flickertorget, located in the suburbs of Helsinki. The evening lasted until 11:00, terminating with a drink at the roof bar of the Vaakuna. During the six hours, we had an opportunity to explain carefully to AM-HIP that in order for us to help his friend, AMLASH must be willing to follow our directions and agree to certain conditions (already agreed upon by interested Hqs. parties). AM-HIP realized that this was necessary, and agreed with our ideas. However, he is attached to AMLASH, and will continue to look down him in the most benevolent and subjective manner. This being rather far removed from our intended approach to, and opinion of AMLASH. AM-HIP will require handling of a delicate nature in that he will write letters and be aware of our

position in this matter. We closed the meeting by telling him that we would have an effort made in the morning to locate AMLASH, and that he might as well relax, sight-see if he wished, and that we would be in touch with him at intervals during the day.

2. Events of 31 July 1962.

Our efforts to locate AMLASH through UNIMBLE/1 proved to be fruitless. Theodore T. Winterst, who was handling UNIMBLE/2, said that the latter tried his best, but had not been able to do us any good.

[redacted] also reported that its contacts had been unable to aid us.

We reported to AMWHIP the fact that we had not located AMLASH, and suggested that we have dinner together, to which he agreed. We met AMWHIP at 2100 at our hotel, the Kamp, and proceeded to the Royal Restaurant for dinner. AMWHIP was obviously getting on pins and needles because we had not found his friend. He suggested that we call up the Cuban Festival delegation, or try some hotels that evening. We persuaded him that it was not the best idea yet, and to give other people more time to locate him. He agreed, but kept coming up with ideas all evening for ways to locate AMLASH. He suggested that AMLASH liked night clubs, and that after dinner we could perhaps try several. We agreed, more to placate him than with any thoughts of success. We tried several, the Hungary and the Theater Hall, both of which were filled with friends of mine, but no signs of AMLASH. The Finns, appearing in the national past as, by usual, irritated AMWHIP, and after being pushed around in the Theater Hall for an hour, he said that he thought this was a waste of time. We agreed, grabbed a taxi and went home. During the evening, we told AMWHIP that tomorrow morning, if nothing had turned up, we would start by calling the latter hotels in town ourselves, and try this rather laborious method to locate AMLASH. We agreed to meet

between 9 and 10 o'clock at our hotel.

3. Events of 1 August 1962.

AMHIP arrived at our hotel at 0945 on 1 August, and we retired to our room to telephone. Securing an outside line, our friend began to telephone. We decided to try the local "pink" hotels first, the Klass Korppi, and the Torni. AMHIP had no luck with the Klass Korppi, but when he called the Torni, he was told that ANLASH was there, and was connected with room No. 201. A Spanish-speaking man (who was later identified as the newly appointed Cuban Diplomatic Representative to Finland) answered the phone in 201 and said that ANLASH was in the shower, and call back later if it was important. AMHIP left a message that he was from Mexico and that he, "Carlos", would call back. During the break, we instructed him to be careful on the telephone, and to talk as if the opposition was listening. He was just to be casual, greet ANLASH, arrange to see him, saying that he was in Europe on business in Scandinavia, France and Switzerland, and that hearing in Helsinki that ANLASH was attending the Festival, he had decided to stop over and contact him. When ANLASH answered the phone, AMHIP's face lit up, caution was abandoned, and he was off at a rapid rate in Spanish. ANLASH said that he would be right over to see AMHIP in his room at the Vaakuna. We briefed AMHIP once more on being careful, and showed AMHIP to the door. We arranged to have AMHIP call us when he could at the office, urging him once more to be careful and discreet. We hope he has been. It was later learned that finding ANLASH in this hotel room was pure good fortune, as he was just going to a room to take a shower, since he was still residing in the quarters of the common delegate.

AM-HIP talked to AM-LASH for at least seven hours, from about 1000 in the morning until approximately 1700 the same evening. Then AM-HIP called us at 1730, he presented us with the fact that he had convinced AM-LASH to talk with us, and for this purpose, he had arranged a dinner meeting that same evening for approximately 1930. We would have preferred to talk longer with AM-HIP about AM-LASH's reactions, but time did not permit. We arranged a dinner for 2100 at "The White Lady", a restaurant some way from the center of town, and succeeded in obtaining a private dining room, a practice not uncommon in this [redacted] recommended restaurant, as it is often used by businessmen to have private dinners and afterwards, business discussions.

We arrived at the White Lady first, arranged for the dinner, and awaited AM-HIP and AM-LASH, who arrived at 2110 by taxi. Although AM-HIP had suggested to us that the discussions should be merely devoted to getting acquainted the first evening, AM-LASH commenced almost immediately into a discussion of his feelings and his position concerning Cuba today. As reported in our cable [redacted] (09) AM-LASH was quite intense, and showed the strain of his unexpected meeting with AM-HIP. Although obviously under emotional strain, AM-LASH presented his feelings in a relatively calm manner, and was given to discussing them throughout the meal. He said he was considering not going back to Cuba, but after talking to AM-HIP, he felt that if he could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there. He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small undertaking, but that if he could be given a really large part to play, he would use himself and several others in Cuba whom he could rely upon. These he said

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included two majors (one of which AMCHIP later reported was a militia commander in the center part of the island), two captains, and several others whom AMLASH said he could trust, but whom he would not name.

AMLASH said he had had plans to blow up an oil refinery, as he felt that the continuing existence of a semblance of normal functioning in Cuba depended upon a continuing supply of petroleum, supplies of which, as we know, are at a critical stage today. He also wanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriguez and the Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Fidel, by execution if necessary. He feels that if Fidel is eliminated, it would be much easier to effect a take-over. (We listened for the most part, but at this point tried to explain to AMLASH that men like Rodriguez could easily be replaced by Moscow, and that the killing of the Soviet Ambassador, would have only the briefest effect on the Soviet control of Cuba.) AMLASH was not too interested in listening at this point, and continued by saying that if he could achieve all these actions, plus others, in one master stroke, a take-over, during the ensuing confusion, would be much facilitated. He did not feel that Kaul or Che would be able to rally the people in sufficient time to prevent opposition forces from forming. His arguments and plans had many flaws, but AMCHIP could not help admiring (to himself) AMLASH's professed desire for vigorous and, hopefully, effective actions, designed to alter the situation in no uncertain terms. While we were making no commitments or plans, we pointed out to AMLASH that schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information-collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans. AMCHIP said he agreed with this, but we weren't too sure that how much of this argument AMLASH was willing, or would be willing, to do.

AMELASH made it clear during the discussions that he was completely against Fidel's use of Soviet help from the first, but he had never envisioned, that even if it were used, just how ineffective it really would be towards solving Cuba's problems. He still feels strongly, he said, about the plight of the lower classes in Cuba, and in any future Cuba, he would still insist on a new deal for them. AMELASH said that although he had not been effective in helping the formation of a beneficial new Government in Cuba, he was now prepared to work towards that end. This time, he said, he wanted to look more towards the future, both for his own interests and for Cuba's. The last time, he said that he thought only as far as the elimination of Batista, and had not given consideration to planning for a government he favored after the fighting was over. He felt that AMELASH meant that he was as much concerned about his (AMELASH's) position in the government and personal stake in a new Cuba, as he was about anything else. It is our impression that AMELASH feels that he did not get his share of the spoils or power from the Castro regime, in proportion to his contribution against Batista. AMELASH is a complicated personality. It is difficult to fairly judge, at this time, AMELASH's degree of concern for a truly revolutionized Cuba for the people's benefit, vs his concern to see a new government in Cuba in which he gets just recognition. This does not necessarily mean that AMELASH wants high political office, but he does want credit for his efforts and the resultant power and prestige among his countrymen.

In addition to his concern for the manner in which the Soviets are using Cuba for their own designs in Latin America, AMELASH is worried about the extent to which Castro is using the Soviet technique of capturing the minds of the young people and the mass propaganda efforts against the masses.

He feels certain that in a couple of years, the young people will be completely and irrevocably won over to Castro, and that the masses will begin to believe the intense anti-American, anti-West propaganda to which they are subjected.

Just as great as are AMLASH's fears about the Castro's winning of young minds, is his concern that the USA will begin to consider a status quo for Cuba, and in the event of any intense and successful anti-regime activity, such as he plans, and which looks as if it might depose the regime, PEPRIKE will withdraw its support from such efforts in the face of serious threats from the Soviets. Although AMLASH did not say it in so many words, it was apparent from the discussions that AMLASH would prefer to be able to free Cuba without any outside support (and by inference, obligations), but he is a realist enough to concede that any efforts to overthrow Castro must have the support of PEPRIKE. He is, therefore, willing to enter into discussions with a representative (s) of PEPRIKE towards this end.

AMLASH agreed to meet in Paris for the purpose of further debriefings and to give any information in any field which he has. He is also most willing to discuss any plans which may lead to an overthrow of the present government. AMLASH stated many times, however, during the course of the meetings, that he was only interested in involving himself in a plan of significant action, and which was truly destined to achieve rapidly his desire to help Cuba. (He told AMSHIP later after we had left the meetings, that he was afraid that PEPRIKE would continue to pursue its present course, that of providing money and ideas, but no ACTION!) AMLASH was also most adamant about not becoming involved in any way with the Cuban refugee circles and organizations in Miami. He said that he feels these are still the same people who left Cuba, i.e., willing to wait for the chance to return and again pursue their only interest, that of making money. He also said

he felt that the Cubans there were completely penetrated by Castro informants, and that for them to know of his cooperation with PEREZ, would be the same as telling Castro, and thus his future would end against the Wall. We assured him that maximum security would be practiced, as far as these people were concerned. He also does not wish to trust or be involved with any contract Cubans. Only the PEREZ does he wish to deal. (Along this line, AMWHIP stated that he did not think it advisable to reveal any of these negotiations to AMCONCERT/1, whom AMWHIP has known for many years and is quite friendly, but whom he does not feel can keep a secret of this nature.)

This meeting terminated at 0030 on 2 August. The three participants took a taxi together back to town. AMWHIP and AMLASH stopped off at a local night club, Teater Grillen, while we continued on to our hotel. No incidents of a security nature were observed, and it was felt that the meeting was held without the knowledge or observation of the opposition.

h. Meeting of 3 August 1962.

We met with AMWHIP in his hotel room (No. 117 at the Vaakuna) at 1700 hours on 3 August. We discussed the events and talks of the preceding evening for some time. At approximately 1900, AMLASH arrived, greeted us affably, and joined us for a drink. AMLASH used this meeting to restate his position concerning his desire for participation in a really significant action against the Castro regime. Having decided by this time that further discussions and debriefings of AMLASH should take place with a Spanish-speaking CIA, we outlined the idea to meet for such a purpose in Paris. AMLASH did not like the idea of too many people being aware of his cooperation with PEREZ, but agreed that it would be best in order to allow himself to express his ideas and plans better, and to be able to provide us with his information in the greatest possible detail.

We persuaded AM-HIP and AMLASH that it would be best not to have further meetings with them in Helsinki, but that we could continue our talks in greater safety in Stockholm and Paris. They agreed. AMLASH also said that he felt that he shouldn't see AM-HIP too much more in Helsinki, as he was beginning now to make some public appearances, and his presence was now established to everyone in the city. Incidentally, prior to Thursday, 2 August, AMLASH had purposely refrained from making any public appearances at the Festival because (1) he and the other Cubans had been aware of the ANSPELL group and their announced intentions, and (2) AMLASH did not feel very disposed to play the "Public Relations" man from Cuba and espouse the "peace and friendship nonsense", as he called it. However, AMLASH also said that he felt that he had better perform this role to some extent, as it was expected of him by Fidel, and he did not wish to provide an unnecessary chance for unsatisfactory reports to be sent back home concerning his lack of cooperation with the Cuban delegation. In making the arrangements for a Paris meeting and further discussions, AMLASH said, in response to the question, that it would be quite normal for him to be in Paris, as he had already cleared this with Fidel, with whom, he remarked caustically, one had to clear everything these days. He then expressed the idea that he would like to return to Paris, via Stockholm, and at AM-HIP's suggestion, spend a few days there just relaxing. From there, or Copenhagen, he would return to Prague for two days at most, in order to pick up his luggage, then come as soon as possible to Paris. There, he intended to visit a hospital or two, as agreed upon with Fidel, and spend a total of at least a week there. He said that if he was to return to Cuba to begin his efforts, he did not wish to be away from Cuba any longer than necessary.

(He has, it is noted, a sense of urgency in beginning action against the regime as soon as possible.) AMNHIP told us later that AMEASH also was interested in a Pan American Miami-based stewardess, whom he would have come over to stay with him. AMNHIP suggested to us that he thought the stewardess might be connected with PBPRIME. He based this apparently on a remark which the stewardess made concerning AMEASH's political frame of mind last year. We answered that as far as we knew there was no basis for AMNHIP's thoughts along this line.) AMNHIP will try to get the stewardess full name for us.

Meeting arrangements for Stockholm and Helsinki were laid on at this meeting. AMEASH felt he had to stay until the end of the Festival for cover purposes. Since AMNHIP had already accidentally run into several people he knew, it was agreed that he should leave town for Stockholm in the near future. We would remain behind until AMEASH left, serving as an emergency contact in the event of change in AMEASH's plans. It was arranged to meet AMEASH if absolutely necessary, at either 1200 or 1300 each day at a given restaurant in the center of the city. Normal security measures for the "emergency" meeting were laid on. In Stockholm, meeting arrangements for Paris will be established. AMNHIP departed Helsinki 5 August and is presumably staying at the Palace Hotel in Stockholm; he will make arrangements for accommodations for AMEASH there. He will follow AMEASH to Stockholm.

5. Helsinki Meetings between AMNHIP/1 and Fallucci.

AMNHIP and Fallucci were in public together only three times for any length of time. Other meetings were held in their respective hotel rooms. One breakfast meeting (the 5th of August) was held in the near deserted

dining room of the Vaakuna Hotel at 1030. AMWHIP and Pallucci met at least once a day during the sojourn in Helsinki. AMWHIP used the name William Thompson, as instructed, when calling HEFINCH to make initial contact. There were no incidents of a security nature observed during any of these meetings.

6. Other Youth Festival Targets.

This area covered by cables [] 1584 and [] 1609. The best and, actually, only possibility among the participants was Jose Venegas. However, both AMLASH and AMWHIP did not want to become involved with him as they felt that this, in both their cases, might compromise their interests in AMLASH's returning to Cuba. AMWHIP felt, for example, that Venegas would almost certainly connect his presence here with an attempt to do something with AMLASH. AMLASH also felt that he did not want to disclose any indications of his real sympathies to Venegas, if he (AMLASH) were going to return to Cuba. Without doing this, it would be difficult to get any reactions or opinions from Venegas, thought AMLASH. Venegas, it is felt by AMLASH, might very possibly be counted on at a later date if this was desirable. An approach could then be worked out at that time.

As reported, AMLASH came to the Festival as a "special delegate," after his request to Fidel was approved. AMLASH claimed to Fidel that he was fatigued and sick and needed a good rest in Europe. The Festival provided the excuse, Fidel bit the bait, and AMLASH got to Europe to see AMWHIP, his original intention. AMWHIP felt that this is a logical and honest explanation. It is interesting to note that neither the local service, [] 2, or any of the Cuban delegates he asked, could determine the whereabouts of AMLASH. It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the Cubans were told not to talk of his presence to anyone not from the immediate delegation.

7. AMSHIP's Role in AMLASH Talks.

AMSHIP has been most helpful and cooperative in establishing the initial contacts with AMLASH, and he undoubtedly does have much influence over AMLASH. AMLASH also trusts AMSHIP explicitly, as evidenced by his remark to us that AMSHIP was the only one whom he felt that he could fully trust and to whom he could speak openly. Of course, he did speak openly at length to us at the behest of AMSHIP, but it is also obvious that he does not tell us everything. AMSHIP has given good advice in the handling of AMLASH, but, as he has a tendency to interpret AMLASH's remarks and feelings subjectively, and to attempt to guide us a bit too much, it might be wise to eliminate in later portions of the talks in Paris. With a Spanish-speaking C/O, this should not be too difficult to do, and without alienating AMSHIP. AMSHIP has no clandestine training to speak of, as evidenced by his actions in this case. However, to his credit, he responds readily to directions in this area, and follows rather well suggestions for adding to the security of the meetings. His remark about the advisability of keeping his old friend AMCONCI T/1 out of the operation or from any knowledge thereof, is gratifying. AMSHIP also has gently explained to us, that while he is a Cuban at heart and loves the Cubans, they simply cannot be trusted to keep secrets among any of their friends who, for no real tested reasons, they consider safe and discreet. As a general statement, we feel that AMSHIP is a good security risk operationally, and that with more exposure to the case, will become a good and useful asset under almost any circumstance. He is, however, somewhat subjectively subjective about his evaluations of AMLASH. He is completely honest, and is using a considerable amount of his own money, not to mention time, in this operation. We only hope his faith in AMSHIP is just that.

8. Evaluation of and Comments about AMEASH.

Our initial comments forwarded in cable [redacted] 1609 remain unchanged. We have seen too little of, and cannot converse in the native language of AMEASH, to make any strongly valid assessment of him to date. In the second meeting with AMEASH, he was considerably more relaxed than in the first, but just as intense about his convictions...or seemingly so. AMEASH stated that, having decided to return to Cuba, he would enroll in an officers' refresher type course at Matanzas in an effort to renew old Army contacts, re-assert his position as a major in the Revolutionary Army, and attempt to re-establish some recognition and following in Army and other Government circles.

For the sake of completeness, we repeat our comments regarding AMEASH from [redacted] 1609:

He appears capable of rash, thoughtless, violent action under the strain of provocation, tense situations, or frustration. For example, he stated to us that last year during a period of defection and frustration, he had contemplated suicide. Although AMEASH appeared to concede some validity to our arguments for planning and for carefully prepared actions, we feel that he will present difficult control and directional problems in any situation. He himself stated several times that he is not the type to sit tight, but prefers solutions to problems by violent, positive actions. AMEASH showed the strain of not trusting anyone. He was according to ANKIP, overjoyed to see him, and talked very, very much about man, many subjects. It is not possible to comment at this time about AMEASH's capacity for loyalty to friends or causes, nor his willingness to see a job through. However, ANKIP assures us that when AMEASH says he'll do something, he will. We don't know at this point.

ANKIP also told us that in discussions subsequent to our meetings with AMEASH, he expressed the hope that "Bill" and his friend (s) in Paris will have a really fruitful, forceful idea and plan of action for him to follow. Otherwise, he said he might drop the whole idea and not go back,

but to forget the whole problem, leave the Cuban fold quietly, and work in Paris or elsewhere, forgetting completely Cuban problems and Cuban politics.

AMWHIP also told us on Sunday that he was truly surprised when AMLASH said he wanted to go back and fight. AMWHIP was sure, as were we, that he would defect, period. AMLASH told AMWHIP that he could not see the point of making a statement regarding defection and the state of affairs in Cuba, and then accepting a dole in Miami. Nor could he see any use in propaganda efforts in Latin America or Europe. Later, after our talks with him, AMLASH told AMWHIP a little different story, i. e., that he would not want to make a public defection statement, because of the probable repercussions against his friends in Cuba for no good reason. This area of thinking needs to be examined at length in Paris. A Spanish-speaking C/O might well do the trick.

STOCKHOLM:

9. Travel to Stockholm.

AMWHIP departed Helsinki for Stockholm on 4 August. Both AMWHIP and AMLASH felt that they had been together enough in Helsinki. AMWHIP also ran onto a refugee newspaper friend of his in Helsinki who was quite curious as to why AMWHIP was there. AMLASH departed Helsinki in the afternoon of 7 August: we took the same flight unbeknownst to AMLASH. No problems were encountered in arriving at Stockholm. We took the next bus after AMLASH to the city. Both AMLASH and AMWHIP stayed at the Palace Hotel, room 528 and 520, respectively. Talks of a general nature were held in our hotel room (the subject) and during the general council. It was obvious that AMLASH had much on his mind. He can return to the

subject of Cuba at any time, with a question, suggestion, or comment upon it, regardless of the context of the general discussion. It was during the talks in Stockholm that AMWHIP revealed that AMLASH had told Naranjo, Ferron, Venegas, and the "Mayor of ^{Paris} Cuba", ~~Manuel Dominguez~~ ^{not} Valdes ~~(?)~~, (in Helsinki) that he was seeing AMWHIP. In Helsinki, he also told the mayor Domingues to tell Saul that he was going on his present itinerary, and that he wanted a refresher course in the Army when he returned home.

COPENHAGEN:

10. Travel to, and Stop in Copenhagen.

AMLASH and AMWHIP took SAS flight 407 to Copenhagen on the afternoon of 10 August. In speaking at length about meeting in Paris, AMLASH felt sure that there would be no problem in getting permission to visit Paris after returning to Prague. He felt that he better not visit Paris first, as it might cause some undue interest in Prague Cuban circles as to why he was away so long. He also had some trouble in getting the Airline to approve his side trips to Stockholm and Copenhagen. They wanted him to fly direct to Prague from Helsinki. He refused their requests, and said that he would pay his own way to Stockholm and Copenhagen (or the difference) if need be. This he finally had to do, for which AMWHIP footed the bill. (perhaps we should later absorb). (He felt that this ability to pay for the extra routing might cause some suspicion among his colleagues. AMLASH said "no", but we are not so sure. Perhaps he can tell them, should they be curious, that AMWHIP paid the bill, as all know he has none, and has, in fact, paid bills before for AMLASH during the time of the Gatti's regime.)

11. Copenhagen, 10 August 1962.

AMHIP and AMLAH arrived as scheduled in Copenhagen and obtained rooms at the Richmond Hotel. AMHIP phoned HBFEXCH as planned and we in turn contacted them by phone at the Richmond at 18:45. A meeting was arranged for 2000 at the bar of the Terminus Hotel. After a drink, the party retired to Divan I for dinner. Apparently the spell of Tivoli, Danish food and snaps, and beer at the student's inn, Faergekroen (in Tivoli), served to mellow AMLAH. He for the first time appeared to talk to us as a friend, rather than as a PBPRIME representative. During supper, and for most of the evening, at intervals, AMLAH talked about himself, his thoughts, and problems. The evening was well worth it, in terms of the rapport and insight gained.

12. AMLAH's Thoughts and Personality.

AMLAH feels basically that he would like to live in a world in peace under an acceptable political system, practicing medicine, thus giving expression to his desire to help the less-fortunate people, and from this to find happiness for himself, something he seeks, but which heretofore has eluded him. As a young student he got into the struggle against Batista without thinking much about the future, particularly that it could be less than perfect. He soon found that the opposing parties in Cuba, and in particular the Communists, were not about to bring true peace and contentment to the people, but rather through mismanagement and poor planning, had created unnecessary hardships for the people. After his fighting time was over (or so he thought), AMLAH became a student again and leader of the FCL. This did not satisfy him and he sought to leave politics all together, and return to medicine. The political climate,

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however, and the acceptance of AMLASH as a military leader by the people rather than as a doctor (Hello Commandante! not, Hello Doctor!) forced AMLASH to reconsider his future, and to decide that he must flee Cuba or fight against what he considers a ruinous future for his country and her people. This time, however, he hopes to make the "operation" successful, and never again subject the patient to another such ordeal. Then when he is sure that the political and social outlook for the Cuban people and the country are sound, he would like to try once more to enter private life as a doctor. He is not sure, however, that this will ever come about. AMLASH was also quite frank, we thought, in his conversation with us concerning his views on the PBRPME position vis-a-vis Latin America. (And, although he had nothing to say which has not been said by many before him, they were interesting to hear from a disenchanted Cuban revolutionary.) He feels that PBRPME is simply not getting "through" to the youth and students of Latin America, as are the Communists, and for this simple reason alone, the next ten years (when these students become the political and economic leaders in Latin America) will see us lose the struggle for Latin America. He recalled to us in the old line that PBRPME realizes only too well to's that there were serious shortcomings in our Latin American policy for a number of years and that now we are doing what we can to correct this. However, it is not our policy, (said with tongue in cheek) to attempt to alter these conditions or influence future events by going behind the backs of the established governments in the various Latin American countries. Instead, we must take the often slow, laborious path of working through these governments, however bad they may be, in our attempts to guide and influence the minds of Latin

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American youth. AMLASH said that he understood why we take this point of view, but nevertheless, if we intended to win the struggle, we must do as the Communists do, and disregard the archaic and doomed old-line governments in Latin America. We agreed that this was undoubtedly the more aggressive way to deal with the problem, but that such methods would leave us open to the old familiar charges of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. AMLASH smiled and replied that from a practical viewpoint this didn't make any difference, for if we didn't act forcefully and soon, there wouldn't be any opportunities there for us to be open to anything! He then cited Venezuela as the next obvious Communist victim and thereby a loss of another opportunity for PEPRIE. Obviously AMLASH was correct in much of his thinking, but rather than standing still with our shoes untied, we gave him the ball by soliciting from him, as a former student leader and politician, any ideas he might have for combating the Communists in the struggle for the minds of Latin American youth. He replied that he would be glad at any time to discuss this problem and to offer what ideas and suggestions he could.

As a result of the discussions of this evening, we felt that AMLASH now was genuinely interested in getting Cuba out of its present predicament with the active aid of PEPRIE. AMLASH seemed more sincere and interested in discussing his thoughts and problems with us than at any previous time. He no doubt examined over in his own mind (or at least declined to reveal this to us) his record as president of the FIA. The full story of this period from his side would be most interesting. However, we felt that a discussion of this particular subject requires the use of Spanish and the precise context.

As a matter of record, AMLASH stated during the evening that he had met Algeria's Ben Bella at one time and knows him more than casually. He felt that the man bears strict watching by the West as a measure of protecting its interests in developments in Algeria. AMLASH thought Ben Bella was a clever man, devious, and ambitious, and not to be taken too literally at his word.

In dealing with AMLASH, one trait of his which confronts the C/O at every turn is his temperamental reactions over points which would generally be considered minor. For example, at one time when we were discussing the various aspects of AMLASH's future role in Cuba, we used the term "assassinate". The use of this term, we later learned from AMCHIP and from AMLASH himself, was most objectionable to the latter, and he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely the choice of word used to describe it. "Eliminate" was acceptable, but obviously the term "assassinate" had a distasteful connotation. From discussions with AMCHIP, this label of "assassin" had been given to AMLASH after some of his escapades against Batista supporters in the pre-Castro era. Another example, which AMCHIP discussed with us, occurred during a meeting in Mexico City in March 1961, when a KURAKI said to AMLASH, "I'm prepared to help you in any way within my power". According to AMCHIP, AMLASH later turned to him, shrugging his shoulders in a manner of saying, "Do I need help from him?" These examples are pointed out here in order to indicate the degree of pride and sensitivity one finds in AMLASH, and to note that however tedious this attitude may become to the C/O, it is, from personal experience, quite necessary to adjust one's approach accordingly in order to secure AMLASH's maximum cooperation.

13. Paris Meeting Arrangements.

AMLASH has been given AM-HIP's hotel in Paris, Franklin Hotel, 19 Rue Buffault (telephone T-U 6960). AM-HIP will reserve a room there for AMLASH, who can come there directly after he has landed in Paris. We also had another contact address in the form of the office of a jeweler friend and business contact of AM-HIP's - M. B. Rosenblatt, 20 Cite-Treuisse (Telephone TAI-7438). Rosenblatt's number has not been given to AMLASH. In discussing security precautions with AM-HIP, it is obvious, that he still is not possessed of a good sense of security by normal clandestine ops standards. This, however, can be improved over a period of time.

Note: Subject expressed interest in obtaining expert instruction in use of silenced-equipped rifles and in use and handling of plastic explosives. This can be handled from France on priority basis, it is felt, after preliminary discussions in Paris.

PARIS:

14. Events of 12 August 1962.

According to prior arrangements with AM-HIP and AMLASH, AM-HIP would see AMLASH off to Zurich from Fastrup Airport on 12 August, then take a late afternoon flight down to Paris. As it turned out, however, AMLASH was able to book a passage on a Hungarian Airlines (Tarom) flight to Prague, via East Berlin's Schoenefeld Airport. AM-HIP later took the early evening flight to Paris. We took the 11:00 AM flight the same night.

In Paris, AM-HIP took a room (110) as planned at the Hotel Franklin, where he remained throughout his stay in Paris. He also booked a room for AMLASH. We arrived in Paris at 0115, 12 August, booking a room (211) at the Hotel Berlin, 2 Rue Marechal-Lacaze (ANJ-720).

15. Events of 13 August 1962.

On the morning of 13 August, we checked into EFFINCH to discuss the Paris meetings with Peter J. Fymington. Thru his good office we were able to arrange for precautionary surveillance of AM/HIP and AMLASH, obtain use of a Station safehouse, and effect other arrangements as necessary. The cooperation and help of the Paris Station was excellent. Following this meeting, we went to a small bistro near our hotel, phoned AM/HIP, and arranged for a meeting in our hotel room at 1830.

This meeting took place in our hotel room (#51) at the Hotel Roblin, at 1830. The purpose was merely to meet AM/HIP and reassure him that arrangements for AMLASH's meeting were laid on. We also made arrangements to give him his expenses for the trip and account for same during a meeting the following day. This will permit him to leave for Milan without delay at the close of our business with AMLASH. He was getting "nervous", as he called it, and will be glad to get this business over and done. We agreed. He wanted to remain until the conclusions of the talks with AMLASH, however, for he felt that he could be of use in handling AMLASH. We agreed. He did not, of course, want to be in on any operational discussions, but just to be on hand to handle his temperamental "charge".

He was very anxious to meet Wallace L. Groves in order to point out to him in advance some of the quips in AMLASH's personality. In talking to us, AM/HIP said that a person with the background of AMLASH, must be handled in a certain manner, and if done, he will respond. AM/HIP told us that while he is of course subjective about AMLASH, he also realized that he is of a different background and more unflattering than either we or himself, and that in order to get him to produce and cooperate, the problem must be approached in a certain way. He said

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that AMLASH is very proud and independent. He does not want to feel he has to take help from anyone. AMCHIP said that this is a rather naive way to look at it, but AMLASH does, and for this reason, one must be careful not to appear to be buying him. We said that we understood this, and were willing to advance our arguments in any manner necessary to get AMLASH's cooperation, but that eventually AMLASH must be made to realize that, though he is of no little importance to us, he is after all, the only one man with one man's resources.

AMCHIP continually stressed the point that to work with people like AMLASH, it was necessary to have them first accept a person either by personal contact over a period of time or on the recommendation of a good friend. He felt that while it was necessary for us to spend some time becoming acquainted with AMLASH, it also might be necessary for Grover to go slow at first. This, we said to AMCHIP was all right, up to a point, but that we felt quite enough time had been spent with AMLASH already, and that the meetings in Paris were going to get down to business quickly, and proceed as necessary to conclude business as rapidly as possible. We felt that AMCHIP understood our point.

During this talk, AMCHIP again expressed the feeling that if Cuba is not returned to freedom within two years, he was going to set up business permanently in Paris or Southern California, and forget the idea of returning. He was obviously moved by the finality of such a decision, as he is a real Cuban patriot. Or so we believe.

We agreed to contact AMCHIP by telephone at his hotel at 1200 on 14 August (Tuesday). Subsequently a meeting at 1700 in our hotel room.

15. Events of 14 August 1952.

As agreed, we called AM-CHIP at his hotel at 1700 on 14 August and arranged a meeting for 1700 in our hotel room. At the 1700 meeting AM-CHIP informed us that AMEASH had arrived as promised from Prague about noon-time, and was already inquiring about a meeting time with "the man from Washington". AM-CHIP was told that "the man from Washington", (whom they in the future called "Jaime" as they could not readily pronounce Growery's true first name) was not able to arrive before that afternoon, and that a meeting with him could not take place before the 16th. Also, AM-CHIP was reminded that he himself had stated that it would be best for him (AM-CHIP) to talk to Jaime first in order to explain AMEASH's personality. AM-CHIP was unhappy that this meeting could not take place immediately, but said he would explain the matter to AMEASH. This meeting, it is noted, took place initially at a small cafe across the street from our hotel, so that we could finger AM-CHIP to two surveillants of the Paris Station. The two principals then retired to our hotel room for the remainder of the meeting. We said to AM-CHIP that we would check in with him by phone the following day and inform him whether there was any chance of Jaime arriving on that day, the 16th.

At this meeting, AM-CHIP was also paid \$300.00 to cover hotel bills for him and AMEASH in Helsinki, Copenhagen and Stockholm.

16. Events of 15 August 1952.

We phoned AM-CHIP at his hotel at 1300 to inform him that there was no chance in plans and that the best we could do was to call him again that evening. AM-CHIP said that he would be out all evening; arrangements were then made that AM-CHIP should call us at our hotel at

2200. Subsequently, AM-HIP did call as agreed, and was informed that he could plan to come to our room tomorrow, the 16th, at 0900. The hour bothered him (too early) but he said he could make it.

Later the same evening, Kynington, Grover and us met to discuss plans for the meetings tomorrow. At this meeting Kynington disclosed that his team had detected what was believed to be surveillance of AM-HIP and AM-LASH. To be positive he planned to have the meeting the next day surveilled. Grover agreed to come at 0900 for preliminary talks with AM-HIP.

15. Events of 14 August 1962.

Grover arrived within five minutes of appointed time at our hotel room. AM-HIP arrived later at 1015, apologizing for his tardiness (a late evening!). Breakfast was provided and, after introductory amenities, the two began their talk, in Spanish. The talks terminated at 1230. The second meeting of the day was postponed until 1500, as AM-LASH was not feeling too well.

Later at the Station, Kynington revealed that he now believed the morning meeting had been surveilled and that efforts were being made to determine who was responsible. It was readily established that it was not Cuban or Soviet exercise, but rather one by one of the French services or local police. Since it was pointless to stop the meeting now and the address of the safehouse had not been mentioned verbatim, it was decided to continue as planned. Data will forward account of surveillance and outcome as soon as possible. When we left Madrid, it was determined that this "surveillance" of our meeting did have been a real first conference, and the subject of the surveillance was another target, not us. It is to be noted, however, the meeting was a report should resolve to s.

Growery and we arrived at the safehouse (19 b's rue Spontini, XVI) ahead of AMLASH and AM-NHIP. A tape recorder was installed. At 1615, AMLASH and AM-NHIP arrived. Shortly after introductions, Growery and AMLASH were talking business in Spanish. After about 30 minutes, we took AM-NHIP out of the flat on the pretense of buying food, in order that the two principals could talk freely. Procuring food and beer, we returned after a two hour absence, and made a cold supper for the four. The meeting terminated about 1930, AMLASH and AM-NHIP leaving some 15 minutes before us. Arrangements had been made for a meeting at 1000 the following day for further talks, and beginning of S/i training.

17. Events of 17 August 1962.

At 1000 Growery met with AMLASH for several hours. Arrangements were made for AMLASH to return to the safehouse for S/i training that afternoon at 1100. (See S/i training report for account of meeting.) Before breaking up, arrangements were made for a continuation of the S/i training the following day.

18. Events of 18 August 1962.

(See S/i report for account of training this meeting conducted at the aforementioned safehouse. Account of debriefing of AMLASH during this meeting and others to be filed by Growery. All debriefing of AMLASH by Growery was conducted in the Spanish language.)

19. Events of 19 August 1962.

Meeting was held at 1900 at safehouse. Account of meeting to be included in Growery's report.

20. Events of 20 August 1962.

Kymington and Grovery picked us up at Madalaine church at 0600, and proceeded to rendezvous with AMLASH. Counter-surveillance detected no apparent observation of the pickup of us. The four then proceeded by car to the Army Air Corps Support Element at St. Andres, for its demonstration and instruction in plastic explosives. The classroom work and the field demonstration lasted until 1130, at which time the four proceeded back to Paris. AMLASH was let out of the car in the suburbs and told to take a taxi back to his hotel. Kymington took some snapshots of AMLASH receiving this instruction. These are not too satisfactory, but nevertheless, will be enlarged and forwarded for the files.

The participants met later that evening at 2100 for a drink and critique and comments of the days activities. AMLASH seemed quite satisfied with the demonstrations, but was interested in having smaller explosive packages with more force, and a remote control method for detonating them. The meeting was short and broke up at 2200. It was agreed to meet once more on 22 August for a final briefing session at Grovery's hotel room (in the Crillon) at 1200.

21. Events of 22 August 1962.

AMLASH came alone and on time to this meeting. A tape recorder was in operation. About one hour was spent on a review of S/I, followed by requirements, and tasks to be performed or looked into upon AMLASH's return. (See Grovery's report for tasks and S/I report for this section of meeting.) Arrangements for emergency contact in Paris were set up using the phone of a contract SUPAINE of Paris Station. AMRTP and we made arrangements for a meeting at Queen's for 1000, 23 August.

22. Events of 23 August 1962.

At the morning meeting, AM-HIP said that AMLASH wanted to see us on a matter concerning C/I. The meeting was arranged for 1300 at the rue Spontini safehouse. This meeting took only a few minutes as the problem was minor. AMLASH and AM-HIP departed the safehouse at 1325. We left a little after. This was the last time we were to see either AMLASH or AM-HIP in Europe.

23. Events of 25 August 1962.

AMLASH departed for Prague. He left Paris at 1045 aboard PAA 119 for New York.

26. Miscellaneous Comments on Case, Personalities, and Actions in Paris.

AMLASH's attitude in Paris was essentially that which it had been during the previous contacts in Scandinavia, that is, changeable as the weather, varying from occasional flashes of wit and mirth to degrees of discouragement and perhaps despondency. He was generally receptive and interested in procedures and conversations during the meetings and during periods of instruction. He makes little attempt to disguise his feelings, should he become tired, bored, or disinterested. His social graces are not the sharpest honed. He can, however, be reasoned with, even in some of his contrary moods. AM-HIP was particularly effective in reaching him during these. We are in complete agreement with AM-HIP when he describes AMLASH as being full of complexes. But further than that, AMLASH not only has complexes as such, but it is felt that he is generally preoccupied with his thoughts presumably about problems Cuban, and is often seen only incapable of maintaining his interest in things about him for any length

of time. If one is discussing Cuba, however, he obviously is very interested. Therefore, it might well be that he is actually so pre-occupied with thoughts about problems at home, that all else is secondary and treated accordingly. When, on occasion, he "opened up" a bit with us, it was obvious that he had done, and was doing, a great deal of thinking about Cuban problems. It may be that Growery will have much more to say on this point, as their discussions were in AMLACH's native tongue. On many occasions, AMLACH is rather exasperating to deal with, but we feel that this is a trait of his which is a normal facet of his personality, and not assumed to try the metal of his case officers. We may be wrong, but doubt it.

27. Physical Appearance:

AMLACH is about 5'11", weighs about 175 lbs., dark wavy hair, thinning noticeably on top and usually needs combing; brown eyes, small, almost pectulant mouth, small nose, pale complexion, eyes are a little small for his face and very intense in expression. He prefers dressing informally, and is prone to wearing jackets with no tie. (He could mingle with the typical small town corner-loungers without difficulty.) When dressed up, he presents a good appearance in a masculine way, and apparently from AMWHIP's stories, does quite well with the women. Concerning the question of his being a homosexual, we cannot say whether he has a hidden bent in this direction, but if he does, he is not at any rate, a purist but rather AC-DC.

28. Language.

Native Spanish, fair to good English, but with limited vocabulary. He can be successfully conversed with us in English, but it has to be done slowly and with basic constructed sentences. It is not possible to be articulate with him, if he is expected to grasp the full meaning of the conversation.

29. Family.

AMLASH is separated from his wife, and stated that since he is going to undertake to work against the regime, he could not go back to her if he wanted (which we don't think he does) as she has been too outspoken in her dislike of the Castro regime and of her desire to get out of Cuba. AMLASH's mother lives with him as she is divorced from his father. AMLASH's father is in the tailoring business and has recently married a girl many years his junior. AMLASH does not approve.

30. Girl Friends.

AMLASH is on good terms with a Pan American stewardess of French descent who is based in Miami. AMWHIP said to us that he thought she was with us, but we replied we really did not know. AMLASH also is friendly with the Cuban dancer Son'a CALENO, whom he telephoned from Paris to give the return date to Havana.

31. Pastimes.

AMLASH likes nightclubbing and dancing. He is also interested to a limited degree in architecture and historical buildings and sculpture.

It is interesting to note that AMWHIP was reluctant to answer many questions about AMLASH's private affairs. He felt that this was not in good taste (somewhat) and most of the information in this report was obtained by elicitation rather than direct questions.

32. AMLASH's Original Schedule in Paris.

AMLASH was interested in coming to Paris, executing his business with us in the first three days, then checking into the Cuba House or a small hotel on the left bank, and socializing with the Cubans at their tables in Paris. He also wanted to spend some time on the Riviera

(several days), as he felt, or so he told AM-CHIP; it may be some time before he would see this area again. As it turned out, scheduling for the Grocery meetings, S/I training, and plastics demonstrations precluded his taking the Riviera trip, and also postponed his seeing his Cuban friends. He finally went to the Embassy on Tuesday, 21 August to make what contacts he felt were necessary. As it turned out, Gramatges and most of the men were away on vacations, etc., so that his late showing at the Embassy was not a problem at all. No plans had been laid on for his entertainment by the Embassy, and no one, it turned out, was expecting him at any definite time after his leaving Prague. He felt much better, AM-CHIP reported, after he had made the Embassy appearance and learned the above facts.

33. Money Banked by AMLASH.

At our last meeting with AM-CHIP on 23 August, he said that AMLASH had given him \$500.00 to be banked in Paris or elsewhere against a rainy day. It is also interesting to note that while AM-CHIP said that any offer of money to AMLASH would be an affront to him, AMLASH readily allowed AM-CHIP to pick up the tabs for the hotel rooms and all expenses incurred during the trip, including a number of new pieces for his wardrobe, and the plane tickets to Prague from Paris. AM-CHIP said that when they dined together on 22 August, AMLASH insisted on picking up the tab, stating that he felt he should get this one, then expressed surprise at the expense of living in Paris. Neither did AMLASH seem to worry when it was we who picked up several tabs in Scandinavia. Funny sense of obligations and finances!

RICHARD M. FALLON
TF/PI