

**INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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<b>COUNTRY</b>	Cuba	<b>REPORT NO.</b>	CS-311/00345-64
<b>SUBJECT</b>	Policy Guidance for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Issued by the MA Department (Intelligence) of the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia - DGI)	<b>DATE DISTR.</b>	10 July 1964
<b>DATE OF INFO.</b>	1964	<b>NO. PAGES</b>	5
<b>PLACE &amp; DATE ACQ.</b>	June 1964	<b>REFERENCES</b>	CS-311/00115-64
		<b>FIELD REPORT NO.</b>	

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**SOURCE:** A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964. Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

**Headquarters Comment.** The following is a translation of a document which source provided this Agency and concerns the General Directorate of Intelligence's (Direccion General de Inteligencia - DGI) MA Department policy guidance for its Cuban intelligence representatives in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. The MA Department no longer exists, as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and the National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional - LN).

**COUNTRY: SECTION M  
SECTION M-A OUTLINE**

**ESSENTIALS:**

1. COLLECTIVE ACTION
2. NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT
3. TRAINING CAMPS AND OPERATIONS BASES
4. COMMUNIST PARTIES
5. ARMED FORCES
6. MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH CUBA
7. REPRESSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND CIA

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GROUP 1  
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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	NR	OCR	FBI 2
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(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#")								

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							LX-1524
							NO PROJECT
							(AMNUG-1)
							CS-311/00345-64
CI/LS	12	(for AF/OSI, ACS, CNI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)					COORDINATING/RELEASING
TOTALS	IE 3,	CI 21,	RID/AN 1,	WH SA 35 (5)	LIAISON *		WH/SA/CI RAO/RWT
	WH 11 (37),	AF 8 (8),	EE 8 (16),	FE 12 (8),	NF 17 (19)		es



8. SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA MOVEMENT
9. INTERNAL POLITICAL LIFE
10. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
11. COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

IMPORTANT:

12. CATHOLIC CHURCH
13. ECUMENICAL COUNCIL REPERCUSSIONS
14. ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
15. FOREIGN POLICY
16. OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

NECESSARY:

17. MINREX OPERATION AND DIPLOMATIC CORPS
18. PRESS
19. PRENSA LATINA ("LATIN PRESS")
20. LABOR MOVEMENT
21. ECONOMY

SECTION M-A

ANALYSIS ABOUT THE POLITICAL INFORMATION WORK:

BACKGROUND:

The M-A task presents some deficiencies, undoubtedly a product of the minimum exploitation of its informative resources and to the lack of orientation with regard to the information that is needed.

In M-A we can observe three working zones, each one with different characteristics: a) MEXICO, b) CENTRAL AMERICA and c) THE CARIBBEAN. An analysis of each follows.

a) MEXICO

The lack of information about MEXICO and events taking place there is really alarming. Concretely we can point out that we do not receive any information about the internal political situation of Mexico.

This deficiency can be easily overcome if attention is paid to the orientations of the guidelines and objectives plan, since the Center in Mexico has contact capabilities with the political forces of the country, at the necessary level, it appears, to obtain this type of information.

With regard to the relations with Mexico or the official policy of the country, we can point out that although the information received is larger in volume, this work is not exploiting the information facilities.

Besides, in the first as well as the second case, the sources available to the Center are not known in the Information Service. We can deduce the information capabilities by analyzing circles or individuals from whom the information is obtained. However, we don't know what the relations are between the Center and these informants, therefore we cannot guide the information collection effort.

b) CENTRAL AMERICA

The information with regard to this region is still worse than in respect to MEXICO. As far as political information is concerned, we note the absence of sources of information and of concrete information about current matters.

Information about the political life of these countries is almost nil, especially with regard to current matters. Information about political matters is frequently received from this region, but almost always they refer to reports from a specific source about his own party or about disagreements, very generalized, with other leftist forces.

Lately, for the last three or four months (actually since early September), a decrease in the total volume of information received has been observed, especially with regard to intelligence information about the national liberation movement in Central America. With regard to other matters (political life, relations with Cuba, solidarity, etc.) the fact is that we have received information, although very limited.

c) THE CARIBBEAN

With respect to Santo Domingo and Haiti, we can say that the job in these two countries is nil, as far as the collection of information is concerned.

We have only received from Haiti, since the month of May, two or three information reports of limited value and they were received through M-N.

With regard to Santo Domingo the situation is very similar. Although some information reports have been received, they come from public (overt) sources (newspapers from progressive organizations, manifests, newspaper clippings, etc.) and occasionally political reports about current events and the way of struggle in the country, drafted by a member of a progressive organization.

NEEDS:

a) MEXICO

Given the importance of the situation in Mexico, for Cuba, basically because it is an important way of contact with Latin America, it is NECESSARY to reinforce our job as far as its RELATIONS WITH CUBA is concerned. This means that we are interested and need to intensify our work with the official organizations from Mexico (Presidency, MINREX, Congress, etc.) having something to do with Cuban relations, so as to have the elements of judgment and information about the future of these relations and above all of the North American plans and pressures on MEXICO with regard to their relations with Cuba and the Mexican position to that respect.

Similarly, we are interested in second place in knowing about the situation among the political forces in MEXICO, especially with regard to leftist forces and their role and importance individually.

And lastly, it is necessary, in our opinion, to develop an organized and methodical task, according to the guidelines and objectives of the plan, with the available sources of information from the Section or the Center in Mexico so as to use them more rationally. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT IN THIS SECTION, AS WELL AS IN M-S, A TENDENCY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM SOURCES IN CUBA IS NOTED.

b) CENTRAL AMERICA

In this region it is necessary to emphasize the obtaining of information about plans of aggression in Cuba, especially with regard to possibilities of collective action against Cuba.

On the other hand, work should be strengthened with regard to the situation and plans of the national liberation movement in the region and in each country. An effort should be made to get to know, completely, what the role and the position of every leftist force is, since there are countries, like Nicaragua, where it is not known, due to lack of information, what role each force is playing and which are their relations with us. We consider that we must establish contacts to work constantly and periodically with each of the leftist forces in these countries. Only this way we will be able to overcome the deficiency.

c) The situation in these countries is very serious, from the standpoint of the information work. As we have said, we have no information about them. We consider that the first matter to solve is to know the sources from which we can obtain information and at the same time establish contact with all the friendly forces in order to obtain information.

ANALYSIS ABOUT INFORMATION ON ENEMY ACTIVITIES WORK:

BACKGROUND:

About the information work with countries in the M-A Section with regard to information about counter-revolutionary-type and aggression plans we can point out, in general, its principal successes and deficiencies.

Through previous experience and the analysis of information received from the countries of this Section concerning counter-revolutionary activities, it was confirmed once more that this is the zone preferred by Imperialism for locating training camps for counter-revolutionary elements, getting to the point where this assumes serious characteristics in certain places or specific zones, such as the case of the Peten zone in Guatemala and Puerto Cabezas and the Maiz Islands in Nicaragua.

From information about this type of activity we can point out that some was incomplete and fragmentary, observing in many cases the absolute lack of exploitation of a source; this fact meant from the standpoint of our work serious difficulties, since this limited considerably our possibilities of indirect confirmation, that is, through other different sources, as well as a series of derivative difficulties such as the lack of continuity in the information, lack of confirmation, lack of contact and guidance as to the source objectives, etc.

Analyzing all these previous phenomena we can point out a definite guideline with regard to our work for this Section during the forthcoming year, this guideline would cover the following aspects that will be basic from the standpoint of aggression plans.

1. Location of training camps for Cuban mercenaries, conclusion as to the type of training they get and their number, as well as their resources.
2. Detection of enemy aggression plans through the Armed Forces of Central American countries and through the so-much mentioned collective action, or something similar.
3. Location of operations bases for pirate launches and counter-revolutionary groups that will operate from nearby countries. This is directly related with the plans for penetrating the enemy.
4. Penetrate and have full information about enemy's anti-guerrilla plans and its development. These would be the tasks to be developed during the year, accordingly, and following the general guidelines and objectives of the current work.