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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/USSR

TDCS -3/573,022

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY TO EARLY FEBRUARY 1964

DISTR 13 FEBRUARY 1964

SUBJECT

- 1. POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF SOVIET SUBMARINES TO CUBA DURING 1964
- 2. CUBAN CONTROL OF LAND-TO-SEA ROCKET SITES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (9 FEBRUARY 1964)

REFD-ACQ-03298N
TDCSDB-3/659,020
FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

A CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE OFFICER WHO IS AN HONEST REPORTER AND WHO HAS SUPPLIED GENERALLY ACCURATE INFORMATION IN THE PAST. HE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM A CUBAN NAVAL OFFICER WHO IS ASSIGNED TO THE KOMAR-CLASS GUIDED-MISSILE BOATS.

1. IT IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD BY OFFICERS OF THE CUBAN NAVY THAT THE CUBAN MILITARY WILL RECEIVE TWO OR THREE SUBMARINES FROM THE SOVIET UNION DURING 1964. DURING 1963, MANY MEN WERE SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE TRAINING. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THOSE SENT FOR NAVAL TRAINING WERE MOSTLY YOUNG MEN TO BE TRAINED IN SUBMARINE HANDLING AND MAINTENANCE AND THAT UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR SCHOOLING THEY WILL RETURN TO CUBA IN THE SUBMARINES.

2. THE RUSSIANS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING OVER COMMAND OF THE LAND-TO-SEA ROCKET SITES TO CUBAN SOLDIERS. ONLY A FEW

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TECHNICIANS ARE REMAINING AT THE SITES TO INSTRUCT AND ADVISE THE CUBAN FORCES.

3. IN JANUARY 1964, RUSSIAN OIL-DRILLING CREWS STRUCK OIL ON CAYO FRANCES; THE STRIKE IS PRODUCING 300 BARRELS A DAY. TO GUARD THE INSTALLATION, SEVEN OR EIGHT YACHTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO PATROL THE AREA OF THE KEY AND BETWEEN 200 AND 300 MEN ARMED WITH BAZOOKAS, MORTARS, AND RIFLES HAVE BEEN MOVED THERE. MANY OF THE RIFLES ARE EQUIPPED WITH SNIPER SCOPES.

4. AS OF EARLY FEBRUARY, THERE WERE RUMORS TO THE EFFECT THAT A CONSPIRACY WITHIN THE MILITARY WAS BEING ORGANIZED. ALLEGEDLY THE TALK OF SUCH A CONSPIRACY IS THUS FAR CLOSELY GUARDED BY MILITARY OFFICERS. THE GROUP BEING ORGANIZED IS SAID TO BE COMPOSED OF ARMY, NAVY, AND POLICE OFFICERS OF HIGH RANK AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME SMALL ARMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED SECRETLY.

5. AFTER THE ATTACK ON THE TWO PT BOATS NEAR ISLA DE PINOS, CASTRO ORDERED THAT WORK ON THEIR REPAIR MUST TAKE TOP PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER MILITARY WORK. HOWEVER, REPAIR CREWS ARE EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES MAKING THE NECESSARY REPAIRS, SINCE THEY EITHER CANNOT REPLACE THE DAMAGED PORTIONS OF MACHINERY BECAUSE THEY LACK THE NECESSARY RUSSIAN SPARE PARTS OR CANNOT MAKE THE REPAIRS BECAUSE OF LACK OF KNOW-HOW. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE

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PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THE EFFECT OF COMMANDO RAIDS ON CUBA IN TDCSDB-3/659,020, DATED 15 JANUARY 1964.)

6. IN THE RECENT ATTACK AT SIGUANEA, ISLA DE PINOS, THE CUBAN GUARDS DID NOT FIRE ON THE ATTACKERS BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID THEIR SHOTS MIGHT SET OFF EXPLOSIVE CHARGES UNDER THE ROCKETS. THE PORT OF CABAÑAS, ALTHOUGH REINFORCED SINCE RECENT ATTACKS, WOULD BE AN EASIER TARGET FOR A RAID THAN THE ISLA DE PINOS AREA. THE PORT IS PROTECTED BY ONLY A FEW GUARDS ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS, AND IT IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE BETWEEN THE HOURS OF MIDNIGHT AND 3 A.M.

7. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

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(15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT