REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 294821

1. Being forwarded are copies of the QRPHONE/1 training report, the evaluation, contact reports of meetings with QRPHONE/1, a WOGRAR review of QRPHONE/1's book and some notes made by the STFIFLAM Headquarters officer, after his meetings with QRPHONE/1. These are for the information of both LCPIPI and Station and, taken together, should give you both the flavor of the variety of measures taken to assess the operational potential of QRPHONE/1.

2. During TTY at Headquarters we discussed the necessity of having QRPHONE/1 undergo an intensive seven day STFIFLAM training program to be conducted. It is our opinion that in order for this training to be of maximum benefit, QRPHONE/1 ought to be ensconced in a safehouse facility which provides security, comfort and an atmosphere conducive to learning. It is important that the training be conducted in a locale which will allow QRPHONE to give his full attention without being disturbed by his multitude of business and social contacts. Therefore, we recommend that LCPIPI rent a cottage or beach house away from for the duration of the training cycle. In discussing this with QRPHONE, he readily agreed and indicated that there would be no difficulty in getting away from his family for as long as we thought necessary.

Attachments:
A. As stated (u/a/c)
B. Idem Sheet (u/a/c)

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DISPATCH
simply would tell them and his business contacts that he was traveling on the continent. Please advise us of the dates which are determined to be convenient to and ORPHONE/1. The Headquarters officer would prefer either the third or fourth week of September, and certainly not before.

3. As indicated in the reference we solicit comments from LCP1P1 and Station on the results of our varied assessments of ORPHONE/1 and our decision to move ahead in the new operational directions described in OKPW-1661. We view the coming year as a trial one for these purposes and the Project Renewal has been submitted with that understanding clearly described.

4. Since ORPHONE/1 might refer to conversations he had with should know that used the alias "Bob" in all his meetings with ORPHONE/1.
27 June 1972

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QUPHEX/1,
Training Program "BIAM"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of WOHL, From Chief, WOLME, dated 27 May 1972.
Subject: "Cover Training for QUPHEX/1"

1. OUPHEX/1 was trained covertly from 22 June to 30 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty-seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainees and instructor. Less than two years ago, QUPHEX was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, QUPHEX was utterly engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, QUPHEX brought a sandwich with his daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for [insert name] and on the few phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, those calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, especially, of his free time with the result that he could not do any studying to speak of for subsequent preparation of some plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop come plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week — and then with only one written one and one that he received orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his counterintelligence exercises and one of his agent development exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time and during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).
In the developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer — and a real dual—job he was. In such circumstances, ENS's had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the writing for meeting notes, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. Then __________, during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job." ENS had surprised that accolade all by himself, the instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of __________, who played his idiot role excellently well and made the exercising a meaningful one for ENS. The three trips to Buzz have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming 214 trip, but they were efforts well spent.

Enos, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our ENS had his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 index card out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from those few words, to ramble off his plan without a single pause for an "uh", "eh", "um", etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, as smoothly did his mind and thought run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have a facile mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full, as important an act as a recruitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for ENS's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. ENS felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the oral dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the paper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing — area
description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability — it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he devoted these off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Some thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting — no pause to think, no reconstruction, to remember — just as لبنان-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a desk report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, when the second meeting in the development series, the instructor said "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" and, as already reported above, FR submariners preferred to save the training time and he assured "I will make time to write it." In this case, the way of the essence because had to see the report before the next meeting. In sum, the instructor feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, said, were excellent. He judging to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading FR's report on his actions during the counter-surveillance exercises, remarked at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants FR had noted, including their ages (but always made each seem an inch or two shorter than their actual height — which FR had admitted he does constantly), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every street direction. After the first counter-surveillance exercise, along EN without a moment's prior notice, he made one of the surveillants. In the second case, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. There were two different teams from the WOBONE.

Concluding his admiration of FR's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructors: "You should be very proud of him."

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of FR's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, thus spends time to browse in a book shop, then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear
Self-control. These are a typical habits. The instructor, also, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly tickled in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a cross-ay street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always use 9,9.13, this doesn't g, the word." By sheerest coincidence, then the instructor was on his way to the airbase to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a cross-ay street and was knocked over by a hippie on a loaded bike—going the wrong way. Only the large heavy tires case the instructor was scraping kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, EUNR is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. (The last note on the counter-surveillance exercises) He chose his positions well and he concealed his actions beautifully.
(a) Example 1: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three-way conversation. They reported one incident in full: "To rapid were EUNR's movements, that even his friend, he hardly paused to speak with, but hurried his car.

(b) Example 2: "Go, it didn't look like it was going to get. So, it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped EUNR and asked him for directions, and EUNR gave them and just went about his business." EUNR's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "Where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin, and asked him for the Ruxam which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed north to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand."

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the term was surprised to note in EUNR's report that EUNR even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed EUNR into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the term compared notes and decided that EUNR may have made two of them but could have possibly have made the third one. The term captain, on reading EUNR's report, was stunned to see that EUNR had indeed made the third one, but good.

18. EUNR had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with an instructor in the office. After relating the fine job that EUNR had done, the instructor's report concludes: "A first rate performance by EUNR, who's evidently been around — both counterwise and far real!"

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be explained. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomats, as held himself cut to be, would properly be seen dining).
Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that SIM, himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an excessively noisy new restaurant near this restaurant was located in the safe site complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safe site from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in carrying out recognition meetings and the brush passes. He had no time to write his own camo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop camo plan) so he was given camo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the reports carried no false intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: SIM is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure cruelty. This, like the previous item, is noted not to dear grade SIM, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset, and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's rank and number. Please ask the field station to send the report directly to this station with the number 187/7. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

For the Director of WOJOOLD.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. I met with QRPHONE/1 for much of the 12th of July and wearing two hats. We first went through the third phase of the training exercise in which I had been playing the role of an agent prospect whom he was to assess and recruit, and then later in the OTR safehouse I identified myself as the Headquarters officer responsible for his project. Incidentally, he did an excellent job in all three phases of the training exercise and did particularly well on the recruitment itself. QRPHONE/1 is clever, imaginative, has an excellent grasp of this aspect of tradecraft and handled himself particularly well in a complex and changing training scenario.

2. As the Headquarters staff officer responsible for his project, I described in detail the reasons for the long, serious look at his performance these last several months, the changing intelligence and operational requirements we face, and the careful scrutiny he had been given as we began to map out new directions for him, all of which ended with this advance four-week training program, testing, and evaluation and substantive briefings. He said he was a bit confused by the WOMBUSE briefing of last week so I explained how that tied in with this evening's planned discussion on the China program.

3. We discussed his itinerary, personal plans and the pacing of the next several months, all of which were clarified to his satisfaction.

a. He will be debriefed on 24 July at 1000 hours at the OTR safehouse following his return from the operational trip around the country.

b. I will meet him for the final operational briefing session at 1000 hours on 26 July in the same OTR safehouse.
c. He will depart the night of 28 July on the 8:00 p.m. TWA flight to London.

d. This will get him in London in time for a previously scheduled ops meeting with on 27 July. He leaves on 1 August for a one-month vacation touring most of Europe with his family and spending one week in Malta.

4. Before the arrival of we discussed other operational matters as follows:

   a. His friend in Richard Ward, recently returned from Tokyo and Paris with the manuscript of a new book written by Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk titled "My War with CIA." Sihanouk gave the manuscript to Wilfred Burchett who gave it to a North Vietnamese friend to give to Ward. Ward was asked to find an American publisher and he, in turn, asked for QPHONE/1's help. Burchett is an old friend of Ward's and stays at his apartment whenever he visits The manuscript has already been given to a publisher in Europe. QPHONE/1 asked if we would be interested in a copy. I told him to get one if he could do so without straining his cover.

   b. His friend, Lyle Stuart, the publisher, has been trying to buy the American branch of the Oxford University Press, and apparently is about to consummate the deal. He offered QPHONE a job as his European representative if the deal goes through.

   c. Per request I asked QPHONE to give his instructor a copy of the long list of names and organizations given to him by Sibcho. Also por request, and in answer to my question, QPHONE said he received the magazine published by the Turkish party in Collette's Book Shop in London.

5. From 5:00 p.m. until a little after midnight on 13 July, of F2 Division briefed QPHONE/1 in substance on the OVERLORD program, our interest in having QPHONE/1 pursue such a role, and explained the great amount of dreary work that would be involved in learning the communist dialectic thoroughly if the whole venture were to be successful. I will make no effort to condense these seven hours
of ethereal discourse, but QPHONE was fascinated, captivated by it and clearly interested in pursuing that long murky path to "enlightenment." He was an outstanding job in setting the stage, describing the target, and then explaining step by step how he and QPHONE/1 would work together as the operation progressed. Regarding QPHONE's upcoming trip in the U.S., explained exactly how QPHONE should act as he meets each of his friends and how he should develop his newfound "interest" in studying Marxist-Leninism as he meets with those various people. QPHONE was very responsive, took notes, had ideas of his own, but more importantly was very appreciative of the tactical advice that was described. QPHONE/1 will meet the following people over the next ten days.

b. Libel Bergman in Newark (on three different occasions)

c. Benjamin Blake, Milton Henry and a fellow named Boggs in Detroit (he's with HARR).

d. Don Wright, Herb Block, and Sidney Lens all in Chicago.

e. LPWEAKLY and family in Chicago

f. Davida Pineman and Saul Landau in San Francisco.

g. The Martin Luther King Foundation in Atlanta.

6. All of the above were carefully chosen because of who they were, what organization or philosophy they represented, or their interest in the Chinese, and the extent to which the whole would knit together and form a viable base which QPHONE could use as a springboard when he returns to London. Urged QPHONE to join, or in some cases rejoin, Trotskyist study groups in London including the one conducted by Mankanda. The role that QPHONE should play with these groups, as well as others in Europe who were singled out during various parts of the conversation, was also spelled out in detail. By the end of the evening QPHONE had clearly in mind what it was all about, what he should do next, and the purpose of our reconvening on the 24th and 25th to decide finally what it all amounts to.

[Signature]
I asked OROPHONE to call on the sterile line using the _______ indicator on Monday afternoon, 31 July. This is simply to check in and let us know he is on the way and how things have come thus far. He calculated that he needed another $500.00 for the U.S. portion of his overall trip since LCPIT apparently had not anticipated this when he was given his original advance. I arranged through the good offices of _______ to get $500.00 to OROPHONE today.

8. OROPHONE asked if we had any intelligence requirements for him to pursue while he is in Malta. I said _______ would brief him on those requirements on the 24th of July if we had any. Incidentally, OROPHONE mentioned that Libol Bergman comes _______ every Thursday and told OROPHONE that he could be reached on telephone number _______. OROPHONE said if we cared to we might want to track that number and see where Bergman hangs out.
31 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Contact with QRPHONE/1

1. As arranged previously, I met with QRPHONE/1 at the WOLOD safesite from 1000 hours to 1230 26 July. The meeting was intended to wrap up loose ends, convey our decision to pursue the STF/ILFLAM program (providing QRPHONE/1 himself was amenable), and to make clear that we expect measurable operational progress within the next year.

2. Although QRPHONE/1 had been debriefed on 24 July by other Headquarters officers regarding his trip around WOCORK, I asked him to review it again for my information so I could put it clearly in perspective as it related to our plans for him in the coming year. I'll not bother with the details here because such have already been written for the record elsewhere, but suffice it to say that QRPHONE/1 was both pleased and relieved at the reception he got from his old contacts because of the reflection these receptions had on his own bona fides. The allegations of his EKTRUST affiliation which had floated through Europe were never mentioned by his WOCORK contacts; on the contrary at least one of them urged QRPHONE/1 to return soon to WOCORK because this is where the action is. This same individual gave QRPHONE reading materials on the Communist dialectic and urged him to study them closely. This greatly impressed QRPHONE because it showed how accurate were the briefings given him by the Headquarters STF/ILFLAM officer and demonstrated that we knew our tactics.

3. I then reviewed with QRPHONE/1 the reasons for our long close scrutiny of him and his performance these last several months followed by our selection of him for advance training, testing, and redirection in the strong hope we had that he would accept this new task because of its priority importance to our national collection requirements. I asked
QRPHONE/1 his impressions of it all, his reaction to the STFLIMFLAM proposal, and whether he would accept its demanding obligations. QRPHONE said he certainly would and that he found it a real challenge to his intellect and his operational skills. The tedious study of the dialectic would not deter him. His only concern was how he should actually play it as he developed relationships with appropriate party members and, ultimately, the Chinese in SMORANGE. I pointed out he needn't concern himself with the last point because that would be part of the purpose of the ten-day training program in SMORANGE in September which would be given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer. I said the training would require total immersion for ten days straight, probably in some secluded beach house on the coast where all involved could reside full time. He said this would present no problem cover-wise; he would simply tell his family he had gone to the continent. I said that would be working out the details of this with him, probably after his return from vacation.

4. I said that given QRPHONE/1's past performance, his credentials with the radical left, and his apparent interest in vigorously pursuing the STFLIMFLAM program we expected to be able to measure in six to eight months the likelihood of his being able to achieve all the STFLIMFLAM objectives based upon the progress he would have made by then with his contacts. Should it appear that the STFLIMFLAM operation would not succeed we would be discussing alternative courses of action with him by the end of the year. He did say that of all the countries in Europe where his STFLIMFLAM and radical left potential is probably the best, Italy would be first and Denmark second.

5. I told QRPHONE/1 that his meeting with had been moved to 31 July as he requested, reviewed his European vacation plans and his Malta trip and wished him the very best of luck. At this point QRPHONE/1 certainly seems willing and able aggressively to pursue our operational plans. We shall see.
WOGEAR Review of African Liberation Movements

In general, the author has done a reasonably good job describing the historical development of the various African liberation movements, especially when one considers the complexity and number of splits and mergers that have occurred within and among the movements over the years. There are several glaring inaccuracies, however, in the author's conclusions about the current position and effectiveness of the several Portuguese African liberation movements.

Regarding Angola, the author characterizes the MPLA as an ideologically-oriented group (i.e., Soviet doctrine) that has failed to grasp and utilize to its advantage the tribal realities that exist in Angola. The author fails to acknowledge, however, that the MPLA has had some success, albeit limited, in building a movement that is national and multiracial in character rather than tribally oriented. Despite its urban intellectual leadership, the MPLA has had some success winning local support in rural eastern Angola.

By contrast, GAE ranks a poor second. From inception, its primary base of support has been the large Angolan refugee population of Bakongo tribesmen who live in southwestern Zaire. Although the organization has won some support among Bakongo kinsmen across the border in northwestern Angola, it has failed to broaden its base because of its thinly disguised regional and tribal make-up. Moreover, Roberto's unwillingness to delegate authority or compromise have produced chronic disputes at the leadership level. The author's conclusion that GAE is a formidable force to be reckoned with in the future of Angola is contradicted by the fact that the MPLA is by far the largest and most effective of the three nationalist groups opposing the Portuguese in Angola.

MOZAMBIQUE

The present FRELIMO leadership does not appear to be in the state of disarray in 1972 that the author believes it is. Although some differences undoubtedly persist, the present leaders seem to have closed ranks somewhat since the departure of Simango in late 1969. For the present, any internal squabbles that may exist are not noticeably affecting FRELIMO's fighting abilities inside Mozambique.

RHODESIA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA

Reasonably straightforward and up to date. No serious deficiencies.
Notes on QRPHONE

1. Revolutionary Image: Discussed briefly how it is obtained. Pointed out there is a pattern to it which is discernable among revolutionaries. It is usually issue oriented in the beginning, the war being one of the key issues, and it gradually evolves into a desire to engage in practical activities which usually expressed best on a continuing basis through work in an organization. Also connected with this process is the gradual development of a different "outlook." It is usually a mixture of idealism and Marxism-Leninism-socialism-Mao Tse-tung thought. Usually unstructured but developing.

   It is possible in this stage to move from one group to another without any particular approbation being attached for this transience. This is particularly so if one starts way outside a M-List group and moves inward towards it. Quite a different thing to start in a M-List group and go out.

   Also in development of a new outlook one comes to study a variety of revolutionary literature. This can take one into different areas, anarchism, GW advocacy, revolutionary nihilism, socialism, Marxist-Leninism, etc. However, to get to latter it must be done logically.

2. Tightly Structured Op: Emphasis upon tight, controlled contacts which seek to accomplish a specific purpose—collection of info not necessarily one nor always one. Purpose is to lay groundwork for future developments. Purpose to establish certain contacts which can be later used in either positive or negative fashion. Structured conversation is also essential. It too should seek to accomplish something, directed so as to be useful to future development of op: e.g., desire to have an explanation for an action to be undertaken later—so bring up in conversation with someone so that can use that conversation later as explanation for interest in a subject, knowledge of a subject, etc. It is checkable.

3. Study: Most important aspect in opening phases of op. Without correct study and without development (understanding) of "correct outlook" one will always be a dilettante to the, outside looking in, someone who is useful to them "under certain conditions," but not someone who is reliable, and not a dependable revolutionary. This is really the key, the ideological tool, it will open doors that cannot otherwise be entered.

4. Contacts: Those to be exploited now and those to be used in or for future time. In the beginning the contacts which are developed are to be used as a means of building his justification for having begun the serious study of Marx,
Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested.

5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make many contacts. Some will be more useful than others, but all have potential for use in one circumstance or another. Since we have no way of knowing how or from whom the Chinese collect their intelligence, seek out, or otherwise spot budding revolutionaries we can assume that some one of his acquaintances will report his interest in Mao, etc. We can assume that through some of his activities Chinese will build up his dossier so that at a later date when we go directly to the Chinese for help they can look in their dossier and see that x number of months ago, etc., various things were reported. Etc.

6. Ops as a Process of Development: Permit no diversions or detours which might become permanent. This would include targets of opportunity, etc. Must always maintain correct operational line and cannot reach target by following various diversionary tributaries in the temporary interest of collecting marginal intelligence. Must be prepared to sacrifice diversionary tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective. If tangential things are foiled up we then have a different op, and a new op line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves as guide for whole op from beginning to end.

7. Tactics in Op: Must always be carefully thought out so as to insure forward development of op. Something must be seen emerging or useful, or having potential future value for development of op, otherwise it is pointless to undertake it. Tactics are details. Details are most important aspect in day to day running of op. They must be paid attention to, must be contributory, must be carried out in correct sequence, and we must keep in mind that at one or more points it is these details which will be subject of the scrutiny of the opposition. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE DETAILS APPEAR LOGICAL TO THIS OPPOSITION, even if they may seem illogical to us at times. Our logic is not the same as communist logic.

8. Ops is Step by Step Process: Op should/or can be divided into steps, phases, stages, segments, whatever. Each phase should dovetail into the next. To some extent a general outline can be developed. Each of the major phases should be sub-divided into stages so that they can be dealt with step by step. For example: Three broad categories:

1st Phase: All initiatives are ours. We do all the work, lay ground for future stages. We have a flexible line which permits making maximum contacts to be correctly exploited. We give training. Also devise concrete activities for him to carry out.
2nd Phase: Chinese and others have shown interest. We will exploit this interest. After he has completed first phase we will begin to make structured contacts with the Chinese. In these contacts he will show that he has a grasp of the ideology; is interested in learning more, desires to study more intensively. Will use as negative examples: his book, Panthers, some aspects of Bergman's behavior, the unstructured and undisciplined nature of most revolutionary activists in U.S., particularly among the blacks, or whatever may seem appropriate at time contact is made. However, will seek their help to further his study and will indicate recognition of need to return to U.S. in order to undertake correct role in revolutionary struggle. At this stage we will have an idea of interest of Chinese. We will be able to determine whether we can expect progress or not. If they prove willing to help they will then be asked to guide his further study, to help him. Through this help they will be able to see the development which has taken place. We should get a good feeling of their willingness to guide him after a couple of meetings. If we are shut out then must make ops judgment from that point on--can always target against Soviets and use Chinese as negative example. If they are interested we will then lose some aspects of our initiative, but in essence the more initiative we lose to them, the more they try to direct him, the deeper he becomes involved with them, which is our objective--one of them. He must continue his study.

3rd Phase: Continue his study; continue his contacts all around, but by now should have significant contacts and can dispense with the more general "sparrow" approach. Once certain of their willingness to help we ask about a trip to Peking to study after which he wants to return to U.S. and take active role.

Recognize that this may be a sticking point. We don't want him here. However, this idea has to always be in the forefront as far as the Chinese are concerned otherwise they have little reason to be interested in him. This MUST appear to be his goal. We may be able to circumvent it later for one reason or another, or it might be useful to bring him back temporarily. This decision must be reserved for that time.

These stages and sub-stages must be further divided if we are to understand the operation correctly and are to carry it out correctly. Each action he is asked to undertake must be seen leading to something concrete in the next or another step. The whole op goes STEP BY STEP. We do not insert unrealistic objectives, or those which would be desirable but may be difficult. This is a waste of time. We only seek to do what is possible--possible is what can be turned into reality.

Emphasis must be made on "step by step" approach and must be maintained. Otherwise we can trip ourselves up by trying to accomplish something which is out of sequence FOR THEM. For
example: He has read Marx and Lenin. We might say he is quite familiar with it. We could then say that he will read Mao and after that he will be able to pretend to be a Maoist. All of this is true. He could say it and act like he and others thought a Maoist should act. However, appearance and essence are not synonymous. It might appear to non-Maoists that our troop is a Maoist because he can talk as good a game as anyone else—or better than those who have not studied as much—but the essence of being a Maoist is not contained in such superficialities. Nor is the essence of being a Marxist-Leninist so contained. He cannot, for example, bloom or emerge as a Maoist and find acceptance with the Maoists. They know the process it takes to get there—"Several years of assiduous study can produce good results." (Some Chinese quote on studying Mao.)

9. Their Weapon is Also Our Tool: Once we understand correctly how they wield their weapon, the dialectical method, it can serve as our tool to pry our way into their camp. Through proper study and understanding we can develop and promote Q's superiority among his friends and acquaintances. To Marxists he will be much more acceptable and his intel product will probably be enhanced since they will talk on subjects they might not have touched upon in the past, he will be more trusted, and also he will have better recognition of key developments in Marxist world through better understanding of their reality.

10. Some activities which we might consider enroute.

a. Start His Own Study Group: Chinese would be very interested. Unlike most study groups with which I am familiar he would stress study of ideology—in correct way. However, to prevent them from profiting from such study they can be tied in knots for months dealing with a variety of ideological problems. Yet this is no point in our developing for their use good revolutionaries. However, it would provide reason for frequent contact with Chinese in order for them to help him in the development of his group. Would probably lead him into contact with other interesting types. Might have it for "Americans only" abroad—to avoid problems with Brits: whatever:

b. Might Talk About Starting a One Man Institute for Studying African Revolution: could put out a four page broadsheet for peanuts. It would discuss various African problems. His book gives him good reason for such study. He might draw one or two people to him. Can use this too as basis for approach to Chinese. He will have come to recognize that he had not painted the true picture of national lib struggle in his book and through his broadsheet he seeks to rectify some his ideas.

c. He could seek to do another book on "The Dialectics of African Revolution." Here again the help of various communists, Marxist-Leninists, and particularly the Chinese in providing guidance (correct guidance) would give him frequent access and contact—providing the Chinese are willing to help.
d. Start a Broadsheet for American Revolutionaries Abroad: This would give him contact with a wide variety of radical U.S. types abroad. It would also have feedback into the American scene and in part fulfill his requirement to have an active role with U.S. revolutionary developments. Etc. Etc.

e. There are other activities which he might also undertake. The above are a few ideas of what we can do to "promote" QRFHONE. He can do a number of different things at the same time since much of it overlaps and is hence compatible. However, each must be structured, carefully handled, with great attention to the details. STEP BY STEP.

Some Words of Caution: Our experience clearly indicates that it is incorrect to rely upon either the agent or the station to provide the impetus. This seems to be true for a number of reasons. Case officers change often, chiefs of ops, bases, or stations change—there is not much continuity. We are thinking of a long term operation which, as it grows, becomes very complex. It is not easily understood by someone who is involved after it has been going for sometime. It is even more true of changes in station leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information here to work with; people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Also most officers in the field simply do not have the time to sit down and plan in the kind of details that is needed to continue and develop the op. It calls for solid knowledge of the communist reality in order to insure that no errors creep in those contacts he may make. It calls for someone to have the time to read, study, certain publications, articles, etc., and then to figure out whether or not a given publication or article can be used to make a useful contact, write a useful letter, etc. If so, how, and then go the field with the idea, and concrete directions about how it should be used. Case officers most likely won’t be exposed to the same material and probably wouldn’t have the planning time necessary, or the various resources of Hqs to do what needs to be done.

This is not to suggest that the field has nothing to say. However, if the understanding can be clearly made that this is in fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in the given concrete conditions and not either the Hqs or the field trying to establish some kind of supremacy of rights over the other—there is a good chance of success.
Under Separate Cover Attachment B to OEPW-1814

IDEN
Agent Profile - QRPHONE/1

QRPHONE/1 is an American citizen and a singleton agent who has been a recruited asset for some seven years. He has extensive contacts among leftist, radical, and communist movements in Europe and Africa and was able to sustain his relations with many such figures for operational purposes in spite of a formal disassociation some years ago. Originally a member himself of a radical pro-communist group, his disenchantment with internal personal and political dissension in an organization to which he had firmly committed himself led later to his acceptance of an operational relationship with the Agency. Although targeted after his recruitment at the plethora of new left and radical elements in Europe, essentially for intelligence collection purposes, QRPHONE/1 has recently been redirected toward the Chinese Communists with a view to ingratiating himself and seeking their guidance and support as he demonstrates an interest in more effectively acting on their behalf. Our ultimate objective is to precipitate invitations to Mainland China which will lead to successively higher echelons of contact within the Chinese Government.

To prepare QRPHONE/1 for this demanding task, extensive retraining, assessment and remotivation were recently accomplished and selective recontact was made by him with his more influential and pertinent communist contacts. Reactions to QRPHONE/1's alleged desire to more fully commit himself to the communist Chinese cause and the assistance rendered thus far by these communist contacts are encouraging indicators of the potential success of this agent to achieve our goal.

Although a complex man to manage operationally because of his own background and the mix of his ideological and professional motivations, QRPHONE/1's intelligence and personality are such as to well equip him to meet the challenge of the tests the Chinese are likely to throw his way. He is based as is his case officer, and operational meetings are held in secure safe sites, sometimes

QRPHONE/1 has produced numerous intelligence reports on communist and radical targets in addition to his covert action functions as a journalist and author. His long-term tenure with the Agency will be determined in part by the degree of success of his new directions.
1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/l

1. On 24 July 1972, and the undersigned converged on the OTR safesite in order to debrief him on his trip through WOCORK.

2. The discussion was started by having QRPHONE relate the details of his trip on a city by city basis describing the people he met and his reception by them. It should be noted here that several of the individuals that QRPHONE was to have seen were out of town or unavailable, however, QRPHONE will correspond with these individuals in order to maintain his relationship with them.

NEWARK

QRPHONE met with Leibel Bergman at his home and stayed overnight (14-15 July) as his guest. QRPHONE told Bergman that he had decided to make a full-time commitment to the study of Marxist-Leninist (M-L) doctrine in order to become more proficient in M-L theory and would like to join the RU to further this ambition. Bergman's reaction, according to QRPHONE, was enthusiastic. Bergman gave QRPHONE some M-L literature (which was the same as the literature gave him several weeks ago to study) which he felt would be helpful. Bergman stated that if QRPHONE was really interested in becoming involved in the M-L movement he should return to WOCORK because that "was where all the inconsistencies were." Bergman invited QRPHONE to
take part in some M-L study groups but didn't say what exactly would be studied. The following are some general comments on the provided about Bergman. Bergman doesn't like Newark, he has been mugged several times and would like to go back to California; however, that is not possible at this time, so Bergman will instead move to New York City. Bergman is pleased with the current development of the RU. He said that the recent trip to China by several RU members was successful and that the trip had been pleasant for them. QRPHONE commented that it appears that Bergman does not have the same control of the RU that he formerly had, although he is regarded as the "guru" of the RU.

NEW YORK

QRPHONE said that Richard Ward is attempting to sell the English language rights of Prince Sihanouk's book My War With the CIA. Ward had been trying to get Lyle Stuart to purchase the rights but Stuart's antipathy toward Wilfred Burchett, "that old Communist" according to Stuart, was too great. Burchett apparently wrote the forward and Stuart doesn't want to publish anything with his name on it. QRPHONE, in our presence, called Stuart and convinced him to at least read the manuscript of the book before he turned it down. Ward has a South Vietnamese student living with him as a combination houseboy/companion. This student, whose name is David Truong, is the son of the South Vietnamese presidential candidate Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran in the 1967 South Vietnamese election on a peace platform and who is now in prison. QRPHONE said that this student has amassed a large collection of books on intelligence, that the books are expensive and that he doesn't have any idea where the money to buy the books came from. He also said he doesn't think Truong has immigration papers to stay in WOCORK legally. I asked if Truong was in any way involved with the recent attempt to hijack a plane to Hanoi. QRPHONE stated that Truong knew the hijackers and might have known something about the attempted hijacking because the hijackers had also stayed at Ward's apartment.
Ward is going to France soon for a vacation with a girlfriend he refused to identify because he feels his apartment and phones are bugged "by at least ten intelligence agencies." Before he goes on vacation he intends to stop in Paris and meet with DRV and PRG officials as well as with Wilfred Burchett. (Ward also met with prior to her recent trip to the DRV). Ward will try to visit QPHONE in London sometime in September before he returns home. Ward claimed that a "wealthy benefactor" gave him some $1000 to cover the cost of his vacation. Ward himself is broke and makes only about $60 per week salary.

DETROIT

QPHONE was unable to see Milton Henry, leader of the New Republic of Africa, who was on vacation in Japan. He did manage to see FNU Boggs, who is apparently no longer involved with radical organizations but who is acting as a clearinghouse for black and white radicals. QPHONE characterized Boggs as less doctrinaire and less dogmatic than he had been in the past. Boggs' feeling about the black radical movement is that it is in considerable disarray.

CHICAGO

QPHONE saw LPWEAKLY/1 who told him that he was trying to get an invitation to visit China. LPWEAKLY/1 told QPHONE that if he went he would see about taking him along. This was the first that QPHONE knew about LPWEAKLY/1's plans. QPHONE was unable to see either Sidney Lens or Hal Block because they were out of town. He did corroborate the fact that Block had recently been to China. QPHONE spent some time with Don Wright, who was a member of the RU delegation to China. Wright is now a full-time RU official responsible for organizing RU cells in the Mid-West and seems committed to revolution although he doesn't speak in M-L terminology. Wright stated that one problem now facing the RU involves national exposure, i.e., getting minorities to become involved with the RU. This is a change from past RU philosophy which was that
minority groups should form their own organizations separate from the RU. QRPHONE said Wright is very bitter toward the Black Panther movement and thinks that Eldridge Cleaver is "bad" and that Huey Newton and Bobby Seale are "corrupt".

SAN FRANCISCO

In San Francisco QRPHONE stayed with Davida Fineeman. The mysterious M, who appeared in several of her letters to QRPHONE, is Martin Nichols, a Marxist scholar of note who translated into the English the entire Fundamentals of Political Economy. He was once a member of the RU.

Emotionally, Davida is not as depressed as she was several months ago, even though her brief exposure to the world of labor union organizing was a failure. Her comments about the RU were to condemn the Bruce Franklin group (Venceramos Organization) which she said is going to bring disaster to the whole RU because of its predilection for violence before the groundwork for revolution has been laid. Fineeman feels that Robert Avakian, a high RU official, is less wild and erratic than in the past and has in fact become a good M-L.

QRPHONE saw Paul Richards, Hodee Edwards' son-in-law. Richards is a former CP member from the Mid-West, which he left because of the people. He feels that the Mid-West is a part of the country where the Government ought to store nuclear warheads. QRPHONE also met with Earl and Lee Rose. Earl was in the RU delegation to China where he must have caused some embarrassment to the delegation by his naivete. He attempted to meet African revolutionaries, particularly members of the MPLA, which he didn't realize were Moscow-oriented. Rose asked QRPHONE to write and send him material on the various African liberation movements. Lee Rose works for

although Earl, her husband, is unemployed.
ATLANTA

QRPHONE went to the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change, formerly the Martin Luther King Foundation, where he met with Tom Porter, the head staffer of the organization. There was recently a split in the Center and the Executive Director, a Dr. Scott, was forced out of office. The office is still vacant and, according to Porter, will remain so for the immediate future. The reason for the continued vacancy is apparently to allow Coretta King and other members of the Board of Directors to maintain direct control. Porter is a former writer for Freedom Ways Magazine. QRPHONE said that Porter knew of him but didn't say exactly how. QRPHONE told Porter he would consider writing a brief on the Center for LPWEAKLY. QRPHONE said that the Center is going to establish a foreign affairs staff which will be headed by Jack O'Dell, an old CP member.

3. After QRPHONE's discourse on his trip, discussed in broad terms what he could expect in the next year with regard to securing entry to the Chinese. QRPHONE was told that once he was proficient in M-L he would be expected to go out and test his knowledge with various individuals and organizations in order to gain access and become known to the Chinese. QRPHONE emphasized it wouldn't be easy, that QRPHONE would have to be diligent and patient, but that in the end, if he was successful, the benefits would be many. QRPHONE accepted this.

Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3 (1 August 1972)

Distribution:
Orig, = routed to AC/CA/B3
1 = AC/CA/B3
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TSD/BAB MEMO 275-72
20 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief CA-3
ATTENTION: Rm 3D18
SUBJECT: ORPHONE/1

Attachment: Report
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff  
ATTENTION:  
SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for GPRHONE/1, Training Program "SHAW"  
REFERENCE: Memo for Director of Training, From Chief, Covert Action Staff, dated 23 May 1972; Subject: "Covert Training for GPRHONE/1"  

1. GPRHONE/1 was trained covertly from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty-seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any caving to speak of for subsequent preparation of comino plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop comino plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then with only one written one and one that he reviewed orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countsurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).
On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher’s teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he mentioned that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four-thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHONE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHONE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHONE. The three trips to must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHONE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an un, um, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have such a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recruitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHONE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHONE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the paper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area
10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting -- no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember -- just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, PHONE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because [ ] had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When PHONE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, [ ] said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading PHONE's report on his actions during the counter-surveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants PHONE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which PHONE admitted he does constantly), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on PHONE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the [Office of Security). Concluding his admiration of PHONE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him."

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of PHONE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear
tail conscious. These are a typical habit. The instructor, also guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, PHONE is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three-way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were PHONE's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped PHONE and asked him for directions and PHONE gave them and just went about his business". PHONE's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "-- where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in PHONE's report that PHONE even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed PHONE into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that PHONE may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading PHONE's report, was stunned to see that PHONE had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. PHONE had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with an instructor in the office. After relating the fine job that PHONE had done report concluded: "A first rate performance by PHONE, who's obviously been around -- both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomats, as held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).
YET IT WAS FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM THE UNITED NATIONS BUILDING TO LESSEN THE CHANCES THAT PHONE HIMSELF AND HIS PUTATIVE DIPLOMAT TARGET WOULD BE SPOTTED BY FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES. HIS CHOICE FOR THE NEXT MEETING WAS AT AN IMPRESSIVELY NAMED NEW RESTAURANT NEAR THE SAFE SITE COMPLEX. HE WAS thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the site from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to flag the report WO40LD/QRPHONE/1/GHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Originated by:

SECRET
SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION
(Always handcopy 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

TO: CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
   CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
   CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: CA/33

PROJECT QPONE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA, OR ALIAS

QPONE/1

BI 201 FILE NO. 201-35053
50 FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

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<td>SECURITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATION</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

International

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE
   See FRQ Part II, page 3, Section VI, 4 and 5.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA WILLING TO BE COMPROMISED?</td>
<td>U/I</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. SUGGEST &quot;CLOSE PRIORITY&quot; TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT SITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTERESTS? 
   If no investigation outside of CIA, explain fully.
   See Memorandum dated 15 February 1966
   YES | NO

5. PRO STATUS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>8. FIELD TRACES ** NA previously sent</th>
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<tr>
<td>SPECIAL CHECK NSA INDICES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Fi/D ** CS REF TO Fi/D (BR, RA, REG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO RECORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL FORWARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-DEROGATORY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEROGATORY/SIGNIFIC NOSTATTACHED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. CS/155 ** NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMIT no additional since last check 1966</td>
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6. R.I. TRACES-INCLUDING COMIT

| NO RECORD                            |
| WILL FORWARD                         |
| NON-DEROGATORY                       |
| DEROGATORY/SIGNIFIC NOSTATTACHED     |

7. DIVISION TRACES-INCLUDING COMIT

| NO RECORD                            |
| WILL FORWARD                         |
| NON-DEROGATORY                       |
| DEROGATORY/SIGNIFIC NOSTATTACHED     |

* LIST AREAS CHECKED ** IF NOT CHECKED - WHY NOT APPLICABLE OTHER (EXPLAIN)

EXTENSION
SIGNAL

1055

COMIT

201-36052-83

SECRET
AMENDMENT TO P0Q PART I

Name: ________________________________

Section II, 12

Present Residence: 32 Hartswood Road
Stanford Brook, London W. 12 (owner)

Section X

Monique Gibson    Female          U.S. Citizen
### Personal Record Questionnaire

**Part II - Operational Information**

**INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER**

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requestor furnishes answers to all questions in PRC parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 2, 12B and 12C. Therefore the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRC part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRC format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items. If information obtainable, if item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for items, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. CRYPTONYM</th>
<th>2. PSEUDONYM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSPIONA1 (formerly OREGON1/1)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Section I

**Contact and Development**

1. Indicate how, when, where, why, and by whom subject was first contacted or developed.

   No change

2. Indicate whether subject could be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to any responsible case officer for handling, if so, indicate to whom.

   See previous Part II

   Yes To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, or [ ]

3. List other case officers who have handled subject or whom he knows or has known. Give names by which they have been known.

   See Previous Part II

   Known to subject as
   
   [ ]
   
   [ ]
   
   [ ]
   
   [ ]
   
   [ ]
   
   [ ]
SECRET

SECTION II
MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. (Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist"). See Previous FRQ Part II.

This image of EKTRAS as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in QRHONE/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of EKTRAS and of the importance of his contribution to the XXXXX EKTRAS EFFORT. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. (If no control, or if there is a lack of control explain.)

QRHONE/1 is dependent upon a EKTRAS salary and has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. QRHONE/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

SECTION III
COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and ZODIGAST use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised. Other officers will use cover of both being journalists.

2. INDICATE TYPE OF SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Freelance journalist, author, and as a sympathetic leftist

SECTION IV
INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTIONS WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERLY.

No change from previous FRQ Part II.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (AGENTS, RELATIVES, FRIENDS) WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

See Previous FRQ Part II.
Reporting Instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports 14-16 Oct. 197.

SECTION V
COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS, EXPLAIN.

No change.
SECTION II

Motivation and Control

1. but every one of the wild anti-BTRUST stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

Having accepted BTRUST employment for a combination of reasons, it must be added that QEPIOR/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

QEPIOR/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. BTRUST has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.
SECRET  

SECTION VI  
OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT  

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

   No Change

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

   No Change

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

   Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES. Subject will operate under [ ] cover and as a sympathetic leftist to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian radical, pro-communist groups and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. Subject will also contact, assess recruit and possibly handle assets in these groups. In pursuit of operational objectives, he may be required to join a radical organization and/or travel to Bloc countries.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP/PH TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

   No PP duties or use are anticipated. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provocateur or zealous to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII  
PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY  

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE.

   A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

      None

   B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

SECTION VIII  
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT  

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

   Subject has HOA providing for salary of $950.00 per month, (tax free), reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources.
SECRET

SECTION XIII
AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. Indicate subject's hobbies or interest in sports, music, etc.

None known

SECTION XIV
GENERAL

1. Indicate whether subject's language abilities and other characteristics are such as he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own. Explain.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. Indicate whether information in Parts I and II was obtained by research, clandestine assessment, files, correspondence or other means.

Research, files, correspondence and assessment by previous case officers

3. If other than routine action is required, if and when termination of subject is effected, please explain. (Also see page 436, supra)

None anticipated

SECTION XV
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. Give full details i.e. recognition signals, where contact could be made, what bona fides could individual making contact use?

SECTION XVI
MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

EXAMINATION OF SUBJET on 21 September 1970 (no deception reported).

DATE 10 March 1972

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

1. A review in some depth of Project QRPHONE was conducted in January 1972 by DC/CA and me with Branch 3 personnel, with the participation of [name redacted] (now of Branch 4, formerly QRPHONE Case Officer at LCIPIT). Attached at Tab A are the questions which formed the basis for the review. A full record of the responses to these questions and the review discussion is not practical so I have attempted below to summarize the general conclusions which emerged. Attached at Tab B are two charts prepared by Branch 3 for the review plus a rough draft "CI Assessment" which they also prepared.
3. Mobility. QRFONE can be viewed as essentially possessing mobility and has expressed a willingness to move small children and an unwilling, anti-US, Jewish wife, who would only be willing to leave her homeland if the overt job to which QRFONE was going was clearly a step upward in his career.

4. Handling. The method by which QRFONE has been handled, i.e., mainly through [although there has been direct LC/PIT contact recently], is unnecessarily cumbersome and not suited to the close consultation needed to explore QRFONE's future directions. Having been declared [the most secure place to meet QRFONE is] and he should be handled directly by an LC/PIT officer.

5. Security. QRFONE cannot escape the record of allegations that he is Agency-connected. What he can do, however, is face-up to these charges, challenge them and deny them. There may thus always be some element of suspicion attached to him, but, as time passes without definite proof of such a connection, its impact on his activities may be minimized and he may be able to engage in effective work inspite of it.

6. Sub-agents. It was felt that QRFONE may possibly have a flair for recruiting and handling sub-agents. It was believed that this should be explored and that he should be given relevant training, based in [This would also provide the opportunity for Headquarters exploration with him of his future development.]

7. Future Focus. What QRFONE's own thoughts might be on his most natural course of development are not clear. He may have an inclination toward African Liberation Movements—the subject of his most recent major writing—but it could be questioned whether on this or on anti-fedayeen work, there is sufficient Agency interest to merit such focus. He has no significant base in the American black community (rather the contrary) which would make him of interest to others on this basis. His overt political orientation is described
as "radical," but it is an intellectual "radicalism,"
not revolutionary. Further, he is basically a theorist-
cian not a personal activist by nature. He might be
asked and might undertake an activist role—but it is
felt that it would not sit naturally upon him and
would probably not achieve whatever success might have
been postulated. Within his theoretician, non-activist
context it was nevertheless felt that the probably-to-
be-expanded field of Chinese Communist activities in
Europe provided the focus which might most usefully be
explored. The expansion of Chinese Communist activities
in Europe may come quite slowly but, in view of the
probable shortage of assets in this field, it was a
matter on which we should have some patience. It is
also a field which could be explored without ORPONE's
needing to move. Whether he focuses on this field or
another, however, ORPONE needs to develop some job
or organizational base which will make him interesting
as a target himself to those we wish to focus him on.
At the present time his cover does not provide a power
or influence base and he is essentially completely
dependent upon us.

9. Some time has passed since the above discussions
took place. I am not aware of the extent to which there
may already have been a follow-up to them. Needless to
say, they have decided field implications in which
LCP/IPIT needs to be consulted, should they be pursued.
SECRET

AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1  DATE: 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE  STATUS: Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his freelance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

SECRET
B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.
WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story. It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.
OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German.

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquired an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However,
the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the likelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

CHIEF, LCPIPIT
<table>
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<th>DATE</th>
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5 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT : Chicom Aspect of QRPHONE/1's Operational Potential

1. In continuing my efforts to probe operational areas for the redirection of QRPHONE/1, I talked at length on 3 January with his former case officer and received a very favorable prognosis regarding QRPHONE/1's mobility (i.e. his possible move to another European city or to Africa), his agent recruiting capability (preceded by additional training), and the prospects of making himself attractive to the Chicoms (again preceded by appropriate training).

2. In pursuit of the latter item I talked at length today with the FE Division expert on long-range Chicom and CP penetration programs. I described in detail QRPHONE/1's background, current status, and the variety of plans we have in mind and received reactions as follows:

A. The butterfly characteristics that QRPHONE has demonstrated thus far will never result in his becoming of interest to either the Chicoms or the Soviets for any operationally meaningful purpose. While the Soviets would perhaps see him as potential FI source, the Chicoms would not even do that.

B. Chicom officers abroad are still totally obsessed with Communist doctrine and its strategic and tactical application to a degree significantly more zealous than their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, in looking at potential foreign assets the Chicoms discard persons of shallow substance as far as their knowledge of Communism is concerned. They are interested in only those who have a serious intellectual understanding of Communist doctrine and a serious revolutionary goal. The thousands of leftists of whatever coloring floating around Europe are seen as only of marginal use to the Chicoms and certainly not the sort that they would take into their confidence.
C. To become of long-term operational use to us in the sense of exploiting his possible long-term use to the Chicom, QRFONE/1 should do two things: join an existing "acceptable" organization such as the Trotskyite Party or a black radical party and, at the same time begin a serious study of Marxist/Maoist doctrine. As he gets into this program (preceded by some ten days training and close Headquarters direction) he should begin to seek out Communist intellectuals, party members, leaders of radical groups, etc., to ask questions about the dialectic, seek additional guidance, borrow books and so forth. In doing this he will in time come into the attention of the professional spotters the Chicom have and begin to develop the sort of bona fides that the Chicom, in time, will find appealing. He should also in this period seek out Chicom officials with the same requests for help. The key here is to demonstrate not that QRFONE/1 is simply sympathetic with Maoism or any other Communist shading but that he is a dedicated serious revolutionary.

D. A quicker way to come into the Chicom spotlight might be for QRFONE/1 to join the Black Panthers, the SDS or one of the other radical groups with which the Chicom are already known to be in touch. He will obviously have to sweat out a period of probation in joining any such group until he divests himself of his tattered leftist reputation and those JKLANCE accusations. Feels that a successful passing of this baptismal period will depend solely on QRFONE/1's willingness to plunge wholeheartedly into a serious study of the terribly boring and lengthy volumes of the dialectic. As he demonstrates his capability to move more deeply into this field to the satisfaction of the "spots" he will be accordingly provided additional help and encouragement by Chicom contacts and officials.

E. The Chicom will be looking at him as a possible asset in their long-range targeting of the American revolution, hence QRFONE/1's utterances ought to be couched in terms of his ultimate aim of contributing to and participating in the American revolution. In other words the Chicom would see little or no use for QRFONE/1 operationally in Europe or Africa.
F. ______ felt that should we pursue the above as a long-term operational goal for QRPHONE/1, the city in which this takes place is almost irrelevant. He could do it perhaps as well in an African setting as in Europe and his cover status i.e., with LPWEAKLY, really makes no difference because the Chicons would test the fiber man himself and would not be deterred by his external trappings.

3. In answer to my question, ______ he would be happy to meet with QRPHONE to assess his potential in this area and then, assuming we all decided to go ahead with such redirection, ______ could train him and guide him thoroughly enough to get him well on the track by spending some seven to ten days with him on a concentrated program.

Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/_______ (5 January 1972)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA Branch 3

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE


1. As stated in referenced memorandum we are beginning a review in depth of certain CA Staff projects. I propose to meet with you and relevant branch personnel to examine Project QRPHONE on or about 21 January 1972. Please advise me when the necessary preparations have been made for this review and we will fix a mutually convenient time.

2. Prior to our meeting, I request that the two charts of Part A of the attached listing be drawn up and copies sent to me and CA/PO. It is not necessary to prepare written responses to the questions posed in Part B of the attachment. These questions provide the basis for our oral review at the time the meeting is held.

Acting Chief
Covert Action Staff
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<th>TO:</th>
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<th>DATE</th>
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: ORPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated 29 November 1971

1. What follows below are some initial comments of mine on the referent memorandum, per your request. We really feel in Branch 3 that for a variety of reasons, we need more time to deliberate on ORPHONE's future operational activity than the previous two weeks. Partly this is due to extended absence by the case officer in charge who has been plagued with a recurring illness—I believe you are familiar with this. It is also in part attributable to the Section Chief's being new to the position and having his time absorbed by matters of current priority. So if you don't mind, we should like to address ourselves further to this subject following the Christmas holidays. At that time we should like to initiate some meetings on this matter both with yourself and with other area components including representatives from CI Staff.

2. Background: Your memo, of course, was triggered by an earlier one of mine which proposed that ORPHONE become operationally engaged in attempting to establish a black Communist cell. The purpose of this would be twofold—namely, to exacerbate relations thereby between the Soviet Union and mainland China through various low-key covert action undertakings, and in the process to further enhance ORPHONE's own credentials as a Maoist activist. This tentative assignment, it should be noted, arose because Branch 3 personnel had become increasingly aware of the possibility that ORPHONE's project status might be terminated in the not too distant future. While it is true that in the immediate preceding month or so, we have benefited from his intelligence reporting, it is all too clear that over the past two years, he has been of diminishing utility to CA Staff and other area divisions. In discussing his future with his recent case officer, her recommendation was that unless something could be found for him in the near future, we should give serious consideration to terminating
his services during the coming year. Thus my foregoing proposal arose from a desire on my part not to terminate an asset of proved capabilities without giving the agent in question suitable opportunity to become useful once more.

3. CI Type Review/ORPHONE Personal Security: Your memo makes out there have been frequent security reviews of ORPHONE's security status, and you question the efficacy of our doing still one more. On this let me point out that in making such a security assessment, we would be doing so in response to a current request by the area division concerned whose cooperation we need to direct this agent. One hardly needs stress that such a request probably should be honored in the interests of maintaining good relations even if its fulfillment means redundant work. But apart from this, the case officer also informs me that the case file does not contain any general summary of the alleged security breaches involving ORPHONE and their implications vis-a-vis his activities. It is true however that his security status has been reviewed for each annual project review and that assessments of his security status were made following each alleged breach, but no up-to-date summary exists. As for our own gut feelings on his personal security, one hazards that he is still in pretty good shape. I agree with you that many of the past charges leveled against him are of the same ilk as those leveled against other leftist colleagues (who do not have any Agency association) by their rivals. And as for the structure of his case officer relationship—that is, having him handled by a deep cover officer from an adjacent country—this would appear to be secure in the extreme (so much so that one would advocate that it be dropped due its operational inefficiency.)

4. Location: We tentatively agree that in all likelihood should not be the venue for our proposed operational undertaking due to the location. However, might do very well. If not, perhaps you or FUR Division might suggest another locale. As for the question as to whether or not the station would want him permanently, only time and his own operational success could determine this. One hazards that if ORPHONE were able to make his way with some good local leftists and had promise of developing some kind of relationship with mainland China representatives, the station might come to regard him as a capital asset.
5. **Substance:** You noted that ORPHONE . . . "cannot just simply show up and start a leftist nuclei . . ." Why not? Others have. He is a well-known leftist in intellectual circles in Europe and has written many articles in praise of Mao. This should do for a start. As for what he might have to offer local leftists . . . money, energy and ideas will do. A great deal of money, of course, is unneeded, but some is. We can supply it. As for ideas and energy, he has both. Concerning the "built-in jealousy, animosity, etc." which such action would likely engender on the part of local rival leftists, this may or may not occur. But is this such a calamity if it should occur? Are not leftists usually fighting among themselves anyway? In any case, we have nothing to lose by trying to salvage this agent. What we have to lose by not trying is an agent asset of proved worth.

6. **Credentials:** You say in effect that ORPHONE has not been known as an activist but only as an intellectual. (Frankly, the distinction is not very important in my mind.) Be that as it may, he has written many articles on leftist subjects and has talked to innumerable leftists around Europe over the years. True, he has not been involved in such actions as street demonstrations, but we would not like him to be so personally involved in the future in any case. What we would want him to do is to write pamphlets, informally recruit associates to his group and provide a little money to the group as might be required for various undertakings. Aside from the organizing and funding, actually this is not very different from what he has been doing—except that it will be in one place for a change.

7. ____________________________________________________________________________ You may be very correct in saying that shopping him around to European stations is a poor way to solicit useful tasks for ORPHONE. But again, I took my lead from C/EUR/CA who made a request along these lines.

______________________________________________________________________________

willing at some future time to visit various field stations and to attempt selling ORPHONE's services personally, we would be happy to have him do so. We, of course, don't know when he will be available to do so, and time is passing.

8. **Concluding Comment:** I really feel that we should relate to you in some detail the success which once had with the kind of undertaking which we have proposed for ORPHONE. It may interest you. On the other hand, it may be perfectly possible that the situation which once manipulated is not applicable to

**SECRET**
the conditions which would confront ORPHONE. But if we are not to channel his energies in this direction, it is incumbent upon us to think of something else for him to do before we begin thinking about writing him off. And so when you suggest that...

"the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project..." I agree. And to this end, we should like a couple of weeks more before coming to you with some general conclusions of ours about the current viability of this case and some future alternative course of action.

Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff
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MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT: Operational Redirection of QRPHONE/1

1. In response to your request that I examine the QRPHONE/1 project to determine how it might best be redirected in order to gain greater value for the time and money involved, I have talked at some length with appropriate officers in CI/SO and Africa Division. I have been advised that the primary reasons for QRPHONE/1's dwindling productivity are as follows:

   A. Key centers of activity of the radical left in Europe are London, Paris, and Stockholm. For different reasons QRPHONE/1's access in these three capitals is either circumscribed or off target.

   B. Although he has a multitude of contacts among the left, virtually all are shallow, periodic, and then very brief when they do occur. Even his correspondence to the more important radical leaders, which used to be quite informative, has fallen to almost nothing.

   C. Because his contacts are so cursory, he has been unable to develop a close and continuing personal relationship with any one of them in order to develop the intimate confidence so necessary for operational exploitation.

   D. His cover has always been thin and thus has circumstantially at least lent credence to the periodic allegations of his being a JKLANCE agent.
E. Close case officer direction has been made very difficult because of the echelons existing between QRPHONE/1 and LCPIPIT, coupled with relative infrequency of field case officer meetings.

F. What contacts he has within the African target, for example, are rendered virtually useless because his case officers are unfamiliar on a timely basis with Africa Division requirements and also miss valuable operational leads simply because they do not recognize them. (This is no fault of the case officers because they obviously have little opportunity to keep abreast of such requirements.)

G. The somewhat artificial nature of his trying to portray a pro-Mao stance may help him a bit with targets similarly inclined but renders him ineffective with other political shadings among the left.

2. With all of the above in mind and without belaboring the history of this project, the following recommendation is offered and has been concurred in informally by CI/SO and Africa Division officers with whom I have talked.

A. Accepting the fact that QRPHONE/1's operational utility in Europe is minimal, I propose LCPIPIT be directed to begin making arrangements for his transfer PCS to Africa and, hence, his operational control transferred to Africa Division as soon as feasible.

B. From the point of view of WHCHAOS requirements and Africa Division's own requirements, both elements felt QRPHONE/1 could best be exploited. It is one of the two most active cities in Africa for the radical left, it is a hot-bed of both Soviet and Chicom shenanigans, and it is politically vital to East African stability.

C. However, because of QRPHONE/1's well-known association with two exiled opposition politicians and current reports that these oppositionists are plotting the overthrow of (perhaps with Soviet assistance), it would be very imprudent for QRPHONE/1 to arrive bag and baggage in the near future. and his police might well conclude that QRPHONE represents the advance probe of the coup plotters and promptly throw him into jail.
SECRET

D. Both to give QRPHONE/1 time to cleanse his tattered image and because there are almost as important operational tasks in West Africa, the idea is to move him (1) or (2) for perhaps a year. This is to be done in concert with a suitable strengthening of his cover (i.e., two or three more stringer ships) and a concurrent mutation of his political posture to that of a plain old anti-imperialist rather than the more confining pro-Mao stance. He would be run directly [Station against local targets but with periodic trips to other parts of Africa for cover as well as operational purposes. Meantime, in the intervening months the dust may settle a bit in the close association with opposition elements would be allowed to fade and QRPHONE/1's writings and pronouncements concerning would be calculated designed to support the government.

E. At the appropriate time, a year or so perhaps, he then moves PCS to

3. If you concur with the above, I will proceed to staff this out more formally here at Headquarters and to advise LCPFIPIT.

Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

SECRET
PROJECT QRPHONE

PART A. CHARTS REQUESTED

PART B. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
1958 Q/1 worked He was discharged when brought forgery charges against him.

Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to over the signature of violently anti-French articles which were printed and could have brought about the expulsion of author.

widow still living in Paris and all took sides with

2

30 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportedly forward to certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against and finally agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations

Fall 1966 during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorff a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: Grippa and Raindorff indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of
Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1.

Bom Hammel editor of TIDSIGNAL is pro-Cuban, and loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: Report from (in handwriting) that Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969* Cleaver accuse Bom Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1967.
8 Feb. 1970: [IW 262712].

Ghassan KALIFAHI mentioned 9/1 and accused him of

being a CIA agent.
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DATE: 29 Nov 71
29 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/B-3

SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Subject: QRPHONE Operations in Europe, Dated 24 November 1971

1. I made some notes in the margin of referent memorandum upon first reading it. However, since these are too brief, I thought it best to let you have my thoughts on this matter in fuller form.

2. As you may know, we had tried for years to give QRPHONE more meaningful assignments, but there are certain facts about him and the operation today which simply cannot be ignored. It seems to me that your memorandum takes inadequate account of these factors.

   a. Security: and QRPHONE's personal security cannot be faulted, in my judgment. However, that has not protected QRPHONE from accusations of being CIA, which have haunted him throughout the years. This is such an endemic charge in the milieu in which he operates that I feel certain he would have had the same charges leveled at him

   b. Location: Apart from the efficiency there are a number of good reasons arguing against the desirability of QRPHONE's for a meeting, let alone being stationed there (e.g., protection of identity, and the location there of I cannot imagine why he would consider it, or why we should advocate it.
A different cover for a move to [ ] might be developed, but not that of a Maoist developing new cells. Station is glad to have him come there and give them "grass roots" reports whenever he visits, but would they want him permanently?

c. Substance: More generally, QRPHONE cannot just simply show up and start forming nuclei -- there are already Maoist nuclei -- the various Marxist-Leninist parties (miniscule though they may be) that existed, and they continue to exist with or without Chinese help. If he were to have something to offer them -- money, preferably -- they might welcome him with open arms. Otherwise he will encounter built-in jealousy, animosity, rivalry, and a source of accusation all over again.

d. Credentials: As a Maoist intellectual (or an intellectual Maoist? ?), QRPHONE can travel all over. As a Maoist activist, he has only minimal credentials. The only group he is actively involved with is [ ] -- and even with that he has never carried a placard, and I doubt if he has even helped them with making up a placard. He has helped them with their press releases, leaflets, etc. In short, with the written word, not the deed. By nature -- which we must also take into consideration -- QRPHONE is no longer a "doer" -- if he ever was one. And I doubt very much that he can at this stage in his life become a "doing" radical. We would be misusing his natural talents, which could still serve us well, in favor of dubious undertaking.

In effect, the proposal (if I read it correctly) is to have QRPHONE develop a group which would serve to distribute anti-Soviet material. I cannot judge if that would be worth the cost ($40,000 ? ?) [ ] but I doubt it. I also do not know enough about the operation to comment on that aspect, particularly as to its feasibility in a sophisticated European community.

e. [ ] Shopping him around to the European Stations is the wrong approach, in my judgment. In the first place, any Station likely to have a use for him is already extremely well up on QRPHONE's background. There are only [ ] Stations really
heavily involved in anti-CP ops (in which field I suppose this would fall),
and those have former CI/ICG men who know QORPHONE well:
QORPHONE has talents and abilities and weaknesses which can best be explained/sold in person, not
through dispatch.

3. "CI-Type" Review: A review of the file will show how often
this has been done, and how thoroughly. (I can understand
asking for a security review -- he had no background knowledge of the
operation that would have given him this information.) I do not know
what you now expect to find. In all frankness, and unless CI Staff feels
the need for yet another review and is willing to undertake it, I would
consider a Staff-internal review pretty much a waste of time.

3. Having gone around this problem several times in the past
several years with CI Staff and the pertinent area divisions (as the
files will clearly show), I am most doubtful that any of them will consider
QORPHONE of sufficient interest (current or potential) to pay what it
costs to maintain him. We may be able to justify it since we attempt
(as no one area division would) -- and to some extent succeed -- to target
him on a multi-divisional basis. In light of these considerations, and
since I have developed serious reservations on the long range viability
of this operation (in terms of the cost-effectiveness factor), I believe
that the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of
the project. After some internal discussions, this will also, of course,
entail consultations with the CI Staff and at least area divisions.

4. I will appreciate receiving your comments by mid-December.

Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
24 November 1971

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

SUBJECT: QRPHONE Operations in Europe

1. [ ] EUR/CA, and myself briefly discussed prospective QRPHONE operations on 8 November. During the discussion I outlined to him a general proposal which had been bruited about during my recent TDY at LCPIPIT in mid-October. In substance, this proposal was that following QRPHONE's forthcoming trips through Scandinavia and Africa, he then repair to either [ ] for an extended period of time. In either of these locations he would then attempt to identify and to enlist the cooperation of various unwitting contacts in the left sector of the student and youth population, who could assume in time the trappings of a Maoist study group. QRPHONE would have excellent cover for doing so inasmuch as he is an established writer of the Maoist stripe. His relationship with these contacts or followers would not be set in the routine JKLANCE operational context. Rather, he would guide and motivate such contacts as would an alleged covert representative of a Maoist group, and would claim to have been a member of a larger such group [ ] He would, of course, imply to his followers that he is attempting to develop a similar nucleus in [ ] or whenever, as good Communists should.

2. Operational activity would be of a twofold nature. First, exploitation of the prospective group of Maoists would follow along lines of a typical black Communist cell, emulating the kind of notional movement which [ ] developed in the Middle East some seven or eight years ago. Hopefully, these unwitting followers, in turn, would each recruit two or three other sympathizers who over time could distribute anti-Soviet literature and perform other low-key CA operations, as directed by the Station, and which could be attributed to the PRC. Presumably their actions would result in some local embarrassment to the USSR and the PCI. Second, QRPHONE, himself, would no doubt enhance his own Maoist credentials—already strong—to the point where he might well become [ ]
of local interest to the PRC. This could lead to invitations to Peking and possibly an FI operation of consequence vis-a-vis the China target.

3. The efficacy of the aforementioned scheme seemed to pose some doubts on the one hand, he did not feel that either Stations had sufficient case officer strength on hand to direct and support a tricky operation of this type which might have only marginal utility, in their view. As for the police, being as efficient as they are, would probably come upon QRFONE's "black net" in time, and could conceivably pose security problems for him. As an alternative, proposed that CA Staff write a general dispatch to all Stations describing the asset and indicating that the Staff would like to see greater use made of QRFONE's capabilities. The dispatch should ask the Stations to comment on the service that QRFONE might provide them and suggest the means for accomplishing it. also asked that, prior to forwarding the dispatch, a security review be conducted of this case. He did comment that, if the security review indicated no severe compromises of QRFONE's cover or personal security, it would be a pity not to make greater use of this agent's notable contacts in the leftist community.

4. Accordingly, I agreed with two recommendations; namely, to conduct a security review of the case and, subsequently, to forward a blanket dispatch to the Field, if appropriate. I mentioned that we would still like to raise the possibility of a black operation in that dispatch and to this, posed no objections.

Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

Addendum: Following the above conversation, has initiated a CI type of review of the Subject's security status.
SECRET

Distribution:
Orig  -  C/CA
1     -  DC/CA
1     -  C/EIR/CA
1     -  QRPHONE 201
1     -  C/CA/B3
2     -  CA/B3/Chronos
SECRET 231613Z JUN 71 CITE

REFS:  A. OEPB-3265

B. (I N 340001)

1. DATES OF GRPHONE/1 VISIT TO SWITZerland CHANGED.
   Q/1 WILL NOW VISIT GENEVA 27 JUNE TO 4 JULY.


GP-1

SECRET
RYBAT DTDORIC ORPHONE

REF: OEP-3285

1. PER REF AND CONVERSATION WITH ORPHONE/1 RECEIVED VISA TO VISIT SWITZERLAND 10-17 JUNE TO COVER EXHIBITION OF BLACK AMERICAN ART BEING HELD AT RATHMUSEUM IN GENEVA.

2. ORPHONE/1 INSTRUCTED LIMIT SELF TO JOURNALISTIC PURSUITS DURING SWISS STAY.


GP-1

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4. The charge is made that QRPHONE is too thinly spread and there is a recurring urge that his targeting be better focussed. Can he in fact be better focussed on a multi-divisional basis or would focussing, in practice, result in his being narrowed down to a primarily divisional target?

5. Granting that the CIA label is somewhat indiscriminately used for character assassination in the conspiratorial fringe in which QRPHONE has been operating, isn't he in fact stuck with this label and in view of the international character of this conspiratorial fringe, won't it turn up wherever he goes? In this milieu is there really much chance he will be given any significant information (and not deception information) by anyone who will do so because he wants the information passed to CIA?

6. When he was looked into in April 1968 by a Chicom official, what do we suppose to be meant by the officials finding that it was not clear if he was completely reliable in a Marxist-Lenist sense?

7. How eagerly sought-after are travelers to China now-a-days? What is the forecast as to demand for such travelers by next summer?

8. With a reportedly anti-US, wife and children, how really mobile is QRPHONE in a PCS sense? If we should move QRPHONE and family to a new location for a trial period and it didn't work out, wouldn't resettling him have considerable complications?

9. In how many languages does QRPHONE have verbal and written fluency?

10. What are the current clearance limitations upon our use of QRPHONE?

11. One gathers from the project renewals that QRPHONE's CIA status is known
that was under some suspicion. QRPHONE has been refused entrance at the border by the Swiss authorities. Does anyone doubt that in view of the groups and individuals he contacts on his travels he has a dossier in each of these countries? Does anyone doubt that in many of these dossiers the alleged CIA connection is recorded? In view of this, isn't it a fact that probably the safest place for him to be contacted in spite of whatever tradecraft he and may practice? In spite of a rapport and background knowledge elements which he undoubtedly benefits from with are these factors worth the extra handling complications? Doesn't this handling method essentially double the cost of the operation?

12. What were the reasons for the break with "Fair Play for Cuba?" the break with? Does QRPHONE have a power base at all among American negroes (SNCC doesn't like him and it is recorded in the renewals that blacks and revolutionaries sense that he is not "sincere")?

13. Can't we determine right here at Headquarters the degree of interest in having a rather low-level propaganda operation involving anti-Soviet propaganda, ostensibly emanating from pro-Chicom sources? Now that the PRC has decided to go "legit," what is our best estimate as to the likelihood that they will lose interest in previous and current pro-Chicom fringe groups?

14. Other than on the above, if we asked QRPHONE to become involved in depth with one of the groups he is in touch with, wouldn't he have to act "more Royalist than the King," and wouldn't he be the first to come under suspicion in case action against the group pointed to a leak?

15. If he could not take covert action himself through such a group to what extent are we now or potentially likely to become involved with covert action by other groups against:

- anti-Vietnam action
- African liberation movements
- New Left groups
- pro-Chicom groups
- Fedayeen groups
16. What are QAPHONE's real talents? Why hasn't he been able to do more about establishing himself on a more self-sustaining basis? Is it because of the targets we keep pushing him on? What is meant by these allusions to QAPHONE's "work discipline?" Do his talents possibly point toward some covert action use in a role where the CIA label is relatively less important?
Chief, AP via Chief, EUR
MAR 3 1971

REPORTING ON AFRICAN EXPATRIATES

REFERENCES:

a. OBLM-25,380 (26 Feb 70)
b. OELA-53,167 (24 Dec 70)
c. DIRECTOR 063010 (27 Aug 70)
d. OEPA 3090 (18 Jan 70)

1. For over a year ZIBET personnel have sought to stimulate more
MINDBRAGE reporting on the activities of certain high level African
expatriates [INSERT]. Up to now the results have been meager and
discouraging, and in addition [INSERT] gained JKLANCE's agreement that
QRPHNB/1 should desist from pursuing these [INSERT] targets.

2. Perhaps stemming from the recent visit of SMOVID to Head-
quarters, however, we have just received an informative and useful
report, prepared by [INSERT] on Osumba L a n g i, the principal radical
Kenyan expatriate [INSERT] along with promises of other studies on
targets mentioned during the Headquarters discussions. This is possibly
a hopeful note for the future.

3. Prior to this development, JKLANCE had received only one report
from [INSERT] in response to various appeals and the submission of require-
ments. That report, received in December 1970 was in response to
Headquarters-supplied requirements forwarded the previous February (and
resubmitted in August 1970), but contained very little positive informa-
tion. Furthermore, the report's format and tone suggested that
[INSERT] reply was intended as a one-time affair. It certainly did not invite
further questions nor indicate an intention to volunteer further details
later.

4. In reviewing the correspondence on this matter, it was noted
that the verbatim minutes of February 1970 Headquarters discussions
with SMAILC and SNRMBAGE contained a passage that may cast new light
on the position. In response to ZIBET officers' queries about
what JKLANCE could expect from [INSERT] (it previously having been made
clear by the SMOH officers that the target was [INSERT]), the visiting
SMO officers said [INSERT] position: "They have a feeling now
[INSERT]". [INSERT]
constitutional problem with their responsibilities to IDEN. The idea of passing out political information on exiles is repulsive to him."

It should be noted for the record that itself has not given such an explanation to JKLANCE, but, knowing bureaucratic position and its traditionally conservative role in the SMORANGE community, it may be that in fact is thus inhibited.

5. As to QRPHONE/1, SMOVID on 15 June 1970 followed up his March 1970 complaints to JADMIN about QRPHONE/1's contacts with expatriates _______ SMOVID expressed concern about QRPHONE/1's security and its view that QRPHONE/1's information was of marginal value. SMOVID emphasizing that he was expressing a view personally endorsed by SMUPSILON, outlined three possible options: withdraw QRPHONE/1 from the country; stop running and tasking QRPHONE/1 as an agent; or have take over the running of QRPHONE/1. (QRPHONE/1 subsequently was instructed to stop pursuing his SMORANGE targets.)

6. Thus JKLANCE is stymied. The question is whether there is anything that can be done to improve the situation. The one new factor in the equation that possibly could be used to reopen the discussion with a view to ameliorating the situation is the fact that there now is a different IDEN than when the February 1970 SMOOT explanation was offered. Even though SMOVID has not specifically given that explanation, to JKLANCE, the Station, without reference to SMOOT's explanation presumably could elect to reopen the discussion in terms of a possible change of atmosphere since the change of IDEN. Such a discussion at least should give an indication of whether SMOOT's explanation was (and JKLANCE's) major obstacle.

7. Were QRPHONE/1 permitted to resume his contacts he could obtain some information of the type JKLANCE would like to get from _______. But, in view of the June 1970 SMUPSILON-approved SMOVID demarche to JADMIN, it might be unwise, for the moment at least, to sound out _______ about reactivating QRPHONE/1. We would appreciate _______ Station's views on this subject.

8. One final point that should be noted is that in forwarding the above-mentioned report on 24 December 1970, mentioned that visiting ZIBET officer _______ recently had discussed these JKLANCE requirements _______ with SMOVID, SMENDIVE and SMGIVIC and that it was understanding that "it was generally agreed to limit our requests in the future to selected targets on which there is evidence of coup plotting or subversion." _______ added that he looked forward to any followup questions based on the above criteria that Headquarters wanted the Station to submit to _______. FREYMARK's recollection of his talks with _______ is at slight variance with _______; account _______ recalls that he had agreed to limit JKLANCE's future requests to those cases in which JKLANCE had clear interest and where there was good reason to suspect a real threat to the stability of the African country against which the based-African might be acting. Accordingly, there is attached a select list of individuals about whose contacts and activities JKLANCE would like to have updated information _______. The type of information we desire is indicated by the illustrative questions and other data in support of our request. Whereas we would like to have unsolicited and regular reporting on these targets, we realize that _______ is not equipped or prepared to accept such a continuing requirement. We believe that the attached list along with the paragraph five discussion pegged to a change of IDENS are good pegs for _______ or his designee in re-opening the discussion _______.

9. _______
9. __________ Station's report on the outcome of its discussions with __________ is awaited with considerable interest.

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig 4 1 - COS __________ (Att. herewith)
1 - __________ (Att. herewith)
ATTACHMENT TO DISPATCH NO. OI.L4-26059

ZIBET would appreciate receiving from any current material on the activities and contacts of the following African who either reside or who visit there frequently. These targets have been selected according to the criteria outlined in paragraph 8 of the referenced dispatch.
1. QRPHONE/1 has received a letter which removes the previous restrictions on his stay and he does not need to report his address, etc., to the police. Further, he may now obtain employment without the need to obtain official permission.

2. For the record, we are forwarding under separate cover, a copy of the letter.
GRACIOUS, EUROPEAN-BORN LADY in mid-60's, of independent means, residing in Berkeley, seeks gentleman companion, scholar, writer, artist, with progressive political interests and desire to share tomorrow. NVR, Box 3507.

WOMAN 30, Manhattan resident, 5'2", attractive, articulate seeks mate compatible to share interests and experiences. Loves politics, music, wine at home and cooking. NVR, Box 3507.

FEMALE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, 27, marooned in Ottawa seeks unattached, intelligent man, 29-35, who appreciates food, music, travel and the outdoors. PO Box 4445, Station E, Ottawa.

CREATIVE, petite woman, in search of sensitive mature unattached man 58-60, whose professional longing is for more than just after-hours. NVR, Box 3489.

UNIVERSITY TEACHER, Denver area, 37, wishes to meet interesting and warm woman. All letters answered. NVR, Box 3495.

ATTRACTIVE, INTELLIGENT LADY, stable, responsible personality, sense of humor, seeks gentleman companion with similar attributes, prefers successful professional who enjoys home and country living. Minimum age, 45. NVR, Box 3494.

LONDON—short, four bedroom family home of American correspondent, large garden, all conveniences, completely furnished, close to Thames, 25 minutes to Picadilly, from 23 July to 5 September for $600, all utilities included. Write Mrs. Joan Glasson, 22 Harrow Road, London, W2 9NA or phone 01-749-0949. NVR, Box 3488.

PUTNAM COUNTY, year-round charming, rustic cottage, two rooms, sleeps, all facilities, six miles from NYC, suitable for single person or weekend couple, $105 per month plus utilities. (203) 982-2260, Write NVR, Box 3487.

RENT. Cliffside Cottage, Barbados, St. Peter, furnished and equipped. $600 per month. Write NVR, Box 3497.

LONDON, BARNES AREA, separate furnished flat in Edwardian house. Living room, bedroom, kitchen, bath, central heat and hot water. Utilities extra. King's Road, London, W3 1JX. Write NVR, Box 3497.

RENT. Edwardian Liberty home, 4 bedrooms. NVR, Box 3497.

MAINELY rental (Mt. Desert Island): 3 bedroom furnished house on pond, near beaches. Car needed. $1000/3 months. NVR, Box 3497.

SINGLET — See PHOTOS of 4-10 ideal mates to select before dating! Advanced matching systems assure compatibility. Write for information and free questionnaire. YALE PHOTO-DATING SERVICE INC. P.O. Box 509, Dept. E, New York, N.Y. 10002.

RENT. Cliffside Cottage, Barbados, St. Peter, furnished and equipped. $600 per month. Write NVR, Box 3497.

IF YOU WISH TO MEET IDEAL MATE computerized matching. All ads, write 16TH STREET PRESS, 101 W. 41ST ST., Suite 531, N.Y. 10001.


I REQUIRE... a "dating service" that

- has outgrown pop puzzle about the "young' em scene" (ages 21 to 65)
- has the enlightened versatility to match flower children and Wall Street tycoons (although only sometimes with each other)
- has penetrated bigtown anonymity to dare deal only with its more cultivated, intelligent, literate community (48% through personal referrals)
- offers exclusive, expensive, exclusive, individual processing by trained consultants

- a LOOK AT YOUR OUTSTANDING QUESTIONNAIRE

MILD MATES Bureau for Interpersonal Relations 1 East 62nd St., New York, New York 10021 MU 2-3757

CLASSIFIED SECTION Effective with May 6, 1971 issue. 40c per word—10 word minimum. Six insertions: 35c per word. Eight insertions: 33c per word. Ten insertions: 32c per word. Twenty insertions: 30c per word.
Attached is an Agent Evaluation for QRPHONE/1 covering the period to 31 December 1970.

**Distribution:**
- Orig. & 2/ Chief, WOLIME, w/att.
- 1/ Chief, EUR, w/o att.
- 1/ COS,
SECRET

AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1
DATE: 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE
STATUS: Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/l's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/l continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/l does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JLANCE: QRPHONE/l's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/l's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/l's motivation:

A. His basic image of JLANCE is positive.
B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.
WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story. It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.
OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter — both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German.

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel — and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES: PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset — which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However,
the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

CHIEF, LC/FPIT

SECRET
19 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

ATTENTION: 

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRFONE/1 (P), Training Aids: FERNISHING

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Director of Training dated 28 September 1970, Attention: Chief, Covert Training/CS/TH, Subject: Covert Training for QRFONE/1, From: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

1. QRFONE/1 was trained covertsly [redacted] on 14, 15, 16 October 1970. There were twelve hours of training in the three sessions.

2. In accordance with the reference training request and discussions between the instructor and the two Case Officers, QRFONE/1 was given a concentrated dosage of reporting instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports.

3. QRFONE/1 is a professional writer, so there was no problem in the writing department. The need was for channeling the writing capabilities of this man who has been an Agent for five years, into our type of reporting and to end his "stream of consciousness" style of reporting, as one Case Officer put it.

4. QRFONE/1 quite quickly got into the spirit of the training and by the end of the first session was obviously enjoying it and appreciating the opportunity to learn to write our way. He pointed out that his big problem is having to retain substantial amounts of information in his head for two or three weeks, then put it all down the night before he meets his Case Officer. From his conversation, it appeared that organizing a report had never occurred to him before and he several times said "no one ever told me about this", "this is the first I've learned of this, etc." These things were said in happiness at having discovered a way of improving his reporting and simultaneously making his reporting less of a chore and more of a joy.
5. In organizing a report exercise, he did extremely well. In exercises requiring fact from inference, he did only fairly well, considering his background and compared to trainees with no where near his experience or education. He has a slight tendency toward jumping to conclusions and reading meanings into words. He realized this and from then on he overcame this weakness to a considerable degree. However, even on the last day, writing reports based on New York Times newspaper articles, he twice (out of five reports) substituted his own word for a word in the article for no valid reason and which new word in fact changed the meaning of the sentence, though only slightly.

6. This small weakness is not unique to QRM/2. It is also true of other equally highly literate trainees, who, like QRM/2, unconsciously substitute their own language for that which has been directly given to them, not realizing that they thereby sometimes change the meaning of that which they are reporting. Happily, QRM/2 realized this during the exercises, recognized the changed meaning, and correctly stated that he will watch it in the future.

7. In observation and description exercises, he did well after a rocky start. Here, he at first concentrated on individuals, almost completely ignoring the actions they were engaged in. He soon saw that he has a mental capacity to watch both at once and there was no problem thereafter.

8. He was excellent in his ability to separate hard facts and put those in the body of his reports while listing as comments those items which legitimately were comments and which had no place in the report itself.

9. For the final session, he had been asked to do assessment reports on two people. He was mortified when he came in on the last morning, having handed in his five intel reports and suddenly realized that he had completely forgotten to do the other reports. However, in discussing spotting and assessment reports, it appears that he now understands them.

10. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in November 1971 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

DC/06/ALL/2

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**Remarks**

- POA Expired — Please submit PdL. If, within 30 days, no further interest in subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.
- Failure to submit PdL as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of subject.

**Case No. 201-**

12 04-H41 1970

360052
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training/OS/TR

SUBJECT: Covert Training for ORPHONE/1

1. This is to confirm telephone conversation between [ ], and [ ], Chief, Counter Front Branch, requesting covert training for subject contract agent.

2. We would like to have this training begin 14 October 1970, and can make the agent available full time for three days only. We are planning to have the training take place [ ] and [ ] has already indicated orally to [ ] that he will be available.

3. Our main objective is to provide ORPHONE/1 with a firm understanding of what is required for good intelligence reporting and also the skills needed for spotting and assessments. ORPHONE/1 has been an Agent for over five years and has absorbed a good deal of tradecraft in the process. He has not, however, had any formally organized training.

4. We would like to have ORPHONE/1's outside case officer (handler) present during this training.

5. Subject and his operational background represent a highly sensitive area and we would appreciate the selection of a training site with this in mind. Biographic background as needed by your instructor will be provided by Chief, CA/CF with whom all further arrangements for this training should be made.

Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

ORPHONE/1
30402
SECRET

DDP/CA/CF  25 September 1970

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Address
1 - DDP/TORO
1 - DC/CA
1 - CA/CRU (Dummy)
2 - CA/CF

SECRET SENSITIVE
TO: ID/1
FROM: Interrogation Research Division
SUBJECT: 201-306052

BACKGROUND:

Subject is a married, male U.S. citizen who has been utilized by this organization since 1966 as a covert action asset. He was granted a POA on 23 May 1966. His previous polygraph examination was on 13 June 1965.

PROCEDURE:

On 23 September 1970, Subject was interrogated and given a polygraph examination which was used as a covert site. Subject's Interrogation and examination were conducted in the English language.

PURPOSE:

The examination was requested through the CA Staff. ADDP approval was granted for the examination.
CONCLUSION:

Subject's polygraph examination did not contain any indication of deception to any of the above listed specific areas of inquiry.
It is the responsibility of the passport holder to obtain necessary visas.

- Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than 11.2.70.
- Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than 1.2.70.

Date: 25 Dec 1969

- Visas
SECRET/MAJORT

FBI wire concerning
SECRET 1216002 AUG 70 CITE

DIRECTOR INFO

12 Aug 70 141393

RYBAT DIDORIC QRPHONE

REF: DIRECTOR 057975

1. IN VIEW REF WE INCLINED ASK QRPHONE/1 MAKE

QFT-POSTPONED VISIT TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER AT WHICH TIME HE COULD

FULFILL [ ] REQUIREMENT AND ALSO MEET PERSONALLY WITH

PRESIDENT OF [ ] TO FIRM UP DETAILS OF NEW CIER. MID-EAST

TRIP WOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER U.S. VISIT.

2. WILL DISCUSS WITH [ ] WEEK OF 17 AUG AND ADVISE

RE DATES, DETAILS, ETC.

3. FILE: 200-124-156/3. GP-1

SECRET

Q-201

ce Q| Cover.
SECRET

Rybat Dtdoric orphone

REFS: A. (in 031696)
B. (in 029903)

If you believe project # 40 can be 70% cost saved:

End jan. total: $7,800. This must add $800 recent pay and tax increases, leaving only some $2,500. All ops travel, remainders.

Ex: 10 (unless this sum further obligated)

1. View ref B access possibility. Request trip be delayed additional few weeks in order permit Q/1 follow-up on Issa contact and service related detailed requirements (forthcoming soon) after his extended absence middle East.

Suggest he be given green light for trip mid-May, subject to urgent leads that might meanwhile emerge from trip or Issa/Phombeah/standard.

2. Re para 2 ref A, agree subject trip not be operational.

Coordinating Officers

Releasing Officer: SECRET

Reproduction by other than the issuing office is prohibited.
ER, REQUEST Q/1 ALLOCATE TIME FOR DEBRIEFINGS/ANALYSIS WITH A/PHOMBEAH POSSIBILITIES BY ZIBET OFFICER A CONGREVE THIS STILL IS NEW, ALSO RECOMMEND STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR R/L, WHICH CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED SAME TIME. UNLESS YOU MAKE OBJECTIONS, SUGGEST Q/1 BE PREPARED TO SPEND WEEK THESE MEETINGS.

SINCE [REDACTED] HAS MET Q/1 AND ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEMS VISE ABOVE, NO NEED [REDACTED] PRESENCE UNLESS HE TAKING LEAVE SAME TIME.


END OF MESSAGE

CA/B&F

CI/SO

C/CA

EUR/B&G

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP I

ISSUED BY AUTHORITY DESIGNATED AND

COPY NO.

PRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
For the record we are forwarding, u/s/c, a copy of the letter to QRPHONE/1 from his lawyer which outlines the status of QRPHONE/1's action against [ ]. As Headquarters will recall this letter was used by QRPHONE/1 to good advantage in connection with his recent trip to Algiers. The letter says, in effect, that [ ] has proposed a settlement of the matter and has agreed to pay this settlement in [ ].

Needless to say, QRPHONE/1 has yet to receive payment. Nevertheless QRPHONE/1's purposes are well served by this attestation of [ ] expressed willingness to pay, with its implied admission of guilt.

Attachment: u/s/c Letter

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

26 February 1970

SECRET
1958: Q/1 worked [underline] [he was discharged [underline]
when [underline] brought forgery charges against him.

Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to [underline]
over the signature of [underline] wrote violently anti-French articles which
were printed and could have brought about the expulsion of author.

[underline] widow still living in Paris
and [underline] all took sides with [underline]

2

30 July 1964: Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP
reportedly forward to [underline] certain documents which
established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over
money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against
[underline] and finally [underline] agreed to pay certain amount and also an
apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations [underline]

Fall 1966 [underline] during the Fall 1966, a

member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that

Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to

Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: [underline] [GRIFFA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of

an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1

and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the sense of
Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1.

Bo Hemner editor of TIDSIGNAL is pro-Cuban, and Q/1 is loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: A Report from [blank] (in 1967) that Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969: Cleaver accuse

Don Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agents. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

Ghassan KANAFANI mentioned Q/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent.
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FILE IN 201-306052
**DISPATCH**

**SECRET**

**TO**
CHIEF, WOLINS

**COS**
Chief, EUR Division

**FROM**
CHIEF, EUR Division

**SUBJECT**
Hamitic/Operational
Quarterly Operational Status Reports

**REFERENCES:**
- OEEA-727, dated 11 September 1969
- OEEA-2325, dated 20 January 1970

Forwarded herewith are Quarterly Status Reports for the period ending 31 December 1969 for VEPITONE/URIMISSI, QSTRIP, OUPADRE, and CREPONE.

**Attachments:**
- As stated (1 in duplicate)

**Distribution:**
- 3 - C/WOLINE, w/atts (2 copies)
- 1 - COS, w/o atts
- 1 - C/EUR, w/o atts

**Cc:**
30/052

**Date:**
JAN 21 1970

**OEEA-2325**

**SECRET**
SECRET
QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE: [Redacted]  PROJECT: [Redacted]
AGENT'S CRYPT: ORPHONE/I  DATE OF COMM: 25 May 1969
PERIOD COVERED: 1 October-31 December 1969  CONTACTS: [Redacted]
CASE OFFICER TIME: 12 working days per month (average)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1969: During the current year an effort has been made to target ORPHONE/I on the activities of the Palestinian liberation groups and their European supporters. A good start has been made in this effort. ORPHONE/I undertook a "reconnaissance" of those European leftist groups active on this issue. (See OPA - 2227)
This in turn led to his being invited to attend the Congress of European Solidarity Committees which was held in Algiers in late December. (See

In early November ORPHONE/I made a brief visit to Paris to re-establish contact with his radical contacts there. (See OPA - 2229) He has also made a visit to The Netherlands in mid-December.

In October ORPHONE/I made another extended visit to Italy in order to "take the temperature" of the radical lobby. The reporting from this visit was forwarded to Headquarters and to... (OPA - 613 and OPA - 2572). This visit was deemed to have been useful by [Redacted]. Section which asked that another such visit be scheduled for February 1970.

A visit to Nairobi by ORPHONE/I in late December may offer an opportunity for an added assessment of her - something which has been sought for some time.

ORPHONE/I continues his cultivation of various African personalities in [Redacted] who are of operational interest. See OPA - 2241 for a discussion of ORPHONE/I' s relations with [Redacted] and OPA - 2257 for a discussion of his relations with [Redacted]

2. SPECIFIC NOTIONS OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: FOR THE PAST YEAR, ORPHONE/I had been under surveillance by the Special Branch of Section X in connection with the Palestinian issue. The Israeli Foreign Ministry security problems. The decision was taken to study and understand why the Special Branch in order to end the police in Israel (institutational), the

DIRECTOR 900343 and INST. ETC. for Israel would.

The suspension of activity by ORPHONE/I has been approved. The cover to be used for ORPHONE/I. Although the cover is stated to be "safe" it has been used for one or two months, a new cover should exist now, it is with all deliberate speed. One suggestion is that we have an "exchange" test. It is our understanding that Headquarters in London's and possibly others. Meanwhile ORPHONE/I has been instructed to prepare a "material" image. He should be able to do so with no notice unless it has been covered.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO THESE ORGANIZATION'S access remains substantially unchanged - with a possible improvement in access to the Palestine target due to his attendance at the May...
1. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO MEET THE STATED OBJECTIVES

The agent has been able to meet the stated objectives with energy and enthusiasm. No major difficulties have occurred.

2. EXTENT AND DEGREE OF PRODUCTION: QRPHON/E has made a significant contribution to the achievement of objectives. He has shown a high degree of enthusiasm and dedication.

3. SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON HIM AND THE AGENT: The agent has met all specified requirements. He has shown a strong ability to adapt to new situations.

4. SPECIFIED RECOMMENDATIONS MADE TO THE AGENT: The agent has been recommended for a promotion. He has shown a strong ability to lead and manage projects.

5. SPECIFIED RECOMMENDATIONS MADE TO THE PROFESSIONAL: The agent has been recommended for a promotion. He has shown a strong ability to lead and manage projects.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSESSMENT: The agent has made a strong personal response to the assessment. He has shown a strong ability to learn from feedback.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE REQUIREMENTS: The agent has shown a strong personal response to the case requirements. He has shown a strong ability to think critically.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, INCLUDING PRODUCTION: The agent has shown a strong administrative response. He has shown a strong ability to manage resources.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON ABILITY TO MEET THE STATED OBJECTIVES: The agent has performed well and effectively against his targets.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS: The agent has made significant progress towards the stated objectives. He has shown a strong ability to adapt to new situations.

The progress toward operationally useful results has been slow. However, the agent has shown a strong ability to adapt to new situations.
contacts (that of an unwitting informant). We feel that given this situation ORPHONE/1 is doing as well as might reasonably be expected.

COPY 858 was a much appreciated analysis of ORPHONE/1's recent reporting on the [REDACTED] target and explained why much of this has not been judged disseminable. Having reflected on this we realize that this is actually not surprising. It should be recalled that [REDACTED] Station specifically requested that ORPHONE/1 get away from rigid formal CS-type reporting and render more opinionated journalistic type reports. This type of reporting has been judged quite useful by [REDACTED] Station - but it is useful in an operational manner and for general appreciation of the situation. Thus it was not surprising that an analysis of this particular group of reports turned out as it did. [REDACTED] Station has orally noted to [REDACTED] that ORPHONE/1's visits will continue to be welcome and his reporting of definite use - even if this utility is outside the CS framework.

In general we feel that this operation is progressing well. In the past there may have been a tendency on the part of certain "customers" to exaggerate ORPHONE/1's potential - with a consequent let-down when the realities of ORPHONE/1 the man and his access to targets was brought home. We now feel that this is behind us. Judged against the realities of his situation, his access and the nature of his targets, we think that ORPHONE/1 makes excellent progress against those targets assigned him.
### WARNING
Alteration, addition or obliteration of entries is prohibited. Any unofficial change will render this passport invalid.

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Expiration Date: NOV. 9, 1974

**IMPORTANT:** This passport is NOT VALID until signed by the bearer.

201-306052
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Chief, Contract Personnel Division, OP

VIA:  Chief, OPSER

SUBJECT: ORPHONE/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. It is requested that ORPHONE/1's Memorandum of Oral Commitment be amended to increase Subject's tax free income from $850.00 to $950.00 per month effective 1 January 1970.

2. This $100.00 a month increase will be set up in an interest bearing escrow account.

Chief
Concor: Covert Action Staff

Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, OPSER
1 - CA/PFRS
2 - CA/CF
1 - CA/CRU
1 - C/CA

SECRET
Reference: OEPA - 2223

1. Reference reported QRPHONE/1's having lost his passport and having obtained a replacement at the U.S. Embassy.

2. On 17 November Air France returned the lost passport by mail. No explanation was offered regarding the delay in finding and returning the passport. Since QRPHONE/1 had already obtained a new passport, he returned the old one to the U.S. Embassy for cancellation.

Distribution:
- C/WOLME
- COS
- C/EUR

CS COPY

Cross Reference to:  OEPA - 2263

Classification:  SECRET/KYBAT

Microfilmed

DEC 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.
24 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/BF

SUBJECT: Escrow Statements of Account

1. Forwarded herewith is the 30 September 1969 Statement of Account for the escrow accounts maintained by Project [redacted] for your division.

2. If any of these statements do not relate to your division, please advise so that we may change our records.

3. Effective 1 May 1969 the interest rate was increased from four to five per cent per annum on interest bearing accounts.

Attachments: a/s

OGC/MHMUTUAL
June 17, 1959 - September 30, 1959

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*5% interest from day of deposit to day of withdrawal compounded annually on value date (6/17).*
### Dispatch

**CLASSIFICATION**
SECRET/RYBAT

**PROCEEDING ACTION**
MICROFILMED

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**ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES**

1. At their most recent meeting ORPHONE/1 reported that he had lost his passport during his recent visit to . The loss occurred on 8 November in the departure lounge at (leaving at 1755 hours). ORPHONE/1 had shown his passport to the immigration officials when he entered the lounge. He then went to the duty free shop to purchase a bottle of Scotch and a carton of cigarettes for his wife . He presumed that his passport slipped from his pocket during the process of producing his wallet to pay for these items. At any rate he did not discover the loss until the flight was airborne.

2. ORPHONE/1 had no difficulty re-entering using . He reported the loss to immediately but as of his meeting with on 13 November it had not been located.

3. On 10 November ORPHONE/1 went to the U.S. Embassy and obtained a new passport (the number of this passport is IDENTIFY - u/s/c).

4. We advised of this loss during his visit to on 14 November.

**Attachment:** u/s/c Passport Number

**Distribution:**
- 3 - C/WOLIME w/att
- 1 - COS w/o att
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- 1 - C/EUR w/o att

**CS COPY**

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**CLASSIFICATION**
SECRET/RYBAT

**NO PIU NUMBER**
201-360-052
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, CA Staff

SUBJECT: Request for ORPHONE/1 Salary Increase

REFERENCE: OEPA - 2122

1. The following is a breakdown of ORPHONE/1's salary history:

   Starting salary, June 1965   $600 per month
   1 September 1966         $700 per month
   1 July 1967              $800 per month

   All of the above figures are tax free. In addition, as of 1 May 1969, Subject
   was given an additional $50 per month (also tax free) as our contribution
   toward some form of insurance against the future (endowment, lump sum
   cash value, or whatever the Field and he finally selected). This appears on
   the books as a salary increase. However, although to his ultimate advantage,
   it does result in a small decrease in take-home pay since O/1 is also required
   to make a contribution to the payment of the premium.

2. In addition, O/1's MOC also provides for $10,000 indemnification in
   case of death, or payment of $600 per month up to $10,000 to his wife in case
   of his total incapacitation or disappearance while employed by CIA. Allowance
   had originally been made for this provision when he seemed to have an excellent
   chance for travel. This year we included the provision as a general
   benefit, not tied to any particular type of hazardous travel alone. Finally,
   this year's amendment to his MOC also included a severance bonus of one
   month's salary for each year of satisfactory service. We placed $3,200 in a
   special escrow account to cover his previous four years' service, and are
   providing in our Project renewals for each year's required deposit to that
   escrow account. Please note, however, that this benefit has not yet been
   surfaced either to ORPHONE/1 or to [_____] by decision of [_____] (a
   decision which I believe was wise).

3. It is my feeling that the proposed salary increase of $250 tax free
   per month is way out of line. I believe that paragraph 3 of the reference,
   [_____] is a rather specious and unrealistic
   argument. O/1, although an American, is an agent, and nothing more,[_____] the question of quarters, allowances, and
   periodic step increases is not relevant. In addition, while I do not subscribe
to some of the criticisms that have been leveled at his production, the fact remains that I have not seen any marked improvement during the past two years in the quality of the material he provides us. As time goes on and the realistic criteria of what is disseminable and what is not are applied more and more to his production, and this production in turn remains at its present level of superficiality, we will see less and less of it qualify for dissemination. Since he is an FI agent, this has considerable significance, although it of course does not present the full picture of his capabilities. His operational intelligence has been received with mixed evaluations; usually his initial coverage of a subject is very well received and often whets the appetite of the recipient for more; somehow, however, that "more" never seems to materialize -- they get more of exactly the same caliber, but little more in terms of depth of reporting. Perhaps the fault lies in ORPHONE/I, in which case we should realize early that what we have here is not a true FI agent, but a sort of "operational intelligence butterfly." Perhaps, on the other hand, the fault lies in handling of the man, not in terms of the personal relationship which has been able to build up with him, but maybe even because of that relationship. I remember when I first talked with I quickly realized that he felt he knew more than Headquarters as to what was important for O/I to cover and what was not; I am sorry I missed on his TDY here and when I was and that his home leave has been postponed, for I had hoped to determine for myself whether still felt that way. Whatever the reason, I am by no means giving up on O/I, but will continue to try to narrow down his targets so that he will have a fair shake at showing what he can do when he is not allowed to cover the waterfront.

4. What the above paragraph is leading up to, is that I do not in all honesty feel that he has done anything to really deserve a promotion, except build longevity since the last one, and perhaps not follow up (actively) on that newspaper job offered to him (his preference, in any event). However, I do realize that a man must have an incentive, and would like to propose that we suggest to that a more realistic increase might be in the neighborhood of $100 a month, and that the severance bonus mentioned in paragraph 2 above might now be surfaced both to and to O/I as a new benefit.

5. Attached for your ready reference is a copy of the ORPHONE quarterly report for 1 April to 30 June 1969; this is the last one we have received.

Attachment: as stated
Distribution:
1 - CA/CF
Orig. & 1 - DC/CA
### Document Transfer and Cross Reference

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**Pertinent Information**

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- **SEX** M
- **DOB** 7
- **CIT** 7
- **OCC** 7

Form on Editorial Board of Revolution
Presently in Italy

- **R 6911060376**

**File in 201-366052**

**File this form in file no.**

**Form 867 Use Previous Edition.**

**SECRET**
QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE: [Blank]  PROJECT: QRPHONE
AGENT'S CRYPT: QRPHONE/L  DATE OF POA/OA: 20 May 1966
PERIOD COVERED: 1 July–30 September 1969  COSTS: $4,332.50 (Field Costs Only)
CASE OFFICER TIME: 12 working days per month (average)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING PERIOD: Pursuant to plans developed as a result of TDY, QRPHONE/L made a continuing effort to deepen his contacts with various African personalities connected with the [Blank]. Although some progress has been made with persons who seem of secondary importance, QRPHONE/L still is unable to gain the confidence of the central characters such as [Blank].

QRPHONE/L's one week stay [Blank] was a week of intense activity for QRPHONE/L and saw his local "credentials" put to a most demanding test. QRPHONE/L performed extremely well throughout the week. See OELA – 51297 for details.

QRPHONE/L has been able to monitor the activity of Belgian Communist [Blank] who is attempting to become a key figure in the Palestinian liberation movement." See OELA – 2037, 2099 and 2123.

Following an overture from a U.S. newspaper QRPHONE/L made a quick trip to consult with Headquarters officers regarding the implications of this overture on his RVOACK status. See [Blank] and DIRECTOR 28728 for details.

Through two unwitting female informants QRPHONE/L was able to obtain reporting on the Algiers Cultural Festival. See OELA – 51298.

QRPHONE/L has continued his monitoring of the activity of various African liberation movement figures [Blank].

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND COVER: QRPHONE/L's vacation with his family produced a marked improvement in his domestic situation – with its consequent impact upon the cover and security of the entire operation. This remains a matter of concern and one which will be carefully monitored.

QRPURE is now entering into a more meaningful overt correspondence with QRPHONE/L, including discussions of his participation in the new magazine. This will have a positive impact upon QRPHONE/L's cover as a representative of QRPURE.

A new means of funding QRPHONE/L's salary is being sought to replace BIKNEE, which is no longer functioning due to unrelated problems encountered by the principal agent of that operation. For a review of the security implications of this matter (which are thought to be minimal) please see DIRECTOR 46178.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO TARGETS: QRPHONE/L's access to his various targets remains substantially unchanged.

4. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: QRPHONE/L has approached all his assignments with enthusiasm and energy. He has fulfilled these assignments to the maximum...
degree feasible - given his cover and the unwitting informant-type nature of his relationship with his many contacts. ORPHONE/1 makes every effort to overcome this limitation and in this regard a plentiful supply of background information greatly facilitates his elicitation of added details from his informants. However, this limitation is one which will always be with us in the case of ORPHONE/1 and it is one which can sometimes be particularly frustrating. During the past quarter ORPHONE/1 has been the source of 11 intelligence reports prepared

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT FOR ENSUING PERIOD: ORPHONE/1 will make a trip in late September and early October in order to survey the situation within the Italian left/radical sector. This trip is one which has been requested by [deleted]. The trip will have been completed by the time this report is received by Headquarters.

ORPHONE/1’s contact with an official of the Eritrean Liberation Front led to a TDY by AF Division officer [deleted] to brief [deleted] on the ELF and to discuss possible operational exploitation of this contact.

ORPHONE/1’s trip to the United States has been deferred until spring 1970 by which time any possible repercussions from ORFEOY’s return will be relatively unlikely.

An effort will be made to explore the operational possibilities posed by ORPHONE/1’s existing (or potential) contacts within the Arab liberation movements. Headquarters views on this matter were requested in GPEA-2044.

A re-scheduling of ORPHONE/1’s trip has been proposed and Headquarters and [deleted] have been asked for guidance/requirements.

6. AGENT’S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS LEVIED INCLUDING MOTIVATION, PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: ORPHONE/1’s response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and energetic. The comments made in previous quarterly reporting regarding his security and motivation remain valid insofar as [deleted] and [deleted] are able to judge.

7. AGENT’S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING OR CRITIQUE OF HIS REPORTING TECHNIQUE: ORPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and relates easily to others. This is a positive factor in his elicitation of information from his many contacts and also makes dealing with him a pleasant and uncomplicated experience. ORPHONE/1 accepts case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting. Please see previous reporting on this subject for added details.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, INCLUDING PROMOTIONS, TRAINING: A new means of funding ORPHONE/1’s salary is now being devised. This has been the subject of several items of correspondence between Headquarters and [deleted]. We plan to consult with the [deleted] representative on this matter.

ORPHONE/1 has had some purely overt problems with his bank (an apparent error in his statement, etc.) He is also being charged very high service charges for the performance of routine transfers. If he is not able to resolve his problems with this bank it may be necessary for him to change banks.

At insistance ORPHONE/1 has begun to invest a portion of his monthly salary in a reputable Mutual Fund of his choice. This modest investment program will enhance his financial security in the event of termination and/or a rainy day".
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**American National Bank**
and Trust Company of Chicago
1. As previously reported, we related to the incident in which the papers of QRPHONE were checked while the latter was out of town. As you know, there have been some indications in the past which might be taken to suggest that there was a contact - he works for QRPHONE and seems to be in touch with one occasion provided QRPHONE with a report (of QRPHONE) which came almost simultaneously from . Clearly, this does not add up to much of a case, and we could hardly conceive that would be involved in the harassment of QRPHONE. Even if there was no contact with QRPHONE, however, we felt it might be possible that could add to our understanding of this peculiar development from sources available to their own net. The reply is as follows.

"With reference to your letter of 24th April 1969, we have been informed by a secret and delicate source that the newly appointed has recently been told by of the incident of search of papers. According to had written him a letter in an attempt to blackmail him. had told that what annoyed him was that had sent photostat copies of own correspondence with . went on to say he was satisfied that must have had covert access to personal effects. was surprised that had not replied to letters.

/Continued/

Distribution:
2 - C/WOLINE
3 - C/EUR
1 - 

CS COPY
A substantial increase in ORPHONE/1's salary has been requested by

We have further proposed that this increase be paid into an,
escrow-type account. See OEPA - 2122 for details.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON OVERALL AGENT PERFORMANCE: ORPHONE/1's overall performance has been superior.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT: ORPHONE/1 continues to perform in a most effective manner.
he had written to him about the A.N.C. and enclosing press cuttings. He has asked to find out if got those letters, and to warn that or someone acting for him has been stealing mail from his house.

speculates that the spy, whoever he is, may be working for Black Power or Marxist/Leninists or The Telegraph or even and wants told of this.

has written to telling him to go to hell and that he and his friends will stand by

has said that he held no brief for but he notes that was introduced to the party by and that in June 1968, wrote an article in the Zambian Mail describing as a great Afro/American and a great revolutionary.

"According to was then living in and he recalls that there was correspondence between and at that time; and that used to supply with pocket money. wonders when began to work for and infers that he and his friends should no longer be taken in by the

"In view of the delicacy of the source I should be grateful if the above information is not passed on to...

2. This reply does not of course answer all our questions, but it does seem to be in accord with what we know of the incident from QRPHONE. It seems reasonable to attribute actions to factional fighting with a crossfire in which QRPHONE happened to be caught.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance
VIA: MPS/BG
OCC [ ]
SUBJECT: Escrow Account for CRPHONE/1

1. It is requested that an interest-bearing escrow account be set up in an appropriateAlias for agent CRPHONE/1. In accordance with an amendment to the agent's MOC concerning a severance bonus, the account is intended to accommodate annual payments of one month's salary for every completed year of satisfactory service. The initial deposit consists of $3,200, retroactively covering four years' service and computed at the rate of $300 per year. Additional deposits, in the amount of the agent's salary on the anniversary date of his contractual relationship (1 June), will be made annually to his account on or about that date.

2. Any additional questions that might arise may be taken up with Chief, CA/CF, or with Miss Ann Jane Long.

Chief
Covert Action Staff

APPROVED [ ]
MPS/BG
[Signature]
[Date]

201-506052

SECRET

[Signature]
SECRET

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - MPS/BG
1 - OGC/MHMUTUAL
1 - C/CA
1 - C/CA/SG
1 - C/CA/BF
1 - CA/CRU
2 - CA/CF
SECRET 201634Z MAY 69 CITE

DIRECTOR INFO

RYBAT DIDORIC ORPHONE MHPROEE

REF: DIRECTOR 03219

1. LOCAL USIS HAS REPORTED THAT VISITING USIA OFFICIAL
   HAS INFORMED THAT ORPHONE IS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT BUT APPEARED
   TOO SMALL TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT FULL TIME STRINGER ABROAD.
   ADVISED NOT TO ENCOURAGE TO GO TO BAT FOR

2. MEANWHILE FOUND ORPHONE OUT OF TOWN
   AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELS ABROAD. THIS HAS SET LOCAL USIA TO
   SPECULATING THAT ORPHONE MIGHT HAVE WANTED PRESS PASS TO
   ESTABLISH BONA FIDES AS NEWSMAN ABROAD. LOCAL USIA HAS
   DETERMINED THAT MORNING STAR (CPGB) HAS PRESS PASSES, BUT
   THAT THEY NOT GIVEN TO BLOC JOURNALISTS.

3. WILL SIMPLY INFORM ORPHONE THAT
   TURNED DOWN APPLICATION AND THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE
   ABOUT IT. ORPHONE WILL DROP MATTER.

4. FILE: 201-306052.

SECRET

CS COPY

SECRET

20 May 1969
201-306052
SECRET 881705Z MAY 69 CITE

DIRECTOR INFO

RYBAT ORPHONE MPHROBE

REF: LCPIPIT 2389 (51831)

1. USIA CABLE DISCUSSED REF WAS UKMT MAY 7, NO. 3516.

FOR ATTENTION

2. FILE: 201-386052.

SECRET

CS COPY

8 May 69
201-386052

SECRET
INBOXING TELEGRAM

United States Information Agency

ACTION
DE RUDTCR 3516 1271020
IOS
ZNY CCCCC 2ZH
R 0210122 MAY 69
INFO:
IAE
FM AMBASSADOR LONDON
TO USIA WASHDC-802
STATE GRNC
CONFIDENTIAL
USIA
FOR
FOR GUIDANCE OF PRESIDENT OF AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER IS LEGITIMATE CLIENTEL.
ALSO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS ANY INFORMATION OF RECENT ACTIVITIES OF WHICH WOULD MAKE HIS CLAIM TO BE REPUTABLE PRESS REPRESENTATIVE SUSPECT. FYI SCOTLAND YARD HAS REFUSED ISSUE POLICE PASS TO AND ASSOCIATION WISHES TO SUPPORT HIS REQUEST UNLESS HE HAS RECORD WHICH CLEARLY INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS. WOULD APPRECIATE CABLED REPLY CONTAINING ESTIMATE WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO ASSOCIATION OFFICERS PURELY AS GUIDANCE. KING

CONFIDENTIAL

C1
C1.3
EUF3
17
1. As addressees are aware QRPHONE/1 has officially been denied entry into Switzerland since 16 December 1963. This order was issued in connection with his employment with Identity A, which was then receiving money from the Chinese—in violation of Swiss neutrality. A similar order was also issued at that time for Identity B, who was the Editor of Identity A.

2. It is now some six years later and QRPHONE/1 (at least overtly) is employed as a legitimate journalist. He is not a member of any group which is proscribed by the Swiss authorities—although, of course, he maintains contact with a wide variety of leftist individuals in pursuit of his operational tasks. QRPHONE/1 has noted that Identity B has been allowed back into Switzerland—in connection with his defense of Arab terrorists and feels that if the Swiss are willing to do this for Identity B then they should also lift the ban on his entry into Switzerland. QRPHONE/1 obviously feels personally about this, and it may be that future operational benefit could be gained if QRPHONE/1 were again able to enter Switzerland.

3. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of a report written by QRPHONE/1 following his contact with the Swiss Embassy on this matter. We are also forwarding under separate cover a copy of the letter which he sent the Embassy in which he formally states his request that the entry ban be lifted.

/CONTINUED.../
4. You will note that the Swiss Embassy suggested that QRPHONE/1 work through the U.S. Embassy on this matter. We have told QRPHONE/1 not to do this, but rather to deal directly with the Swiss. If he needs certification of his status as a working journalist we suggested that QRPHONE/1 obtain this from the appropriate professional organization (of which he is a member) in London.

5. We presume that the Swiss Embassy will be forwarding QRPHONE/1's letter to Bern. We will appreciate being advised of any Swiss action, or statements, on this case which may come to the attention of Station. Any advice which Station can offer regarding QRPHONE/1's pursuit of this matter will be welcome.

6. Of course Station should continue to be guided by the contents of DIRECTOR-69543 in any dealings with the Swiss concerning QRPHONE/1.
SECRET 061128Z MAY 69 C11E

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO

RGAT DIDORIC QP2PHONE MPHPROBE

1. USIA REPS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY

CONCERNING QP2PHONE. FORWARDED QP2PHONE'S APPLICATION FOR A POLICE PASS TO WHICH TURNED IT DOWN, REFUSING TO GIVE A REASON. HAS CAPABILITY RAISE CONSIDERABLE FUSS ON QP2PHONE BEHALF AND WANTS TO REPRESENT MEMBERS OF HIS ASSOCIATION AS BEST HE CAN. QP2PHONE HAS PUT SOME PRESSURE ON HIM, CLAIMING TO BE LEGITIMATE REP OF QP2PURE, ETC., RAISING QUESTION WHETHER TURN DOWN HAS SOME RACIST OVERTONE. SOMEWHAT CAUGHT IN MIDDLE, TURNED TO EMBASSY TO ASK WHAT IT CAN TELL HIM ABOUT QP2PHONE TO HELP HIM JUDGE LATTERS JOURNALISTIC BONA FIDES. ACCORDING TO USIA OFFICER WHO INTERVIEWED HIM, IS ALSO HAVING QUIET INQUIRY INTO QP2PURE MADE THROUGH HIS CONTACTS.

2. USIA QUERIED LOCAL LNEER WHICH REPORTED IT HAD

CS COPY

SECRET

6 May 69

201-206052
PAGE 2  
SECRET

NOTHING SINCE 1962 AND FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA CONNECTION. IN ANSWER TO USIA QUESTION, STATION REPLIED THAT IT HAD COME ACROSS QRPHONE NAME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BECAUSE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH EXPULSION FROM SWITZERLAND, ETC. TOLD USIA THAT IT SOUNDED TO US THAT JUDGMENT WHETHER TO GIVE OR WITHHOLD POLICE PASS IS POLICE DECISION, AND WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO TELL LOCAL USIA WHICH WOULD ARGUE THAT SHOULD MAKE A CASE OUT OF IT. DID STATE THAT OUR RECOLLECTION FROM THE FILE WAS THAT QRUPLE WAS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT, BUT DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT IT THAN THAT.

3. IN ORDER TO PERMIT US CHANCE TO ALERT YOU, WE PERSUADED USIA DELAY ITS MESSAGE "WHILE WE CHECKED STATION FILES FOR ANY RELEVANT INFO." USIA CABLE WILL REPORT PROBLEM AND ASK GUIDANCE ON HOW TO ADVISE

4. WILL FORWARD USIA MESSAGE NUMBER WHEN AVAILABLE.
SUGGEST YOU ALERT QRUPLE TO POSSIBLE INQUIRY (ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT, OF COURSE, BECOME AWARE OF IT).

5. QRPHONE OUT SINCE 24 APRIL, RETURNING 13 MAY. WILL BE TOLD NOT RPT NOT TO PRESS TO ESCALATE THIS MATTER INTO MAJOR ISSUE.
SECRET 0212857 MAY 69 CITE
2 May 69 in 43487

DIRECTOR INFO

2. IN PASSING THE ABOVE, COMMENTED PUTS OUT SOMETHING CALLED ON ABOUT A WEEKLY BASIS AND HAS FOUND THAT HIS INFO RE

SECRET

201-306052

02 May 69
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

May 6 3 20 PH '69

PAGE 2

SECRET

RPT NOT ONE OF CONTACTS.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT
BE FOR PASSAGE TO

4. INDEX.

5. FILE: 72-2-2/3.

SECRET
as which are obviously known to the security authorities. Furthermore QRPHONE/1 himself might think it odd that he was being treated in that fashion and suspect that was aware of his role which would not help your relationship with him. Alternatively (a) would obviously be a nuisance to say the least, so we felt that the obvious answer was (b) i.e. an extension of another year on present conditions."

3. We have attached QRPHONE/1's brief report of his visit to obtain this visa renewal.
20 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/CF, JDO101

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS DIVISION

REFERENCES: (1) CEPA-1662, 28 February 1969
(2) CRF-405, 7 October 1968

Operations Division
Office of Medical Services

Attachments:
Above references
**DISPATCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>PROCESSING ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECRET/RYBAT</td>
<td>MARKED FOR INDEXING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To:  
Chief, WOLME  
Chief, EUR Division  
Chief of Station

From:  
Chief, [Name]

Subject:  
DDORIC/Operational

Attachment:  
\( u/s/c \) Report

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C  
BY RID/GD 13 MAR 1969

Distribution:  
3 - C/WOLME w/att  
1 - CO( )w/o att  
1 - C/EUR w/o att

Cross Reference to:  
OEPA-1662  
28 February 1969

 Classification:  
SECRET/RYBAT  

No. File Number:  
201-306052  
200-120-156/3
NOTE:
This is sensitive information and must be cleared with E/AS/S prior to forwarding to HSRA.

OLC-78-17901
1. Attached find contact and subject reports covering activities of [Redacted] during the month of January 1963. The two outstanding characteristics of this project remain a bellwether operational pattern and the usual difficulties in administration.

2. We cannot really blame [Redacted] for the former. His forte is moving around and being able to convince. These two qualities are rare enough not to demand in too loud a voice for the third-paramilitary concentration on a long range target. It is not that [Redacted] lacks professionalism, rather it is the tempo of his personal and professional life that inclines him to speed rather than accuracy. As last month was marked by the stop and go of [Redacted], so this month was hampered by the upcoming Congo voyage. It is not that these ventures are unimportant, it simply remains difficult to judge performance on events occurring outside our area of competence.

3. We can say nothing new or nothing untrue on the administrative aspects of the project. The cry is the same from all small stations—why must so much valuable time be spent on tiny administrative detail. In case the matter is perhaps compounded by his transfer from [Redacted], but his complete file is living evidence of the imbalance of the outside staff. In the regular four way breakdown, the file reflects almost no paper in Plans and Development, Production is not fat. Operations is fuller but transitory, Support is a swollen, blistering monster. We see no end to it. Our present agenda for the next meeting calls for a discussion of separate administrative items. One more chestnut and we are finished. The world take precise careful case offiencing with sufficient time prior and post the meeting to bring order from chaos. It is just this time that a small station lacks. So far we are glad to state, seems to be worth the price paid.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/AF (w/att b/w)

Attachments:
a.s.a (1 copy of each)

INDEX
17 Feb 1963 FEB. 19 1963

DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED

AAA-554
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFIED
3 - 6 - 25/4
1. On 12 March 1969 QRPHONE/1 was granted an extension on his visa valid until 15 February 1970.

2. Since QRPHONE/1's file indicates an interest on the part of his case, was consulted prior to the issuance of the extension. (This is not unusual in the cases of persons such as QRPHONE/1 and does not necessarily imply an "agent" status. Of course WOFIRM is not mentioned at all in this file.) In coordination with Station it was decided that a renewal of QRPHONE/1's one-year visa was preferable to the granting of permanent resident status—which would normally have been the case. We quote from the appropriate memorandum from Station on this matter:

"The choice was between:

a) an extension of two months
b) an extension of one year i.e. a repeat of what was granted to him last year
c) that his temporary residence should be made "unconditional" which would be the normal procedure if there were no special considerations.

Our feeling was that for QRPHONE/1's cover purposes (c) would be undesirable; if his friends got to know of it they might think he was being treated over-generously in view of his contacts with leftwing revolutionaries such

/CONTINUED.../
SECRET

10 Jan 63

Subj: Contact with

Pass: two meetings 17 Jan and two meetings 18 Jan

1. He is starting a new publication to be called (name on the order of which will be added at France—speaking North African, Middle East, and Alinerian in France. An is the editor (he was once) and will be the only Arab. Color will be used for the cover and inside, the plates being made in West Germany. An Arabic edition will be issued later.

2. Plan to use three photographers for the magazine. (name of photographer)

   (He is not a "photographer," but that he needed me to back him up technically.) He has already taken twenty-five photos from me and has given me a long list of others he wants. He has promised to pay 150 F. francs each to start, with raises in pay as the magazine progresses. I said my present work fills my living, and a question of prestige was more important than pay for the moment. (Comment: It's not sure how serious he is, nor if he has the authority to use me. At least he takes a good care, and he has taken some photos to show the editor for use in the first few issues.)

3. Before offered employment on the magazine, he asked if I would be free to spend three or four weeks in the Middle East with him to take (name of photographer) photos which could be used for the next several years in a continuing campaign for the liberation of Algeria. With no retaining selling rights in the negatives and the entire trip being paid, I said I was willing if I could arrange it with my employer. That was at noon 18 Jan. At six p.m. 18 January, announced to me that he had agreed to sponsor a trip for me to Algeria. As a first step, he was present at 1000 Jan 19 to take photos of his interview with me. I will be there.

4. Then said the trip once underway would not be his responsibility, just as he had loosed the reins of Al Shaab once it was started. Then he will publish an entire series of small, monographic publications on the various phases of the Algerian government and its efforts, a photo book on Algeria, photo books on the various regions and problems of Algeria. Concurrently, he will be doing publications on Black African subjects, taking many, live, entire through Africa to gather the information and photos. He said, "You will be working with me and traveling through Africa at that time than working on Atlas, which should have a good backlog of Algerian photos by then." He added, "Of course, I'll have to get permission to take you on these trips—maybe she'll want an African photographer instead."

5. After the interview today, I am to set out to make further plans.

3

SECRET
Through Station's liaison with we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of ORPHONE/I’s enemies within radical circles. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of ORPHONE/I’s sources of income.

Attachments: u/s/c stated above

Distribution:

- C/OMIN w/atts
- COS w/atts
- C/EUR w/atts

Secret/eyes open

14 October 1969

CS COPY

1215

SECRET/RECEIVED

200-124-135/3
SECRET
INFORMATION REPORT COVER SHEET

FROM:

CASE OFFICER:

REPORTS OFFICER:

RELEASE OFFICER:

DISTRIBUTION:

DTPDRC/QRPHONE

SUPDATA:

Subject: First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

Source: QRPHONE/1

Note: Request Headquarters verify and correct names. INDEX participants.

Congress documents gave several English translations for this Congress. We have chosen the one which we believe is the most accurate translation of the French.

File: 200-124-158/4
Summary: The First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers was sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine. About 200 delegates, most of whom were Western European pro-Chinese militants, attended the event. In the proceedings of the Congress these militants sought to apply the Chinese theme of the "People's War" to the Palestinian struggle. The Congress firmly backed the notion that Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were one and the same body with Al Fatah acting as the vanguard body for bringing about unity among all Palestine commando/liberation organizations. A major decision of the Congress was the acceptance of a Palestinian proposal to create an information bureau in Algiers. The Algerians claimed that fifteen countries were represented. There was no list of delegates and the Algerian hosts went out of their way to ensure anonymity among the participants. End Summary.

1. The Premier Congres International des Comites "Palestine" (First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees) was held at the Club des Pins conference site ten miles outside of Algiers from 26 to 29 December 1969. It was attended largely by pro-Chinese militants from Western Europe. The total number of delegates was 188 -- 168 foreign, 20 Palestinian and 20 Algerian. The French delegation was the largest one present and the most divided into various factions.
The Congress was officially sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine.

2. The participants, for the most part, espoused the Chinese themes regarding the "People's War" and applied them to the Palestinian struggle. While not directly criticizing the Soviet policies in the Middle East, it was evident in the Congress documents that the European militants sought to do so. For example, they strongly condemned the United Nations resolutions on the settlement of the Middle East conflict. The main conclusions of the Congress were: an acceptance of the Al Fatah as being the only genuine Palestinian revolutionary organization, and a decision to create an information bureau in Algiers which will be run by Palestinians. The bureau will provide information on developments in the Palestinian revolution to Palestinian committees throughout the world and to all revolutionary movements which support the Palestinian people. In conjunction with these Palestinian committees, the bureau will sponsor meetings, lectures, debates, film shows and an annual conference. A prominent leader of the Palestinian delegation, confided to one of the delegates after the Congress that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would probably sponsor a conference in Jordan sometime in 1970 or 1971.

4. The delegates slept at the Zeralda Tourist Center, located about eleven miles from the Crime des Pages, and were housed daily in the Congress site. The Algerian hosts saw to it that the delegates were kept busy and together. Security was maintained and the delegations had no chance to mingle with the Algerian people. There was no list of delegates and several of the participants used pseudonyms.

5. The first session of the Congress on 26 December, which included the attendance of a large group of Germans, was chaired by Barfuhe Semtov (Algerian). The opening speech, delivered by Toufic Ghobash, 31 December 1969, described Bentoumi as the Algerian defense lawyer in the recent trial in Switzerland of the three Palestinian terrorists charged with attacking an El Al Boeing 707 in Zurich in February 1969. Most of the first session was devoted to assigning the delegates to the commissions, among them the timing of the various speakers, such as Yasser Arafat, Al Fatah's official spokesman and chairman of the PLO. Upon the recommendation of a Palestinian representative, the Congress voted by a majority of 33 votes to create three commissions: Political, Information, and Organization. Below are some commonly known information: Political Commission, Information Commission and Organization Commission. (Comment: The Palestinians obviously had come to the Congress with only one immediate practical aim, i.e., to obtain left-wing acceptance of the creation of a Palestinian information bureau.)

6. At the beginning of the second day of the Algiers Congress, 27 December, Bentoumi ceded the chair to Nabil Massar of the PLO. For the rest of the Congress the Algerians played no active role, thus leaving the Palestinians with considerable freedom of action in the proceedings. The
Palestinians took over the chairmanship of the three commissions and guided much of the work of these groups. A (Comrade) Abu El Hassem chaired the Information Commission. Abu El Hassem chaired the important Political Commission. 

Comment: Source did not know the name of the Palestinian who chaired the Organization (Commission). 

7. The most important Congress document was a political declaration which had been drafted in the Political Commission mainly by Abu El Hassem and Mahmoud Al Hammad. 

Comment: Manchanda confirmed that it was not completely satisfied with the text of the document, but considered it worthwhile nonetheless because it came close to what he considered were general Chinese positions, although it did not condemn the Soviet Union by name. Abu El Hassem and other Palestinians congratulated Manchanda for his success in ramming through such a hard-line political document. Manchanda had in fact demanded the final plenary session of the Congress on 29 December which voted affirmatively on the declaration. On one occasion during the discussions in the Political Commission, Vazir tried to persuade the Commission (whose revolutionary commitments he claimed to share) that it should go easier in its condemnations of the United Nations. 

8. Delegations from the following countries were represented at the Congress: 

- **Austria** - Represented by an observer from the Working-line Communist Party of Austria 

- **Belgium** - a divided delegation headed mainly by René Van den Broek but which included a few supporters of Jacques Meeus, a current political enemy of René. 

- **Belgium** - Brazil - represented by a youth named Kiggel who lives in London. 

- **Belgium** - Delegation led by Manchanda as follows: 

  (1) Manchanda representing the Solidarity Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Arab Peoples and the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League 

  (2) Diana Langford, of the Women’s Equal Rights Campaign 

  (3) Mike Mylitisas, of the S-A-M 

  (4) Minxx, Chinnamasa, of the 

- **Belgium** - S-A-M 

- **United Kingdom** - a school teacher. 

Comment: An official British Service reported in August 1949 that Chinnamasa was expelled by the executive committee of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) as president of the ZUPE. 

15. Richard Glibson, journalist for the "Liberator"
Delegation from the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

1. Roger Young, Treasurer of Friends of Palestine which is now affiliated with the PSC

2. Norrie T. M. P. of the Friends of Palestine

3. Abdullah Yasameen, of the Friends of Palestine

4. Louis Eakins, of the Young Liberals

5. An unidentified girl friend of lanes

6. Anon. Hallier of Agit-Prop

7. Tom Backhouse, who came as an observer

8. Bill Gurney, of the British Communist Party and the Socialist Students Federation (BSCF), in London

Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PLO representative, who is apparently the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine." The newspaper, however, lists its editor as "Ali Yafi." Armanazi had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not want the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of Kachandu. All of the PSC people were young and no match for Kachandu who, in the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of AI Patah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Prolletarian Unity (ISP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who passed out a statement at the final session deploiring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.
France - The delegation was initially divided into factions. A sort of truce was worked out and there were no overt troubles. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger Saad, a left-wing university lecturer; Jean-Pierre Negre, a former member of the Rassemblement Africain National; and Marie-Claude Negre, the mistress of Adolphe Benhadj (Algerian living in Paris).

West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League - SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the PFLP. On the other hand, the SDS played a role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

Switzerland - The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Kees van den Donk and Bertus Hendriks.

Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries. Source Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which was not as large, was guided during the proceedings by a certain "ムトベが" who resides at Al-Habbani, H. Masersten, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who claims to be a member of the Lesbian and Syrian publications and who had attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.

United States - Delegation as follows:

(1) Herb Block, leader of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation.

(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas". Mrs. Block was at the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

Dr. Luridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party leader now residing in Algeria.

Don (LSU), a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther Party.

L. I. Liebermann, a former member of the Communist Party of USA in Chicago who now

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
DEFENDANT IN SAN FRANCISCO.

(8) David R. F. W. A. Z., who resides in
250 STUDENT
San Francisco.

(2) Delegation was accompanied by
two newsreel photographers from the West Coast, one who
gave his name as "(3) (3)." They only attended the
final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned
with lobbying the PL to facilitate in going to Jordan to
photograph guerrilla activities there.

SEX M
CIT: USA
OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER
Through Station's liaison with we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of ORPHONE/1's enemies within radical circles. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of ORPHONE/1's sources of income.

Attachments: u/s/c stated above

Distribution:
- C/WOLME w/atts
- COS w/atts
- C/KUR w/o atts

1 ATT

SECRET/KYBAT

14 October 1969

COSPA - 2115

200-124-156/3.
SECRET

Chiefof Division

Chief, NE

Chief, WE

Chief of Division

KOBIRD/FORH descriptive/PAIDAYON

PAIDAYON/1 Relationship with Jacques M. Verge

Action: FYI

RI: Index this dispatch in 271 file of Jacques M. Verge, French citizen, Director of pro-Chinese Communist newspaper "Revolution".

1. Forwarded, herewith, as Attachment 1 to this dispatch is a copy of the letter cited in the reference from PAIDAYON/1 to Jacques M. Verge. Attachment 2 is a copy of the reply written on behalf of Verge. Attachment 3 is a personality sketch of Verge prepared by PAIDAYON/1.

2. Regarding Attachment 1, Tile is a mutual friend who currently is studying in Canada. "Algerian Sicsor" refers to Jamila Benhouda. The remainder of the attachments are believed to be self-explanatory.

3. Headquarters asked (DIK 05476) if PAIDAYON could furnish any information on Hamee Alavi of Pakistan who is on the Editorial Board of "Revolution". PAIDAYON/1 had no previous heard of this individual.

Attachments
1, 2, 3 as stated

Distribution:
2-COS, Paris w/ct
2 - C/NE w/ct
2 - C/WE w/ct
3 - F/Ece

INDEX

40 - 6 - 133/3

12 March 1964

NEDA-10, 064

SECRET
Jacques Verges
10 March 1944

Physical details

Verges is about 30 years old, about 5'6" tall and of medium build. He is fair skinned, has a Chin-esque looking face and wears spectacles. He has dark hair and dark eyes.

Parentage

Verges was born in Reunion Island which is a French Protectorate. His father is a citizen of that Island and his mother was from Indo-China. He has at least one older brother. The father was a Member of the French Parliament representing Reunion Island. Now the brother Paul Verges is a Member of Parliament from that Island.

Marital Status

Verges was married about 1946 but was divorced in about 1958. He has one son from this marriage. It is now clear that he has married again in about 1963 to Jannis Bourhead, the famous Algerian prisoner who was sentenced to death but was given a reprieve. He defended her during her trial.

Personal Habits

Verges was a prominent student in Paris and was from the very beginning a very good debater. He is a very dialectical and can keep any audience completely enraptured by his talk. He has been extremely popular with all groups and particularly with females. He is very fond of eating well. He likes spicy food which would put even an Indian to shame. He drinks very little, works late hours, sleeps long in the mornings. He has an artistic temperament and good taste.

Career

In about 1950 Verges started working in the International Union of Students in Prague. There he was Secretary of I.U.S. and later also of International Students' Relief which was formed shortly after his arrival. He remained there till 1954. After this he returned to Paris and studied to get his law degree. From about 1955 to 1967 he worked as a lawyer in France. As a lawyer he rose to prominence immediately. He was elected to the first Secretariat of the French Lawyers' Body, which is a post at academic distinction. From the very beginning Verges started taking political cases of those who were accused in the various French colonies of "secession". He was adopted by the F.L.M. of Algeria as the Chief of the Legal Defence Bureau in Paris. He conducted several famous trials including that of Jannis and at the same time carried on the campaign for Algerian independence in France and elsewhere. For
some time he was in trouble at the hands of the political groups opposed to Algerian independence. He was provided a guard outside his house and for a little while had even to leave France to live in Geneva because of fear for his life. Even in the legal defence that he conducted, the basis was entirely political. He was all this period subscribing to an extremist view which may be called ultra-revolutionary. For example, in his legal defence his theory was always to justify an act of killing by an accusation on the ground that it was part of a war of independence.

Almost from the very beginning and in any case from 1951 Végers had serious difference with the French C.P. He considered them to be reformists and accused them of being cowardly in their support to the Algerian revolution. He was never a member thereof in this period and often worked against them.

In 1952 he shifted to Rabat as Political Adviser to the King. He was very friendly with a Senior Minister, "Ahmed", and his post in Rabat was brought about by the Minister. However, it appears he did not continue long in this post and was back in Paris in 1953. Now he is the Chief Editor of a political monthly journal called "Revolution". He is also reported to be the head of the China Lobby in Paris.
1. have reported that a secret and delicate source has provided information about the activities of [redacted] in editing the English edition of *African Revolution*, entitled "African Revolution*. French editions of this paper are being published in Algiers under the title of "Revolution Africaine," and the English edition is being published in London. The journal has established an office in London. The American editor is [redacted].

2. would appreciate any additional information that Headquarters could provide about this man's background and activities.

Distribution: 4-Chief, VE
SECRET CONTROL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

REPORT NUMBER: OEL-37-251
FROM:             DATE:  24 September 1964
NUMBER OF PAGES: 1
ATTACHMENTS:     REPORT MADE BY: 1
                     APPROVED BY:
DISTRIBUTION BY COPY TO: Washington 1

INDEX

REGISTRY

ORIGINATING SECTION: B.I  REFERENCE OSIA-41,245 of 10 Sept 64

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA AND COMMENTS:

Comment: "The attached report contains some further information (see reference which was not sent) about the difficulties experienced in recent months by "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

"Please do not give contents of this report any further distribution, other than to ODACID, WASHINGTON, without prior reference to us."

CS COPY

SECRET CONTROL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

D 2CO-4-105
D 29-4-105

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification 11-4-105
A secret source has provided the following information about "Africa, Latin America, Asia, Revolution" and its French counterpart "Révolution" and about the differences between Jacques VELDING, the publication's Director, and

2. On 13th August 1954, the Swiss Federal Council banned "Africa, Latin America, Asia, Revolution", which had hitherto been printed in Lemberg, and the Swiss authorities took possession of previous issues and subscription lists. Jacques VELDING has however been able to retain possession of one copy of the subscription list as well as distribution records and most of the unpublished manuscripts.

3. [Handwritten text]

4. Jacques VELDING has been removed from his position as the director of the newspaper. He and his wife are in serious financial difficulties, as a substantial sum is in arrears of salary. Jacques VELDING made no attempt to pay these arrears, with the result that the newspaper was unable to continue and was forced to cease publication. Jacques VELDING was eventually declared bankrupt by a French court.

Because of his financial difficulties, Jacques VELDING has had to give up the tenancy of the Paris office of the publication of "Les Nouvelles l'Asie" and has moved to 57 rue Galande, Paris 10. He has been declared bankrupt.
A secret source has provided the following information about "Africa, Latin America, Asia, Revolution" and its French counterpart "Révolution" and about the differences between Jacques Verrès, the publication's Director.

2. On 11th August 1964, the Swiss Federal Council banned "Africa, Latin America, Asia, Revolution" which had hitherto been printed in Lebanon, and the Swiss authorities took possession of previous issues and subscription lists. It was however able to retain possession of one copy of the subscription list, as well as distribution records and most of the unpublished manuscripts.

3. Jacques Verrès was dismissed from his position as an editor, and his wife was owed a substantial sum in arrears of salary. Jacques Verrès made no attempt to pay these arrears, and the result was that he faced legal action and received judgment in favor of the printers for a sum in excess of CHF 50,000. He hopes that it will be possible for the printer of the English edition, to take over both the English and French editions.

4. "Africa, Latin America, Asia, Revolution" has had to close up the tenancy of the Paris offices of the publication at 43 rue Drouot, and has moved to 2 rue Galande, Paris 5e. It expects to be declared bankrupt.

22nd September 1964

INDEX

SECRET

EQ FOREIGN DISSEN

SECRET
REFERENCE: OILW - 20652 (9 December 1963)

1. LCSPORE reported on 17 January 1964 that Subjects, both of whom are mentioned in reference dispatch concerning Révolution Africaine (OMOON is a US citizen) and were working from that publication's Leuvenne office, have been expelled from Switzerland at the request of the Swiss Government. According to LCSPORE, OMOON departed Switzerland on 25 November 1963 (possibly Brazil).

2. LCSPORE believes that in part it can take credit for these expulsions in view of the fact that LCSPORE's inspired publicity about Révolution Africaine has appeared in the Swiss press and that this publicity helped to draw the attention of the Swiss authorities' attention, thus prompting them to expel these two propagandists.

3. LCSPORE also noted that the November 1963 issue of Révolution Africaine lists Leuvenne as a bureau (and Paris as the Main Office) whereas the December issue listed Leuvenne as the Main Office and Paris as one of the bureaus.
REF: OELA-40, 542 (15 April 1964)

1. Reference forwarded a paper dealing with the well-known Communist magazine Revolution. Attached are (1) another note from Joined's office, and (2) the paper received with it. Please note caveats on the use of the material.

2. SWINPISH also remarked to me, on one recent occasion, that he had learned that someone had been expelled from the staff of Revolution (as is indicated here), but the reason that SWINPISH gave was that someone had been accused of working on behalf of "subversive" elements, which SWINPISH implied to mean PERAK. Maybe SWINPISH was speculating on or discounting this report. I haven't been able to go back to SWINPISH on this, because he has subsequently gone on leave.

3. We would appreciate any comments on this report.

Attachment: hereewith
1-Letter
2-Report

Distribution:
3-Chief, att h/w
2-C/LOMOL, att h/w
1-C/LOMOL, att h/w
2-C/LOMOL, att h/w
"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Reports received from a number of sources make it clear that "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has been in difficulties for several months and it appears that the last issue was No. 11 dated March 1964. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities seized copies of issue No. 7 of the French edition, "Révolution", dated March 1964 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then estimated to exceed £10,000. Jacques VERGES, the publication's director, tried to effect administrative economies in order to cope with the situation but, according to VERGES, he argued that the Chinese should be asked to pay the debts. Matters worsened when, again according to VERGES, he persuaded the Lausanne printer to write to Peking and ask the Chinese to settle the publication's debt. In VERGES' regard, activities as deliberately disruptive and designed to produce proof of China's support for the publication.

2. Also, VERGES complained that he was working for Communist splinter groups in Europe to the detriment of the International Communist movement, and that he was dealing treacherously with the magazine's agents and contributors. The situation was such that VERGES visited the U.K. in mid-July to discuss the position with B.A.P., a member of the Editor Board. B.A.P., who is now Minister of State for Development of the United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar, was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference.

3. In July 1964 there were rumors that the English edition had gone bankrupt, but these were denied by VERGES who suggested that the English and French editions should be made quite separate, and that the former should be published in London. At about this time the split between VERGES and the editorial board became complete and the latter was removed from his position, which issued the following "bulletin":

"Complaints from New York, London, and Accra (Ghana) have raised grave charges. These charges have been confirmed and underlined by Revolution's editorial board has decided to dismiss him and expel him from all his responsibilities and responsibilities in all its editions.

for the Editorial Board"

A similar statement was published in "Revolution" No. 10-11 dated July-August 1964:

(JACQUES VERGES 201-180114) DIRECTOR OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION, EXPELLED LATTER AGREED THAT CHINESE WOULD BE ASKED TO PAY DEBTS OR PUBLICATION.)
4. VERGES and his supporters were hoping to resume publication of the English edition. Also seemed determined to carry on and it has been reported that as early as June 1964 he was inquiring into the possibility of publishing an English version in the Netherlands.

5. The only other change of significance which has occurred during 1964 has been the resignation from the Editorial Board of Hamza ALAVI who objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. Issue No. 11 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" shows that he was replaced by another Pakistani, the 28 year old Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BHASHANI. BHASHANI, who lives in East Pakistan, is the leader of the National Awami Party.

1st September 1964.

Hamza ALAVI
C-II, PAKISTAN

REIGNED FROM EDITORIAL BOARD OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION, WHERE HE OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE

(Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BHASHANI)
(201-070343) LIVES EAST PAKISTAN, IS LEADER OF NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY. ON EDITORIAL BOARD OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION, REPLACED HAMZA ALAVI WHO OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE.
Delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

(1) Roger Young, Treasurer of Friends of Palestine, who is now affiliated with the PSC.
(2) Norman T. L. E. of the Friends of Palestine.
(3) Abdullah Yassae, of the Friends of Palestine.
(4) Louis M. A. E. of the Young Liberals.
(5) an unidentified girl friend of Eakes.
(6) (four) Walker, of Agit-Prop (a PSC member).
(7) (four) Walker, who came as an observer.
(8) Bill G. W. W. of the British Communist Party of Great Britain, Secretary of the PSC.
(9) Dave H. C. M. of the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation (RSTF) in London.

Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PSC in protest of the fact that the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine," which the PSC opposed, had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not send the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of the PSC. In the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of Al Fatah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSICP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who opposed the statement at the final session deploiring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.
France

The delegation was initially divided into factions but, on 27 December, a sort of Truce was worked out and there was no overt trouble. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger Guesdon, a leftist journalist; Jean-Pierre Pinet, an officer of Alain Robin's "Action Front"; Marie-Claude Blignaud, the mistress of General Eichinger; and the Algiers living in Paris.

West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League - SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the Al Fatah. On the other hand, the Germans played no role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

Switzerland

The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Konstantin Wagendorf and Hertug Hendriks, who came from Amsterdam. Source: Wagendorf said that he was still a member of the Communist Socialist Party; Hendriks described himself as a Marxist-Leninist.

Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries. Source: Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which came as observers, was guided during the proceedings by Olof Palme who resides at Alrosa on Hemmet, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who works for Le Monde and several Syrian publications and who has attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.

Armenia

Algeria

Palestine

The United States - Delegation as follows:

(1) Herb Block, of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation.

(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas." Mrs. Block, even went to the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

(3) Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panthers Party leader now residing in Algiers.

(4) Don Bucy, a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther Party.
Comment: The 13 delegation was accompanied by two newreel photographers from the West Coast, one who gave his name as "Harvey." They only attended the final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned with lobbying the PL for facilities to go to Jordan to photograph guerrilla activities there.

SEX M

CIT: USA

OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER
REFERENCE: OELS 6746 (7 January 1964)

1. Reference authorized the Station to pass the 5 January 1964 issue of Propaganda Notes, Series N-40 (b) on Subject Chicom-financed publication to liaison.

2. We passed the KUBARK paper to SMOOTH, LCBFORE, and [redacted] and requested comment.

3. JAGUAR's 3 April 1964 response, prepared by SMOCK, is attached. Please note the caveat in SMOCK's paragraph five, and that SMOCK indicates in paragraph four that the response is on behalf of LCBFORE and SMOOTH as well.

Attachment: herewith
1. SMOCK response
2. Note "Africa, I.A. Asia Revolution"

Distribution:
S - Chief, WE w/att.
1 - Chief, KUWOLF w/att.
1 - COM w/att.
1 - Chief, KUWOLF w/att.
1 - Chief, KUDASK w/att.

DATE TYPED: 15 April 64
DATE DISPATCHED:
OELS - 40, 542
SECRET 3912952

DIR INFO CIR:

DGDORIC GRZBONI GHPREE

REF [USA 86052]

1. GREGORY REPORTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT
BECAUSE MUST LEAVE APARTMENT 1 JUNE AND MAKES LOT OF
DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT (ALLOWING LONG-
TERM ADVANTAGEOUS LEASE OR PURCHASE) OR TEMPORARY?
IF STAYS WIFE CAN GET JOB, AND IS TRYING AT
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR FAMILY PLANNING, WHICH
WOULD INVOLVE TRAVEL NEAR EAST ETC. WIFE WOULD NOT
MIND STAYING BUT WOULD LIKE AS WELL.
IN ANY CASE, DECISION NECESSARY. REQUEST ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

2. Q WOULD LIKE HAVE WIFE OFF AT LEAST 3-4
DAYS DURING HIS END-APRIL STAY THERE TO IMPROVE HER
MORALE (COMPLAINS SHE NEVER GOES ANYWHERE) AND
MAINLY TO MEET CAROLE PINA, ABOUT WHOM SHE HAS HEARD.
MORE INVOLVED USE OF PINA WILL REQUIRE PUTTING TO
REST WIFE'S JEALOUSY. QALP REQUESTS AUTHORIZATION
TRAVEL NOT PER DIEM FOR Q WIFE TO

20T-124-156/2
30 March 66
AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION

Congo

The monthly publication "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is the successor to "African Revolution" which was the monthly English digest of the Algerian weekly "Revolution Africaine". "Revolution Africaine", which is published in French, first appeared in February 1963 with the declared aim of helping to build socialism in Africa. In order to increase its effectiveness it began to publish a monthly edition, "African Revolution", consisting largely of material selected from previous issues of "Revolution Africaine". The editorial office of "African Revolution" was established in Lausanne, Switzerland by March 1963 and the first issue appeared two months later.

2. When the first editor of "Revolution Africaine", Jacques Mansour-Verdier, was replaced by Mohamed Grahi in May 1964, he left Algiers and took control of "African Revolution" in Lausanne. After two issues had been published the connection between it and "Revolution Africaine" was severed and "African Revolution" became "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". In December 1965 the editorial board moved from Lausanne to Paris, and the publication now appears monthly in English and French, although the two editions are not identical. The former is printed in Switzerland and the latter, which carries the title "Revolution", is printed in Paris.

"Editorial Policy of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution"

3. The Editorial "Europe too..." in issue No. 8 (December, 1963) urged the European working-class movement to take up the revolutionary struggle. Thus "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" made it clear that it intended its message to have a world-wide application. At first, however, it had directed its attention to the destruction of colonialism in Africa and the establishment of national independence and socialism, and had later acknowledged the logic of its arguments by changing its title to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

4. To begin with, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" did not give the impression that it was advocating any particular brand of socialism. The Editorial on "Ideology" in issue No. 3 acknowledged the existence of various types of socialism in Africa and recognised that they were based on the "profound logic of experience". In time, however, it became increasingly apparent that the publication was lending its support to the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, and the Chinese Communist interpretation of it. The principal article in issue No. 7 (November, 1963) which had the subtitle title "Third World? Which Third World?", was largely an exposition of the Chinese Communist attitude towards the national liberation movement, drawing material and inspiration from the Chinese Communist Party's document "A proposal concerning the general line of the International Communist Movement". (This was the letter, dated 18th June 1963, from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; it is a major document in the ideological debate between the two parties.) The article contained the following quotation from the Chinese letter:

"The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are centred in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism."

/As if...
As if to emphasize the extent of Chinese influence in the publication's policies and at the same time to denounce those Communist parties which supported the Soviet line, the Editorial in issue No. 8 referred summarily to the "proponents of the peaceful road to socialism" and the "tragedy of the revisionists", and proclaimed the end of the "isolation in which revolutionary Marxists have been held because of the revisionism of the leaderships of the Communist parties". Clearly, therefore, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" supports the Chinese Communist argument that it is most unlikely that socialism can be achieved by peaceful means.

5. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has for the most part shunned theoretical discussion, although issue No. 9 (January, 1964) has a heavily ideological content that preceded the previous issues. It has made its appeal in extremely practical terms; its range of subjects has been wide and by no means confined to politics. Appendix A contains a list of the articles, and the names of their authors, which have appeared in issues 1 - 2 of "African Revolution" and issues 3 - 9 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

Chinese Support and Influence

6. When "African Revolution" was in Peking in the early part of 1963, the Chinese agreed to take out 15,000 subscriptions to "African Revolution" and these were in due course transferred to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". It is quite likely that this was a form of subsidy and, initially, when the publication sold for 5s. Od., it was worth 450 a month. An article in "Newweek" dated 9th March 1964 refers to a report that the Chinese Embassy in Bern provided the publication with 250,000 in 1963. In addition, each issue has contained at least one full page advertisement from Chinese Communist publications. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that it has been stated that the Chinese are in a position to control to some extent what appears in "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" but no clear, reliable information is available to show how this is done. The publication has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed BASU, a member of the Editorial Board who is now Minister for External Affairs and Trade in Tanzania. He visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961 and went to China again in October 1963.

Cuban Support

7. A Spanish edition of the publication was envisaged as early as May 1963 and it has been reported that members of its staff have been in touch with Cuban diplomats in Europe with a view to the latter editing the proposed Spanish edition. There is however, no confirmation that it has yet been published in Spanish. It may be that this Cuban connection was of assistance in providing the pictures of the Cuban revolution which appeared in issue No. 3 (July, 1963).

Contact with the Communist Splitter Group:

8. By the end of 1963, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" had established contact with the Communist splitter group which is sympathetic to the Chinese line in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Publications of this group were advertised in issues No. 8 and 9. An article on "The Fight Against Revisionism" by Michael McGreery the leader of the group was published in issue No. 9.
SECRET

Staff, Editorial Office and Agencies

9. The following persons are listed in issue No. 9 as members of the Editorial Staff:

   Director: Jacques H. VELLES

   Editorial Board:
   - Naza ALAVI — Pakistan
   - A.R. Mohamed EIBU — Zanzibar
   - Amilcar CABRIL — Venezuela
   - Nguyen Kien — Vietnam (This is believed to be a pseudonym)
   - Hassan RIAD — U.A.R.
   - Castro DE SILVA — Angola

The same names are listed in issue No. 6 of "Revolution" as members of the editorial staff of that paper.

10. The Business Manager of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is Hile ANDERSON, a Swede, and the Legal Adviser Bernhard Fritz KARDER, a U.K. lawyer whose main task is to check proofs. Brief pen-portraits of some of the individuals prominently concerned with the production of the publication are given in Appendix B, from which it will be seen that, of the ten persons named in this paragraph and paragraph 9, at least three are Communists and two Communist sympathisers. Appendix C contains details of the Editorial Office and Agencies.

Publication and Circulation

11. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is published by Nouvelles Editions Internationales and is printed in Switzerland. The circulation of the English edition is believed to be about 20,000 while that of the French edition, which is printed in France, may be as much as 30,000. The English edition is given a world-wide distribution.

3rd April 1964.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF ARTICLES WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN ISSUES
Num.1 - 2 of "AFRICAN REVOLUTION" and Issues
Num.3 - 9 of "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA

REvolution"

"AFRICAN REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 1 (May 1951)

Liberate Our Brothers of South Africa
Umtonto wa Sizwe
For Revolutionary Unity
Belfa, Our One
Yemen: A New Beginning
The New Strategy of Imperialism
The Holy Alliance
"Our Victory Depends on All the African Peoples"
"Five Months of Independence in Angola"
We Will Avenge Lumumba
Hammer or Sickle?
War in South Vietnam
The Blacks of Vientiarn
Moscow, Peking and the Third World
(Comments)
Guinea: Two Steps Forward?
Mali's Road to Socialism
Rwanda, Burundi and the British
Lerbil Ben M'Hidi
Bina Looks at the Jews
London, Colonial Capital
Abd-El-Krim Is Dead
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (document)
New Colonial War in Borneo
An American in Algeria
Cuba S1
Negroes with Guns
African Art
Jesse: Renaissance or Decline
Jesse, The Avant Garde
Sports and Racism in South Africa

Volume 1 Number 2 (June 1951)

The Chinese Spring

I. Interview with Mao Tse-Tung
II. The Army and the Party
III. The Course of the "Four Green Seasons"
The Peasants Will Decide
Africa in Question
The Working Class in Africa
The Perspectives
The Stages
Clarity in the Struggle
Economic Planning in Tropical Africa
Kudibo Koits Spokes
Bina Looks at the Jews
The U.A.R.'s New Victory at Suez
The People Have Spoken

Algeria's...

Afrod Berella
Olivar BALBO
Batary DIBO
K. TEMNE and M. BEKKAOUI
Ahmed EYDIVEIL
A.R.
Joaquin DIAZ
Agostinho NETO
Commander BERKETO
Abdess ALFA
Charles BETTELHEIM
Ir. RAKJIT
P.F.
Gerard CHALARD
Gerard CHALARD
Don STEFFEN
SISE
Robert P. WILLIAMS
Philippe KOSCHLIN
Lo Roj JOMB
Roselyne AINSBIE
Algeria's Workers Management Committees: Gerard CHALIAND
End of an Era. Bourgaud Leaves Algeria: J. LINCHE and M. BENDJOUNES
The U.A.R. and French "Presence": Albert-Paul LENTEN
Algeria's Investment Code: Jacques CHARRIER
The Kenya-Somali Crisis: Tony HUGHES
The Malagasy Rebellion: Aristide RASIPIZAFTY
The Testament of Adrianaeppinsetana: "..."
The Virtues of the Truth: SEKOU TOURÉ
The War in "Portuguese" Guinea: C. 'César CARRAL
Black Africa between the Two Wars: Jean-Jacques CANAL
The Workers University in Conakry: Gerard CHALIAND
What Is Sansi?: "..."
Forces and Violence in South Africa: Johannesburg Correspondent
Welser Simula, Underground Leader: Johannesburg Correspondent
South-West Africa and the Nazis: "..."
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (Part Two): "..."
Tears: "Patriot? Dangerous Mystification": "..."
Towards an African Cinema: "O.C."
Marxism Painter of the Repression: "O.C."
The Civilization of Benin: "..."
Algeria: Sports and Independence: "..."

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 3 (July 1963)

The Cuban Revolution in Pictures: "..."
Our New Base: "..."
Ideology: "..."
Obama Builds Socialism: Jack MOSSIS
National Revolution in Africa and Asia: Chefi BEN BARKA
Modibo Keita: Lenin Peace Prize: "..."
Africa and the Common Market: V. PILAY
Morocco and the Common Market: Abdellatif BELAL
The Dangers of Foreign Aid: Afera OBENG
"I Accuse!": Nelson MANDELA
The Pogo Affair: Johannesburg Correspondent
African Capital of Youth: Mohamed BENDJOUNES
A School for Building the Future: "..."
A Open Letter to President John F. Kennedy: "..."
The Chinese Spring: Djalila BOUCHER and J. M. VERGES
Spanish Students Fight Fascism: "..."
Four Deserters from Mozambique: "..."
For the Defence of Democratic Freedoms in Africa: "..."
Rise Looks at the Jews: SIVE
The Politics of Culture: Abdou ALFA
The Haunting Epic: The Death of a Tyrant: "..."
Young Artists of Southern Rhodesia: "..."
Two Jazz Artists: Philippe KICHLIN

Volume 1 Numbers 4-5 (August-September 1963)

The Afro-American Struggle: Harold GUSE
Negro Nationalism and the Left: Julian MIDDLETON
Unicycles Go to Africa: William BYRNE
You Can't Go Home Any More: "..."
Aiding the Struggle in "Portuguese" Guinea
The New Slave Trade
A Memoir: Monument for the Future
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu
Towards Victory in South Vietnam
The P.N.L. of South Vietnam
Notes for a Biography of Fidel Castro
"If Fidel Castro Were Elected President. of the United States"
African Nationalism and the Common Man
The War of National Liberation of Iraq
Kurdistan
Documents from Addis Ababa:
Resolutions of the African Summit Conference
Charter of the Organization of African Unity
The Power Behind Apartheid
Education for African Servitude
Two South African Poets:
Musisi Kunene
Dennis Brutus
Modern Poetry in Africa
The Khaldun Today
The Magic Art of the Congo
Bird-Cry
A Jazz Great: John Coltrane

Volume 1 Number 6 (October 1951)

The Freedom Struggle in South Africa
An Introduction to African Economic Problems Stephen BAZAKO
Dr. DuBois is Dead
My Last Message to the World
State Capitalism in Egypt
The O.A.S. "U.S. Ministry of Colonies"
Why I Came to China at the Age of 72
Socialist Planning in Cuba
Barbudos St.
Techniques of the Guerrilla Fighter
The Real Meaning of the Washington March
The Agrarian Situation in India
Five Poems
Will Handicrafts Survive?
White Critics, Black Musicians, New Music
Appeal of the Executive Committee of Afro-Asian Writers

Volume 1 Number 7 (November 1951)

Third World? Which Third World?
The White Dictators of Southern Rhodesia
"Malaysia" - the Neo-Colonialist Federation
The Agony of the Spanish Bourgeoisie
A Day with Francisco Julio
Vasconelos Empire of Oil and Iron
Cuba at the United Nations

Alcide Moneiro DUARTE
WILFRID HURD
General Vo Nguyen GIAP
Nguyen Kiem
C. FABLO
Johannesburg Correspondent
Ken GEBEKI
Kouloud HAMZETH
Keita MUSSA
Le Rol JONES

Haile SELASSIE
Fencer BROCKWAY, M.P.
Abdul RAHIM KARIM
E. FERNANDEZ
Duco ROGRIEUZ
Carleton EALAS
Interview with Dr. Carlos LEONCIA
SECRET

The Preparation for November
Verwoerd's Bantustan Bluff
Illusion, Emulation and Integration
Free Man: Allergy!
Robert Williams Speaks from Peking
Our Struggle in British Guiana
Which Way for British Guiana?
Crude Weapons that Helped Destroy an Army
New British Poets of the Left
Mr. Rockefeller's Museum of Primitive Art
A Handful of Chest

Volume 1 Number 8 (December 1961)

Europe Too!
Spain - the Strikes and the Parties
The Crisis in Soviet Agriculture
The Alliance for Plunder
The End of the Mexican Revolution?
Why Do We Want to Cuba
The Road to Revolution in Peru
Cartoons from Cuba
The National Liberation Struggle in South
West Africa
Underdeveloped Countries and the Problem
of Peace
The Kennedy Assassination
The Rights of Man in an Age of Abundance
Repression and Torture in South Africa
"Beggars" (filmed and staged in the U.S.A.)
The Failure of the "Peaceful Road" in Chile
U.S.A. The Shady Side of the Street
Protest Through Music in South Africa
Ornette Revisited

Volume 1 Number 9 (January 1964)

The Revolution in Africa
The People's Victory in Zanzibar
What Kind of Independence for Angola?
The Class Struggle in Africa
Just How Hung?
The Fight Against Revisionism
Panama: "Big Steal"
Support the Panamanian People's Just
Struggle

The Unfinished Revolution in the Philippines
China: There, How and Either?
What China needs by "Readjustment"
The Meaning of Black Revolt in the U.S.A.
Praise Young Afro-American Poets

Unchain My Soul
Don Cherry: Trumpet of the Year

Rahah BITAT
Brian BUNTING
Wilnot Alfred TRAHER
Clarence Seniors
Dr. Cohera JACAN
Jeanette SCOTT
Chou Chih-ching
Ken GERRING
Lenor BROWN, Jr.
Frez CHAND

J. EZONQUIKE

Fidel CASTRO
James BOOGS
Brian BUNTING
Wilnot Alfred TRAHER
Pedro ANDINO
Thomas TOPOR
Todd T. MATSIKIZA
Lenor BROWN, Jr.

J.W. VERGES
Viriato da CRUZ
Michael McCREERY
Carleton SEALS

Mao Tse-tung
William J. FORDY
Keith BUCHANAN
Anne Louise WONG
James BOOOGS
A.B. SVELMEN
Lorenzo THOMAS
Sonia SANCHEZ
Joe JOHNSON
Le Roi JONES
C. LIFEBAY BARRY
Le Roi JONES
APPENDIX B
INDIVIDUALS FAMILIAR WITH THE PRODUCTS OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Reza ALAVI
- He is a Pakistani resident in the U.K. and has strong Communist sympathies. Member of Editorial Board

Freddy Nile ANDERSON
- He is a Swede and the business manager of "Evolution". He has been a Communist for a number of years.

Abdul Rahman Mohamed BASU
- and is at present Minister for External Affairs and Trade in the Zanzibar Government. His sympathy towards Communism is well known. Member of Editorial Board

Bernard Arthur LARDER
- He is a Communist and has taken a close interest in African affairs. Reported to be Legal Adviser

Jacques Camille Raymond VERGES
- He was a member of the French Communist Party in 1951 and subsequently was employed by the I.U.S. as Secretary of its International Relief Organisation. More recently he was Defence Counsel in the trial of a number of members of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). Director and key figure of the publication "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"
SECRET

APPENDIX C

EDITORIAL OFFICE AND AGENCIES OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" and "REVOLUTION"

The Editorial Office is at 10, rue Francaise 1er, Paris 8e and there are the following agencies:

BRAZIL - Jurema FINART, Avenida Viara Brute 86, Ipanema, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara.

BRITAIN - 1, Leigh Street, London, W.C.1

(NOTE - This is the business address of a Pakistani Communist, Taseduq Ahmed)

CHINA - A.H. KHIDIR, 9 Tai Chi Chang, Peking; distribution: Guizi Shudian, P.O. Box 399, Peking (37)

(NOTE - KHIDIR, a Sudanese Communist, is a member of the World Council of Peace and works for the China Peace Committee which is located at 9, Tai Chi Chang, Peking. Guizi Shudian is the official Chinese Government centre for the distribution of Chinese literature and propaganda)

CUBA - General Suarez entre Ayestarren y Calzada de Rancho Boyaca, Havana.

EGYPT - F. E. I. MOHMAID, 309, Asalowo Hall, University of Egypt, Giza.

SWITZERLAND - Muriopolis, 10-11, Luzerna.

(NOTE - This is Mr. ANDERSON's home and business address)

TANZANIA - Jueli KILGEO, P.O. Box 9221, Dar-es-Salaam.

U.S.A. - Room 603c, 1 Union Square, New York, N.Y.

ZANZIBAR - P.O. Box 114b, Zanzibar.
**DISPATCH**

SECRET

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>10 Sept 64</td>
<td>OCLA-41,545</td>
<td>(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sept 64</td>
<td>OCLA-39,251</td>
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Attached is a recent report dealing with Subject publication. In light of the continuing interest of the Addressed offices, this material is being made available on a strict KUBINKA INITIAL USE ONLY basis. It was called to the report's FUTURE distribution if any) be limited to ODID only. Any distribution beyond that indicated above should first be cleared.

Attachments:
Report, herewith

Distributions:
- Chief, VE w/att b/w
- Chief, KUBINKA w/att b/w
- Chief, KUBINKA w/att b/w
- Chief, AP w/att b/w
- Chief, AP w/att b/w

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COPY

DATE TYPED: 20 Oct 64
DATE DISPATCHED: 29 Nov 64
OCLA-41,788
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

11-4-105
"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

The following information was received in the first half of October 1964:

2. A number of people had thought that the Chinese Communists had provided some financial backing for "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", but this was true only to the extent that the Chinese had a standing order for 3,000 copies of each issue of the English edition. If the Chinese had given more general financial assistance VERGES, the publication's Director, would not have had to contend with the present financial difficulties and possible bankruptcy.

3. VERGES had had access to a relatively large sum of money which had been held in Switzerland from the time of the Algerian war of independence. When this had dried up VERGES had been unable to replenish it. Reports that VERGES had stolen this money were not true.

4. The publication owed 45,000 Swiss francs to a businessman, possibly Swiss, called RESEL and 30,000 francs to the French printers. Too much money had been spent on maintaining prestige offices at 40 rue Francois ler, Paris.

5. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" was banned in Switzerland all except 100 copies of issue No. 12 were seized by the Swiss authorities.


16th October 1964.

Comment 1) Para. 4
Source could not provide any further particulars about VERGES.
The following information was received in the first half of October 1964.

2. That a number of people had thought that the Chinese were going to provide some financial backing for "Africa, Latin America, Asia: Revolution", but this was true only to the extent that the Chinese had a standing order for 3,000 copies of each issue of the English edition. If the Chinese had given more general financial assistance VERSIES, the publication's Director, would not have had to contend with the present financial difficulties and possible bankruptcy.

3. VERSIES had been able to a relatively large sum of money which had been held in Switzerland from the time of the Algerian war of independence. When this had dried up VERSIES had been unable to replenish it. Reports that VERSIES had stolen this money were not true.

4. The publication owed 40,000 Swiss francs to a business-man, possibly Swiss, named Ksuggest, and 30,000 francs to the French printers. Ksuggest had threatened to seize much money had been spent on maintaining prestige offices at 40 rue François 1er, Paris.

5. When "Africa, Latin America, Asia: Revolution" was banned in Switzerland all except 100 copies of issue No. 12 were seized by the Swiss authorities.


26th October 1964.

Comment 1) Para. 4
Source could not provide any further particulars about Ksuggest.

11) Para. 4
Source did not say whether the sum owed to the French printers was in French or Swiss francs.
1. During the past year *Proletariat and Life* and the Africa Latin America Asia *Revolution* have undergone several important changes. For a time during the summer it was reported that the publication was in financial difficulties, but in the most recent French edition, No. 15, dated October/November, it was announced that the magazine would continue on a new basis, with an enlarged Advisory Board, appearing every two months, not only in an English and a French edition but also in a coming Spanish edition to be published in Bogota for Latin America.

2. The changes which are being made do not in any way alter the pro-Chinese complexion of the magazine. Though the magazine now seems on a much firmer financial basis, there is as yet no evidence that the Chinese are directly subsidizing it. They are however buying copies and taking advertisements.

It has been reported that when Vargas was in Peking in the early part of 1962, the Chinese agreed to take out 3,000 subscriptions to "Africa Latin America Asia Revolution" and these were in due course transferred to the magazine.

3. The publication has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu, a member of the Advisory Board who is Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives in the Tanzanian Government. Babu visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961, and went to China again in October, 1961.

4. By the end of 1963, *Revolution* had established contact with the Communist splinter-group in the UK, led by Michael Latsis, which is on the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet cold war.
The French Revolution

3. Entitled Revolution, this is now published in France by S.A.R.L. Nouvelles Editions Internationales, 79, rue des Champs-Élysées, Paris 5e. The first issue of Revolution in September, 1917, was published at 40, rue Tronsona, Paris 6e, printed by "La Cité", Lausanne, Switzerland, and bound by Artigue, France. Then in the spring, the Director, Jacques M. Vergès, had run into financial difficulties, and found cheaper premises for the editorial office at 52, rue Galande—Paris 5e—and with No.10 of July/August 1919 he printed his printers to Offset-Presses. It seems that Revolution was in financial difficulties for several months. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities asked copies of issue No.7 of the French edition of March 1918 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then estimated to exceed £10,000.

Under the new arrangements Jacques M. Vergès remains editor-de-facto with the following as Advisory Board ("Collaborateurs""). New-director to the Board since the last issue in July/August are marked with asterisks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ali</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul C. J. Ph. Honé</td>
<td>Benin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amines Cabrera</td>
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<td>Emile Diao</td>
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<td>Equiends'ien</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hassan Niaid</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Castro da Silva</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlos Ferrer</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hennalde Ferrer</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdul K. Early</td>
<td>Malaya</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The first change on the original Advisory Board came with the inclusion in No.2 of Martin Valdes—Spain. The next change was in issue No.9 when Hennalde Ferrer—Spain—was replaced by...
by Maulana Abdul Haq Rand Brahmani also from Pakistan. It was reported that H B. Ali was resigned because he objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. An important further change came with the appearance of issue No.10/1 last July in which was prominently published a "Communique" announcing the dismissal of the Advisory Board of Peking.

In Revolution No.12 it is claimed that the total issue of the new and enlarged bi-monthly magazine, including French, English and Spanish editions, will be 50,000.

Meanwhile about 20,000 copies of the French edition were printed, the top sale of any issue was never more than 7,500 copies. In the case of the April No.6 issue the total sale in France was 3,000 copies.

The prices of Revolution are given as: Africa: 2.5 dirhams, 2.5 dinars, 150 C.F.A. Europe: 4.50 francs. This represents a 50% increase in the price of the French edition. But this is accompanied by a lowering of the price by 50% in countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Those taking out annual subscriptions are informed that they are entitled on request not only to make use of Revolution's Documentation Centre on International Workers' Movement and the Struggle for National Liberation, but also to free copies of the magazine Peking-Information. Those taking out a long-term subscription now will also be entitled to "publications in foreign languages from Peking".

A main feature of issue No.12 is a leading article by Jacques Verges entitled "Hiroshima, plus jamais!" Possibly by coincidence, this was published at the same time as the
first Chinese nuclear device was exploded.

9. The Russian view of Revolution was made clear in

Pamphlet on June 3 in an article attacking China, containing

the following passage: "fascist groups ... are also invol-
ved in the publication in several languages, with Trotsky's help,
of a new "international" journal with the high-flying title of

Revolution."

The English Edition

10. Now entitled Africa Latin America Asia Revolution, the

English edition was originally published in Algiers with the

title African Revolution. From the third issue onwards it

was published in London as Africa Latin America Asia Revolution.

In issue No. 7 of November 1963, it was announced that the

editorial office would be located in Paris, with the offices

of the French edition, but it continued to be printed in Switzer-

land. In August 1964, the Swiss Government banned the "printing

edition and the transit through Switzerland of the English edition

because they considered Africa Latin America Asia Revolution

"an organ of propaganda of the Chinese Communists, designed for
non-European countries, which does not limit itself to support-
ing the liberation struggle of the so-called colonial peoples
but also propogates the political views of Red China."

11. The last English issue in the old series which has come
to hand was No. 11 of March. The first in the new series, No. 1

Vol. II dated September/October is published in Paris by S.A.R.L.

Nouvelles Editions Internationales, from the same address as

the French Edition, 92, rue Galande - Paris 9th. This English

edition, which was previously similar in format to Reform News,
is now glossy and similar in format to the French edition. Most

of the articles in it are re-printed from the French edition.

Revolution.

The Editorial Board

12. As with the French edition, the Editorial Director remains

Jacques L. Vergé, with the same Advisory Board except except
that Andean Carrera - Venezuela - is not included and there are two members not listed on the French Board - East Asia - New Zealand - a member of the Peace Union Committee of the Asian and Pacific Regions, and A.C. Mayor of the United States.

13. Prices of this new edition are given as follows: Africa: 2 shillings; America: 79 cents; Europe: 5 shillings; 1.50 Francs.