

6 February 1964
DI GERVENO/FI

INCOMING SW MSG #352 FROM AMLISP-1, dated 24 January 1964.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION :

MSG 352 x TODAY [redacted] RETURNED FROM CIENFUEGOS x SHE WAS NOT ABLE TO

SEE [redacted] WHO WAS IN SANTA CLARA x ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ [redacted] IS THE WIFE

OF [redacted] NOT [redacted] x SHE [redacted] TOLD HER [redacted]

ON BEHALF OF [redacted] THAT THEY HAD NOT SENT NEWS FOR LACK OF MEANS x ON 16

January) THE LEBANESE SHIP "MALOU" BROUGHT GENERAL CARGO AND AMONG THIS

GENERAL CARGO THERE WERE EXPLOSIVES, BOMB DETONATORS AND JEEPS x FROM LAS

AURAS AT THE END OF DECEMBER THEY REMOVED EIGHT MISSILES AND TOOK THEM

TOWARD CIENFUEGOS, THEY DO NOT KNOW THE (EXACT) PLACE x THIS WAS TOLD TO

HER HUSB AND [redacted] BY A GUAJIRO WHO LIVES NEAR THE BRIDGE OF

MANAROCA AND WHO SAW THEM PASS AT NIGHT x HE DID NOT SAY AT WHAT TIME OR

IN WHAT MANNER x IN LAS AURAS THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 800 RUSSIANS AND AT

PRESENT THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 40 x IT IS PLANNED TO PUT A NET OR "MAYA"

FROM PASA CABALLOS TO JAGUA IN ORDER TO PREVENT SUBMARINES FROM PASSING

INTO THE BAY x THEY HAD PREPARED AN ATTEMPT ON FIDEL WHICH FAILED BECAUSE

ONE OF THE CONSPIRATORS INFORMED OR TALKED (SHOT OFF HIS BIG MOUTH) x THE

ATTEMPT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT (WAS TO BE CARRIED OUT) AT AN END OF THE

EVEN MEAL IN THE JAGUA CASTLE x FOR THIS REASON, SAYS, THAT SO MANY HAVE

BEN SHOT IN CIENFUEGOS x NAMES UNKNOWN x BETWEEN THE TOWN OF PALMIRA AND

THE CENTRAL PORTUGALETE A FEW DAYS AGO THERE WAS ^{A VERY BIG} AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE

ARMY AND ANTI-CASTRO FORCES x THE ARTILLERY WAS HEARD FROM CIENFUEGOS x THE

HEAD WERE TAKEN TO CIENFUEGOS AT NIGHT x THERE WERE MANY DEAD x DOES NOT

NOW IF THE DEAD WERE FROM BOTH SIDES x END x

9/12

S E C R E T

18 March 64
DI GERVENO/FI

OUTGOING SW MSG 44 TO AMLISP-1

ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

Msg. 44. Last Msg. 376 received. Keep us informed in detail on all assassination attempts and plots against Castro by civilians or disaffected military. Also on actions conducted by rebels or counterrevolutionary groups and repression measures taken by the government. Report details of every military alert giving its duration, areas, movement of troops and arms including types, quantities and how transported, mobilization of doctors and medicines during the alert explaining if civilian ~~medical~~ medical facilities were mobilized for military use. The military contacts of AMLISP-3 have a wonderful opportunity during the alerts to observe and report in detail the conditions of readiness, strength and morale of the Armed Forces. It is also possible to observe during the military alerts the use and storage of secret weapons that they may keep hidden during normal times. Ask AMLISP-3 to enlarge his report on key locations in Pinar del Rio which the government was to dynamite in case of an invasion. Who and how were the bridges ^{reported} dynamited? If they are already dynamited, who and how are the charges protected? Who will give the orders to set them off? Through what means of communication the orders will be given and to whom (individual responsible to execute them)? Can AMLISP-3 report the location of the principal concentrations of forces in the province identifying the units, type of arms, number of soldiers, of militiamen, permanent positions, mobilization plans in case of an invasion, in case of an ^{internal} uprising, in case of an attack by rebels? Can AMLISP-3 locate the underground petroleum and gasoline tanks at Cordillera los Organos, San Felipe, Cayajabos, San Cristobal and give the amounts stored in each ^{of these} places and others mentioned which we have already located. Tell ^{reported}

1 April 1964
DI GERVENO/FI

COMING SE MSG # 390 FROM AMLISP-1, dated "14 May", 14 March 1964

ENGLISH TRANSLATION :

MSG. # 390: ON RECEIVING MSG. ABOUT NON COMMUNIST~~S~~ OFFICERS FOR A COUP D'
 ETAT, I ASKED [REDACTED] TO ASK ORDAZ, DIRECTOR OF MAZORRA WHO IS NOT
 COMMUNIST, IF THERE WERE MANY OFFICERS ~~XXXXXXXX~~ WHO WERE NOT COMMUNISTS
 LIKE HIM. ORDAZ SAID TO [REDACTED] THAT SHE COULD BE SURE THAT THE ONLY NON
 COMMUNIST COMANDANTE WAS HE (ORDAZ) ; THAT ALL ARMY OR NAVY OFFICERS WITH AN
 IMPORTANT POSITION WERE PROVEN COMMUNISTS, WHO WERE WATCHED AND WHO WERE
~~XXXXXXXX~~ FREQUENTLY CHANGED FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER OR FROM ONE COMMAND
 TO ANOTHER. [REDACTED] ASKED HIM IF ^{HE} ~~FEARED~~ ANOTHER 4 SEPTEMBER OR 10 MARCH.
 TO WHICH HE REPLIED) THAT IS VERY WELL CONTROLLED ; THEY CAN PREPARE IT (A
 COUP D'ETAT) BUT WHEN THEY THINK IT IS SET, THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TAKEN
 ALL THE "THREADS" OF THE CONSPIRACY AND WILL EASILY DOMINATE THE MATTER ; HE
 NO ATTEMPTS OR TRIES TO ANIMATE THE ARMY IS CRAZY ; IF ANYTHING COMES FROM
 OUTSIDE (ABROAD) IT ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ WOULD HAVE TO BE IN A PROPORTION OF TWENTY TO
 ONE IF IT IS GOING TO HAVE ANY POSSIBILITY OF WINNING OR BECOMING A TRIUMPH ;
 EVERYDAY THE ARMY ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ HAS MORE DISCIPLINE, PREPARATION,
 BETTER WEAPONS AND MORE REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR ; EVERYDAY IT WILL BE MORE
 DIFFICULT TO ATTACK CUBA AND YOU CAN BE SURE THAT FIDEL IS CONSOLIDATED ;
 DO NOT LET YOURSELF BE IMPRESSED WITH NEWS ; I ASSURE YOU THAT EVERYDAY THIS
 IS MORE DIFFICULT TO OVERTHROW ; YOU KNOW THAT I HAVE BASES OR GROUNDS TO
 TALK TO YOU LIKE THIS. [REDACTED] TOLD HIM THAT ON ANOTHER OCCASION THEY WOULD
 DISCUSS THESE BASES. HE REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD AND THAT HE WOULD CONVINCE
 HER IN ORDER TO REMOVE HER FEAR. AS [REDACTED] ^{WAS} ~~IX~~ SICK SHE COULD NOT GO TO THE
 GENERAL OF ORDAZ'S FATHER. [REDACTED] WENT TO MAZORRA TO GIVE OR EXTEND HER
 CONDOLENCES TO ORDAZ AND IT WAS AT THAT TIME THAT THE ABOVE CONVERSATION
 TOOK PLACE. OF COURSE, [REDACTED] DOES NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT YOUR MESSAGE. END