

SECRET

Job # 76-485/10 (4 folders:  
(Feb 61 - Dec 64)

File # 201-<sup>23</sup>~~009239~~ (14 folders:  
(June 47 - Dec 64)

Volumes: 18 reviewed

Project File # <sup>23</sup>~~68~~-6-147

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: <sup>02</sup>(PLS)STEEL-1 (Formerly AM<sup>01</sup>ANVIL-1), AM<sup>01</sup>CLOCK-1 and (INDEVOUT-3)<sup>01</sup>  
Project and 201 Files

1. Description:

SENSITIVE SOURCE; information should be handled accordingly.  
DO NOT USE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF LAD/COG. HANDLE WITH UTMOST CARE.

2. Findings:

a. TDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 Oct 1962 filed <sup>23</sup>~~68~~-6-147/4

Minister MOLYAKOV told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action /missile crisis/ was an "election affair"; that President Kennedy discovered that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again."

b. <sup>20-11</sup> 4357 (OUT 53779) 25 Oct 1962 filed <sup>23</sup>~~68~~-6-147/4

MOLYAKOV commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. That with this measure he /President Kennedy/ had become the "man of the nation" again, and the nation was in a state of hysteria behind him.

c. <sup>k</sup> 4376 (OUT 53800) 27 Oct 62 filed 201<sup>23</sup>~~9239~~

At a dinner party on 25 Oct 62 in Geneva attended by orbit officials, MOLYAKOV reportedly stated that KHRUSHCHEV was aware that Kennedy was mad, an adventurer, and must not be allowed to pull strings, meaning, to retain initiative or control pace in the current international situation.

12/25

d. <sup>26-11</sup> [ ] 4470 (OUT 53909) 19 Nov 62 (TDCSDB 2/652,244)  
~~Files~~ <sup>62 23</sup> 68-6-147/4

SDSTEEL-1 reported the following on the probable reaction of Fidel CASTRO and his principal associates to the Soviet withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba and to U.S. demands re the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 aircraft and on-spot inspection: Source said that CASTRO's vanity was immense and no matter how it had been explained to him by MIKOYAN or other Soviet officials, he must have been furious at the fact that the Soviet Union had "backed down" before the U.S. and was negotiating with the U.S. on an independent basis. CASTRO must have considered himself as being in a desperate situation. Source said that CASTRO was dominated by vanity, had megalomaniacal tendencies, and possessed a compulsion for revenge which was notorious; on occasion his compulsion caused him to reach back as far as twenty years to revenge actions taken against him at that time. Source added that in the current situation CASTRO was fully capable of undertaking an act of desperation, for example the aerial bombardment of the U.S. or some gross act against the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba.

e. <sup>26-11</sup> [ ] 5006 (OUT 54584) 28 Mar 63 (TDCSDB 3/653,939)  
~~Files~~ <sup>23</sup> 68-6-147/4

At the height of the October 62 Cuban crisis, CASTRO haranged a Soviet commander about the "impossibility" of permitting U.S. planes to photograph Cuba. The Soviet succumbed to CASTRO's persuasiveness and took action which resulted in shooting down a U-2 plane. The Soviet command was furious and the Soviet officer was returned to the USSR under arrest.

f. <sup>26-11</sup> [ ] 6022 (IN 79271) 12 Dec 63 Filed <sup>23</sup> 68-6-147/3

Report that there was no speculation among orbit or Soviet officials re implications of Johnson's accession. There was a special alert status ordered for Cuban Missions as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy. The alert was still in effect 9 December 1963.

g. <sup>26-11</sup> [ ] 6029 (OUT 65853) 12 Dec 63 (TDCSDB 3/658,469)  
~~Filed~~ <sup>23</sup> 68-6-147/4

Report that circa 2 days after the assassination of President Kennedy, Cuban dip missions abroad began to receive a series of messages placing them on a special alert status. These messages were obviously due to apprehension by the Cuban Government that the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy might lead to hostile activity directed against the missions. They were instructed among other things, to

be certain that there were "no compromising documents on the premises."

h. <sup>26-11</sup> [ ] 6313 (IN 30483) 2 March 1964 Filed 201/9239 <sup>23</sup>

<sup>03</sup> INDEVOUT-3 reported at 29 February meeting that CASTRO was concerned that Johnson would not follow Kennedy's course which might have lead to negotiations. KHRUSHCHEV was convinced that CASTRO's Caribbean P-ace must be strengthened.

/COMMENT: Ref. IG Memo dated 25 April 1967 SECRET EYES ONLY, Page 112 - Discussion of Assassination at High-Level Government Meetings. HURWITCH of State, and McGeorge BUNDY, White House, among others, attended 10 Aug 62 Special Group (Augmented) meeting at Dept. of State. Bill Harvey attended with McCone for CIA. Remember Harvey's Mafia contacts. Also, keep in mind that Tad SZULC allegedly had access to Hurwitch, both President and Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy. Could he have learned or heard of the plot and let the word out? McCone recalled that liquidation of CASTRO, and other regime officials, was mentioned at JCS op room meeting 8 or 9 August 1962. It was later determined that McCone's recollection was probably faulty, that assassination came up for discussion at the 10 August State meeting. 7

Attachments: 8

LAD/JFK Task Force

Researcher: KGB