

FM A 34-484

6 June 1968

REMARKS FOR: CDR, COMINT Operations (U.S. Naval  
VIA : Deputy CDR, COMINT (U.S. Commander)  
SUBJECT : Handbook of COMINT Operations

1. During a meeting with Mr. Wood, C. I. C., DDCI, Mr. Cheever,  
DCI, DDCI and Mr. Swanson, C. I. C./SAC/CI on 20 June 1968,  
Mr. Swanson reviewed the following points concerning the handling  
of the COMINT operations. These points were the subject of  
earlier discussions by Mr. Swanson and the various COMINT Chiefs  
in their Divisions.

2. From the outset, in view of the proposed actions in Canada,  
A. several factors were:

2.1. to develop An, ComINT's crest and to get the information  
to the appropriate country desks as soon as possible. To con-  
tract, including field offices, and to analyze the results. Leaves  
to be run by C. I. C./SAC/CI in Canada to staffers and by the U.S. Country  
desks or Canadian agents in their respective countries.

2.2. to select target countries. The major areas identified  
by Mr. Swanson and his staff in order of priority, considering the  
overall value, chance of success, accessibility and probability.  
The selection of targets to be made jointly by DDCI and the  
CIOs.

2.3. to have a mechanism to apprise any Canadian  
agents before the content of any message from the Canadian country desk  
to the Canadian country's despatch and that it can be fully aware  
of greater communication problems in reporting to the CIO. The  
Canadian Country desks will be required to have no responsibility  
transferred, either in transferred or in control of any messages to the

1400000  
1. To use the C-1 for drawing pictures of selected targets, agents first and staffers second as outlined above.

c. To provide the information acquired from the briefing

AMM CG-11

(i) To allow [redacted] to be given [redacted]  
[redacted] information, and  
to prompt them to take any action as we may wish.

(ii) To give pertinent information [redacted]  
who can help us in locating and identifying targets.

d. Meanwhile, as in the A-N exercise for the Canadian  
defector who has provided us with considerable information and  
has been used in a number of approaches, to allow those appropriate  
information to the U.S. intelligence community. In the case of a  
personality, the Canadian that is would consist only of descriptive  
and biographic data furnished by [redacted], including appropriate  
headquarters traces. It would request that nothing be done in return.  
(This procedure has been used in the A-N exercise.)

e. To decide what information we shall give the various

1. To work out in cooperation with the CI and C-1 staffs what  
can be done in the event it may be useful at some future date to  
publicise AMM CG-1's description by releasing certain information to  
the press or by possibly having him appear before the congressional  
of American states.

2. The above represents a general outline of what our overall  
planning has been in connection with the AMM CG-1 case since we  
are going to the United States. The type of contact, to understand  
it is to manage and coordinate the overall aspects of the  
operation and to see that no inadvertent disclosure of any non-  
interested donor or source that may have damaging effects on other  
aspects of the operation.

Postscript:

AMM CG-1