

JFK Assassination System
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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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COUNTRY: USSR
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[C]

SUMMARY (UNCLASSIFIED) The following information was obtained from DS-2137. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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- 1. (S) Source was furnished the following requirement: "Describe in detail the established procedures for handling U. S. military personnel who defect to the Soviets or Communist countries, to include handling, coordination with Satellite intelligence services, interrogation, and utilization. Are 'walk-ins' handled differently than induced defectors? On what basis are some U. S. military defectors given asylum in the Soviet Union, while others are sent to Bautzen, Germany?"
2. (S) Source said that the initial procedure calls for studying and checking and then a decision as to the best exploitation of the defector. He said that a defector might be sent to Moscow if he were important or if it were connected with special investigation or contact with satellite countries. However less important cases or those of primary interest for local exploitation would be kept in place, especially in Germany. Source remarked that sometimes a defector is used in operational intelligence activity in the local area, particularly in Berlin and Germany.
3. (S) Source said that the checking of the defector would be done by officers of the KGB and in Germany by officers of the American Section of the KGB Aparat in Germany. Source said that there is no difference in the KGB procedures for checking from those that he encountered except that the Soviets do not use the lie detector and that "when it concerns important defectors their action is more effective, more quicker...makes the decision more quicker."
4. (S) In the case of military defectors the KGB would give the military (GRU) an opportunity to work with them. Source said that if an American soldier were to defect to the CSR territory, he would be handled by the Czechoslovakian State

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Security Service. Source said that he does not believe that a KGB officer would participate in the initial interrogation that would be conducted by the Czech Service. The information, of course, would go to KGB headquarters in Moscow through the KGB advisor in the CSR. Source said that he believes that KGB officers would deal directly with an American military defector in Germany but not in other satellite countries.

5. (S) The Soviet handling of a defector does not depend on whether he is a "walk-in" or an induced defector, rather the handling is based on pragmatic considerations of the importance of the individual and possible benefit for political and propaganda exploitation. If the defector is sufficiently important and the Soviets plan to use him "for a serious task" or plan to use his experience and background story for "illegals", the Soviets "send such people to the Soviet Union".

COMMENTS: (of Preparing Officer)

None

COMMENTS: (of Approving Officer)

None

APPROVED:

DOROTHE E. NATLACK
Chief, Exploitation Branch,
Collection Division, OACSI

(Classification)