JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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FROM: LOWMAN, DAVID
TO: PDASOFD (INTEL)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Queries to NSA Concerning the Warren Commission

Reference your letter dated 14 January 1976 transmitting a request from Mr. Alton Quanbeck of the Senate Select Committee Staff. The following information is provided in response to Mr. Quanbeck's letter, keyed by paragraph to his letter (inclosed - see underlined portions). Most of the information was made available to the SSC Staff, Mr. Jim Johnson, during an interview with Dr. Louis Tordella on 20 January 1976.

Para. 1. - NSA requested permission to retain photocopies of those reports on which we had worked merely as record copies of our efforts on behalf of the Commission. It was felt that if a question should arise at that time concerning what analytic efforts had been involved and the number of manhours expended, a record copy would prove useful. No operational use was made of these documents except to hold them on file for a period of time which cannot now be determined. To the best of our present knowledge, the photocopies have now been destroyed. Absolutely no results relevant to the assassination were obtained through NSA's analytic look at the exhibits. The Commission, in the person of Mr. Allan Dulles, had asked Dr. Tordella, informally, to review the exhibits for any secret writing or codes which might have been contained in the documents. Dr. Tordella, after causing a careful review of the documents by NSA cryptanalysts, reported verbally to Mr. Dulles and other Commission members that nothing whatsoever had been achieved by the analytic effort. No written reply was submitted.
Para. 2. - NSA is uncertain as to what is precisely meant by these comments, but we assume that the comments on names refer to our biographic files which are maintained on foreign personalities of potential intelligence significance. As the Committee knows, these biographic files are maintained (now at CIA incidentally) as analytic support. It is also possible that the Commission was referring to the fact that names are frequently seen in traffic collected for foreign intelligence purposes and therefore NSA might have access to foreign names not otherwise available to the Intelligence Community.

Para. 3. - It may well be that CIA did obtain such transmissions and pass them to NSA for analysis, but no one presently working that analytic area recalls such a request. Discussions with Dr. Tordella also failed to shed any light on this subject. There are no files or records which we have been able to locate from that time frame which would substantiate such a claim. In fact, the only file the responsible analytic group has been able to locate concerning a request from the Warren Commission deals with a file compiled from open sources citing major dates in the last months of Oswald's life. Presumably the data file was to be compared with NSA product on/about the key dates in the hope that something could be deduced. The file does not contain any "hits." The analysts who performed this effort have since retired.

Para. 4. - The informal request from Mr. Dulles is the known total extent of NSA's role in assisting in the investigation. The file discussed in Paragraph 3 is the only file thus far recovered. There is no information which can now be identified which was developed from Cuban or Soviet transmissions relating to the assassination.

Para. 5. - We have no information on this subject at all. However, pursuant to the subject raised during the Tordella interview, we have searched our files manually, and as Mr. Lowman agreed during the Tordella interview, we have recovered three product reports (Inclosures 2 through 4) which show that Cuban military forces did go on alert immediately after the assassination. There is no SIGINT evidence, however, that the Cuban forces were alerted prior to the assassination, thereby suggesting that they had prior knowledge of the event.
Serial: N0078

Para. 6. - No hard copy material of any kind was provided to the Commission (see Para. 1).

[Signature]
DAVID D. LOWMAN
Special Assistant
to the Director
for Congressional Reviews

4 Incls:
a/s
cc:  DIR  (Less Incls)
     D/DIR  "
     ESS  "
     ESS/R  
     ESS, Mr. Lowman  
     G, Mr. Peksa  
     NCRDEF  
     A, Miss Caracristi (Less Incls)  
     L221  

  M/R: Inclosures 2 through 4 are product reports numbered 2/0/R65-63, 2/0/R196-63 and 2/0/R58-63.

Frank Foster/O/ESS/3161s/26 Jan 76/kjb
Handle Via Indicated Controls

COMINT

Access to this document will be restricted to those persons cleared for the specific projects;

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the BYEMAN and Communications Intelligence Controls. No action is to be taken on any communications intelligence which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source, unless such action is first approved by the appropriate authority.
January 13, 1976

Mr. Thomas K. Latimer
Special Assistant to the Secretary
U. S. Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Tom:

In connection with the Select Committee's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, we earlier received answers to certain questions put to NSA. Since then we have examined other material pertaining to NSA's contribution to the Warren Commission's investigation and we desire further information from NSA.

By way of background for this request, we note the Warren Commission provided NSA various documents and asked NSA to review them for any cryptological significance. NSA found no cryptological significance and its report of this fact was published by the Commission.

1. By letter of July 10, 1964, (a copy of which is attached) Mr. Rankin provided General Blake a copy of certain documents requested by Dr. Tordella for NSA's files. Since NSA's analysis of the documents was apparently completed at the time of Rankin's letter, we wish to know why NSA wanted to keep these documents for its file. Further, we wish to know what use, if any, was made of these documents and what results relevant to the assassination were obtained from such use.

2. In a Commission staff internal memorandum, discussing the documents provided NSA, it is reported that NSA is "primarily interested in names," and NSA claims it has "information on names which the CIA does not have." Assuming these statements are accurate, we wish to know what significance such names would have.
to NSA and what information on names NSA had that CIA did not. If names had significance, what names did NSA use in its analysis?

3. We are informed that CIA obtained transmissions from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for November or December 1963 and that it may have passed these to NSA for analysis. Did NSA receive these transmissions or any transmissions relevant to the assassination inquiry? Did it analyze them? What were the results of its analysis?

4. We are interested in learning the extent of NSA's role in assisting in the investigation of the assassination. In that connection, please inform the Committee the extent of NSA files relating to the assassination. Please provide the staff of the Committee access to those files. Please provide the staff with a summary of all information NSA developed from Cuban or Soviet transmissions relating to the assassination.

5. We have been informed that after the assassination the Cuban government instructed its embassies and consulates to return all files on Oswald to Cuba. What information does NSA have on whether such instructions were issued?

6. In connection with the answers to questions 4 and 5, please indicate whether such material was provided the Warren Commission and provide copies of all documents evidencing that fact.

We would appreciate receiving a response to these questions as soon as possible and to expedite this inquiry we are sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Foster of NSA.

Sincerely,

Al

Alton H. Quanbeck

cc: Frank Foster
Lieutenant General Gordon A. Blake, U. S. A. F.
Director, National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

Dear General Blake:

In regard to Dr. Tordello's request, the National Security Agency is authorized to keep for its file the following photographic copies of items which have been used by the Commission in its investigation:

(1) Commission Exhibit 31
(2) Commission Exhibit 15
(3) Commission Exhibit 104
(4) Commission Exhibit 18
(5) Typewritten version of Commission Exhibit 24
(6) F. B. I. items A-2, A-6
(7) F. B. I. items 137, 152

Thank you for the cooperation and assistance you have rendered the Commission.

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

cc: Mr. Rankin
Mr. Willens
Mr. Mosk
SECRET

All subordinates of the First Army Headquarters in both Eastern and Southwestern Orientals were placed in an alert status at 22 November 1963 (2/12/63). The urgent need to keep the planes in the fleet (probably 1st J-10) on emergency alert was revealed in a message from the Chief, South Sector, General Headquaters, to Chief of Staff, First Army Headquarters on 22 November 1963 (2/12/63).

PART IV: SOUTH SECTOR

On the morning of 12 November, the 15-255, in the first actual accident involving a U.S. vessel to Cuba, was reported leaking at approximately 0800 on 20 November the 15-255, at approximately 700-800 feet above the water. The vessel was salvaged and secured at the port of Havana by 0100, 10-25. The salvage work was completed on 10-25 by 0100, 10-25. The vessel was not found to be moored, presumably at Portil (2/25/63).

A CUBA suddenly received the following message by telephone: 15-255 was found on the ocean floor by the crew of a submarine and a CUBA vessel was launched immediately to launch a rescue mission. The vessel was located at approximately 15-25 miles from the port of Havana and was two miles north of the CUBA vessel. The rescue mission was completed on 10-25 by 0100, 10-25. A CUBA vessel was launched immediately to encounter and rescue the 15-255, which was located at approximately 15-25 miles from the port of Havana and was two miles north of the CUBA vessel. The rescue mission was completed on 10-25 by 0100, 10-25.

The USS JUPITER K (16-177), has been the subject of special CUBA reports concerning its position. The reports have been noted to have been passed from Havana to CUBA; the USS JUPITER K (16-177) reports of movement were first noted in September and have continued until now (2/25/63).

The CUBA Naval Base was established on 22 November by Naval Headquarters in Havana, and the facility was recently scheduled for renovation and improvement in the near future. The facilities would include personnel and equipment for ground firing and target testing procedures. The information was reported to be a report filed by an American. These sources were not identified (2/25/63).
SECRET KIMBO

1/01/2010/53
25 Nov 63 1815Z
DIST: Q/IA
ST: 230°

ALERT IN EASTERN NAVAL DISTRICT: RELAXED, 22 NOVEMBER

As a result of the death of President Kennedy, the Eastern Naval District of Cuba has placed on an alert at 2042 EST 22 November by Sanez, headquarters for that district.((A))

At 203/2 EST on 22 November, the alert was relaxed a certain degree by Sanez. Instructions were passed to Santiago de Cuba, a subordinator, to give leave to 25 percent of that personnel for the 23rd and 24th and that further orders would be forthcoming on 22 November 1963.

COMMENT: The authorization to grant leave to personnel is an indication that the alert is somewhat relaxed and the note that further instructions would be issued on Monday, 25 November indicates that a humble view has been adopted for the situation by Cuban naval authorities in the Eastern Naval District.

((A)) (2/1/01/ 1961-52, 2/05/ 1965, 656, 6667-63)
SECRET KIMBO

2/08-63
26 November 1963
DIST: O/WA
ST 250

ALERT IN ORIENTE PROVINCE BELIEVED TO BE TERMINATED

The alert in Oriente Province (see 2/O8-63) is believed to be terminated. The alert, apparently prompted by President KENNEDY's death on 22 November, was possibly pre-scheduled to terminate on 25 November. There have been two orders which suggest that the alert was destined to be concluded on 25 November; they are:

1) Access to the Coastal Observation Post at Punta Maisí (29-15N 74-05W) was restricted until 25 November because of the alert (see 2/QS-63); and

2) Subordinates of Banes, Headquarters Eastern Naval District, were to receive further orders on the 25th, presumably concerning their alert status (2/O8-63); no such orders have been noted in communications.

There have been no further references in intercepted communications to the alert since 0222Z on 23 November (2/QS-63).

It is possible that the restricted access to the Observation Post at Punta Maisí extends to other Observation Posts in Oriente Province such as reported on 23 November when First Army Coastal Observation Posts were placed in an alert status (2/QS-63), and that the restriction was to be lifted on 25 November by all those posts.

Further indication that the alert has terminated is the fact that the Cuban Navy was engaged in an island-wide communications exercise on 25 November. It is considered unlikely that such an exercise would be conducted under alert conditions.

There have been no further references to the alert status of the (0 percent Santiago de Cuba) units which was first observed on 23 November (2/QS-63). All CAF and Soviet Forces Cuba communications appear to be normal during this period, 22-26 November 1963.

FILE: O/WA F105 CC 240 WAV

[Signature]