

JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

Date: 2/23/201

## Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10255  
RECORD SERIES : TRANSCRIPT  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R262

## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA  
FROM : SZULC, TAD  
TO :

TITLE : TESTIMONY OF TAD SZULC

DATE : 06/10/1975  
PAGES : 66

## SUBJECTS :

EXHIBITS 1-2  
GSA EMPLOYEE  
ESQUIRE ARTICLE  
EASY CHAIR PROJECT  
CUBAN OPERATION  
CASTRO  
KENNEDY, FRANK  
SZULC, TAD  
PENTHOUSE ARTICLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT/TRANSCRIPT  
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified  
RESTRICTIONS :  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/1994

## OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : BOX 259-15

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1 than I and nothing stands or nothing sticks in my mind to  
2 suggest that Dick said anything which would be other than  
3 normal, casual conversation after what was rather a strong  
4 remark by the President. And I was a little bit stunned,  
5 needless to say.

6 Mr. Kirbow. Thank you very much, Mr. Szulc.

7 Mr. Aaron. If we can go onto another subject, Mr. Szulc,  
8 from page proofs of a forthcoming article in the magazine  
9 there is a suggestion there concerning the involvement of  
10 the Agency in -- the Central Intelligence Agency -- in the --  
11 involvement of the Agency after the 1956 Suez War in a program  
12 with Israel.

13 Can you tell us what that story is about?

14 Mr. Szulc. The article which is to appear in the August  
15 issue of Penthouse magazine relates in a general fashion for  
16 reasons which I will explain presently, if so desired, the  
17 fact that sometime in the late 50's subsequent to the Suez War  
18 of 1956, the CIA had made available to the Israeli government  
19 technical knowledge, technical assistance, in many fields,  
20 leading to the creation -- that was the case at the time --  
21 or the development at least of a nuclear weapon.

22 Mr. Aaron. Can you tell us how you managed to acquire  
23 the story, what substance there is to it, or in what way the  
24 story can be substantiated?

25 Mr. Szulc. I was told by one of my news sources that a

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1 situation had occurred in the 1960's in which the CIA delivered  
 2 to the Israeli government classified information, technical  
 3 knowledge know-how, the services of distinguished physicists and  
 4 fissionable material in the form of plutonium to assist in the  
 5 development of an Israeli nuclear weapon at the Dimona Israeli  
 6 Nuclear Testing Grounds.

7 I have raised the subject in a private conversation with  
 8 Mr. James Angleton in the spring of this year. Mr. Angleton  
 9 told me that essentially this information was correct.

10 Let me backtrack and add one point.

11 My original information was indeed the counterintelligence,  
 12 the CI Division of the Central Intelligence Agency, which was  
 13 then headed by Mr. Angleton, was the unit in CIA responsible  
 14 for this nuclear operation. Because of an acquaintantship  
 15 which I have with Mr. Angleton I had the opportunity in a  
 16 private conversation to ask him in so many words, can you  
 17 corroborate or confirm that this which I have described took  
 18 place and that you and CI were involved in this.

19 Angleton said that -- he was rather taken aback by this  
 20 information -- said that, in effect, he could confirm it, with  
 21 two corrections. One, the timeframe was wrong, that it was  
 22 not in the early '60's, but indeed in the late '50's after the  
 23 Suez War and number two that as far as he was concerned it  
 24 was not delivered by him or the CIA or anyone of his knowledge  
 25 of any fissionable material such as plutonium or other material.

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1 That all that was made available to the Israeli government  
2 by the CIA as represented, and as represented by CI, the  
3 counterintelligence was classified information, technical  
4 assistance, and the availability of one or more distinguished  
5 nuclear scientists or physicists whose services were available  
6 to the United States government.

7 I, based on information which I had from my original  
8 source, asked Mr. Angleton whether he could confirm that  
9 a British born scientists whose name, upon investigation,  
10 turns out to be Mann -- M-a-n-n -- first name Wilfred Basil  
11 or Basil Wilfred -- again I can correct the record at that --  
12 where Mr. Mann, or Dr. Manr I should say, was indeed one of  
13 the scientists involved in this operation. Mr. Angleton  
14 confirmed that indeed this was the case.

15 He cautioned me that any publication of Dr. Mann's  
16 involvement in Mr. Angletor's words could be enormously  
17 explosive, damaging to the national security of the United  
18 States, damaging to our intelligence assets and also enormously  
19 dangerous to Dr. Mann personally. In effect, Mr. Angleton  
20 said at one point that should I surface Mr. Mann's name,  
21 Dr. Mann's name, he may go as far as commit suicide.

22 I asked for an explanation and Mr. Angleton told me that  
23 Dr. Mann, who was a British citizen at the time, who in the  
24 '50's was part of the joint U.S.-British nuclear group based  
25 at the British Embassy in Washington, was found by

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1 counterintelligence, by CIA, to have been involved in some way  
2 in one or more espionage situations involving the defection  
3 of McClean and Burgess and subsequently Philby. I asked  
4 Angleton to tell me more about this. He said it was one of  
5 those very complicated double agent situations in which a  
6 decision was made when Dr. Mann was still in this country that  
7 he would not be prosecuted, arrested or otherwise exposed and  
8 because the Agency felt that he could be useful or helpful as  
9 a U.S. intelligence asset.

10 It is further my understanding that Dr. Mann, who now  
11 resides in Washington, D.C. -- or I should say in Chevy Chase,  
12 Maryland, across the state line -- is now employed by the U.S.  
13 Bureau of Standards, is an American citizen. According to  
14 Mr. Angleton, his equivalent, the CIA equivalent of a parole  
15 situation which means he's under surveillance and has to report  
16 at certain intervals to his case officer or his parole officer,  
17 as it were, at the CIA and he repeated that should the story  
18 of Dr. Mann's involvement in those situations, the espionage  
19 situations and the Israeli situation emerge, it could be  
20 enormously damaging to the U.S. national interests, to the  
21 negotiations in the Middle East, to men with our intelligence  
22 arrangements with the British, who I understand have the knowledge  
23 of the U.S. decision not to prosecute Dr. Mann and that in the  
24 end it could even become personally damaging to Dr. Mann to the  
25 point to use Angleton's words, he might kill himself.

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1 I told Angleton that I would handle the story in the most  
2 careful way, which is the way in which it appears, or will  
3 appear, in Penthouse magazine. The name is not given. There  
4 is no mention whatsoever of the Burgess-McClearn-Philby type  
5 of situations.

6 Angleton's name is used in the story to corroborate the  
7 material but without direct attribution to Angleton. The  
8 article will say or is saying that sources close to Angleton  
9 confirmed the thrust of the story but disclaimed other alleqa-  
10 tions, or words to that effect, that a fissionable material  
11 was made available to the Israeli government.

12 Mr. Angleton chose not to go into a question which I  
13 raised with him which was whether this operation was undertaken  
14 with the knowledge and the authorization of the President of  
15 the United States at the time or the National Security Council,  
16 the Atomic Energy Commission and/or other departments of the  
17 government who would normally be responsible for transfer or  
18 clearance for transfer of classified information in the nuclear  
19 field to a foreign government.

20 Mr. Angleton chose not to discuss this and I therefore was  
21 not in a position to pursue this point which obviously was one  
22 which contains a great deal.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Did you discuss with Mr. Angleton anything  
24 about -- any question relating to why this was done, assuming  
25 this was done, if it was done?

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1 Mr. Aaron. Can we interrupt the record to note that the  
2 Senator has left.

3 (Senator Mondale left the room.)

4 Mr. Schwarz. Under the rules, you don't have to proceed  
5 further, if you wish.

6 Mr. Szulc. Fine with me.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Did you discuss with Mr. Angleton whether or  
8 not there was anything that the United States or the Central  
9 Intelligence Agency or Mr. Angleton, taking them in that order,  
10 received in return for the passage of this material, if in  
11 fact it was passed?

12 Mr. Szulc. No, I did not. I did not raise the question,  
13 I suppose because among other things because of the limitation  
14 of time and because my main effort at that point was to try  
15 to corroborate to my own satisfaction that such an operation  
16 occurred and to obtain from Angleton as much as I could of  
17 corroboration or denial, which was done in the form of  
18 transcribing.

19 Mr. Kirbow. Let me get it absolutely clear so that there  
20 is no doubt left in my mind.

21 Did you describe in the same detail to Mr. Angleton that  
22 you related here about the transfer of all of this stuff and  
23 the physicists, and did he confirm that that did in fact take  
24 place except for the fissionable material?

25 Mr. Szulc. Basically yes. I said something to the effect

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1 that I understand, can you confirm this or not, because I'm  
2 in a quandry, do I use the story or not, would you comment on  
3 the following information. In other words, do I understand  
4 correctly that the CIA and specifically counterintelligence and  
5 you personally have engaged in making available to the  
6 Israeli's information, know-how, assistance, technical  
7 assistance, manpower, scientists and nuclear materials for  
8 development of nuclear weapons in the early '60's.

9 This was roughly the way I put it to him. His response  
10 was, being rather taken aback by the question in the first  
11 place, you know, he said, how the hell do you know about this,  
12 and I said, well, you know one hear's things in this town,  
13 and he says well, as long as you know, you might as  
14 well have it straight. Your timeframe was wrong, it wasn't  
15 the early '60's it was the late '50's and decidedly, flatly,  
16 to the best of my knowledge, there was no delivery of  
17 fissionable material to the Israeli's.

18 Then my second question was, as I recall, do I understand  
19 correctly that Dr. Mann was one of the scientists who were  
20 made available to participate in this operation, which he  
21 confirmed, as I mentioned, and then he said, but, did you know  
22 that he had this peculiar background to which I referred  
23 earlier.

24 Mr. Kirbow. You referred to him as a double-agent  
25 background?

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1 Mr. Szulc. He didn't use the word. I think this was  
2 my word to describe him. I think more precisely he did not  
3 use the expression.

4 Mr. Schwarz. You stated the conversation took place in  
5 the spring, was it April?

6 Mr. Kirbow. April of '75

7 Mr. Szulc. If that's really relevant to you and I can  
8 look at my calendar and give you the precise date of it. It  
9 would have been late March, early April.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Well, I think it would be relevant if we  
11 want to check it out with anybody else.

12 Mr. Szulc. That's easy. I can check it out.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Where did the conversation take place?

14 Mr. Szulc. It took place in the home of a mutual friend  
15 in the first instance and then it continued at dinner at a  
16 restaurant in Washington.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Dinner in the evening, not lunch?

18 Mr. Szulc. I would say most of the conversation was at  
19 the mutual friend's house and loose ends were wrapped up at  
20 dinner.

21 Mr. Kirbow. What was the friend's name?

22 Mr. Aaron. Can we ask a different question?

23 Was your mutual friend a party to the conversation?

24 Mr. Szulc. Yes, he was present.

25 Mr. Kirbow. Then I think the question is even more

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1 pertinent. What was the person's name and do you mind telling  
2 us where the home is located?

3 Mr. Szulc. I would have the same problem that I had with  
4 the other question on sources. I have no difficulty here,  
5 I would make the request, if I may --

6 Mr. Kirbow. Certainly.

7 Mr. Szulc. Because it does involve a friendship here.

8 Mr. Kirbow. Apparently Mr. Angleton's a personal friend  
9 of yours too.

10 Mr. Szulc. No, I wouldn't describe him as a personal  
11 friend. I would describe him as an acquaintance, a good  
12 acquaintance.

13 The mutual friend is Benjamin Wells who is a former  
14 correspondent of the New York Times, he's a former officer of  
15 the OSS who worked with Angleton in OSS. Is there some way in  
16 which I can refer this as privileged information or words to  
17 that effect?

18 I do not like to be in a position of violating confidences,  
19 situations where people are trying to be helpful.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Well, I think in this case the individual  
21 does have evidence. The other individuals were just sources,  
22 and there's a distinction between this and the other.

23 Now it seems to me if Mr. Angleton confirms this story  
24 then anybody else's testimony I suppose is irrelevant.

25 Do you agree with me, Charlie?

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1 Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

2 I believe that it should be fair to say to you at this

3 time that if the Committee chose to verify this matter with

4 Mr. Angleton and he denied the same, then the Committee might

5 well want to look further and talk with someone else, so I

6 make you no promises of what the Committee would do. I'm not

7 in a position to do that as a staff member. But I think that

8 would be a matter which they would very carefully consider

9 along with the request that you've made.

10 Mr. Szulc. The point of the request is essentially that

11 Angleton and Ben Wells are old and close friends. My

12 acquaintantship with Angleton is through Ben Wells and in a

13 way it is a bit of a -- it would be a bit of ethical violation,

14 you know, friendship to cite Ben Wells as a witness, a

15 corroborating witness.

16 Mr. Kirbow. I don't believe we understand here that he

17 corroborated the fact, only that he was present at the time

18 that the confirmation took place?

19 Mr. Szulc. This is why I have a problem of giving you

20 the name but again I want you to understand about the personal

21 relationship that exists among friends, particularly in our

22 profession.

23 Mr. Kirbow. I think more importantly in our understanding

24 you should understand that the transcript is in your own

25 words available to the Committee and they will be able to see

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1 exactly what the concerns are.

2 Mr. Szulc. Sure.

3 Mr. Schwarz. I don't have anything further on this  
4 particular matter.

5 Mr. Aaron. I have one last matter.

6 Do you intend to do any further stories on this particular  
7 subject?

8 Mr. Schwarz. This one'

9 Mr. Szulc. Israel?

10 Mr. Aaron. Yes.

11 Mr. Szulc. At this point, no. I understand that a  
12 colleague of mine, a professional colleague of mine in this  
13 town has some knowledge, I do not know how much, of the  
14 general story. This colleague, for his own reasons, has  
15 refrained from publishing it. We have discussed it as friends.  
16 We have made an arrangement that -- a gentleman's agreement,  
17 if you will, that each will inform the other the last minute  
18 if one of us wants to use the story.

19 This is a conversation which goes back to January,  
20 February. I believe that my colleague, at the time, at least,  
21 did not have as much information as I believe I do at this  
22 time.

23 I would go back to this only if either this colleague  
24 surfaced in more detail than I have and as you will see in  
25 Penthouse I am enormously restrained about the detail. Most

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1 of the detail that I mention here does not appear in the story  
2 for obvious reasons. Or if some agency of the government  
3 produces a flat denial which then involves my credibility and  
4 my reputation as a reporter which would then force me almost  
5 in defensive action to go into detail.

6 If left alone, I would prefer to stand on what I've  
7 written and the story is to come out in such detail as I have  
8 mentioned here. My personal predilection would be to see it  
9 come out through the Committee for reasons --

10 Mr. Kirbow. You're telling the Committee then that you  
11 did not obtain the information from this colleague of yours,  
12 but you think that he has separate source information?

13 Mr. Szulc. Well, he has sources that are obviously not --

14 Mr. Kirbow. Could you tell us this colleague's name?

15 Mr. Szulc. If it is not absolutely necessary, I would  
16 rather skip that one, because again we are in this peculiar  
17 field of very personal financial relationships and I don't  
18 think it really tells you all that much. You know, we tend to

19 waltz around each other, you know, when one of us thinks the  
20 other one knows what he's working on there's a little bit of  
21 waltzing and there's a little bit of confidential -- discuss  
22 personal friendship involved.

23 I see Wells' name is relevant to the conversation because  
24 he can corroborate a conversation. Here I'm dealing with a  
25 man where I don't even know how much knowledge he has, and simply

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WARSAW

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1 we were discussing did we know about a CIA nuclear Israel  
 2 situation without mentioning any details. Angleton's name was  
 3 never mentioned in my conversation over lunch with this colleague  
 4 so I don't even know what he knows. He may know just the  
 5 general subject.

6 Mr. Aaron. I have one question, the last question for  
 7 my part.

8 Why did you want to tell this story to the Committee?

9 Mr. Szulc. Two reasons.

10 As a reporter I do not believe that I can clarify this  
 11 matter further than I have because of my own limited resources.  
 12 I cannot subpoena people, et cetera, et cetera. I think it is  
 13 an extremely important point to be established in the context  
 14 of the whole look into the intelligence community whether this  
 15 is or is not the case of the Agency acting outside of  
 16 established channels of government.

17 I think it is useful and necessary for the Congress and for  
 18 the public opinion at some point somewhere to have knowledge  
 19 of it since I am not able professionally to pursue this any  
 20 further, unless someone lands on my doorstep with the information.  
 21 I think Angleton is as far as I can go on this in what he  
 22 has given me I have written with all the self-imposed restrictions  
 23 to which I have referred and I think that nothing is served  
 24 by my keeping this in secrecy.

25 The thing which I have not printed which I have mentioned

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1 here, but I think that there may be a valid follow-up on your  
2 part of this information. Call it a citizen's duty for lack  
3 of a better word.

4 Mr. Aaron. Did you speak to Mr. Mann or Dr. Mann about  
5 this?

6 Mr. Szulc. No, I did not. Deliberately.

7 Mr. Aaron. Did anybody working with you make an effort  
8 to contact him?

9 Mr. Szulc. No, it was a very deliberate decision on my  
10 part not to go to him because he was described to me as an  
11 elderly gentleman in ill health and if, indeed, with Mr.  
12 Angleton --

13 (Pause)

14 I was simply saying that I made a deliberate decision not  
15 to call Dr. Mann because I did not think one, he could be  
16 very helpful to me and I was told by Angleton and other people  
17 that he was an elderly man in ill health and my calling him  
18 or coming to him saying is it true that you're a spy, is it  
19 true that you worked for the CIA in Israel, is it true you  
20 work for the CIA would unhinge the person and in situations  
21 like this I think most of us have simply to balance what you're  
22 likely to get out of a call of conversation against the  
23 damage that you can inflict on an individual, and I felt that  
24 it was too little to be gained.

25 Mr. Kirbow. I have one final question.

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1           Although you've indicated this was prepared for an August  
2 issue of Penthouse, did you tell the Committee when you first  
3 obtained this information from your source?

4           Mr. Szulc. The very first inkling about this would have  
5 been early February.

6           Mr. Kirbow. Of this year 1975?

7           Mr. Szulc. Yes, 1975. And then I pursued -- I was given  
8 the name of the scientist and we ran down the background details  
9 and so on, subsequent to which I had a conversation with  
10 Angleton which would have been, as I say, late March or early  
11 April. And Angleton was really the only -- professionally the  
12 only person who could be in a position to discuss it. Even if  
13 he stonewalled it, which he did not, which raises the question,  
14 was the counterintelligence, was the CIA or how was it directly  
15 involved.

16           Mr. Kirbow. Have you ever discussed this with any other  
17 government official or police person?

18           Mr. Szulc. I have not other than which appears in  
19 Penthouse magazine or will appear, this is the first discussion  
20 to date.

21           Mr. Kirbow. We want to thank you, Mr. Szulc, very  
22 much.

23           Mr. Schwarz. Thanks.

24           (Whereupon, at 4:55 o'clock p.m., the hearing in  
25 the above-entitled matter was recessed.)

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WARD, SZULC

410 F Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003



FRANK K. KENNEDY  
Born: 6/27/31, Hungary.

Original Surname: Tatabanya.

Divorced, date unknown; first wife Hungarian, named Magdano

Remarried 6/20/65

Social Security Number: 043-32-1039

GS-9, Step 4. Earns \$6.20 per hour.

Started Federal Employ 3/66.  
Became Career Employee 3/69.

Received Outstanding Attendance Citation, 1971-72.  
Received Office of Emergency Preparedness Award Commendation,  
Date Unknown (Routine Award).

Assigned to WHITE House Area GSA (Date Unknown; re-assigned to Rock  
Creek Area 8/9/70).

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Contact getting above felt he couldn't push source further, to  
get information such as citizenship, date of entry into US, home  
phone, etc....if in fact, some of this data in records.