JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10005

RECORDS SERIES:

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO:

TITLE:
INDEX CARDS

DATE: 06/00/75
PAGES: 478

SUBJECTS:
CASTRO
WIRETAP
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: T
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:
Box 139, Book 1 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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<td>/59-65</td>
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<td>O'Connell</td>
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<td>Maheu</td>
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<td>Edwards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Castro</td>
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</table>

**OCCURRENCE:**

O'Connell testified that Maheu helped CIA. Request came to O'Connell from Edwards. CIA arranged for [text redacted] to go to N.Y.C. to [text redacted] in America. CIA monitored mail thereafter between [text redacted] unknown to either. (Tr. 144-151)

CIA, again through Maheu, [text redacted] in San Francisco.

**SOURCE:**

Testimony of James O'Connell, 5/30/75

**FILE:**

**STAFF:**

John Bayly

**DATE:** 6/30/75
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED (CIA) EX 10 MAR 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
(See the 13 names listed below)

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEPPHIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. RAY TRECHLER, Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)


STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED (I)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Maheu
Edwards
Rosselli
Giancana

TRAFFICANTE
Breckinridge

DATES:
3 or 4-61

CATEGORIES:
Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified, Maheu on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99) ('50's?) and "on one occasion he obtained a female companion for an important foreign leader." (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Rosselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ...was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
(See list of names below.)

DATES:
Apr 17, 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANitized (1)(4)

CASTRO
SYNDICATE/PHASE II --
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II
CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. J. HENFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)

5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the rambling syndicate in 1962.)
6. BRUCE CHEEVER, HARVEY's deputy in 1962 (CHEEVER knows that HARVEY was meeting with gangsters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)
7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JM/WAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT
FILE: TOP SECRET

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<td>SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.</td>
<td>April 17, 1961</td>
<td>CARD 2 of 3</td>
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<td>8. RAY TREISCHLER TSO (TREISCHLER's participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)</td>
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<td>9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)</td>
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11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(cont.)

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<td>Edwards</td>
<td>11/62</td>
<td>Castro</td>
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<td>Bannerman</td>
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<td>Gomez</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holcomb</td>
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<td>O'Connell</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

O'Connell testified that when Edwards was on leave, once, King spoke to Robert Bannerman (who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell Bannerman that B. was not "prive" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 30, 99-100). No one but King, not Gomez or Holcomb, knew (100).

**SOURCE:**

SIG Cdoll 5/30/75

**STAFF:**

John Bayly
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)

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<td>KING, J. C.</td>
<td>May 23, 1967</td>
<td>CASTRO</td>
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<td>IG REPORT</td>
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<td>BISSELL</td>
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<td>HALPERN</td>
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OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpem, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Treichler, John Warner, Nestor Sanchez, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron
DATE: 7/2/75
BRUCE CHEEVER attended the 14 September 1962 MONGOOSE meeting for the CIA. He reported (according to WALT ELDER) that no decisions were made, and no new ideas were brought up, and nothing useful emerged from the meeting.
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (a)
seen 16 Mar 74

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE,
MCGEORGE BUNDY, BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA)

DATES:
9/14/62

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE
Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:
CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially to alert for any shipments
of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries--
Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Elder
FILE: Cage 00049

STAFF: PGW
DATE: June 30, 1975
Possibility of sabotage of spare parts allegedly ready for shipment to Cuba by is being looked into--Chief, Task Force W says this activity is underway.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
FREICHLER, Ray
TSD
ESTERLINE, Jake

DATES:
March-July 60

CATEGORIES:
CUBA (Misc. Schemes)

OCCURRENCE:
Aerosol attack on radio station: A scheme was discussed at CIA to "contaminate the air of the radio station where CASTRO broadcast his speeches with an aerosol spray of a chemical that produces reactions similar to those of Lysergic Acid (LSD)." (10) "Nothing came of the idea," (10) FREICHLER of TSD, remembers the discussion and discouraged the scheme "because the chemical could not be relied upon to be effective." (10) Others who may be knowledgeable: 1. \[\text{Redacted}\] (TSD) recalls general experimentation with psychic energizers.
2. Jake Esterline.

SOURCE: IG Report, 1967

STAFF: Baron
7/3/75

DATE:
### PERSONS/ENTITIES:

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<td>3. RICHARD BISELLE, DD/P</td>
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<td>4. SHEPPLE-EDWARDS, D/Security</td>
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<td>11. SIDNEY GOTTLEIB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLEIB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)</td>
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<td>12. ROBERT BANNerman, DD/Security</td>
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<td>13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)</td>
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### SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

### FILE:

### DATES:

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<th>TOP SECRET</th>
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### STAFF:

Baron

### DATE:

28.6.75
UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCONE
HEIMS
BUNDY
R. KENNEDY

DATES:

Mar 2, 1964

CATEGORIES:

Special Group
Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U.S. would not condone the planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach to March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has offered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to use 5 men.

March 3, 1964 meeting in which Cameron says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy..."
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<td>KILPATRICK</td>
<td>4/23/63</td>
<td>SPECIAL GROUP</td>
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<td>FITZGERALD</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:** Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied that Castro's sister worked for us, but didn't always have inside information.

**SOURCE:** Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** WALLACH

**DATE:** 7/2/75
Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Nestor SANCHEZ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89) (emphasis added)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)
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<td>Castro</td>
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<td>FITZGERALD</td>
<td>Nov. 13, 1963</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:** (CARD 2)

In a memorandum by SANCHEZ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed AMLASH that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that SANCHEZ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting." (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life." (90) However, the SANCHEZ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now wanted to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

**SOURCE:** IG REPORT 1967

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** F. Baron

**DATE:** 7/1/75
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In a memorandum by Sánchez on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "Fitzgerald informed [Amlash] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that Sánchez reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Fitzgerald meeting" (90), Fitzgerald recalled that Amlash was "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) Fitzgerald said that he told Amlash "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on Castro's life. (90) However, the Sánchez memorandum reported "After the meeting [Amlash] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now wanted to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

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<td>Castro</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMLASH</td>
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Met with TEPEDNO, who reported to him AMLASH's reaction to his meeting with FITZGERALD. TEPEDNO said that AMLASH dwelt constantly on the fact that "he could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the US Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to TEPEDNO, AMLASH feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date." (91)

SOURCE: IG REPORT 1967

FILE: TOP SECRET

STAFF: F Baron
DATE: 7/1/75
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

| SANCHEZ |
|AMLASH |
|FITZGERALD |

DATES:

Nov. 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Nestor SANCHEZ prepared a memorandum for the Record which indicated that the CIA would give AMLASH assassination weapons: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD) approved telling [AMLASH] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include... high power rifles W/scopes.....C/SAS requested written reports on AMLASH operation be kept to a minimum." (91) (Emphasis added)

Note: There are sniper/assassin weapons, TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75
Nester SANCHEZ met with AMLASH in Paris and gave him an assassination device (a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe for the injection of poison). (93-93a) According to the IG REPORT, "It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (94)

SANCHEZ stated "that he received an OPIM cable from FITZGERALD that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off." (94) But, the IG REPORT authors did not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. (94)
Helms notes that McConé briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that "each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnaissance overflights are now approved. Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which the Director had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

**Source:** Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CO matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

**Staff:** diGenova

**Date:** 7/25/65
**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

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<th>GIANCANA ✓</th>
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<td>ERICHEK, Raymond</td>
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<td>EDWARDS, Sheffield</td>
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<td>O'CONNELL</td>
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**DATES:**

- Late January 1961

**CATEGORIES:**

- CUBA (Syndicate/Phase I)

**OCCURRENCE:**

TSD prepared poison pills (of Botulin) rather than liquid poison. (24).

Remembers meeting with EDWARDS and O'CONNELL in EDWARDS' office to discuss the requirement "(24) for poison pills, which had initially been the preference of GIANCANA."

**SOURCE:** IG REPORT, 1967

**STAFF:** Baron

**FILE:**

**DATE:** 7/3/75
Breckinridge testified that he was Maheu on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99) ('50's?) and on one occasion he obtained (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Rosselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ... was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)
PERSONS/ENTITIES:

[See list of names below.]

DATES:

Apr 17, 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

CASTRO / SYNDICATE/PHASE II -- KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASINO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)
5. J. C. KING, Chief, VM Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)
6. [Redacted] (HARVEY's deputy in 1962)
7. [Redacted] (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967 - 55 - 56

FILE: TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RFK  Mr. McConna
McGeorge Bundy  Mr. Wilson  Mr. Parrot
Mr. Johnson  Dr. Charyk
Dr. Gilpatrick  Dr. Scoville
Gen. Taylor  Col. Steakley

DATES:

Oct 9, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group (Augmented)

OCCURRENCE:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accompanied by all out ELINT support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the NSIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, referring to a meeting of Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

FILE: Special Group Augmented

STAFF:

DATE: 6/23/75
As for psychological operations, all CIA assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use.