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IDENTIFICATION FORM

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OPERATION MONGOOSE

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Box 139, Book 2 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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AS SANITIZED
6.4.1984
(1)(R)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Sam Gold / Dr. Edward Gunn
Juan Orta
Dr. Raymond Treichler
Cornelius Roosevelt

DATES:
September 25, 1961

CATEGORIES:
Castro

OCCURRENCE:
In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam
Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but that if he could be furnished with
some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated
that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had
been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro,
and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned
Dr. Raymond Treichler to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high
lethal content, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and—
after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, three pills were
ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on
the ultimate use of the pills.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153 Memorandum by Howard J. Osborn
to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu
dated June 24, 1966.

STAFF:
Rhea

DATE: July 1, 1975
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AS SANITIZED

6-4-94

(1)(2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: |

DATES: |

CATEGORIES:

Oct. 6, 1960 Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some ___________ in this group and that we would talk informally to ___________ about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in ___________ this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF:

DATE: Bob Kelley

June 29, 1975
The Special Group discussed (1) the possibility of providing sixty-three thousand dollars from the Cuba budget; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that the current thinking contemplated figures more on the order of 3,000." Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.
DR. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960, he received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with a lethal material. (21). He understood them to be CASTRO's favorite brand. (21). GUNN's notes show that within the next month he contacted CHIEF of TSD, (Sept. 6, 1960) and gave him the box of cigars (21). The chief recalls "that he did contaminate a full box of 50 cigars with Botulinum Toxin, a virulent poison," (21) which would kill the intended victim upon merely putting it in the mouth. The chief's notes showed delivery of the box on February 13, 1961, although they do not indicate to whom. (22).
The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. EDWARD GUNN, Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services

10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)


FILE:
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11-4-93

PERSONS/ENTITIES: Dr. Edward Gunn
Sam Gold
Juan Orta
Dr. Raymond Treichler
Cornelius Roosevelt

DATES: September 25, 1961

CATEGORIES: Castro

OCCURRENCE: In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but that if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned Dr. Raymond Treichler to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethality, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and—after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.

TOP SECRET


STAFF: Rhea

DATE: July 1, 1975
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<th>DATES:</th>
<th>CATEGORIES:</th>
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<tr>
<td>[SANCHEZ] Samuel HALPERN</td>
<td>Nov. 20, 1963</td>
<td>Castro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMLASH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Edward GUNN</td>
<td></td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**
[SANCHEZ] reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)

Samuel HALPERN and [SANCHEZ] requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for [SANCHEZ] to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to [SANCHEZ] a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)
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11-4-94

The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plotting in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services); and, brief records of [redacted] (of TSD). Some operational files were also used.

For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people who's memories are fogged by time. (1)

"We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DULLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant inaccuracies in the Report they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events." (2).
### PERSONS/ENTITIES:

- Harvey Bissell
- Kennedy, Robert
- HALPERN

### DATES:

- 1961
- October

### CATEGORIES:

- Castro

### OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and [name redacted] who was the Branch Chief (3). The meeting occurred in the middle of October 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both and to me was to plan an operation to accomplish that end. (3)

Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (3). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

### SOURCE:

Halpern 6/18/75

### STAFF:

Shea

### FILE:

### DATE:

7/1/75
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halpern</td>
<td>Gen Lansdale</td>
<td>Oct 1961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OCCURRENCE:**

Shortly after a meeting with Bissell, Halpern, and [ ] were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

**TOP SECRET**

**SOURCE:** Halpern 6/18/75

**STAFF:** Shea

**DATE:** 7/1/75
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11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Harvey
Helms
McCone

DATES:
Dec 1961

CATEGORIES:
Castro

OCCURRENCE:

...sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (15) Helms told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (15). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to office, checked into the organization of operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the WH Division (14).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Halpern 6/19/75

STAFF:
Nina

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75
<table>
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<th>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</th>
<th>DATES:</th>
<th>CATEGORIES:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FITZGERALD, Desmond</td>
<td>Early 1963</td>
<td>CASTRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALPERN, Sam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OCCURRENCE:**

DESMOND FITZGERALD originated a scheme to assassinate CASTRO: "The idea was to take an unusually spectacular sea shell that would be certain to catch CASTRO's eye, load it with an explosive trigger to blow when the shell was lifted, and submerge it in an area where CASTRO often went skin diving." (77).

FITZGERALD explored this idea at several sessions with SAM HALPERN and (redacted) but it was ultimately dismissed as impractical. (77).

**DISCOVERY LEADS:** Note: There is no indication that FITZGERALD told anyone above him in the CIA hierarchy of this plan.

**SOURCE:** IG REPORT, 1967

**FILE:**

**TOP SECRET**

**STAFF:**

**DATE:** 6/29/75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:  SAMUEL HALPERN
AMLASH  Dr. Edward GUNN

DATES:  Nov. 20, 1963
CATEGORIES:  Castro

OCCURRENCE:
[Sanchez] reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)

Samuel-HALPERN and [Sanchez] requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for [Sanchez] to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to [Sanchez] a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)

SOURCE:  IG REPORT 1973
STAFF:  F Baron
FILE:  TOP SECRET
DATE:  7/1/75
**TOP SECRET**

**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KING, J. C.</td>
<td>HARVEY</td>
<td>EDWARDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BISSELL</td>
<td>HALPERN</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**DATES:**

- May 23, 1967

**CATEGORIES:**

- CASTRO

**OCCURRENCE:**

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Reynolds, John Warner. çeşa: șel, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Richard Ober.

**SOURCE:** IG REPORT, 1967

**STAFF:** Baron

**DATE:** 7/2/75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,
LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER

Harris Craig

DATES:
June 27, 1962
June 21-22, 1962
7/1/62
6/21-23/62

CATEGORIES:
Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

STAFF: di Genova
DATE: July 1, 1975
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AS SANITIZED

11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,
LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-
PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LBNITZER

DATES:
June 27, 1962
June 21-23, 1962

CATEGORIES:
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MONGOOSE

6/21-23/62

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AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

(1)(a)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William
WIN, K. J. - QJWIN

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that Q.J.WIN was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through QJWIN for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use. (50) or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the people spotted by Q.J.WIN as possibilities. (50) He testified that before someone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall, K.J.WIN was used only once in connection with an operation in the Congo, which was not an assassination operation. (51)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY June 25, 1975, pp. 50-51

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 30.6.75

FILE: TOP SECRET
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11-4-94

(1)(C)

(1) O

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard
Harvey, Mr.

DATES:

CASTORIES:

Castro

OCURRENCE: Helms testified that he does not recall whether he selected Harvey to head the Cuban operation, but that he did certainly approve Harvey's selection. Prior to receiving the commitment Harvey had been in charge of a staff in the foreign intelligence staff whose function was to mount operations against

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Helms 6/13/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/28/75
CIA has no objection to declassification and/or release of this document as sanitized.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY, William

DATES:

CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:
HARVEY testified that during World War II he worked on counterespionage matters with the FBI, having entered the Bureau as a Special Agent in 1940. He continued in that job until 1947, when he joined the CIA as the head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch. Between 1947 and 1952, he worked on Soviet counterespionage and special operations in the Department of Plans. Between 1952 and 1959, he was in Berlin as for the CIA. He was instrumental in the Berlin tunnel operation. In 1959, he became Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff Division, D. This is the Division which is responsible for intelligence operations of Staff D.

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 5-9

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea
DATE: 30.6.75
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11-4-94

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY, William
O'DONNELL, Justin
RISSELL, Richard

DATES:

CATEGORIES:
LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE:
HARVEY testified that he worked with a man called O'DONNELL, who stated that O'DONNELL came to him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of PATRICE LUMUMBA. HARVEY testified that O'DONNELL told him that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

HARVEY testified that he subsequently had a conversation with BISSELL, in which BISSELL stated that he had requested O'DONNELL to undertake such an operation. (9-10)

HARVEY testified that he did not know about any steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency in connection with any proposals to eliminate LUMUMBA. (10)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975 (pp. 9-10)    STAFF: Rhea

FILE:    DATE: 30.6.75
Harvey was asked about notes written during a meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes stated, "The subject was the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the JIC should be officially advised. He should not be advised the JIC was advised."

He testified that this matter would have been brought up again at any time.

CIA has no objection to declassification and release of this document.
Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives":

The objectives of this project is the procurement of

Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. "The Project will be conducted by division B with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed." (exhibit 1)

Harvey testified that his notes did not cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover (49)
The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrrifel state "3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of ______ Division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from ______ became more refined and in many respects more sensitive because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division D which was the closest touch with procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)"

SOURCE: Harvey 6/25/75

FILE: Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/30/75
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11-4-94

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<tr>
<td>HARVEY, William</td>
<td>26 Jan. 1961</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILVER, Arnold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BISSELL, Richard</td>
<td></td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ARNOLD SILVER about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52)

HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ARNOLD SILVER. (52)

**TOP SECRET**

**SOURCE:** HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

**STAFF:** Rhea

**FILE:**

**DATE:** 30.6.75
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11-4-94
(1)(4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Silver, Arnold
Harvey, William
Bissell, Richard

DATES:
1/26/61

CATEGORIES:
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver (52).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE: 
DATE: 6/30/75
Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zriffle state "4. Operational Assets: (1) Personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K.G. Win. In October 1960: K.G. Win annual salary $7,200, Travel and OBS expenses for K.G. Win and other agents and agent candidates $2,000, Hire of safe houses and other automobile expenses $1,000, Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates $2,000, Travel of staff employees engaged in Zriffle $2,000."

SOURCE: Harvey exhibit 1, pages 1 - 3

FILE: Harvey 6/27/75
The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZERIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QWIN, who had been recruited earlier by STEVEN FOR use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O'DONELLY. O'DONELLY made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released — which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMA's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HEIMS when he read the report. Why?
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AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(6)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT

HARVEY, WILLIAM

DATES:
2/61

CATEGORIES:
CASTRO
EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE: Breckinridge testified that from his review of the files of Project ZRRIFLE, the "controlling character" (30) of the Project was to [BLANK] rather than to develop the capability for assassination. (30)

Breckinridge testified that on the face of the documents relating to Project ZRRIFLE, the Project was only directed at [BLANK]. The fact that it related to developing the capability to assassinate came out in interviews with William Harvey. (31)

SOURCE: BRECKINRIDGE testimony, 6/2/75

FILE:

STAFF: WALLACH

DATE: 7/5/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BISSELL, Richard
CIA

GOTTLEIB, Sidney
WHITE HOUSE

HARVEY

DATES:
February 1961
(HARVEY's rough estimate)

CATEGORIES:
EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZARIFLE
CASTRO
CONGO

OCCURRENCE: the
BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability,
a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such
a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability
with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with
HARVEY and with SIDNEY GOTTLEIB." (37-38).

(continued)


STAFF: Baron

FILE:

TOP SECRET

DATE: 28.6.75
HARVEY used STEWART in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

Some time shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

**TOP SECRET**

**SOURCE:** I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

**STAFF:** Baron

**DATE:** 28.6.75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DCCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. RAY TRENCHLER, Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLEIB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLEIB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)


DATE: 28.6.75
**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
(See list of names below.)

**DATES:**
Apr 17, '61

**CATEGORIES:** TOP SECRET

**CASTRO**
SYNDICATE/PHASE II
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

**OCCURRENCE:** The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. **RICHARD HELMS, DD/P**
2. **WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W**
3. **JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security**
   (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. **SHEETFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security**
   (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)
5. **J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division** (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)
   (KNOWS that HARVEY was meeting with members in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)
7. **TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JM/WAVE** (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

**SOURCE:** I.G. REPORT 1967

**FILE:** TOP SECRET

**STAFF:** Baron

**DATE:** 28.6.75
SHACKLING, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used, was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.

9. ANTÓNIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (presumably not aware of government sponsorship, he too was presumably not aware of government's role).

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (he too was presumably not aware of government's role)

II. MACDO, ROSELLI'S "Man" (MACDO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)
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<td>HALPERN</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and [deleted] who was the Branch Chief (3). The meeting occurred in the middle of October of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [deleted] and to me were to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (3)

Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (3). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

**TOP SECRET**

Halpern 6/18/75

**STAFF:** Shean

**DATE:** 7/1/75
Some time in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) Told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (15). Sometime after the meeting, Helms came to office, chelced into the organization of operations, and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the WH Division (14).
It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate a story from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas. "The-Cuban-source to story--need not--wait-your-determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration."

SOURCE: Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, from Lansdale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (00395)

FILE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MCCONE, HARVEY

DATES:
July 10, 1962
June 21, 1962
July 1, 1962
May 1962

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with [ ] because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to Ms. Virginia de Castro de Cuba, she contacted [ ] and obtained [ ] agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm." Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of [ ] in Mexico.

SOURCE: Memorandum for McConen from William Harvey re: [ ] 10 July 1962 (02561)

STAFF: di Genova
DATE: July 1, 1975
With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the penultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and [CHEEVER] which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with [CHEEVER] and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and [COBRA]. Teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to [CHEEVER]'s recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."
With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandum. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and [REDACTED] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)
PERSONS/ENTITIES: HARVEY, William √ Chief, PI Staff, CIA QJWIN

DATES: 27 June 1963

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:
HARVEY writes a memorandum to the Chief, PI Staff, "stating that the original justification for employing QJWIN no longer existed." (41) 02 April 1964

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

STAFF: Baron
DATE: 28.6.75
The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. King, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Brehm, John Warner, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Borthier, Richard Ober.
The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plotting in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services); and, brief records of (May reference). Some operational files were also used.

For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people who's memories are fogged by time. (1)

"We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DULLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant inaccuracies in the Report they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events." (2).
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<td>Bannerman</td>
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<td>O'Connell</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

O'Connell testified that when Edwards was on leave, once, King spoke to Robert Bannerman (who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell Bannerman that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarrassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but King, not Gomez or Holcomb, knew (100).

**SOURCE:**

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

**FILE:**

**STAFF:**

John Bayly

**DATE:**

6/30/75
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**OCCURRENCE:**

Houston testified that he cannot remember that his legal advice as to not continuing a project was ever rejected by CIA, (47) although Houston recalls vetoing two propositions: one

**SOURCE:**

Testimony of Lawrence Houston, 6/2/75

**FILE:**

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<td>Hughes</td>
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<td>Col. King</td>
<td>June 20, 1963</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

On June 20, 1963 the Special Group approved a CIA paper dated June 1970 regarding political action in Haiti. (The substance of the paper is not expressed). "Mr. McConne said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for Duvalier but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Haiti from going very far to the left. Colonel King... said that in his opinion, we have no feasible alternatives to cooperate with Duvalier..." **TOP SECRET**

**SOURCE:**

Minutes of Special Group meeting June 20, 1963

**FILE:**

**STAFF:**

Kelley

**DATE:** 6/28/75
**TOP SECRET**

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**OCCURRENCE:** According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64, "It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116) The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; Asst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; the AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000. - JOSE MARIO PEPIN.

**SOURCE:** Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from Mccone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot." (117)

**FILE:** IG REPORT 1967

**DATE:** Baron, 7/1/75
**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
- MCCONE
- FITZGERALD
- HUGHES
- BUNDY
- APAPICH
- BOSCH, JOSE
- JESSUP
- RFK
- STEAKLEY
- JMwave
- VANCE

**DATES:**
- 8/19/64
- 7/30/64
- 6/10/64

**CATEGORIES:**
- SGA
- MONGOOSE
- CASTRO

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**DATE:** Baron, 7/1/75
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