JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10014

RECORDS SERIES:

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO: [R]

TITLE:

INDEX CARDS

DATE: 06/00/75
PAGES: 483

SUBJECTS:
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CASTRO [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
✓ CLASSIFICATION: T
✓ RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
✓ CURRENT STATUS: P
✓ DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:
Box 141, Book 2 of 3, Index Cards dated June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Taylor states that the Special Group and the Sencial Group Augmented considered a proposal by CIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This had been prepared in response to a request by the Sec's of State and Defense.

Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support of this program. An aerial flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of battle, so as to permit planning overflight routes was authorized. This will be flown out of Saigon, using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese Air Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalist as pilots documented South Vietnamese pilots.

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated Sept 27, 1962. (00950)
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

29-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HELMS, Richard

DATES:
feb 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used [REDACTED] in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

RUGER states that

Sometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the
development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general
concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASIROS." (38)


STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75
Breckinridge testified, Maheu, on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99), ('50's?) and "on one occasion he obtained a female companion for an important foreign leader." (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Rosselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ... was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
(See list of names below.)

DATES:

APR 17, 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

CASTRO SYNDICATE/PHASE II

KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security
   (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. SHEPHERD EDWARDS, D/Security
   (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)

5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division
   (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)
6. PRICE CHAMBERS, HARVEY's deputy in 1962
   (He knows that HARVEY was meeting with gangsters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)
7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, J-2/AV
   (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967

FILE: TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

DATES:

Apr 17, '61

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.

3. ___________ TSD ___________ (participation was limited to furnishing the bills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)

7. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

SOURCE:

FILE:

TOP SECRET (cont.)

STAFF:

DATE:
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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AS SANITIZED

24 Mar 94

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<tr>
<td>HARVEY, William</td>
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<td>ROSSELLI, John</td>
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<td>June 1962</td>
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<th>OCCURRENCE:</th>
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HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSSELLI meet in Washington. O'CONNELL and HARVEY agreed that O'CONNELL continue in the operation for two or three weeks after HARVEY's takeover (46).

The I.G. REPORT does not set with certainty the date O'CONNELL was finally eliminated from the operation, although it says he definitely had to be out of the operation by June 1962, when he was assigned to__________________________.

TOP SECRET

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<td>FILE:</td>
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</table>
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY, William
ROSSELLI, John
VARONA, Tony
O'CONNELL
CASTRO, Fidel

DATES:
21 April 1962

CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
CUBA
SYNDICATE/PHASE II

OCCURRENCE:
HARVEY arrives in Miami to find ROSSELLI already in touch with TONY VARONA, the Cuban exile leader who had participated in PHASE I. (47)

According to HARVEY and O'CONNELL, who agreed that this was an on-going operation, the poison pills were to be placed into CASTRO's food, by an asset of VARONA's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by CASTRO.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:  I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 47
STAFF:  Baron
FILE:
DATE:  28.6.75
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24 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARVEY, William
O'CONNELL, John
ROSSELLI, John

DATES:
14 Apr 11, 1962
June 1962

CATEGORIES:
CAIRO SYNDICATE/PHASE II

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSSELLI meet in Washington. O'CONNELL and HARVEY agreed that O'CONNELL continue in the operation for two or three weeks after HARVEY's takeover (46).

The I.G. REPORT does not set with certainty the date O'CONNELL was finally eliminated from the operation, although it says he definitely had to be out of the operation by June 1962, when he was assigned to

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 46

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MCCONE, HARVEY

DATES:
July 10, 1962
June 11, 1962
June 1, 1962 - May 1962

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Ruz, half-sister of Fidel and Raúl Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to Mrs. Virginia Leitao de Cunha, she contacted the Agency and obtained the agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raúl and Fidel." Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of Mr. . in Mexico.

SOURCE: Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re: 10 July 1962 (02561)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975
Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Néstor Sánchez as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY, who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:
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AS SANITIZED
29-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
FITZGERALD
AMLASH

DATES:
Oct. 29, 1963
Nov. 13, 1963
Castro

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:
(CARD 2)
In a memorandum by §49, on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that §49, reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the §49 memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but not detailed to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:
F. Baron

DATE: 7/1/75
Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Nestor SANCHEZ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89) (emphasis added)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89)
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AS SANITIZED
29-3-92

I.K.

**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

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<th>FITZGERALD</th>
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<td>AMLASH</td>
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**DATES:**

| Oct. 29, 1963 | Nov. 13, 1963 |

**CATEGORIES:**

| Castro |

**OCCURRENCE:**

CARD 2

In a memorandum by SANCHEZ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that SANCHEZ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-I spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the SANCHEZ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now seems to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

**SOURCE:**

IG REPORT 1967

**FILE:**

TOP SECRET

**STAFF:**

F. Baron

**DATE:**

7/1/75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:
SANCHEZ
AMSLASH (MANUEL) ARTIME

DATES:
Dec. 6-7, 1964

CATEGORIES:
Castro

OCCURRENCE:
SANCHEZ met with AMSLASH in Paris. AMSLASH indicated that although he was unable to carry out his plans during the past year, he "continued to feel that his solution to the Cuban problem was the only feasible and that he had to continue trying." AMSLASH "was told that the U.S. Government could not and would not in any way become involved or provide assistance in the task he had planned for himself."

However, the IG REPORT explains that SAS "contrived to put (MANUEL) ARTIME and AMSLASH together in such a way that neither knew that the contact had been engineered by the CIA. The thought was that ARTIME needed a man inside and (AMSLASH) wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, ARTIME might get his man inside and (AMSLASH) might get his silenced weapon--from ARTIME. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon for ARTIME to give to (AMSLASH)."

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:
F Baron

DATE: 7/1/75
ARTIME and AMLASH met in Madrid, where AMLASH told ARTIME that "he had requested a silencer for a FAL rifle from the Americans, which they had not been able to provide. ARTIME agreed to furnish either a silencer for a FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer." (102) ARTIME reported the results of this conversation in a meeting with in Florida on Jan. 3, 1965.
ARTIME and AMLASH met in Madrid, where AMLASH told ARTIME that "he had requested a silencer for a FAL rifle from the Americans, which they had not been able to provide. ARTIME agreed to furnish either a silencer for a FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer." (102) ARTIME reported the results of this conversation in a meeting with Santer in Florida on Jan. 3, 1965.
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AS SANITIZED
29-3-94

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<tr>
<td>Mr. McCone</td>
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<tr>
<td>McGeorge Bundy</td>
<td>Mr. Wilson</td>
<td>Mr. Parrot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Johnson</td>
<td>Dr. Charyk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Gilpatrick</td>
<td>Dr. Scoville</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. Taylor</td>
<td>Col. Steakley</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 9, 1962</td>
<td>Special Group (Augmented)</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accompanied by all out Flint support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the NSIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

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<td>Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.</td>
<td>DATE: PM</td>
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(02:00 PM)
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29-3-94

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<th>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</th>
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| (See list of names below.) | **CASTRO**  
**CUBA** - SYNDICATE/PHASE II -  
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II |

**CARD 1 of 3**

**OCCURRENCE:** The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. **RICHARD HELMS**, DD/P
2. **WILLIAM HARVEY**, Chief, Task Force W
3. **JAMES O'CONNELL**, Office of Security  
(He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. **SHEFTIELD EDWARDS**, D/Security  
(He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)
5. **J. C. KING**, Chief, WH Division  
(He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)
6. **BRUCE CLUTER**, HARVEY's deputy in 1962  
(He knows that HARVEY was meeting with gangsters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)
7. **TED SHACKLEY**, Chief, JMWAVE  
(He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

**SOURCE:** I.G. REPORT 1967

**FILE:**

**TOP SECRET**

**STAFF:** Baron

**DATE:** 28.6.75
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<tr>
<td>(Same instruction as card 1.)</td>
<td>Apr 17 '61</td>
<td>CARD 2 of 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

8. TSD participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

**SOURCE:**

**FILE:**

**STAFF:**

**DATE:**
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29-3-94

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

26 Jan. 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ARNOLD SILVER about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52).

HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ARNOLD SILVER. (52)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75
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AS SANITIZED
29-3-94

PAY

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Harvey, William
Bissell, Richard

DATES:
1/26/61

CATTEROGIES:
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver (52)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52
STAFF: Rhea
FILE: 
DATE: 6/30/75
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<td>HARVEY, WILLIAM</td>
<td>Spring, '61</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubark</td>
<td>Jan. 25, '61</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:** Harvey was asked about notes written by him and delivered from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a capability for Executive Action and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear that this in no way means he should be advised. He should not be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). He testified that this matter would have been brought up again at any time that the Executive Action Project led to specific targeting or specific operation or specific assessment of consequences. (59)

**SOURCE:** HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, '61, pp. 104-105.

**FILE:**

**DATE:** 6/30/75
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<td>QUWIN</td>
<td>BISSELL, Richard</td>
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<td>SILVER, Arnold</td>
<td>LUMUMBA, Patrice</td>
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<td>February 19, 1962</td>
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<td>EXECUTIVE ACTION</td>
<td>ZRRIFLE</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION... program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QUWIN, who had been recruited earlier by O'DONNELL for use in a special operation in the... made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted." (38)
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<tr>
<td>HARVEY</td>
<td>(HARVEY's rough estimate)</td>
<td>ZARIFLE</td>
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<td>WHITE HOUSE</td>
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<td>CASTRO</td>
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<td>the BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of &quot;an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability, a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required.&quot; (37)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with HARVEY.&quot; (37)</td>
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<td>&quot;HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD STEINER and with SIDNEY CORTELL.&quot; (37-38).</td>
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<td>I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38</td>
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<td>28.6.75</td>
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</table>
The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZERIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER, for use in a special operation in COMBO run by JUSTIN O'CONNELL. O'CONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted."

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, phrase in the above paragraph was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

FILE:  

DATE: 28.6.75
The project name, ZPRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962. (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION program came to be known as ZPRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, OWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER. For use in a special operation in the [redacted] [redacted] to be run by O'CONNELL, O'DONNELL] made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted." (38)
"The project name, ZRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION program came to be known as ZRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the [ ] to be run by JUStIIN O'DONNeLL. O'DONNeLL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted." (38)
CIA has no objection to declassification and/or release of this document as sanitized.

29-3-94

(1)(C)

persons/entities:

HARVEY, William

Dates:

Executive Action

Categories:

5/27/75

occurrence:

HARVEY testified that N.J. Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through ARNOLD SILVER for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use. (50) Or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the people spotted by N.J. Win as possibilities. (50) He testified that before someone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall N.J. Win was used only once in connection with an operation in the

Source: HARVEY Testimony, June 25, 1975, pp. 50-51

Staff: Rhea

Date: 30.6.75

File: Top Secret
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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29-3-94

(i)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

A.M. LASH

March 9, 1961

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

an officer assigned to the Mexico City station met in
Mexico City with a high officer in the Cuban armed forces who was subsequently
to become a CIA asset known as A.M. LASH-1. The meeting was with A.M. LASH to
sound out his views on the Cuban situation. A.M. LASH was in Mexico City to
attend a "leftist-sponsored" conference. (78).

The March 1961 meeting was inconclusive, but it led to other meetings out
of which Project A.M. LASH was created. A.M. LASH-1 "repeatedly insisted that
the essential first step in overthrowing the regime was the elimination of
CASTRO himself, which /A.M. LASH-1/ claimed he was prepared to accomplish. He
repeatedly requested that we /CIA/ furnish him the special equipment or material
needed to do the job." (79).

The IG REPORT concludes that: "The Agency offered both direct and indirect
support for /A.M. LASH's/ plotting." (80) (Continue on next card)

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron

FILE:
### Occurrence:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low-level coverage by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accompanied by all-out ELINT support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

### Source:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

### Staff:

DATE: 6/29/75