

Date : 08/06/95
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10010
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-02

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : WANNELL, W. RAYMOND
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 05/11/76
PAGES : 85
SUBJECTS : WANNELL, W. RAYMOND

CIA

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

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DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 1

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Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
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The United States Senate

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REASON: 1.5 (c,d)

DECLASSIFY ON: X (U) (6)

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

W. Raymond Wannall

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STAFF INTERVIEW

Tuesday, May 11, 1976

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 o'clock
a.m. in Room 608, The Carroll Arms Hotel.

Staff: Paul Wallach, Michael Epstein and Jim Johnston,
Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL

Mr. Wallach. Would the witness please state his full name and address for the record?

Mr. Wannall. W. Raymond Wannall, W-a-n-n-a-l-l, 305 Southwest Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Wannall, you have testified before the Committee before.

Mr. Wannall. Yes, I have.

Mr. Wallach. Under oath?

Mr. Wannall. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, as I explained to you earlier this morning, the Senator will not be able to be here because of a conflict in his schedule, and I take it from what you have said you have no objection to proceeding in their absence, although you do have the right to have them present.

Mr. Wannall. I have no objections to proceeding.

Mr. Wallach. Additionally, you are presently, recently retired from the Bureau, and you do understand that you do have the right to come before us with counsel.

Mr. Wannall. Yes, I understand that.

Mr. Wallach. And if at any time you want to adjourn these proceedings until you can secure counsel, we will do that at your convenience.

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1 area of my responsibility.

2 Mr. Wallach. Taking a country that was, say, Brazil,
3 for example, would you investigate that type of thing for the
4 Criminal Division?

5 Mr. Wannall. If it were a Federal violation or a potential
6 Federal violation, that would have been handled under the
7 Criminal Division.

8 Mr. Wallach. So even though the Agent might have been or
9 was believed to be involved in a foreign intelligence service,
10 the Criminal Division --

11 Mr. Wannall. The actual assassination would be handled
12 by the Criminal Division, yes. We would not disregard the
13 agent. We would continue to follow and report on his activities,
14 but any investigation of the assassination as such would have
15 been a criminal violation and under the Division 6, the General
16 Criminal Division.

17 Mr. Wallach. In March of 1962 you replaced Sterling
18 Donahoe as Section Chief of Nationalities Intelligence
19 Section, is that right?

20 Mr. Wannall. That is correct.

21 Mr. Wallach. And you continued in that position at least
22 up until the time of -- through May of 1965.

23 Mr. Wannall. Yes.

24 Mr. Wallach. A couple of questions I would like to ask
25 you about. At that time I realize that it may have been touchy

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1 on either in a meeting that we had over in your office at
2 the Bureau or in possible other testimony, but I would like
3 to put them together here for the record today.

4 At any time while you were -- and again I'm talking from
5 the period 1958 through May 1965 -- at any time during this
6 period were you aware of the fact that the CIA was using the
7 Mafia or underworld figures in attempts to kill Fidel Castro?

8 Mr. Wannall. You are going back a long time, but to the
9 best of my recollection I didn't become aware of that until
10 after that period, and I think my knowledge was acquired as
11 a result of reviewing information in our files for the purpose
12 of reporting material to the Attorney General. A memorandum
13 was prepared which I think you possibly have access to, and the
14 date of that memo would probably coincide pretty much with
15 my knowledge.

16 Mr. Wallach. I think the memo you speak about is a March 6,
17 1967 memorandum which we basically discussed at your office
18 the day I was there.

19 Mr. Wannall. That's right.

20 Mr. Wallach. There were two. One was an internal
21 memorandum, the other was from the Director to the Attorney
22 General.

23 I would like to get to that a little bit later and get
24 your knowledge as to what precipitated that and what review
25 was actually conducted, but I will get to that matter.

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1 coming to my attention.

2 That was in 1964 you say?

3 Mr. Wallach. Right.

4 I will read to you -- we had access to the memorandum
5 although we have not had delivered, a portion of it. It says --
6 have you ever heard the name Tepedino? Does that name
7 ring any bell?

8 Mr. Wannall. I can't say that it does.

9 Mr. Wallach. I may state to you, and it really doesn't
10 need to be stated, that the information we are discussing
11 here is classified, and I know from your experience, you will
12 treat it as such. But I just wanted to reiterate that.

13 Mr. Wannall. I will respect that.

14 Mr. Wallach. The quote -- and this was taken down by
15 one of the people on our staff, so I can't say it is 100
16 percent accurate: "He (Tepedino) cautioned the informant
17 to say nothing concerning their conversation which would
18 permit the information to reach CIA or any other source
19 through which it might become public inasmuch as to do so
20 might result in the death of persons in Cuba as well as himself.
21 Tepedino thereby confided that he had been acting as contact
22 man between CIA and AMLASH. AMLASH has been constantly com-
23 plaining to him that CIA refused to furnish him with certain
24 necessary equipment with which he could take effective action
25 in Cuba."

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1 And then it goes on to talk about they had furnished
2 effective equipment at certain points in time.

3 Mr. Wannall. Defective?

4 Mr. Wallach. Effective equipment for the purpose of
5 eliminating Fidel Castro, and it says there is now discussion
6 under way with the CIA on attempts to kill Fidel Castro.

7 Do you recall any of that coming to your attention?

8 Mr. Wannall. It is possible it did, but I don't have any
9 recollection of it. If it was in a memorandum from our Miami
10 office to headquarters -- and I think that's what you said it
11 was -- that would not necessarily come across my desk. It is
12 quite possible the supervisor, however, could have called it
13 to my attention. I can only say I cannot recall it and the
14 name Tepedino does not strike a note with me at all.

15 Mr. Wallach. Was there any special -- again the period
16 1958 through 1965 -- was there any special operations being
17 run out of the Miami field office vis-a-vis Cuba?

18 Mr. Wannall. By the FBI?

19 Mr. Wallach. Right.

20 Mr. Wannall. No, in the way of special operations I
21 think we'd have to define the term. Of course, we had a
22 very intensive informant development program down there among
23 the anti-Castro Cubans, and during the period when Castro
24 began releasing individuals and permitting them to come to
25 the United States, we had a program down there for the purpose

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1 trying to identify Castro Agents coming in both by ship and by
2 plane.

3 Now, I don't recall the dates of that right now. It could
4 have been within that time period.

5 Mr. Wallach. Did the Bureau to your knowledge at that
6 time have, without identifying them, any sources inside Cuba?

7 Mr. Wannall. Inside Cuba?

8 Mr. Wallach. Yes.

9 Mr. Wannall. Not to my recollection. There were sources
10 that I -- I shouldn't use the word "sources" -- there were
11 individuals who on occasion made forays into Cuba and we
12 learned about information and conditions inside Cuba as a
13 result of people inside this country, but not agents inside
14 Cuba, no.

15 Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard the name Rolando
16 Cubela?

17 Mr. Wannall. That name strikes a note with me somewhere,
18 yes. Orlando Cubela?

19 Mr. Wallach. Rolando Cubela.

20 Mr. Wannall. I recognize the name. In what context I
21 can't recall.

22 Mr. Wallach. Let's go off the record.

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 Mr. Wallach. Let the record reflect that I just noted to
25 Mr. Wannall off the record certain facts about Mr. Cubela.

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1 In any event, do you recall at any time whether he was
2 a source?

3 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall that he was or was not.
4 I can't even remember in what context I recall the name Cubela,
5 but it does hit me as someone that I had heard about before.

6 Mr. Wallach. Did you know General Lansdale?

7 Mr. Wannall. No, I never met the gentleman.

8 Where was he?

9 Mr. Wallach. General Lansdale was -- have you ever heard
10 about a person MONGOOSE or the operations the U.S. was running
11 against Cuba in '62 and '63?

12 Mr. Wannall. I have read the term MONGOOSE in the press
13 recently, I have heard it in that context, but I don't recall
14 hearing about it in connection with my official duties.

15 Mr. Wallach. Did you at any time attend meetings at the
16 Pentagon at which Cuban affairs were discussed?

17 Mr. Wannall. During that particular period?

18 Mr. Wallach. Yes, '58 through '65.

19 Mr. Wannall. No, I did not. I don't recall attending any
20 meetings at the Pentagon on Cuban affairs. In fact, I don't
21 recall any meetings at the Pentagon during that period at all.

22 Mr. Wallach. There was a meeting, we've had testimony,
23 that Mr. Donahoe and Mr. Cotter went out to in, I believe it
24 was in the spring of '62.

25 Do you have any recollection of them going out

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1 to a meeting?

2 Mr. Wannall. No specific recollection, but I think Cotter
3 at the time was probably head of the unit which handled
4 Castro affairs, and Donahoe -- in the spring of '62, Donahoe
5 of course up until about the first of March of '62 was
6 chief of the Nationalities Intelligence Section. So I wouldn't
7 be surprised if they had gone. I can't say I can recall
8 specifically a meeting that they attended, or their having
9 gone to a meeting at the Pentagon.

10 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any meeting -- and I have
11 identified General Lansdale as a person who we have been
12 told was close to Bobby Kennedy at that time and who was
13 heavily involved in all types of Cuban operations, operations
14 targeted against Cuba -- ever coming to a meeting with Mr.
15 Belmont -- I'm asking you in an attempt to refresh your
16 recollection.

17 Mr. Wannall. Well, as I say, I don't know Lansdale.
18 Is that his name?

19 Mr. Wallach. Right.

20 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall a General Lansdale. I have,
21 now that you have refreshed my recollection, some vague recol-
22 lection of a meeting with Belmont by some General. It may have
23 been Lansdale. I don't know the name -- where there was a
24 discussion of Cuban matters.

25 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anyone bringing up the subject

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1 of assassinating Castro?

2 Mr. Wannall. I think the subject was taken up, and I
3 probably learned that from Donahoe. He may have been at the
4 meeting.

5 Mr. Wallach. Do you remember how Mr. Donahoe told you
6 that it was taken up? Did he say it was taken up jokingly
7 by Belmont, does that ring a bell? Was it brought up by
8 Lansdale?

9 Mr. Wannall. I would be reaching to try to say in what
10 context. I have a recollection of a conversation with Donahoe
11 where he said --now, let's see -- I think the way that Donahoe
12 said it was someone brought it up, some General, and my
13 impression was that Belmont was about to throw him out of the
14 office. So I would assume that it would have been the General
15 that brought up the conversation.

16 Mr. Wallach. Brought up assassinating Castro with the
17 use of Mafia figures?

18 Mr. Wannall. No, not with the use of Mafia figures, I
19 can't recall that, just the assassination of Castro.

20 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall reading a memo or a document
21 relating to that meeting?

22 Mr. Wannall. I am more inclined to think that I learned
23 this from word of mouth from Donahoe. It is possible if the
24 document was written -- I think if I read such a document that
25 had Mafia in it, I believe I would remember that.

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1 Mr. Epstein. Well, apart from the Mafia issue, do you
2 remember reading any document reflecting a meeting between
3 Belmont and Lansdale in which the assassination of Castro was
4 raised?

5 Mr. Wannall. I cannot say, Mr. Epstein. I recall reading
6 the memo. I know I have this knowledge. I think I acquired
7 it orally. It is possible I read a memo. I just cannot say
8 positively yes or no on that.

9 Mr. Epstein. The knowledge that you are recollecting now
10 is knowledge that came to you that you had in and around the
11 time of the meeting as opposed to within the last few weeks or
12 months.

13 Mr. Wannall. Yes. It was about the time of the meeting
14 which I recollect as having been in Belmont's office as opposed
15 to the Pentagon.

16 Mr. Epstein. How do you recall it as having come about?

17 What was the purpose, as you understood, of the issue
18 coming up in Belmont's office? Why was Lansdale even mentioning
19 that to Belmont?

20 Mr. Wannall. Well, I don't know that it was even Lansdale.
21 I can't remember at all. A General, an Army General I think
22 was the way it was told to me, or perhaps the name was
23 mentioned. I don't know. It could be the name was given
24 to me and I don't remember the name. But in the context,
25 just the matter of a discussion of the Cuban situation, and

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1 as I can recollect it, the General himself probably brought up
2 the matter of attempted assassination of Castro, and Belmont's
3 reaction against it.

4 Mr. Epstein. Was it your understanding that it was an
5 assassination attempt that had taken place or a proposal?

6 Mr. Wannall. A proposal, not any assassination attempt
7 that had taken place.

8 Mr. Epstein. Was it your assessment, then, that the General
9 was seeking Belmont's reaction to the idea, or what?

10 Mr. Wannall. I don't know, just the subject had come up,
11 but for what purpose I can't recall if that was explained to
12 me, or if it was, I don't remember.

13 We are going back a lot of years.

14 Mr. Epstein. I understand.

15 Do you recall any discussion between yourself and
16 Donahoe on the subject of whether anyone outside the Bureau
17 ought to be notified that someone in the military was proposing
18 such an idea?

19 Mr. Wannall. I can't recall any such discussion.

20 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall whether anyone was in fact notifi-
21 fied by the Bureau?

22 Mr. Wannall. I don't know. I was not privy to the
23 conversation.

24 Mr. Wallach. You don't recall being in Belmont's office
25 during this, do you?

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1 Mr. Wannall. Oh, I definitely do not. I think I would
2 have remembered if I had been.

3 Mr. Epstein. Can you relate it in point of time to any
4 events, so we can get the benefit of the date, or month or
5 year when it might have occurred, even to the Bay of Pigs or
6 the Cuban missile crisis?

7 Mr. Wannall. I wish I could be helpful to you on that, but
8 I just can't. It was a conversation, as I remember --

9 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall -- I'm sorry.

10 Mr. Wannall. It was a conversation, I know. It was
11 certainly during that time period we were having our difficulties
12 with Castro, but whether it was during the Bay of Pigs, which
13 I think was May of '61, the Cuban missile crisis, which was
14 October '62, I would be stretching. I don't think I can really
15 tie it down as to the time.

16 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if it was before or after you
17 replaced Donahoe?

18 Mr. Wannall. My recollection is that it was before.
19 That would help because I think Donahoe was the section chief
20 at the time.

21 Mr. Wallach. I might say I think it was Donahoe's
22 recollection that it was soon after or after you replaced him,
23 and that he asked -- this might refresh your recollection
24 further, if you had any discussions with him -- he asked
25 Richard Cotter to also come to the meeting with him, and he and

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1 Mr. Cotter went to Mr. Belmont's office and met with a General,
2 General Lansdale.

3 Now, do you remember having had any discussions with Mr.
4 Cotter about this subject?

5 Mr. Wannall. No. I am pretty sure that my knowledge
6 came from Donahoe. And it is quite possible it was during
7 that transitional stage, because Donahoe went over -- he was
8 working as an assistant to Belmont when he left the Section
9 Chief's position, and there were some things he had to leave
10 undone. I was just acting for him, and suddenly he was
11 appointed, and the same day I was appointed Section Chief. And
12 so we did have discussions between then and about the middle
13 of April for, among other things, the preparation of performance
14 ratings, for example, of the men who were in the Division. I
15 had several discussions with him before preparing the ratings
16 that year. But I said, as I did before, my recollection was
17 it was while Donahoe was still section chief, but it could
18 possibly have been in that period immediately following March
19 which is the date of my appointment as Section Chief.

20 Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this. Is your recollection
21 that Donahoe discussed a meeting with you in Belmont's office,
22 or he discussed plans or suggestions that were being made, he
23 had attended at the Pentagon?

24 Mr. Wannall. My recollection is it was a meeting in
25 Belmont's office.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Let me show you a memorandum dated May 10,
2 1962, prepared by Mr. Hoover. It was disseminated to -- apparent-
3 ly disseminated to six persons within the Bureau, and it discusses
4 a variety of subject matters. I would like you to read over
5 just the last page and a half of the memorandum, the last
6 paragraph on page 6, and the remainder of page 7, and tell me
7 if the facts described in there ring any bell or were discussed
8 with you.

9 Mr. Wannall. Do you mind if I make a note of the memo
10 and what it is?

11 Mr. Wallach. No, surely.

12 I think it is a May 10, '62 memo.

13 Mr. Wannall. Well, I was going to put down to whom it
14 was addressed.

15 Now, you would like for me to read --

16 Mr. Wallach. The last paragraph on that page, and the
17 next page.

18 (The Witness reads the document.)

19 Mr. Wallach. I realize it is not the cleanest of
20 copies.

21 Were you able to get through it?

22 Mr. Wannall. I think I have the sense of it.

23 Mr. Wallach. Was any of this information ever called
24 to your attention back in 1962 or '63?

25 Mr. Wannall. No. I have seen that memo in recent months,

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1 but not at the time it was written.

2 Mr. Wallach. As a matter of fact, I think this is one
3 of the memos we discussed that you said, I believe, that I
4 think you said you saw in 1967 in your review.

5 Mr. Wannall. I think it was the basis of the memorandum
6 I put together, the memorandum to the AG that was put together
7 in my section back in '67.

8 Mr. Wallach. Do you know of any reason why this informa-
9 tion would not have been brought to your attention as a person,
10 I guess you would say, responsible for Bureau policy vis-a-
11 vis Cuba?

12 Mr. Wannall. Well, I can't say except that it was probably
13 very high level, closely held information, handled on a
14 need to know basis, and a decision must have been made that I
15 did not need to know. In May of '62, Donahoe, who was fully
16 cognizant of the activities with respect to Cuba, was working
17 directly in Mr. Belmont's front office from which you said
18 before, I was passed over to go to the unit chief who would
19 have to be involved in the thing. I can only say that that
20 probably was the reason for its not having been.

21 Mr. Wallach. I might say that Mr. Donahoe has testified
22 he did not know at this time.

23 Were you ever in contact directly with anyone out at
24 CIA about Cuban matters at any time, '61, '62, or '63?

25 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall being in contact. I was in

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1 very close contact with our liaison man who frequently took up
2 Cuban matters with CIA. I don't recall having had any direct
3 contact with any other officers during that period, nor on
4 Cuban matters at any time that I can remember.

5 Mr. Wallach. Were you aware that the CIA had a station
6 that they were operating down in Florida?

7 Mr. Wannall. Yes, I was very much aware of that.

8 Mr. Wallach. Was there a liaison set up between the FBI
9 and that station?

10 Mr. Wannall. Yes. It was rather shaky to start with,
11 but the Attorney General sent about 16 of us down to Miami
12 in about March of 1963, to the best of my recollection, and
13 while I was there, I learned that the liaison between our
14 office and the CIA operational office there was not the best.

15 Mr. Wallach. Why were you sent down? Why were the 16
16 men sent down?

17 Mr. Wannall. It was at the time that some anti-Castro
18 Cubans took a vessel, a mother vessel with some smaller
19 vessels aboard, to Cuba, and they put a detonation charge in the
20 bow of a smaller vessel, and set it off so it would go into
21 Havana Harbor, and this small ship with the detonation charge
22 in the nose struck a Soviet vessel, and it almost brought about
23 an international incident, and the Attorney General had
24 about 16 officials from Washington go to Miami on a Friday
25 evening -- I think we arrived about midnight -- and the next

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1 morning we had a conference there for the purpose of discus-
2 sing what action might be taken to restrain the anti-Castro
3 Cubans from engaging in such type activities.

4 Mr. Wallach. Were they officials other than FBI personnel?

5 Mr. Wannall. Yes.

6 Mr. Wallach. Can you recall who was there? I realize
7 you probably won't recall everyone.

8 Mr. Wannall. Well, I remember from the Department,
9 Walter Yeagley was there because I roomed with him that night.
10 I think from CIA the gentleman was Desmond Fitzgerald, if I
11 recall correctly. There were representatives also whose names
12 I don't recall from INS, a couple of the Military agencies,
13 I think probably the Army, perhaps Air Force. It was a group
14 made up of representatives of various Federal agencies, and
15 I was the only representative from the FBI.

16 Mr. Wallach. Was the Attorney General there?

17 Mr. Wannall. No, he did not go down. General Carroll
18 of the Air Force arranged for the transportation down and
19 back.

20 Mr. Wallach. Did you meet with the Attorney General before
21 you went down?

22 Mr. Wannall. Yes.

23 Mr. Wallach. Did you receive instructions from the Attorney
24 General?

25 Mr. Wannall. Yes. He had representatives of these

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1 various agencies in, more than the 16 who went, and said he
2 wanted a group to go down, one representing each of the
3 organizations, at least one, and that the President was quite
4 concerned over the problem that had been generated by this
5 bombing of a Soviet vessel in Havana Harbor, and he wanted the
6 group to go down on the site and try to make some decisions
7 as to what action could be taken for the purpose of eliminating
8 this type of activity on the part of the anti-Castro Cubans.

9 Mr. Wallach. At that meeting with the Attorney General,
10 do you recall who else besides the persons you mentioned
11 were present? For example, was Mr. Helms there?

12 Mr. Wannall. I can't say for sure that Helms was there.
13 I don't think I knew him at the time. I would not have
14 recognize him. There must have been 40 people at the meeting.
15 It was a very large meeting.

16 Mr. Wallach. Did you know Desmond Fitzgerald before you
17 met him in Florida?

18 Mr. Wannall. No, I met him on the plane.

19 Mr. Wallach. How was he identified, or what was your
20 understanding as to the area he was involved in with CIA?

21 Mr. Wannall. Well, CIA did have a post in the Miami
22 area which, as I understand it, was for the purpose of carrying
23 out intelligence gathering activities directed against
24 Cuba.

25 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you are saying that they

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1 used that post to gather intelligence information from inside
2 Cuba?

3 Mr. Wannall. From what I was told by our liaison man --
4 and I had no discussions directly with CIA on this, was that
5 the CIA station in Miami operated just the same as any CIA
6 station abroad, but it was not able to be located in Cuba, and
7 therefore it was located in the Miami area.

8 Mr. Wallach. Was it your understanding that they had the
9 capability to gather intelligence information from inside
10 Cuba, that they had sources, assets, etc., inside Cuba?

11 M Mr. Wannall. Well, I wouldn't say my understanding. I
12 feel, from some of the information that came from CIA, it must
13 have originated inside Cuba, so I would assume they did have
14 sources there.

15 Mr. Wallach. And that was your understanding in '62 and
16 1963.

17 Mr. Wannall. I would say yes.

18 Mr. Wallach. What was the outcome of the meeting? Can
19 you tell us what transpired at the meeting?

20 Mr. Wannall. I think the principal thing that was
21 accomplished was that the anti-Castro Cubans that time were in
22 an alien status in this country, and they were issued notifi-
23 cations that if they should leave the United States for the
24 purpose of engaging in forays of this type, they would be
25 excluded from re-entering.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Was it your understanding that any of the
2 government agencies, governmental agencies had backed this
3 Cuban group, be it the military or the CIA?

4 Mr. Wannall. No. I would say it was my understanding that
5 the Government was very upset over the activities of this group.

6 (Pause)

7 Mr. Wallach. At any time that you were at the Bureau,
8 did you have any knowledge of the fact that the military was
9 running operations targeted at Cuba aside from the Bay of
10 Pigs?

11 Mr. Wannall. The military?

12 Mr. Wallach. Yes.

13 Mr. Wannall. I can't recall any such knowledge coming to
14 my attention.

15 Mr. Epstein. [Did the Bureau ever run any counterintelligence
16 operations directed at Cuba, counterintelligence, in the early
17 '60s?] (S)(u)

18 Mr. Wannall. Well, your term counterintelligence, Mr.
19 Epstein.

20 Mr. Epstein. Defensive action.

21 Mr. Wannall. [In the way of trying to] [develop defectors,
22 developing double agents] (S) [against the Cuban U.N. mission,
23 preventing the sabotage of some department stores in New
24 York in November 1962, yes. We engaged in counterintelligence
25 operations of the same type that we would engage in with] (S)(u)

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1 the period in 1963, without getting into specific identities.

2 Did the Bureau have sources within the Cuban consulate
3 in Mexico City in '62 or '63, do you recall?

4 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall whether we did or not, not
5 to my knowledge.

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the name Silva Duran?

7 Mr. Wannall. Yes, I have heard that name.

8 Mr. Wallach. She was the person in the Cuban consulate
9 I believe who met with Oswald.

10 I'm asking you if you have a recollection as to whether
11 or not she was ever a Bureau source or asset?

12 Mr. Wannall. I don't have any recollection that she was
13 a source or an asset. I wouldn't necessarily know the name,
14 because from reviewing our material you know that we mention
15 our sources normally by serial number and the names are kept
16 in one place. So I don't connect Silva Duran as having been
17 an FBI source.

18 Mr. Wallach. Before, when we were talking about the
19 meeting that you had in March of 1963 down in Miami that
20 related to the anti-Castro group incident, is there a reason
21 why Vince Nasca did not go to that meeting since it was my
22 understanding that he was on top of the anti-Castro groups?

23 Mr. Wannall. Well, the decision was not made by me or
24 in consultation with me. I was at lunch one day, and they
25 sent out about ten clerks to find me, and I was told to report

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1 to Mr. Sullivan's office. And when I got back he told me to
2 be in the AG's office that afternoon. And from there it
3 snowballed.

4 Mr. Wallach. You mentioned also before that at that
5 meeting I think you said you became aware of a liaison relation-
6 ship between the field office in Miami and the CIA station in
7 Florida?

8 Mr. Wannall. Oh, no. I was aware that we had liaison
9 with the office down there. I learned at that meeting that
10 it wasn't all it should be. In fact, the FBI was criticized
11 very severely because the Miami office was precluded from
12 disseminating reports directly to the CIA office down there.
13 All of it came through headquarters, as a result of which there
14 was a time lag in information being exchanged.

15 Mr. Wallach. Criticized by whom?

16 Mr. Wannall. By representatives of the CIA down at
17 that meeting.

18 Mr. Wallach. Who else was there besides Mr. Fitzgerald,
19 do you recall, from the CIA?

20 Mr. Wannall. Well, their local man was there. I don't
21 recall who he was. As was the SAC of our Miami office.

22 Mr. Epstein. Who was he, do you recall?

23 Mr. Wannall. I think he was Wes Grapp.

24 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall who the Cuban desk chief was
25 in Miami, of the Bureau?

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1 [respect to the Soviet Bloc interests.] (S)(u)

2 Mr. Epstein. [Did some of that counterintelligence involve
3 disruptive actions taken against Cuban --] (S)(u)

4 Mr. Wannall. Well, I think -- this is a classified
5 interview?

6 Mr. Epstein. Yes.

7 Mr. Wannall. [I believe that one of the counterintelligence
8 programs was Cuban, was it not, so in that respect, yes.] (S)(u)

9 Mr. Wallach. Let's go off the record.

10 (Discussion off the record.)

11 M Mr. Epstein. [Did any of those operations ever involve
12 Bureau agents going into Cuba or Bureau sources or assets
13 going into Cuba at the Bureau's request?] (S)(u)

14 Mr. Wannall. Well, definitely no with respect to
15 Bureau agents. [I think there may have been some Bureau

16 assets who did in fact get into Cuba, not extensively.] I

17 recall specifically extensive efforts to try to get next to the

18 Cuban Foreign Minister (S) without success, as I recall, but it
19 was a long term thing where we had assets in this country who
20 were either related to him or friends of his family, against
21 whom we made these efforts. (S)(u)

22 Mr. Epstein. And that was for the purpose of developing
23 intelligence as opposed to disruption.

24 Mr. Wannall. That's right.

25 Mr. Wallach. Just a couple of more questions dealing with

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1 Washington had been on the spot, and that may have been one
2 reason for the meeting, to show an interest and an effort to
3 do something that would eliminate the problem.

4 Mr. Epstein. Were there any policy discussions relative
5 to the possibility that some of the anti-Castro people or
6 groups might have been running U.S. Government operations and
7 how they were to be dealt with, or how that was to be determined
8 before any restraining actions were taken?

9 Mr. Wannall. At that meeting?

10 Mr. Epstein. Correct.

11 Mr. Wannall. Or otherwise. I don't recall any discussions.
12 There were certainly none at that meeting.

13 Mr. Epstein. Not at the Attorney General's meeting.

14 Mr. Wannall. No.

15 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall that issue ever arising
16 with the anti-Castro groups?

17 Mr. Wannall. As I have said, I don't recall any
18 discussions of this kind.

19 Mr. Epstein. Not just at this meeting, but at any time.

20 Mr. Wannall. Not at any time.

21 Mr. Epstein. Were there occasions when there were cases
22 that the Bureau began running, where at some point the Bureau
23 became aware that it was indeed a CIA operation?

24 Mr. Wannall. I think there were cases where we came up
25 with an individual in whom we developed an interest later, and

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1 later learned that there was a CIA interest. That was usually
2 worked out by our liaison section.

3 Mr. Wallach. Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Wannall,
4 in the time period 1962 and 1963, as to whether or not -- the
5 first question is whether or not the FBI was running any sort
6 of what is called a COINTELPRO activity against the Fair
7 Play for Cuba Committee.

8 Mr. Wannall. Well, we had a COINTELPRO operation, and
9 we did target in on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. It was
10 one of only about two organizations in the country that were
11 openly pro-Castro.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the nature of that COINTELPRO
13 operation and the approximate date?

14 Mr. Wannall. Well, COINTELPRO operation, I wouldn't
15 say it was a COINTELPRO operation. As I recall, we did do
16 a bag job on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and
17 it may have been after they moved out of their premises. While
18 I am not sure of the facts, it seems to me that the idea
19 originated with somebody on the Hill. I can't recall who
20 it was.

21 Mr. Epstein. When was that?

22 Mr. Wannall. Well, it was within this timeframe, I would
23 say.

24 Mr. Epstein. What idea are you talking about?

25 Mr. Wannall. Of taking some action that would neutralize

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1 the efforts of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

2 Mr. Wallach. Well, insofar as we have no documents relating
3 to the actual black bag job, we do have documents showing
4 that mailing lists and photographs and other documents were
5 obtained from Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which indicates
6 they were obtained in that manner. Additionally, I think
7 we do have documents which relates to some sending of letters
8 to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee to try to divide the two
9 groups.

10 Mr. Wannall. It is possible. I don't remember those, but
11 it is quite possible.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether the Bureau had any
13 high level assets or informants within the Fair Play for
14 Cuba Committee, and by that I mean very high level.

15 Mr. Wannall. I cannot recall any.

16 Mr. Wallach. What was your perception -- this is
17 prior to the assassination of President Kennedy -- if you could
18 categorize the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, what type of group
19 was it?

20 Mr. Wannall. Well, it was openly a pro-Castro group. I
21 think they were engaged in collection of funds to send down to
22 Cuba for the purchase, reportedly, of farm equipment and things
23 of that sort. They supported Castro openly. There wasn't any
24 question about their sympathies.

25 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if the CIA was conducting any

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1 sort of operations against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee,
2 either in the United States or worldwide?

3 Mr. Wannall. I don't know. If I had found that they
4 were conducting against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee here,
5 I think we would have been in touch with them about it.

6 Mr. Wallach. Let me get into one or two operational
7 things, and let's just use the period September-October 1963.

8 If the Bureau was conducting an investigation and it
9 turned out that they needed some information that the CIA
10 was likely to have by virtue of its overseas operations, how
11 would that information be requested, or would it be requested?

12 Mr. Wannall. Oh, I think so. We would send an indication
13 and ask for it.

14 Mr. Wallach. Through Papich?

15 Mr. Wannall. It would be a letter. If it would be
16 sensitive, he would probably deliver it, we would mark it by
17 liaison so it would get in the right hands over there.

18 Mr. Wallach. Would you have authority to send the
19 communication yourself, or would you have to get approval for
20 any communications that went to CIA?

21 Mr. Wannall. No, all communications went up the line as
22 I recall. There was a period when some name checks and
23 routine sort of things were initialled out at the section chief
24 level, but I would say that information of that nature would
25 go up through channels. That would be the normal procedure.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Let me show you an article dated September 9,
2 1963, which appeared in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, among
3 some other newspapers, and ask you just to take a look at it.
4 It is captioned Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba.

5 Mr. Wannall. The Times-Picayune?

6 (The Witness reads the document.)

7 Mr. Wallach. And supplementing that, let me show you a
8 cablegram from Legat Mexico City signed by Clark Anderson
9 to the Bureau on 11/27/63. It is Cable No. 196, with specific
10 attention on the last paragraph on the first page, and which
11 continues on to the second page. And I might note for the
12 record that there Clark Anderson is essentially giving a
13 similar version of Castro's speech or interview that is
14 referred to in the Times-Picayune article.

15 (The Witness reads the document.)

16 Mr. Wallach. Looking at first of all the cablegram, can
17 you tell if -- the initials are not the clearest, but do you
18 have any recollection of seeing this cablegram?

19 Mr. Wannall. My initials are not on it. I don't recall
20 having seen it.

21 Mr. Wallach. Can you tell from that if anyone in your
22 section saw it?

23 Mr. Wannall. Well, the five here would indicate someone
24 in Division 5 did in fact see it.

25 Mr. Wallach. Which was Domestic Intelligence Division.

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1 Mr. Wannall. Right.

2 It could have been a section other than the one that I
3 headed at the time. I will try to make out the name.

4 Mr. Wallach. Well, don't speculate if you really can't --

5 Mr. Wannall. It would be speculation.

6 Mr. Wallach. Who in the period September-October 1963 was
7 most familiar I will say with Cuba, Cuban activities, Cuban
8 counterintelligence activities and with all the aspects of
9 Cuba within the Bureau?

10 Mr. Wannall. Well, those two phases were on different
11 desks as I recall. Nasca would have been familiar with the
12 anti-Castro Cuban activities, and I would guess it was Ray
13 Mullens who would have handled the pro-Castro Cuban activities,
14 although I am not certain.

15 Cotter was probably the unit chief and would have been the
16 one through whom most of this material flowed, at least on its
17 way up the line, not the incoming material.

18 Mr. Wallach. Did you also have an extensive knowledge of
19 Cuban activities?

20 Mr. Wannall. I had a pretty good knowledge of it, yes,
21 as section chief.

22 Mr. Wallach. At any time, referring back to the New
23 Orleans Times-Picayune article where Castro, among other things
24 states we are prepared to fight and answer in kind. United
25 States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist

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1 plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not
2 be safe. And I stress the words "eliminate Cuban leaders."

3 Were you aware at that time that the CIA was meeting
4 with a high level Cuban official and plotting an attempt to
5 assassinate Fidel Castro?

6 Mr. Wannall. I have no recollection of being aware of that,
7 nor at any other time, to my knowledge.

8 Mr. Wallach. I take it that you also would not have been
9 aware that on November 22nd, 1963, that a poison pen was passed
10 to a high level Cuban official by the CIA.

11 Mr. Wannall. I read that in the paper recently, but I
12 was not aware of that at the time.

13 Mr. Wallach. Did you have the type of expertise with
14 respect to Castro that would lead you one way or the other
15 to be able to render an expert opinion as to whether or not
16 his granting an interview by an AP reporter at a particular
17 location, the Brazilian embassy, had any particular significance?

18 Mr. Wannall. I don't know that my expertise is very
19 extensive in that regard. However, I do recall his granting
20 interviews to a New York Times correspondent rather frequently
21 after his ascension to power. I think the Times correspondent's
22 name had the name Matthews in it. I don't recall whether that
23 was the name, the first name or the last name, but he did
24 grant interviews.

25 Mr. Wallach. One reason I asked the question is because

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1 shortly before this article came out -- well, that's all right,
2 you wouldn't have knowledge of it.

3 What do you recall, may I ask this, what you recall
4 happening at the Bureau on the day of the assassination of
5 President Kennedy on November 22nd, 1963, besides everyone
6 being upset and etc. What instructions do you recall being
7 given that you overheard, what instructions were given to you,
8 what meetings were held, that type of thing, that day and the
9 day after?

10 Mr. Wannall. Was that on a Friday do you recall?

11 Mr. Wallach. Yes.

12 I realize again -- and I will stress for the record -- we
13 are talking about obviously a time period some 13 years ago,
14 and I am only asking for the best of your recollection. I am
15 not trying to pin you down as to any facts.

16 Mr. Wannall. Well, the reason I asked the day of the week
17 is I have a recollection, we were probably in that weekend
18 working on file reviews information. I was also on duty the
19 day of the funeral, which was probably a Monday, because I
20 recall seeing the funeral procession pass the corner of the
21 building where I was working. So we were involved in reviewing
22 material, probably name checks, but what names they were I
23 cannot recall. But a good portion of the manpower was handling
24 that during the weekend and the day after that.

25 Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard the name Carlos Lechuga?

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1 Mr. Wannall. It strikes a note with me, but I don't know
2 in what context right away.

3 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether he was a suspected DCI
4 in the Cuban consulate in New York or the United Nations?

5 Mr. Wannall. It's possible. I can't remember. The name
6 does mean something to me, but I have difficulty dredging up
7 the background.

8 Mr. Wallach. What do you recall in terms of meetings and
9 strategy discussions as to how the investigation would go
10 forward? taking place, or were you involved in any?

11 Mr. Wannall. Which investigation?

12 Mr. Wallach. The investigation of the assassination of
13 President Kennedy.

14 Mr. Wannall. No, the investigation of the assassination
15 was not in the Division and I wasn't privy to any of the
16 discussions.

17 Mr. Wallach. Were you at any time tasked with any
18 requirements in that investigation or any people under you
19 tasked?

20 Mr. Wannall. I can't recall that we were, because even
21 the phases of it that spilled over into our Division were handled
22 in another section.

23 Mr. Wallach. Which section was that?

24 Mr. Wannall. That was the Espionage Section.

25 Mr. Wallach. Was that Branigan's section?

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1 Mr. Wannall. Yes.

2 Mr. Wallach. That had primarily to do with the Soviets,
3 is that not the case?

4 Mr. Wannall. Well, there was an Oswald aspect in the
5 assassination. You'd have to say that there were interests
6 overlapping because Branigan did have the Oswald case, and he
7 handled the Soviet aspects of it, yes.

8 Mr. Wallach. I understand that, but in Mr. Branigan's
9 section, in Mr. Branigan's shop, the persons there, their
10 area of expertise was the Soviets, is that correct?

11 Mr. Wannall. Right. We had in our section at that time
12 a case which had been opened about five or six months before,
13 perhaps more recently than that, on the Fair Play for Cuba
14 Committee which appeared to have been Oswald himself down in
15 New Orleans. So that aspect of it was handled by one of the
16 supervisors.

17 Mr. Wallach. What I'm asking, really, Mr. Wannall, is
18 whether at any time during the assassination investigation your
19 unit or your section, the section that was most familiar with
20 Cuba and Cuban matters within the FBI was ever tasked to conduct
21 certain aspects of the investigation, or certain operations or
22 tasked to go to certain informants during the course of the
23 investigation?

24 Mr. Wannall. I think we probably were. I feel we probably
25 were, but I cannot recall any specific guide when you mention

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1 it.

2 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anything else other than
3 pinning down details with respect to Oswald? I mean, do you
4 recall ever receiving instructions to conduct an investigation
5 to determine whether or not there was Cuban involvement in the
6 assassination of President Kennedy?

7 Mr. Wannall. I think we probably did, but what it was
8 I can't recall. Let me see if I can give you a few thoughts
9 on it.

10 (Pause)

11 Mr. Wannall. While I can't say specifically, it is quite
12 possible we may have been tasked to contact Cuban informants
13 because there were indications of a connection between Oswald
14 and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

15 Mr. Wallach. Let me read you a portion of a cablegram
16 from Mexico City dated 11/25/63, No. 182 and 183. It is from
17 Legat to the Director. It says "Ambassador here" -- and that's
18 Ambassador Mahan to Mexico -- "feels Soviets much too
19 sophisticated to participate in direction of assassination of
20 President by subject, but thinks Cubans stupid enough to have
21 participated in such direction, even to extent of hiring
22 subject. If this should be the case, it would appear likely
23 that contract would have been made with subject in U.S. and
24 purpose of his trip to Mexico was to set up getaway route.
25 Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban

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1 sources in U.S. in effort to confirm or refute this theory."

2 Now, beneath that is the notation "Not desirable. Would
3 serve to promote rumors." And that notation was by Mr. Cotter.

4 Do you recall whether or not the Bureau ever -- and I'm
5 not asking whether it was your belief -- do you recall whether
6 the Bureau ever went out and contacted its Cuban sources, either
7 in this respect or to see if there was Cuban involvement in the
8 assassination of President Kennedy?

9 Mr. Wannall. I can't recall that they did. When I
10 answered your question before, I said I couldn't recall if it
11 was done. It would be a normal step. That is why I used that
12 as an example. I can't recall that the sources were polled.

13 Mr. Wallach. Who, if that requirement had been levied,
14 who in your section would have handled? That would have had
15 to have been made through your section, would it not?

16 Mr. Wannall. Yes, I think we would have been given that
17 assignment by the agent who would have been coordinating the
18 investigation of the assassination. It would have come to the
19 section and gone back to the Cuban unit, possibly Cotter or
20 Owens or Cotter. Most of our informants were in the anti-Castro
21 field, and Nasca would have been most knowledgeable about that.

22 Mr. Wallach. Where is Mr. Mullens now? Is he still at
23 the Bureau?

24 Mr. Wannall. No, he passed away two years ago.

25 Mr. Wallach. Insofar as the other gentlemen you mentioned,

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1 your testimony is that they were never asked, and so far as
2 your recollection is, there was never any polling of Cuban sources.

3 Mr. Wannall. No, they would have the best knowledge of
4 it.

5 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall ever discussing with anyone
6 whether or not a separate investigation should be conducted
7 to determine whether or not there was Cuban involvement in the
8 assassination of President Kennedy?

9 Mr. Wannall. No, I don't recall any such discussions.

10 Mr. Wallach. Do you know why immediately after the
11 assassination of President Kennedy persons like Al Belmont and
12 Bill Sullivan never told you about the assassination plots that
13 CIA had been running against Castro?

14 Mr. Wannall. No, I don't know that.

15 Mr. Wallach. Were you at any time aware of any queries
16 to the CIA for them to conduct an investigation to determine
17 whether or not the Cubans had been involved in the assassination
18 of President Kennedy?

19 Mr. Wannall. Not that I can recall, and those probably
20 would have been handled over in the division handling the
21 assassination. Anytime you have a case of that importance,
22 it would take precedence over anything else.

23 Mr. Wallach. Well, the division that was actually handling
24 the assassination case was Al Rosen's division, the Criminal
25 Investigation Division. They did not, as I understand it, have

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1 expertise in security cases and counterintelligence matters, is
2 that correct?

3 Mr. Wannall. That is correct, but if they should make
4 a decision that there should be a polling of sources or a
5 contact with CIA, they would have handled that themselves. They
6 would probably have consulted with the agents on the desk if
7 they had any questions about it.

8 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall ever learning that anyone in
9 the Criminal Investigative Division had been told that the
10 United States had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro?

11 Mr. Wannall. I don't know.

12 I don't think I had any knowledge of that myself at the
13 time.

14 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Wannall, let me show you a letter to
15 Mr. Rankin from Mr. Hoover, Mr. Rankin being General Counsel of
16 the Warren Commission -- and I don't see a date on our copy
17 of this letter. There it is, June 11th, 1964, and it marks
18 you on distribution of the letter, and let me ask you if you
19 recall receiving that letter, a copy of that letter?

20 (The Witness reads the document.)

21 Mr. Wannall. This letter was prepared in my section, and
22 I am certain that I either saw the letter going out, or a copy
23 of the letter which was designated for me. I do not see that
24 I -- yes, my initials are on here as having approved the
25 outgoing letter.

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1 Mr. Johnston. Does that mean that you approved it prior
2 to its being sent?

3 Mr. Wannall. That's right.

4 Mr. Johnston. This letter deals with a Warren Commission
5 request on data on Fair Play for Cuba, an organization called
6 Jure, the DRE, Alpha 66, and the 30th of November movement.
7 All of those groups would have been within your jurisdiction.

8 Mr. Wannall. They were handled in the section I headed,
9 yes.

10 Mr. Johnston. Do you know who was the author of this
11 letter, who drafted it for Mr. Hoover?

12 Mr. Wannall. Well, I can tell from the initials, are they
13 not LLA?

14 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

15 Mr. Wannall. Lambert Anderson.

16 Mr. Johnston. He was --

17 Mr. Wannall. He was a supervisor who was handling as I
18 recall the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

19 Mr. Johnston. First of all, reading this letter, would you
20 have also seen the note on it?

21 Mr. Wannall. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And let me call your attention to one
sentence in the note which is, "The Commission is being referred
to CIA and the Department of the Army. CIA has or has had
an operational interest in the DRE, Jure, and the 30th of

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1 November Movement and/or individuals connected therewith, and
2 the Department of the Army has operational interest with
3 certain individuals in the SNFE.

4 Now, you previously testified this morning that you did
5 not know of the Army interest in Cuban groups.

6 Does this refresh your recollection about --

7 Mr. Wannall. Does that say an interest in the group? I'm
8 sure the Army had an interest in individuals because they were
9 training some of these people.

10 Mr. Johnston. I'm sorry, interest in certain individuals
11 connected with SNFE.

12 Mr. Wannall. I will have to say it doesn't do anything
13 for my recollection. I answered the question the best I
14 could. Having had that read to me by you doesn't give me the
15 benefit of any more material. It is obvious from that that the
16 Army did have an interest in the SNFE.

17 M Mr. Johnston. SNFE.

18 Mr. Wannall. I'm not even sure what that is.

19 Mr. Johnston. The Second National Front of Escambray.

20 Mr. Wannall. I've heard of that. Now, we probably had
21 something on it in the section.

22 Mr. Johnston. And indeed, this correspondence mentions
23 names of individuals as members of SNFE. In fact, those
24 individuals mentioned here were in Dallas, Texas. They were
25 residents of Dallas, Texas, and I ask you, given that fact, does

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1 that refresh your recollection as to interest your section may
2 have taken in this correspondence?

3 Mr. Wannall. In what context?

4 Mr. Johnston. In the context of, in connection with the
5 investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, the names
6 of these individuals in Dallas who were members of SNFE had
7 come out.

8 Mr. Wannall. No, it doesn't because this is a reply
9 to the Commission for information from our files. Now,
10 we, as I said before, I'm pretty sure we would have had a case
11 on the Second National Front of Escambray, Fair Play for Cuba
12 Committee and others mentioned in there which undoubtedly would
13 have preceded the investigation, per se. I don't have any
14 recollection of any specific person connected with that group
15 or any other whose identity came to our attention as a result
16 of the assassination.

17 Is that your question?

18 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

19 But I'm saying in this correspondence, these individuals
20 did come up in connection with the assassination investigation.

21 Mr. Wannall. It would seem so, and the Commission obviously
22 expressed an interest in them and asked us for what we had on
23 them.

24 Mr. Johnston. Let me also ask, attached to this letter
25 are 224 pages of reports from the field on these groups, and

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1 supporting the statements made in the letter. Again, all of
2 these deal with Cuban groups, either pro-oor anti-Castro groups,
3 and my question is, would you have reviewed these reports
4 prior to sending them to the Warren Commission?

5 Mr. Wannall. Not necessarily because the note on the
6 yellow indicates that the reports had been reviewed by Belmont
7 and Rosen, and Rosen's division had the case, and Belmont, of
8 course, was quite interested in the entire matter and was
9 coordinating it. And I knew that. I can't say yes or no. It
10 is unlikely that I did, simply because it had been reviewed on
11 a high level and a decision had been made they should get it.
12 That would be the only reason for my reviewing it, to make a
13 decision against its being furnished.

14 Mr. Johnston. You would not receive that correspondence and
15 be asked whether it was an accurate or fair portrayal of these
16 groups.

17 Mr. Wannall. No, because this correspondence would have
18 been the results of investigations we had conducted, regularly
19 submitted by investigative reports or by letterhead memos, and
20 there would be no need for me to review that and say this was
21 a fair portrayal of the investigation. It would be submitted
22 by the field, and then sometime prior to the date of this letter
23 would have been reviewed by a desk man, put in a file, and
24 possibly, almost assuredly, disseminated to various branches
25 within the Executive Department.

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1 Mr. Johnston. Okay. Let me just take your answer in
2 two parts. First of all, as far as these being regular reports
3 from the field, with regard to that, individuals whose names
4 came up in the Dallas area apparently were contacted by the
5 FBI specifically about the Kennedy assassination. I ask you as
6 to whether you would have reviewed the submissions from the
7 field to determine whether they were consistent with the FBI
8 view of those groups and possibly of those individuals.

9 Mr. Wannall. I would not have personally reviewed that.

10 Mr. Johnston. Would your section have done that?

11 Mr. Wannall. Possibly.

12 Mr. Johnston. Under your overall jurisdictional responsi-
13 bility.

14 Mr. Wannall. Normally if a division is handling something
15 and another division has an interest, the handling division
16 would take the responsibility for review, but would surely put
17 my name or the name of my section or 5 or the Division name
18 on it in order that the supervisor in our division would have
19 an opportunity to look it over.

20 Mr. Johnston. Do you interpret -- we do not have the
21 Warren Commission request, but do you interpret this response
22 to the Warren Commission -- I'm sorry .

23 (Pause)

24 Mr. Johnston. That references a May 20, 1964 letter from
25 the Warren Commission to Mr. Hoover, and let me read to you

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1 paragraph 3 of that letter, which is a request for a general
2 summary of activities of such groups, being the same groups
3 that we named, "outside of Texas during the year 1963 with
4 particular reference to activities in Chicago, Michigan,
5 Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Puerto
6 Rico and San Francisco."

7 In other words, the Commission is specifically requesting
8 the FBI to furnish information on these named groups and a
9 general summary of their activities during the year 1963, and
10 I ask you whether you would have been consulted as to whether
11 this response met the request, in your knowledge of Cuban groups.

12 Mr. Wannall. I will have to explain the possibility that
13 these -- in fact, it says, there is a list identifying 46
14 memoranda and 15 reports. Now, if the memoranda were typed
15 in my section, I would have reviewed the memoranda as the
16 function in connection with sending mail up the line. The
17 reports I would not have reviewed. I would not have been
18 personally consulted as to what should go in there, but I
19 would have the opportunity of anything that was actually typed
20 of looking it over, and chances are I did on those 46. But
21 you understand from what you have said there, this was a
22 request for information on these individuals and groups in
23 areas outside of Dallas.

24 Mr. Johnston. I'm sorry, I read only paragraph 3. Para-
25 graph 2 is a summary of activities throughout Texas.

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1 Mr. Wannall. Then we possibly would have had a single
2 memo on that. I don't know. I would have to see the enclosures
3 to try to give you the specifics.

4 Mr. Johnston. Well, the document in front of you is
5 the entire enclosures to the letter, that whole file folder.

6 Mr. Wannall. Well, let me -- may I take a look at it?
7 I'm talking about something and speculating.

8 Yes, in fact all of these are dated from May 27 up through
9 June 4. They were prepared, however, by our various offices.
10 They were apparently not prepared by our Division. I would
11 not have reviewed these.

12 Mr. Johnston. Would you have had anybody in your section
13 review these?

14 Mr. Wannall. Yes, they would have been reviewed by the
15 man who prepared this memorandum.

16 Mr. Johnston. Lambert Anderson?

17 Mr. Wannall. Yes. In fact, the mechanics would be this.
18 The request would come in from the Commission. Our supervisor
19 would have gotten the request. It could have come down through
20 me. And he obviously sent out to the Field Offices, conveyed
21 to them the nature of the request and asked for letterhead
22 memos responsive to it. These memos would have all gone back
23 to him. He would organize them, review them for typographical
24 errors, for substance, for contents, and attach them all to the
25 outgoing letter.

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1 I originally, as I said, would probably not have reviewed
2 them since they had been reviewed for approval by Messrs.
3 Belmont and Rosen.

4 Mr. Johnston. Then I guess what I'm asking ultimately is
5 do you know of any steps or of any procedures that were taken
6 to ensure that this information being provided to the Warren
7 Commission was in fact a true representation of the FBI holdings
8 on these groups?

9 Mr. Wannall. Well, I think the responsibility was fixed
10 on the field offices to furnish the information that they had
11 in their files. I don't know of any other procedures that could
12 have been invoked for that purpose, there being no reason for
13 taking any special precautions, in that regard, to my knowledge.

14 Mr. Johnston. Are you saying that headquarters of FBI
15 had no responsibility for assuring that the Warren Commission
16 got an accurate portrayal of these groups?

17 Mr. Wannall. No, I'm saying that the men who would have
18 reviewed them would have been knowledgeable of these organiza-
19 tions. Now, I can't say that Anderson was the expert on all
20 these organizations, but I see that he went through his
21 supervisor in charge, who was Ray Mullens, and he initialled
22 it as having been a fair rendition or a correct rendition of
23 what knowledge there was at headquarters on the thing. I would
24 have no reason to believe that this was just taken and put
25 together without someone having gone over it knowledgeably, and

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1 the fact that only Mullens' initials are on there doesn't
2 mean necessarily that somebody else didn't look them over,
3 For example, some of the groups would have been handled by
4 Nasca. It is quite possible, he was in the unit, he may
5 have looked over the -- the way to find out for sure would be
6 to look at the incoming communications by which these
7 letterhead memos were transmitted, and the initials on there
8 would show who actually reviewed it.

9 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask specifically in the case of
10 Tampa, Florida. There is a report on Tampa, Florida, Fair
11 Play for Cuba Committee activities. That report which originated
12 from the Miami office does not mention other activities of
13 Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Tampa which were in FBI files
14 at the time this report was prepared.

15 Who made the final decision as to whether to include or
16 exclude other information in the Bureau files?

17 Mr. Wannall. I don't know.

18 Mr. Johnston. Did you take steps to assure that somebody
19 made those decisions?

20 Mr. Wannall. I rather doubt it, since they were reviewed
21 by Mr. Belmont and Mr. Rosen, it was handled on a pretty high
22 level. I can't recall having had any specific discussions
23 on this particular piece of mail with anybody. I can't say
24 I didn't, but I don't remember any where I did.

25 Mr. Johnston. And if Mr. Belmont and Rosen wanted the

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1 advice of your section?

2 Mr. Wannall. Yes.

3 Mr. Johnston. Would they have bypassed you and gone
4 directly to your subordinates to get that advice?

5 Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Belmont had the prerogative of
6 talking with anyone he saw fit, yes.

7 Mr. Wallach. Where was Donale E. Moore? What was his
8 position at this time?, November of '63?

9 Mr. Wannall. Branch Chief@Inspector, Inspector-Branch
10 Chief.

11 Mr. Wallach. So he was below you?

12 Mr. Wannall. No, that's above.

13 Mr. Wallach. That's above you.

14 Mr. Wannall. Yes, he initialled this on the way up.
15 His initials are on here.

16 Mr. Wallach. He was number one man to the number two
17 man to the Inspector, whatever they call it?

18 Mr. Wannall. No, actually they didn't delineate between
19 the two branch chiefs at the time, the number one and number
20 two. He would have been responsible directly to the Assistant
21 Director.

22 Mr. Wallach. Which would have been whom, Sullivan?

23 Mr. Wannall. '64, that would have been Sullivan.

24 Mr. Wallach. All right. Let me again read to you from
25 a document that we haven't gotten a copy of, and August document

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1 in '64 which was written by Mr. Nasca. It states, "It is
2 noted at the request of Attorney General we are conducting
3 investigation of allegations that U.S. Hoodlum element and
4 Cuban exiles are involved in plan to assassinate Castro and
5 other Cuban leaders."

6 Now, stopping there, do you recall that investigation
7 or anything about that investigation in '64?

8 Mr. Wannall. I should because I would have been section
9 chief at the time and Nasca would have been working under
10 me, but I can't say that I can independently recall it.

11 Mr. Wallach. Do you ever recall any discussions about
12 "hoodlum element" being involved in plans to assassinate
13 Fidel Castro at all, up until '67?

14 Mr. Wannall. No, during this timeframe I cannot recall
15 any discussions.

16 Mr. Wallach. Continuing on in this document it says "We
17 are aware, in addition, that Attorney General reportedly
18 discussed this matter with White House, which reportedly
19 concurred with requested investigation. It is possible that
20 above-mentioned plan to assassinate Castro is identical with
21 one we have under investigation." The above-mentioned plan
22 was the use of the high level Cuban.

23 Now, Mr. Nasca obviously in 1964 knew about all this.

24 Do you recall knowing about it?

25 Mr. Wannall. Yes, now, yes, and you know, we had numerous

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1 investigations of alleged plans to assassinate Castro. The
2 hoodlum element aspect of it doesn't stick with me in my
3 memory, but it was probably one of several that we had.

4 Mr. Wallach. This is referring to above-mentioned plan
5 is the plan that he mentioned that CIA was using, AMLASH,
6 and I take it that in '64 we have him again, later in '64,
7 referencing it, and your best recollection is that you do not
8 recall ever being informed of it.

9 Mr. Wannall. I can't recall it. I can't say that I was
10 not.

11 Mr. Wallach. Aside from such requests as Mr. Johnston has
12 showed you, specific requests from the Warren Commission, were
13 you yourself personally involved in any aspects of the
14 investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

15 Mr. Wannall. Personally involved in the investigation?

16 Mr. Wallach. Right. Aside from possibly reviewing name
17 checks or anything like that.

18 Mr. Wannall. My personal involvement, of course, would
19 have had to have been supervision of something. This is what
20 you have reference to.

21 Mr. Wallach. Right. I realize you wouldn't have been out
22 in the field.

23 Mr. Wannall. You are reaching back so far, I would have
24 to honestly say I can't recall. I can't discount the possibility
25 that there was something, but I have no recollection of anything.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Do you ever recall generically or specifically
2 giving instructions that something be done in the Cuban area
3 to determine if there was Cuban involvement in the assassination
4 of President Kennedy?

5 Mr. Wannall. I can't call up anything of that nature.

6 Mr. Wallach. We know from the documentation that certain
7 senior Bureau officials were aware of the fact that the CIA
8 had been attempting to assassinate Fidel Castro. Additionally,
9 it would seem from the documents that we have reviewed over
10 there and requested further backup documentation on, that
11 certainly the same Bureau officials, and in '64 even Mr. Nasca,
12 were aware that the CIA was on the very day of the assassination
13 passing a poison pen. I don't know if he was aware in that
14 great detail, but they were aware that in November of '63 the
15 CIA was actively attempting to assassinate Fidel Castro.

16 Can you give me any explanation as to why this
17 information would not have been made available to you as the
18 person charged with responsibility in the Nationalities
19 Intelligence Section, and one of the persons who was most
20 familiar with Cuban activities?

21 Mr. Wannall. No, I can't give you any explanation. I
22 would say it should have been called to my attention and possibly
23 was, but I just can't recall if it was. It would be normal
24 for a man in the division in my section to have called
25 information of that nature to my attention.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Based upon -- accepting the fact right
2 now that I've told you about the CIA's efforts, and accepting
3 for a fact that it was learned that Castro was aware in detail
4 of each step in the CIA's plots against him, and, in fact, there
5 was some evidence developed, intelligence evidence that
6 indicated that he might have attempted some sort of retaliation,
7 be it absolutely not factual, not concrete -- I want to
8 stress that -- would you in any way, looking back, have directed
9 any different type of investigation, or would you have felt
10 that that type of an investigation could have been only con-
11 ducted by the CIA and have gone to them to ask them to conduct
12 the investigation?

13 I'm going -- what I'm getting at very frankly, Mr. Wannall
14 is that we have an investigation where a heck of a lot of
15 Bureau evidence, your agents did thousands of manhours of work
16 tracing down every possible piece of physical evidence, every
17 possible ramification in certain areas, whereas in the Cuban
18 area it seems very frankly that almost nothing was done, and
19 what I'm trying to get a grasp on, what the Senators are
20 concerned about, is why.

21 Really, I'm asking if you can shed any light on that at
22 all.

23 Mr. Wannall. You asked me if I had known about this
24 would I have directed something be done.

25 It's difficult sitting here now to tell you what was going

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1 through my mind at the time.

2 While you were talking, I do recall a situation -- I don't
3 know when I learned about it, where some hoodlums from
4 Chicago, I think it was, were allegedly going down to Florida,
5 possibly to Miami, and I think that was checked out and found
6 to be without foundation. So the hoodlum element did come in
7 to there. Whether there was an allegation they were going
8 down to assassinate Castro, I can't recall, and I think that
9 was handled on the Cuban desk. So there must have been an
10 allegation that would tie in with the Cubans.

11 To my knowledge, anything that seemed should be checked out
12 was checked out. As an example, everyone who had any connec-
13 tions whatsoever, either direct or indirectly with cases
14 which came to the attention of the Bureau as a result of the
15 assassination was interviewed, and during the course of that,
16 one of my men was asked why he didn't have Oswald on the
17 Security Index, and I made it very clear to him that in my
18 opinion if he thought he should have been on there, he should
19 have called it to the attention of the supervisor handling the
20 case.

21 So we weren't sitting in a removed area unconcerned. We
22 were trying to do whatever seemed logical.

23 Mr. Wallach. I don't mean to argue, and I don't mean to
24 try to look back with hindsight, and I realize that a lot of the
25 knowledge that I'm talking about you obviously did not have at

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1 that time period. But, for example, given the facts that
2 certain senior Bureau officials, including Allen Belmont and
3 William Sullivan knew, just be it the fact that the Mafia
4 was used because they had high level sources inside Cuba to
5 try to kill Fidel Castro, and the fact that Sullivan and
6 Belmont knew the names of those Mafia figures, and the fact
7 that these articles were at least called, these threats were
8 called to Sullivan's attention, and certainly the attention --
9 we can't speak to Mr. Belmont, he is ill -- an explanation as
10 to why, for example, the Bureau did not go out and talk to any
11 of these people or talk to the later, identified in '64, Cuban
12 personages who were involved in the CIA's attempts to
13 assassinate Castro, particularly because they did have access
14 to Castro -- one of them was a member of his entourage, immediate
15 entourage -- to determine if there was any Cuban involvement
16 in the assassination.

17 In other words, it appears to me as a layman that we
18 have this huge counterintelligence machinery that was never
19 called into play in the Cuban area, and what I'm trying to
20 make, and what we're trying to make here is a determination
21 as to why it wasn't called into play, and maybe at the time
22 there was no evidence that was called to your attention that
23 would lead you to believe that it should have been, but the
24 investigation that was conducted appears to have been sort of
25 a backtracking of Oswald, I mean, as to where he was, what he

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1 did, etc., and pinning that down, and almost -- I'm not saying
2 that he didn't kill the President, but almost proving that
3 fact rather than going out and pressing a button and conducting
4 a separate and independent investigation as best you could.

5 And maybe it wasn't possible to see if Cuba had actually
6 participated or attempted to assassinate the President of the
7 United States. That just doesn't appear to have been done
8 from the records, and while you say you have a belief that
9 some sources were contacted and other things were done in the
10 Cuban area, the records seem to belie that.

11 And I'm really asking, do you have any -- I would like
12 to have it for the record, any specific recollection of anything
13 like that being done.

14 Mr. Wannall. What I said was not that I had the belief
15 that the sources were contacted. I said that would have been
16 a normal thing to do, and you have a notation that consideration
17 was given, and obviously it was turned down.

18 Now, you have mentioned to me that the knowledge that
19 Belmont and Sullivan had --

20 Mr. Wallach. Well, you can see that for example -- and
21 we have other documents, but I just showed you the May 10,
22 '62 Hoover memorandum as one example to show you that they
23 were at least aware of that at that early date. There is
24 extensive documentation and followup that shows that they had
25 a continued awareness of it. Those Mafia "plots" terminated

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1 in early '63, and the other plots began taking place after
2 that, one of which we have referred to earlier.

3 Until recently we did not know that the Bureau was aware
4 of that plot. But some documents, which we don't have here
5 yet which I would be glad to show you if we had them, indicate
6 that the Bureau was aware of that plot and in all likelihood
7 it was aware of it in the fall of 1963 before the assassination.

8 Mr. Wannall. Was that the one out of Chicago that I have
9 a recollection of?

10 Mr. Wallach. No, this is the one of using the high level
11 Cuban to assassinate Castro, the CIA's -- I want to be careful
12 the CIA's using a high level Cuban official, and if that is in
13 fact the case, the Bureau could very easily have put together
14 what we have put together and seen that there are some very
15 coincidental remarks by Castro after meets with that agent,
16 and I'd rather not go into the whole thing here, but that
17 there would be some reason to believe -- I want to be clear
18 I have no evidence that in fact it was such the case, but
19 I'm just asking, based upon the information, I don't have an
20 understanding of why a separate button wasn't pushed. Even
21 in the Soviet area it appears that a lot more was done than
22 in the Cuban area.

23 And what I'm trying to get at, whether -- was there any
24 reason for that that you can recall.

25 Mr. Wannall. No, I can't. I don't -- my recollection is

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1 don't have knowledge of the information, and I don't have
2 knowledge of what other information was available that might have
3 explained some of the allegations that were made. Some of the
4 material could very well have gone to different desks. There
5 isn't necessarily one place where everything goes together,
6 although there is supposed to be a cross-routing of these things.

7 I can't give you any explanation as to why, if it was
8 not done, or there wasn't some reason for not doing it. You
9 said Belmont and Sullivan had knowledge of these things, but
10 I don't know whether they were also knowledgeable that something
11 hadn't been pursued and specifically resolved.

12 Mr. Wallach. Well, we have not seen that from the
13 documents.

14 Mr. Wannall. Well, I don't know either. I have to say
15 that there is a possibility of that.

16 Mr. Wallach. And the CIA has told us that they didn't
17 conduct the investigation because it was the FBI's job.

18 Mr. Wannall. Well, I am not too familiar with the
19 operations of the Commission, but it is my understanding at
20 least that the Commission itself got material and sent leads
21 to our Division 6 to pursue. Wasn't all of this, the CIA,
22 the FBI and any other aspects all funneled through the
23 Commission?

24 Mr. Wallach. Well, clearly in the evidence we have
25 developed, there is no evidence that the assassination plots

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1 against Fidel Castro ever reached the Commission.

2 They would make requests like Mr. Johnston showed you for
3 information on certain Cuban groups. They would be supplied
4 with documents which, in retrospect, when we look at the
5 documentation, appears not to be adequate, but it's not
6 purposely misleading, I want to be clear about that.

7 But Mr. Johnston knows more about the Cuban situation
8 than I do.

9 What was your understanding of -- or let me ask you this.
10 Did you in any way participate in a supervisory capacity in the
11 Bureau's investigation in Mexico City. You are aware that
12 Oswald had contact with the Cuban consulate down there about
13 some five and a half, six weeks before the assassination.

14 Mr. Wannall. I didn't participate in the supervision
15 of that.

16 Mr. Wallach. Were you at any time made aware of the
17 fact that -- I'm sorry, strike that.

18 Do you know what Department 13, Line V of the KGB is?

19 Mr. Wannall. My recollection is, it is the sabotage and
20 assassination section, is it not?

21 Mr. Wallach. Yes.

22 Were you at any time informed that one of the persons with
23 whom Oswald had contact at the Soviet embassy was their chief
24 man in that department?

25 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall hearing that. That was proba-

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1 pursued, if it was in our division, in the espionage section.

2 Mr. Wallach. Sure, I understand that. I'm asking
3 whether or not --

4 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall that, no.

5 Mr. Wallach. This is a memorandum dated 11/27/63 from
6 yourself to Sullivan -- I realize that someone else wrote it
7 here. I don't even know if your initials are on it.

8 My question really doesn't go to the substance of it
9 except for the fact that it appears that initially you were
10 somewhat tangentially, at least, involved in the Mexico City
11 investigation and then your name doesn't appear in any subsequent
12 correspondence or documentation. I was wondering if you recall
13 any reasons why that might have been the case.

14 (The Witness reads the document.)

15 Mr. Wannall. I probably saw a copy of this. I didn't
16 see the original. It would be unlikely that I didn't read the
17 tickler that would come in.

18 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time having discussions
19 as to what would happen if it was determined that there
20 was Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy,
21 or what would happen if the Bureau had missed something in its
22 handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination?

23 Mr. Wannall. What would happen if we had missed something
24 or if Cuba had been involved in the assassination?

25 Mr. Wallach. Yes. By way of background, the fact is made

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1 clear from Mr. Hoover's notations on the documents that clearly
2 show that the Bureau had been derelict in its handling of the
3 pre-assassination Oswald security case, most pointedly in the
4 fact that the investigation was not stepped up after Oswald
5 was in contact with certain foreign establishments in Mexico
6 City, but it also goes to other questions such as Security
7 Index, etc., and he stressed continually through his memorandums
8 the embarrassment that had been caused to the Bureau by this,
9 and in one memorandum to Mr. DeLoach, there was a possibility
10 of the fact that the Bureau was going to be blamed for the
11 death of President Kennedy.

12 Now, with that sort of background, and my very limited
13 knowledge of the Bureau, I was wondering if you recall any
14 discussions as to what would have happened if indeed the Bureau
15 had missed a very salient point about Oswald that was turned
16 up during the investigation.

17 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall any discussions of that nature.
18 I do know that Mr. Hoover was very upset with about a dozen
19 and a half men who had any connections with the cases that
20 had ramifications on the assassination investigation, and took
21 disciplinary action in several cases against the men. But that
22 had nothing to do with having missed a salient point. It had
23 to do with the handling of the Oswald case principally.

24 Mr. Wallach. Well, we have Mr. Gale's memorandums to
25 Mr. Tolson in which he talks about disciplinary action.

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1 I understand that the disciplinary action had nothing to
2 do with missing a salient point; it had really a failure to
3 follow up internally on Bureau procedures in terms of where
4 information was available, for example, putting Oswald on the
5 security index, when everyone who touched the Oswald case
6 felt he should not have been on the security index, and in
7 any event, under the then current dissemination procedures, it
8 is my understanding that that would not have led to the notifi-
9 cation of the Secret Service in any event.

10 Mr. Wannall. Not then.

11 Mr. Wallach. Right.

12 What I'm talking about is really whether or not the Bureau
13 had in its two interviews of Oswald after he returned from the
14 Soviet Union, or in not putting more emphasis on the Oswald
15 case, had missed, for example, a meet that he might have had
16 with a known KGB or DGI agent in New York City, or had missed
17 a lot of what happened in Mexico City while he was down there.
18 It seems the only evidence they have of what happened when
19 he was down there was from the tapes received from CIA and from
20 its follow-up investigation.

21 But what I'm saying is that since you had Oswald the subject
22 of a security case and Mr. Hoover having demonstrated his
23 dislike of having the Bureau embarrassed, whether there were
24 any discussions in the Bureau about what would happen if it
25 turned up that something had been missed, that the Bureau should

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1 have, during the course of the security investigation, known
2 about.

3 Mr. Wannall. Not to my knowledge.

4 Mr. Wallach. Were you yourself aware of any occasions
5 in which the Bureau misrepresented anything to the Warren
6 Commission?

7 Mr. Wannall. (Nods in the negative)

8 Mr. Wallach. Let me read you one example that is stated
9 in a memorandum and ask you if this was ever discussed with
10 you.

11 The Bureau by letter to the Commission indicated that
12 "the facts did not warrant placing a stop on Oswald's passport
13 as our investigatio disclosed no evidence that Oswald was
14 acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign
15 government or instrumentality thereof.

16 "Although it is proper at this time to take this public
17 position, it is felt that with Oswald's background, we should
18 have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did
19 not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence
20 assignments at that time."

21 So, in other words, we have internally senior Bureau
22 officials saying that while we took this public position and
23 represented this to the Warren Commission, I don't feel like
24 this, and this memorandum was signed off on by four or five
25 other senior Bureau officials.

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1 Now, do you recall that fact or any other facts like it
2 where the Bureau took a public position but really had another
3 position on how it should have handled the case?

4 Mr. Wannall. Well, I wouldn't have seen that memo because
5 I was probably written up in there for consideration of
6 administrative action. I don't have any knowledge of it. I
7 think you probably recognize from your extensive inquiries
8 into Bureau procedures and policies at the time Mr. Hoover was
9 there, it was the thing to do to tell him, well, this is the
10 public position that you're looking for in something, and this
11 is something that you can be criticized for.

12 Mr. Wallach. I just have a couple more questions.

13 Turning now to 1967, we have been informed by the Bureau
14 officially that the assassination case is still open, that it
15 has been open, and any significant leads, or any leads that
16 come in are still followed up.

17 Is that your understanding?

18 Mr. Wannall. I was not aware of that.

19 When were you informed of that, Mr. Wallach?

20 Mr. Wallach. Oh, at all times it has been my understanding
21 in fact, there is still an agent assigned to the case. His
22 name escapes me now. I remember he struck me as a very capable
23 young agent, and that the case is still open, the assassination
24 case itself.

25 Mr. Wannall. I was not aware of that.

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1 In any event, in February and March of 1967, what was your
2 position within the Bureau?

3 Mr. Wannall. Chief, I don't know if it was Latin
4 American or Nationalities Intelligence, but one of the two
5 sections, at which time Cuban matters were handled in that
6 section.

7 Mr. Wallach. Well, Bureau records I'm sure would reflect
8 which section you were chief of.

9 But within either section you would have had responsibility
10 for Cuban matters in 1967?

11 Mr. Wannall. It's my recollection they were returned to
12 the section, having been removed in May of '65, returned about
13 August of '66.

14 Mr. Wallach. Were you at any time -- well, let me read
15 you -- briefly go over a couple of documents with you.

16 By letter dated February 13, 1967, Mr. Rowley of the
17 Secret Service informed the Director that he had met with
18 Justice Warren, and that Justice Warren told him that Drew
19 Pearson's friend, Edward Pierpont Morgan, who was a former
20 Bureau agent, reported to him that Bobby Kennedy had organized
21 a group that went to Cuba to kill Castro, and that all the
22 group were killed or imprisoned, except one person who escaped,
23 and that subsequently Castro decided to utilize the same
24 procedure to kill President Kennedy.

25 In any event, Rowley came into the picture because Morgan

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was on the no contact list, which I'm sure you have heard of.

Mr. Wannall. I've heard about it, yes.

Mr. Wallach. And was reluctant to go to the Bureau. In any event, Mr. Morgan and Mr. Rowley never got together, for reasons that we have not yet been able to determine why Mr. Rowley did not get in contact with Mr. Morgan, and this letter of February 13, 1967, reported the facts to the Bureau essentially as I have stated them to you.

This is the Bureau's response some two days later to Mr. Rowley.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Wallach. Let me also ask you this. In the February 13, 1967 letter, which is just an incoming letter from Mr. Rowley, the Bureau stamped it Secret, and then it used this form of dissemination slip, and I ask you if you during your years at the Bureau have ever seen a slip that uses the term "eyes only" on it for internal Bureau memorandum where no information was provided by a third agent or a third agency file, or at any time, really.

Mr. Wannall. Eyes only was not normally used by the Bureau. I can't say it was never used in cases other than this, but normal procedure would not be to use that as an indication of the fact that this should be handled on a very confined basis.

Mr. Wallach. I'm sorry, your understanding of eyes only

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1 is what?

2 Mr. Wannall. That it is to go to the individual to whom
3 it is addressed, to be opened by him.

4 Now, we have used communications in double envelopes, to
5 be opened by addressee only, but even on the inside communication
6 we would not put eyes only.

7 Is that responsive to the question?

8 Mr. Wallach. Yes, it is. I mean, well, it would indicate
9 to you that it was a very sensitive matter of some sort?

10 Mr. Wannall. Well, from having received communications
11 with that legend on it from other agencies, I would assume it
12 to be a very sensitive matter, yes.

13 Mr. Wallach. Well, this eyes only was put on a routing
14 slip internally in the FBI, emanating from Mr. Hoover's office.

15 Do you ever at any time recall -- and I realize you've
16 seen thousands, in fact millions of documents, but do you ever
17 recall seeing an eyes only document emanating from Mr. Hoover's
18 office?

19 Mr. Wannall. I would say that there have been other docu-
20 ments of that nature, but very infrequently.

21 Mr. Wallach. Generally are they extremely sensitive
22 security matters or extremely sensitive matters?

23 Mr. Wannall. You're asking an opinion. I would say
24 in my opinion yes.

25 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall ever being informed of the

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1 Morgan allegation as relayed to Drew Pearson and Warren?

2 Mr. Wannall. Isn't that tied in with the same information
3 which was used as a basis for my letter?

4 Mr. Wallach. Well, I was going to ask you that, but I
5 mean, separately, independently, before we get to that, this
6 is in February. Your memorandum is a March memorandum that
7 we're talking about.

8 Mr. Wannall. Well, no, I didn't see this particular
9 information that came in, to my best recollection, and I don't
10 recall having heard the information prior to my preparation of
11 the letter.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you have any information as to why -- and
13 I now show you a memorandum dated February 15, 1967, from
14 Rosen to DeLoach, information relating to Cuba, possible
15 assassination attempts against Castro, retaliations by Cubans
16 against the President Kennedy would not have been referred to you,
17 to your unit?

18 Mr. Wannall. I can only say it looks as though it was
19 handled on a very discrete, limited basis, and that possibly
20 is the reason I didn't.

21 Mr. Wallach. Let me show you who else had knowledge of
22 it, of this February memo, February 13, '67.

23 (The Witness reads the document.)

24 Mr. Wannall. Well, DeLoach, of course, his position was
25 such that he would be knowledgeable. Rosen did have the

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1 assassination, which is the caption on this communication.

2 Mr. Wallach. Aside from Mr. Sullivan, was anyone else
3 involved in the Domestic Intelligence Division?

4 Mr. Wannall. I can't tell that anyone else was involved
5 from this. Wait a minute, yes, I can, Branigan's name is on
6 here, and there is a name, and I don't recognize what it is.
7 It starts with a W, but it's not initialled by me, at least
8 to the best of my being able to make this out. If you have
9 a clearer copy --

10 Mr. Wallach. No, that's it.

11 Mr. Wannall. It looks as though it was initialled for
12 someone whose name began with a W. Now, whether that is Wannal
13 I can't really say.

14 Mr. Wallach. Would it be Wick?

15 Mr. Wannall. It could be Wick. In fact, it looks more
16 as though it is Wick. It's a shorter name than Wannall would
17 be.

18 Mr. Wallach. Right.

19 Mr. Wannall. Well, Wick, of course, received a copy of
20 the communication itself.

21 Mr. Wallach. Well, this in essence rehashes it, but what
22 I would like to get some understanding of is internally
23 within the Bureau why this matter would have been referred for
24 response to the General Investigative Division or into
25 the Criminal Division, Mr. Rosen's division as compared to the

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as contrasted to the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Mr. Wannall. I think I earlier explained that an investigation of the importance of the Kennedy Assassination would take precedence over anything else, and the caption on the communication, as I recall, which you have there, is Assassination of Kennedy, and he was the one who was -- Rosen's division was the one where the investigation itself was being coordinated and handled. I don't think it was unusual that it went to Rosen.

Mr. Wallach. Well, do you recall anybody ever making inquiries of you as to whether or not this information that Morgan was alleging was true or not?

Mr. Wannall. I have no recollection of anybody making any such inquiries.

Mr. Wannall. Let me give you two memorandums dated March 6, and let you just review them along with an article that was written by Drew Pearson, the Washington MerryGoRound which appeared on I think it was March 6 or 7, I'm sorry, I'm not positive. Additionally, I don't believe it appeared in the Washington newspapers.

Let me just give you these three documents and ask you to take a look at them.

I think those are the ones that we reviewed when we were talking at your office, or the first two memorandums were.

(The Witness reads the documents.)

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1 Mr. Wannall. I think I have looked at all of these.

2 Mr. Wallach. Would you take a look at the Pearson article
3 just briefly, please.

4 (The witness reads the document.)

5 Mr. Wallach. I realize that might be difficult for you
6 to make out. I just want you to get the gist of it.

7 Mr. Wannall. All right. If you have questions that
8 I haven't covered, I'll refer to it.

9 Mr. Wallach. What I would like to get from you, Mr.
10 Wannall, on the record, is an explanation as to what precipitated
11 this March 6, 1967 memorandum.

12 Mr. Wannall. That is shown by a notation at the bottom
13 of the second page, I think, by Mr. DeLoach, the Attorney
14 General had requested this information.

15 Mr. Wallach. Is that Mr. DeLoach's handwriting, as best
16 as you can tell?

17 Mr. Wannall. Yes, I think it is, I think it is DeLoach's
18 handwriting.

19 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall DeLoach coming to you?

20 Mr. Wannall. No, the normal way for this to come down
21 would be through the Assistant Director, probably a call, and
22 then a call to me by the Assistant Director, or by Don Moore,
23 or by someone over me.

24 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall how it did come about?

25 Mr. Wannall. No, I don't. As a matter of fact, when I

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1 got to the note, I wondered myself why it came about. It says
2 pursuant to the request, so I have to rely on the note as being
3 a request from the AG which was conveyed to us.

4 Mr. Wallach. Were you ever told why the AG wanted the
5 information?

6 Mr. Wannall. No.

7 Mr. Wallach. I take it you were never told what precipi-
8 tated his request.

9 Mr. Wannall. No. As a matter of fact, the way that it is
10 worded in the first paragraph, in accordance with instructions,
11 would indicate that we just had instructions to gather this
12 stuff together, in communication with the AG, and this was put
13 on to explain to the Director or to remind the Director
14 Mr. Hoover why this communication had been put together.

15 Mr. Wallach. Now, the subject is Central Intelligence
16 Agency's intentions to send hoodlums to Cuba to assassinate
17 Castro.

18 Do you recall receiving any broader instructions than that
19 that the President, through the Attorney General, actually
20 wanted to know what if anything the Bureau had on U.S. attempts
21 to assassinate Castro?

22 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall any such.

23 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall your instructions as being
24 limited to the use of hoodlums to assassinate Castro, or you
25 really don't know.

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1 Mr. Wannall. It is very difficult for me to recall the
2 specific instruction. I can only draw conclusions from what is
3 in the memorandum.

4 Mr. Wallach. What I'm getting at is from the recent
5 documents we've seen but have not yet received, and all of
6 which we have not yet seen there appears extensive documentation
7 in Bureau files that the Bureau had knowledge of other CIA
8 attempts to assassinate Castro than those that made use of the
9 Mafia, and I wonder if you recall any discussions at this time
10 as to just limiting this request to the Mafia.

11 Mr. Wannall. I don't recall any discussions of that
12 nature.

13 Mr. Wallach. Can you recount for us as best you can what you
14 did in order to respond to this request?

15 Mr. Wannall. Well, I signed it out to one of the
16 supervisors who prepared the communication.

17 Mr. Wallach. GCM?

18 Mr. Wannall. Yes.

19 Mr. Wallach. Whose name is what?

20 Mr. Wannall. George C. Mohr.

21 Mr. Wallach. Now, do you know how he went about preparing
22 the communication, just from reviewing files?

23 Mr. Wannall. That would be the only means that he would
24 have of doing it.

25 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if Mr. Nasca was involved in the

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1 preparation?

2 It is my understanding, and I can't remember who explained
3 it to me, that this took place over a weekend. The Attorney
4 General requested it on a Friday and over the weekend there
5 were Bureau agents within your section reviewing files all
6 weekend.

7 Mr. Wannall. That information was passed on to me by
8 Nasca. He recalled it, before I retired. That may be where
9 it originated.

10 Mr. Wallach. Was there a reason why there was nothing
11 included in this memorandum about the fact that a suggestion
12 was made in Belmont's presence by some general that the Mafia --
13 I'm sorry, I think you didn't know if it was the Mafia.

14 Mr. Wannall. No, I did not.

15 Mr. Wallach. Well, I withdraw the question then.

16 Was there any discussion in your section amongst the people
17 who, including yourself, about whether or not the CIA attempts
18 to assassinate Castro using the Mafia were related in any way
19 to the assassination of President Kennedy?

20 Mr. Wannall. I can't recall any such discussions.

21 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any connection at all between
22 or any mention now of whether or not Morgan's statements and
23 inquiries precipitated this review?

24 Does that ring a bell together? Do you recall Morgan
25 said certain people in the underworld?

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Mr. Wannall. No, I really, while I cannot tell you positively, I am fairly convinced in my mind that we would not have known the basis for the Attorney General's request. It is possible, it looks as though DeLoach may have gotten the request from the Attorney General since he put the notation on it, but we would have had instructions to compile the information and get it out.

I think had we known that, we would put right in the first paragraph, based on the Attorney General's indication the President was interested in this, or something of this nature.

Mr. Wallach. Let me just give you a little scenario of what happened after this memorandum was prepared, and I take it, disseminated on or about March 6, 1967. On March 17, 1967, according to a memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, DeLoach was instructed through Marvin Watson that the Bureau had to interview Edward Morgan.

Mr. Wannall. He was instructed by Marvin Watson?

Mr. Wallach. The Bureau had no inclination on its own to interview Mr. Morgan, and no one has been able to tell us why.

In any event, Mr. Watson indicated that the President wanted Mr. Morgan interviewed. He was subsequently interviewed by two agents from the Washington field office. The whole process was run out of Mr. Rosen's division, none of which persons had any knowledge of the validity of the claims that the

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1 U.S. Government had used Mafia figures in an attempt to kill
2 Fidel Castro. Mr. Morgan was interviewed on March 21, 1967,
3 and stated, among other things, that his clients were underworld
4 figures. It was a matter of public record at that time that
5 he was representing Maheu and Rosselli. It goes on to say,
6 Mr. Morgan further explained that his clients -- he had noted
7 that he, Morgan, was employed by more than one of those involved --
8 obtained this information concerning Castro's dispatch of these
9 assassins from feedback furnished by sources in place close to
10 Castro who had been initially placed there in effecting the
11 purpose of the original project.

12 Now, going back, the feedback that he went on to say was
13 that -- well, he went on to say that his clients were involved
14 in the project that had as its purpose the assassination of
15 Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the
16 infiltration of the Cuban government, placing informants in
17 key posts within Cuba.

18 The project almost reached fruition when Castro became
19 aware of it and arrested a number of suspects. By pressuring
20 captured suspects, he was able to learn fully of the plots
21 against him, and decided, "if that was the way President Kennedy
22 wanted it, he too would engage in the same tactics." Castro
23 thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched
24 to the U.S. for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy.

25 And then it went on to say that Morgan further explained

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1 that his clients obtained this information concerning Castro's
2 dispatch of the assassins from "feedback" furnished by sources
3 in place close to Castro who had been initially placed there
4 in effecting the purpose of the original project, i.e., the
5 U.S. Government's attempts against Fidel Castro.

6 So at that point you have Morgan making an allegation
7 that Castro retaliated, making an allegation that there were
8 high level sources in the Cuban government, around Castro, who
9 were placed there by government agencies, and that they had
10 gotten feedback that Castro had sent out teams to retaliate
11 in kind against President Kennedy.

12 He even stated in the interview that his clients were
13 aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to
14 the United States for this purpose, and they understood that
15 two such individuals were now living in the State of New Jersey
16 and then he went on to say he knew where in New Jersey they
17 were living.

18 The Bureau did absolutely nothing with this information.
19 It was never followed up, and it was passed on to the President
20 and to the Attorney General. So I'm not saying that the President
21 or the Attorney General did nothing with the information also.

22 Was this ever made known to you, I mean these facts in
23 1967? At least Morgan's allegations ever made known to you?

24 Mr. Wannall. I saw Morgan's allegations during the
25 course of the collection of this material, I think, by Cassidy.

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Mr. Wallach. Jack Cassidy?

Mr. Wannall. Fred Cassidy.

Mr. Wallach. I think I met him in your office that day.

Mr. Wannall. That's right.

I don't recall having seen it at that time. In transmitting it to the President or the AG, was there any indication that we would do nothing more unless requested, or do you know? I ask that because normally that is what the Bureau would do. We were responding to a request of an official in the White House to conduct an interview.

Mr. Wallach. Mrs. Stiegal, who was the President's secretary, enclosed information which I believe would be of interest to Mr. Watson, information containing enclosure which is revealed on page 4, has been furnished by CIA on a strictly highly confidential, need to know basis. That is information that was added on to the Morgan interview saying yes, indeed, we know there were assassination plots against Castro.

In view of this, it was requested that it be handled on a most restricted basis. This information has also been furnished to the Attorney General and the U.S. Secret Service.

After taken away from the classified enclosure, this document becomes unclassified.

So, in answer to your question, no, and the letter to Rowley and the Attorney General, no, and from what we looked at in the Department of Justice files, it apparently went to

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1 Mr. Yeagley, and there was no followup on that.

2 I don't know why, but in any event, what I was asking was
3 whether -- I take it from your answer that you in 1967 were
4 never made aware of the Morgan allegations at all.

5 Mr. Wannall. I cannot recall that I was.

6 Mr. Wallach. Well, I don't think I have any further
7 questions. I thank you very much for being fully cooperative.
8 I realize that in some of these questions it's been 12 to 15
9 years, and I understand that. It is, of course, a given. I
10 sometimes can't remember two or three months back.

11 And I think you have been most cooperative with us throughout
12 the course of our Committee.

13 Mr. Wannall. Well, at the time we had the Fair Play for
14 Cuba Committee case in the section, it was one of 2700, and
15 if you interviewed me on the others, I would have the same
16 difficulty, but I have done the best I can in trying to
17 remember this for you.

18 Mr. Wallach. Thank you very much.

19 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the interview in the
20 above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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W. Raymond Wannell

Page 8 line 24: Mumpelling began releasing

Page 10 line 5: -- on someone that I have heard about before

Page 12 line 23: this by word of mouth from Danahoe. It is possible if the

Page 15 line 13: I think was April of '61, the Cuban missile crisis, which was

Page 19 line 3: contact with ^{any} CIA officers during that period, nor on

Page 21 line 21: accomplished was that the anti-Castro Cubans at that time were in

Page 25 line 15: our sources normally by symbol number and the names are kept

Page 31 line 4: were conducting them against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee here,

Page 31 line 12: Mr Wannell. Oh, I think so. We would send a communication

W. Raymond Wannell

Page 37 line 25: were, but I cannot recall any specific aspect when you mention

Page 39 line 20: ^{Hasea} Mullins or ~~father~~. Most of our informants were in the anti-Castro

Page 39 line 22: misspelling - Mullins

Page 49 line 21: misspelling - Ray Mullins

Page 50 line 1: misspelling - Mullins

Page 50 line 8: would show who actually renewed them.

Page 59 line 25: Mr Wannall. No, I can't. I don't -- it is my recollection I

Page 60 line 11: had been pursued and specifically resolved.

Page 74 line 12: stuff together, in a communication in the AG, and this was put

Page 75 line 20: Mr Wannall. George C. Moore

W. Raymond Wannall