INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

INTERVIEW WITH: Congo Chief of Station

REGARDING: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo.

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 20, 1975 - 12:30-3:30 p.m. - Room 608, Carroll Arms

PRESENT: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):

EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES  X  NO
MEMORANDUM

TO: Files
FROM: Frederick Baron
DATE: August 20, 1975
SUBJECT: Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo

Staff Members Present: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron

The following is a summary of the contents of an interview conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961) in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo. The interview was conducted from 12:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. today in Room 608 of the Carroll Arms Hotel.

At the request of the Chief of Station (COS), we agreed to take his testimony under alias. He will be referred to hereinafter as "COS".

COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERS

COS said that he arrived in the Congo as Chief of Station in early July (probably the 10th or 11th) 1960. COS said that before he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Tweedy (Chief, Africa Division) about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Soon after arriving in the Congo, COS was asked to return to Headquarters in late July for briefings. He said there was no talk of assassination at those meetings, either.
After his return to the Congo, probably in early September, COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words, "someone I would recognize would appear to give me instructions for a mission I would carry out." Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb arrived in the Congo to meet with COS. COS recognized Gottlieb from the Technical Services Division at the CIA, and it was made clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable.

Gottlieb and COS met in COS's new apartment. COS dated this meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early September, 1960. COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal biological agents had been developed for the assassination of Lumumba. COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus and probably two other lethal biological agents with him in his bag. But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived shortly thereafter. COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber gloves, a gauze mask, and probably a hypodermic syringe -- equipment for administering the poisonous substances. The poisonous substances were to be injected into food, drink, toothpaste, or anything else that Lumumba might ingest. COS did not remember the appearance of the biological agents themselves, but he did recall that there were approximately three different types of lethal substances provided to him.

COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb's assignment to him of the assassination of Lumumba. COS said that he was a junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to "pin down" the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had never
heard of anything like this." COS's best recollection was that he had the following interchange with Sidney Gottlieb:

COS: Where did this brilliant idea come from?
Gottlieb: The top.
COS: Who at the top?
Gottlieb: The Director has instructions from President Eisenhower.

COS said that he could not recall the exact language of the interchange, although this was his best recollection. He said Gottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way to remove Lumumba from the scene. He said that when Gottlieb explained the source of authorization for the assassination plot, he made it clear that the President was the source. COS said it was possible that Gottlieb used a euphemism, but it was more likely that he mentioned either "President Eisenhower" or "the President." In response to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the import of Gottlieb's instruction to him, COS said that Gottlieb told him something to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highest authority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can." COS said that Gottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place by means of the biological agents he was supplying.

COS said that this was not an exploration of the possibility of assassination or the establishment of a mere capability for assassination. "They were serious about it . . . it was clear that the policy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made." COS said
he was not awaiting any further "go signal" in order to proceed with the assassination operation.

COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connection with the United States if the biological agents were to be employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project. COS said that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the assassination, Gottlieb made it clear that "I was to do it or find a way to do it."

COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would lose their potency. Gottlieb said this would happen over a long period of time. COS said that he did not remember exactly what the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his bag, and this would not be surprising because "in those days there were no customs checks in the Congo."

COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which only he had access. He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime later -- probably after the arrest or death of Lumumba -- to dispose of it by burying it near the Congo River. COS said that he had no training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons. COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces. Gottlieb told him that it left the traces of a normal disease.

COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the poison. COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb, "I don't
think I agreed to use it." Although he also said that he did not tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it.

COS said that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance for the assassination of Lumumba had come from the President and the DCI, he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment of such magnitude. COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a double-talk message, saying that I had met the messenger and requesting confirmation. I then received a cable containing double-talk confirmation, something like 'your assumption confirmed.'"

COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables. They also said 'Director' and I sent my cables with a special slug. My cables were probably marked to 'Director' which is never actually seen by the DCI. COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy. COS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields. He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with Dr. Lester Houck because Houck was removed as Branch Chief in early fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance.

COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad idea, both morally and practically." However, COS said that he may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was so taken aback at receiving the assignment. COS thought that he told Gottlieb that he did not have a good means of access to Lumumba.
COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in the context of his (COS's) feeling: "Thank God I never had to use it."

COS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell as a source of authority or approval for the assassination operation. COS does not recall that anyone other than the President and the DCI were indicated as the source of authority for the assassination operation.

O'DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGO

COS recalled the fact that Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960. COS said that O'Donnell "came to eliminate Lumumba." COS did not recall whether O'Donnell recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell.

COS said that, in anticipating O'Donnell's arrival, he had the impression that O'Donnell was coming to aid in the removal of Lumumba. COS said, "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was dragging my feet and that I might be relieved."

COS said he did not remember discussing his meeting with Sidney Gottlieb with O'Donnell but he simply does not have a specific recollection. COS said he would not dispute O'Donnell's testimony that COS had made O'Donnell aware that a poison virus was in his safe. COS said that assassination was "not excluded" as one of the means of removing Lumumba that O'Donnell might use. But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was included as one of O'Donnell's tools. COS said that he may have discussed
with O'Donnell a plan to snatch Lumumba from "protective custody." But he does not specifically remember this.

COS said that "O'Donnell did not seem to do anything most of the time, and I didn't take him very seriously. He spent a lot of time drinking." COS said that he was not aware of any action O'Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" of Lumumba.

COS said that the assassination plan had struck him from the beginning as a bad idea, so he moved slowly on it. "I showed some action to Headquarters by sending cables, but never pushed it."

COS said that he asked O'Donnell to clear with him any major actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that O'Donnell was in the Congo from September until approximately Christmas.

**LUMUMBA's ESCAPE**

COS said that Lumumba's escape from "protective custody" was a surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do with it, although they investigated the incident.

COS said "I was in touch with many official Congolese about where Lumumba was and how he got out. But I did not get much good information. It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville. The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the Congolese."

COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect that Lumumba might start an uprising against 'white devils.' But
when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured. I learned from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in Thysville.

COS MEETS WITH BISSELL, TWEEDY, AND KARAMESINES IN ROME

In November 1960, while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines (then Chief of Station ______) for a briefing session on events in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. COS remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's escape and of the situation in the Congo, but he does not recall any specific discussion of assassination. He said, "Perhaps we did discuss assassination, I simply don't recall. I was tired. I had flown all day. And I wasn't in favor of assassination."

BRONSON TWEEDY

COS assumed that Tweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination plan. However, he does not recall specifically discussing the plan with Tweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in possession of the poison. COS said, "I did talk with Bronson Tweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank God nothing was ever done.'"

COS did not remember whether Tweedy came to the Congo before Lumumba's death. COS thought that he must have come later. COS said, however, that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would have asked Tweedy about the assassination mission.
COS INFORMS DCI SCHLESINGER OF ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that in response to Schlesinger's request for reports on "questionable activities" within the Agency, COS met with him. COS said that he informed Schlesinger verbally that he had received instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba. COS said that he did not mention a poison virus to Schlesinger. COS said that Schlesinger did not make a response to this information. COS was unaware of any follow-up that was taken due to his briefing of Schlesinger.

OTHERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that he assumed that TWEEDY, BISSELL, and DULLES were witting of the assassination plan. COS said that he did have occasion to see ALLEN DULLES from time to time, but he does not remember discussing assassination in any form with DULLES.

COS said, "I might have mentioned the assassination plan to COLBY when he became Director." However, COS does not have any specific recollection of a conversation with COLBY.

COS does not think he informed RICHARD HELMS of the assassination plan.

COS said that he was never interviewed by the INSPECTOR GENERAL in 1967 in the preparation of the IG Report on Assassinations.

COS said that he never discussed the assassination plan with ARNOLD SILVER.

PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND AGENT QJWIN

COS said he never discussed the assassination plan with William Harvey (the Director of Project ZRRIFLE). COS said he never discussed assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey.
COS did not recall agent QJWIN. He did recall that O'Donnell may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him. He said, however, that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the Congo in the fall of 1960, he must have known of QJWIN's activities.

**WIROGUE**

COS does not remember the true name of agent WIROGUE nor why or how he came to the Congo. When his recollection was refreshed by seeing cable traffic, COS said that WIROGUE was a difficult man to handle. For a short time, WIROGUE became a major in the Congolese Army. COS said that he had wanted ROGUE to pull together a surveillance team. COS did not recall discussing WIROGUE with O'Donnell.

COS's only specific recollection is of being in WIROGUE's apartment and discussing an assassination squad. COS does not think that he mentioned the use of QJWIN in connection with this "execution squad." COS said that it was conceivable that he had approached WIROGUE with the idea of using him against Lumumba. But COS remembers he came to mistrust WIROGUE and felt that WIROGUE did not know what he was doing. COS also said it was unlikely that he would have sent the cable about WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN in ordinary CIA channels as he did if he thought this related to the actual assassination mission. Instead, it was merely evidence that WIROGUE was out of control.

**MOVING LUMUMBA TO KATANGA**

COS recalled that troops in Thysville mutinied while Lumumba was being held there. COS was in contact with various Congolese
officials and discovered that Casavubu and Mobutu had decided to fly to Thysville to put down the mutiny. COS attempted to convince them not to go together. They did succeed in putting down the mutiny.

COS did not learn that Lumumba was to be moved to Katanga until after it happened. COS said his discussions with Mobutu about Mobutu's intentions for Lumumba left COS with the impression that Lumumba might be executed.

COS said that [REDACTED] was the Acting Base Chief in Elizabethville, and was succeeded by David Whipple, who became Base Chief in Katanga. COS also said that Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake worked closely with COS, but they never discussed with him the general question of assassination.

**TESTIMONY UNDER ALIAS**

At the outset of the interview, the Committee staff agreed to honor COS's request to testify under alias. COS, who is still in private enterprise in Zaire, said he would be in personal danger there if he were linked to this story. He said, "They might make me take the big high jump. I've been on the 'zap list' before."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state:

From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter's absence from Washington.

Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12 Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accordingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Committee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations.

During this entire period I have no recollection of any discussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.

Dated this 2/ day of May, 1975.

C. Douglas Dillon

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2/ day of May 1975.

Notary Public
District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM

TO: William C. Miller
Fritz Schwarz
Curt Smothers
Bill Bader
Burt Wides
Rhett Dawson

FROM: Frederick Baron

RE: Douglas Dillon Interview

DATE: August 28, 1975

I spoke today by phone with Douglas Dillon, who was on vacation in Maine, concerning a paragraph in an affidavit he supplied to the Rockefeller Commission on May 21, 1975. The paragraph records Dillon's recollection that

"On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone."

I explored the subject of this meeting generally with Mr. Dillon on the phone and set an appointment for him to review documents and testify on Tuesday, September 2, at 3:00 p.m. in Room G 308.

On the phone Dillon gave the following background information on the meeting at the Pentagon:

1. This was not a small meeting; eight or ten people attended. He did not think it was a meeting of a small body. He said it was not a Special Group meeting or NSC meeting. But he was clear that
was a high-level meeting due to the participants.

2. He believes the participants included the Secretary of

Defense because Dillon's recollection is firm on the fact that

meeting took place in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Dillon did not remember whether Allen Dulles attended the meeting,

he said "top CIA people were present". Dillon said Richard

Wise was probably present. Dillon does not recall a man named

Johnson, nor does he recall whether such a man was present

the meeting, but he said that we might be able to refresh his

ollection by giving him more background on Robert Johnson.

did not mention on the phone the nature of Robert Johnson's

imony before the Committee; I simply asked if Johnson was

ent at the meeting."

3. The mention of the subject of assassinating Lumumba was

in the general context, Dillon said, of Lumumba's visit to

United States, which had "convinced us that Lumumba was

ephatic, not in a well-balanced mental state. After his

at we wondered whether there was any way of changing the scenery

the Congo." Dillon said the subject was raised in the general

text of "eliminating Lumumba", but the discussion did not

eed as far as mentioning means to be used.

4. Dillon said that the response of the "CIA representative"

ot necessarily a moral objection to assassination but was

in the sense of indicating that the CIA did not have that

capacity".

Dillon did not recall who the CIA representative was who

the remark.
September 23, 1975.

Dear Mr. Dawson:

I enclose herewith Mr. Dillon's signed and notarized affidavit.

Sincerely yours,

Dorothy de Borchgrave

Mr. Rhett Dawson
Senate Select Committee
Room G-308
New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
State of New York  
County of [illegible]

C. Douglas Dillon, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have read the attached statement consisting of two pages prepared by Rhett Dawson, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 15, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

[Signature]
C. Douglas Dillon

Sworn to before me this 13th day of September, 1975.

[Signature]
Notary Public

CECILIA A. VERDON  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 31-4075135  
Qualified in New York County  
Commission Expires March 30, 1977
STATEMENTS BY C. DOUGLAS DILLON
TO RHETT DAWSON ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1975

I, C. Douglas Dillon, do wish to make the following statement.

1. On September 15, 1975 I was shown by Rhett Dawson, Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, what he represented to me to be documents of the National Security Council of the below dates:

   Exhibit 1. Minutes of the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council held in the Cabinet Room of The White House on Friday, July 5, 1960, 9:00-11:00 a.m. (Approved by the President on July 19, 1960)

   Exhibit 2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 452nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, July 21, 1960

   Exhibit 3. Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960

   Exhibit 4. Minutes of the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council held in the Cabinet Room of The White House on Thursday, August 18, 1960, 9:00-11:00 a.m. (Approved by the President on August 24, 1960)

   Exhibit 5. Minutes of the 458th Meeting of the National Security Council held in the Cabinet Room of The White House on Wednesday, September 7, 1960, 2:30-4:30 p.m. (Approved by the President on September 13, 1960)

   Exhibit 6. Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 21, 1960
2. The documents shown to me do not in any way refresh my recollection beyond the statements contained therein as to events related to the Congo in the summer and early fall of 1960. I still do not have an independent recollection of any specific conversation regarding the assassination of Patrice Lumumba other than that described in my affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission and in my testimony before the Select Committee on September 2.

3. I was informed by Mr. Dawson that Mr. Robert Johnson has testified that he recollected a statement by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting which he construed as being an order for the assassination of Lumumba. After seeing the documents listed above I am of the opinion that it is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson. Although the record shows that I was present at that meeting I have no personal recollection of any such statement or order by the President.

4. I note that as to the Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960 (reference C, above) a page or pages immediately before the second page of the exhibit seem to be missing.

5. It is my understanding that the six exhibits noted above, will be appended to this affidavit for filing by the Select Committee.

Prepared by me on this 23rd day of September, 1975.

Rhett Dawson,
Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
MEMORANDUM

To: The Files
From: Frederick D. Baron
Date: September 5, 1975
Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.

I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.

Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.

I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting (at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassinating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely to have attended such a meeting.

Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination

Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even on anyone's mind," he said.

Pentagon Meeting

Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but he has no recollection of it.

Special Group Meetings

Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during that period. Douglas said that Irwin was "more actively in contact with the State Department and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing law in New York.)

Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.
Memo to Files
September 5, 1975
Page Two

I read to him a quote from the Special Group minutes of September 8, 1960. Douglas was in attendance at this meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped that CIA people were "fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."
Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the discussion to which it related.

Note:

I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter. Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September 29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).

cc:  Rhett Dawson
     Burt Wides
     Fritz Schwarz
     Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm
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cc: Rhett Dawson
    Burt Wides
    Fritz Schwarz
    Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 31, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
11 October 1975

Mr. John N. Irwin II
Patterson, Belknap and Webb
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Thank you for sending the rewritten version of your affidavit. All of the changes you have made are perfectly satisfactory and accurately reflect my understanding of the statements you made on September 22.

I am enclosing the statement with my signature so that you may proceed to sign and swear to it.

Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, it would be appreciated if you will not retain a copy of the affidavit. A copy will remain on file at the Committee and accessible to you at any time.

I look forward to receiving the sworn statement. Once again many thanks for your cooperation and careful attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN II

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Administration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. My current business address is c/o Patterson, Balknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020.

1. On September 22, 1975 in my office I reviewed with Mr. Baron the following documents in an attempt to refresh my recollection on discussions that took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC Meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. These documents indicate that I attended all of these meetings except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, which Mr. Hadyn Williams of ISA attended. I also reviewed the affidavit of C. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960.

2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize.
I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to the United States Government during the entire course of my government service. I do not recall ever hearing of the CIA adopting any assassination plan, nor do I recall ever hearing the President make a statement that could be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.

3. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group Meeting of August 25, 1960 is sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of assassination:

   It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

4. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960 is sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of assassination:
Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.

However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the substance of the NSC Meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have any recollection of such a report, nor do I have any other recollection of learning by another source of any of the substance of the discussion at that meeting.

6. It is possible that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. However, I do not remember if I were at this particular meeting; nor do I remember attending any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.

7. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion it would be improper for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake an assassination operation without an express directive from the President.

Prepared by me on this 9th day of October, 1975

[Signature]

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
SEL COM
File: ____________________________

September 23, 1975

Mr. John N. Irwin II
Patterson, Bellknap & Webb
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I prepared as a result of our recent discussion.

Please feel free to make any additions or corrections in the statement. It would be appreciated if you would mail a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon as possible.

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel

Enclosure

FDB/do

cc: Rhet D鲛son
Fritz Schnee
STATEMENTS OF JOHN H. IRWIN II
TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Administration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense. My current business address is c/o Patterson, Bellknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York.

1. On September 22, 1975 in my law office I reviewed the following documents to refresh my recollection on discussions that took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. As indicated in these documents, I attended all of these meetings except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, where I was represented by Mr. Hadyn Williams. I also reviewed the affidavit of C. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960.

2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize. I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to the United States government during the entire course of my
government service. I do not recall whether I ever heard of the CIA adopting any assassination plan; nor do I recall whether I ever heard the President make a statement that could be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.

3. It is my opinion as a former member of the Special Group and as a participant in the meeting of August 25, 1960 that the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination:

It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

4. It is my opinion as a frequent participant in NSC meetings and as a participant in the meeting of September 21, 1960, that the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination:

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.

However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the substance of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have
any recollection of such a report nor do I have any other recollection of learning by another source of any of the substance of the discussion at that meeting.

6. It is likely that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. However, I do not remember if I was at this particular meeting; nor do I remember whether I was present at any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.

7. It is my general opinion that it would be improper for the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an assassination operation without an express directive from the President.

Prepared by me on this 22nd day of September, 1975.

Frederick D. Baron,
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities
JOHN N. IRWIN II, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
I have read the attached statement consisting of three pages
prepared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him
on September 5, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-
ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

John N. Irwin II

Sworn to before me this
day of September, 1975.

Notary Public
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH ROBERT JOHNSON

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF LUMumba

PARTICIPANTS: MR. JOHNSON AND MR. WILLIAM G. MILLER

DATE: JUNE 10, 1975

Mr. Robert Johnson who is now at the Overseas Development Council for the summer, telephone 234-8701, was a member of the National Security Council staff working on Asian affairs in the last two years of the Eisenhower Administration and the first year of the Kennedy Administration. He said that on occasion, when people were on vacation, he was assigned the task of taking notes at NSC meetings. In July or August of 1960, Mr. Johnson had the task of note taking. After a review of world events, by Director of CIA Dulles, which included a description of Mr. Lumumba's activities in Africa, Eisenhower turned to Dulles during the meeting in the full hearing of all those in attendance, and said something to the effect that Lumumba should be eliminated. According to Mr. Johnson, there was a stunned silence for about 15 seconds and the meeting continued. He said he wrote the notes and that if they still exist, they are probably in the Eisenhower Presidential papers. He said that notes generally in presidential papers, official documents of the NSC, remain with the NSC. He said that the impression at the time was one of great shock. He said he had heard of nothing like that since. He said it was uncharacteristic of Eisenhower to speak of anything of substance during NSC meetings, reserving judgment to private meetings. He does not remember exactly who was at the meeting beyond Herter and Dulles, and possibly James Lay, Gordon Gray and Robert Mcory.
I asked if he would be willing to say this under sworn testimony. He said that having gone this far he would, but he cautioned that 15 years had passed and he could not vouch for the exact wording, although his memory of the impact of the meeting is firm.

Mr. Johnson called one hour after the meeting saying that upon reflection, he would prefer not to testify if at all possible unless it was absolutely essential. He fears retribution, saying that such testimonies in the past have blackballed people who were interested in working for the government. Again, he cited people who had testified for the right cause such as the Dodd case. He said he would testify if it were deemed to be absolutely necessary but he did want to raise this question.
MEMORANDUM

To: The Files
From: Frederick D. Baron
Date: September 5, 1975
Re: Interview with Robert Johnson regarding the Lumumba Case.

I interviewed Robert Johnson by phone this afternoon to supplement the earlier interview (June 10, 1975) and examination (June 18, 1975) that the Committee conducted with him. At the beginning of the conversation I explained there were a number of questions raised by his interview and examination that needed to be answered on the record. Because it was inconvenient for him to make a trip to Washington in the near future and because of the limited amount of additional information he was able to provide, we agreed that I would memorialize the important points of our interview in the form of an affidavit to which Mr. Johnson would swear.

The following points are related as faithfully as possible in the manner in which Mr. Johnson made them:

1. I never heard of a CIA plot assassinate Lumumba with lethal biological substances.

2. To the best of my recollection, President Eisenhower turned toward Allen Dulles when he made the statement relating to Lumumba about which I have testified.

3. After the meeting at which I heard the statement by President Eisenhower which I described in my testimony on June 18, 1975, I must have consulted James Lay (Executive Secretary of the NSC) for advice on how to treat the President's statement in my memorandum of the meeting. Mr. Lay was meticulous about including in the record some form of reference to every major subject that was discussed at NSC meetings. So we probably included the President's statement in some form, but in what form I do not know. In general, these memoranda would be as complete as we could make them. Nevertheless, on something as sensitive as this, we may have decided to handle it with euphemism.

4. The NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 is probably not the meeting at which I heard the President's
statement in reference to Lumumba. Based on Mr. Baron's representation that I am not listed (either by name or position) among the participants in the memorandum of record, I am convinced that I heard the President's statement at a different meeting.

5. After hearing Mr. Baron read portions of the minutes of the NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 to me, I do have a recollection of some of the subject matter that was discussed at that meeting. This would not be unusual, however, because as a member of the NSC Planning Board I received a debriefing on the subject matter of each NSC meeting. I do not, however, have a recollection of the statement by Mr. Dulles as related in the minutes of the meeting: "Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."
I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged.

5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and
revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes.

According to my recollection at this time, there was no fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance. Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circulated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly controlled distribution.

Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975:

[Signature]
Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities
State of Virginia } } SS:
County of } }

JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have read the attached statement consisting of two pages prepared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

James Lay

Sworn to before me this 26th. day of September, 1975.

Henry B. Pettit
Notary Public

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 20, 1977
September 23, 1975

Mr. James Lay  
Route 2, Box 273-A  
Stanley, Virginia 22851

Dear Mr. Lay:

Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I prepared as a result of our recent discussion.

Please feel free to make any additions or corrections in the statement. It would be appreciated if you would mail a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon as possible.

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron  
Special Assistant to the  
Chief Counsel

Enclosure  

bcc: Rhett Dawson  
Fritz Schwarz

FDB/do
STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged.

5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and
revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes.

According to my recollection at this time, there was no fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance. Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circulated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly controlled distribution.

Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975.

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have read the attached statement consisting of two pages prepared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

________________________
James Lay

Sworn to before me this day of September, 1975.

________________________
Notary Public
September 9, 1975

Dear Mr. Baron:

I received your draft statement today. I'm afraid that it is difficult to record telephone statements in the way that the speaker used. Therefore I am enclosing a rewrite in which I have tried to clarify and in some cases correct my statements without undue modification. I hope that this will prove satisfactory to you.

I apologize for any handwritten transcription but we don't have our good stationery here in the mountains as we do at our Falls Church home.

I am also returning your draft statement.

Sincerely,

James D. Hoy, Jr.
Statements by James S. Lay
To Frederick D. Baran on September 8, 1975

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official record of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a
remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged.

5. In 1965 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marion Boggs, who usually took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at the NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the
NSC minutes.

After having been read to me the following portion of the memorandum of the NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960, I still do not recollect the substance of the discussion that took place at that meeting:

(Quotation)
I am a current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. My current address is c/o Review Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia.

1. In 1960, I was employed by the CIA and one of my responsibilities in the course of my employment was to serve as the case officer at Headquarters for an agent who operated under the cryptonym "WIROGUE." I read most of the cable traffic relating to WIROGUE until the point of the termination of his relationship with the Agency.

2. To the best of my knowledge, I participated in all training that WIROGUE received in preparation for his assignment to the Congo in 1960.

3. WIROGUE was not trained in medical immunization in my presence. I am not aware that he was provided with any such training.

4. I have no knowledge of any CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. I have no knowledge that WIROGUE was ever connected to a plot to assassinate Lumumba, nor have I heard any hint or suggestion of such a connection.

5. I hereby affirm that "Robert Marana" is an alias which is registered at the CIA along with my true identity. My true signature is affixed to this affidavit. The Senate Select
Committee will receive a copy of this affidavit from which my true signature will be deleted. This statement will remain on file at the CIA and will be available for verification purposes for not less than five years.

Frederick D. Baron, Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

From: Gregory Treverton

August 29, 1975

Subject: Kennedy Library Tape Recording of March 13, 1963
National Security Council Meeting

On this date, I listened to a portion of the tape
of the March 13, 1963 meeting of the National Security
Council (President present). I listened to it several
times in order to check it against the Library transcrip-
t of that meeting.

The relevant portion of the statement by John McCon reads as follows:

"With respect to Cuba, the thinking in the Agency is... we have to first get rid of the Soviets'... troops, and
as stated ((several words garbled)) and use every resource we
have available -- political, diplomatic, otherwise -- to accom-
plish that. Once that is done, then we believe that the
monolithic structure of the Castro regime can be broken up.
Maybe we'll have to catalyze it a little bit. But we think
that there are enough indicators of distress within the
military and within his political organization so that
once the Soviets are out some... military coup can be...
will be brought about which will remove the Castro
government, and with a strong possibility of replacing
that government with a government more favorable to our
interests in the Western Hemisphere. Now, this is...
there's a lot of ifs connected with that, but it seems
to use, after having thought about this a good deal, that
some such action as that is a more probably course of
action that would be successful than to try to out... to
envisage an uprising on the part of the population in the
absence of the military... With the military and security
forces on behalf of Castro, they can very easily frustrate
and defeat any civilian uprising. I think, as time goes
on, that our principal problem is going to be dealing
with the future of Cuba and the future of Latin America.
I think the problems of the Bay of Pigs and the October
incident and the missiles will disappear, and more and
more attention is going to be brought on the part of the
people on the Hill... is going to be... is how we're going
to dispose of this problem."

Then the President speaks.
The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, September 2, 1975
Washington, D.C.

(Wstenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
(202) 544-6000
Testimony

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C. Douglas Dillon

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TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE SESSION

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Tuesday, September 2, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock
p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart
presiding.

Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson,
Professional Staff Members.

---

Mr. Baron. Would you state your name and address for the
record, please?

Mr. Dillon. My name is C. Douglas Dillon. And my address
is Far Hills, New Jersey.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, we have a few formalities that we
must go through with every witness.

I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have
the right to counsel here today?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am aware.
Mr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering questions at any point to seek advice of counsel?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me.

Mr. Baron. And are you voluntarily appearing here today without counsel?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have all of your constitutional rights intact here before the Committee, including your Fifth Amendment rights?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad to know that.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, could you please give the Committee a general idea of your position in the Government from, say, late 1959 until March of 1961?

Mr. Dillon. In late 1959 I was Under Secretary of State, which was the number two position in the State Department. And I continued in that position until 1961.

My duties as such were two-fold. One was the position as the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting Secretary in his absence from time to time, in which capacity I had to be fully aware at all times of more or less everything that was in the ken of the State Department, so I could fill in for the Secretary of State as necessary. And in those days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time, because there were travels abroad, and various reasons. I think I mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting Secretary at least a third of the time during that period.
My other duty, which was a more particular duty, was to be in charge of the economic side of our foreign policy, which included economic areas of the State Department, and also included oversight and general direction of the ICA, which was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency. And I had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the Foreign Aid Program, and for getting the legislation passed each year, for not the detailed operation, there was a director of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And also a military program, which was not under the ICA, but which was run through the Defense Department, and I was the senior State Department official involved in that area.

So I had those two different functions. And for that reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been prior to that. Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the Under Secretary had always handled that. Mr. Herter, who was my immediate predecessor, handled it, and Mr. Hoover before.

When I became Under Secretary I became so under a new law that had been passed in 1953, at which time I was promoted to Deputy Under Secretary to the new position, which was called Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, which was the number three job in the Department. That legislation provided that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, as I was, or an Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the economic area, which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first appointed as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, but then when I became Under Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities.

So The number three fellow was named Under Secretary for Political Affairs. It was Mr. Murphy first, and then Mr. Merchant. And they handled in each case all the details of the Special Group.

Mr. Barron. And the liaison with the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. And the liaison with the CIA. That was not handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political Affairs. On the other hand, when things were really important, I was notified, because I had to know about them if an emergency came up while the Secretary was out of town. But that was not my particular problem.

Mr. Barron. So you would be kept notified of major developments in the Special Group by Mr. Murphy or Mr. Merchant?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, major developments.

And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionally on meetings that I presume were on that. But they all dealt
with economic assistance to the various political groups in
different countries when they needed help.

Mr. Barron. Did you attend National Security meetings
regularly?

Mr. Dillon. I attended National Security meetings quite
regularly whenever I was in town, either in --

(Off the record discussion)

Senator Hart. Mr. Dillon, do you swear that the testimony
you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Dillon. I do.

Senator Hart. Just for the record, you also understand
that all of the testimony you have given will be covered by
the oath?

Mr. Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised you of your
constitutional rights?

Mr. Dillon. They have.

Mr. Barron. Would you read back the witness' last answer?

(The witness' last answer was read.)

Mr. Dillon. Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of
State if the Secretary was out of town, or as one of the
Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had
overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and
economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it was
important that I be fully aware of everything that went on at National Security meetings. And they took place as you know, at that time on a regular basis every Thursday, I think it was morning.

Mr. Baron. And where did they take place?

Mr. Dillon. In the Capitol Room at the White House.

Mr. Baron. Were you in a position as Under Secretary of State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a foreign leader or a foreign government?

Mr. Dillon. I think if there were any such things I would assume that I would have been aware of them.

Mr. Baron. Would you have also have been aware of any communications or orders running from the President to the Director of Central Intelligence?

Mr. Dillon. Only if they had been given in my presence and I had heard of them. I wouldn't necessarily be aware of them otherwise. If the President had wanted the State Department to be aware of it, -- and they usually did, there was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Special Assistant and would keep everybody notified. But that wouldn't necessarily mean that we knew of every particular thing.

Mr. Baron. In what manner were you made aware of major CIA covert activities?

Mr. Dillon. I think if they were major they were all
discussed at one time or another in the National Security
Council, or they at least knew about them at that time, because
the major activity that was just getting underway at that time
was very much aware of the development of the capability to
move against Cuba.

Mr. Baron. And what was the nature of your awareness of
that development?

Mr. Dillon. We discussed it quite frequently. And it was
the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban
exiles, and the development of plans for their use. They were
rather general in nature, but of which I was aware of in some
detail. But at that time we all knew that those plans would
not be ready and the capability wouldn't be ready until
sometime next year. So if a decision was to be made to use
them, it would have come in the following Administration.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of any CIA
plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Dillon. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. Did you hear any discussion of that subject?

Mr. Dillon. None whatsoever. I was aware of the presence
of Mr. Dillon. So although you were aware of CIA covert
activities against the Cuban régime, you were completely
unaware of any assassination effort against Castro?

Mr. Dillon. The major activity was the building up of
this capacity among the Cuban exiles, or supposed capacity,
to invade Cuba and cause a change in regime.

Mr. Baron. Turning back to your position in the
Government, isn't it true that shortly before the change of
Administrations you resigned from the State Department in
contemplation of resuming Government service in the Kennedy
Administration as Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

I might as well explain that in some detail, because it
was an unusual situation.

That fall, I think it was in October, just prior to the
election in early October, due to some mishap in London, the
Bank of England failed to support the price of gold at a
given moment, and it shot up from the support price of $35 an
ounce to maybe $49 or $50. And there was great perturbation
in the financial markets over this, the first time that it
had happened since the thirties when the price had been set.
And there began to be an outflow of gold from the US at the
rate of over a $100 million a week, which seemed very big in
those days. And it was very disturbing.

That continued through the election. And if anything, it
intensified after the election.

During the election, of course, as a member of the
Republic Administration while the State Department was not
involved in the election campaign, it was specifically exempt
from having anything to do with it -- I was obviously a
supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election at that time. Nevertheless, about two or three weeks after the election, about three weeks after the election, I received a telephone call one day in my office from Pierre Salinger, whom I did not know. And he told me on the telephon that Senator Kennedy -- whom I knew slightly, because he was on the Foreign Relations Committee -- would like to come and see me that night.

And I said, that was very foolish. I am at his disposal, I will go see him.

He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants to come to see you.

And I said, very good. I will be home all night.

So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 o'clock. And he told me that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and the lack of confidence in the financial stability of the US and the world. And he wanted to rectify this. And nobody trusted him because the campaign had been made on the basis that he was going to disrupt everything, and didn't have anything about finances.

And so what he wanted was to appoint someone whom he thought would carry weight around the world, and yet who was sympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving. And he had read some speeches I had made at one time or another in my economic capacity with the State Department which
pretty much paralleled his thinking. And I had been quite contrary to Vice President Nixon's campaign on that issue where he talked about growthmanship and the path to push our growth. And I mentioned, I believe, in the Rockefeller Report that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year if we wanted to produce and not have unemployment, and so forth.

And I had seen Kennedy's economic speech which he made in Philadelphia at the end of October, and I thought it was just great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to it. And I don't think he had ever given it, but it had been released, he had been there and made a speech and said some of it. And it was very carefully prepared, and was quite dull and dry as a result. It was written largely or suggested largely, I found out later, by Professor Samuels, who was the Dean of all economists at that time. And I couldn't find anything wrong with that.

And he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn't doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he thought it was absolutely essential to safeguard the currency and all that.

Well, this came as a great surprise to me. I had made all my plans to go back home.

To make a long story short, I talked to various people,
including Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury. And he said I should do this. And quite a few people did. And also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did do this he would work with me, and I would be his top economic advisor, and if there were any differences in economic advice that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was serious enough to lead to a parting of the ways. And one commitment that he wanted from me was that if there was that it would not be a silent parting of the ways. And that was a very easy thing for me to agree to.

And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed, at which I had been a leading negotiator, early in December I had a call from him when I got back that morning saying that he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do this if I would agree.

So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator Kennedy -- which he didn't like very much. And I saw him. And we talked about certain financial things that might be a problem, which I told him about, which they turned out not to be.

And he then right away, that morning, much to my surprise, went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and took me out there with Robert Kennedy, whom I had never met before.
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 21, 1960

Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce (Items 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett) (Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import Bank of Washington (Items 1 and 2); and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Packard for the Department of State; Mr. Knight McMahon, Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM
   (NSC Action No. 2050; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC 6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August 9 and 29, and September 19, 1960)

   Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

   At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects for petroleum production in Libya. He had been told that the Libyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He asked
untile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary of the Treasury.

That rather limited my capacity in the State Department. But I did continue for two or three more weeks to wind things up and make a proper turnover.

And then I resigned from the State Department in January and continued that preparation for the new job.

And that is how that happened.

Mr. Baron. So you left the State Department -- you said earlier to me on January 2nd or 3rd? or did it -- sometime in the first four or five or six days. And after that one thing I ought to make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles had probably dominated President Eisenhower in some aspects, which I don't think was an accurate description of what happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time. So he wanted to take over this very much himself. And so he put in some new people there.

And we came to be very close, and worked very well together. And I had the greatest admiration for him.

He never at that time or later ever asked me anything about my experience at the State Department or any foreign policy
thing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all.

Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan?

Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me. And I think I might have been of some help to him if he had, because I had been aware of it right up through January, and in particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at the time, that there was always an ultimate background in the use of our naval air if those people got in trouble. And I don't think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy. And that was too bad. And when it was made clear to him he reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this much about it.

Senator Hart. Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings, did you have contact with the CIA in any other capacity on a routine basis?

Mr. Dillon. No, not on a routine basis.

Senator Hart. Occasional basis?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. Because, for instance, I went back -- when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions, for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department, or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor, he was then a colonel, at the White House. So I did in that capacity a couple of times, as Acting Secretary, have to clear
those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so from time to time there were those more or less informal contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and they needed something from the State Department.

Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of questions by the Staff on this sequence, but we may want to get some questions on your experience during the US situation on the Doctrine of "Plausible Deniability".

Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal to say about.

Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially.

Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for advice on your State Department experience.

Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive Committee. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay of Pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he called me in right at the beginning, and I had a very active role in this period.

Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo
affairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. No, nor any other foreign policy, except as it fell under the monetary area, with one exception. And this was economic entirely. That is, the President, because of my past experience in the handling of this matter, asked me, more or less as a favor, because he didn't believe the Treasury should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the US effort or set up the Alliance for Progress. And there was going to be a meeting down in Uruguay, Puntal del Este. And so I did do that. And that was the only foreign policy job I did. And that was economic in nature.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now a copy of your affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other things a meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the Congo was discussed. First, let me ask you if that is a true copy of your affidavit?

Mr. Dillon. It so appears.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall this meeting where, as you have affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of
operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone."

Do you recall this meeting now?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I recall just what I said there. And I think probably should expand on that a little bit, because in looking at it it is not as clear as I would like it to be.

When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not necessarily limited to -- or it might have been CIA personnel. It also included encouraging one of the many factions that might not like him there to take action on their own, with CIA encouragement.

Senator Hart. What kind of encouragement, material support, financial support?

Mr. Dillon. That, or moral support, if they did the US would recognize them if they became the head, and would help them.

Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can recall of the passage of weapons?

Mr. Dillon. No, no detail like that. This was very brief, very general, and just turned off by the CIA people at that time.

Mr. Baron. So this mention of assassination could have included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, yes.
Mr. Baron. And it was a more general reference --

Mr. Dillon. It was a very general way of getting somewhere. In one of those other papers something was said about getting rid of Lumumba. That was really more or less the objective, not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but just to get him out of the Congo and away.

Mr. Baron. Your obvious impression that the suggestion contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. As a possibility.

Mr. Baron. And let's fill in some of the context of the meeting. Do you recall where this meeting took place?

Mr. Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other day I called Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense at that time, and who was a friend of mine then, and has continued to be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particular meeting. And he says he did not. But I do think it took place in his office. And I don't recall whether he was there or not. It could be that he wasn't even there. But I think it was in his own office that it took place.

Mr. Baron. When we spoke before you said that you thought he probably was in attendance. Is that still your feeling?

Mr. Dillon. Well, because it was in his office. I don't
remember him being there or saying anything. All I remember is the location, and the fact that the subject came up, and the fact that there were a number of people there -- I don't remember who they were -- and the fact that the CIA people, whoever they were, were negative to any such action.

Mr. Baron. About how many people were in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. I would say five or six, because I saw them sitting around the desk, I would say five or six, or it could have been seven or eight, no more.

Mr. Baron. Was this the meeting of any official body?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. It was not a not-taking note-taking type of meeting. It was not sitting around the table with somebody as the Chairman.

Senator Hart. It was ad hoc, in other words?

Mr. Dillon. It was ad hoc.

Senator Hart. Would you be able to characterize the nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement, violent, casual?

Mr. Dillon. No. It was just more or less silent, and "there is nothing we can do." It wasn't moral.

Senator Hart. There was no policy objection?

Mr. Dillon. It wasn't stated in that way. It was just saying, no, it is not a possible thing.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned on the phone to me that rather than a moral objection, as you have just said, it might have

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been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have the capability to perform such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. It could have been, it may have been just something that they couldn't do, and therefore there is no use talking about it.

Mr. Dawson. The subject matter of the meeting was probably something which the Secretary of Defense had a leading role in designing a policy for, right?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall the details of what was happening at that time in the Congo. But I do have a basic recollection that over this period of time it was a pretty difficult situation, with UN forces in there, and all sorts of troubles down in the southeastern part where the copper mines were, and trying to get people out so they wouldn't get killed. There was always contingency planning, whether we would have to use any of our forces for another evacuation or something else. So it was a very mixed up and sort of a hot situation at that time.

So certainly various people in the Defense Department would be interested. Mr. Gates, when I spoke to him, said that he personally had not given primary attention at any time to the Congo. He said it might have been Jim Douglas, who, as I mentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of those meetings. And I don't recall exactly what his title was at that time, but he had been, I think, Secretary of the Air
Force, and maybe still was at that time.

Mr. Baron. Was it a regular occurrence to convene such meetings at the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. We had a very close relationship between the State Department and the Pentagon at that time. And it was not unusual, because of the fact that generally there would be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present, and they were both over there, and if for any reason it seemed reasonable, we would do that. Now, usually I think the man who was responsible would be this number three person in the State Department, he would go to the Pentagon for many of the meetings, the briefings and things like that which would be in the area of the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. He was there a great deal. I wasn't there in my capacity.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea why you were in attendance at this particular meeting?

Mr. Dillon. It might also have had something to do with the thing that I was talking with them about all the time, a totally different subject, which was military aid. That could well have been.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Not by name.

On the telephone you asked me about Bissell, whether he might have been there. And I answered, in all probability he might have, because I knew him, in fact I have known him for
many years, all my life. But when I was down here at that time
I knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in charge
of all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetings,
there, or even at the White House. He was an advisor to Mr.
Dulles. So I say that is very likely.

Mr. Baron. By this sort of stuff would you mean covert
actions?

Mr. Dillon. Covert actions or anything that was important
enough in that general field to involve Mr. Dulles, The CIA,
the President. He was a person there, one of the people that
was talked to about it. There were three people. There were
really at that time Allen Dulles, General Cabell, and Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that this was
a high level meeting -- a sufficiently high level meeting so
that Allen Dulles might have been in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. He could have been.

Mr. Baron. And are there any other people who would have
been likely candidates to have been in attendance at the
meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I imagine there must have been some repre-
sentative of the military there. But I don't know who it would
have been. But there must have been someone else if the
Secretary of Defense was there. Now, Erwin, since he didn't
allow these things, he might have been there. That is just
supposition.
Mr. Baron. And I believe you had said to me before that despite your absence of a clear recollection as to which CIA people were there, it was clear to you that some top level CIA people were there?

Mr. Dillon. Top enough, so that something like this could be raised and more or less disposed of without even thinking of it any further.

Senator Hart. Let me insert a question, if I might. This is a philosophical question.

First of all, factually, in any of the dealings, formal or informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, did the subject of assassination ever arise?

Mr. Dillon. As far as I know, as I recall, in dealing directly with either of them, no.

Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think the Committee would be interested in your view as to the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say, the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders?

Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way, most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence
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rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle. That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy of the US, generally both of them were very much opposed to it.

Senator Hart. Off the record just a second.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at the Pentagon, I wonder if you could fill in the nature of the discussion that was taking place on the Congo before this prospect of assassination was raised at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recallly recall it, except that it was bemoaning the general presence of Lumumba and the difficulty of working anything out with him, or the impossibility of working anything out with him, and the exploration of other possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Did you date this meeting by any particular event which took place?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. I dated it only because it must have taken place after, and presumably shortly after, Lumumba's visit to Washington, because the impression that was left was that it was very bad, that this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time. I don't think it would have possibly have occurred before he
came. We hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to
better understanding with him.

Mr. Baron. Why did he strike you as being impossible to
deal with in any way?

Mr. Dillon. Well, what I really recall was the impression
he made rather than the individual things he said. When he was
in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the
Secretary in my presence, he spoke in a manner that seemed
almost messianic in quality. And he would never look you in
the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of
words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very
fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the
particular things that we wanted to discuss. And it was just
like ships passing in the night. You had a feeling that he
was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only
characterize as messianic. And he was just not a rational
being.

Mr. Baron. When we talked earlier I believe you
characterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that
right?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. So that after he departed from the US you
and others at a high level in the State Department were,
extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position
in the Congo?
Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall who raised the question or the prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I don't. It very likely could have come from somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly from the Defense Department in the international affairs areas, someone just throwing out this question. Now, I said the State Department. There was probably someone there besides myself. Because it wasn't usual to just be alone talking about this.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether this was raised as a question or as a suggestion?

Mr. Dillon. No, as a question.

Mr. Baron. And who was the CIA representative that you mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that this was not within the capability of the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. That I don't recall. But I imagine it would have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly Cabell, but I think most likely Cabell.

Mr. Baron. We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960. Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of this conversation? It would be shortly after Lumumba's visit.

Mr. Dillon. Shortly after his visit. And that must have been it. And the record that you had must have been the
record of the meeting that I attended that I referred to earlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit were supplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after his visit. So they looked up when his visit was, and that is why they put this in. All I recall of the place and date is that when I saw him off at the airport it was very hot. So it must have been the summer, July or August.

Mr. Baron. Let me fill you in on a few other events that were happening from mid to late July, and ask you if this refreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency that might have existed at a meeting such as the one you attended in reference to getting rid of Lumumba. It appears that on the 12th of July the US had sent a carrier, the Wasp, to the Congo, although we had refrained from sending troops to the Congo. Then on the 20th of July Ambassador Lodge indicated that it was the US position that the UN would be urged to do everything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo.

Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-year contract with CINCO, a large American resources company. But that contract was disavowed by the finance minister of the Congo the following day, on the 26th of July -- I am sorry, it was disavowed on the 26th of July, which wasn't the following day. And it was in that setting that Lumumba then came to Washington.

While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herter pledged aid to the Congo. And Mr. Detweiler, who was the
Head of the CIMCO Company that had this huge contract in the Congo, met with people at the State Department to discuss the situation as to whether the contract was going to be performed or not in the Congo.

Do you recall any of that background? And does that refresh your recollection about the urgency of the situation at that time?

Mr. Dillon. No. The only thing I recall is that there were -- which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informal conversations -- that there were talks at the time about the possibility of using US military force in one way or another -- I think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits right in with that sort of general recollection, that it was something that we were very worried about. And I don't remember this particular contract with this company. In fact, I don't think I have ever heard of CIMCO.

Mr. Baron. Did you have an independent recollection of the ordering of the Wasp to the Congo -- or to the shores of Africa?

Mr. Dillon. Not of that one particular thing. But I do remember that there was consideration of the use of military -- I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and things of that nature, too, at that time.

Mr. Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe CIMCO, C-I-M-C-O, stands for the Congo International
Management Corporation, which was a US corporation. And they had signed a resources development contract in the Congo.

Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just formed for that purpose or something, it sounds like.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall a visit from Ambassador Timberlake, who was at that time the US Ambassador to the Congo, to Washington shortly before your meeting at the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No. But I think it would have been normal, with Lumumba, who was then Prime Minister, coming here, and our concern about the situation, for the Ambassador to come back prior to Lumumba's visit or simultaneous with it, to brief the Department on the latest developments there. That was sort of standard operating practice. When the head of a government comes usually the Ambassador comes with him to do that.

Mr. Baron. Would it fit with your memory that the CIA Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to Washington shortly before Lumumba's visit in preparation for his visit to report upon events in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. It is not my memory, because I don't remember that. But what I can say is that that would have been standard practice, and I would have been surprised if they hadn't.

Mr. Baron. What kind of reports would you have been
getting at that time from the CIA Chief of Station and the US Ambassador?

Mr. Dillon. Well, we would have been getting whatever reports the US Ambassador sent, the reports from the Chief of Station would go to the CIA, and we would not get those except in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us.

Mr. Baron. Did you receive urgings from the US Ambassador from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced by the Soviets. But my impression of seeing him was that he certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else, he was so far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an individual. I don't recall any particular urgins from the Ambassador, although I think they would have been natural, because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there, and if he had been not warning against something, that would have been very unusual.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the recent visit of Lumumba and the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and the Secretary of State, there were other reasons, were there not, to have a sense of urgency about removing him?

Mr. Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that I
don't recall. But there were those problems down around the
copper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down there
of sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo at
that time.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything else about the language
that was used in raising the question of assassination at the
meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I am sorry, I don't recall really anything
but what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came up
generally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA.

Mr. Baron. Would the manner in which the question of
assassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have served
as sufficient authorization for the CIA to proceed to develop
the capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Well, I don't think they really needed any
authorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't use
them. And certainly it would not have been enough authoriza-
tion by a long shot for them to start doing that. But I think
they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability
in this area irrespective of this, just by knowing the concern
that everyone had about Lumumba in the area. That they could
have done. They wouldn't have to tell anyone about that.
That is just developing their own internal capability, and
then they would have to come and get permission.

Mr. Baron. Would the same thing hold true for the
development of a generalized assassination capability at the CIA -- that such a capability could be developed without specific authorization from authority outside the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would think so.

Mr. Baron. But it is clear to you that the discussion at the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in itself have served as an authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Not at all.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Action" during your entire tenure in Government?

Mr. Dillon. No. The first time I ever heard it, I was on the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA undertook a project which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means for carrying off an assassination if required?

Mr. Dillon. No, I didn't.

Mr. Baron. And your first knowledge of any such project was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson, who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and serving until early 1962. Do you recall whether Robert Johnson participated in this meeting at the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I wouldn't think so,
because I wouldn't think there was necessarily anyone from the National Security Staff. And as I said also earlier, I don't personally remember Mr. Johnson myself at all.

Mr. Baron. As I represented to you earlier, Mr. Johnson, in testimony before the Committee, indicated that he was present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker, at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated to Mr. Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of Lumumba. And Mr. Johnson said there was a silence -- Mr. Johnson himself was shocked, but no one at the meeting reacted explicitly, and the meeting simply proceeded. He places this meeting in the summer of 1960, and said that it happened at some point before the coup in which Mobutu took power on September 14th of 1960. Were you present at such a meeting?

Mr. Dillon. If you mean was I present at a meeting where I recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba, I don't remember such a thing. But I think that I was probably present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time. It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly for a vacation, and I might have missed one. But otherwise I would have been there. It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself, we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him.
I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others present may have interpreted it other ways. But I am pretty sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him, shoot him or something -- I just can't conceive of him doing that. But I can conceive of him saying, let's take action and get this situation rectified, which is more or less along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the President make such a remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take action right away on this?

Mr. Dillon. I don't remember that. But certainly this was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it.

Mr. Baron. So although you have no recollection of being present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts, you would find his testimony at least plausible?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. But I would think anything like this was not a direct order to have an assassination, but let's take some action to get rid of Lumumba, get him out of office.

Mr. Dawson. Would that be adequate, implicitly authorization?

Mr. Dillon. It would have been up to the CIA as to what they thought. And they could have well thought that. That
is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it is Lumumba or Castro. And you won't be able in the Castro area, or particularly in this area, to run it down, because the people aren't here anymore. But the person who really made that decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dawson. I guess I was asking for your expert opinion on the command and control structure as to what adequate, implicit authorization would have been?

Mr. Dillon. I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization, because he felt very strongly that we should not involved the President directly in things of this nature. And he was perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dawson. And you were aware that that was the way the system worked at that time?

Mr. Dillon. It was the way he worked; because he had a very strong feeling of protecting the President from getting too closely involved with anything that was unpleasant and of this nature.

Mr. Baron. So from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it is conceivable that he would have taken Presidential language such as, get rid of Lumumba, and translate it into an
authorization for an assassination within the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with
Castro, when that came along the following year. That is
perfectly possible.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I would like to show you a
series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those
refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward
the Congo in the summer and fall of 1960. The first, which
we will call Exhibit 2, is dated 30 June 1960.

(The above referred to document
was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 2,
for identification.)
Mr. Baron. And this document refers to the election of Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo, and recounts a report by General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo financially and "may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual."

Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think I ever did.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall having a report of this meeting from Mr. Merchant who would have been State Department representative at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I don't think I would have, because this wouldn't have seemed to me to be important enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a significant figure in Congo politics?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall him at all now.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you, to refresh your recollection, that in September of 1960, after Lumumba was taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu, he was replaced as Prime Minister of the Congo by Joseph Ileo.

Mr. Dillon. I didn't realize that.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any refreshed recollection now of the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Generally speaking, would you have been
notified by Mr. Merchant or Gordon Gray about what transpired at a Special Group meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job. But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be something that was of enough importance that it might be something that I would have to act on or know about in my capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the US was supplying financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate" polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Not in detail, but certainly the general fact that we would be doing that, yes.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now minutes from a Special Group meeting of 25 August 1960. Which we will marke Exhibit 3.

(The above referred to document was marked Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)
Mr. Baron. For the record, these minutes refer to a report by Thomas Parrott, who was the Secretary of the Special Group on CIA activity in relation to the Congo. Mr. Parrott outlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use of trade unions in the Congo and include the prospect that a vote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged.

Following that report by Mr. Parrott there is a paragraph which describes the action of the Group as follows: "The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associate had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."

Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't, that particular meeting. But you would have to ask Mr. Gray about that. I don't know who
they referred to as his associate, that is the key point. He worked for the President.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes for this meeting and other Special Group meetings, that when he used the phrase "Mr. Gray's associate or Mr. Gray's friend," he was referring euphemistically to the President.

Mr. Dillon. That is what I would moreorless have assumed. But as long as you have that testimony, my assumption is probably correct. And it follows the same way, that Mr. Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously. And then he talks about those as instructions and the same thing. And it would seem to be that. And that must refer to the same meeting that your friend Mr. Johnson testified to, which I presume took place before this. They are talking about something that happened before this day, where he had said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the matter, and Mr. Dulles said he would take the comments referred to seriously.

Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. Dulles had heard comments by the President previous to this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Certainly.

Mr. Baron. Comments which called for "very straight-forward action?"

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that is certainly what this
said. So I think that whatever records there are of NSC meetings before that, that they may not have kept such records in detail. And that meeting -- if you can find any meeting that Mr. Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, that is probably the meeting.

Mr. Baron. So you would assume that the language used by the President, heard by Mr. Johnson, which indicated to Mr. Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptable means of getting rid of Lumumba, is probably the language referred to here by Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Dillon. It would sound so, seems so.

Mr. Baron. And would you also assume, from your knowledge of Special Group meetings and the way the minutes were written up, that very straightforward action could be a euphemism for assassination?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wouldn't necessarily think that. It would just mean strong action to do something to get rid of Lumumba, it could be a revolution, it could be anything. I think it comes here that they would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular activity. I would think, if they were really going to mount something, they probably would have come back to the Group. But they might not have. And again, getting back to Mr. Dulles, I do not think he would have gone back to the President and said, now, I have got the capability to assassinate Lumumba, and I am going to do it
next week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't have

done that. Because where I particularly remember this, or
get the feeling particularly strong, is dating back to

something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident.

Allen Dulles' strong desire was to take the whole responsi-
bility for that, and resign, and be fired in disgrace,
publicly, in order to protect the President. But the

President totally refused to accept any such way of handling

it.

Mr. Baron. So that says something not only about the

class of Allen Dulles, but the character of the President?

Mr. Dillon. Of both, yes.

Mr. Baron. That the President would be interested in
taking responsibility for the orders that he had given?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. He was very strong that way. And Mr.

Dulles was so strong in wanting to protect the President that

he was willing to go out in disgrace, public disgrace after
ten years or more of service to the Government, just to pro-
tect the President, although there was nothing that he had

responsibility for, primary responsibility.

Mr. Baron. From your knowledge of Special Group meetings

and minutes, it is your reading of this sentence that "it

was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not

necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind

of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba"
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-- you would read that sentence to indicate that an assassina-
tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might
be used to get rid of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would.

Mr. Baron. And you were commenting before that Mr. Dulles
might be expected by, say, some members of the Special Group,
to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being
mounted?

Mr. Dillon. Not only that, but anything being mounted,
I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba, I think he would
probably come back and say what we are doing.

Mr. Baron. But it is also your statement that, due to
the mode of operating of Allen Dulles, and his character,
it is quite conceivable that he wouldn't have returned to the
Special Group with such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. That might be, although it is more likely
that what he really said was that he wouldn't return to the
President.

Mr. Baron. In order to protect the President?

Mr. Dillon. In order to protect the President. I think
he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite
different from the President, all of the, in other words, as
expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and
do things totally on his own. And his whole idea was to
protect the President as the public representative of the US
from any bad publicity in connection with this or any other
similar thing.

Mr. Baron. But based on the discussion at this meeting
you would assume that the CIA would have the authority to
proceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No, I said that they would certainly have the
authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would
be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way
this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything
just on their own. I think they would have checked back at
least with the senior people in the State Department or the
Defense Department.

Mr. Dawson. Would they have done that in such a way that
it would be available to appear on the public record at any
time?

Mr. Dillon. Maybe not. It might have just been a call
from the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, or possibly the
Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection --

Mr. Dillon. -- and Gordon Gray. I think they would have
kept him notified, because he was sort of central in this
thing, they wouldn't do anything without his at least knowing
about it.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any independent recollection of
being made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have
been discussing before you saw the minutes today?

Mr. Dillon. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now what we will marke as Exhibit 4, which is minutes of the Special Group of September 3, 1960, and point you toward the passage on the second page that refers to the Congo where Gordon Gray indicates that "there is top level feeling that vigorous action would not be a mistake."

(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)
Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of being made aware of this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Is this consonant with your understanding of the policy at the highest levels of the American Government toward Lumumba at this time?

Mr. Dillon. It fits into what I understood was the general policy that we were very concerned with.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall that at this period of time, in early September, Lumumba had just been deposed, and there was a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power which culminated in a coup on September 14th by Mobutu and on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective custody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville, do you recall that chain of events?

Mr. Dillon. No. I knew that at some point there was a change in government. I don't recall the detail of it at this time.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that in early September Soviet planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville?

Mr. Dillon. If you tell me that is the case, I think it does refresh my memory, because I do know -- I do remember that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the Soviets.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware that Stanleyville was the
stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that.

Mr. Baron. Did you do recall that at that point there was concern at higher levels in the State Department over the connection between Lumumba and the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, very much so.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you Exhibit 5, which is "minutes of the National Security Council meeting of September 21, 1960."

(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)
Mr. Dillon. Yes, I now that I attended this as Acting
Secretary of State, this particular meeting.

Mr. Baron. And do you recall the discussion reported in
those minutes of affairs in the Congo, that there was the
fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation on the part
of Lumumba, and that there was some pressure being brought to
reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall any of the details of this
meeting. I don't recall the meeting itself. But it fits
right in with the general feeling about the problem, the way
you looked at the Congo problems.

Mr. Baron. The minutes refer to a visa application for
Lumumba. Would that have been in connection with Lumumba's
desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate
representative of the Congo Government before the United
Nations?

Mr. Dillon. It would certainly refer to his desire to come
to the United Nations to get out of the Congo, where he had
been deposed. Whether he cared much whether we recognized
him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt.
I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized.
But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this
was a way of getting out.

And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big
complaint there.
Mr. Baron. The last paragraph of those minutes quote Mr. Dulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."

Did Mr. Dulles make those remarks?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall those particular remarks. But he could have. But again, there my own interpretation, "disposed of" wouldn't necessarily only be assassinated, it would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was neutralized and couldn't come back in, and you could be sure he was done with.

Mr. Baron. But assassination would have been one of the means of disposing of Lumumba, that would have been acceptable?

Mr. Dillon. I guess the word "disposed" could mean that. But that strikes me as rather surprising, because I would think once he was out of office, our concern would have been deescalated to some extent, it would have been more to find some way, which should have been perfectly possible, of getting him out, or locking him up, or anything.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that the report of the United Nations investigation of the circumstances surrounding Lumumba's death, which was not reported until February of 1961, indicated that at this time, in late
September of 1960, Lumumba was in the custody of the United Nations troops, who were actually protecting him at his residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving, but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his residence.

Mr. Dillon. I think I recall that now, because it is rather unusual circumstances.

Mr. Baron. And then apparently in the middle of October the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese Army, who had come with an arrest warrant for Lumumba. Is it your understanding that during this period of time, even after Lumumba was in the protective custody of the United Nations, he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force in the Congo by the US?

Mr. Dillon. I would imagine so. And I would not be at all surprised if the then rulers or officials of the Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned about it, because he had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes.

Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headquarters for the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba's escape from UN
custody, and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army, where the CIA officer's expectation was that Lumumba would receive a trial, and probably capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese Army. Does this mission of the CIA officer seem to conform to your own idea of US policy at that time toward Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think very much so.

Mr. Baron. Now, we also have testimony that the CIA Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological agents and the equipment with which to administer these substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that he, the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission, which obviously he never carried out successfully. Have you ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. No, I never have.

Mr. Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those Special Group meetings?

Mr. Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one document you have showed me --

Mr. Baron. The August 23rd meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Yes -- if assassination is a real possibility as that indicates, this would be a way to do it. But I never heard of it at the time, and I didn't realize that there was
any such capacity for the use of biological things. I read about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission with Castro, but not about this.

Mr. Dawson. Would you expect to be told about the operational detail?

Mr. Dillon. Not in detail. But I am rather surprised that it went this far and in my position I didn't know something about it. It may be that they felt that it was so tight that there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of State. I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it.

Mr. Baron. Would it be possible that the CIA would feel that the "plausible deniability" would have covered someone in your position?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, if they felt that they had a clearcut --

Mr. Baron. -- mandate to proceed with an assassination operation?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. That is just supposition, but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr. Dulles' decision.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any connection between the CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government
in mid-September of 1960?

Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I would like to follow up on some of your statements about Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I think you made a very interesting and forthright observation, that he was very interested in keeping the President protected from things which may cause embarrassment to him.

Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA, it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond personal personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should not be involved in this sort of thing.

Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known
in mid-September of 1960?

Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army?

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Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known
him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and also in the State Department. But it was highlighted because this experience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I was Acting Secretary of State, and I had to bear the brunt of a lot of that mix-up.

Mr. Dawson. Was Mr. Dulles generally a responsible individual in whom the President placed great trust?

Mr. Dillon. Very much so, great trust.

Mr. Dawson. In his relationship with the President do you believe that President Eisenhower was aware of Mr. Dulles' desire to protect him, President Eisenhower, from a great embarrassment?

Mr. Dillon. I would think so. Of course, the U-2 thing made him aware of that, because it was not only Mr. Dulles' view, but it was also the view of the State Department that this was the correct procedure, that the President should take whatever action was necessary either with Mr. Dulles or with senior officials in the State Department, and blame them for both, but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothing happened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that.

Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in Turkey, and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urge this on him, to warn him before he did assume responsibility himself. But to no avail. Hagerty was very strong for the President taking responsibility, because I think he had a
little different view of this. I think he had a view that the press looked on the President as someone who was not in full charge of the State Department at time, and he thought this would contribute to that, which would be very bad for the President. So we were thinking of it more from the international aspect. We had the contrary feeling.

Mr. Baron. Did the President's trust in Allen Dulles diminish significantly after the U-2 affair.

Mr. Dillon. No, because there was nothing wrong with the U-2 affair, except that the President had authorized it specifically, it was flying on the day after he authorized it. The only bollix that came was in the after events, where this silly press release announcement was put out by NASA, I guess it was, that this plane had just been sort of flying around and got lost, or something like that. And we really had a very difficult time about that at the morning meeting where the news came to us, which was out in the Virginia hills. The President had a meeting of a restricted nature afterwards, including me and Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, and Colonel Goodpastor.

And he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, and gave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed on all the cover stories or anything of this nature. And I went back to the State Department and was working diligently on this and talking to Mr. Dulles as to what we would say.
And the next thing we knew suddenly the President told Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended from the State Department.

And the next thing we knew the statement came out from the US from NASA which made no sense at all.

And of course what had happened was that Hagerty -- that had been the routine thing, and when it came up Hagerty was to refer the press to NASA, and NASA, if they were referred, had the cover story.

And Goodpastor -- I never quite found out what happened in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn't get to Hagerty or Hagerty didn't pay any attention to them, either way was more likely, because Hagerty was way senior to Goodpastor at that time, and they had done this, and he didn't know, he had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't know that it was supposed to be in the State Department. And that got everything off upside down. So we were trying to explain how the US Government had put out this silly statement which bore no relation to the facts, when we knew the facts.

And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it followed electronically. And but it was because of this White House bollix that this had happened.

Mr. Dawson. The basis for Dulles' willingness throughout
this period to protect the President was also -- I guess there
was some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis
--

Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a
mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where he
felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President,
and so forth, which we felt would not have been the case
otherwise.

So this didn't change Mr. Dulles at all, it made him even
stronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knew
the President was difficult to protect.

Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisis
you saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence
operations?

Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National Security
Council meeting. The format of the meetings were that the
meeting would be called to order by the President, and then
he would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing,
which was the first item of business in all those meetings.

Mr. Dawson. On those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt to
tell the President enough where he would have some idea of
what was going on, but not tell him directly what was
happening?

Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence
what other people were doing and what was happening. And it
would only be exceptional when they would deal with what we
were doing ourselves.

Mr. Dawson. Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles
wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how did he
go about achieving that or gaining that approval?

Mr. Dillon. I don't really know. I do know in regard,
to the U-2 flights, which had a very special procedure set up
whereby a piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, or Acting Secretary of Defense, and then
taken to the President and approved by him before the flight
could take place. And that was handled by General Goodpastor
rather than through Mr. Gray.

Mr. Dawson. Did that change after the U-2 crisis?

Mr. Dillon. No, that was the procedure.

Mr. Dawson. He knew what he was approving very clearly?

Mr. Dillon. He had been right up to this time and that
was the case with the U-2. After the U-2 crisis there weren't
any more U-2 flights, and that procedure came to a sudden end.

Mr. Dawson. In other intelligence operations which you
brought up which were required to be brought before the
Special Group --

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall that there were any. But if
it was needed, I don't know who would do it, but it would be
through the person who would know the most about it. And
that would be General Goodpastor, because he was very close
to the President, although he was a relatively junior officer
at that time, he was a young colonel — I think he may have
even been a major when he started there in the White House.
But he was sort of Staff Secretary to the President on all
those relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the State
Department. If you wanted to see the President on something
important, it was generally through General Goodpastor rather
than through Gordon Gray. And Gordon Gray handled most of
the detailed mechanics of setting up meetings, and that sort
of thing. He was not as much a personal assistant to the
President. And that job was held by General Goodpastor.

Mr. Dawson. But in circumstances where the President was
going to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government,
in front of a number of people like the Special Group of the
National Security Council, were you privy to some of those
occurances?

Mr. Dillon. I don't ever recall one.

Mr. Dawson. You don't recall instances where an attempt
or discussion to overthrow a government or anything more
sinister than an assassination was brought up?

Mr. Dillon. No, except the discussion of preparing a
capacity to invade Cuba. That was considered. And we have
the minutes on that. That was considered a number of times
and reported a number of times.
Mr. Dawson. After an intelligence operation blows, in the sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Government of the US is found, are you aware that oftentimes a routine order goes out to stand down intelligence, to take positive actions in that area, are you aware of that standard operating procedure?

Mr. Dillon. I don't quite understand what your question is there.

Mr. Dawson. After the U-2 crisis did we for a period of time stop aggressive intelligence actions against the Soviet Union?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that was natural.

Mr. Dawson. That was my question. That is a routine matter?

Mr. Dillon. That was a natural thing. Obviously we stopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacity to shoot them down, and so it was no use doing it again. And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronic flights along the coasts of the Soviet Union, and kept them further away, or discontinued them for awhile.

Mr. Dawson. Are you aware of a similar stand down order having been issued after Lumumba was captured?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that you might have been away from Washington in August of 1960 when
this Special Group meeting took place on August 25th, is that correct?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, there is a possibility, because August was the month, if one was going to take any time off in the summer, it was likely to be in August.

Mr. Dawson. It was best to take it off during August because of the miserable summers?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. And my family had a summer place where I had gone since childhood in Maine, and it was easy to get to. I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of times when I had to get back for a Security Council meeting and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of Maine. I recall one time, it could have been this year, or it could have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those summers for a few days. And it could have been in August.

Mr. Baron. In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me before we began this testimony today that from what you have read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the CIA representative at that meeting which, as you have said, in effect turned off the suggestion of an assassination attempt against Lumumba, might have been made simply because the group was too large for such a discussion?

Mr. Dillon. It might have been -- I said that because of what I have learned since, and I have learned more today --
but they did try to develop such a capacity versus Castro.

But as I have thought about it since we talked, I think that
is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have
been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that
they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't
have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in
August.

Mr. Baron. So wittingly you have been present at the
creation?

Mr. Dillon. The early stages, yes.

Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

I would simply like to say that the Committee is extremely
appreciative of your coming here today. This is obviously
a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss. And you have
been tremendously informative on it. So thank you very much.

Mr. Dillon. I wish I could be more so. But the details
of what happened at that time, the day to day details, have
really departed from my mind. It is only those few relatively
unusual things that I still recall. And any way I can help
I am glad to.

Mr. Baron. There may be one way you can help right now.

I know that before we started today Bill Miller, the Staff
Director of the Committee, indicated that the Committee would
be interested in hearing you out at great length on policy
recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both from
your experience in the State Department and the Treasury Department, and also your recent service on the Rockefeller Commission. But I wondered specifically, in reference to the assassination area, where we faced the need to tie up our investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some recommendations as soon as possible, do you have any specific suggestions?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. I think that the record has shown that this is the type of thing that the US Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage in. And I doubt very much that there will be any repetition of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties, which I guess was predicated on the belief that something like that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its being surfaced and being connected with the US. And I think even those who believed that such action was morally proper and might have been in the best interests of both the US and the world would think that the costs were too heavy if it was ever traced back to the US. And the record seems to show that it does get traced back. So I think that there will be a general agreement among those who are the type of people who would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be thought of as US Policy.

Mr. Baron. Are there any institutional changes that you would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool
of foreign policy?

Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just what institutional changes are really necessary, but there should be the clarification that the Special Group, or whatever name it is given for the Committee, would have to approve any action by the CIA, whether it is assassination or military action or anything else, in writing. I think that would be fine. I think it is naivete to have the idea that the President has to approve anything like that. I tend to agree with Mr. Dulles that you should not get the President personally involved in details of operations that might be on the edge of what is right. I am not judging just about assassinations, but in any covert operation. The law now is that the President has to approve any covert operation. I think that the result now will be that there wouldn't be any. I think there may be times when we will need them, but not violent ones. I have in mind such things as financial help and such things as that. But I don't think the President ought personally to sign the checks.

Mr. Baron. Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state:

From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter's absence from Washington.

Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12 Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accordingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Committee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations.

During this entire period I have no recollection of any discussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.

Dated this 2/1 day of May, 1975.

C. Douglas Dillon

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2/1 day of May 1975

Notary Public
District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 June 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen. Cabell

3. Congo

Gen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the election of Joseph Iléo to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted him financially. He indicated that we in no way intend to claim full credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close contest, we might have had some effect; and in any case we may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual.

7. Cuba

In an informal conversation after Gen. Cabell's departure, Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the Castro government; that public opinion both here and abroad is probably beginning to feel that there is no limit as to how far this country can be pushed around; that this may encourage other small countries to take a similar tack; and that the longer we delay with effective economic and other action the harder we may make it for ourselves.

Mr. Merchant and Mr. Irwin agreed, with the stipulation that the United States should not take affirmative action until it is prepared to follow through on a substantial scale.

THOMAS A. PARROTT

SECRET - EYES ONLY
to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise - of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

THOMAS A. PARROTT
know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country.

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans' point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as appropriate.

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical.
4. Cuba

The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into.

One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not
outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

1. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not
4. Dominican Republic

Mr. Dulles inquired whether Mr. Merchant wanted to discuss the proposal to dispatch a letter to Trujillo suggesting that the latter retire from office. At Mr. Merchant's request, the DCI stated his opinion, which was to the effect that he had considerable reservation as to the efficacy or wisdom of such a letter. He said that it seemed to him much more useful to make a personal approach, which not only stood a chance of being more effective, but also could be denied. He pointed out that a personal approach had been attempted some time ago, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it off. He suggested that the approach might best be made by an unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a better bet than the previous individual.

Mr. Merchant said that he realized his own name had been suggested, and that he was far from enthusiastic about the idea. He said further that he has a visceral feeling against asking a Chief of State to get out of office - either through the medium of a letter or personal contact - particularly when we do not know who might succeed him. Mr. Merchant conceded with good humor the validity of Mr. Gray's wry comment that Mr. Merchant's ethics and his pragmatism might be somewhat intertwined.

Mr. Gray said that he was entirely opposed to having any U.S. official sign such a letter. He thought that an unofficial letter might be a different matter.

The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth the effort to get Mr. Pawley to attempt a direct approach to the Benefactor; it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even, but that no great harm could result.

5. Congo

There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss.

THOMAS A. PARROTT

SECRET - EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. Mr. Dulles then reported that we had attempted to provide Mobutu with funds but that the guards protecting Mobutu had relieved our messenger of the funds. We cannot get funds to Mobutu because he does not have complete control over his guards. A new development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers, most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have been turned out of office and their offices have been taken over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temporary period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats, after departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary Dillon said the Soviet press has not yet admitted that the Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplomats indicated to the press before leaving that they would be back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet markings which they painted over the Congo markings on their planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.

Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still confusing and that little progress had been made toward the settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening situation in Sam Neua Province, however, had been quieted as a result of the dispatch of Laosian parachute troops to that area. The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settlement. The King has requested that General Ouane and General Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Phoumi's forces and Vientiane forces has been reported at Pak Sane, but little bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Phoumi has adopted tactics of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile,
kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested departments and agencies to ensure that it serves the purposes of retarding the growth of the war potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its unity. Noted that, with respect to paragraph 11 of NSC 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materials, equipment, technology and services as can be unilaterally controlled by the United States may be imposed not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially with regard to technology and services.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5704/3.

5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts to save Lumumba. An intercepted message between Egypt and Ghana indicates that Nasser is urging the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea to concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to bear for the maintenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Mr. Dulles remarked that a bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province, while the Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province. Intercepted messages also indicated that Nasser had asked that a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to persuade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On September 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no agreement with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper purporting to be an agreement with Kasavubu.

Secretary Dillon reported that Lumumba had requested a visa for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Government of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. However, if Lumumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private citizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down. Mr. Dillon added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumba if he attempts to leave the country.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 September 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles

1. Supply Drop to Cuban Dissidents

Mr. Parrott outlined the proposed supply drop to Cuban dissidents in the Escambray. After brief discussion, the Group approved the project as presented. Mr. Parrott asked whether approval could be granted at this time for continuing missions of a similar nature to this group or other bodies of dissidents. The Special Group agreed to this, with Mr. Dulles stating that the other members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of convening a meeting.
FIDEL CASTRO INTERVIEWED BY DAGENS NYHETAR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jul 75 pp 1, 12 LD

[Excerpts] Havanna, 2 July—For a man who has for many years been on the CIA death list, Cuba's leader Fidel Castro looked remarkably unconcerned. He sat on a sofa in the Swedish Embassy a few hours before Olof Palme's departure from Cuba and when he was questioned about the CIA's repeated attempts to assassinate him, he raised both hands to the ceiling in a gesture of resignation:

"Good Lord," he said. "We have known all that for a long time. It seems a little ridiculous," Fidel said, "to hear today of disclosures of new assassination plans when here in Cuba we already knew of them.

"Yet what is now being disclosed in the United States is only a small part," he said. "We could describe a dozen similar assassination plans and we will also do so when the U.S. investigations are over."

But he did not believe that he ran the risk of being assassinated by the CIA any longer.

"If there are such plans today, we at least, do not know of them," he said. "I believe that the United States is no longer so interested in assassinating me—and I believe that it has accepted the Cuban revolution as a fact and that sooner or later it must come to an agreement with us."

"But no one can be absolutely certain," he said.

Raised Eyebrows

What Fidel Castro said while seated on the Swedish Embassy sofa will cause some eyebrows to be raised in many countries which Cuba has accepted as international allies.

One of the key phrases of Olof Palme's Latin American trip has been "a new economic world order." It is a term which embraces small countries' rights to control their natural resources, and in both the oil power, Venezuela, and the potential oil power, Mexico, Olof Palme's hosts have adopted the concept with enthusiasm.

When Fidel Castro explained his own skepticism concerning talk of "a new economic world order" after dinner at the Swedish Embassy, he did so in a violent attack on the world's oil-producing countries.

He believed that a new world order could not be created by the introduction of new privileges for a new group of countries.

The Poor Are Affected

"It is not sufficient to demand that all countries have control over their own raw materials," he said. "All privileges are created at another's expense, and today it is not the industrialized countries which are affected by the oil countries' profits but the poor countries which do not have oil."
"How can you compare cocoa and oil?" he asked. "What benefit is it to countries like Sri Lanka and Tanzania that all countries control their raw materials when all this means to them is that they must pay more for both oil and industrial goods?

"I am not speaking for myself," he explained. "We receive oil from the USSR on favorable terms. But if the oil countries demand solidarity from the Third World, they must concern themselves with the problems of the Third World. They are, as yet, reluctant to do this.

"Where has the oil revenue gone?" he asked, and he answered the question.

"It has been deposited in the economies of the industrial world and has been used for arms purchases. The industrialized countries will emerge from the economic crisis stronger than ever. It will be the developing countries which will be affected."

They Do Not Dare

Fidel Castro fell silent and he looked at the Swedish journalists with an expression of genuine alarm.

"Do you think I am speaking too severely?" he asked worriedly. "But you must understand that someone must talk about this. There is no one else who dares, since all are hoping for loans from the oil countries."

And he gave those who sat next to him a comforting slap on the back.

In various Latin American countries Latin America is described today as a changing continent, and in both Mexico and Venezuela Olaf Tafse listened to the revolutionary and anti-imperialist diatribes which are increasingly part of both these countries' official language.

Fidel Castro did not appear especially impressed by this change. He did not mention Mexico and Venezuela at all when he was asked about the prospects for socialist revolution in South America—but he did mention the military governments of Peru and Panama.

Better Than Nothing

"No path toward revolution can be ruled out," he said, "and we are watching the progressive regimes in Peru and Panama with great interest. It is meaningless to discuss whether an armed struggle is necessary for revolution—all that can be said is that a revolution must be based on real force, whether it be in Chile or Cuba."

He smiled sadly when asked for his opinion of the governments in Venezuela and Mexico, which, by their own assurances, are revolutionary, and he thought for a long time before answering: "It is better than nothing."

Someone asked if it is true that Cuba is receiving economic aid from the USSR in conflict with its own ideology and that it has its "stomach in Moscow and its head in Peking."

Fidel Castro was obviously upset by the question.

"It was not they who contrived the Cuban revolution," he said, "it was us. But the USSR helped us when no one else would, and we cannot forget that. We have not compromised with either the USSR or anyone else, and who else could have helped us? The United States?"
"Goldwater's Toughness Challenged by Castro"

by Daniel Harker, AP Staff Writer

"... Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Mr. Castro said:

'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.

'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.

'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's....""

[From an impromptu interview given by Castro at a Brazilian Embassy reception this week.]
"Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels."

This item was introduced by an editor's note referring to the fact that Castro had turned up at a Brazilian Embassy reception Saturday night (7 September) where he had submitted to an impromptu interview. Harker's account of the interview reached New York Sunday afternoon.

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: 'U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba.'"

"Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said: 'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.'"

"...World affairs ... seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with attacks."

"The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.

'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's....'"

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 14 1975

CIA
THE CIA IN CUBA: CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CUBAN ALLEGATIONS

(1) Mid-1960, "La Cruz" counter-revolutionary group, Teviel Sague, a "gangster," and Cubria Ramos were infiltrated through Punto Hicacos zone in Matanzas Province for a plot against Castro and other terrorism and sabotage. Four revolvers, and automatic pistols, a high-powered rifle, and large quantities of ammunition were supplied by the CIA.

(2) March, 1961, various counterrevolutionary groups were trained and armed by the CIA and infiltrated through the north of Havana, to assassinate Castro and support the Bay of Pigs invasion. Humbero Sorí Marin and four other individuals were infiltrated to coordinate the activities of various counterrevolutionary groups directed by the CIA inside Cuba. Weapony included automatic weapons, high-powered rifles with scopes, ammunition, and explosives.

(3) June, 1961, the "Frente Revolucionario Democratico" (FRD) met with individual infiltrated into Cuba with instructions for a plot against Castro. Jeeps with bazookas were placed in a garage at an intersection in Havana and a truck with grenades was placed in sports city. Plan was to ambush Castro and other leaders. Two participants -- Guillermo Caúlta Ferrer and Higinio Menendez -- said when arrested that the CIA was in charge, and that contact was maintained through Guantanamo and the Swiss Embassy.

In July, 1961, after Bay of Pigs, CIA worked to consolidate counterrevolutionary groups into the "Unidad Resistencial" (Resistance) organization. Jose Pujals Naderos made an undercover visit to the United States to meet with CIA officers Jim Bender (or Bûlding), Harold Bishop and Carl Hitch. There Naderos was appointed head of CIA operations in Cuba in place of the arrested Aldredo Izaguirre. Programs included "selfagression" against Guantanamo to justify counter-attacks on other countries to provoke war against Cuba.

(4) July 26, 1961, through the infiltration of CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivera Caro (Said), Adolfo Mendez (Raul) and Jorge Garcia Rubio (Tony), and others, the United Resistance group developed a plot against Castro during the 26th of July celebration in Oriente Province.

(5) July 26, 1961, the same group planned another plot the same day against Castro during a rally at Revolution Square. Meetings were held at the Guantanamo Naval Base, where war material, including large quantities of small arms, was supplied by base commander Captain Carl E. Schenwits.

(6) Also in July, 1961, plotting against Castro was undertaken by representatives of "30 de Noviembre," "Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo," and "Frente Revolucionario Democratico." The assassination attempt was to be carried out near the home of Colé Sanchez Manduley in Vedado. CIA instructions came through contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel Ray and Aureliano Sanchez Arango, and through Admiral Burke and CIA agents on Guantanamo. Missions included explosives, mortars, high-powered rifles, and 30-caliber machine guns.

(7) September 13, 1961, the same groups listed in (6) above, in contact with the "Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria" (MRR), led by Juan Jose Martore Sîlvia, made an attempt on the life of Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez when he was returning from Matanzas to Havana. They worked with a CIA agent in Matanzas and a counterrevolutionary hand there. Weapons included automatic handguns, machine guns, and a high-powered rifle with telescopic sight.

(8) October 4, 1961, the MRR and "El Frente del Escambray," under CIA direction, agreed upon a plan for sabotage in Havana, timed to coincide with the return of Cuban President Osvaldo Torrado from Puntla del Este. A bazooka was to be fired toward the President at the former presidential palace from a nearby apartment building, with the withdrawal covered by launching grenades against the public. Weapons recovered included automatic rifles and grenade launchers.
In early 1962, with CIA instructions through Guantanamo, Jorge Luis Cuervo Calvo reorganized several groups into the "Union de Unidades Revolucionarias" (UDUR). A meeting was held to plan an uprising and discuss arrangements which had been made to receive equipment through Guantanamo. CIA was pressing both attempts against Castro and staged acts of aggression against Guantanamo. Calvo outlined "Plan Z" -- a scheme to kill Foreign Minister Raul Roa, and then attack other Cuban leaders who would attend the burial. The authors of the plan are listed as Cay Hernandez and Cay Gispert and members of the DRE organization headed by Julio Hernandez Rojo, listed as a CIA agent infiltrated into Cuba. Weaponry included a double-barreled shotgun, explosives, grenades, and demolition timing devices, one labeled "Block Demolition, MS AI."

In 1963 another consolidation of groups was carried out with CIA direction from abroad through agent Nino Diaz. The umbrella group was "Resistencia Civica Anticomunista" (RCA), and it incorporated the "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" (ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria" (MRK), and "Agrupacion Montecristi," among others. The overall objective, as instructed by the CIA, was to create the impression of a strong internal resistance to Castro, and to inspire a decision for armed intervention at the meeting of OAS presidents. Again, instructions came through Guantanamo.

March 13, 1963, the RCA initiated a plan to assassinate Castro from a house near the University of Havana, by firing a mortar. People arrested included Samuel Carballo Moreno, identified as a CIA agent. Attacks were to be made simultaneously on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and on National Revolutionary Militia sites. Bazookas, mortars and machine guns were taken.

April 7, 1963, the RCA developed a plan involving sixteen men armed with pistols and fragmentation grenades, who were to attack Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Those arrested were Enrique Rodriguez Valdes (known as "Mulgado"), Ricardo Lopez Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo, and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

July 26, 1963, the RCA grouping planned to assassinate the Minister of the Armed Forces, Raul Castro, at Revolution Square during the 26th of July celebration. Leading those groups involved in the plot was Ibrahim Machin Hernandez.

September 28, 1963, another group was formed through a relationship with CIA agent Pierre Owen Ditez de Ure, who was a French citizen living in Cuba. Their plan was to dynamite sewage pipes under the presidential palace. de Ure confessed that he had been working for and giving information to the CIA for a period of two years.

March, 1964, a plan to assassinate Castro by Mario Salabarria Aguilar, a "gangster," who had contacts with the CIA through its agent Dr. Bernardo Milanes Lopez, who sought support in Spain from Tony Varona and Juan Bosch, listed as friends of Salabarria. The CIA gave Salabarria weapons and "great sums of money" for a scheme which involved installing a 30 or 50 caliber machine gun on a vehicle and waiting for Castro to pass by.

Mid-1964, another plan to assassinate Castro was formulated by members of "Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional," part of the RCA block controlled by the CIA. The effort involved CIA agents Alberto and Ramon Grui Sierra, members of a network headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who attempted to poison Castro in 1965. The mid-1964 plan called for throwing grenades at Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Nine men were involved.

September, 1964, members of "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" (ELN) and "Frente Interno de Liberiacon" (FIL), who had been engaged in intelligence for the CIA, began, under CIA instructions, to seek unification.
(16) One of the members of this group, Ramon Perez, told Angel Miguel Arechibita Vizan, Rolando Galdos Maleso and others of a plot against Castro to occur at Ti St. Vedado.

(17) In early 1965, counterrevolutionaries Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín González Carballo and Girardio Reynaldo Diego Sepúlveda -- members of an RCA sub-group known as "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" were working on a plot against Castro in Santiago de las Vegas. This plan was dropped in favor of a plan to hit Castro at the Latin American Stadium, with another group in a nearby building set up to fire machine guns into the crowd to create panic and facilitate the escape.

(18) In June, 1965, there was an arrest of the group headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alcina (see (19) above), which was part of the "Rescate" and "Movimiento Anticomunista Revolucionario" (MAR) groups sponsored by the CIA. María Leopoldina Grau had received CIA instructions for poisoning Castro at the Havana Libre Hotel. Jesus Companioni Souza and Santos de la Caridad Perez Nuñez, members of MAR, were to carry out the poisoning. When this attempt failed, another 500 capsule bottle of poison was sent by Tony Varona. Maria Alcina, also known as "Polita," also received weapons with silencers and special assassination projectiles from the CIA.

(19) In July of 1965, there was an arrest of a group which represented another CIA attempt to organize counterrevolutionaries, this time under the name "Unidad Resistencia." This group developed a plan to assassinate Castro with a Thompson submachine gun at Vita Havana's restaurant, firing also at the Ministry of Interior across the street to create confusion and permit the escape. Equipment included weapons and communications gear.

(20) Also in 1965, there was an arrest of former Cuban commander Rolando Cubela Secades. Cubela was recruited during a trip to Madrid by CIA agents Manuel Artime, Jorge Robredo ("El Magician"), Luis Enrique Trasancos, and Carlos Tejedor. The planning also involved an official at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Jose Luis Gonzales Gallarreta, and Alberto Blanco (or "El Loco"). In Madrid, Artime promised boats, weapons and men for an invasion of Cuba within 72 hours to support the assassination of Castro. Before returning to Cuba, Cubela received from Gallarreta a rifle with a telescopic sight and silencer.

(21) In mid-1965, two groups with CIA connections and contacts in the United States, the "Comando L" and the "Movimiento 30 de Noviembre," planned to infiltrate Cuba. That effort was given up, and instead they fired from gunboats in the "schnellboot zone" in Naranj and at the Riviera Hotel, in the direction of the presidential residence.

(22) In May, 1966, these same groups were infiltrated into the Monte Barreto zone in Havana with the mission of assassinating Castro. In the action Armando Ramiro Martinez and Sandalso Nersinia Diaz Garcia were killed; and Antonio Cuesta Yelis -- head of "Comandos L," and Eusebio Enrique Zaldivar Cardenas were arrested. These men had been trained in Puerto Rico by the CIA, and some had been involved in the commandeering of the "San Pasqual," a merchant vessel anchored at the Cabrera Port in Las Villas Province.

(23) On March 17, 1967, three infiltrators from the United States -- Felix Asencio Crespo, Wilfrido Martinez Diaz, and Gustavo Araces Alvarez -- were arrested while attempting to land by Cayo Fragoso. Their planned activity was to assassinate Castro and conduct systematic sabotage to create the image of a popular uprising, to help counterrevolutionary groups in the United States get official backing. These people had been trained by the CIA through "N-30-11," "NSC," "Las Vinas Nuevas," "Conmares," "Alpha-66," and other organizations. They had automatic rifles, boats, plastic explosives, and communications equipment.
(24) In 1971, a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a visit to Chile. The main protagonist was Jesús Domínguez Benítez, known as "The Islander," who had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for promoting terrorist actions inside the United States. In 1970 he had participated in an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate Cuba through Oriente Province and had sought refuge at Guantanamo, where he was arrested for bond violation. Nonetheless, he was free in 1971, to participate with the CIA, Chilean fascists, and Cuban counterrevolutionaries in a scheme to assassinate Castro using a gun concealed in a television camera. He obtained Venezuelan press credentials from Cuban exiles in that country. The plan was aborted. Those involved in the plot feared for their lives because the plan did not insure their escape.

###
We consider that the analysis of the informations we offer, the publicly known, and the ones that the American authorities possess and have not been published, allows us to affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, especially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterated policy of the United States through its subversive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizens and all kind of corrupted individuals, inside the country as well as abroad, without taking into consideration the victims that would result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the participants with a great number of weapons, explosives, technical means of transportation and communication for the accomplishment of their plans.

These are some of the connoted and proved facts of the numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out aimed to the assassination of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.
THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE   WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

November 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Shipment of Contaminating Elements to Cuba

1. I refer to your interest in hearing more about the
Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment
of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at
bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of
Cuban machinery.

2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted
for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5
would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald
is now conducting.

I have not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting.
(As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted
and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While I do
not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached
memo, they indicate that Item 5 was approved. My own
strong recollection of the following from the meeting was
that Items 1 through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious
problems concerned Items 6 and 7.

3. I assume that you still want to hear a status report on the
Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I
will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.

I think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop,
if indeed we do want to stop it. In any event, you will be able
to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives
his status report.

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

Copy

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TOP SECRET

April 7, 1964

Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba

U. S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a higher level.

The present covert program is designed in support of a general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro, accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, or (d) abandoned.

Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:

1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and exfiltration of agents and covert supply of agent operations.
   Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this program be continued.

2. Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
   Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.

3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selective economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban economy.
   Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued.

4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements near the power centers of the regime.
   Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued.
5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).
Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued.

6. CIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons.
Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.

7. CIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.
Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Arinto Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Arinto, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluctant line on cutting off Arinto. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Arinto up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Arinto quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

2. Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange to have diluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange. Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either.

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the
attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to compromise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop aid to Artime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing.

While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg contraption. I am against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a very short space of time.

Gordon Chase
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Cuba

In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the JCS.

In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square Dance," I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on "just" international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could undertake such operations without having our role discovered and resulting in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if "Square Dance" were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid and control would be increased.

As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I understand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend, however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration of "Square Dance" at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals, we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.

R. C. BOWMAN

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Destruction of this sheet is authorized one year from date of destruction of the document attached hereto.
REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

Reference: JCS 2304/244

DEcision

1. At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 12 of this report.

2. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are requested to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised white pages 3 and 5, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A, B, and C, was forwarded as JCSM-942-64, dated 9 November 1964, to the Secretary of Defense.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c) applied and were followed.

DISTRIBUTION:

Gen. Wheeler (O/JCS)  
Gen. Johnson (CSA)  
Adm. McDonald (CMO)  
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)  
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Gen. Palmer (DCS, OCS)  
Gen. Blanchard (USMC, SEC)  
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Gen. Burchinal (D/JS)  
Gen. Mannhart (VD/JS)  
Adm. Davis (DD/JS)  
Adm. Austin J-3  
Gen. Enrick (J-5)  
Gen. Anthia (CSMC)
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SQUARE DANCE (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US Army, to consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President that the United States covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Cuban regime.

3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent a memorandum, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding a study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The Chief of Staff, US Army, recommended that the Joint Staff accomplish interagency coordination on the study proposals; and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it by memorandum to the President, informing him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the conclusions and recommendations of the study and consider that the outline program therein provides an adequate framework for the development of detailed supporting programs and plans for participating agencies.

4. On 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and agreed to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation of a report.

* Attachment to JCS 2304/244
** Enclosure to JCS 2304/218-3

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J-5 2304/244-1

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5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented with a briefing on the study and discussed some of the issues of the proposed actions.

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Appendix A.

CONCLUSIONS

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

8. The proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and merits consideration by other appropriate governmental agencies as another option, in concert with other actions, for causing the collapse of the Castro regime.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are possible political consequences which could result from proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed.

10. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-agency coordination.

11. The study should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

   a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A, B, and C, which reflects the above conclusions be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

Copy

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b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of
unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer: Captain J. O. Sherman, USN
J-5, Extension 78926
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ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in responding to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Castro regime.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a study which examines world sugar economics and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an outline program which would undermine Castro's economy, deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by introducing aerially from off-shore, a sugar cane plant parasite, Bunga. Subsequently, the economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems.

Lyndon B. Johnson Library
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. The concept of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert means would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime.

4. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the possible political consequences from proof of the US involvement in such a program, they believe that proposals related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix A hereto.

5. It is recommended that the attached draft memorandum (Appendix B) and study (Appendix C) be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
APPENDICES A, B, AND C

(6 pages)
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APPENDIX A

CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY

1. The ultimate success of the proposed program would depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices. It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of convertible currency as it had before the program was undertaken. The arguments and rationale in favor of the economic proposals in the study appear to have validity. However, world economics is a most complex subject and involves many variable factors. The important points on economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate agencies in the government having responsibility for such matters.

2. Assuming that success of the actions of the outline program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or that if it did fall, a government friendly to the United States would be installed. Russia has too much at stake, politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime for economic reasons alone. Success of the proposed actions would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro Government and would be an additional means of exerting pressure against that government.
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3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by the study. The approval for implementation of such a concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the event of discovery. There is also an obvious political risk associated with this proposal. Should any credible evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political loss to the United States would be great. Quite apart from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence of the United States in international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States would be impaired seriously.

4. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the President apprised of the capabilities of the military establishment. The subject study presents measures which should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after coordination with appropriate government agencies it would represent another option for positive actions against the Castro regime.

5. NSAM 213*, dated 8 January 1963, established a committee to coordinate the management of all aspects of US policy toward Cuba. The President looks to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for the effective coordination of the execution of policy decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. The subject study should be referred to this committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to reporting to the President.

* Enclosure to JCS 2304/Lyndon B. Johnson Library

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Appendix A
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility to provide military advice to the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that a matter such as the proposals under consideration, be sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation that the study be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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APPENDIX B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President that they would continue to review the problem of putting additional pressures on Castro and that the President would be advised if any new and promising courses of action were uncovered.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry, and proposes a phased interagency program which would:

   a. Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1966 production level.

   b. Expand US influence in the world sugar market by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate the free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses.

3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in the study are within existing or attainable military capabilities. Several actions are proposed. Key among these is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly disavowing US involvement.
4. Mindful of the risks attending such actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposals of the study and believe that they offer an option for exerting new pressures against Castro. They believe that proposals related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction of Bange into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence.

5. The study is forwarded herewith with a request that the concept and actions proposed in the outline program of the study be coordinated by your committee with other governmental departments and agencies. Upon completion of your review and coordination, it is further requested that your comments be made available to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
APPENDIX C

Army Report on
SQUARE DANCE (U)

(See Attachment to JCS 2304/244,
beginning on page 6 of the white attachment)
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/244-1

A Report by the J-5 on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

R. C. FORBES
J. E. MANSFIELD
Joint Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF

SUBJECT: Inspection of Classified Documents at LBJ Library Related to Covert Actions Against Cuba

FROM: Loch Johnson

Among the many documents which I examined at the Johnson Library in Texas this past week is one that I find particularly alarming. I wish to draw it to your attention.

The document in question is from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated 30 October 1964. The subject is a proposed covert action against Cuba, with the code name SQUARE DANCE.

On 21 March 1964, the JCS responded to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba by advising the White House that any new promising courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be brought to the President's attention. Apparently their first bright new idea was SQUARE DANCE, outlined in the 30 October document (attached). The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by introducing aerially from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called Bunge. The program would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated Cuban sugar production (see page 6) and within three-to-six years the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved. "The economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited," continues the JCS memo, "by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining cane fields, burning cane, and directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems" (6, emphasis added). In sum, SQUARE DANCE "would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime" (7).

In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCE proposal, the memo notes that the approval for implementation of the program "would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy." Indeed it would—or at least one hopes we have not used such methods before! The proposal is nothing less than a variant of germ warfare which would have had serious consequences for the civilian population.

At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE concept. It may never have been implemented at all, even partially. (The covering memo written by Bowman, an NSC staffer, to Bundy suggests that the White House was skeptical toward the idea.) To me, though,
the mere writing of this kind of proposal is a reprehensible first step toward the worst kind of foreign policy mischief. I find it even more repugnant than contingency plans for assassination. These are not the kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the White House from the intelligence community. The agencies must have a better sense of what is acceptable policy, legally and morally. As in the Huston Plan, the White House was confronted here with a series of illegal and unethical options. The result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic death for the major plant and animal life in Cuba. The feeble efforts of the CIA to direct assassination attempts against Castro pale by comparison with this Army proposal for covert action.

I believe SQUARE DANCE deserves our attention. If assassination is unacceptable, surely too is the widespread destruction of plant and animal life through covert germ warfare. Somehow (probably through hearings and restrictive legislation) the Congress must drive home the point that there are legal and moral limits to American foreign policy. These limits may not be easy to define, but we must try.

Note: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference is made to "possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food)." The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSC staffer) indicates that this proposal received Presidential backing.
ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS: Castro

Newspaper accounts report that prior to the April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu enlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli in organizing assassination attempts against Castro. The first attempt on Castro's life was on or about 3/13/61. The first attempt used poison and it was hoped that with Castro dead, the invasion planned and executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success. There were five more attempts made on Castro's life after 3/17/61. The last was in late February or early March of 1963.

Allegations (from Newspaper sources):

1) The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro.

2) Johnny Roselli headed several missions against Castro from late March or April 1961 / late February or March 1963.

3) That RFK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it.

4) Roselli received poison capsules from the CIA which he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro.
before the Bay of Pigs. One of the Cubans was related to one of Castro's cooks.

5) The assassination was intended to take place before invasion the planned Bay of Pigs/in order to insure that CIA operation's success.

6) The CIA has extended services to Giancana which included a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas apartment.

7) Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA agents William Harvey and James O'Connell.

8) Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly with Cuban Refugees:
   1. Roselli
   2. Maheu
   3. Hunt
   4. Liddy
   5. Giancana
   6. James O'Connell
   7. William Harvey

Questions:

1) Who was COS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963?

2) Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals to determine if there were any Castro intelligence agent information?
3) Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on Castro’s life? If so, how was the situation handled?

4) In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and positive step towards the success of the invasion?

5) Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by Cuban nationals?

6) Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters made known to the agency by the Cuban nationals in advance?

7) Did the CIA clear such actions?

8) Was the CIA aware of Roselli’s actions?

9) Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of Johnny Roselli?

10) At any time has the CIA been associated with Sam Giancana?