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**Document Information**

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**SUBJECTS**

- CIA
- COLBY, WILLIAM
- VIETNAM
- KENNEDY, JOHN
- DIEM, ASSASSINATION

**DOCUMENT TYPE**

- SUMMARY

**CLASSIFICATION**

- Declassified

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**CURRENT STATUS**

- Redact

**DATE OF LAST REVIEW**

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**OPENING CRITERIA**

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FROM : DAWSON, R.
TO :
TITLE : DIEM
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PAGES : 157
SUBJECTS : VIETNAM

DIEM, ASSASSINATION

COLBY, WILLIAM

CIA

KENNEDY, JOHN

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants McConne and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamara pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McConne commented that he believed that we should move cautiously, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McConne also suggested that another approach be made to Mrs. to seek his cooperation in a departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studied. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President would be well informed of any steps taken in this context. Such as the instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.


DATE: Dawson

6/27/75
OCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when the telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent to Saigon, McCon was called over by President Kennedy and met privately with President Kennedy and the Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, and took the position that the CIA should take a hands-off position as far as the assassination of Diem was concerned. McCon felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and it might last several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would be more stability if Diem could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him and hope that some group of generals could run the country better."

TOP SECRET
PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
MC CONE, JOHN  
DIEM

DATES:  
5 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:  
DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On October 5, 1963, MC CONE sent, to some locations, including SAIGON the following message: "Believe assassination discussions most careful handling. In general best line is no line so that it is clear that we are sticking to position of having no responsibility for actions of any of various contending Vietnamese groups. We certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of DIEM. We believe in gaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, etc. Consequently, believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan. This message has been cleared with State Department."

SOURCE:  
Hearing held before Senate Select Committee Intelligence, June 6, 1975, McConnell, p. 60.

FILE:  

STAFF:  
R. DAWSON

DATE:  
29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
MINH, GENERAL  
CONIEN  
NGO DINH CAN  
NGO DINH NHU

DATES:  
October 3-4  
1963

CATEGORIES:  
DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On October 3-4, 1963, CONIEN was asked to contact BIG MINH and did so by himself at MINH's headquarters. "At that time, BIG MINH explained to me that they had had, that there was going to be a coup d'etat, that they didn't want this to be an American sponsored coup d'etat, they wanted to be assured of American backing, specifically in the part where it comes to military and economic aid after the coup had been successful." p. 24 "What the GENERAL meant, he actually did not want U.S. participation in the coup d'etat. He did not want the U.S. government to start the coup d'état. He also outlined three general ideas, this was the first time that a leader had mentioned the possibility of assassination. This assassination was not of DIEM. This was -- if they could not do anything, it would be the elimination of NGO DINH CAN, who was the war lord in central Vietnam and NGO DINH NHU. At that time GENERAL MINH did say that one of the alternative means was to eliminate CAN and NHU and keep DIEM." That was one of the alternatives. p. 25

SOURCE:  
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:  

STAFF:  
R. DAWSON

DATE:  

In an August 31, 1963, CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0499), the following message appears:

"This particular coup is finished... GENERALS did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces... There is little doubt that GVN aware US role and may have considerable detail...."

(15)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 15

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75
On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities as follows:

"At 0745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact GENERALS MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to GENERAL HARKINS stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WHITE HOUSE and commenting that second thoughts were beginning in Washington. Faced with this information and given strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting with GENERALS MINH and KHIEM should not be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH.

"When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't.)

we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON advised him of our meeting with GENERAL WEDEE, of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which RICHARDSON had made as a result of the TAYLOR cable. LODGE was angry and expressed the view that RICHARDSON's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying out a coup. RICHARDSON expressed a firm dissenting opinion." (12)
"Important WHITE HOUSE meeting on subject scheduled for 1200 28 August EDT, your views urgently needed on overall feasibility of operation contemplated...FYI State to Saigon 243 was prepared without DOD or JCS participation. Authorities are now having second thoughts." (11)
On August 26, 1963, AMBASSADOR LODGE presented his credentials to SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT NGO Dinh Diem. (8)

On August 26, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0304),

"RICHARDSON reports that the AMBASSADOR decided that the American official hand should not show in the operation. It was agreed that CONEIN would see KHIEM and that SPERA would see KIANN. CONEIN and SPERA were directed to convey the substance of DEPTEL 243, plus this comment: 'We cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose.'" (9)
DATE: 28/6/75  PAGE: Dawson

FILE: PART C  REF: REPORT 1977, PP. 7-8

SOURCE: I.G.

This view on possible successor regimes. Richardson flies headquarters
and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions. Richardson
flies headquarters.

On August 25, 1963, the following cable from Section (SARG 2596) had the message below:

TOP SECRET

DATE: 25 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:


general, Paul D. (commander, Mac/V)
general, John

TRAVELLER: William

LOCATIONS: Henry Cabot

MISCELLANEOUS:
The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains the following description of the events of August 25, 1963, from a book by MARGUERINE HIGGINS: "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek tragedy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24, 1963, a date made more significant because it was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on summer weekends or lapses into a somnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation.

"The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON. It was drawn up at a meeting called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task force. The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CIA DIRECTOR JOHN MCCONNE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation. (cont')

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK was attending a baseball game in New York. PRESIDENT KENNEDY was at Hyannis Port. GENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over and the telegram long on its way.

"... the cable proved historic. For the first time it gave the signal to 'unleash' the Vietnamese military, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which the generals had been talking for so many years.

"... the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy of one war at a time. It envisaged the generals' making war on their own government, and with the implicit blessing of the United States.

"The substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.)
To persuade Diem to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and restore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law. And if, as the cable anticipated, Diem would not do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIETNAMESE GENERALS and tell them that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.

"... the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday evening after being cryptically summarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at Hyannis Port.

"The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC ... had the cable described to him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC says he was frankly surprised that such an (con't.)

Important set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not feel that he ought to veto the telegram since ... it had the 'approval of the PRESIDENT.'

"In McCONE's absence, the cable was described, again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR of the CIA, who also did not feel disposed to veto something 'approved by the PRESIDENT.'" (5-6)
In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, the following message appeared:
"The DEPARTMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation in which power lies in NHU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM himself may have to go. The AMBASSADOR is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions against BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that the U.S. cannot support a DIEM regime that includes the NHU's and that 'we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism'; (3) to make statements in Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids.'"

"The telegram includes the following statement: 'The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (con't.)"
Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her own experiences, was more a political command post than a holy place. It was the headquarters from which the militant Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political war against the Diem regime. According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two of us."

Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconcile the Buddhists. (Page 181)

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"On the night of the 21st of August, GENERAL TON THAT DINH, as military governor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps, has established a curfew. If I recall correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody seen after that time would be -- shot. And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard of NGO DINH NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon. What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador LODGE was on his way to take over". p. 21
Higgins claims that "...the raids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam." Higgins goes on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this time was because: "It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many concessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem propaganda explosion, it would be less embarrassing to the United States if they took place when the new ambassador was President of Vietnam. For the same reason, great care was taken not to inform the United States of the pagoda plans. The reasoning was that Washington could be blamed for something about which it knew nothing." (page 183)

On August 21, 1963, at a meeting between CONEIN [an officer of the CIA Saigon station] and General DON, the latter asked for US government assurances of support for moves against the DIEM regime." (3)
GENERAL DON
AMBASSADOR NOLTING
CONEIN

July 1963

DIEM

On July 4, 1963, CONEIN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public meeting and the hotel was jammed packed. CONEIN states that: "It was at that time on the 4th of July that I had the first indication that something serious was being contemplated, when GENERAL DON told me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning. I reported this fact, and I believe it was around the 8th or 9th of July, that more indications...." p. 20.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE: Hearing, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one
DATE: 6/30/75

EN. DUONG VAN MINH
EN. TRAN VAN DON
AJ. GEN. LE VAN KIM
EN. TRAN THIEN KHIEM

7/63

TOP SECRET

The initial conscious decision and agreement among the coup principals occurred on July 4, 1963, but the coup attempt was thwarted. Lieutenant General Duc Van Minh has been the indisputable leader of the coup principals from the outset. General Thien Khiem's role was to issue necessary orders and to act as Chief of Staff to General Minh during the plotting and the actual coup.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one
FILE: Hearing, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one
DATE: 6/30/75

STAFF: Dawson
The main factors that affected the coup was the decision to
eliminate or keep President Diem. The majority of the officers,
including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable
retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile.
As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never
dissension. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Indosis Ngo Dinh
Nhu, would be welcomed.

SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page ten.

DATE: 6/30/75

TOP SECRET

In SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the situation in South Vietnam" the
following quotation appeared: "If -- as is likely -- Diem fails to
carry out truly and promptly the commitment he has made to the Buddhists,
disorders will probably flare again and the chances of coup or assassina-
tion attempts against him become even better. . . . We do not think . . .
the Communists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some
combination of his non-Communist opponents. A non-Communist successor
regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but,
given continued support from the U. S., could provide reasonably effec-
tive leadership for the government and the war effort." (1-2)

SOURCE:
1967 T.G. Report, part 2, 401-2

STAFF: Dawson
Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic--having any precedence over the National Vietnamese flag in public places or in public view. Higgins does not doubt that the Vietnamese government's decision to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti-Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the National Vietnamese flag on view being sometimes tattered and torn and few in number. (91)

CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be Buddhists. And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish some mustard at a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. This made people want to identify themselves against the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas. CONEIN did not know whether or not this became the principal reason for the United States wanting to get rid of the regime. pp. 42-44.
Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue was to "urge Diem to repair all Buddhist grievances forthwith, to accept responsibility for the May 8 killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting Hue himself to do so." (Ambassador Nolting was on a Mediterranean vacation at the time.)

"According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from Washington, 'direct, relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government...' In despair Trueheart in June resorted to a formal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures (police effort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), the United States would be forced to disassociate itself publicly from such actions, as indeed we did two months later. The warning was a momentous step. It amounted to a direct official command from (continued next card)

Source: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row

In the United States. Public disassociation could have disastrous results, encouraging the Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regime's foreign critics..." perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup" (100)
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
NHU, NGO DINH
MADAME NHU
CAN, NGO DINH

DATES:
"Summer 1963"

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the attacks in May in Hue followed up by an attack in August on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of the Buddhists by making them become a political entity which they had never been before. CONEIN stated that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAID and JUSPAU, as well as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power of the government at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME NHU, the chief of the women's solidarity movement. DIEM was felt to be out of touch with reality and not getting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp. 44-45

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN

DATES:
"middle May 1963"

CATEGORIES:

OCURRENCE: CONEIN said that the DIEM government started the Buddhist antagonism but could not understand their doing so. He gave his personal opinion as that "they had a chance to get out of it and get out of it very gracefully within the first two weeks after the 8th of May incident in Hue by meeting the demands of paying off the families of those people who were killed when the military attacked the pagodas in Hue. If this would have been done, I think that we would have been much better off... This was a turning point of the political situation....". pp. 41-42

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DIEM \ MAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp.)

DATES: May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: "Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation of the Hue affairs. For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical commission led by Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a man of integrity by the Americans.)" The commission also included the Surgeon General of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance. After extensive interrogation of witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of the deaths on May 8.

"At the time, nonetheless, Diem's regime claimed that plastic bombs caused the deaths was widely ridiculed.

"Unfortunately, no American officials were witness to the incidence. The American consul had been out of town but he tended to disbelieve the government's efforts to place responsibility on Viet Cong partisans. He felt that the American supplied grenades were responsible for the killings." (95)

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: THICH TRI QUANG \ NGUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief) \ MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV. CHIEF)

DATES: May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: Nguyen Van Bang later at the trial of Major Dang Sy said that "While we were inside, two loud explosions suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the sounds of broken glass, gunshots, and exploding hand grenades." In the confusion Major Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air. Unfortunately this was the prearranged signal authorizing his troops to use grenades to disperse the crowds. At least 15 of these grenades were throw and the explosions caused at least 8 dead at the radio station. (95) This statement though, appears to be in conflict with later medical evidence coming from the Interior Minister which found that none of the bodies of the dead had metal splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla." (95-96)

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975
According to Higgins on May 8, 1963 on the Buddhist birthday Thich Tri Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags. About 8 pm Thich Tri Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then made the demand upon the director of the station to play. He was refused. Thich Tri Quang proceeded to encourage an already active angry crowd which in the middle of this oration began to shout and press forward. The director of the station called up Nguyen Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would frighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd. Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94)

"No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam. If there had been, assuredly the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world. Complaints of alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quang and his accomplices in a campaign of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented no more than the early activity of determined propagandists.

Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and techniques of governing."
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<td>Nhu</td>
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**TOP SECRET**

**OCCURRENCE:**
Colby explained that a couple of weeks before the assassination the thought of assassination was not aimed at Diem but at Nhu and Can, Diem's two brothers who were considered the evil influence of the government. "The idea of removing Nhu from Vietnam was one that was discussed in great detail and a great deal of pressure was put on Diem to send his brother out of the country." "At one point I made a suggestion that perhaps I could convince him of the desirability of leaving the country for the benefit of his own, of the country itself. That I could go over and argue him into it that I think is the separable thing from the actual decision to shoot Diem. I think the decision to shoot Diem was a conscience decision taken by the generals which came as a very new development during the coup, but let's face it, it is something you have to anticipate may take place in an overthrow of a government." Pages 33-34

**SOURCE:** Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975, Colby

**STAFF:** Dawson

**DATE:** 7/1/75

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<td>11/2/63</td>
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**OCCURRENCE:**
Cucin stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassination was there a discussion of the killing of Diem. Further, there had never been any discussion at any time about Diem himself being killed by anybody. In fact, the generals and many people wanted Diem to be around but they could not stand Nhu and Madame Nhu, Diem's wife. Page 64-66.

**SOURCE:** Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975

**STAFF:** Dawson
OCCURRENCE: COLEY stated that "Apparently the decision by several of the generals, the ones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent an officer, a small armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in the other part of town. He and his brother were put in an armored personnel carrier with an officer, a young Vietnamese who was an aide to GENERAL MINH, head of the coup group, and they went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier arrived back at headquarters, the two were dead and had been shot several times. That officer, incidentally, and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently when this junta of generals was overthrown about two months later. Somebody took that occasion to shoot him."

pp. 18-19.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 18-19

FILE:

DATE: 29 June 1975

STAFF: R. DAWSON

OCCURRENCE: The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached Hue on May 7, 1963. Since the city was already bedecked with flags the Vietnamese Minister of Interior, Vui Van Long, arriving in Hue on the same day as the circular arrived went to the Buddhist leaders and explained that the flag regulation would not be enforced. "The leaders of the monks were very pleased," said Minister Long. "They listened to me and told me that I had given complete satisfaction to their desires." Quang was present during this exchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the arrangement not to enforce the regulation. Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief could reverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, according to Higgins was that Kuang sent a few monks around to tell the people to haul down the flags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministers actions. "The monks were told to tell the population that this was being done as a

SOURCE: The result of Diem's order to ban the Buddhist flags. "(1)"

FILE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

DATE: July 2, 1975

STAFF: Dawson, R.
In response to a question as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate Mr. Diem and had sent a telegram in conjunction with that suggestion, McCone testified that he did not think it was Mr. Diem. He testified that "there was a proposal, one of a number of proposals, in connection with the difficult political situation that existed in South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination Mr. Nhu and General Kanh.... when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down." (4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations. We were really at war there. My opposition was more on the basis of considered judgement that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final an analysis solve any problem." (5).

**SOURCE:** McCone, June 6, 1975

**STAFF:** Gordon Rhea

**DATE:** 6/27/75
### Document 1

**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
- Lansdale
- Alan Dulles

**DATES:**
- Mar 16, 1960

**CATEGORIES:**
- Mongoose
- Special Group
- Diem

**OCCURRENCE:**
On March 16, 1960 at the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans to use the base radio at Guantanamo Bay to expand the station's listening audience. 
**VIETNAM** Mr. Dulles referred to the worsening security situation in South Vietnam and commented that this appears to be a situation where S. F. training might be in order. Dulles asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. Lansdale to visit the area to assess the situation on the spot." Dulles also discussed briefly "the possibility of assisting the South Vietnam government to mount guerrilla operations in the north."

**SOURCE:**
Minutes of Special Group Meeting March 16, 1960.

**FILE:**

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**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
- Lansdale
- Dulles
- Hare
- Irwin

**DATES:**
- May 12, 1960

**CATEGORIES:**
- Diem
- Special Group

**OCCURRENCE:**
On May 12, 1960, the Special Group discussed the subject of the invitation from President Diem for General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam. Mr. Hare said "that he assumed that the way in which Diem would like to use General Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U.S., but that some adjustments could no doubt be made. Mr. Dulles said that "Lansdale could be counted on to carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated to upset Diem."

**SOURCE:**
Minutes of Special Group meeting May 12, 1960

**FILE:**

---
STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
NGO Dinh Nhu
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM, COLBY, HARKINS
WESTMORELAND, GENERAL

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "In 1962 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTER THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM to be responsible for liaison between CIA and the MINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. The idea for this program was that of Nhu, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security within hamlets and villages in order so the people could deny access of food and taxes to the VIET CONG. In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspice of the MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and including small sections." p. 17. CONEIN. "This was done with the permission of GENERAL HARKINS and it was known to GENERAL WESTMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18.

OCCURRENCE: Maxwell Taylor states that the Special Group and the Special Group Augmented considered a proposal by CIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This had been prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense.

Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support of this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of battle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized.

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated Sept 27, 1962. RG 50
STAFF: PCW
DATE: 6/29/75
FILE:
CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, there was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was the political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was unable, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.
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SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, CONEXIN

FILE: 30 June 1975

STAFF: R. Dawson
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<th>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</th>
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**OCCURRENCE:** "Most manifestations of political opposition," wrote Henderson, "were vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elections were far from free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime bore the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's people with the forms and substance of democracy, but...Diem had still to prove that his professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165)

**SOURCE:** Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** Dawson, R.

**DATE:** July 2, 1975

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**OCCURRENCE:** CONEIN stated that: "On May 7, 1963,..."The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself and my entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam. While in Hue, it was on my aircraft that I was assigned to me for that day -- while in Hue, they had a very large meeting of different military authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on. They had met with the President's brother, NGO DINH CAI who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some decisions were made, of which I was not aware of (sic). We returned quite late the night of the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR told me it would be impossible. I wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Buddha. I wanted to see burnt boats with the candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there was an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists. At that time, the Buddhists as an entity was not a political force and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Buddhists came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening in..."

**SOURCE:** Vietnam, p. 19

**Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, CONEIN**

**STAFF:** R. Dawson
"...I worked for Ambassador LODGE. I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I received my instructions from Ambassador LODGE. They were cable instructions, he had a very good habit of not reading something. He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained to you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know who was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instructions, do you understand them? Yes, sir; allright, we'll carry them out." p. 23

"I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25
Colby stated that the policy of the chain of command wanted a determination whether it be by the Security Council or by other authority is made to carry out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council to the ambassador. "The ambassador is the President's representative and has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an important question like this (the Diem coup) would be passed to the ambassador to handle." Now, the other agencies in town would be informed of the policy directive that we might have additional communication as to the details as to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through directive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and immediately under the control of the ambassador." Page 35.

Colby stated that "the Special Forces first arrived in Vietnam working for CIA in this country program of developing villages for their own defense. When it got to be as I remember 750 of them the question arose as to whether they should be transferred out of CIA into military control, and this was done during 1963; military took over responsibility for that program and I will have some more words to say about that at another time." Page 28-29.
### PERSONS/ENTITIES:
- Bundy, Mc George
- Taylor, Maxwell
- Ball, George
- Forrestal, Michael
- Hillsman, Roger
- Ambassador Nolting
- Mc Cone, John
- Mc Namara, Robert
- Gilpatric, Roswell

### DATES:
- 1963

### OCCURRENCE:
COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conference room or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, Messrs. Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Hillsman, Mc Cone, Mc Namara Gilpatric, Taylor. p. 70 COLBY also stated that generally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to be with the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the Attorney General would have been there. pp. 70-71, The chairman of the meetings downstairs whose President never attended would have been Mr. Bundy. pp. 71-72 Mr. Harriman would come sometimes, COLBY recalled, and Vice President Johnson would always attend the ones upstairs in the Cabinet room, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. 72 Ambassador Nolting when he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam took a very active role opposing actions against President Diem to the extent that he was invited to participate. And his advice was not accepted. p. 73

### SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCJ, June 20, 1975, Colby

### STAFF:
R. Dawson

### DATE:
1 July 1975
Diem was not conforming to Western standards of democracy. And this was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assumption that Occidental style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems. It was an assumption with which Ngo Dinh Diem disagreed on both practical and philosophical grounds.

Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for conciliation was based on the assumption that Thich Tri Quang's grievances concerning flags and such were what motivated his Buddhist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich Tri Quang wanted was a pretext to see. His objective was not a solution, but nonetheless than Diem's head.

Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personally shown immediate public concern for the victims of the Hue tragedy. He then instantly order generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never publicized. Perhaps he was too . So inwardly assured of his innocence was Diem that he did not of going through the trouble of proving it. He could certainly (Continued on Card 1) have pleased Madison Ave. boys of the Embassy, even if only a or two old chaps wouldn't scarcely have approved Thich Tri Quang's photo essay, but not Diem's image.
General Huy H. Van Cao, Commanding General of IV Corps, was never taken into the confidence of the coup principals. The participants preferred to work with Colonel Bui Khu Binh, Commander of the 21st Division. With the 7th Division and the 8th Division, the conspirators dealt with regimental commanders and bypassed the division commanders. This tactic applied also to the Marine Brigade and the Airborne Brigade and, to a lesser extent, to the Armor Command.


FILE: 

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

Other general officers such as Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Khanh were informed of the coup planning but did not actively participate in any of the actual planning. General Tou That Dinh, Commanding General of XII Corps, was handled completely differently than any other officer. Division Commanders were contacted by General Dau directly or were requested to appear at the Joint General Staff when their military situation permitted or when visiting Saigon.


STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
elements of the presidential Guard had been contacted and there were early defections during the fighting. The Ranger Command was not contacted since Ranger Units were assigned to individual corps and divisions. Those assigned to corps units were assumed to be loyal to that unit. The Air Force was 100 percent with the coup plotters with the exception


of its commanding officer, Colonelafen Fum Kien. The medical service, a non-combatant one, was with the coup plotters. The navy, always considered faithful to President Bien, was to fall into the category of the Vietnamese Special Forces with its consider issuing the necessary orders under cover.
Unfortunately, the officer, a Major (Ind) Pham (pseud), who had the mission to escort Captain Ho Van Quyen, Commanding Officer of the Naval Forces, killed the Captain prior to 1000 hours. This nearly upset the timing of the plan. Fortunately, he was driven directly to the military hospital and no one knew of his death except the deep principals and the doctors loyal to them.

**SOURCE:** Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Page 11.

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** Dawson

**DATE:** 6/30/75

The Saigon Garrison troops, including support troops such as quartermaster, signal, engineers, etc., were contacted through individual commanders. Vietnamese Special Forces, because of its dubious role as the executive arm of the secret police, was never contacted but was always considered by the Generals as being completely loyal to President Diem.

**SOURCE:** Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 10-11.

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** Dawson

**DATE:** 6/30/75
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together for a staff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he knew of some coup planning going on among the generals. This scared the generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DINH NHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks." p. 20-21.

Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour of the country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against the Viet Cong. Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on the effect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "Have you two fellows been in the same country?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reaction to Viet Nam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by going to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and battalion headquarters. But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, i.e., Hue in Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that Americans knew during that time, and it was the slightly Effett, volital society which was the haven of Viet Nam's chronically critical and bickering intellectuals. (Pages 102-105)

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, Harper and Rowe

STAFF: Dawson
FILE: 30 June 1975
OCCURRENCE: The coup ..."aborted, because, one, they did not have necessary forces. I'm talking about the coup plotters, did not have the necessary forces to combat those loyal to the Diem government, namely elements of the Marines, elements of the Rangers, presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the best armed troops available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have a coup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality Ngo Dinh Ngo who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare." pp. 22-23

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE: 20 June 1975

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that: "As part of the pressure on the government in the August period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnamese military and with Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assistance to the SPECIAL FORCES. We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the military who were involved in that, but CIA is an easy thing to turn off, turn on and off. The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off. In a simple way, I think it has had a certain influence in what they did. I know it resulted in the transfer of some units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them." p. 78-79

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE: 1 July 1975
CONEXIN states that: "Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the bonzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME NHU that were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the population." p. 21
OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided Buddhist pagodas and essentially sought to suppress the Buddhist dissidence. COLBY stated that DIEM went out and suppressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying it in his mind and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that country was faced with. COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect DIEM's image here in the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within the educated class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 8-9

FILE:

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Dawson, R.

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975
During an interview by Higgins with Diem on August 7, 1963 "...Diem sent an aide for document, which I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent conversation with an American official."

"Your ambassador," Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my posture of the liberal image to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists and the political opposition...I cannot seem to convince the embassy that this is Viet Nam—not the United States of America. We have had good reason to ban street demonstrations in the middle of a war, and the reason is that the Viet Cong are everywhere...what would happen if the Viet Cong should infiltrate the demonstration here in Saigon, toss a bomb, kills dozens of persons, including some American press? What would 'liberal opinion' say of me then? Would they believe my government when it said that the Viet Cong were responsible for the killings because only the Communists could profit from such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the Viet Cong...but whom did the Americans blame? They blamed me—the President of Viet Nam—and the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable next time? This is not child's play; I am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when I try to protect the people of this country—including the Americans—by good police work, keeping control in the streets, I am accused of persecuting the Buddhists!" (167)
Higgins points out that on August 14, 1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was "beginning to affect the war effort." Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who was at that time in conference with Trueheart and Mechlin. Milting told Higgins that "Our report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though, of course, it could if riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting front-line troops."

"We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued, "of the rumor that Buddhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what Hilsman based this statement on. But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA."

Mechlin suggested to Milting that perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's comment as "Hilsman was, after all, Milting's boss." Higgins, returning to New York, shortly thereafter, called Hilsman.

(Continued on Card 2)
In the Current Intelligence Memorandum (OCI 2339/63): "Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared: "... the coup reports and rumors which have arisen since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect some serious coup plotting. We have no firm evidence of advanced planning by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime ..." (2).

On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial law. At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control." (2)
On 21 August 1963, the current intelligence memorandum (OCI 2341/63): "Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" stated that "additional reports of plotting against the DIEM government have been received. While there is no hard evidence of imminent action, the Buddhist issue continues to make the situation dangerous." (3)

"During the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16 September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of the DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both President DIEM and counsellor NHU that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself. NHU's reaction was to order him to Dalat for a rest." During this period of time, DINH realized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. The generals would recognize this fact and GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and that, above all, should have been thanked by DIEM and NHU for saving the government. pp. 12-13
**OCCURRENCE:**

Higgins characterizes the raids on the XaLoi and on August 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy toward Viet Nam. She states that this crystallizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration that Diem had to be opposed.

"...stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an Oriental Ian Fleming. Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks "stormed" into shortly after midnight. A of bells, a blood-curdling scream shattered the spirits serenity. One eye witness professed to see two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy.

"...When the United Nations in Viet Nam investigated the rumors in charge..." 3 months later, he could find no evidence that anyone had been killed!"

**SOURCE:** Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins
Harper and Rowe

**STAFF:** Dawson

**DATE:** July 2, 1975

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**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

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**OCCURRENCE:**

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**SOURCE:** 1967 I.G. Report, Part C

**FILE:** Cage

**STAFF:**

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**DATE:** 6/28/75
During the period between 21 August and the lifting of martial law on 16 September, General Dinh actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of the Diem Regime.

Dinh's actions during this period did not endear him to the population or the other officers.
On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334), the following message appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Hqs. not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushed at all levels. Hilsman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station pointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and who real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtaining U.S. objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can substantially assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary drive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingency planning and serve as focus of build-up program. Hqs. will comment on.

Further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above at Hill'sman's request." (3)
On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0208) Chief of Station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate leadership: "... Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic. The solution seems even more improbable than ever before. It would appear that we should have either DIEM or military junta... View time factor have not coordinated this message with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject matter." (3-4)

DATE: 6/28/75

HILLSMAN, ROGER
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
CONEIN

OCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August. When he arrived he found that Saigon was an armed camp. "During this period of these attacks on the pagodas, there had been many contacts made by a lot of people to anybody who would listen to them talking about doing something about doing away with the existing regime. I had talked with different generals and the one in August -- I don't recall if it was the 23rd or 24th, we received a cable which later been known as the famous ROGER HILLSMAN cable which practically gave us the go-ahead that this type of thing could not continue." pp. 21-22

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conen
STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: 6/28/75
"There was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occasions. I met with them, other people had also. We had met with colonels and junior officers. And we anticipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August."

On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS at 2000 hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HELMS the substance of what eventually turned out to be Deptel 243 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to HELMS' query, "HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained an implicit pullout of American forces and support if the Nhus were not ousted. HARRIMAN said the message had been cleared 'with Hyannisport' with the Secretary of State and with Mr. GILPATRICK."

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:
Cage

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE:
30 June 1975
On August 25, 1963, in a cable from Hilsman to Lodge (personal), sent via CIA channels (DIR 63854), there appeared the following message:

"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way." (5)

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following message appeared:

"FYI CIA not consulted on cable being sent separately, which however cleared at highest levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact text, understand it invites Lodge final judgment. . . . Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. Thus suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we probably unable to affect it.) This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least interim period. . . ." (7)
A CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appears on August 25, 1963:

"CHIEF OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH requested an immediate meeting with CIA [an officer of the CIA Saigon Station]. At the meeting, KHANH requested assurances that the U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the DIEM regime." (7)

On August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Staff Memorandum, No. 60-63, Internal ONE Working Paper, CIA Distribution Only," the following statement appears:

"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment of US objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Communist nationalists with sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a group might not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better than the present regime. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist nationalist elements to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of past years, months, and weeks. In such a fresh start, we believe, lies the only viable hope for the attainment of US interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)
In August 26, 1963, HELMS' record of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other CIA participant was GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER, DDCI.

"The question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam situation that it really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DIEM himself. Principal points discussed were: ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current US action in South Vietnam; the fact that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role of the NHU's; the meaning of the phrase 'give direct support to military commanders' in DEPTEL 243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend failed. The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August 27 with participants to present biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9)

FILE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon on August 26, 1963 (SAIG 0330),

"RICHARDSON reports the results of the CONEIN/SPERA approaches to the generals. In essence, KHIEM said he was not yet ready, and KHIEN said he would have to check with MINH." (9)

FILE:
On August 27, 1963, there was a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. The record was taken by HELMS or by COLBY for the CIA, and the other CIA participants were CARTER and HELMS:

"The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it would be successful and asked whether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT asked that the judgment of LODGE and HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup. A cable was drafted asking if they still agreed with their concurrences to DEPTEL 243." (9-10)

In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 256), on August 27, 1963, the following message appeared:

"Examination of reports to date gives considerable hope but leaves unanswered questions. . . . Proceeding from the concept outlined in DEPTEL 243 as modified, now desire your prompt interim appraisal of present prospects. . . . Highest authority asks whether you and HARKINS, in light of developing situation, presently favor operation as currently planned by generals. We wish to give you all possible support in best available course but not to insist on any decision that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." (10)
Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President Diem and Counsellor Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself.

1 August 28, 1963, RICHARDSON reports in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0363) that:

Situation here has reached point of no return....Unless the generals are neutralized before being able to launch their operations, we believe they will act and that they have a good chance to win....We all understand that the effort must succeed and that whatever needs to done on our part must be done...." (10)
TOP SECRET

At a NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam on August 29, 1963, with a record taken by DD/P HELMS, shows that:

The consensus was that HARKINS should confirm to the generals that the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the US government. There was agreement that better information was needed on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether it was militarily feasible. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for PRESIDENTIAL approval." (12)

(Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12)


FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 28.6.75

TOP SECRET

On August 28, 1963, the PRESIDENT met privately with RUSK, McNAMARA, TAYLOR, and McGEORGE BUNDY. He reported to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE merely that three telegrams were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from the PRESIDENT, a general message from the DEPARTMENT to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARKINS. (11)

(This is reflected in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not identified.) (11)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 28.6.75
On August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, with HELMS, CARTER, and COLBY participating. The record is provided by C/FE COLBY which shows that:

"RUSK referred to recent cable traffic and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing with or what they were planning. McNAMARA pointed out that there was some question whether the generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY said he had re-read the earlier traffic and noted that they never said they did. GEN. CARTER said he believed that the general's coup was not likely at this stage and that in another week we will be approximately where we were before the attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY suggested we consider additional contingencies before the GROUP and whether the assumption that NTV is impossible is well founded." (13)


At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects that:

"RUSK suggested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us think of a coup and what might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. McNAMARA suggested the first requirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE and HARKINS. RUSK directed that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we might ask the GVN to do." (14)

DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS also participated.

In August 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities, the following report appears:

GENERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to give KHIEM assurances of USG backing. KHIEM showed a reluctance to talk and suggested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH. KHIEM reported that MINH had called off the planning and was working on other methods which KHIEM would not describe. KHIEM further stated that the generals were not ready as they did not have enough forces under their control. HARKINS decided not to give KHIEM assurances which he had been authorized to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS' decision on 31 August after HARKINS reported. (13)


FILE: DATE: 28.6.75

State Department
Defense Department

Colby stated that the "...in this situation we were having almost daily meetings with senior officials in the CIA, State Department, Defense Department and so forth, in the basement of the White House and there was no question that this was national policy and hammered out. ...at these meetings, these were the meetings at which Mr. McCona and I argued very strongly that we should not move against the Diem government. we should continue to work with it." Page 36
### PERSONS/ENTITIES:

| CONEIN |

### DATES:

| Fall 1963 |

### CATEGORIES:

| DIEM |

### OCCURRENCE:

CONEIN stated that: "there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. The best way I can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one general would talk, walk out of the room to go to the "John", two would tell you, don't trust that one, and finally the one who had outwaited the other two, there would be one left, and he would say, don't trust those two." p. 31

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### PERSONS/ENTITIES:

| COLBY |

| LODGE, HENRY CABOT |

| NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL |

| STATE DEPARTMENT |

### DATES:

| Fall 1963 |

### CATEGORIES:

| DIEM |

### OCCURRENCE:

COLBY stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the proposition that the war could not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, this which was the public pressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and the United States, and think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT." p. 61

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### SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

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### STAFF:

R. DAWSON

### DATE:

July 1, 1975
stated 

OCCURRENCE: Mr. COLBY stated: "The Defense Department was almost totally in a position that the wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well, that this (DIEM's continuance in office) is an urban problem, urban political problem which should not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and General HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth". p. 62
**DATE:** Fall 1963

**CATEGORIES:** DIEM

**OCCURRENCE:** COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT was "one of distaste for President DIEM." p. 61

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**SOURCE:**
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

**DATE:** 1 July 1975

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**DATE:** Fall 1963

**CATEGORIES:** DIEM

**OCCURRENCE:** COLBY stated that: "The most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has been described publicly a number of times, was that at one time, particularly with the frustrating period the President (Kennedy) faced with these two strong positions, he sent two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara and a Mr. Mendelhay, who had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about five days to make an assessment on the spot and they came back to the camera room, and one sat on one end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had been to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 30 military chiefs and all that sort of thing and the war business (was) going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing that was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless because there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the general feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, looked at them and and and...
Conein stated that Diem and Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double agent. Diem or Nhu had planned to have a Bravo I and a Bravo II that Diem and Nhu would have their own coup and go down to Vung Tau as if they were trapping and there would immediately be a counter-coup to bring Diem—all instigated by Nhu back to power by popular acclamation. So on November 1 p.m. in the afternoon when troops were moving it was assumed by Diem and Nhu that this was part of Diem's plan to have a counter-coup. Page 66-68.

Source: Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975

CONEIN
DINH
GENERAL DON
HUAN, Commanding Officer, Military Academy at Dalat

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein

Date: June 30, 1975
"During the month of September, there was still more talk of coups, and at that time, the month of September, I had been told by Ambassador LODGE that I was to monitor communications only... That I was to convey any messages. I had conveyed messages to BIG MINH on two occasions, GENERAL KHIEM on one occasion. I had met with GENERAL KHIEM andBIG MINH on another occasion. On several occasions, I had met with GENERAL DON and other military leaders."

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**TOP SECRET**

**SOURCE:**

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

**FILE:**

R. Dawson

**DATE:** 20 June 1975

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**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

RICHARDSON, John

DIEM

NHU

CIA

COL. TUNG

**DATES:**

2 Sept. 1963

**CATEGORIES:**

DIEM

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**OCCURRENCE:**

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523), the I.G. REPORT provides the following summary:

"RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIEM and the NHU's are fully aware that the USG encouraged the GENERALS to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of this encouragement. He judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a GVN liaison vehicle through which to conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we were willing to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with TUNG. [NOTE: PM programs = paramilitary programs]

"The Times of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting and financing a coup and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIEM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widely played by the New York Daily News, the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent newspapers."

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**STAFF:**

Dawson
A PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the following summary:

RUSK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out the necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real showdown with DIEM over NHU at this forthcoming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction. RUSK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but expressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK commented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16

FILE: 

DATE: 28.6.75
a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the following summary:

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At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the following record by Colby is provided of the meeting of September 10, 1963. General Grovesack reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions were that the war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won if current U.S. military and sociological programs are continued. Mendenhall, the State representative who accompanied Grovesack, expressed the view that there was complete breakdown of the Saigon civilian government in the security situations in the provinces had deteriorated. The President asked where the two gentlemen had been insane country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August that reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June. Mr. McConic talked from a personal telegram which he had received Richardson recommending against any cut in aid.

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19

FILE:

DATE:
6/27/75
On 10 September 1963, in an interview by Huntley and Brinkley, the President denied the charge that the CIA makes its own policy.

At a National Security Council executive meeting on Vietnam, with Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the following record: Bundy stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, to coordinate press guidance and to control outgoing messages to Saigon. He emphasized the importance of following the President's guidance on this delicate problem, in spite of intensely differing views of what should be done and how, the risk, minimum objectives, and facts. McNamara stated that his position was virulously against throwing out this government without seeing an alternative and that none appeared to exist. Mr. McConé commented that the problem was not so much the existence of an alternative as to how to put one into power. Bundy summarized the President's position as one in which we must express our reservations as to mistakes and misdeeds of Diem but not be a position where we can not deal with him further.
OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0797) Richardson reported that the country team attempted to agree on a six page summary cable to answer a cable from the department requesting views. The team was unable to agree even on the first three pages of the summary. Weed and Richardson dissented on the basis of the draft summary was too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country on an inadequate basis of data. He said: "In some ways we seem to have reached the point in the official American community, where if you think we can win with the present government, you are simply not running in the right direction with the majority."

OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 meeting of the National Security Council Executive Committee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with McConne also being present for the CIA) the following appears: "Rusk said he believed that we were not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminate Nhu. At the same time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, he saw no alternative. Rusk commented that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real leadership and become the real President. McConne suggested also the desirability of negotiating with Diem. Bundy read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu."
In a state telegram from Saigon (SAIG478) Lodge provided the following reflection on the situation: "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that it is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U.S. to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing government and the installation of another; and (c) that intensive study should be given by the best brains of the government to all the details, procedures and variants in connection with suspension of aid."

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamara pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiously, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation in a departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President should be well informed of any steps taken in this context, such as the instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.
In a CIA cable from Saigon on 13 September 1963 (SAIG0890) Huntington Shellman who visited Saigon reported his views of the situation in Vietnam. He included as part of his report the substance of a discussion with DON Truehart: "The Ambassador is considering charging McVey with making the approach to SVN military. He mentioned Gen. Don, to attempt to stimulate early coup action with appropriate U.S. assurances. I inquired had Ambassador made such a proposal to Washington and was told this was within Lodge's authority."

On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their chief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence gathering.
**Persons/entities:**

<table>
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<th>Halberstam, David.</th>
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<tr>
<td>15 Sept. 1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diem</td>
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**Source:**

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 23

**Staff:**

Dawson

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**Persons/entities:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Richardson, John</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 Sept 1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diem</td>
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</table>

**OCCURRENCE:**

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's request for his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably peridious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be more effective if they are limited to practical and achievable objectives.)"

**Source:**

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's request for his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably periptious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be more effective if there are limited to practical and achievable objectives.)"

**SOURCE:**
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

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In a memorandum for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963, he reported "Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson (Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?"
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### SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

### STAFF:

Dawson

### DATE:

6/27/75

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### OCCURRENCE:

In a personal letter from Mccon to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced .... We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter....."
On September 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (514) Lodge stated to the President that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the present government in the immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as an interim measure pending such eventuality. Frankly, I see no opportunity at all for substantive changes."

In a personal letter from McConne to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale (replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced. Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced. We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter....."
On September 23, 1963, the McCone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services. He told them that the agency was urging a slow cautious approach to the problem of ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regime that was capable of running the government.

DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to President Diem. He became the actual key to the success of the coup. His facile, and at times brilliant mind, was used to the general's advantage in that General DINH convinced President Diem that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket orders to be a counter-coup force. DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his principal airborne companies on a bootless operation outside of Saigon on 29 and 30 October, so that these troops would not be present on 1 November. DINH is the Minister of Security in the provisional government.  p. 13

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein

STAFF:
R. Dawson
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying orders from his ambassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who were planning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caught with their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economic and military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his objective the encouragement or the promotion of the coup, nor did he ever discuss the possibility of discouraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest or remained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway. pp. 38-41

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: When the ministerial post for DINH did not materialize by early October, the coup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime. It is evident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL MINH during the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had compromised him sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH if he showed any sign of compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a day including CO, his deputy. p. 13

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET
OCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONEIN) received a call on October 30 (1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the decision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home at one point, etc."
Concin/General Don meeting at Nha Trang with the following significant points: (a) General Duong Van Minh desired a private conversation with Concin; (b) General Ton That Dinh (Counseling General, III Corps) realized he had been duped by Diem Government during his tenure as Military Governor of Saigon between 31 August and 16 September 1963; (c) Generals, during the month of September 1963, submitted a request to President Thieu to accord then positions in different ministries which they did not expect Diem to honor; (d) Concin stated that the Generals now have a plan; (e) prior to General Diem's press conference of 20 August, an unidentified Vietnamese civilian told Counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu that the Americans were contacting various Vietnamese in order to encourage a coup - Don was called by Nhu and shown a list prepared by Nhu naming Americans engaged in coup plotting; Concin's name was not on the list.

**SOURCE:** Hearings, SSCT, 6/30/75, Concin, Exhibit One.
On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon, (SAI61397) the following report appeared: "...it is clear that Lodge wants a change in chief of station...departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". In a comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."
On 5 October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534) it was stated as a fourth GPN.

On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCona stating that "I... agree with what I understand McNamara said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:"...it is clear that Lodge wants a change in chief of station...departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". In a comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."
On 5 October 1963 in a State cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534) it was stated as a fourth instruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness" toward GPN.

In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears: "...President today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as it appears...."
In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears: "...President today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as it appears...."

On 5 October there was a Presidential meeting on Vietnam. The only CIA participant was McCon. He provided the following record. The meeting was held to discuss matters that became the subject of DEPTEL 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.) DCI said it was the opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Far East Division, that fiddling with the commodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create an economic crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more cooperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at large of a more serious nature. It was the consensus of the meeting that some meaningful political movements had to be made but exactly what they should be was not determined.
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1447) of 5 October 1963, DAVE SMITH, the Acting Chief of Station cabled that he had discussed this latest CONEIN/MINH meeting with Ambassador LODGE and DCM TRUEHART. SMITH reported that he had recommended to Ambassador LODGE that: "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or protracted struggle which can rip the Army and the country asunder."

On October 5, 1963 in a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG1445) it was stated that the meeting with CONEIN (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future. He said he did not expect U.S.G. support of a coup effort but did need USG assurances that USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the change of government: (a) assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Diem, keeping President Diem in office; (b) encirclement of Saigon by various military units; and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist military units.
**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
LODGE, HENRY; KENNEDY, JOHN F.; KENNEDY, ROBERT F.; MC CONE, JOHN

**DATES:**
5 or 6 Oct. 1963

**CATEGORIES:**
DIEM

**OCCURRENCE:** MC CONE recalled a meeting with President KENNEDY and Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about October 5 or 6, 1963. The Attorney General was rather non-committal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said, John, are you sure you are right? And I said, I think I am and he said I'm rather surprised the position you took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it..."(T)his discussion had nothing to do with assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to. Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of messages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways. CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called — CABOT LODGE was called by DIEM's staff and DIEM said, you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do it. Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy.

**SOURCE:**
Hearings, SSCI, June 6, 1975, McConne, pp. 63-64

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**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
KAHN, CONEIN, LODGE, TRUHART, WM.
NGO DINH KAHN
SMITH, DAVID
COLBY, WILLIAM; MC CONE, JOHN

**DATES:**
5-7 Oct. 1963

**CATEGORIES:**
TOP SECRET

**OCCURRENCE:** COLBY testified as to the events surrounding the cable from Saigon of 5 October 1963 which reads as follows: "We do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon, or a protracted struggle which could rip the army and the country asunder." And the response on 6 October 1963 which COLBY wrote for MC CONE as follows: "MC CONE directs that you withdraw recommendation to Ambassador concerning assassination plan under MC CONE instructions as we cannot be in a position to actively condone such course of action thereby endangering our responsibility, therefore COLBY explained that this second message he drafted was to eliminate assassination as an alternative. COLBY stated that the assassination of DIEM's other brothers NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to continue. A reply was sent on October 7 from Saigon in response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was taken as directed, meaning that the Ambassador had been so informed to withdraw the recommendation.

**SOURCE:**
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 12-17

**FILE:**

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In a CIA cable to Saigon (DKH73661of 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs that you withdraw recommendations from Ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under MCCONE instructions as we can not be imposition actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore."

In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Saigon, the station in Saigon responded (SAIG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DOC TRUEHART was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal recommendation at MCCONE's instruction was also conveyed to TRUEHART. Ambassador LODGE commented that he shares MCCONE'S opinion."
On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.S. was maintaining a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to the fact that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans. Mr. MCGOON also referred to "the orientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that "for Americans to resume direct contacts at this time would appear to represent a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running counter to his policy." The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined.)

On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflects in a comment that the U.S. government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had already been cut quietly and over a period of some months. Bill Colby, Jock Anderson and Dave Smith told us that the public announcement of the aid reduction was a signal to the general and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals on, but if so, that intention did not find its way into the record. The nearest thing to it is in the record of a presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips recommended and he suggested "cutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much enthusiasm as an indication of vigorous of American position." In general, aid cuts were discussed in terms of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in his regime. However, planned or however looked upon by the U.S. administration, it is clear that the Vietnamese considered the official confirmation of aid cut as a clear token of their support of coup planning.

On October 9, 1963, the President stated that "I know that the transfer of John Richardson, who is a dedicated public servant, has led to surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities, but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions."

In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228) which was originaled by William Colby the following appears: "... while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave the impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges that the contact with MINH press for "detailed information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."
### PERSONS/ENTITIES:
- Kennedy, John F.
- Richardson, John

### DATES:
- Oct. 9, 1963

### CATEGORIES:
- DIEM

### OCCURRENCE:
On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that the transfer of John Richardson, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities, but has operated under close control of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions."

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### SOURCE:
- IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

### STAFF:
- Dawson

### DATE:
- 6/27/75

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### PERSONS/ENTITIES:
- Lodge, Henry Cabot
- Kennedy, John F.
- Minh, General
- Don, General
- Colby, William

### DATES:
- Oct 10, 1963
- Oct. 9, 1963

### CATEGORIES:
- DIEM

### OCCURRENCE:
In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General Minh or Don, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with Minh or Don, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR 74228 of 9 October wherein Colby had stated that the matter of Minh's plans be detailed clearly indicating that Minh's plans offer a high prospect of success. "While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort..."
In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR/74228) which was originated by WILLIAM COLBY the following appears: "... while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave the impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
MINH, GENERAL
DON, GENERAL
COLBY, WILLIAM

CATEROGIES:
DIEM

DATES:
Oct 9, 1963

OCCURRENCE:

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SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33

STAFF:
DAWSON
In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."
A briefing by MCOONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that "we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed cautiously, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines."

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In a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the Generals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. CONEIN under instructions passed the substance of DIRY/4228 to DON. DON promised he would seek permission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's eyes only.

A report was received at approximately 1230 hours 0ct. Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao was planning a coup scheduled for 1600 hours; the coup failed to materialize. Later, Thao admitted that the coup forces lacked transportaion, otherwise the coup would have begun as reported.
**Top Secret**

**Persons/Entities:**
- DIEM
- ONEIN
- Ambassador Lodge
- DON

**Dates:**
- 10/23/63

**Categories:**
- DIEM

**Occurrence:**
ONEIN asked why the generals had not spoken to Ambassador Lodge at the 13 October reception; DON stated that security could not permit an approach to the Ambassador since other members of the GVN were present; DON promised he would seek permission of the coup committee to give ONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's eyes only and requested a meeting in downtown Saigon on 24 October.

**Source:** Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, ONEIN, Exhibit One; Dawson, Page 6.

**File:**

**Persons/Entities:**
- NEIN
- NERAL DON
- R74228
- GHE, HENRY CABOT

**Dates:**
- Oct 23, 1963

**Categories:**
- DIEM

**Occurrence:**
a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals up", it was noted that a meeting with ONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the generals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. ONEIN under instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek permission of the coup committee to give ONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's eyes only.

**Source:**

**Staff:** Dawson

**Date:** 6/30/75
General Doan requested Conein to meet him at JCS Headquarters; Doan stated the general officers coup committee had decided to try to take advantage of the 26 October National Day in order to stage a coup within a week. A member of General Doan's staff, Colonel Nguyen Huong, had leaked to U.S. authorities that a coup was to occur on or about 27 October. Huong's overtures to the Americans had reached the palace and as a result President Diem had ordered the 5th and 7th Divisions, which were key elements in the Saigon area, to go on extended operations outside Saigon.

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SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, p. 6

FILE:  
DATE: 6/30/75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
DATES: Oct. 23, 63
CATEGORIES: DIEM

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CONFESSIONAL:

Doan said to know the answers to previous questions with respect to the U.S. attitude toward a coup; Conein, under instructions, told Doan that the U.S. would not tolerate a change of government in Saigon; Doan would provide artillery assistance to a new regime.

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SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, p. 6

FILE:  
DATE: 6/30/75
TOP SECRET

Both Generals Minh and Don presented credibly to General Harkins as well as most other ARVN generals, though Ambassador Talked with said generals, none mentioned Caioin.


FILE:

TOP SECRET

A. In addition to the above maneuvering, Colonel Do Mai, then intelligence chief, Chief of Military Security Service, played his role by issuing false intelligence reports which went to President Diem. These reports started in or about 24 October, and built up a picture of strong Viet Cong forces approaching Saigon for attack and permitted the Joint General Staff to issue appropriate orders, approved by the President, to move units en masse to the vicinity of Saigon and also to move units, such as the Special Forces, away from Saigon.


FILE:
CONERN and Huan held meeting during which Huan
confirmed the fact that he attempting to contact
and had a message from the generals. At a reception
to be given 12 October by General Harkins for
Ambassador Lodge, one of the generals would
approach the American and ask the latter to
vouch for Corein; if the Ambassador confirms that
Corein is speaking with the Ambassador's authority,
he should be prepared for a future meeting outside.
Harkins told Huan was only passing a message and did
not elaborate further.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,
          page 5.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

Mr. Lam Ngoc Huan, Manager of Caravelle Hotel and
former ARVN officer who was retired due to sus-
picions of involvement in November 1960 coup plot,
approached an Embassy officer after a social event
and stated he was trying to establish contact with
a military officer designated by Ambassador Lodge
to take part in confidential discussions. Huan
claimed he was representing some Vietnamese
generals and other officers who wanted to talk to
an American military officer about the situation
in South Vietnam.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,
          page 5.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
OCCURRENCE: When CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p. 5, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, i.e., NGUYEN QUANG and THAO. But did not explain the reference to MC NAMARA. p. 29

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: July 1, 1975

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Captain Nguyen Quang Nguyen, Chief of Operations, Armor Command, stated he was contacted by two different coup groups during the week of Oct. 12 October: the second group was headed by Lt. Colonel Tran Thanh Thien, who had

PHAM NOOC THAO

SECRETARY MACNAMARA

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, STAFF: Dawson
Conein and Don met at 1230 hours; (a) Don did not receive permission from the coup committee to turn over the political plan; (b) Don had been authorized to outline the political thinking of the coup committee - (1) the succeeding government would be civilian and no member of the coup committee would hold a senior position in the new government; (2) the new government would, as soon as possible, free non-communist political prisoners, hold free elections, and permit operation of opposition political parties except for the Viet Cong; (3) there will be complete freedom of religion and


no favoritism or discrimination shown toward any creed; (a) the new government would be pro-West, but not a papa of the USA; (b) the new government would carry the war against the Viet Cong to a successful conclusion with Western, particularly USA, help; (c) Don said that Conein would be in close contact with coup headquarters to insure a close line of communication between the coup headquarters and the Ambassador; (d) Don stated that once the coup started, it would do no good for the USA to attempt to stop it; (e) Don was aware of coup plotting on the part of Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc That; (f) the coup committee was in contact

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
with Thao, but Thao does not have the necessary force to carry out his plan; (g) The generals' coup committee had come to the conclusion that the entire Ngo family had to be eliminated from the political scene in South Vietnam; (h) A new meeting was scheduled for 28 October.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON
CONEIN
HENRY HARKINS
MC GEORGE BUNDY
GENERAL DON
CONEIN

DATES:
10/24/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: General Don also requested Conein to be at the Trip Lounge at Saigon airport at 0615 hours; General Don told Conein that he had seen General Harkins the evening of 23 October and General Harkins informed him that the U.S. military would not thwart any plans of the generals; Don informed Conein that all plans were complete and had been checked and rechecked. The necessary military units were available and willing to join the coup; the coup would occur within the next week and in no case later than 3 November; Don requested a meeting that evening at a contractor's office in downtown Saigon.


FILE: one

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Harkins
Bundy, Mc George
General Don
Conein

DATES:
October 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: In a cable marked "eyes only" to Lodge and Harkins from Bundy dated October 24, Conein characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.S. government and Diem. The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. Nhu attempting entrapment Don's approaches to Conein. Feel quite strongly that Lodge and Harkin can stand back from any non-essential involvement. It seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between Don and Conein." p. 33

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF: R. Dawson
On October 24, 1963 Mr. McConne had a special group meeting "expressed his fear that the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved in conversations between General DON and CONEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN's usefulness and involve Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins in operation difficult to deny." The Special Group authorized a message to Lodge and to Harkins emphasizing a secure system of contacts with General DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment of DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONEIN meetings. The group agreed to firm up policy thinking re Vietnam before Lodge returns to Washington and hear Mr. Lodge's views on what courses of action should be taken.

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from Lodge to Bundy it was noted that: "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between General DON and CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly..."
In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's approaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKENS should stand back from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN."

The IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION: 'In future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you should slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.' As a consequence, the first cabled reports from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here at headquarters."
On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at his initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing with NLU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the hill tribes; 3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddhists and was caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had done in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the Ambassador, and had been carried out with good judgment and with a high quality of performance. HANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting with LODGE, LODGE had not yet had a full briefing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later. (This appears to be a record by the CIA of a source which it had in the Bureau of the Budget for finding out what Lodges thinking was at this time.)

In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON reported he had been informed by General HARKENS that the U.S. military would not thwart any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON to outline its substance, which he did.
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In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in South Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail. In scession, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during period of political confusion; (7) civilians capable of running South Vietnam could not be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8) cannot discuss important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9) we either have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggressive steps to remove them and it is not clear that the succeeding government would be much better.

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36
The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador. LODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the U.S. government should not interfere with or try to stimulate a coup. The Ambassador agreed with DON.

CONEIN said "In the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey to LODGE that they were ready to have a coup and that CONEIN was to stay home and await further orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE, who was preparing to return home on the 31st of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON that LODGE not change his plans as it might be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was going on." p. 48.

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
STAFF:
R. Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
OCCURRENCE: In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated, the people in Washington figured that CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the U.S. government in case he was found out to have been set up. Therefore, the people in Washington made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive military background should take over from him. When Washington then sent a message to Ambassador LODGE and recommended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN's, GENERAL STILWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't want anybody else. pp. 31-32

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. Dawson

DATE: July 1, 1975

OCCURRENCE: The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador. LODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the U.S. government should not interfere with or try to stimulate a coup. The Ambassador agreed with DON.
On October 28, 1963, entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnamese Generals Group" it is noted that: CONEIN met with General DON for the last time before the coup was launched. DON confirmed he had talked with the Ambassador who had vouched for CONEIN. DON stated that he was leaving on 29 October to coordinate final plans. DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until 30 October -- until further notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began, but when pressed on his previous commitment to make them available, 48 hours in advance, DON said that possibly the hours would only be made available 4 hours in advance. DON said that nothing would be happening within the next 48 hours and that there was a good reason for the ambassador to change his planned 31 October departure, the Ambassador would be informed in time to make his own decision.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SOURCE:</th>
<th>STAFF:</th>
<th>FILE:</th>
<th>DATE:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IG Report 1967 (CIA) P. 37</td>
<td>DAWSON</td>
<td></td>
<td>6/27/75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
- CONPIN
- GEN. DO CAO TRI
- GEN. NGUYEN KHANH
- GEN. DON
- AMBAS. LODGE

**DATES:**
- Oct. 28, '63

**CATEGORIES:**
- TOP SECRET

**OCCURRENCE:**
Condon and General Don met at a dentist's office in downtown Saigon at 10:45 a.m. (a) Condon confirmed that he had talked to Ambassador Lodge who had reached for Conlin; (b) Don stated that the generals' committees wished to avoid Americans' involvement in the coup and requested that other U.S. personnel stop talking to colonels and majors about any coup action; (c) Don was informed that Ambassador Lodge was scheduled to depart Saigon on or about 31 October; (d) Don was interested in the exact time the Ambassador intended to depart on 31 October, stating that he hoped the Ambassador would not change his schedule as a change might be

**SOURCE:** Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conlin, Exhibit one

**FILE:** Page 8

**STAFF:** Dawson

**DATE:** 6/30/75

**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

**DATES:**

**CATEGORIES:**
- TOP SECRET

**OCCURRENCE:**
suspected by the SVN; (2) Don stated that he was leaving on 29 October to coordinate final plans with Generals Le Van Thi and Nguyen Khanh; (3) Don requested Conlin to remain at base from 30 October onward until further notice; (4) Conlin questioned Don regarding General Ton That Dao's participation in coup planning. Don stated that Dao was not participating in the planning and that the coup committee sympathizers had General Dao continuously surrounded and had instructions to eliminate Dao if he showed any signs of conspiring the coup; (5) Don, although admitting that he was not

**SOURCE:** p. 8, cont.

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** Dawson

**DATE:**
participating in the actual planning of the units that would participate in the coup, stated that from the meetings of the coup committee he knew of the following units: One-half of the Airborne Brigade, 3 Battalions of Marines, all of the Air Force with the exception of Colonel Nuyt Huy Nuo Hia, the entire 5th, 7th, and 11th Divisions, half of the 23rd Division, and elements of the 9th Division. (j) The Command Post for the coup would be Joint General Staff Headquarters.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Hinh
Hung, CAPT
Conein

DATES:
11/2/63
Diem

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:
Lam was returning with Diem and Nhu and an aide of Diem to the headquarters in an armored personnel carrier when Hinh in a separate column in radio communications with Lam's column found out that Diem and Nhu had been taken. Conein states that Hinh with his aide, crossed the column, halted it and Lam stepped into the armored car and upon orders from Hinh Shung killed them. The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff Headquarters and later on in the afternoon they were later removed from the General Staff Headquarters to Clinique St. Paul.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975
FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Conein

DATES:
1 November 1963
Diem

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: On or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1963, there were communications between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was transpiring. CONEIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the generals did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They did not want any American participation within the coup. p. 50

TOP SECRET
THIEN KHIEM

Van DON

THIEN KHIEM is acting as Hinh's Chief of Staff for Operations, but Tran Van Don is definitely the No. 2 in the generals' group. General Chieu is assisting General Hinh and his following military operations closely, directed by several competent colonels and majors.


FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
Troops moving to the palace area and covering the Zop to
ensure that Bien and Nhu do not attempt to escape through
a sewer tunnel exit in the Zop area.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 19.

FILE: 

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: 

DATES: 11/1/63 2400 hours

CATEGORIES: DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

11. Colonel Trung heading group designated to blow up the
palace. 24 teams from the Palace Guard which had joined
the party, and some of the armored vehicles from the
army forming into three columns. They will save it on the
palace...that the blast. The tanks are commanded by
Major Long, former Chief of Air Force Province.
TOP SECRET

1925 Minh informed that Ambassador Lodge will receive the generals after the coup is over.


FILE: 

TOP SECRET

Presidential Guard elements in the palace continue fighting.


STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
TOP SECRET

1945 Pro-rectified civilian politicians at 305 with generals will head new civil government. No military personnel in new government which should be established under civil control in two to three days. It is later revealed that Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho and Dai Trung Leader Quoc are the only ones thus far selected for the new government.


FILE:

TOP SECRET

1945 General still plans talk with Communist Elite. Communist mentioned above talked with him. In addition to the following: 1/General Nguyen Van Cu; Capital Military District; 2/General Tran Ngoc Van; Strategic Talent Program; 3/General Tran Du Giai; Navy; 4/General Nguyen Quang Ngo, Assistant to Chief, Joint General Staff. For Revolutionary plans these matters concern 39th and Cultural Division. They are several at gun point to commence all capture. Air Force Command Eisen did not speak; may have been eliminated.


FILE:

TOP SECRET
— radio VNM is under coup control: taped broadcast today
but the relay point had been blown.

The following generals are at 365:

N/General Duong Van Minh, Military Advisor to
the President
N/General Tran Van Minh, Permanent Secretary
General, KND.
N/General Tran Thien Khien, Chief of Staff,
Joint General Staff.
N/General Le Van Xuan, KND
N/General Nguyen Ngoc Lo, Inspector, Self Defense
Corps/Civil Guard
N/General Phan Xuan Chieu.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Concin, Exhibit 1
FILE: page 16.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. NGUYEN KHANH

DATES:
11/1/63
1545 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

The following are claimed also to be supporting the coup:

N/General Nguyen Khanh, Commanding General, II
Corps
N/General Le Van Tri, Commander, 1st Division

Rieu Van and My Tho under coup control.

Joint General Staff preparing heavy air bombardment for
the palace.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Concin, Exhibit one
FILE: page 16.
TOP SECRET

1338 Marines pour into Saigon from the direction of Bien Hoa; later indicated to be from Quang Trung Training Center.


FIGHTING AT PALACE; about 200 troops observed.

35 armored cars moving toward the palace.


FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

STAFF: Dawson

TOP SECRET

Colonel Le Quang Tung captured; directed to order Vietnamese Special Forces to cease fire; flying toward at WILF 23.

DATE: 11/1/63

1400 hours

TOP SECRET

DIEM
OCCURRENCE: when DIEM called LODED directly preceding his death, COLBY states that the message that he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "...said that he was going to require his officers to have filled their oaths of loyalty to the constitution, the Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position President." p. 67

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

DATE: 1 July 1975

STAFF: R. Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
- CONEIN
- DON, GENERAL
- STATION (SÀI CÔN)
- JGS headquarters

DATES: 1 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES: DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On November 1, 1963, "CONIN went to JGS headquarters and remained at the command post throughout the struggle. Before leaving his home, CONIN alerted the STATION by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, CONIN was told by GENERAL DON that DON had tried unsuccessfully to reach CONIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that CONIN's telephone was out of order. CONIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate contact with the coup principals, the STATION was able to report almost minute-by-minute progress of the coup."


STAFF: R. Dawson

DATE: 29 June 1975
COLBY states that "When CONEIN was told by the generals, GENERAL MINH, that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance to look at the bodies but turned it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assassination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between President DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to receive that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city."

SOURCE: CONEIN was not in attendance.

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19.

The IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles", and bolsters that notoriety by the following statement: "The first cable (on the coup) was received at headquarters at 0117 hours, (November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159. At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the STATION. Sometime during the day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in its CRITIC cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages, seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at headquarters."


STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975
When the generals took over the PTT which controlled the communications, they left only the embassy lines open. The telephone terminals had been taken out prior to the coup and instead of leaving CONEIN's telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected.

**TOP SECRET**

**SOURCE:**
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

**FILE:**

**STAFF:**
R. Dawson

**DATE:**
July 1, 1975

**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLBY, WILLIAM</th>
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<td>NHU</td>
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**DATES:**
1 November 1963

**CATEGORIES:**
DIEM

**OCCURRENCE:** COLBY stated that "The CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of President Diem and Mr. NHU. The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in the United States government and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern. In retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encouraging and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the Diem regime, and that the record is very clear that the United States through its overall policy was in support of that overthrow, and, of course, I think it is fair to say that in launching a violent overthrow of a regime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders were killed in the process." pp. 19-20
Military Governor did not endear him to the population or the other officers.

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take place at a certain time in order to alert American personnel who might be living around the area to watch out or stay under cover, because they would find 105's in the center of the city. There were no American casualties during this coup. The Vietnamese suffered about 100 dead. p. 51-52
There was a leak to the President prior to the actual coup being launched. Because of this, the President ordered the 1st Ranger Battalion to move into Saigon and to take the PPR and to surround the palace. This caused another stumbling block in the generals' plan. They were completely taken by surprise by this maneuver and had to negotiate with the commander of the battalion to withdraw his unit.

Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President Diem and Counsellor Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself.
The method used by the generals to neutralize opposition elements or doubtful officers was to hold a lunch meeting for all general officers in the Saigon area (with the exception of General Van That Dinh) and all commanders of separate units. Once every one of these officers had appeared at General Staff Headquarters and were seated (with the exception of Captain Cuyen who had been killed), General Dinh announced that he and a group of officers were going to overturn the government by force. At this time, a section of Military Police armed with sub-machine guns came into the room. General Dinh asked for those officers who were willing to go along with the coup to stand up. He told them that they would be free to move around General Staff Headquarters but were not to leave the command post. Those who did not join the coup were immediately placed under arrest and put under armed guard. Once the non-coup members had been taken away, General Dinh ordered a tape recorder brought to the command post at which time he read the proclamation and objectives of the coup plotters which was recorded. He then asked each officer who had agreed to participate in the coup to speak his name into the tape recorder. Several tapes were made from the original and distributed in different parts of the city in pre-arranged hiding places so that in the event the coup failed, no officer could claim that he had not voluntarily participated in the coup.

SOURCE: P. 12, LAST CARD CONTINUED

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
Once the coup had started, Colonel Khang of the Marine Brigade and Colonel Lam of the Civil Guard decided to join the coup. Colonel Lam at this time recorded instructions on a tape recorder which were to be later broadcast to all Civil Guard units ordering them to cooperate with the Generals' Revolutionary Committee. Lt. Colonel Khang, Commander of the Marine Brigade telephoned his unit commanders not then participating in the coup and ordered them to support the coup.

The command of the Air Force was given to Colonel Do Khac Mai vice Colonel Hien. The command of the 7th Division was given to Colonel Nguyen Van Co. Temporary command of the IV Corps was given to Colonel Bui Huu Khanh. Command of troops in Saigon was given to General Ton That Dinh. Under General Dinh's overall command were Saigon support troops, the Marine Brigade, the Airborne Brigade, 40 tanks from the Armor Command, the 5th and 7th Divisions, supported by the Air Force and the Thu Duc Officer's Training Base which joined the coup under the command of Colonel Lam Sen.
THEN THIS DID NOT materialize by early October, the coup principals realized that they had Dinh actively thinking against the regime. It is evident from statements during the series of meetings with General Toi and General Minh during the month of October that they still did not trust Dinh but felt they had compromised him sufficiently to use his troops and, if necessary, to eliminate him if he showed any sign of compromising the generals. Dinh was surrounded by relatives who effectively had 9a hours a day including Colonel Co, his deputy, now IV Corps commander and newly elevated to Brigadier General.


FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
In addition to the above overestimating, Colonel Do Nhu, (now Brigadier General), Chief of Military Security Service, played his role by issuing false military intelligence reports which went to President Diem. These reports started in about 24 October and built up a picture of strong Viet Cong forces approaching Saigon for attack and permitted the Joint General Staff to issue appropriate orders, approved by the President, to have units favorable to the conspiracy to the outskirts of Saigon and also to move units, such as the Special Forces, away from Saigon.


FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NGO DINH NHU

GEN. DON

GEN. DNH

OCURRENCE:

11/1763

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD

Binh insisted that he would personally speak to the President on Binh's behalf and that he would ask that Binh be granted the Ministry of Interior while he, Don, would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. Binh believed that Don had his personal interest at heart and Don did, in fact, make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his government but made the proposal in such a way that it would be impossible for Dinh or Nu to accept. Deadlines were given. Binh was assured that the President would give him a ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and Binh had not received what he thought


FILE: DATE: 6/30/75

p. 13, Con't.
Colby stated that although he did not have the copy there was a telegram which recounts a call made from Diem to Lodge on the afternoon of the coup. Diem said that he was having trouble. "...an effort was being made against him by his Generals, and that he believed it essential to put this down. He urged that the U. S. consult General Lansdale and me (Colby) by name because we understood something about this situation. This was in the afternoon of the coup. The response, I believe, Ambassador Lodge did mention something about assistance in leaving the country." Pages 49-50.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON,

DATES:
30 Oct. 1963

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063): ".....do not think we have the power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has made it clear many times that this is a Vietnamese affair.....I believe we should continue our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has been analyzing forces for some time and it is their estimate that the generals have probably figured their chances pretty closely.....It does not seem sensible to have the military in charge of matters which is so profoundly political as a change of government.....As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be passed discreetly, I believe we should furnish them....If we were convinced that the coup was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. HARKINS has read this and does not concur.


FILE:

STAFF: R. Dawson
DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC Commander CONEIN

DATES:
31 October 1963

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on or about October 31, 1963, FELT came to Vietnam and landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning. p. 48

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. Dawson
DATE: July 1, 1975
On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the following cable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred: "Thanks for your sagacious instruction. Will carry out to best of my ability."

"...we do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage coup...we cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention...U.S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side..." (the IG Report here states without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House repeats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves." The inference can probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, it was undoubtedly emanating from the White House.)
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCONE, HELMS, and COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advice to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FILE:

-------

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of Oct 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that "...changes of action with or without our approval now so significant that we should urgently consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to coup group can still have decisive effect on its decision. ... We must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable... COWEN should express to DON that we do not find presently reveal plans to give clear prospect of quick results... we badly need some corroborative evidence of men or others directly involved... highest authority desires it clearly understood that after your departure HARKINS should participate in all coup contacts supervision and the event coup begins he become head of country team..."

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 39
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup: "In summary, it would appear that a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent...and that no positive action by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU...Although there have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GEN. DON
AMBASSADOR LODGE
CONEIN

DATES:
10/28/63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:
General Don approached Ambassador Lodge at Da Nang Airport on the occasion of the departure of President Diem and Ambassador Lodge for their return to Saigon and asked if Conein was speaking for the Ambassador; Ambassador Lodge replied in the affirmative; Don told the Ambassador the U.S. should not interfere or try to stimulate a coup; The Ambassador agreed, the U.S. wanted no satellites and the U.S. would not start an attack.

SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE:
6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
SMITH, DAVID
MCCONE
HARKINS, GENERAL
HEIMS
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM
COTBY
KENNEDY, ROBERT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.

DATES:
Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HEIMS, and COLBY in attendance. The following record by HEIMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence. The D.C.I. stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

STAFF:
Several days before the coup was to take place, General Don coordinated the final plan with Generals Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Khanh and with the Commanding Officer of the Military Academy at Dalat. The signal to start the coup was based on a previous decree issued by President Diem which stated that after 1 November there would be no siesta and there would be only a one-hour lunch period. By radio and telephone, the coup principals had issued instructions to coup participants that as of 1 November working hours would begin at 1230. Starting at 0730 hours 1 November the instructions were transmitted to units furthest away from Saigon, i.e., Hue, and in sufficient time so that the forces which were to attack Saigon would be in position at 1330 hours. One unit of the 7th Division received its instructions to move at 1330 hours but actually moved at 1315 hours. This also was one of the minor incidents which nearly upset the coup as there was fear that this would be detected by the forces loyal to Diem.
Gen. Duong Van Minh was contacted by Capt. Hoa, Aide de Camp to Gen. Van Don, on November 1, 1963, at 12:15 hours, stating that Gen. Conein was wanted immediately at Central Staff Headquarters. Since this was not within previous arrangements for the next meeting, Conein questioned Hoa who said he was only carrying out instructions and related that Conein should come in uniform to JCS and he then departed. While getting into uniform, the dentist whose office had been used for meetings appeared at Conein's home and confirmed the message that Conein was to proceed immediately to JCS Headquarters. No further steps were taken, and the coup was in progress. Conein alerted CAS.


CONT. FROM LAST CARD

Saigon, via radio, told using a pre-arranged voice code and proceeded to the War Room at JCS Headquarters.

Present were Generals Nguyen Van Minh, Tran Van Don, Pham Van Chieu, Tran Van Khai, Tran Van Minh, Nguyen Ngoc Lo, Mai Van Xuan, Le Van Khi, Tran Tu Cai, Nguyen Van La, Nguyen Giac Ngo, Tran Ngoc Tan, Le Van Nguyen, Coloqgis Le Nhu, Nguyen Khoang, Nguyen Ngoc Loan; Majors Le Nguyen Khuong, Do Duc Mai, and unidentified junior officers.


FILE: DATE:
0310 Vice President Tho at 303
Palace is under heavy attack

SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, Page 22.

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
CONEIN stated that around 6:30 or 6:40 on November 2, 1963, DIEM talked to MINH for the first time. DIEM asked MINH for full honors and MINH replied that he could not guarantee full honors, if and during the time that Vietnamese were still killing one another. DIEM stated that he would order the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls that this took place at about 7:50, November 2, 1963. CONEIN stated as follows: "At this stage, there were four armored cars and 113's an escort of military police proceeded immediately from the joint general staff headquarters toward GAI LONG PALACE. BIG MINH with his aide, CAPTAIN NHUNG got into a sedan and with MTS Corps, went out the back road from the general staff headquarters toward the back of the golf course and took a different road from the armored cars that went down Cong Le." p. 52-53

C.330 Interestingly heavy attack on the palace. MINH has ordered that the palace be taken at any cost. 15 armored vehicles are ready from the Embassy roof. Approximately one company of 100 soldiers moving up to enter into the palace.


FILE:
Concein stated at the time they were going to bring the press in for the ceremony on the capitulation of Diem, Don said 'get the hell out we are bringing in the press.' Page 74.

**TOP SECRET**

**SOURCE:** Hearings, SSC Concein, June 20, 1975

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** Dawson

**DATE:** 7/1/75

**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**

LAM, DUONG NGOC

NHU

XUAN

GENERAL MAI HUU

**DATES:**

**CATEGORIES:**

OCCURRENCE: XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted, took off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted, and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan. DIEM and NHU were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the column LAM, who was a little fat guy who wore a mustache and used to command the civil guard and not the individual who later became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical protection. p. 59-60

**SOURCE:**

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Concin

**STAFF:** R. Dawson
Concin stated he kept contact with the junta "until the day that the U.S. officially recognized the South Vietnamese government. There were several countries that recognized, and I was acting as the liaison officer for the ambassador to the junta during this period for approximately ten days or two weeks.

Colby stated that another officer who had worked with Concin was apparently executed about that same time as Diem and Nhu were. Tuan had been head of the Special Forces and had worked very closely with Diem and Nhu and Concin and was executed by the Generals that morning. Page 27-28.
TOP SECRET
PERSONS/ENTITIES: CON'T ON NEXT CARD

DATES: 11/2/63 0310 hours

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: All general officers except Generals Ky, Van Thanh Cao, and Nguyen Van Cao, Thanh Quang Young.

LIST OF OFFICERS Colonels: Lan Van Phat

PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:

Do Manh, Chief of Military Security Service
Nguyen Van Co
Nguyen Van Chuan, J-4, JCS
Nguyen Khac, Chief of Staff for Infantry
Tran Van Nguyen
Bui Hau Huyen, CO, 21st Infantry Division
Daug Ngoc Lam, Director General Civil Guard and Viet Cong Defense Corps


FILE:

TOP SECRET

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: NGUYEN CAO KY

OCCURRENCE:

LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:

Lt. Colonels: Le Nguyen Khang, Commander, Marine Brigade
Do Khanh Lai, Chief of Staff, Vietnamese Air Force
Nguyen Gia Ky, CO, 1st Transport Bde, Vietnamese Air Force

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Majors: Nguyễn Đình Khuê
        Nguyễn Văn Chấn

Majors: VICK LEE
        Nguyen Trung Khuu

SOURCE: 

FILE: 

STAFF: 

DATE: 

CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD: 10c
Lt. Colonel Thao and Lt. Minh agreed that Diem and Nhu could have maintained telephone communications from the Cholon villa throughout the city since lines ran from Gia Long Palace to Thu Sue and from Thu Sue to the Cholon villa.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Pages 24 - 25.

FILE: 6/30/75

According to one of Conein's reports, Diem called General Don at 0650 hours 2 November and offered to surrender unconditionally. General Minh immediately ordered all telephones removed from rooms in their JGS Command Post area. This cut off all communication with the outside except for radios under Minh's control.
1130 LT. Colonel Phoa Ngoc Thao said that he and his forces entered Gia Long Palace during the early morning hours to arrest Diem and Thao to the JCS after their surrender. A search revealed they were not at the palace but had not been there during the coup. Thao reported back to the JCS. Villas in Saigon and Cholon known to be used by the Ngo family were searched.

**SOURCE:** Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 24.

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** Dawson

**SOURCE:** Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 25.

**FILE:**

**STAFF:** Dawson

Officer in J-2, JCS, reported that Diem and Thao and an orderly were caught and killed by Army personnel at a church in the Quan, Cholon. Captured with them was Captain Do Hau, a nephew of Do Nhu, NSS Chief.
**TOP SECRET**

Ambassador Lodge chased enroute to the Chancery.

GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN

11/2/63
1000 hours

DIEM

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**TOP SECRET**

2/General Mai Huu Xuan led the detail which located Dien and Thu at a villa on Duong Hung street in Cholon. Xuan returned to the 366 with their bodies. Cause of death at this time is unknown.

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**TOP SECRET**


Dawson

6/30/75
1000. Diem and Nhu are reported at 2CS. This is unconfirmed.

There are also rumors that Diem and Nhu have escaped.


STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75
Vice President THO has accepted position as Vice Minister.


FILE: 

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Sporadic small arms fire continues.

OCCURRENCE: On 2 November 1963, GENERAL DON informed CONEIN that he needed money to pay the families of persons killed during the coup. CONEIN gave GENERAL DON an additional 1,750,000 piasters. One bundle of 250,000 piasters was overlooked and was found later in CONEIN's safe. (The IG Report goes on to note as follows: "The passing of these funds is obviously a very sensitive matter.")


FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975
At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime that succeeded that of the coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh's prosecutor insisted that the deaths had been caused by American-supplied grenades of the type known as MKIII whose use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the conviction by the military court was that the 8 deaths were caused by these concussion grenades. Higgins argues in her book that this conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessment of the MKIII grenade which found that at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have sufficient force to decapitate or mutilate persons, let alone bring down the ceilings, doors, and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station. (95-96) Higgins also states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter one way or another. The trial was clearly rigged from the start." (96-97)
Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that: "Thich Tri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps the greatest mistake we made was when we gave Thich Tri Quang at the U. S. Embassy." (from September through November 1963) Page 103
Breckinridge actually put together the I.G. Reports and he did so in response to a March 1967 Drew Pearson column to the effect that the agency was involved with criminal syndicates to assassinate Castro. As a result of discussions caused by the Pearson column, staff members in the I.G.'s office were directed to put together reports on CIA involvement in the assassination of Castro, Trujillo, and Diem (50).
In concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations: "To recap: (a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the Diem regime, but faithfully carried out instructions. (b) CIA officers Conein and Spera were the contacts with the coup generals, but only as approved and under instructions. (c) A CIA officer, Conein, was at the generals' command post throughout the fighting. (d) Conein furnished General Don about $65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress. (e) CIA had no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them."

**TOP SECRET**

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44

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**PERSONS/ENTITIES:**
- IG REPORT
- CONEIN
- SPERA
- DON, GENERAL
- DIEM

**DATES:**
- 31 May 1967

**CATEGORIES:**
- DIEM

**SOURCE:**
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44

**FILE:**

**STAFF:**
- R. DAWSON

**DATE:**
- 29 June 1975
COLBY stated in response to the difficulty for the United States once it has sought to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of the foreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various times the degree to which he is going to do one thing or the other. The U.S. cannot control it. The U.S. can assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, perhaps influence him, but the control, that is...when you are dealing with essentially another sovereign, why there are limits to your degree of authority over them." p. 76

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:  

STAFF: R. DAWSON  

DATE: 1 July 1975