
Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10228

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-133

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/00/1975
PAGES : 81

SUBJECTS :
BISSELL, RICHARD
LUMUMBA, ASSASSINATION
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CC Box 133

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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
CIA

BISSELL, RICHARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CC Box 133

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CONGO



PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

HARVEY, William
O'DONNELL, Justin
BISSELL, Richard

LUMUMBA ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he worked with a man called JUSTIN O'DONNELL in Staff 7. He stated that O'DONNELL came to him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of PATRICE LUMUMBA. HARVEY testified that O'DONNELL told him that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

HARVEY testified that he subsequently had a conversation with BISSELL, in which BISSELL stated that he had requested O'DONNELL to undertake such an operation. (9-10)

HARVEY testified that he did not know about any steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency in connection with any proposals to eliminate LUMUMBA. (10)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975 (pp. 9-10)

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Dillon
Lumumba

Congo ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On May 21, 1975 in an affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission Mr. Douglas Dillon stated that in late July or early August of 1960 in attended a meeting in the Pentagon in which the overall Congo problem was discussed. He state: "During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding a possibility of an assassination attempt against Lamumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Affidavit dated May 21, 1975 of Mr. C. Douglas Dillon to the Rockefeller Commission

Kelley

DATE:

June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard
 ROSTOW, Walt
 O'DONNELL
 LUMUMBA

DATES:

1960(?)

CONGO ✓

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he told WALT ROSTOW that he had taken the initiative to instruct O'DONNELL to plan for the assassination of LUMUMBA (55).

TOP SECRETSOURCE: BISSELL, IISTAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard
 O'DONNELL, Justin
 LUMUMBA
 GOTTLIEB, Sidney

DATES:

1960(?)

CONGO ✓

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he asked JUSTIN O'DONNELL to investigate the possibility of killing LUMUMBA. (54) BISSELL does not remember the date.

BISSELL told this to O'DONNELL in connection with making plans to see SIDNEY GOTTLIEB. (Note: From this transcript, it is impossible to tell whether these were BISSELL's plans to see GOTTLIEB or O'DONNELL's plans.)

TOP SECRETSOURCE: BISSELL, II, p.54STAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> BISSELL, Richard O'DONNELL LUMUMBA, Patrice WHITE HOUSE	<u>DATES:</u> 1960(?)	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET CONGO - Authorization for Assassination Plotting Against LUMUMBA ✓
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OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that no one authorized him to tell O'DONNELL to take steps toward assassinating LUMUMBA. (54) He did not inform the WHITE HOUSE and, to the best of his knowledge, no one informed the WHITE HOUSE that this assignment had been made. (54) BISSELL said that the initiative probably came from himself. (55) BISSELL emphasizes that he did not "seek to assassinate" (55) LUMUMBA, but rather "told a member of the Clandestine Service to make plans and develop the capability so to do if it were approved and ordered." (55) He recognized that it would have to "have approval at the highest level of government" (55).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BISSELL II

STAFF: BARON

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard
O'DONNELL
LUMUMBA

DATES:

1960(?)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

CONGO ✓

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that O'DONNELL told him that he did not want to investigate the possibility of assassinating LUMUMBA and said, "that he thought it was an inappropriate action, and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways." (54)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BISSELL, II, p. 54

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
MR. GRAY
MR. DULLES
LAMUMBA

DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Lamumba ✓
Special Group
Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1960 the Special Group heard an outline of "three operational lines that we are following and mounting an anti-Lamumba campaign in the Congo." These lines included various political efforts and "The group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order."

There was also discussion which might be construed to refer to an assassination attempt: "Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates /The President?/ had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Lamumba
Special Group
Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lamumba." (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: Cage

DATE:

June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell
O'Donnell

DATES:

Fall 1960

CATEGORIES:

✓ CONGO

EXECUTIVE ACTION

BISSELL testified that he "very definitely" (p. 75) asked O'DONNELL to investigate the possibility of killing LUMUMBA.

BISSELL said that this could be an example of Executive Action capability but when pressed on the contradiction between the dates of late 1960 for his conversation with O'DONNELL and May 1961 (or early 1961) for his establishment of the Executive Action capability, he said that he did not remember whether his assignment to O'DONNELL was part of the Executive Action program. (p. 76).

SOURCE:

t

FILE:

Bissell testimony, SSCI

STAFF:DATE:

Coron
7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KASAYUBU
Gov. HARRIMAN
DULLES, J.F.

DATES:

September 1,
1960

CATEGORIES:

Lumumba ✓

Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On September 1, 1960 the Special Group discussed the suggestion to provide PRESIDENT KSAVUBU with an airplane superior to the one provided by the Soviets. MR. DULLES expressed a number of objections to the proposal.

"Mr. Merchant noted that the question of whether Governor Harriman should offer to find an advisor for Lumumba has been put up to the Secretary General of the U.N., for the decision would have to be made in the first instance."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting September 1, 1960

STAFF:

Rob Kelley

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. PARROTT
MADAME BLOUIN

DATES:

October 20, 1960

CATEGORIES:

CONGO
Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On October 20, 1960, the Special Group heard a report by MR. PARROTT "about the operation in connection with Madame Blouin, noting that her appearance in Switzerland could receive some publicity for next week's meeting."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting Oct. 20, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: CageDATE:

June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. GRAY
MR. MERCHANT
MR. DOUGLAS
MR. DULLES
LAMUMBA

DATES:

Sept. 8, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group
Presidential Authorization
Congo ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On September 8, 1960 at a Special Group meeting the minutes recorded the following: "There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

No other material on the CONGO appeared in the minutes other than the above quotation.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting Sept. 8, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KASAVUBU

MOBUTU

LAMUMBA

MERCHANT

HAMMARSKJOLD

DATES:

October 27, 1960

CATEGORIES:Special Group
Congo ✓OCCURRENCE:

On October 27, 1960 the Special Group read a paper outlining " the proposal to aid Colonel Mobutu in working toward the eventual formation of a moderate government..."

The Special Group approved the proposal with the understanding that the program envisages complete recognition of Kasavubu as the legitimate head of state and that Mobutu would remain in the background."

Mr. Merchant reported on discussions with Hammarskjold: "He has swung away from a feeling that Lamumba must be removed, to a feeling that is the legitimate prime minister and that we much live with him although acknowledging that his title is somewhat clouded."

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 27, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: CageDATE: June 29, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL

DULLES

LAMUMBA

DATES:

Nov. 10, 1960

CATEGORIES:Special Group
Congo ✓OCCURRENCE:

On November 10, 1960, at the Special Group meeting "Mr. Bissell mentioned briefly that we are making certain contingency plans for the Congo against the possibility of a pro-Soviet Lamumba government, the complications arising from a militant Katanga independence movement"...Mr. Dulles said that he had discussed the Congo [] during his recent visit to [] had told him that they would have arms available for a contingency of this kind, and he said that the U.S. and [] views on the Congo seemed quite close."

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting, Nov. 10, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: CageDATE: June 29, 1975

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> BISSELL, Richard TWEEDY, Bronson WIROGUE	<u>DATES:</u> late 1960	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE GENERAL THEMES CONGO ✓
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OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that the philosophy described by the Chief of the CIA Africa Division, probably BRONSON TWEEDY, in a memorandum in late 1960, was probably applicable to matters within the scope of Project ZRRIFLE. The memorandum recommended the agent WIROGUE in these terms: "He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions" (59).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BISSELL, II

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> O'Donnell Bissell	<u>DATES:</u> 1961	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> Congo ✓
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OCCURRENCE:

"My judgment is that before Mr. O'DONNELL ever got there, the assassination plan had been decided to be inappropriate and unnecessary and had been dropped." (p. 79)

This is BISSELL'S reason for saying that he was surprised that the virus appeared in view of Mr. O'DONNELL's position of refusing to assassinate a leader.

SOURCE:

Bissell Testimony, SSCT

STAFF:

Baron

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Bissell	1961	✓ Congo
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

BISSELL testifies that he does not remember ordering any virus sent down to the Congo, nor does he remember any conversations with the person in charge of producing virus capability in relation to the Congo (p. 77).

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Bissell I	Brown
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
HELMS, RICHARD O'DONNELL, JUSTIN BISSELL LAMUMBA	1961	LAMUMBA ✓
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u> HELMS was told by the committee that O'DONNELL had testified that he had come to HELMS' office and told HELMS that BISSELL had asked him to kill LAMUMBA but that he wasn't going to do it and that HELMS had agreed that he should not do it. HELMS testified that he did not recall the conversation at all (155). At that time HELMS was serving as BISSELL's number two man, Chief of Operations. HELMS testified that he would not necessarily have known about the poison if it had been sent to the Congo because the Deputy Director could have made his own arrangements without going through his underlings (156).		

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Helms Testimony, 6/13/75	G. Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bundy
Bowles
Parrott

DATES:

June 21, 1961

CATEGORIES:

Congo ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On June 21, 1961, Thomas Parrott wrote a memorandum for the record, subject: "Covert Action in the Congo." The memorandum stated "the Congo paper was presented at the Special Group June 8 and deferred because of the request for an overall briefing on political action. On June 10, Mr. Bissell obtained approval for Mr. Bundy for part of the program, i.e., an expenditure of \$20-30,000 for support of Bulikango (equateur) and Bomboko. Memorandum also notes that the "parliament program" was given "full approval by Mr. Bundy and "at the Special Group meeting on June 22, Mr. Bundy stated that the Congo paper had been personally approved by the President."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record by Thomas A. Parrott
dated June 21, 1961,

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ISELL, Richard
WIN
VEY
RIFLE

DATES:

Feb, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION
CONGO ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

ISELL testified that he did not have any personal recollection of who QJWIN was, although says that he probably was informed at the time if HARVEY recruited him for ZRRIFLE (58).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BISSELL, II

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> CONGO QJWIN LUMUMBA, Patrice BRECKENRIDGE, Scott HELMS, Richard ←	<u>DATES:</u> 2/61	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET LEADS Congo ✓
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OCCURRENCE:
CONGO: In discussing the recruitment of the agent QJWIN by the EXECUTIVE ACTION program "for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" (38), the ribbon copy, which is the only copy in existence, has the phrase "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" scratched out. SCOTT BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this was done by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report.

Why?

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38	<u>STAFF:</u> Baron
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 28.6.75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> HELMS, RICHARD O'DONNELL, JUSTIN LAMUMBA	<u>DATES:</u> 2/61 O'Donnell	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> LAMUMBA ✓
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OCCURRENCE: HELMS testified that he knew a CIA agent named JUSTIN O'DONNELL, HELMS stated that he did not recall having been involved in assassination attempts against LAMUMBA but he thought he might very well have been (154). HELMS did not know why LAMUMBA might have been slated for assassination, although he did remember that when LAMUMBA was alive many of his followers were opposed to the CIA and that after his death allegations were widespread in the black community that the CIA had killed LAMUMBA (154). HELMS testified that at the time of publicity about possible CIA involvement in LAMUMBA's death he recalled making inquiries to find out if there was even a remote relationship and was told there was not (155).

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Helms Testimony, 6/13/75	<u>STAFF:</u> G.Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/29/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

BISSELL, Richard
 HARVEY, William
~~ZRRIFLE~~
 SILVER, Arnold
 LUMUMBA, Patrice

O'DONNELL, Justin
 BRECKENRIDGE, S.
 HELMS, Richard
 QJWIN

FEB.
 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION / ZRRIFLE
 CONGO ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

ZRRIFLE
 QJWIN
 SILVER, Arnold
 LUMUMBA, Patrice

O'DONNELL, Justin
 BISSELL, Richard

May 1961
 February 19, 1962
 Feb., 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE
 LUMUMBA ✓

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~two-step~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE.

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard
HARVEY
WHITE HOUSE
SILVER, Arnold

GOTTLIEB, Sidney

DATES:

February 1961
(HARVEY's rough
estimate)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION / ZRRIFLE
CASTRO
~~LEWIS~~ CONGO ✓

OCCURRENCE:

the
BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability;
a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37) i.e.,

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such
a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability
with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD
SILVER and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

card 1 of 2

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

TOP SECRET

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

STAFF: Baron

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

TOP SECRET

HARVEY used SILVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability. (38).
SILVER states that
sometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the
development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general
concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:Lumumba
ColbyDATES:

2/12/61

CATEGORIES:QJ WIN
Lumumba ✓OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified:

Q. J. Win was asset who was considered for effort to assassinate Lumumba,
which never took place (Tr. 108)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:ZRRIFLE
QJWIN
SILVER, Arnold
LUMUMBA, Patrice
O'DONNELL, Justin
BISSELL, RichardDATES:May 1961
February 19, 1962
Feb., 1961CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE

LUMUMBA ✓

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~two up~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bowles
Gilpatrick
Bundy
Dulles

DATES:

June 29, 1961

CATEGORIES:

Congo ✓
Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On June 29, 1961, the minutes of the Special Group state: "Mr. Dulles said that we feel Gizenga will probably not come to the parliamentary session in Leopoldville unless he is sure that his forces will win. He commented that this raises a policy question as to whether an attempt should be made to stop the assembly. Mr. Bowles said that Mr. Bissell had raised this with him yesterday and that appropriate officials in the department are considering the matter."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting June 29, 1961.

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

RESIDENTIAL
APPROVAL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
MR. GRAY
MR. DULLES
LAMUMBA

DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Lamumba
Special Group
Presidential Authorization ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1960 the Special Group heard an outline of "three operational lines that we are following and mounting an anti-Lamumba campaign in the Congo." These lines included various political efforts and "The group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order."

There was also discussion which might be construed to refer to an assassination attempt: "Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates /The President?/ had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE:

Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Lamumba
Special Group
Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lamumba." (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE:

Cage

DATE:

June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. GRAY
MR. MERCHANT
MR. DOUGLAS
MR. DULLES
LAMUMBA

DATES:

Sept. 8, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group
Presidential Authorization ✓
Congo

OCCURRENCE:

On September 8, 1960 at a Special Group meeting the minutes recorded the following: "There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

No other material on the CONGO appeared in the minutes other than the above quotation.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting-Sept. 8, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

DATE:

June 29, 1975

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ALLEN DULLES GOODPASTER, GEN.	<u>DATES:</u> Sept 29, 1960	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE Special Group Presidential Authorization✓ <i>Card 1 of 3</i>
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OCCURRENCE:

On September 29, 1960 the Special Group discussed a proposal for U-2 airplane coverage of Cuba. GENERAL GOODPASTER "told the group that the President wishes to reserve himself any decision which involves violation of the borders of a foreign country by an element of the military establishment."

After a great deal of discussion "all members of the group expressed some skepticism as to the complete justification for U-2 coverage based on agency requirements" with

There was also discussion of a proposal to permit exploration of / certain foreign intelligence services of recruitment of limited numbers of foreign nationals to bolster the Cuban paramilitary force and the proposal of using Americans as well.

<u>SOURCE:</u> Minutes of Special Group Meeting Sept 29, 1960	<u>STAFF:</u> Bob Kelley
<u>FILE:</u> Cage	<u>DATE:</u> June 29, 1975

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> MR. GRAY MR. GEHLEN	<u>DATES:</u> Oct 6, 1960	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization✓ <i>Card 2 of 3</i>
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OCCURRENCE:

On October 6, 1960 the Special Group discussed relating to CUBA:

- (1) Explanation by MR. DULLES of the "abortive supply drop to resistance elements" in Cuba.
- (2) MR. DULLES' proposal for U-2 coverage of CUBA "All the members of the group said that they were in favor of proceeding with the coverage." Mr. Gray asked to have the memorandums on which Mr. Dulles had based his presentation forwarded to him for use in getting the required decision.
Mr. Dulles' proposal for use of American volunteers and foreign nationals in the Cuban operation. The group agreed Mr. Dulles could begin screening lists of potential candidates. Dulles "added that there might be a possibility of

<u>SOURCE:</u> Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960	<u>STAFF:</u> Bob Kelley
<u>FILE:</u> Cage	<u>DATE:</u> June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Oct. 6, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group
MONGOOSE
Presidential Authorization

card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF:

DATE: Bob Kelley
June 29, 1975

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRESIDENT KENNEDY BUNDY ROBERT KENNEDY MCNAMARA HELMS RUSK	Nov. 12, 1963	MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

At the meeting on November 12, 1963, with the President, FITZGERALD in response to a question as to what decisions remain to be made stated that "we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabotage and harassment." After outlining a number of large scale sabotage operations "the consensus was that the CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
JOHNSON KILPATRICK MCCONE PRESIDENT KENNEDY	Nov. 6, 1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On November 6, 1963, higher authority (PRESIDENT KENNEDY) "disapproved all Cuban Operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before November 12. Two operations dated November 8 and 10 are therefore disapproved. "

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Kelley

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Dulle, Alan Cabell, General Bissell, Mr.	May 24, 1961	SPECIAL GROUP PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION ✓

OCCURRENCE: On May 24, 1961, at a CIA deputys' meeting Mr. Dulles "stated that he was quite concerned about the way essentially 5412 projects are being handled and stated CIA is totally unprotected if we do not follow established procedures in discussing and obtaining approval of these projects before implementation."...a discussion ensued regarding the special groups relationship with the various task forces appointed on a Iran, Vietnam, Korea, and other areas together with the special groups connection with NSC actions. The Director agreed that this was a problem for the special group and asked Mr. Bissell to prepare" a memorandum for the special group meeting on May 25.

<u>SOURCE:</u>	Memorandum dated May 24, 1961 titled "Deputys Meeting" (00737)	<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley
<u>FILE:</u>		<u>DATE:</u> July 1, 1975

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Bundy [RFK] President Kennedy [RUSK] TAYLOR [McNAMARA]	Aug 23, 1962	MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization ✓

OCCURRENCE: On August 23, 1962, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum titled "National Security Action Memorandum #181" to the Secretary of State, Defense, Attorney General, CIA Acting Director and General Taylor stating the President had directed 8 studies and actions "to be undertaken in the light of evidence of new Bloc activity in Cuba." The memorandum included the President's direction that "The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. Action: General Taylor." Also listed for study were various military alternatives to execute a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S. and "the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockage or invasion or other action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an agravated Berlin crisis."

<u>SOURCE:</u>	National Security Memorandum #181 Aug 23, 1962	<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley
<u>FILE:</u>	Cage	<u>DATE:</u> June 30, 1975

TOP SECRET

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> PRESIDENT KENNEDY BUNDY ROBERT KENNEDY MCNAMARA HELMS RUSK	<u>DATES:</u> Nov. 12, 1963	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

On November 12, 1963 FITZGERALD reported to the President at a meeting on disaffections in the military in Cuba, stating that while the military is loyal there are indications that some leaders might break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. The principal aim of the U.S. is to "get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the CASTRO regime to dare to talk and plot CASTRO's downfall with each other."

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963 <u>FILE:</u> "Cuban Operations"		<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley <u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75
<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> PRESIDENT KENNEDY BUNDY ROBERT KENNEDY MCNAMARA HELMS RUSK	<u>DATES:</u> Nov. 12, 1963	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

On November 12, 1963 mr. FITZGERALD briefed President KENNEDY on sabatage and harrassment in operations in Cuba describing successful operations against four installations and the belief that these operations have raised the moral of the people in Cuba and continues to keep pressure on CASTRO adding to the growing economic problems facing the country.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963 <u>FILE:</u> "Cuban Operations"		<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley <u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75
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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRESIDENT KENNEDY ROBERT KENNEDY HELMS RUSK BUNDY MCNAMARA	Nov. 12, 1963	MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:
On Nov. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the President that the United State economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective if the Canadians would be willing to cooperate.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963 <u>FILE:</u> "Cuban Operations"	<u>DATE:</u> Kelley 6/28/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRESIDENT KENNEDY ROBERT KENNEDY HELMS RUSK MCNAMARA BUNDY	Nov. 12, 1963	MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:
On November 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VANCE, Mr. HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, Mr. CHIEVER, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963	<u>DATE:</u> Kelley

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> PRESIDENT KENNEDY BUNDY ROBERT KENNEDY HELMS RUSK MCNAMARA	<u>DATES:</u> Nov. 12, 1963	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓
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OCCURRENCE:

On Nov. 12, 1963, at a meeting with President KENNEDY and others, Mr. FITZGERALD discussed covert collection in Cuban operations, pointing out that CIA had three kinds of agents activities inside Cuba: (1) "Singleton" operations (2) Collection nets (3) agents involved in black net operations. Some 25 agents had been either captured or killed in the past year. There is increasing effectiveness of CASTRO's internal security forces, accounting for the loss of agents.

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963 <u>FILE:</u> "Cuban Operations"	<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley <u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75
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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> PRESIDENT KENNEDY BUNDY ROBERT KENNEDY MCNAMARA HELMS RUSK	<u>DATES:</u> Nov. 12, 1963	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓
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OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 FITZGERALD briefed the President on CIA probaganda activities in Cuba. He said some "30,000 to 40,000 leaflets per month had been mailed and during the day there are 32 hours of programs from seven different stations."

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963 <u>FILE:</u> "Cuban Operations"	<u>STAFF:</u> Kelley <u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75
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<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRESIDENT KENNEDY SECRETARY RUSK SECRETARY MCNAMARA SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS	May 28, 1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On May 28, 1963 at a special meeting with the President, "it was decided that two-level missions using two airplanes each should be flown over Soviet military camps in Cuba."

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Memorandum of record dated May 28, 1963, "low level reconnonaisance of Cuba"	DATE: Kelley 6/28/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
PRESIDENT KENNEDY SECRETARY MCNAMARA HARRIMAN FITZGERALD	June 19, 1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On June 19, 1963 the meeting was held with "higher authority" at which a program for "external sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest."

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963 FILE: "Sabatoge Program Cuba"	DATE: Kelley

PERSONS/ENTITIES: Bissell DATES: General Themes CATEGORIES: General Themes

"The device or the doctrine of plausible deniability" (5) was explained by Bissell: for any covert operation that was likely to have a visable consequence one objective was to carry out such operations "in such a way that they could be plausibly disclaimed by the U.S. government." (5)

PRESIDENTIAL DENIABILITY: "To protect the President" (5) Allen Dulles would have attempted "to have indicated to the two successive presidents the general objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the President--either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy could have ordered the termination of the operation, but to give the President just as little information about it as possible beyond an understanding of its general purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it should surface." (5-6) Bissell believed, based on "my knowledge of command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations-- is that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated" (6); i.e., "circumlocutions" (6)

SOURCE: Bissell II
STAFF: Baren

Bissell uses this theory of plausible deniability as his explanation for the reason that neither he nor anyone else in the Agency would have discussed an assassination operation on their own initiative with members of the White House Staff. "The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been notified, and had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization." (6)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

General Themes

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that the Russians have made extensive use of assassination although he was not referring to assassination of heads of state. BISSELL had no knowledge of Russian assassinations of heads of state by the KGB. (p. 84)

SOURCE:

Bissell I

STAFF:

Baren

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES
(Assassination) ✓

TOP SECRET

CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he could envision two circumstances in which assassinations would be justified. First, on proper orders from the proper highest authorities in cases of utter necessity to eliminate a threat to the security of this country. (22) As an example, he mentioned that it might be necessary to eliminate a Cuban leader to protect the United States against possible attacks by Soviet missiles. (22-23)

HARVEY also believed that assassination would be proper in the case of treason, where not eliminating the person might lead to the loss of many lives or of a life more important than that of the person to be sacrificed. (23) He clarified that these were solely his personal opinions and have nothing to do with the policy of the Agency. (23)

HARVEY testified that he believed authorization for assassinations should come from

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 22-26

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CARD 2 of 2

the President. (24) He was less certain as to whether Presidential approval was necessary for the assassination of treasonous persons, such as key agents within the Soviet Union on whose information the CIA was dependent for its own security. (25)

HARVEY emphasized that in the case of threats to national security, assassinations should always be authorized by the President. In the case of assassinations necessary to protect the resources of the Agency, he felt that authority might better be derived from parties other than the President to keep the President in a "credibly deniable position." (26)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William
DUNLOP, Sgt.

DATES:CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES ✓
(General Assassination Policy)

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had no knowledge of American assassinations of a defected agent, either a defected American agent, or defected agents who were third-country nationals. (19) He further knew of no instance of the United States' assassinating any person who was a non-political leader. (19-20)

HARVEY testified that he knew of no attempt to assassinate SGT. DUNLOP. (20)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 19-20

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Chou En Lai *and*
Colby

DATES:

'55
'56

CATEGORIES:

Castro

General Themes ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified that no CIA involvement with 2 reported attempts to assassinate Chou En Lai in '55 and '56 (Tr. 11-12)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. C. Colby on 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly
7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETBISSELL, Richard
TWEEDY, Bronson

late 1960

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE
GENERAL THEMES ✓
LONGO

WIROGUE

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that the philosophy described by the Chief of the CIA Africa Division, probably BRONSON TWEEDY, in a memorandum in late 1960, was probably applicable to matters within the scope of Project ZRRIFLE. The memorandum recommended the agent WIROGUE in these terms: "He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions" (59).

TOP SECRETSOURCE: BISSELL, IISTAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Dulle
BissellDATES:

9/60

CATEGORIES:

✓ General Themes

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question about whether the use of circumlocutions to describe an assassination operation resulted from a malaise of conscience, BISSELL replied, "I don't think it grated against my conscience. I think it may have been a feeling that the Director /ALLEN DULLES/ preferred the use of the sort of language that is described in the IG Report." (25).

SOURCE:

Bissell I

STAFF:DATE:

Baron

FILE:**TOP SECRET**

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Breckinridge

DATES:
late April 1961

CATEGORIES:
*General Themes (auth)
Castro
(termination of Phase I)*

Breckinridge testified that as far as Phase I was concerned he had no evidence that the CIA had been acting as an instrument of policy. (33) —

NOTE: This phrase "instrument of policy" is taken from the end of the IG REPORT on page 132. It seems to indicate that, based on his research for the IG REPORT, BRECKINRIDGE concluded that there was no authorization outside the CIA for the Phase I assassination plot against CASTRO.

BRECKINRIDGE said that "no specific instruction" (33) was given. Specifically in response to a question from Sen. BAKER, BRECKINRIDGE said that the Inspector General has no record of any authorization for the Phase I gambling-syndicate assassination plot by the White House, the President, or the Department of Defense (33).

SOURCE:

FILE:

*Breckinridge
Testimony*

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron

7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge
~~Castro~~
CIA-Mafia
~~Phase II~~

DATES:

April 1962

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO
MONGOOSE
SGA
GENERAL THEMES (authoriza-
tion)

OCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE testified that in preparing the Inspector General's report of 1967, he found no evidence of specific authorization for Phase II for the CIA-Mafia plot against CASTRO from outside the CIA. (43-44)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Breckinridge Testimony

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron

7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ROSELLI

DATES:

1963

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO
GENERAL THEME ✓

OCCURRENCE:

ROSELLI testified that there was never any suggestion from the CIA that what he was doing was illegal nor that if he got in trouble with law enforcement agencies it would be taken care of. (65)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: ROSELLI TESTIMONY

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

JIM GARRISON
EDWARD MORGAN
ROSELLI
JIM O'CONNELL
KENNEDY, John F.

March 1963

CASTRO
JFK ASSASSINATION
GENERAL THEMES ✓

OCCURRENCE:

P. 1 of 2

The I.G. Report of 1967 indicated that JIM GARRISON, EDWARD MORGAN, and JOHN ROSELLI were all in Las Vegas at the same time in March of 1960. According to JIM O'CONNELL, "Garrison was in touch with Roselli". (120)

TOP SECRET

The I.G. Report commented:

"The Roselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that CASTRO had something to do with the KENNEDY assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that CASTRO actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this." (120)

SOURCE: I.G. Report 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

P. 2 of 2

Discovery Leads

1. Did the CIA ever disclose this line of reasoning to the Warren Commission or to anyone outside the CIA?
2. Should Garrison be interviewed or Roselli questioned about this contact?
(ATTENTION: DAVID AARON)
3. (ATTENTION: RICK INDERFRUTH) Whether or not this line of reasoning can be substantiated, demonstrates the CIA's general awareness that American assassination plotting may breed assassination attempts against American leaders.
(GENERAL THEMES)

SOURCE:

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> Breckinridge IG REPORT	<u>DATES:</u> 5/23/67 4/25/67	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> CASTRO GENERAL THEMES
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OCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE said that the introductory memorandum to the IG REPORT of 1967, which was dated April 25, 1967, implicitly reached the conclusion that assassination was "not desirable". (19) He points to the statement: "Elimination of the dominate figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government." (4) Second, the memorandum made the point that "There is always the risk that the participants will resort to assassination" (5) In a covert action to bring about the fall of a government, implying that assassination is not desirable.

<u>SOURCE:</u> Breckinridge Testimony	<u>STAFF:</u> Baron
<u>FILE:</u> TOP SECRET	<u>DATE:</u> 7/3/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> J. S. EARMAN SAM PAPICH HARVEY ROSELLI GIANCANA	<u>DATES:</u> May 3, 1967	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> CASTRO GENERAL THEMES ✓
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TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

With regard to the FBI's knowledge of the gambliny syndicate assassination plot, the I.G. Report of 1967 noted: "They should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assassination of CASTRO and used U.S. gangster elements in the operation." (131)

On May 3, 1967 J. S. EARMAN, Inspector General of the CIA, met with SAM PAPICH of the FBI and told PAPICH of an expected meeting between ROSELLI and HARVEY. PAPICH commented "that ROSELLI and GIANCANA have CIA 'over a barrel' because of 'that operation'. He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either ROSELLI or GIANCANA because of 'their previous activities with your people.'" (131)

<u>SOURCE:</u> I.G. Report 1967	<u>STAFF:</u> Baron
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Breckinridge
IG REPORT

5/23/67

4/25/67

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO
GENERAL THEMES

OCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE said that the introductory memorandum to the IG REPORT of 1967, which was dated April 25, 1967, implicitly reached the conclusion that assassination was "not desirable". (19) He points to the statement: "Elimination of the dominant figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government." (4) Second, the memorandum made the point that "There is always the risk that the participants will resort to assassination" (5) In a covert action to bring about the fall of a government, implying that assassination is not desirable.

SOURCE:

Breckinridge Testimony

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/3/75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES ✓

CSA

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The I.G. Report of 1967 acknowledges that there is an inherent incompleteness to CIA internal investigation of CIA operations involving personnel outside the Agency:

"If an independent investigation were to be ordered, the investigators could learn everything that we have learned. Such an investigation probably would uncover details unknown to us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants." (132)

Discovery Leads

ATTENTION: RICK INDERFURTH

SOURCE:

I.G. Report 1967

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

DATE:

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO
GENERAL THEMES ✓

OCCURRENCE:

~~TOP SECRET~~
P. 1 of 2

In the conclusion to the I.G. Report of 1967, the following action alternatives were considered:

1. "Try to silence those who are talking or might later talk." (128)
2. "Plausibly deny that we plotted with gangster elements to assassinate Castro" (131)
3. "State or imply that it [CIA] was merely an instrument of policy" (132)

In this case each of the alternatives was rejected. But the format seems to indicate that such alternatives are considered frequently by the CIA in dealing with the disclosure or potential disclosure of a covert operation.
(Continued)

SOURCE:

I.G. Report of 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

EXECUTION
2 RIFLE

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

HARVEY, William
SILVER, Arnold
BISSELL, Richard

26 Jan. 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ARNOLD SILVER about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52). HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ARNOLD SILVER. (52)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

HARVEY, William
HELMS, Richard
BISSELL, Richard

Spring 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that after he had examined the possibility of the CIA's carrying out assassinations, he reported his conclusions to HELMS and BISSELL. He testified that he discussed the matter with HELMS shortly after he had been given the assignment of looking into the assassination matter and that they talked about HARVEY's grave doubts, reservations, and problems concerning this kind of operation. (42)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 42

STAFF: Rhea

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:*Bissell*DATES:*5/61*CATEGORIES:*Cuba
Executive Action*

Referring to the White House requests for establishing an Executive Action program, Bissell said: "What they contemplated is action that would be conducted through the clandestine service in the regular channel. What they meant by an Executive Action capability, of course, embraced a great deal more than assassination. It embraced means of discrediting a political leader, possibly means of physically incapacitating him, but without permanent injury, possibly assassination as last resort." (p. 57).

Bissell indicated, however, that this was not said directly to him in those terms and was an assumption on his part (p. 58).

*Bissell 1*FILE:STAFF: *Baron*DATE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:*Greer
Bissell
White House*DATES:*'62-'63
5-9-73*CATEGORIES:*Castro
ZR Rifle ✓*OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified Ex. A, Project ZR Rifle, The "Ken Greer Document," (Tr. 85), is correct in its statement that "the White House urged Richard Bissell to create an executive action capability," (Tr. 86) and that one of its purposes was a general standby capability to carry out assassinations." (Tr. 86)

SOURCE:*Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75*STAFF:*John Bayly*DATE: *7/2/75*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Bissell
Bundy
Rostow

5/61

Cuba
2 R/RIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In reference to the initial White House requests for establishment of an assassination capability to be known as Executive Action, Bissell testified "Very probably one of those two /Bundy or Rostow/ or both of those White House staff members would have discussed it with me." (p. 54).

SOURCE: Bissell 1

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

BISSELL

May 1960

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

"The plan of the capability I could have done on my own or ordered on my own." (p. 79).

Note: Here BISSELL is answering a question about whether he had the authority to establish such a program without instructions from the WHITE HOUSE.

SOURCE:

BISSELL i

STAFF: Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL
ROSTOWDATES:

May 1960

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Although BISSELL maintains that he does not remember specific conversations in which the WHITE HOUSE urged him to create an Executive Action capability, he has testified: "I believe that I did have conversations, at least with Mr. ROSTOW about the creation of a capability." (p. 81).

"In other words, it may have been initiated within the Agency, it could have been, but I believe that if so, I talked, to him about it." (p. 81).

SOURCE:

BISSELL I

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:DATE:

July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell

DATES:

5/61

CATEGORIES:Cuba
Executive ActionOCCURRENCE:

Bissell testified that the Executive Action project did not only represent an assassination capability but "it is a capability to secure the removal from office or to render powerless or in some other way to frustrate figures, usually political figures that are considered or whose activities are considered contrary to the interests of the United States." (p. 68).

SOURCE:

Bissell I

STAFF:

Baron

SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL
CASTRODATES:

May 1961

CATEGORIES:ZR ✓
RIFLE
EXECUTIVE ACTIONOCCURRENCE: CARD 1 of 2

Despite Bissell's statement that he does not remember requests from the White House to set up his ZR/RIFLE assassination capability, he states later in his testimony: "I interpreted this as a request to develop a different kind of a capability which would have been appropriate for the clandestine service and of a wholly different sort from that being used in the so-called First Phase against CASTRO." (p. 53).

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:DATE: July 3, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONTINUATION OF IG REPORT

DATES:

Card 2 of 2

CATEGORIES:1
ConOCCURRENCE:

Bissell recalls that this is true (p. 49), but he cannot remember who in the White House made this request (p. 49). Bissell places this request in early 1961. (p. 50). Bissell remembers assigning William Harvey the task of developing the Executive Action program, but he does not remember the requests from the White House (p. 50). Bissell suggests that the requests might have come from Bundy (p. 49) or Walt Rostow (p. 51). Bissell does not deny the truth of the quote from Harvey that he, Bissell, stated that he received two requests from the White House to set up the ZRRIFLE assassination capability. But he does not remember specific conversations (p. 51).

SOURCE:STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL
BUNDY
ROSTOW

DATES:

Early 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

CARD 1 of 3

BISSELL said that shortly after the advent of the KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION there were weekly luncheon meetings in the STATE DEPARTMENT with BUNDY and ROSTOW in attendance representing the WHITE HOUSE, BISSELL in attendance from the CIA, and one or two people from the Departments of STATE and DEFENSE, roughly at the Assistant Secretary level. No minutes were kept. They were occasions for discussing without agenda whatever topics were brought out. (p. 81-82).

SOURCE:

BISSELL I

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

July 3, 1975

FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that the proposal for an Executive Action project at those luncheon meetings was "exactly the sort of thing that could have happened, and this is the kind of place where I think that it probably was proposed." (p. 82).

He said further that assuming there were two requests from the WHITE HOUSE, they could have come at successive meetings of this sort. (p. 82).

BISSELL indicated that he might have made reports on the developments in the Executive Action program at these luncheon meetings, but "as I normally operated I would replied more particularly to ROSTOW in this case." (p. 82). (continued)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION CARD 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that he had the feeling that he did report in this way to Mr. ROSTOW (p. 83).

Note: This card contains two discreet subjects: (1) Formulation of the Executive Action plan, and (2) Reporting to ROSTOW on the Executive Action program.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

HARVEY

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action ✓

Castro

Z R Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Helms testified that the Z R Rifle effort to assassinate Castro the other general efforts to "eliminate Castro or dispose of Castro" were lly distinctive programs (52). Helms testified that the reference to the IG orts stating that he authorized Harvey to handle the Z R Rifle project on a cial basis was correct. Such authorization was necessary bec ause of the ounting system of the CIA which required an officer's signature for disbursemen d in sensitive operations (54).

SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action ✓

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that he remembered ZR Rifle. He particularly remembered his desire to end the project and to see if the hit man ^{was} ~~to~~ be used ~~to~~ some other useful way. ~~was~~ ^{ZR Rifle} was eventually terminated two or three years later. Helms testified he did not remember the man's name or his nationality. He did not like the idea and finally phased it out. (53) Helms testified that he considered Z R Rifle a "tiny little thing". (52)

TOP SECRETSOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action ✓

Castro
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that there was no doubt that one of the purposes of Z R Rifle was to establish a capability for assassinating foreign leaders. (54-55) Helms could not recall hearing discussions regarding setting up a capability for the assassination of Castro. (55) He could recall know overlap between the Castro assassination programs and Z R Rifle (55).

TOP SECRETSOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge
Helms
Harvey
Bissell
Castro

DATES:

'61 - 62
'62

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Helms "signed off on a project that was originally initiated by Mr. Bissell called ZR Rifle, and ZR Rifle was a project that Mr. Bissell was quoted as saying was at the urgency (sic) of the White House." (Tr. 66) "ZR Rifle was described as an executive action capability, a capability to permit assassination if someone called for them". (Tr. 66-67) "Mr. Harvey was given the responsibility of this by Mr. Bissell and originally it continued as a separate action from the Castro operation, but Mr. Harvey was also given that responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became wedded." (Tr. 67)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:STAFF:

DATE John Bayly

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge
Helms

DATES:

'61 - 62
'62

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Rifle... (which) had a dual purpose... to steal codes" and to provide lethal executive action capability. (Tr. 67, 69-70) *Rifle meant* rifle (gun) and rifle (rummage through files). *[Tr 67]*

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> McCone Bay of Pigs	<u>DATES:</u> 1961	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓
---	-----------------------	--

OCCURRENCE:
 MCCONE Testified that the Executive Action Plan was not called off after the Bay of Pigs. He state that this was understandable because this was a planning operation. It was not an authorized action operation (42)

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> McCone Testimony	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/27/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> HARVEY, WILLIAM BISSELL, RICHARD	<u>DATES:</u> early 1961	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> CASTRO EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓
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OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that the following events led him to believe that the White House had approved, at least in principle, the operation to assassinate Castro. First, he had a conversation early in 1961 with Bissell, when Bissell told him that, on one or more occasions, he had been urged by the White House to see that the Agency developed an Executive Action capability. (80) Bissell referred to the White House only in general; and did not name specific individuals. (81)

Harvey testified that he believed that if the White House had given a "generalized approval, in principle, then the CIA would have been acting within its authority to mount a specific operation against Castro." (82) He further testified that he could conceive of situations, including assassinations, where "no one would want to charge the President, personally, with the complete dirty-handed details of it." (82)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 80-82.

<u>FILE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea <u>DATE:</u> 6/30/75
--------------	--

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

HARVEY, William
~~Win, K. J.~~ ~~QJWIN~~
SILVER, Arnold

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that Q.J.Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through ARNOLD SILVER for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use. (50) Or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the people spotted by Q.J.Win as possibilities. (50) He testified that before someone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall K.J.Win was used only once in connection with an operation in the Congo, which was not an assassination operation. (51)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 50-51STAFF: RheaFILE:DATE: 30.6.75**TOP SECRET**PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

HARVEY, William

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that the EXECUTIVE ACTION PROGRAM was a synonym for assassination. (10)

TOP SECRETSOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 10STAFF: RheaFILE:DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Colby, Wm. E.

DATES:CATEGORIES:

IX - C - 2 - b

Executive Action ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question from Senator Huddleston which asked who was the lowest ranking official in the CIA who could authorize assassination attempt and have the ability to have action taken on it and funds supplied, etc., Colby stated "I doubt that I could give you a formal answer to that, Senator." He indicated that it was such a serious matter it could only be approved at a very high level including the Director. He further indicated that he cannot imagine the Director giving this authority without having some _____ (37). (Interrupted by further question, answer incomplete.)

SOURCE:

SSCI; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75

FILE:

Cage

STAFF:

JFD

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE

Higher Authority

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE was asked whether the Executive Action was an instance of a section of the CIA below his level acting without his authority or whether in fact there was Presidential authority authorizing it and MCCONE had been kept in the dark. _____
MCCONE responded that the actions taken under the authority of the Executive Action Plan were not under "direction from higher authority" (43)
MCCONE stated that his answer was purely speculation. (43)

TOP SECRETSOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONE
HARVEYDATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE testified that he "never knew of the Executive Action Plan" (42). In describing lack of supervision in HARVEY's activities, MCCONE testified "for several months Mr. HARVEY was in charge of the Executive Action Plan. Just what he did I don't know but this I am told. I never knew of the Executive Action Plan and was never briefed on it, I was never told about it to my memory or any record on it. Then Mr. HARVEY was moved over in charge of the Cuban operation and I think whatever action he took -- I have hear of two or three, all of which were abortive and in my opinion stupid -- he did it under what he thought was the authority of the Executive Action Plan but not any -- to my knowledge -- any direction of higher authority" (42) MCCONE testified that the Executive Action Plan was a subject on which he could only speculate (42)

SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

6/27/75

TOP SECRETPERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE described the Executive Action Plan as follows: "An Executive Action Plan in the jargon of the intelligence world means a plan for removal by any means of an undesirable head of state or senior person in a country. It doesn't necessarily mean an assassination. It might mean setting them up on the Riveira with a blonde and swiss bank account but getting rid of them." (41)

TOP SECRETSOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Helms, Richard HARVEY	1961	Executive Action Castro ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the Z R Rifle effort to assassinate Castro and the other general efforts to "eliminate Castro or dispose of Castro" were wholly distinct ~~ing~~ programs (52). Helms testified that the reference to the IG reports stating that he authorized Harvey to handle the Z R Rifle project on a special basis was correct. Such authorization was necessary because of the accounting system of the CIA which required an officer's signature for disbursements used in sensitive operations (54).

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Helms 6/13/75	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Helms, Richard	1961	Executive Action ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that he remembered ZR Rifle. He particularly remembered his desire to end the project and to see if the hit man ~~to~~ be used ~~to~~ some other useful way. **ZR RIFLE** was eventually terminated two or three years later. Helms testified he did not remember the man's name or his nationality. He did not like the idea and finally phased it out. (53) Helms testified that he considered Z R Rifle a "tiny little thing". (52)

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> Helms 6/13/75	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

Breckinridge *Castro*
Bissel
Harvey
Mafia

'61 - '62
~~'62~~

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Bissell told Harvey to create the executive action capability" and to take over the Castro assassination attempt, which was connected with a continuing relationship between the CIA and the Mafia."
(Tr. 71)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Harvey
Colby

DATES:

'61 - '62

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified "Mr. Harvey was... very effective..." (Tr. 90)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. C-1by, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

Silver, Arnold
Harvey, William
Bissell, Richard

DATES:
1/26/61

CATEGORIES:
EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver (52)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY
K. G. WIN

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle state "4. Operational Assets:
(1) personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief of the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg, in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960:

K. G. Win annual salary \$7,200

Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and

Hire of safe houses and other

automobile expenses \$1,000

other agents and agent candidates \$2,000

Total \$14,700

Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates \$2,000

~~Travel of staff employees engaged in Zrriffle \$2,000~~

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

2R Rife ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives":
The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The Project will be conducted by division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed." (exhibit 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials. (49)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

2R Rife ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background:
In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard
QJWIN
HARVEY
ZRRIFLE

DATES:

Feb, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓
CONGO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he did not have any personal recollection of who QJWIN was, although he says that he probably was informed at the time if HARVEY recruited him for ZRRIFLE (58).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

BISSELL, II

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ZRRIFLE
QJWIN
SILVER, Arnold
LUMUMBA, Patrice
O'DONNELL, Justin
BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

May 1961
February 19, 1962
Feb., 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

TOP SECRET

ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~two up~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> BISSELL, Richard HARVEY, William XXXXXXXX SILVER, Arnold LUMUMBA, Patrice	<u>DATES:</u> FEB 1961 May 1961	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE CONGO TOP SECRET
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> ZRRIFLE QJWIN SILVER, Arnold LUMUMBA, Patrice	<u>DATES:</u> May 1961 February 19, 1962 Feb., 1961	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET EXECUTIVE ACTION ZRRIFLE LUMUMBA ✓
--	--	---

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~the~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

BAKER
BISSELL
HARVEY
ROSTOW

May 1961

ZR
RIFLE
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Card 1 of 2

Senator Baker asked Bissell to comment upon the section of the IG Report of 21 May 1973 which says: "Early in the KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, the White House urged Richard Bissell to create an Executive Action capability, that is, a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations." (p. 48).

SOURCE:

IG REPORT
1967

Bissell testimony

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

DATE: July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell

DATES:

5/61

CATEGORIES:

Cuba
ZR/RIFLE ✓

— "Project named ZR/RIFLE first appears in the files in May 1961 although the first recorded approval is 19 May 1962." (p. 48).

This is a quote from the document entitled Nine Pages from the Inspector General, 21 May 1973.

Note: Check this quote against the original document. It is important to locate the document referred to as "the first recorded approval" for ZR/RIFLE in order to determine whether the White House requests for the establishment of an assassination capability was first made in May 1961, as I have assumed here, or around May 1962. Note further that all of my references to the initial White House requests for the establishment of ZR/RIFLE have been filed under May 1961.

Bissell + ... Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BAKER
BISSELL
HARVEY
ROSTOWDATES:

May 1961

CATEGORIES:~~ZR~~
RIFLE-
✓ EXECUTIVE ACTIONOCCURRENCE:

Card 1 of 2

Senator Baker asked Bissell to comment upon the section of the IG Report of 21 May 1973 which says: "Early in the KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, the White House urged Richard Bissell to create an Executive Action capability, that is, a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations." (p. 48).

SOURCE:IG REPORT
1967STAFF:

Baron

FILE:DATE: July 3, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:**Dulles**DATES:

late 1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action ✓

~~MONROE~~ CastroOCCURRENCE:

MCCONE testified that he had no knowledge ~~that~~ at any time prior to his assumption of the Directorship of the CIA that the CIA had been given authority to be involved in assassination plots (68) He testified that he had no knowledge of who had initiated the MAHEU operation or carried it out and that he had never known of the Executive Action Plan. He also denied knowledge of other abortive assassination attempts against CASTRO, although he presume they were carried under the authority of the Executive Action Plan. He had never discussed with DULLES or General CABELL or HELMS whether there had ever been any grant authority to the CIA to plan assassination (68)

TOP SECRETSOURCE:

McCone Testimony

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:

✓ ZR
RIFLE
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

William K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division DD, issued a memorandum for Cable Secretariat, the subject of which was "Distribution -- ZR/RIFLE Traffic," which indicated that two copies of all cable traffic concerning ZR/RIFLE were to be delivered to Harvey, and no other distribution was to be made.

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:DATE:

July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:

✓ ZR
RIFLE
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

William K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division DD, issued a memorandum for Cable Secretariat, the subject of which was "Distribution -- ZR/RIFLE Traffic," which indicated that two copies of all cable traffic concerning ZR/RIFLE were to be delivered to Harvey, and no other distribution was to be made.

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> HARVEY MCCONE FITZGERALD, DESMOND	<u>DATES:</u> 1962	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> CASTRO EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

In response to a question as to how HARVEY could have continued the Executive Action Plan without MCCONE's knowledge, MCCONE replied "I think he was reporting at that time to DESMOND FITZGERALD who in turn reported to Mr. HELMS." (49)

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> McCone Testimony	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 6/27/75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> MCCONE	<u>DATES:</u> 1962	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> MONGOOSE CASTRO EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓
<u>OCCURRENCE:</u>		

MCCONE was asked how assassination attempts could have taken place without his knowledge. He replied that it was very disturbing to him to learn of these assassination attempts "but I think the reason it went on was it "under an authority that was granted before I took office, But that is not an excuse" (47)

was elected

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u> McCone Testimony	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

BISSELL, Richard
HELMS, Richard

February 1962

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL believes that he told HELMS about Project ZRRIFLE at the time of HELMS' succession as DDP.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BISSELL, II (53)

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Cubella
Breckinridge
Castro

63
'64
'65

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied element," (Tr. 80) or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83) In general, in the past, for the CIA, "assassination became a consideration, but assassination had not been the objective." (Tr. 80)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Statement of Mr. Colby 5/23/75

Name John Bayly

Breckinridge
Castro
Harvey

2-63

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "the Mafia connection from beginning to end was an attempt to assassinate Castro. The operation was called off finally in the Spring, perhaps February of 1963." (Tr. 72)

Harvey called off Mafia operation (Tr. 72-73)

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Dulles
Colby

DATES:

~~7-63~~
6-63

CATEGORIES:

ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified "the indication (is) that Mr. Dulles did know of this act (ZR Rifle project to carry out assassination) at the time." (June, 1963) (Tr. 88) (Tr. 87-88)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

DATE: John Bayly

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William
Chief, FI Staff, CIA
QJWIN

DATES:

27 June 1963
~~27 April 1964~~

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY writes a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, "stating that the original justification for employing QJWIN no longer existed." (41) ~~On 21 April 1964 QJWIN~~

~~was terminated by the Luxembourg Station.~~

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:DATE:

28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella
Fitzgerald
Harvey
Artimo

DATES:

~~11-22-63~~
~~11-22-63~~
11-22-63
2-64
(2-65)

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refused it. In Feb. '64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid (Artimo?) after arms catches put down off Cuban Coast. (Tr. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bowler

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella
Breckinridge
Castro

DATES:

'63
'64
'65

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied element," (Tr. 80) or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83) In general, in the past, for the CIA, "assassination became a consideration, but assassination had not been the objective." (Tr. 30)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:STAFF:

DATE: John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella
Fitzgerald
Harvey
Artimo

DATES:

~~61~~
~~10-63~~
11-22-63
2-64
(2-65)

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refused it. In Feb. '64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid (Artimo?) after arms caches put down off Cuban Coast. (Tr. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella
Breckinridge
Castro

DATES:

'63
'64
'65

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied element," (Tr. 80) or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83) In general, in the past, for the CIA, "assassination became a consideration, but assassination had not been the objective." (Tr. 80)

SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella
Fitzgerald
Harvey
Artimo

DATES:

~~11-22-63~~
11-22-63
2-64
(2-65)

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refused it. In Feb. '64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid (Artimo?) after arms catches put down off Cuban Coast. (Tr. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

Breckinridge
Cubella

6-65

Castro
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that last contact with Cubella group was 6-65. (Tr. 79)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge
Cubella

DATES:

'75

CATEGORIES:

Castro
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Cubella now in jail on Isle of Pines. (Tr. 98)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> HARVEY, William BISSELL, Richard HELMS, Richard	<u>DATES:</u> Spring 1961	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> EXECUTIVE ACTION
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CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY summarized the thrust of BISSELL's conversation with him concerning setting up an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY: "I have been charged by the WHITE HOUSE with the development of an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY. Will you please survey it and see what you can do about it and tell me what you can do about it." (44)

To the best of his knowledge, HELMS knew nothing about the program. (44) As far as HARVEY could recall, HELMS did not know about the program until he briefed HELMS about the fact that he had been given the assignment by BISSELL. (44)

HARVEY testified that after he reported back to BISSELL, explaining his generally negative assessment of the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY, that he was instructed to continue and at least make reasonable efforts to see what the CIA had in the way of assets without communicating his objectives outside of a limited circle within the intelligence agency. (45)

Aside from determining if the CIA had an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY, he was instructed to at least attempt to develop a capability for possible stand-by use. (45) (con't)

<u>SOURCE:</u> HARVEY TEL June 2, 1975	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 30.6.75

TOP SECRET

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
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CARD 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that to the best of his knowledge during the entire EXECUTIVE ACTION project, no agent or officer who had not been in on the project at the time of its inception was told about it; no operation was ever mounted; and no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassination; and no tentative-targeting list was ever drawn up. (45)

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u>

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT
HARVEY, WILLIAM

DATES:

2/61

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO
~~EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE~~

OCCURRENCE: Breckinridge testified that from his review of the files of Project ZRRIFLE, the "controlling character" (80) of the Project was to steal codes rather than to develop the capability for assassination. (80)

Breckinridge testified that on the face of the documents relating to Project ZRRIFLE, the Project was only directed at stealing codes. The fact that it related to developing the capability to assassinate came out in interviews with William Harvey. (81)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BRECKINRIDGE testimony, 6/2/75

STAFF: WALLACH

FILE:

DATE: 7/5/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Richard

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action

Castro
Z R Rifle

CURRENCE: Helms testified that there was no doubt that one of the purposes of the file was to establish a capability for assassinating foreign leaders. Helms could not recall hearing discussions regarding setting up a capability for the assassination of Castro. (55) He could recall know overlap between the Castro assassination programs and Z R Rifle (55).

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard
HARVEY
WHITE HOUSE
SILVER, Arnold

DATES:

February 1961
(HARVEY's rough
estimate)

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

CASTRO

~~LEAD~~ CONGO

/ZRRIFLE✓

OCCURRENCE:

the
BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability, i.e.,
a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such
a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability
with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD
SILVER and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

Card 1 of 2

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard

CARD 2 of 2

DATES:

Feb 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used SILVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

BUGS states that

Sometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the
development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general
concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

BISSELL, Richard
HARVEY

DATES:
August
1960

CATEGORIES:

CUBA
(Executive Action)

✓ ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

Bissell testified that he assigned Harvey the task of establishing an Executive Action project (p. 73).

Bissell said that his initial conversation with Harvey about establishing the Executive Action program did not include a request to direct this program toward Cuba (p. 74).

However, Bissell indicates that Harvey's note is accurate that on 11/16/61 Harvey discussed with Bissell "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba." (p. 74).

SOURCE: BISSELL TESTIMONY

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/3/75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

EY
ELL

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

y testified that ~~BISSELL~~ had never specified targets for the Executive Action
am (133) ~~BISSELL~~

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William
BISSELL, Richard
WHITE HOUSE

DATES:

~~Spring 1961~~
February, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that during his initial conversation with BISSELL about EXECUTIVE ACTION, BISSELL stated that the WHITE HOUSE had urged him to develop an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY. (37) On further reflection, he was not certain whether BISSELL had said that the WHITE HOUSE had urged him personally or whether it had simply urged other persons within the organization to look into the matter. (37) HARVEY did not know who in the WHITE HOUSE had done the urging. (37)

HARVEY testified that during that meeting, BISSELL asked him to explore and assess the field of assassination and the attendant problems and restrictions and requirements, and implied that the program would continue into an attempt to develop an assassination capability. (37-A).

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 37 - 37-A

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE:

30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William
BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

~~Spring 1961~~
February, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with BISSELL in which BISSELL asked him to investigate a capability for EXECUTIVE ACTION. He had assumed the conversation took place in the Spring of 1961, although, after having reviewed materials presented to him by the Committee, he felt that it probably took place in February 1961.

HARVEY testified that during this conversation, BISSELL said that he was concerned about the CIA's capabilities to perform EXECUTIVE ACTION and about the various protections, methods, techniques, decisions, and judgments as to its advisability. (34-35) HARVEY did not recall whether BISSELL used the word "assassination," but he did say that "the implication was so clear as to be beyond any misunderstanding." (35)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:DATE:

30.6.75

HELMS, Richard
BISSELL, Richard
CIA-Cuba Task Force

~~SECRET~~
EDWARDS
CASTRO, Fidel

Nov. 15, 1961

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
CUBA -- SYNDICATE/PHASE II
EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE
CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY discusses with BISSELL the application of the ZRRIFLE/EXECUTIVE ACTION program to Cuba. HELMS places HARVEY in charge of the CIA-Cuba Task Force.
"HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with BISSELL the application of the ZRRIFLE program to Cuba. HARVEY says that BISSELL instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact with the CRIMINAL SYNDICATE and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO." (39)
HARVEY adds: "Shortly after this discussion with BISSELL, he was told by HELMS that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's Cuba Task Force." (39)

~~NOTE: After this card is used for the Cuba Chronology, it should be used as well in the EXECUTIVE ACTION Chronology.~~

Late 1961-early 1962 HARVEY engages in daily meetings concerning Cuba operations. (39-40)
About this time Cuba operations of the CIA were known as Task Force W ~~which was~~ up." (40) (cont)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 39-40.

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

(continued from card 1)

HARVEY indicated that he ran the CASTRO operation as one aspect of ZRRIFLE, handling personally and not using any of the assets being developed in the general ZRRIFLE/EXECUTIVE ACTION program, for which he used agent QJWIN. (40)
IE: Use this entry as well for the heading EXECUTIVE ACTION, as well as CUBA.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard
HARVEY, William
~~ZR/RIFLE~~

DATES:

Nov. 16,
1961

CATEGORIES:

CUBA
(Executive Action)

✓ ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testifies that HARVEY's note (I don't know the source at this point) says on 11/16/61 that Harvey discussed with BISSEL "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba." (p. 74).

SOURCE: BISSELL TESTIMONY

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

QJWIN
HELMS
HARVEY HARVEY

DATES:

19 Feb 1962

CATEGORIES:

~~ZR~~
~~RIFLE~~
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

On 19 February 1962, Richard Helms, then DDP issued a memorandum for William K. Harvey; Subject: Authorization of ZR/RIFLE Agent Activities.

"For the purpose of ZR/RIFLE activities, you are hereby authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN and such other principal agents and sub-agents as may be required. This authorization will continue to be in force through 31 December 1962, subject to renewal at that time."

"Because of the sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category and by your certification."

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

July 3 1975

PCIMS
Harvey

February 19, 1962 EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE ✓

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

First recorded approval of ZRRIFLE.

New DD/P HELMS authorized HARVEY by a memorandum "to handle the project on a special basis (38-39) accounting for expenditures would be by general category on HARVEY's certification. (39) Initial approval: \$14,700. (39)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 38-39

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

QJWIN
LUXEMBOURG STATION
~~ZRRIFLE~~

21 April 1964

EXECUTIVE ACTION
ZRRIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

QJWIN was terminated by the LUXEMBOURG STATION ~~two up~~. (41) on 21 April 1964.

"There is no indication in the file that the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY of ZRRIFLE/QJWIN was ever used." (41)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:Spring 1961
February, 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that after his meeting with BISSELL concerning setting up an EXECUTIVE ACTION PROGRAM, that he discussed, in theoretical terms, with a few officers whom he trusted the whole subject of assassination, including whether assassination was a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and whether it was in the CIA's capability to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (37-A - 38)

He concluded that assassinations could be used only rarely, and then under carefully controlled conditions, and, as a result of the greatest provocation. Secondly, there were several caveats about the technical effectiveness of the CIA in carrying out this type of operation. (38) His ultimate conclusion was that the CIA did not have the assets. There were no staff officers who were capable of this kind of direct action or to whom he would have been willing to delegate authority to carry out such action. (39)

HARVEY testified that he decided that assassinations were generally impracticable and reported his conclusions to both BISSELL and HELMS. (40)

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 37-A - 40

STAFF: RheaFILE:DATE: 30.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:TOP SECRETZRRIFLE
QJWIN
SILVER, Arnold
LUMUMBA, PatriceO'DONNELL, Justin
BISSELL, RichardMay 1961
February 19, 1962
Feb., 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~two-man~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRETSOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38STAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, WILLIAM
SILVER, ARNOLD.
KUBARK

DATES:

Spring, 1961

1961

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE: Harvey was asked about notes written by him and Silver from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a capability for Executive Action and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear that this in no way means he should be advised. He should not be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). He testified that this matter would have been brought up again at any time that the Executive Action Project led to specific targeting or specific operation or specific personnel for that purpose. (59)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 2, 1973, pp. 3, 4, 9.

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Harvey, William Gottlieb, Syd

DATES:

1/25/61

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

Castro
Trujillo Lumumba

OCCURRENCE: Harvey recalled some details of his conversation with Syd Gottlieb on January 25, 1961. It was a general philosophic discussion of assassination and assassination ~~and~~ techniques. As Harvey recalled, there was simply a general discussion of assassination as an intelligence service technique and weapon. It was logical for Gottlieb to be present at this discussion, because he had taken over a new job as Chief of the Technical Services Division of the Clandestine Services. As such, the TSD would have been responsible for technical support for assassinations. (54)

The notation in Harvey's notes from that meeting, stating, "last resort beyond last resort, a confession of weakness," was, Harvey recalled, "a sort of concept of operation philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb." (54-55). As Harvey recalled, the logical candidates for assassination at this period were Trujillo, Lumumba, and Castro. They were not being considered as specific targets, but they were three people that might come to mind in conjunction with such an operation (55).

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1973, pp. 54-55.

STAFF: Rhea

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan.26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR R. file ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibht 1) state "identification: the purpose of project Zrriffle is to spot, develop and use agent assets for dividison D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in the countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The projects will be operated against third country installations and personel."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: Rhea

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

ZR R. file

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "identification: the purpose of project Zrriffle is to spot, develop and use agent assets for dividison D. operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in the countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The projects will be operated against third country installations and personel."

TOP SECRETSOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:STAFF:DATE: Rhea

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:~~ZRRIFLE~~DATES:FEB.
~~May~~ 1961CATEGORIES:TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Cover: "Project ZRRIFLE was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop a capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers)." (39)

TOP SECRETSOURCE: I.G. REPORT, p. 39STAFF: Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

2 R Rife

TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives":
 The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The Project will be conducted by division B with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed." (exhibit 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials. (49)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARVEY
K. G. WINDATES:

Jan.26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

2 R Rife ✓

TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes eneitled Project Zrriffle state "4. Operational Assets:
 (1) personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief of the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg , in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960:
 K. G. Win annual salary \$7,200
 Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and other agents and agent candidates \$2,000
 Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates \$2,000
 Hire of safe houses and other automobile expenses \$1,000
 Total \$14,700

SOURCE:STAFF: