

## Agency Information

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TO : SMOTHERS, CURT

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LANSDALE, EDWARD  
GILPATRIC, ROSWELL

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CIA

LANSDALE, EDWARD

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

July 16, 1975

To: Curt Smothers

From: Paul Wallach

Re: Roswell Gilpatric: Comparison of Staff Interview  
(7/7/75) and Sworn Testimony  
(7/8/75)

Set forth below are certain observations and comments based upon our July 7, 1975, interview of Roswell Gilpatric and his sworn testimony I took the very next day.

Our initial questioning revealed that Gilpatric literally has no present recollection of Operation Mongoose or, for that matter, any U. S./Cuban operations undertaken during his tenure as Under Secretary of Defense with the exception of a vague recollection of sabotage operations targeted against Cuba. Indeed, Gilpatric did not recall either that there was a Chief of Operations for Cuba or that his old friend Lansdale "directed" Cuban operations for the SGA.

My notes indicate that during the course of our July 7, 1975, interview, Gilpatric indicated that he had

no present recollection of:\*

1. Gen. Lansdale playing any role whatsoever in U.S./Cuban operations during his tenure as Under Secretary of Defense. (Gilpatric restated this under oath on July 8; see Testimony, p. 23.) After reviewing numerous documents which demonstrated Lansdale's participation, Gilpatric surmised that his lack of "Lansdale recollection" stemmed from Lansdale's "low profile" at Special Group [Augmented] meetings and Gilpatric's preoccupation with other matters;

2. Gilpatric has no recollection whatsoever of the term "Mongoose";

3. Gilpatric could not attribute any special meaning to the Special Group [Augmented]. However, he did recall that there were certain Special Group meetings where Robert Kennedy was in attendance.

Despite our reviewing certain relevant documents with Gilpatric, his recollection was not substantially refreshed. After some two hours we reached the determination that in view of his "diminished recollection" his

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\* It is instructive to note that Gilpatric's recollection coincided with that reflected in the Rockefeller Commission's interview summary dated June 3, 1975.



testimony would be of little, if any, value to the Committee. However, in order to ensure that Mr. Gilpatric's recollection (or lack thereof) was made a matter of record, we scheduled single Senator testimony for the morning of July 8, 1975.

As I mentioned yesterday, Mr. Gilpatric's recollection of certain of the aforementioned topics was substantially greater at his July 8th deposition. Indeed, Mr. Gilpatric recalled a great deal about Gen. Lansdale's participation in Cuban operations (i.e., Mongoose) and numerous details relating to Special Group [Augmented] activities. Surprisingly enough, Gilpatric's recollection was refreshed as to matters that were neither discussed during the prior day's interview nor set forth or reflected in the documents we reviewed with him during the interview. For example, Gilpatric testified in detail as to operational aspects of the Special Group [Augmented], the implementation and various stages of Operation Mongoose, and Administration pressure to "do something about Castro". However, what looms even larger is that Gilpatric -- who only a day prior to his sworn testimony told us that he did not recall Gen. Lansdale being involved at all in Cuban operations -- was able to testify to, inter alia, the following:

Page 23, line 4. Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, going back to the conversations that you had with Mr. Smothers yesterday, is it correct that before we actually showed you documents and refreshed your recollection that you really had no recollection that Gen. Lansdale was involved with any Cuban operations.

Mr. Gilpatric. That is right. I had lost track in my own memory of the fact that after he finished up the Vietnam job for me in the spring of 1961, and left off that assignment, that he was later on brought back and made Chief of Operations.

Page 24, line 16. Mr. Wallach. Was it really, then, the function of the Special Group [Augmented] to come up with ideas or to receive ideas from the Agency and to consider them?

Mr. Gilpatric. It was generally to stimulate a more vigorous course of action than had been followed prior to this augmentation. . . . [A]nd Lansdale in his position as Operations' Director had a large part in stimulating thinking among the group and the ideas that were sent out to the Agency for further study and work.

Page 27, line 1. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if Gen. Lansdale had his own staff?

Mr. Gilpatric. He had an office with a number of assistants. I don't recall any names except the name HAND which came up yesterday and came back to my mind as a result.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall how large the staff was?

Mr. Gilpatric. It couldn't have been more than half a dozen, because he drew on the resources of the various elements in the Pentagon, including the Joint Staff or the Air Force if he needed more assistance.

Page 28, line 24. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what Gen. Lansdale's relationship was with the CIA when he worked on the Cuban operation?

Mr. Gilpatric. I never detected any friction or any difficulty between them. It certainly didn't exist in the Agency, the same sort of distrust or question about Lansdale as expressed in the State Department, as I explained earlier.

Despite our questioning and document review, it is difficult for me to understand Mr. Gilpatric's immensely increased recollection. Apparently Gilpatric did discuss certain of these matters with McNamara over dinner on Monday evening. It would also appear that they reviewed McCone's 1967 memorandum. However, based upon McNamara's present recollection, and upon the length of time McNamara and Gilpatric spent together Monday evening, I would not think that the dramatic change in Mr. Gilpatric's recollection can be attributed to an evening with McNamara.

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1 Senator Baker. Mr. McNamara, tell us who those people  
2 were that told you who Lansdale worked for and who they claimed  
3 he worked for.

4 Mr. McNamara. I talked to Max Taylor or Roswell Gil-  
5 patric and to Ed Lansdale himself. The three of them, before  
6 I called the AP, and the reason I did, I was going to ask the  
7 newspapers to correct my statement, what I thought was a mis-  
8 statement.

9 Senator Baker. Who did they say he worked for?

10 Mr. McNamara. Well, I would rather leave it that they  
11 said he didn't work for me.

12 Senator Baker. No, no.

13 Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor tole me he worked for him. I  
14 don't want to draw Max Taylor into this.

15 The Chairman. General Taylor told us the same thing.

16 Mr. McNamara. All right.

17 Senator Schweiker. He has been here.

18 The Chairman. He told us that.

19 Mr. McNamara. I am not trying to broaden the net. I  
20 don't want to blacken anybody.

21 Senator Baker. We don't want to blacken anybody. Who  
22 else, if anybody?

23 Mr. McNamara. Well, all I can tell you, Max Told me that  
24 Lansdale worked for him at the time. Ros Gilpatric told me  
25 that it was his understanding he worked for Max at the time.

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1 program. I don't know whether the memo referred to it as  
2 such and I am sure, therefore, that the program in the sense  
3 of the original structure and action to consider what could  
4 be done to weaken the Cuban regime was authorized by the  
5 President. I don't wish to imply that whatever actions we  
6 took, and I have lost recollection what they were -- I  
7 don't want to imply every one of those individual actions  
8 was authorized by the President. I doubt it very much.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Was a program to overthrow the Castro  
10 regime authorized?

11 Mr. McNamara. I think one would phrase it somewhat  
12 definitely. I think a program to weaken the Castro regime  
13 with the hope that it would be overthrown was authorized.  
14 I think that was the objective.

15 I tried to recall as best I can what the objective was  
16 and I think that is the best expression of it.

17 Mr. Schwarz. There is a memorandum which is dated  
18 April 13, '62, it in the Taylor Book generally here or not?

19 Senator Morgan. No.

20 Mr. Schwarz. I can read the whole thing into the record.  
21 It is a memorandum from Maxwell D. Taylor for the record  
22 April 13, '62. Subject: Operation MONGOOSE, and it refers  
23 to you, Mr. Secretary, and I would like to ask you to explain,  
24 if you can, what you understand the position attributed to you  
25 to be after it had been read into the record.



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1 This is, as I see it, quite a little different approach.

2 Mr. McNamara. Let me both refer to what I said half  
3 an hour ago and if you don't think I am referring to it  
4 correctly check the record, then also let me refer to this.

5 A half hour ago I don't believe we were talking about the  
6 President. What I was discussing was the control by senior of-  
7 ficials of the Administration of the CIA and I stated that  
8 I believed that there were no major actions undertaken by  
9 CIA that were not properly authorized by senior officials.

10 Now, I did not mean to imply by that every major  
11 action taken by CIA was authorized by the President. I think  
12 I very carefully used the term senior officials, and I meant  
13 particularly the members of the 54/12 committee, and through  
14 them I meant myself and Secretary Rusk.

15 I did not mean to imply the President himself parti-  
16 cipated in a review of or authorization of major actions  
17 of CIA.

18 Now, I state then that, having said that, I was faced  
19 with a dilemma of the kind you are when you tell me that  
20 assassination attempts have been carried out by CIA, and I  
21 said I have no knowledge of it because I believed that I  
22 would have had knowledge of that kind of event carried out by  
23 CIA, and I believe I would not have only had knowledge, I  
24 believe it would not have been carried out without my author-  
25 ization or the authorization of senior officials reporting to

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To: Messrs. Smothers and Wallach  
Re: Roswell Gilpatric -- Short Summary  
Date: July 16, 1975

Gilpatric was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Materiel in August of 1951 and Under Secretary of the Air Force in December of 1951. In May of 1953 he returned to private practice in New York, where he remained until January of 1961 when he was appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense. He held that office from January 20, 1961, until January 20, 1964, at which time he then returned to private practice in New York City.

As Under Secretary he served as Defense's representative on the Special Group and Special Group [Augmented]. The documents establish that Gilpatric was the most frequent attendee at the SG and SGA meetings during the period of "Cuban operations".

Gilpatric also worked closely with Lansdale prior to the latter's Mongoose involvement. In February, March, and April of 1961, Lansdale served as Gilpatric's deputy on his "Vietnam Task Force". It was Gilpatric who at this time brought Lansdale to the Kennedys' attention.

Gilpatric's examination should encompass the following questions and areas:\*

The operational structure of the Special Group and Special Group [Augmented], and the Defense's role in Cuban operations.

Was the policy/approval structure employed by the Special Group [Augmented] such that the operational people had authority, albeit implicit, to formulate and/or initiate plans to assassinate Castro or his immediate entourage?

To what extent were the Special Group [Augmented] Mongoose plans and/or operations authorized by or made known to President Kennedy?

The extent of the military's involvement in Operation Mongoose. What, if any, plans existed -- contingency or otherwise -- for the invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces?

Did the Special Group, Special Group [Augmented], or any other person or entity entertain or approve plans to assassinate Castro or members of Castro's entourage?

Pertinent Relationships:

General Lansdale

Gilpatric was one of the first Kennedy Administration people exposed to Lansdale. Gilpatric will testify that he recommended Lansdale highly to the Kennedys.

Robert McNamara

As the Under Secretary of Defense, Gilpatric worked closely with Secretary McNamara. Also, close relationship still exists, as exemplified by recent discussions.

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\* See Comparison of Gilpatric's Staff Interview (7/7/75) and Sworn Testimony (7/8/75) enclosed herewith.

Generals Harris  
and Craig

These were the DOD/JCS  
representatives to the  
Special Group [Augmented].  
They also worked out of  
the Pentagon and frequently  
reported to Gilpatric.

## COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

3 June 1975

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GILPATRICK

C-11-3

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose: Interview with Roswell Leavitt  
Gilpatrick

On Thursday, May 29, 1975 at 2:30 P.M., I met with Roswell Leavitt Gilpatrick in his office at Cravat, Swaine and Moore, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York.

Mr. Gilpatrick was named Air Force Assistant Secretary for Materiel in 1951. From 1951 to 1953 he was Under Secretary of the Air Force and from 1961 to 1964 he was Deputy Secretary of Defense.

1. I asked him whether he could recall any discussions about actions to be taken against Cuban leaders during the period he was Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1961 and 1962. He answered that he had participated in a number of discussions with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara after the Bay of Pigs failure. He also participated in the discussions held by the 54-12 group. Gilpatrick recalls discussing plans to disrupt the economy of Cuba and other ideas about weakening the Cuban government. The CIA submitted the plans to the 54-12 group and the group would approve or reject them. At no time Gilpatrick said was any discussion or planning held in his presence concerning an assassination of Castro or other Cuban leaders. Gilpatrick was very definite about this.

2. I asked Gilpatrick if he recognized the term "Special Group Augmented." He said he did not and when I explained to him that the "augmented" probably referred to the addition of Robert Kennedy to an intelligence planning group, he said that did not help his recollection. Gilpatrick said Kennedy came to the Pentagon frequently and discussed Latin American affairs; particularly freeing the prisoners from the Bay of Pigs. Gilpatrick said Robert Kennedy did meet occasionally with the 54-12 group to listen to CIA suggested projects.

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3. I asked Gilpatrick if he recalled a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office on August 10, 1962 at which Secretary McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and General Lansdale were present. Gilpatrick did not remember such a meeting. He sent out to have his secretary locate his diary from the period when he was Deputy Secretary of Defense to see if the meeting was listed in his diary. He discovered the diary had been sent to the Kennedy Library. I asked Gilpatrick if the overall planning against Cuban leaders included possible liquidation of those leaders. He said it did not and moreover, he did not think General Lansdale ever participated in any discussions concerning Cuba. Gilpatrick said Lansdale was his Assistant as head of a Special Task Force on Vietnam and that in Gilpatrick's recollection Lansdale had no participation in Cuban matters. Mr. Gilpatrick did not recognize the term "Executive Action Capability" and he said he had never heard of Operation Mongoose.

4. I asked Mr. Gilpatrick if he was familiar with a plan to make an attempt on Fidel Castro's life at the Sports Palace in Havana, Cuba on April 9, 1961? Gilpatrick said he had never heard of such an attempt or a plan for such an attempt. To Gilpatrick's knowledge the Department of Defense was not involved in such a plan. Gilpatrick said that he was in charge of the 54-12 matters for the Department of Defense and was under instruction from McNamara to be sure the CIA didn't involve itself in any plan beyond its capabilities. Gilpatrick said McNamara was especially sensitive to that after the Bay of Pigs failure. Gilpatrick also recalled he found himself in dispute with the CIA over who would run the reconnaissance over Cuba during the missile crisis. Gilpatrick said that the reconnaissance operations were beyond the capability of the CIA and Gilpatrick insisted the Department of Defense conduct the operations.

that

5. Gilpatrick commented to me/the press had been calling up asking questions about possible involvement in assassination plans against Castro and that he had tried to refresh his memory and think back over that period of time. Of course, Gilpatrick had no files or contemporaneous documents to help him refresh his memory.

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE  
Harold A. Baker

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1 I returned to private practice in New York City. And  
2 in January of 1961 I was appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense.  
3 And I held that office from January 20, 1961 until January  
4 20, 1964.

5 Mr. Wallach. I think you may have misspoken when you  
6 said 1973. You meant --

7 Mr. Gilpatric. You mean after --

8 Mr. Wallach. In any event, you held that until 1964.  
9 And then in 1964 you returned to private practice?

10 Mr. Gilpatric. Private practice. And the only position  
11 of any governmental nature I have today is, I am Chairman of  
12 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

13 Mr. Wallach. What was the exact date, Mr. Gilpatric,  
14 that you came on board as Undersecretary of Defense?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. I was sworn in on January 20, 1961.

16 Mr. Wallach. I take it, then, the only experience that  
17 you had with the military prior to that was as Secretary of  
18 Materiel for the Air Force?

19 Mr. Gilpatric. Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary  
20 during the Korean War.

21 Mr. Wallach. Was Mr. McNamara Secretary of Defense at  
22 that time?

23 Mr. Gilpatric. He was, and through the time that I  
24 served as his deputy.

25 Mr. Wallach. When you really began toward the end of

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1 January or early February of 1961, did you have any occasion  
2 to serve on what was known as the Special Group or the 5412  
3 Committee?

4 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. The Committee to which you refer  
5 had been set up in structure during the preceeding Eisenhower  
6 Administration. And when I took office, by virtue of being  
7 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I was the Defense Representative  
8 on that Committee. And I remained so during the period I  
9 was in office.

10 Mr. Wallach. Was that by Mr. McNamara's own choosing that  
11 he decided to have you do that, or was that a matter of  
12 custom that preexisted?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. The President decided to continue the  
14 practice inaugurated during the preceeding administration of  
15 having the Special Advisor on Security Affairs, Mr. Bundy,  
16 and the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of  
17 Defense, and the Director of the CIA comprise that group.  
18 And that was accepted by the principals, namely, the Secretary  
19 of State and the Secretary of Defense. And later on the group  
20 was expanded to include the principals, namely, the Secretary  
21 of State and the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General.

22 Mr. Wallach. Did you recall why the group was expanded  
23 to include those three people?

24 Mr. Gilpatric. The President and the Attorney General  
25 felt that by including the principles the focus on Cuba and

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1 after the Bay of Pigs would be more sharply focused. And  
2 as I recall, it was largely at the instigation of the Attorney  
3 General that the principals were brought into what had  
4 previously been just the deputies.

5 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if that is what has been  
6 referred to as the Special Group Augmented?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. Having had my recollection refreshed  
8 yesterday through the curtesy of Mr. Wallach, I do recall  
9 that name as having been applied to this expanded group.

10 Mr. Wallach. I would like to state for the record, since  
11 you mentioned that, Mr. Gilpatric, that yesterday Mr. Smother  
12 and I met with Mr. Gilpatric for about two and a half hours  
13 and discussed the issues we were going to cover here with  
14 him today, and also showed him a variety of documents. And  
15 at that time Mr. Smothers and I talked together, and Mr.  
16 Smothers made the decision that we take Mr. Gilpatric's  
17 testimony in Executive Session here today instead of before  
18 the full committee.

19 Mr. Gilpatric, were you involved in any way in planning  
20 for the Bay of Pigs?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. Only peripherally. I was brought in only  
22 in sessions that were held in the Pentagon when some of the  
23 paramilitary aspects of that operation were being discussed.  
24 Certain members of the military were detailed to review the  
25 planning of the Central Intelligence Agency. And when they

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1 came back to report to Mr. McNamara and the Chairman of the  
2 Joint Chiefs, then General Lemnitzer, I sat in on those meetings.  
3 I did not attend any meetings outside of the Pentagon relating  
4 to the Bay of Pigs. And my only knowledge of it other than  
5 those meetings came through what Mr. McNamara told me.

6 Mr. Wallach. Did you remember the substance of the report?  
7 Was it a recommendation to go ahead or not to go ahead?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. The decision as to whether to go ahead or  
9 not to go ahead was taken either at the White House or the State  
10 Department. And I was not party to those proceedings.

11 Mr. Wallach. Specifically I am talking about what you  
12 remember the military recommending as to the operation.

13 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, the military had a number of  
14 reservations about the way in which the agency was setting up  
15 to do this, and the amount of cover, the amount of equipment,  
16 the resources generally that were being applied. And some  
17 of those points came up in those discussions that I heard.  
18 And they were ultimately communicated back to the President  
19 and to the other top officials, either Mr. McNamara or the  
20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. There were no decisions reached  
21 at these briefing sessions which I attended.

22 Mr. Wallach. How do you know that Joint Chiefs or Mr.  
23 McNamara communicated that to the President.

24 Mr. Gilpatric. Mr. McNamara told me that he was attending  
25 other sessions. And it was my assumption that he and General

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1 Lemnitzer expressed the views that they expressed at the  
2 meeting. But I have no direct knowledge because I was not  
3 at the meetings.

4 Mr. Wallach. Did the military people who sort of reported  
5 on this to you and Mr. McNamara give you any prognosis or  
6 suggestions in terms of percentage or anything like that?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall anything other than a general  
8 attitude of skepticism, which was not unusual when the Agency  
9 was mounting a paramilitary operation. The natural tendency  
10 of the military was to sort of second guess and question the  
11 judgment of the people in the Agency. That happened at  
12 subsequent times, but I think it was also, as I recall it,  
13 expressed at that time. The specifics about the reservations  
14 I could not say.

15 Mr. Wallach. Did you remember if there were any comments  
16 along the line of, it was much too big an operation for the  
17 CIA to handle?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall those particular words.  
19 But certainly there was doubt among the military as to whether  
20 the Agency could mount this kind of an exercise without draw-  
21 ing more on the expertise that the military felt that they  
22 had, and that was their principal line of business.

23 Mr. Wallach. Were there contingency plans drawn up to  
24 follow up the CIA sending in the Cubans?

25 Mr. Gilpatric. The word at the time I took office and the

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1 word continually throughout the period of my services as  
2 Deputy Secretary was contingency plans for every conceivable  
3 eventuality, including the possibility of an invasion of Cuba.  
4 Now, those plans existed before we came in, and these were  
5 constantly being revised and brought up for review at the  
6 meetings that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had with the Secretary  
7 of Defense and myself. I don't recall any particular changes  
8 in those plans that were made in conjunction with this Bay of  
9 Pigs operation. But the plans were in existence with the  
10 Joint Chiefs and the Joint staff.

11 Mr. Wallach. Prior to the Bay of Pigs, sir, were you  
12 aware of any other on-going operations that were being targeted  
13 toward Cuba?

14 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

15 Mr. Wallach. Were you specifically aware of any other  
16 sabotage operation or anything of that nature?

17 Mr. Gilpatric. Not prior to the Bay of Pigs.

18 Mr. Wallach. After the Bay of Pigs was there any sort of  
19 change in the structure of the Special Group or change in the  
20 emphasis of the Special Group?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. The change -- and there was a change --  
22 occurred, as I recall it, gradually over a priod of months follow-  
23 ing the spring of 1961. I don't recall exactly when this  
24 expanded Special Group augmented was set up. My best  
25 recollection is that 5412 continued to function in the way it

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1 was set up, namely, the CIA would come up with a particular  
2 project or proposal to infiltrate some people into Cuba,  
3 either intelligence gathering, or sabotage, and that would be  
4 reviewed before the 5412 Committee, and either sent back to  
5 the Agency, or changed, or disapproved, or if it were approved,  
6 it would be passed through Mr. Bundy to the President. Some-  
7 time during those months that followed the Bay of Pigs the  
8 Attorney General felt that more emphasis, more focus, more  
9 high level attention should be given to those efforts to  
10 weaken the Castro regime and to prevent it from exporting its  
11 subversion to neighboring countries like the Dominican  
12 Republic and Venezuela. And as a result, the principals,  
13 namely, the Attorney General himself, and the Secretary of  
14 State and the Secretary of Defense were added to the group,  
15 and he had a larger body of people who passed on what the  
16 Agency was doing, and also tended to press the Agency for  
17 more efforts in this regard.

18 Mr. Wallach. If we could just sort of focus in on a  
19 moment on what you described as the Attorney General's emphasis,  
20 or the Administration pressure, did you at that time feel that  
21 there was Administration pressure really being put on you, for  
22 example, to get something done with respect to Cuba?

23 Mr. Gilpatric. Not on me, because the Defense Department  
24 wasn't the focal point. We were treated as a supporting  
25 agency to the Central Intelligence Agency. And obviously if

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1 nothing went wrong with an Agency operation, the military  
2 might be involved. Ad you say, we had contingency plans in  
3 that event. But the focal point was on the Agency itself,  
4 which after the Bay of Pigs was a rather shaken organization,  
5 and changes were in process. The director left. In due  
6 course the director of operations, Mr. Bissell, left. So  
7 the whole thrust of the effort initiated by the administration  
8 was to strengthen, beefup and otherwise try to make the Agency's  
9 efforts in this regard more effective. But the actual  
10 operational activities were to be carried on by the Agency or  
11 by its personnel, not by anybody in the Defense Department.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you know Mr. McCone?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. Very well.

14 Mr. Wallach. Would you say that the administration put  
15 pressure on Mr. McCone to get something done with respect to  
16 Cuba?

17 Mr. Gilpatric. It was understood from the beginning when  
18 he came in -- and I don't recall the exact date in 1961 when  
19 he took over -- it was certainly made clear to him in my  
20 presence at least on some occasions that that was one of the  
21 first orders of business, to see to it that the Agency came  
22 up with more imaginative and hopefully more effective measures  
23 to cope with the Castro regime.

24 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if there were any limitations  
25 made on his imagination in terms of what the Agency could

1 have come up with?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. Only through this mechanism. But no  
3 plan or procedural could be put into effect unless it had the  
4 approval of the President, and it had to go through the channel  
5 of this 5412 Group expanded, as we have discussed, by having  
6 the principals sit in as well as the deputies.

7 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, did the planning for the  
8 Bay of Pigs go through the 5412 Group?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. No, not during my time.

10 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if it went through the 5412  
11 prior to your time?

12 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I don't know whether that was hived  
13 off of the 5412 Group or it was under the jurisdiction of that  
14 Group, but it was a separate operation at the time the  
15 Kennedy Administration took office in January of 1961.

16 Mr. Wallach. Do you know why the Bay of Pigs operation  
17 was not put through the 5412 mechanism?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

19 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not there were any  
20 other operations targeted at Cuba or any other country that  
21 were not put through 5412?

22 Mr. Gilpatric. No. And I don't say that it wasn't put  
23 through, I said I didn't know for a fact whether it was or was  
24 not put through. I just know it was handled separately at the  
25 time that Mr. McNamara and I and the others in the Kennedy

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1 Administration came in. It was treated as a much more  
2 secure, sensitive project with a much smaller circle of need-  
3 to-know people by January and early February of 1961.

4 Mr. Wallach. I take it that the Committee you have been  
5 talking about, the one that has expanded after the Bay of  
6 Pigs with Mr. Robert Kennedy and Mr. McNamara and the Secretary  
7 of State, amounted to a fairly large group?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. With their aids. You always had the  
9 military, you had General Taylor there, either as special  
10 assistant to the President or later on when he became Chairman  
11 of the Joint Chiefs, he was always involved in this group. And  
12 General Lemnitzer before that. And they usually had deputies.

13 Mr. Wallach. I would like to note that at approximately  
14 10:18 Senator Huddleston left to go to the full committee  
15 hearing.

16 I take it, then, we were talking about a group that could  
17 have amounted to 15 or 20 people at some meetings.

18 Mr. Gilpatric. Certainly more than a dozen, possibly  
19 as many as 15.

20 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not there were any  
21 highly secret operations that were not put through this group  
22 of more than a dozen people during the time that you were  
23 there?

24 Mr. Gilpatric. As I recall it, this group was concerned  
25 exclusively with Cuba. And we didn't have any other operations

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1 in the expanded group. Now, 5412 kept functions as a smaller  
2 group on various exercises and projects that came up from the  
3 Agency involving other countries. But the expanded group  
4 concentrated on Cuba. And I don't recall any other  
5 activities that came before that expanded group.

6 Mr. Wallach. Basically at least some of the people who  
7 were in 5412 were also in the Special Group Augmented, is  
8 that correct?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct.

10 Mr. Wallach. And did there come a point in time when the  
11 Special Group Augmented was created for the purpose of focusing  
12 on Cuba?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

14 Mr. Wallach. Getting back to what we talked about  
15 before as administration pressure, were you aware of any  
16 instances where either President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy  
17 made requests for actions that circumvented the normal channels?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. That was certainly true in the case of the  
19 counterinsurgency planning activities in Southeast Asia.  
20 They were handled out of the usual channels of intergovernmental  
21 actions. And there was another special group, socalled  
22 counterinsurgency group, set up again as the instance of the  
23 Attorney General, and of which he was a member, and which  
24 tried to pull together all the planning and initiation of  
25 steps to resist the Communist inroads in Laos, Thailand, and

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1 South Vietnam patricularly.

2 Mr. Wallach. I am trying to get a flavor from you  
3 really as to how the President and the Attorney General  
4 operated at that time. Would you say it would have been  
5 unusual for them to pick up the phone and make a request  
6 for some action from Mr. McCone?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. They believed very much in direct  
8 approaches to people at whatever level they happen to be in  
9 the Executive Branch structure, without going always through  
10 the head of the particular agency. And in the case of the  
11 Defense Department, that was fully understood and accepted  
12 by Mr. McNamara and myself. And the request might come through  
13 to me, to Mr. McNamara, or sometimes to Mr. Lemnitzer who  
14 was Secretary of Security for International Affairs, or Mr.  
15 Vance, who was Secretary of the Army. And that was accepted  
16 as sort of not unusual procedure during that period of the  
17 Kennedy Administration.

18 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, do you know a General Edward  
19 Lansdale?

20 Mr. Gilpatric. I do.

21 Mr. Wallach. When was the first occasion that you recall  
22 meeting General Lansdale?

23 Mr. Gilpatric. I met him early on after my installation  
24 in office, probably by late February or March, when I was  
25 assigned by President Kennedy to head up the first task force

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1 looking to what might be done to strengthen the Diem govern-  
2 ment in South Vietnam. General Lansdale, who was then a  
3 colonel in the Air Force, and on active duty in the Pentagon,  
4 was assigned to me because of his prior experience during  
5 the Eisenhower Administration in Indo-China generally and  
6 the Philippines, particularly in South Vietnam. And from  
7 that time on until sometime in May or June of 1961 General  
8 Lansdale, or Colonel Lansdale as he then was, in effect  
9 served as my special assistant in regard to the planning for  
10 South Vietnam.

11 Mr. Wallach. Who else was on this Vietnam Task Force  
12 that you described to us?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. There were representatives of the National  
14 Security Council, I believe Mr. Rostow. There were repre-  
15 sentatives from the Department of State. I believe it was  
16 Alexis Johnson, although I may not recall some of the names  
17 directly. And there was a representative from the Central  
18 Intelligence Agency. I think it was Desmond Fitzgerald. And  
19 there were representatives from the Joint Staff of the Services.  
20 I don't recall the names of the various officers. There was  
21 a group of about 15 or 20 who met regularly for two or three  
22 weeks in the Pentagon, and ultimately came up with a series  
23 of recommendations which were presented to the President, as  
24 I recall, in April of 1961. And at that time Colonel Lansdale,  
25 as my assistant, I believe was present at that meeting with the

1 President. And the Attorney General was there.

2 Mr. Wallach. Had Colonel Lansdale been recommended to  
3 you as an expert on Asian affairs?

4 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. He was proffered by the -- whether  
5 it was General Lemnitzer or General White, the Chief of Staff  
6 of the Air Force -- by one of the principal military advisors,  
7 Lansdale was put forward as a man who would be useful for this  
8 kind of exercise for which I was put in charge.

9 Mr. Wallach. How in your mind was Lansdale useful to  
10 you are your deputy?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, he had had a vast amount of exper-  
12 ience in sort of quasi military, at times clandestine,  
13 operations, dealing with governments and factions through this  
14 area. He worked in the Philippines with Macapagal in handling  
15 guerrilla problems there. He had been in Vietnam a number of  
16 times. He had formed a personal relationship with the  
17 President Diem of South Vietnam. And he was held out, and found  
18 by me, to be a very knowledgeable person in the conditions that  
19 then existed in South Vietnam, the different faction and  
20 sects that were presenting problems for the Government of  
21 South Vietnam.

22 Mr. Wallach. My knowledge of history is not the greatest,  
23 but wasn't it difficult at that time for Americans to get  
24 close to the President of South Vietnam?

25 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't know, because I never met him.

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1 Lansdale obviously was an unusual type of military officer  
2 who succeeded in establishing relations with other nationals,  
3 and gaining their confidence, and if you will, working his  
4 way into organizations of other nationals. And he thereby  
5 gained a considerable insight into, say, the South Vietnamese  
6 character which I for one and most of those in the Kennedy  
7 Administration lacked entirely.

8 Mr. Wallach. Did General Lansdale ever have a direct  
9 command assignment where he had men under him that you are  
10 aware of?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall. He was primarily a  
12 staff officer.

13 Mr. Wallach. Do you know who he reported to at that  
14 time?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. I think he reported to either the Chief  
16 or the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He was always  
17 on a special duty. He didn't have a regular slot in the  
18 hierarchy of the Air Force during the time I knew him.

19 Mr. Wallach. I think you said before that at least he  
20 had a reputation for being involved in quasi-clandestine activit-  
21 ies. Did you recall any more specifics about that reputation?

22 Mr. Gilpatric. No, not the specifics, at least I don't  
23 recall them now after 14 years. I was just aware of his  
24 general experience and background and the knowledge and facility  
25 that he displayed in inventing, coming up with ideas of

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1 counterinsurgency and antiguerrilla activities, as well as  
2 intelligence and counterintelligence type of activities.

3 Mr. Wallach. And he had, for example, a thorough  
4 knowledge of guerrilla warfare?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not Mr. Fitzgerald  
7 had known General Lansdale and had worked with him prior to  
8 working with him on your committee?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

10 Mr. Wallach. I take it during the time that the  
11 Vietnamese Task Force we were talking about was in session  
12 you did have occasion to meet with either the President or  
13 the Attorney General to discuss the essence of what you were  
14 working on?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.. There were at least two sessions  
16 with the President, and because of the increasing rather  
17 ominous prospects in Vietnam, the President brought in the  
18 Attorney General as well as the Vice President for those  
19 sessions. So that they had an opportunity to hear directly  
20 from me, assisted by Lansdale, what we were recommending and  
21 why we were recommending it, and the discussions that went  
22 on before the President finally reached the conclusion on  
23 those recommendations.

24 Mr. Wallach. I take it, then, that General Lansdale was  
25 also present with you at the times you met with President

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1 Kennedy and the Attorney General?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. At least some of the times, certainly two  
3 or more.

4 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not the President  
5 and the Attorney General had known of Mr. Lansdale prior to  
6 his coming on board with you?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

8 Mr. Wallach. Did you make any comments to them about  
9 Mr. Lansdale?

10 Mr. Gilpatric. I commended the work he had done as  
11 my assistant to this group for whom we made the recommen-  
12 dations, including the President, and the Attorney General,  
13 because I found him to be extremely helpful. And he was  
14 at that stage very tactful in his dealings with other  
15 agencies involved, the White House Staff, the CIA, and the  
16 State Department. And I found him to be in that assignment  
17 very effective, and I said so.

18 Mr. Wallach. Did either the President or the Attorney  
19 General express any opinion to you about Mr. Lansdale?

20 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

21 Mr. Wallach. Do you know when in fact he was promoted  
22 to General?

23 Mr. Gilpatric. Both Secretary McNamara and I recommended  
24 him for promotion thereafter. Whether this was the summer or  
25 fall of 1961 I don't recall. But we did, on the basis of our

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1 experience, particularly my experience with him on the South  
2 Vietnamese Task Force, endorse his promotion to General.

3 Mr. Wallach. Did part of the recommendation that you made  
4 as a result of that report suggestion that General Lansdale  
5 go over to South Vietnam, or Colonel Lansdale?

6 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall any specific suggestion  
7 to that effect, although it was discussed, and we learned that  
8 there were certain elements in the State Department which did  
9 not favor General Lansdale going out there, on the basis  
10 that he had a special relationship with Diem which, if renewed,  
11 would go sort of out of channels as far as the State Depart-  
12 ment was concerned. And so there was a reluctance on the  
13 part of the State Department to see him go back to Vietnam  
14 at that time. Later on Ambassador Lodge did take him out  
15 there as his own assistant. But that was after I left the  
16 government.

17 Mr. Wallach. I think you said before that both yourself  
18 and Mr. McNamara recommended General Lansdale for a promotion.  
19 Did Mr. McNamara ever express to you his feeling about  
20 General Lansdale?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. No. We saw very little of Lansdale at  
22 that time, other than that Lansdale accompanied me and  
23 assisted me in presenting our Task Force recommendations.  
24 And I think he felt that Lansdale had done a good job.  
25 I told him so. And he accepted that, and joined with me in



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1 recommending him. But at that stage Lansdale had very little  
2 contact directly with McNamara.

3 Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara at any time ever tell you  
4 that he did not think Mr. Lansdale was very straightforward  
5 or up front or readable?

6 Mr. Gilpatric. Not at that stage, because he hadn't  
7 had the contact which would form the foundation for that  
8 kind of belief. I recall some doubts that McNamara expressed  
9 later on when he dealt with Lansdale more closely. And as a  
10 result, he, McNamara, never used Lansdale himself as an aid  
11 or assistant.

12 Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara express the nature of  
13 those doubts to you?

14 Mr. Gilpatric. No, not specifically. He just indicated  
15 that he wasn't comfortable with having Lansdale as his own  
16 personal assistant. He didn't give him any task or assignment  
17 to my knowledge.

18 Mr. Wallach. When did McNamara have further contact with  
19 General Lansdale.

20 Mr. Gilpatric. That arose after Lansdale became the  
21 Chief of Operations for this Augmented Special Group. As you  
22 refreshed my recollection yesterday by showing me the docu-  
23 ments, he was appointed by the President and the Chief of  
24 Operations for this Special Group Augmented. And from that  
25 time on McNamara was exposed to him through the activities of

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1 that Special Group Augmented, beginning, I guess, sometime  
2 toward the end of 1961, but certainly by the early part of  
3 1962.

4 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, going back to the conver-  
5 sations that you had with Mr. Smothers yesterday, is it correct  
6 that before we actually showed you documents and refreshed  
7 your recollection, that you really had no recollection that  
8 General Lansdale was involved with any Cuban operations?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. That is right. I had lost track in my  
10 own memory of the fact that after he finished up the Vietnam,  
11 job for me in the spring of 1961, and left off that assignment,  
12 that he was later on brought back and made Chief of Operations.  
13 I had forgotten that until you showed me the documents which  
14 make that very plane. It just had not stayed with my memory.

15 Mr. Wallach. Turning again to the Special Group Augmented,  
16 which is the group that was set up after the Bay of Pigs, can  
17 you relate to us the substance of the meetings as they took  
18 place?

19 Mr. Gilpatric. The general tenor of the activities in  
20 the group was to discuss in a general way the types of actions  
21 that might be taken to weaken or destabilize the Castro regime  
22 with a view toward preventing it from being effective outside  
23 of its own borders, particularly, as I said earlier, vis-a-vis  
24 other countries. And I remember being specifically concerned  
25 about Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, and a whole range

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1 of possible actions to that end were discussed, and then  
2 referred to the Agency to investigate and come up with some  
3 specific programs, project or proposals which the Group would  
4 then consider anew after they had been staffed out by the  
5 Agency.

6 Mr. Wallach. Was it really, then, a function of the  
7 Special Group Augmented to come up with ideas or to receive  
8 ideas from the Agency and consider them?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. It was generally to stimulate a more  
10 vigorous course of action than had been followed prior to  
11 this augmentation. Whether the ideas came from General  
12 Lansdale as the Chief of Operations, or whether they came  
13 from CIA people, or whether they came from members of the Group  
14 itself just depended on the course of discussion at the particular  
15 meetings. Obviously there was a great range of possibilities  
16 discussed. And Lansdale in his position as Operations Director  
17 had a large part in stimulating thinking among the Group and  
18 the ideas that were sent out to the Agency for further study  
19 and work.

20 Mr. Wallach. Is this something that we refreshed you  
21 as to yesterday, the fact that General Lansdale actually was  
22 Chief of Operations and came up with ideas himself?

23 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. I didn't recall who was guiding  
24 focus on the staff level for this enlarged special group.  
25 But the Group did, both from a principal level and a staff

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1 level, try to generate projects, programs, and ideas. And  
2 I am clear now, having refreshed my recollection as to the  
3 personalities involved, that the focal point was the  
4 Director of Operations as far as keeping the whole effort  
5 going and stimulating thinking and planning.

6 Mr. Wallach. Was General Lansdale active at the meetings  
7 himself, do you recall?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. That was not his nature, to take over  
9 and run a meeting. He would come up with his ideas and feed  
10 them into the appropriate segments of the agencies that were  
11 supposed to staff them out. And he usually in his work  
12 for me -- and now I am referring to the methodology he  
13 employed in connection with Vietnam, because it is clear in my  
14 mind -- he would put in writing to his principals, in that  
15 case myself, and then the principal would table the idea, put  
16 it forward, and then would be discussed. But Lansdale himself  
17 did not, as I can recall, in either of those sessions,  
18 either relating to Vietnam or Cuba, act as a discussion  
19 leader, or assume a very active role in the meetings themselves  
20 as opposed to the preparations for them.

21 Mr. Wallach. Would you describe General Lansdale as a  
22 very cautious man in the sense that he would not go ahead  
23 with an activity unless it was approved by higher authority  
24 or by his superiors?

25 Mr. Gilpatric. I wouldn't describe him as cautious. I

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1 think he was a very calculating man, very deep, very sensitive  
2 to the power structure in which he was working. After all, he  
3 had been working under the Eisenhower Administration with  
4 an entirely different case of character than the Kennedy  
5 Administration, and he proved himself very adaptable to  
6 that kind of a major change. And he always impressed me  
7 that he knew what he was doing, and he recognized the hazards,  
8 political and otherwise, in how you function in this kind of  
9 a setting, where you had so many presidential appointees, and  
10 where you were working on a project that had a very high  
11 priority in the President's own mind, which was true both  
12 of Vietnam and Cuba.

13 Mr. Wallach. Did General Lansdale speak generally about  
14 the President's project he was involved with, or was he close-  
15 mouthed about them?

16 Mr. Gilpatric. Probably reserved. He wasn't an  
17 individual who just spouted forth a stream of ideas and notions.  
18 He would think them out, and when he put them forward, as I  
19 say, they were usually in written form. And we didn't have  
20 what I would call brain-storming sessions with him. He and his  
21 assistants and associates would formulate a scheme or plan  
22 and then come back with this and lay it out. It was pretty  
23 well put together. It was pretty well put together. It  
24 wasn't done in an extemporaneous or impromptu fashion. That  
25 wasn't his way of working.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Lansdale had his  
2 own staff?

3 Mr. Gilpatric. He had an office with a number of assist-  
4 nats. I don't recall any names except the name Hand which  
5 came up yesterday and came back to my mind as a result.

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall how large the staff was, four  
7 or five people?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. It couldn't have been more than have  
9 a dozen, because he drew on the resources of the various  
10 elements in the Pentagon, including the Joint Staff or the Air  
11 Force if he needed more assistance.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if he worked with the various  
13 elements in the Pentagon on operations aside from those that  
14 may have been going on at the CIA?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. Vietnam and Cuba, as the result of having  
16 my recollection refreshed, are the only ones that I can recall.

17 Mr. Wallach. Specifically, Mr. Gilpatric, with reference  
18 to Cuba, do you know whether or not there Lansdale made  
19 specific requests to any of the military agencies to con-  
20 duct operations by themselves, not joint operations with the  
21 CIA?

22 Mr. Gilpatric. I am pretty sure that never happened,  
23 because the name of the game was to conduct these operations  
24 on a covert, clandestine basis, clearly within the province  
25 of the Central Intelligence Agency, and whatever Defense or

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1 State or anybody else contributed was purely support rather  
2 than direct participation.

3 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not General Lansdale  
4 met by himself with the President or the Attorney General?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. I do not know whether such a meeting  
6 took place.

7 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any instances when either the  
8 President or the Attorney General put pressure on General  
9 Lansdale, aside from the pressure that was put on the Group  
10 as a whole, to come out with something on Cuba?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. My understanding was, I do not know of  
12 it.

13 Mr. Wallach. From the time that this Special Group  
14 Augmented was set up, do you recall any basic change in the  
15 operation in terms of the focus, for example, the switch from  
16 intelligence to sabotage?

17 Mr. Gilpatric. There was a shift from just intelligence  
18 gathering through infiltrating teams to positive efforts to  
19 disrupt the Cuban economy. And these ideas drew in scope from  
20 relatively minor attempts to intercept communications or  
21 disrupt transport to something as major as the demolition of  
22 a large power plant. That would have to be the most important  
23 project that I can recall that came before the Group in 1962.

24 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what General Lansdale's  
25 relationship was with the CIA when he worked on the Cuban

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1 operation?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. I never detected any friction or any  
3 difficulties between them. It certainly didn't exist in the  
4 Agency, the same sort of distrust or question about Lansdale  
5 as expressed in the State Department, as I explained earlier.

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the name that was given to  
7 the Cuban operation?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. You refreshed my recollection yesterday  
9 as being Project MONGOOSE.

10 Mr. Wallach. But before yesterday you really didn't recall  
11 the name?

12 Mr. Gilpatric. It had slipped my mind.

13 Mr. Wallach. At any time did you become aware of any  
14 project that General Lansdale was working on with respect to  
15 Cuba that were not brought before the Special Group Augmented?

16 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

17 Mr. Wallach. Was it your understanding that all operations  
18 that he was conducting had to be brought before the Special  
19 Group for approval first?

20 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. The Special Group Expanded or  
21 Augmented was given exclusive jurisdiction as far as any  
22 covert or clandestine actions in regard to Cuba were concerned.  
23 That I am clear enough about in my mind.

24 Mr. Wallach. I think you testified before, Mr. Gilpatric,  
25 that you and Mr. McNamara became used to Mr. Kennedy, President

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1 Kennedy, or the Attorney General, going, I think, to levels  
2 beneath you at the Department of Defense.

3 Mr. Gilpatric. On occasion.

4 Mr. Wallach. Would it have surprised you if they went  
5 directly to General Lansdale in this instance without going  
6 through the Special Group Augmented?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

8 Mr. Wallach. At any time while you were present at the  
9 meeting of the Special Group Augmented was the topic of  
10 eliminating or assassinating Castro brought up?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. No, at least I did not recall it.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any restrictions in negative  
13 terms that one of the considerations could not be the  
14 elimination of Castro?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't have in my mind any recollection  
16 about that subject at all. I don't recall either any  
17 restrictions put upon the types of projects that were enter-  
18 tained. The discussion was usually over how effective a  
19 particular suggestion would be and how feasible it was. And  
20 my principle concern, after the experience in the Bay of Pigs,  
21 was as to whether the Agency could successfully carry out some  
22 of these rather grandiose schemes they came up with under  
23 pressure from the Attorney General and the Group. In other  
24 words, I was concerned about the feasibility and durability,  
25 particularly if they involved paramilitary actions. But I

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1 don't recall any restrictions put on the types of things that  
2 might be laid on the table. And as I say, I have no  
3 recollection of any question being raised about eliminating  
4 Castro as a person, assassinating him or otherwise.

5 Mr. Wallach. Did the intelligence information, if  
6 you can recall -- and I realize that we are talking about a  
7 period that was quite sometime ago -- at that time indicate  
8 that Castro was in control, should I say, by himself, or  
9 that there were other leaders that could readily assume  
10 control if Castro left the scene?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. Our intelligence regarding Cuba was very  
12 deficient. We knew about Che Guevara, or Ortega, and  
13 about Raol Castro and other names. We were aware that there  
14 was a system, an organization which was responsible for the  
15 functioning of the Cuban economy in a pretty effective  
16 fashion, with Soviet help. But one of the problems was, we  
17 didn't know enough about how the Castro system operated to  
18 infiltrate those teams and groups, and they would never come  
19 back, we would never get any playback. And there was a real  
20 dearth of hard intelligence regarding what was happening on  
21 the inside of Cuba that didn't emanate through countries  
22 that were in communications with Cuba directly such as Mexico  
23 and Spain.

24 Mr. Wallach. When you say the agent teams didn't come  
25 back, you mean they were captured or whatever?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. Captured or eliminated.

2 Mr. Wallach. So I take it, then, at least in your  
3 mind-- let's take the period from the end of 1961 to the  
4 beginning of 1962 -- you did not really have any idea in  
5 terms of exactly how the country was being run and where the  
6 power structure really lay?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. Not in detail, not in depth. We just  
8 knew the results, which were that the Cuban economy was  
9 surviving, there was no wide scale famine, there was no great  
10 shortage. The sugar crop was being harvested and exported.  
11 And the general knowledge that we did have -- all of it not  
12 through the Agency at all, but through completely overt  
13 means was -- was that Castro had been pretty effective in  
14 whatever mechanisms he used to run the Cuban system.

15 Mr. Wallach. Going back to the time of the Bay of Pigs,  
16 had you been given to understand that there was an expectation  
17 that when this Cuban brigade landed on the shore that a  
18 popular uprising would occur in Cuba?

19 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, we were told that all along, not just  
20 before the Bay of Pigs, but there were certainly a school of  
21 thought, a certain number of beliefs in the State Department  
22 and the Agency, who felt that there were dissident elements  
23 who, given the occasion and the opportunity, would oppose  
24 Castro. I don't remember any positive proof of that. And  
25 none of the developments with which I am familiar bore that

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1 out. That was just a belief of certain people in our  
2 government.

3 Mr. Wallach. That school of thought, I take it, contin-  
4 ued even after the Bay of Pigs?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. Whether it was a hope or a solid  
6 conviction I don't recall. But it was always talked about  
7 as a possibility, if we could strike a damaging enough blow  
8 to the Cuban economy it might bring into the open whatever  
9 underlying dissident opposition existed in Cuba to Castro.

10 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if the Attorney General  
11 ascribed to that theory that there were dissident elements in  
12 Cuba that were willing to come forward?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. I never heard him express any views on  
14 that. I don't recall his own personal views as having been  
15 expressed in my presence.

16 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who really propounded that  
17 theory, at least while you were present?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, it certainly didn't come from  
19 the Defense Department, because they didn't profess to have  
20 any knowledge. It was either the intelligence people of  
21 State or in the Agency or both -- it was either State, the  
22 CIA intelligence analysis who advanced those views. It  
23 could have been -- I don't want to speculate -- I know that  
24 Dick Goodwin, who was the Presidential assistant assigned to  
25 Latin American Affairs, may have been detailed by the State

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1 Department in some period of time that we are talking about,  
2 and he may have had some inputs from contacts he had in  
3 Latin America. So he might have expressed some such idea.  
4 But those are the only resources I can recall for that kind  
5 of thinking.

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether or not there was  
7 any discussion of arming Cubans to go in and get rid of  
8 Castro?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

10 Mr. Wallach. Specifically not just to overthrow the  
11 Government?

12 Mr. Gilpatric. No. A number of those projects involved  
13 inserting armed individuals, whether they were Cubans or  
14 other nationalities, to carry out these specific projects  
15 that the Group approved, principally of a sabotage nature.  
16 There were demolition teams and machine guns and other weapons  
17 to cover the operations, the people to do the demolition work.  
18 But that is the kind of use of arms that I recall as having  
19 been reviewed by particularly those of us from Defense who were  
20 concerned about how effective these things could be without  
21 some combat element involved.

22 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the school of thought that  
23 talked about dissident elements in Cuba ever discussing these  
24 dissident elements in relation to the presence or absence of  
25 Castro himself?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

2 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether Mr. Harvey from the  
3 CIA ever attended any of these Special Group Augmented  
4 meetings?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. I did not remember his name until  
6 yesterday. But when I saw the documents it came back to me that  
7 he was detailed by the Agency under a man named Fitzgerald to  
8 be the action officer for the Agency as far as the Group was  
9 concerned. So he was at meetings, certainly some of the  
10 meetings.

11 Mr. Wallach. Did he come to those meetings with Mr.  
12 McCone?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

14 Mr. Wallach. Did Harvey have any reputation that  
15 preceded him that you heard either from him or from someone  
16 else?

17 Mr. Gilpatric. I only recall his having been held out  
18 as having had experience and competence in what might be  
19 called the dirty tricks area. He was an operations man in the  
20 Agency. He was picked, so we were told by Mr. McCone, because  
21 he was tough and hard and a good organizer, and was in fact  
22 equipped to carry out the kind of schemes that the Agency was  
23 putting forward. They held him out as a very effective type.

24 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, I take it you were in  
25 attendance at the Special Group Augmented meetings and involved

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1 MONGOOSE from the time it really began until the time that  
2 you left in January of 1964?

3 Mr. Gilpatric. I attended most of the meetings. I am  
4 not clear at this stage, 10 years later, as to which of the  
5 meetings that I attended were the Augmented Group or the  
6 principals in which were the entire Group, the deputy group,  
7 because sometimes we would meet in one capacity for one form  
8 and sometimes in another. But I recall that up through the  
9 time of the missile crisis from the period following the Bay  
10 of Pigs I was in on most of the sessions regarding Cuba.

11 Mr. Wallach. Without really focusing on the period of  
12 the missile crisis, and those discussions there, Mr. Gilpatric,  
13 would it be fair to say that Cuba was not one of your primary  
14 concerns?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct. I regarded this whole  
16 effort to undermine the Castro regime as a project for which  
17 the CIA was the principal instrumentality. Obviously, since  
18 it affected foreign affairs very directly, the State Department  
19 was primarily involved. And since it had very high president-  
20 ial priority, the White House was very much involved. But I  
21 felt, and I believe Mr. McNamara felt, that the role of the  
22 military establishment of the Defense Department as such was  
23 secondary. And I had a lot of other things that I was working  
24 on at that stage. So that this did not occupy a major part  
25 of my time or efforts.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Did it occupy a major part of Mr. McNamara's  
2 time or efforts, if you know?

3 Mr. Gilpatric. I do not think so. He was in the same  
4 position I was in. He had been asked by the President and  
5 his brother to see that this effort got a lot of public  
6 behind it. We were getting needled from the White House,  
7 particularly from the Attorney General, to get the thing  
8 going, get the show on the road. And so we, along with  
9 the other departments, kept the heat on the Agency. But it  
10 was a sporadic thing with us, not a day to day kind of  
11 involvement, such as we had in some other principal concerns  
12 of the Defense Department.

13 Mr. Wallach. When you say kept the heat on the Agency,  
14 could you be more explicit about that?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, after the Bay of Pigs the President  
16 and many of those around him felt that you just couldn't  
17 leave it to the Agency alone. But when it came to a judgment  
18 factor as to how much the Agency could do on its own and how  
19 it would do it, it needed to be, if you would, in a word,  
20 second guessed by others. And the President wanted to be  
21 very sure that he didn't have another aborted effort such as  
22 the Bay of Pigs. And he wanted the judgment of not only the  
23 deputies like myself and Alexis Johnson, and before that,  
24 Bowles, but of the principles themselves, the Secretary of  
25 State and the Secretary of Defense. So our role was to see



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1 that the moving spirits kept moving, the moving spirits  
2 being basically the Agency and its operatives pushed and  
3 stimulated by the Group.

4 Mr. Wallach. What was the pressure, Mr. Gilpatric,  
5 that either you or Mr. McNamara, as representatives of  
6 Defense, put on the Agency.

7 Mr. Gilpatric. As I recall it, it was simply questions,  
8 had they considered this, or had they considered that, could  
9 they mount a larger scale effort, and if so, what it would  
10 involve, so that it would have more of an impact. It was  
11 just a question of resorting, persuading, or otherwise trying  
12 to cause the Agency to exert itself to the utmost toward the  
13 accomplishment of the objective, which was to undermine the  
14 Castro regime.

15 Mr. Wallach. Was there a reluctance on the part of the  
16 Agency to have anything to do with Cuba after the Bay of Pigs?

17 Mr. Gilpatric. Not a reluctance, but an understandable  
18 caution not to fail again. And with the new head -- John  
19 McCone had been Undersecretary of the Air Force, and my  
20 boss for a while, 10 years before, and he had been head of the  
21 Atomic Energy Commission in the meantime, and he was a hard  
22 headed type, and he wasn't about to let ephemeral, halfbaked  
23 ideas get under way. So he was in a sense resisting the idea  
24 of doing something just for the sake of doing something. And  
25 it was a perfectly healthy understandable attitude. And

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1 obviously there were a lot of differences of views as to  
2 whether some of those sabotage projects were really big enough  
3 to be effective if they succeeded, or if they were too big to  
4 be likely to be feasible, having in mind the capabilities of  
5 any external force such as the Agency to get into Cuba and  
6 survive and return.

7 Mr. Wallach. What was the Attorney General really  
8 pushing for at that time?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. He wanted to stop Castro from doing any  
10 more damage. I think he thought it would hurt his country,  
11 and hurt the administration, because of the Bay of Pigs, and  
12 he wanted to do everything possible to hamstring, prevent  
13 Castro from continuing what at that point had been a pretty  
14 successful course of action in defense of the U.S.

15 Mr. Wallach. And in this regard I think you have told  
16 us before that Mr. Kennedy or the Attorney General put  
17 pressure on Mr. McCone to get something done.

18 Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

19 Mr. Wallach. Did the Attorney General ever take the  
20 position that we had to be very cautious about what we were  
21 going to do with respect to Cuba because of what had happened  
22 with the Bay of Pigs?

23 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, he shared the general view that  
24 McNamara, Bundy and others and myself had, that an overt  
25 effort to overthrow Castro, such as by military invasion, would

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1 have such dire consequences from the standpoint of other  
2 relations, primarily with the Soviet Union, and also with  
3 our own allies in Europe, and that that had to be avoided.  
4 So we never talked about a moment that I can remember employ-  
5 ing any of these contingency plans of a military nature,  
6 which the military always had on file there with the Joint  
7 Staff.

8 Mr. Wallach. Are you talking specifically about an oper-  
9 ation such as the Bay of Pigs that would be conducted by  
10 the U.S. forces, or an actual invasion of Cuba.

11 Mr. Gilpatric. That was ruled out for higher policy  
12 reasons. And the kind of actions that were considered were  
13 limited in this sense to covert, clandestine operations,  
14 with which the U.S. could deny attribution.

15 Mr. Wallach. Did the Attorney General ever tell you  
16 that he wished he could go ahead and mount this sort of  
17 invasion?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. No, he was never for invasion, never.

19 Mr. Wallach. Are you talking about after the Bay of  
20 Pigs?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. At no time did he ever think that was a  
22 solution.

23 Mr. Wallach. Did you recall whether or not he voiced  
24 any objection to the landing of the Cubans at the Bay of Pigs?

25 Mr. Gilpatric. I was not privy to any position he took

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1 on the Bay of Pigs. I never heard him discuss it myself. I  
2 never heard him invest himself.

3 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Lansdale ever  
4 talked to you about military invasion of Cuba?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. No. That was not his field. He was  
6 a specialist in concentrated undercover operations, not  
7 direct military actions.

8 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, did the fact that Castro  
9 held prisoners from the Bay of Pigs in any way effect what  
10 the Special Group Augmented could do with respect to Cuba?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. The matter of obtaining the release of  
12 the prisoners was handled separately. It was handled  
13 primarily through the Department of Justice, and mechanisms  
14 were set up there. And it never came directly into the  
15 discussions, because as I said, the theme was, whatever we  
16 did through the Special Group and the CIA in response to its  
17 approval would be nonattributable, and therefore wouldn't affect  
18 whatever steps were being taken in regard to the prisoners.  
19 It had to be covered and not recognized as a U.S. approved  
20 or a U.S. inspired operation. The two things were on separate  
21 tracts, sabotage to undermine the regime, and the efforts to  
22 get prisoners back.

23 Mr. Wallach. Didn't the fact that any operations had to  
24 be first approved by a group that was so large affect the  
25 question of attributability one way or the other?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, what I am talking about is attri-  
2 butions, people get caught and are sent in. Could they be  
3 supplied sufficiently with a cover so that they wouldn't  
4 be directly identified as agents or instrument of the U.S.,  
5 that is the kind of nonattribution we are talking about, not  
6 trying to protect the leak within the Executive Branch at  
7 that stage.

8 Mr. Wallach. Were there any suggestions by General  
9 Lansdale or by the CIA that were actually discussed and an  
10 approval given that were not forwarded to the President?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. No. The general impression was that  
12 it was a reviewing body, but without the power to make  
13 executive decisions, to reject or revise our recommendations  
14 to the President. Every kind of project, clandestine or of  
15 a cover nature, had to be received before it was implemented  
16 with the Presidential approval.

17 Mr. Wallach. In other words, the President, if asked  
18 directly, would not be able to deny that he knew about it?

19 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, unless the Special Group, whether  
20 it was the initial smaller group 5412 or the Augmented Group,  
21 decided to approve and recommend the proposal, the President  
22 might never hear of it. It is possible that the Attorney  
23 General could have told him, or Bundy might have mentioned it.  
24 But he wouldn't be likely to come to grips with a project until  
25 the Special Group had acted on it and referred it to him for

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1 approval. And that was a very rare situation.

2 Mr. Wallach. For example, where specific sabotage  
3 actions were actually approved and planned to be conducted,  
4 those were at least sent to the President for his review?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

6 Mr. Wallach. Would he send back to you approval or  
7 convey it through Mac Bundy?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. Mac Bundy -- or if the President would  
9 inform him that the President had disapproved or changed, or  
10 whatever his change was in his particular action, we would be  
11 told by Mac Bundy.

12 Did Mr. Bundy play a very active role in the Special  
13 Group Augmented?

14 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, Bundy was not one to remain  
15 silent or stay out of things. He was a very active partici-  
16 pant. And he was after all the President's principal  
17 advisor as far as the White House was concerned on CIA  
18 matters. In other words, all the contacts between the  
19 Agency and the President came through Mac Bundy. And you  
20 had the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but that was  
21 purely a staff operation. And even that I think was under  
22 Mac Bundy. So he was the focal point as far as the staff of  
23 the White House was concerned.

24 Mr. Wallach. Did he ever put pressure on the Special  
25 Group Augmented to get something done in Cuba?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't think he was an instrument of  
2 pressure. I think he was also -- he was inclined to  
3 question very closely all aspects of operations, particularly  
4 from a political or foreign relations point of view, whereas  
5 we in Defense, as I said, would question the feasibility  
6 as a practical matter, particularly having in mind the use of  
7 military measures, sending arms as well as demolition teams.  
8 But the chief need-to-know certainly was the Attorney General.

9 Mr. Wallach. Prior to the time that he became Chairman  
10 of the Joint Chiefs in October of 1962 was General Taylor  
11 on the Special Group Augmented as the White House Represen-  
12 tative?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

14 Mr. Wallach. Was he actually the Chairman?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall who chaired the meetings.  
16 It was certainly no designated chairman, as I remember.  
17 Obviously the Secretary of State was the highest ranking  
18 officer among the Group, he took precedence over the Secretary  
19 of Defense. And the Secretary of Defense was number two.  
20 And then the rest of us -- of course when General Taylor  
21 became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs he was one of those  
22 ranking officers. But I don't recall when any one individ-  
23 ual ever took the chair regularly. Mac Bundy did in the  
24 case of the smaller 5412 group, he in fact ran that group.  
25 But I am talking about the larger group where you had those

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1 principals present. And there I think they acted as a  
2 Group of peers without anybody being more equal than the  
3 other.

4 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Taylor had any  
5 specific type of input into the Special Group?

6 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, General Taylor, whatever he was in,  
7 he had something to contribute. He was an extremely intelli-  
8 gent, able officer. And having been out of the military  
9 for several years before President Kennedy brought him back,  
10 he had a lot of insight and perspective gained since he  
11 retired as the Chief of Staff of the Army. And he was in  
12 the midst of every discussion. He was a very active partici-  
13 pant at all times, both in the counterinsurgency group and  
14 the Special Group Augmented.

15 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, when you left your  
16 position in January of 1964, was the Special Group Augmented  
17 still functioning?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall that it functioned after  
19 the Cuban missile crisis actually. I think after the Cuban  
20 missile crisis you had set up a different intent which was  
21 called ExCom. It was something that the President set up  
22 during the missile crisis. And that kept going from the  
23 time, October of 1962, until the President's death in November  
24 22, 1963. That was a different group, and it had the Secretary  
25 of the Treasury, Vice President, and the Attorney General.

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1 And it had kind of a moving base. But that was the group  
2 that functioned in the way that the Special Group Augmented  
3 had prior to the missile crisis.

4 Mr. Wallach. Is Mr. McNamara also an ExCom?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes sir.

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who also was?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. The Secretary of State and George Ball,  
8 the Assistant Secretary, Governor Harriman, and Mr. Nitze,  
9 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International  
10 Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mr.  
11 Taylor, and myself, the Deputy Secretary, and Mr. McCone,  
12 Vice President Johnson, and Secretary Dillon, those were the  
13 ones.

14 Mr. Wallach. Is it your understanding that whatever  
15 was done with respect to Cuba after the missile crisis was  
16 done through this body, ExCom?

17 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

18 Mr. Wallach. And I take it that you did not participate  
19 in the ExCom meetings?

20 Mr. Gilpatric. Oh, I participated in the ExCom, I was  
21 a member.

22 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what activities ExCom  
23 really ran with respect to --

24 Mr. Gilpatric. For example, the major effort after  
25 the missile crisis was to get those IL-28 bombers out of Cuba.

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1 And the ExCom designated George Ball and myself, along with  
2 Jack McCloy, who had formerly been Assistant Secretary of  
3 War, and we went up to New York and we worked on negotiations  
4 with the Russians, participating with Adlai Stevenson, who  
5 was the U.S. Representative to the U.N., in an effort which  
6 finally succeeded in getting the bombers out of there. And  
7 that was all originated by the ExCom under the President's  
8 direction.

9 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether or not ExCom approved  
10 sending in any armed exile groups for raids into Cuba?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. I have no recollection of any of those  
12 activities after November of 1962. From that point on the  
13 Cuban operation had really been made part of the Soviet Union/  
14 U.S. overall confrontation conflict. And it seems to have  
15 been folded into that very major international security  
16 problem rather than being treated as it has been heretofore,  
17 that is prior to the missile crisis, as a separate operation.

18 Mr. Wallach. I think you mentioned to Mr. Smothers and  
19 myself yesterday that you had spoken with Mr. McNamara and  
20 possibly others about the question of whether or not  
21 assassination was ever raised as a viable alternative. I  
22 don't mean to paraphrase you.

23 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall ever discussing the matter.

24 Mr. Wallach. I am talking about within recent months,  
25 Mr. Gilpatric.

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. Oh, I met with him last night. I have  
2 talked to him recently, since this began to appear in the  
3 press, references to the August 10, 1962 meeting. And we each  
4 asked each other whether either of us had any recollection of  
5 the subject having been discussed. And that is the time we had  
6 the discussion I referred to yesterday.

7 Mr. Wallach. And what was Mr. McNamara's comment?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. He doesn't recall ever putting forward  
9 the idea, and if it was discussed, his recollection is that  
10 he was opposed to it. He does not recall putting forward the  
11 idea, and I don't recall hearing him.

12 Mr. Wallach. Have you discussed the matter of assassin-  
13 ations recently with anyone else?

14 Mr. Gilpatric. No. Only Mr. McNamara.

15 Mr. Wallach. I take it once again, though, prior to  
16 your refreshing your recollection yesterday with documents,  
17 that you really had no recollection of an August 10 meeting --

18 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I didn't think I was present at  
19 that meeting. When I read about it in the paper it didn't  
20 register as to my having been present until you showed me  
21 the minutes of the meeting showing that I was present,  
22 I had no recollection of it.

23 Mr. Wallach. Did there come a point in time in 1963  
24 when you again recommended General Lansdale for another  
25 promotion?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. No. The only connection I had with his  
2 promotion was in 1961 when he was made Brigadier General.  
3 When he became Major General I don't recall, I had nothing  
4 to do with it.

5 Mr. Wallach. I would like at this time to have marked  
6 a couple of documents that we showed you yesterday and  
7 a couple of other ones. Do you want to take a two minute  
8 break?

9 (A brief recess was taken.)  
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(A brief recess was taken.)

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1 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, I would like you to just sort  
2 of glance over these documents. I do not expect you will have  
3 time to go through them at this time.

4 Some of them you saw yesterday and some you did not. In  
5 any event, I do not expect you to know the contents.

6 I would like you to keep them before you. I have a couple  
7 of questions on each of them, and I will refer you to the  
8 appropriate document.

9 Looking at 1-A, sir, which is the attachment to 1, the  
10 memorandum dated November 30, 1961, do you recall ever having  
11 seen this particular document before?

12 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

13 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at the outset of operation  
14 MONGOOSE whether there was a question as to whether or not  
15 the task force concept would be kept or just be put into a  
16 trial period?

17 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall this two-week trial period  
18 that is referred to in 1-A.

19 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who at the Department of De-  
20 fense was designated to assist General Lansdale in these MONGOOSE  
21 operations?

22 Mr. Gilpatric. No. There are references to several  
23 offices in these papers, including General Craig and General  
24 Harris, but I think they were representatives of the joint  
25 staff.

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1 The only name I recall is the name you mentioned  
2 earlier, a man named Hand.

3 Mr. Wallach. Is that Frank Hand, do you remember?

4 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

5 Mr. Wallach. I have no questions on two.

6 Will you turn to Exhibit 3 for identification. I will  
7 ask you whether or not you recall you have ever seen this docu-  
8 ment before?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. It is not familiar to me.

10 Mr. Wallach. As a general matter, did General Craig re-  
11 port to you on MONGOOSE operations?

12 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

13 Mr. Wallach. Do you know who he reported to?

14 Mr. Gilpatric. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to my  
15 recollection.

16 Mr. Wallach. Would General Craig speak for the Department  
17 of Defense?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. No. He would speak for the joint staff  
19 or the Joint Chiefs to the extent he was so authorized.  
20 He was a staff officer assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
21 and detailed apparently to the Cuban project, as it was then  
22 called.

23 Mr. Wallach. Maybe I don't understand the relationships  
24 of the Joint Chiefs myself or not. In the first paragraph it  
25 is stated: "As requested in the referenced memorandum, the

1 position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the  
2 military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime  
3 in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors."

4 I am not going to go through these factors. But at least  
5 there it appears that he is stating a position of the De-  
6 partment of Defense and not the Joint Chiefs.

7 Is that common?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, what he means is that the Secretary  
9 of Defense has proved his position, which was put up to him  
10 by the Joint Chiefs at one of our weekly meetings. This is the  
11 type of action that the Chiefs would ask the Secretary  
12 to concur in, and if he did, it became the position of the  
13 Department.

14 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, turning your attention  
15 to the second page, paragraph 4, do you recall that at any time  
16 either the Joint Chiefs or anyone in Defense expressing the opin-  
17 ion that is set forth there?

18 And I will read it: "In view of the factors set forth  
19 above" -- that is above in the document -- "the Department of  
20 Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible  
21 with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemi-  
22 sphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to  
23 overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent  
24 of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government  
25 acceptable to the U.S.".

1 Now, going back to the first part of that paragraph that  
2 I read a portion of which states: "The Communist regime in Cuba  
3 isn't compatible with the minimum security requirements of the  
4 Western Hemisphere", do you recall that opinion being expressed?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. It was always held by the Chief, but  
6 it was never held by Mr. McNamara and myself, unless the Presi-  
7 dent so ordered.

8 Mr. Wallach. Would Mr. McNamara have had to approve this  
9 memorandum?

10 Mr. Gilpatric. Not this particular piece of paper. He  
11 knew how the Chiefs felt. They never shifted the ground. They  
12 always wanted to move in on the Castro regime with military mea-  
13 sures.

14 Mr. Wallach. Turning to the fifth paragraph on the  
15 third page which reads: "The Department of Defense is  
16 also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State or  
17 any U.S. approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of  
18 supplies, transportation, personnel and bases", was that the  
19 supportive role that you generally talked about before?

20 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, that is right. Any approved program  
21 we would support implied actions within our resources.

22 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, do you recall discussions  
23 about creating pretexts for military invasion of Cuba by the  
24 U.S.?

25 Mr. Gilpatric. None comes to my mind right now.



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1 Mr. Wallach. You don't recall general discussions  
2 to that effect?

3 Mr. Gilpatric. I just don't have any recollection on  
4 the subject.

5 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to the exhibit  
6 which we have identified as NO. 4, the minutes of the January  
7 25, 1962 meeting, that indicates that you were present at that  
8 meeting.

9 Do you have any reason to believe that you were not,  
10 Mr. Gilpatric?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

12 Mr. Wallach. Your diary, I take it, is in fact in  
13 the Kennedy Library?

14 Mr. Gilpatric. Correct.

15 Mr. Wallach. Turning to the last paragraph on the first  
16 page of these minutes it states:

17 "Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establish-  
18 ment of the Lansdale Group, higher authority had directed State  
19 and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the  
20 event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He" --  
21 by that it means Johnson -- "said a great deal of work has al-  
22 ready been done along these lines, and that this should now  
23 be directed into the channel of an integrated political military  
24 plan to cover any contingency".

25 Do you remember any plans for military intervention in

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1 the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene,  
2 or as compared to those for supporting an uprising?

3 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I remember there was a series of  
4 planning efforts, and on different hypotheses and assumptions.  
5 And this obviously is one hypothesis, the one that is referred  
6 to by Alexis Johnson in this paragraph on page 4.

7 Mr. WALLACH. Do you remember any specific discussions  
8 as to how Castro was going to be removed  
9 from the Cuban scene?

10 Mr. Gilpatric. No -- other than that the general thrust  
11 of the whole effort was to undermine or weaken or over-  
12 throw the Castro regime.

13 Mr. WALLACH. I take it by that that you are saying  
14 that the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene, looking  
15 back now, would mean to you removal of the Castro regime  
16 from the Cuban scene.

17 Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

18 Mr. WALLACH. Turning your attention to the second para-  
19 graph on the second page, without my reading the entire para-  
20 graph into the record, would you just read through it.

21 There it refers to the Castro regime being overthrown without  
22 U.S. military intervention and not Castro.

23 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't attach any significance to that  
24 change in phraseology. I think that the two expressions have  
25 a common meaning, at least that is my recollection.

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1           Mr. Wallach.    Just looking at that paragraph -- I  
2   don't want to paraphrase what apparently General Taylor  
3   said, but it to the effect that more than contingency plans  
4   were required for military intervention, and as far as possible  
5   he wanted to get authority to undertake major moves which  
6   might be required.

7           Do you know if anything further than military contin-  
8   gency plans developed? Was there ever an actual state of readi-  
9   ness for an invasion of Cuba?

10          Mr. Gilpatric.   Not until the missile crisis.

11          Mr. Wallach.   Skip over to Exhibit 6.

12          Exhibit 6 is a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of De-  
13   fense from General Craig. Would that have been to you?

14          Mr. Gilpatric.   Yes.

15          Mr. Wallach.    Do you recall any discussions with General  
16   Craig where you expressed to him a need to inject a sense of  
17   urgency?

18          Mr. Gilpatric.   Not specifically with him. As we  
19   said before, he was the officer detailed to work with this  
20   group. And I am sure I had a lot of contacts with him. But  
21   I don't recall giving him any specific instructions.

22          Mr. Wallach. I think he is identified here as the DOD  
23   JCS representative to the Caribbean survey group.

24          Was that another name for the Special Group Augmented?

25          Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, I think that must have been an earlier

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1 terminology.

2 Mr. Wallach. With respect to Exhibit 7, was General  
3 Lansdale actually in the office of the Secretary of Defense?

4 Mr. Gilpatric. No, not physically.

5 Mr. Wallach. Do you know why he was writing memoran-  
6 dums on the office of the Secretary of Defense stationery?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. Since he had been assigned this  
8 project by the President, as indicated by Exhibit 1, he must  
9 have used this stationery simply because he was not operating  
10 either as a part of the Air Force or as a member of the Joint  
11 Staff. This stationery, office of the Secretary of Defense,  
12 was used by everybody who wasn't either in one of the military  
13 departments or in the Joint Chiefs, but it was just generally  
14 the work of the Department of Defense. The term covered a  
15 great deal of ground in many individuals.

16 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether Guantanamo was  
17 ever used as a training facility for Cuban exiles at any time?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

19 There was a lot of discussion about Guantanamo and how  
20 important it was and what could be done. And my recollection  
21 is that the military always felt that we shouldn't compro-  
22 mise its position under prior arrangements for the Cuban  
23 government by using it for CIA purposes.

24 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you don't know one way or the  
25 other whether it was actually used?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

2 Mr. Wallach. Going back to Exhibit 6-A for a second,  
3 "Guidelines for operation MONGOOSE", paragraph 1-a, which  
4 is attached to the memorandum which General Craig sent to you,  
5 I note there that he has stricken out General Lansdale's  
6 use of the words "Castro Government" and put in "Communist  
7 Government of Cuba" in the sentence reading "In undertaking  
8 to cause the overthrow of", he struck out "Castro Government"  
9 and put in "Community Government of Cuba."

10 Do you recall any discussions with him as to that change  
11 at all, as to what the difference was as between the Castro  
12 government and the Communist Government of Cuba?

13 Mr. Gilpatric. No. It was just a legal system employed  
14 by the military.

15 Mr. Wallach. Okay.

16 Exhibit 8.

17 I really have no questions with respect to this document  
18 except that it reflects that you were present at the meeting  
19 along with Mr. McNamara.

20 Do you have any reason to think that that is not correct?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I am sure it is correct.

22 Mr. Wallach. Is it your recollection that once the  
23 Special Group Augmented was formed Mr. McNamara attended as of-  
24 ten as he could with you, or was the function divided between  
25 you and Mr. McNamara?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. I certainly went regularly. And my  
2 recollection is that he may have been less regular, because of  
3 other duties. As I indicated yesterday, my memory is blurred  
4 as to what meetings were called Special Group Augmented and  
5 what were just 5412.

6 My recollection is that whenever the Attorney General  
7 was going to be present, Mr. McNamara came. . .

8 Mr. Wallach. Was there an agenda that was sent out to  
9 your prior to these meetings, do you recall?

10 Mr. Gilpatric. Sometimes papers during this time we  
11 were discussing these guidelines, as exhibit 8 shows, there were  
12 a number of papers that had been tabled before the meeting,  
13 and they were discussed. There ass no agenda other than the  
14 circulation of papers beforehand that I can recall.

15 Mr. Wallach. Exhibit 9, the memorandum from General  
16 Craig to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And I want to establish  
17 again that that was a memorandum to you.

18 Mr. Gilpatric. Correct.

19 Mr. Wallach. And that just concerns the guidelines for  
20 operation MONGOOSE. No need to go over those here.

21 Mr. Gilpatric. General Craig was regarded as the proper  
22 channel for submitting any kind of defense point of view as going  
23 through me as the top civilian.

24 Mr. Wallach. Just looking at the first paragraph there  
25 where General Crais is commenting on the CIA's proposed changes

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1 to paragraph 2, which in fact were eventually adopted, it  
2 says:

3 "The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during  
4 the coming three months would be the acquisition of hard intelli-  
5 gence on Cuba".

6 I take it the coming three months would be from March on?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes.

8 Mr. Wallach. The memorandum was dated March 13.

9 In any event, do you remember that that was in fact the  
10 case, that there was a point in time when strictly there was  
11 an attempt to be an intelligence gathering operation, MONGOOSE.

12 Mr. Gilpatric. As I stated earlier, we were confronted  
13 at the threshold of our work with Cuba by the absence of  
14 hard intelligence. So it was natural to give the acquisition  
15 of such intelligence top priority at the beginning.

16 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if the Attorney General  
17 ever expressed any opinion on whether or not this intelligence  
18 gathering should be terminated and actual sabotage or other  
19 types of operation should be undertaken?

20 Mr. Gilpatric. No. He was frustrated, as the rest of us  
21 were, by the fact that we didn't know enough as to what was  
22 going on down there. He didn't regard this particular activity  
23 as exclusive, pre-empting all efforts of other activities.

24 Mr. Wallach. Looking back, Mr. Gilpatric, at the  
25 program as a whole, would you say that it was a successful

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1 program against the Castro regime?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. No. It never really accomplished very  
3 much.

4 Mr. Wallach. Do you have any thoughts as to why it  
5 really didn't accomplish very much? Were there certain re-  
6 strictions on it?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. I think it had an inherent weakness.  
8 It depended for accomplishment of its objectives on covert  
9 activities. And under the circumstances that then confronted  
10 this country, we didn't have the capabilities, or at least we  
11 didn't discover them, through this effort in the CIA to be  
12 effective.

13 Mr. Wallach. Did General Craig do most of the sort of,  
14 can I say, leg work, or background work, or writing for you,  
15 on some of these proposals?

16 Mr. Gilpatric. He called him the DOD representative, but  
17 He was really the military man in the Pentagon who staffed  
18 all these papers and went around and got ideas from different  
19 services and from the Joint Staff.

20 Mr. Wallach. Was there someone who you delegated  
21 a certain review to?

22 Mr. Gilpatric. No, I didn't have any assistant.

23 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to Exhibit 11, sir, --  
24 I believe it is the next exhibit, I have skipped 10 -- I am  
25 sorry, it is No. 12 -- which is a one-page memorandum signed

by you to Mr. Lansdale, is that in fact your signature,

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1 Mr. Gilpatric?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. And I am sure I dictated this myself.

3 Mr. Wallach. On the bottom line it is stated: "some-  
4 time before the weekend I want to talk to you about Mr.  
5 McCone's 'liberation plan'".

6 Do you recall what that liberation plan was?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't.

8 Mr. Wallach. Was it usually your duty to notify General  
9 Lansdale of the meeting of the Special Group Augmented?

10 Mr. Gilpatric. No. We had executive sessions, and if he  
11 wasn't present, I would be the one of the members of the group  
12 who would communicate with him.

13 Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McCone ever tell you that he was  
14 either planning or undertaking activities for the CIA that  
15 actually did not come through the Special Group Augmented?

16 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I understood that all his activities,  
17 unless they related to overt activities or diplomatic activities,  
18 if he had any ideas, would all come through the group.

19 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to 13, sir, the  
20 third paragraph reads: "Mr. Gilpatric felt that it was neces-  
21 sary to achieve as high a posture of readiness as possible.  
22 For example, PT boats and other material necessary for our ac-  
23 tive operations should be acquired. In addition, more  
24 Cubans should be inducted into the U.S. Army. In this connec-  
25 tion he" -- and by that he refers to Mr. Gilpatric -- "pointed

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1 out that the restriction on service of such Cubans outside of  
2 this country has been lifted.. The Attorney General concurred  
3 in Mr. Gilpatric's comments that a more imaginative approach  
4 toward enlistment of Cubans can be devised".

5 Mr. Gilpatric, what did you mean there? I realize that  
6 is only Mr. Parrott's notes on what you said. But by as high  
7 as posture of readiness as possible, do you recall what you might  
8 have meant?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. I was concerned again that the military  
10 would be in a position to react quickly if some of these CIA  
11 mounted efforts were in danger of aborting, or surfaced in a  
12 way that would involve some risk or peril to U.S. property  
13 or nationals, and they felt that the military had to be on the  
14 alert any time that the CIA activity was going forward, in case  
15 something might fail in a way that we would have to do  
16 something.

17 Mr. Wallach. Wouldn't the military having to come in  
18 have created a situation similar to the Bay of Pigs in terms  
19 of publicity for President Kennedy, and an operation by the  
20 CIA having failed, the military having to bail it out?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. But it was a question of the lesser  
22 of two evils. And if U.S. personnel were involved, and under  
23 service as a U.S. activity, we at least didn't want to have  
24 the consequences that the Bay of Pigs had.

25 Mr. Wallach. I thought that would be of the prime emphasis

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1 of the Special Group Augmented was to have activities that  
2 were not attributable to the U.S.

3 Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct. This was purely a  
4 contingency proposal.

5 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether or not the President  
6 had expressed a desire to have more Cubans inducted into the  
7 U.S. Army?

8 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall the President's position  
9 on that. I felt that the attitude of the military heretofore  
10 in not wanting Cubans in the services for questions of  
11 security or loyalty was wrong, and that we ought to include  
12 them in the Armed Services.

13 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to Exhibit 15, the  
14 first paragraph states:

15 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have approved  
16 the attached plan prepared in response to your memorandum of  
17 10 June 1962, subject: 'Spontaneoud Revolts in Cuba, Contin-  
18 gency Planning'".

19 That memorandum is from Benjamin Harris to the Chief of  
20 Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, which was General Lansdale.

21 Did Benjamin Harris replace General Craig?

22 Mr. Gilpatric. That is my recollection.

23 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if about this time there was  
24 still discussion going on of a spontaneous revolt occurring  
25 in Cuba?

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1 Mr. Gilpatric. There certainly was planning against  
2 that eventuality. I don't recall ever thinking it  
3 was going to be likely to happen. But as was the case of  
4 every other possibility, the military always wanted to have a  
5 plan for it.

6 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to Exhibit 16,  
7 which bears the date August 3, 1962, and the title DOD Task  
8 No. 69, is this an usual format, this type of sheet?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. No -- I don't recall. It doesn't  
10 look like a JCS paper, in spite of it being titled "DOD Task  
11 No. 69". It looked to me as though this came out of Lansdale's  
12 office.

13 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to 17, sir, which  
14 is not only undated, but it is unsigned, do you know whether  
15 or not you have ever seen this document before?

16 Mr. Gilpatric. I never saw it until you showed it to  
17 me yesterday.

18 Mr. Wallach. I think you stated yesterday that this looked  
19 like the Joint Chiefs paper, but you can't really attribute  
20 it to anyone, I take it?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. That is the closest I can come to specu-  
22 lation as to its origin.

23 Mr. Wallach. In any event, in the sixth line from the  
24 bottom, which is partly wiped out, the language is "Assassinate  
25 Castro and his handful of top men".

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1 I take it you don't recall that ever being promulgated?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

3 Mr. Wallach. 10.

4 These are the minutes of the August 10, 1962

5 Special Group Augmented, meeting on MONGOOSE. I take it  
6 that this looks like, at least from the records we have, a  
7 fairly large number of people present at compared to the other  
8 meetings.

9 Do you recall if there is any special significance for  
10 this meeting?

11 Mr. Gilpatric. It was unusual to have Ed Murrow and  
12 Don Wilson present from USIA. Otherwise the conditions were  
13 lousy because there were more people from State than usual.

14 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anything about any meeting  
15 that was really special where more people were called in to  
16 come?

17 I realize you can't pinpoint a specific date for me.

18 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I don't recall why Murrow and Wilson  
19 were there. And the question of whether there were five people  
20 or two people from State just depended on whether Mr. Rusk  
21 and Mr. Johnson wanted in the way of assistance for a particular  
22 session.

23 Goodwin is listed for State, but he was actually a presi-  
24 dential assistant.

25 Mr. Wallach. In the third paragraph -- I am not

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1 going to read that verbatim -- it just refers to Mr. Rusk --  
2 it brings up the blockade of Berlin. Did Mr. Rusk often talk  
3 about Cuba and the blockade of Berlin together in terms of an  
4 action the Soviets could take?

5 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall it coming up often.  
6 It was generally accepted that our operations vis-a-vis Cuba  
7 should not be such as would touch off crises or threats in  
8 other areas.

9 So that it is not surprising that he mentioned this  
10 here, particularly at this juncture, when we had had one  
11 Berlin crisis.

end nash  
cb fols

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1 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to the second  
2 page, sir, the fifth paragraph, which says: "The discussion  
3 then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr.  
4 McNamara questioned whether we can not separate the building  
5 up of agent assets in Cuba from the actions that would hurt  
6 the U.S. in the use of world opinion". It then states: "This  
7 lead to the discussion by General Taylor that we should  
8 consider changing the overall objective from one of over-  
9 throwing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible  
10 failure".

11 Do you remember as a constant theme at this meeting that  
12 Mr. McNamara stressed the building up of agents inside Cuba?

13 Mr. Galpatric. No. I only recall the concern that  
14 surfaced continually over effecting our relations adversely  
15 with other Latin American countries. We appeared to be  
16 intervening in the internal affairs of one of them. And I  
17 think that is the point that Mr. McNamara must have had in  
18 mind here.

19 Mr. Wallach. Sir, I call your attention to Exhibit 19.  
20 And I would like you to look at that in conjunction with  
21 Exhibit 20. That these are two documents that you saw  
22 yesterday. Exhibit 19 is a two page memorandum from General  
23 Taylor to his various people at State, the CIA and Defense.  
24 And you will note that in the next to the last paragraph,  
25 the second line of that paragraph, there is a portion that

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1 is whited out, is that correct?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct.

3 Mr. Wallach. It is under Mr. Harvey.

4 Now, referring to Exhibit 20, sir, which is a memorandum  
5 prepared by Mr. Harvey and dated August 14, 1962, paragraph  
6 two states: "Reference is made to your conversation on 13  
7 August 1962 concerning the memorandum of that date from  
8 General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum,  
9 excised from which are four words in the second line of the  
10 penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were,  
11 'including liquidation of leaders'".

12 I believe that the penultimate paragraph that Mr. Harvey  
13 is referring to is the four words that are excised in the  
14 August 13 memo.

15 In the next paragraph Mr. Harvey states: "The question  
16 of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought  
17 up by Secretary McNamara at a meeting of the Special Group  
18 Augmented in Secretary Rusk's office on August 10".

19 I take it you testified before that you did not recall  
20 Mr. McNamara's bringing that topic up, is that correct?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. Right.

22 Mr. Wallach. Was the meeting of August 10 in Mr. Rusk's  
23 office, if you recall?

24 Mr. Gilpatric. I believe so.

25 Mr. Wallach. Could that have been the reason why so many



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1 people from State were there?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. It could have well have been, there  
3 could well have been a connection.

4 Mr. Wallach. Was it unusual for the meeting to be held  
5 there?

6 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, because as I said before,  
7 Secretary Rusk was the ranking officer, and we usually went  
8 to his office. We never went to the CIA. And except for a  
9 few meetings that were held in my office very early on, I  
10 think all the meetings were held in State.

11 Mr. Wallach. Looking again at Exhibit 20, the third  
12 paragraph, after Mr. Harvey states that the question of  
13 assassination was brought up by Secretary McNamara, he goes  
14 on to state: "It was the obvious consensus at the meeting,  
15 in answer to a comment by Ed Murrow, that this is not a  
16 subject which has been made a matter of official record".

17 Do you recall Mr. Murrow saying anything to that effect?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

19 Mr. Wallach. I take it you wouldn't because you don't  
20 recall the assassination?

21 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I don't recall the conversation on  
22 the subject at all.

23 Mr. Wallach. The fourth paragraph reads: "Upon receipt  
24 of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and,  
25 in his absence, point out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility

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1 and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing  
2 in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as  
3 CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining  
4 to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing  
5 it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he  
6 excise the phrase in question from all copies of this  
7 memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense  
8 and U.S.I.A. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and  
9 left the message that he agreed and that he had done so."

10 My first question is, did you ever discuss with Mr.  
11 Hand the excising of this language from the document?

12 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I never saw either document.

13 Mr. Wallach. Did you ever discuss with Mr. McNamara  
14 the excising of certain words from this document?

15 Mr. Gilpatric. Not this document, no, because I never  
16 saw it until yesterday.

17 Mr. Wallach. Were there references to assassination of  
18 Castro in any other documents that Mr. McNamara had, do you  
19 recall, just proposals?

20 Mr. Gilpatric. No. The only thing I have seen is a  
21 memorandum in 1967 that Mr. McCone dictated at that time  
22 after he was out of the government, and following some story  
23 of Jack Anderson in which the subject of assassination came  
24 up.

25 Mr. Wallach. When did you see that memorandum, Mr.

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1 Gilpatric?

2 Mr. Gilpatric. I saw it last night. Mr. McNamara  
3 showed it to me.

4 Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara tell you how he got a  
5 copy of the memorandum?

6 Mr. Gilpatric. McCone sent it to him.

7 Mr. Wallach. Had you discussed assassinations or planning  
8 for assassinations at all with Mr. McCone?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

10 Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara comment on Mr. McCone's  
11 1967 memorandum?

12 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, he wasn't sure. He said to me  
13 last night that the chronology of events was quite dim, as  
14 the McCone memorandum stated, being five years after the  
15 event.

16 Mr. Wallach. Did he tell you whether or not it was  
17 in fact correct or incorrect?

18 Mr. Gilpatric. He had no recollection of ever having  
19 brought the subject up in his position then. And he says  
20 now he was against the idea.

21 Mr. Wallach. Does he remember it being discussed?

22 Mr. Gilpatric. He doesn't remember it being discussed at  
23 all.

24 Mr. Wallach. Did he tell you that he ascertained a position  
25 at that time that he was against the idea?

1 Mr. Gilpatric. He said it was his position. Whether he  
2 expressed it he doesn't recall. But he asked McCone if  
3 McCone had any recollection after the statement to the press  
4 began appearing several weeks ago during early June.

5 Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard any discussion of  
6 using the Mafia for any purposes in the MONGOOSE operation?

7 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

8 Mr. Wallach. Or using any hoodlums or anything like that?

9 Mr. Gilpatric. No.

10 Mr. Wallach. Turning your attention to Exhibit 21,  
11 which reflects a Special Group Augmented meeting on MONGOOSE  
12 on October 4, that indicates that you were present also. Do  
13 you have any reason to believe that you were not?

14 Mr. Gilpatric. No. This is before the missile crisis.

15 Mr. Wallach. The first paragraph of that memo states:


16 "The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that  
17 higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE  
18 program and feels that more priority should be given to  
19 trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General  
20 said that he wondered if a new look is not required at this  
21 time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage  
22 field. He urged that 'massive activity' be mounted within  
23 the entire MONGOOSE framework". Do you recall the Attorney  
24 General stressing this, or is this just one time in many  
25 that he was pushing?

JFK

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Y

WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1961



NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 100

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Cuba

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: The Secretary of Defense  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Mr. Richard Goodwin

cc: Mrs. Lincoln  
Mr. Bundy's Files  
Mr. Bromley Smith

TOP SECRET

C-O-P-Y

RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL

5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he would be leaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Wymerley Coerr, would have to take this project on.

I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him. I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the presence and positions of Raul and Che Guevara must be taken into account. We agreed that this was an exercise that should be under the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of this requirement.

Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right away. As to timing, I said that I did not understand that this was a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed. He then set Monday as a target date for a first draft.

I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President's interest in this matter, before General Taylor had told me he preferred this not be done. Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr, on the assumption that Mr. Woodward would have already told him. I asked that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture. He understood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an exercise emanating from his own office. I said I would leave this up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General Taylor.

On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be related to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement.

Thomas A. Parrott

RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL

5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

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On the covert side, I talked to Tracy James in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be related to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. James of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement.

Thomas A. Farrer

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*7-8-75*

*File*

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,  
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

*P-76*

Subject: Cuba Project

Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for  
BrigGen W. H. Craig, USA, subj:  
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62

1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors:

a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during the meeting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

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4  
25 January 1962  
*Gilpatrick Et al*  
*7-5-75*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 January 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatrick, General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell

Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Helms and General Lansdale were present for Item 1.

1. Cuba

The Group considered General Lansdale's paper "Cuba Project," 19 January 1962; his paper "Task 33," 19 January 1962; and the CIA paper "Cuba Project," 24 January 1962. In addition General Lansdale circulated, but retained, copies of a paper on actions taken to gain popular support for the U.S. position in connection with the OAS meeting, and another outlining actions taken on the spot, in Punta del Este.

After a lengthy discussion, all agencies currently involved (State, Defense, Joint Staff, CIA) agreed that they accept the tasks assigned to them. In the case of State, this is subject to concurrence by the Secretary upon his return. February 20th is recognized as a target date to take a searching look at progress up to that point and to recommend new lines of policy if appropriate.

General Lansdale commented that it appears that some clarification might be in order as to exactly what is intended in the planning papers. He emphasized that there is agreement that external support of internal operations should be provided for and that it is recognized there might be an internal revolt which could lead to a Cuban group's requesting U.S. intervention. He also said he had met with the JCS and that the latter had responded strongly to the idea of preparing for external action. Additionally, he had met with the intelligence estimators and it had been noted there will be some delay in the NIE because of the need to acquire more intelligence and to digest a sizeable input from the State Department.

Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establishment of the Lansdale group, higher authority had directed State and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He said a great deal of work has been done along these lines and that this should now be directed into the channel of an integrated politico-military plan to cover any contingency.

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Mr. McCone made several points: (a) The NIE of November 28, which was commented on in General Lansdale's paper, was based on all available intelligence and dealt with certain operational aspects. The latter had been done at Mr. McCone's direction. (b) Clandestine operations are not susceptible to rigid scheduling and must be approached on a step-by-step basis. Therefore, schedules will have to be reexamined periodically. (c) Sabotage, sanctions and economic warfare can all be attributed to the United States. The Special Group should recognize this as a possible consequence. (d) A popular uprising within Cuba could be brutally suppressed in the manner of Hungary. In such an event, unless the U.S. is prepared to give overt assistance, future opportunities to unseat the Castro government would be lost.

In commenting on Mr. McCone's last point, General Taylor noted that the CIA paper of the 24th appears to question the feasibility of the basic objective of overthrowing the Castro regime without overt U.S. military intervention, and that it suggests the need to accept in advance of implementing the Project the definite possibility of having to use U.S. forces. He said that in his view more than contingency plans are required and that, so far as possible, authority should be obtained in advance to undertake major moves which might be required as circumstances develop. He conceded that it may be impossible to get such a firm determination very far in advance. The Group agreed, however, that every effort should be made to line up various situations that might arise, and to formulate recommended policy to capitalize on these situations at the proper time. It was agreed that no action should be taken before February 20th which could have possibilities of involving the U.S. in charges of overt aggression.

General Lemnitzer noted that military contingency plans now in being provide enough American strength to accomplish the job without internal help. He said that while these plans are up-to-date, it will be necessary to build up a number of them based on varying assumptions. He also warned that planning for operations of this kind should not involve a firm commitment to a time schedule, as was the case in the earlier unsuccessful operation.

Finally, General Lansdale noted that task number 33 (a) has been withdrawn. The others under 33 will not be put into execution until future examination and approval.

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*Gilpatrick - Ex 5*  
*7-8-75*

5 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) on Project  
Mongoose, 5 March 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Rusk and Mr. Johnson;  
Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatrick, General Lemnitzer and  
General Lansdale; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey.

1. After considerable discussion, the following was agreed:

a. The intelligence-collection program presented in General Lansdale's paper of 2 March was approved. General Taylor emphasized that this should not be interpreted as a completely rigid plan, but should serve as a general outline at this stage. Any actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the Special Group for resolution.

b. We cannot afford to concentrate on the intelligence aspects to the exclusion of preparations for other eventual actions, during the next five months. Accordingly, General Lansdale will prepare a phased plan for circulation before the next meeting to provide for possible actions which could lead to an internal revolt and eventual U.S. intervention.

c. In addition certain preliminary actions can be begun in the very near future, involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents. As the danger of blowing our plans by doing this is recognized, the Special Group (Augmented) must keep its hand tightly on these preliminary actions.

d. The Guidelines prepared by General Taylor will be examined by all members, with a view to concurrence at a meeting a week from today. These will be shown to higher authority, but in the context of information rather than a request for specific approval. The Secretary of State felt that the Guidelines should make it clear that, while Mongoose is concerned with covert operations, the U.S. is simultaneously pursuing an overt course which may contribute to the same end. He added that the covert operators should keep in touch with the overt programs.

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2. In making the above point, Mr. Rusk pointed out that if it should be possible to prove Castro's involvement in efforts to subvert other Latin American countries then this might present an excuse to intervene either unilaterally or multilaterally. He said that Cuba could be viewed as the "East Germany" of the Western Hemisphere. He added that the Department is looking into the possibility of enlisting the aid of other Hemisphere countries in establishing mechanisms for patrolling and controlling movement of Cuban operatives in the Caribbean area.

Mr. Johnson was asked to have a list prepared of various situations which would serve as a plausible pretext for intervention.

3. It is recognized that many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba would be of an all-purpose type; that is they would be trained in paramilitary skills as well as those of exclusively intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S. although every effort will be made to attempt such control. It was noted that the scale of this covert intelligence effort is about the maximum that can be supported within the framework of assets available, unless there is some dramatic change for the better.

Thomas A. Parrott

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*Signature - Ex 6*  
*7-5-75*  
*A-31*

9 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Comments on the Guidelines for  
Operation Mongoose

1. In conformance with our conversation and for such use as you may desire, I am transmitting herewith my views concerning General Taylor's "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose". I have incorporated my views into the attached revision of General Taylor's "Guidelines". This paper has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Essentially, the changes recommended are designed to clarify the command channels and responsibilities and to inject a sense of urgency.

3. I have indicated specific deletions of General Taylor's wording by striking through the word(s), and indicated additions by underlining.

*William H. Craig*  
WILLIAM H. CRAIG  
Brig General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure:  
Guidelines

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GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION MONGOOSE

1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions:

a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the ~~Castro-government~~ Communist government of Cuba, the United States will make maximum use of Cuban resources, internal and external, but recognize that final success will require decisive US military intervention, and that this should be accomplished before Soviet military bases are established in Cuba.

b. Such Cuban resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and therefor to facilitate and support it.

2. The immediate primary objective of US efforts during the coming three months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the conditions inside Cuba. Concurrently, other actions ~~generally-political-and-economic-in-character~~ may be taken as necessary to develop credible intelligence concerning: US support; leadership potential; likely areas for the development of resistance and insurgency; and to test the appeal of proposed political platforms; provided that these actions are relatively inconspicuous and consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and of

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neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The Joint-Chiefsef-Staff-will-carry-forward-the-neecessary planning- The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive US military capability for intervention. At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program.

3, During this period, General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies through their respective CSG representatives and the established working groups for support and implementation of agreed required tasks. The heads of departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to the President. The Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating the combined planning and execution of tasks by the Caribbean Survey Group and reporting to the President through the Special Group (5412 Augmented).

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 March 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *SL*

Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, needing resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations.

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltration into Cuba.

2. Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is

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logical that the number of requests will increase as the operation proceeds. There is a need for clearly defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self-defense, for training, for purposes short of open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, in Phase I.

3. Use of U.S. military personnel and equipment. CIA has requested Defense assistance in air and sea capabilities, including supplying equipment and supplying U.S. military crews to operate the equipment. Included in these requests are 2 LSD's (or similar ships) to lie off the coast in support of CIA maritime operations, with U.S. Navy crews of 200-300 depending upon the missions, 3 USAF cargo aircraft with "sheep-dipped" USAF crews for air re-supply, 2 amphibious aircraft with "sheep-dipped" USAF crews, and 2 submarines for black broadcast operations. (This is in addition to CIA requests for 6 PT type boats, 3 Helio aircraft, 2 82-foot Coast Guard cutters, and arms, communications equipment, etc.). Again, where U.S. military personnel and equipment are involved in Phase I, there is need for a policy determination which will permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, as well as a need for rules of engagement.

Distribution:

Copy:	To:
1 -	General Taylor
2 -	The Attorney General
3 -	Secretary Rush/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
4 -	Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
5 -	General Lemnitzer (through General Craig
6 -	Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)
7 -	Chief of Operations

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13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on  
Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara,  
Mr. Gilpatrick, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale;  
Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey

1. The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some of this language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific proposals for approval to the Special Group, which involve policy considerations.

2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Institutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved. The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

3. The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions made:

a. Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation.

b. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be made to the Group. (This decision did not deal with the actual means of supply, which is covered in c below.)

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c. Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re-supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will be included in the Guidelines. General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next week. In the meantime preparations should be begun for the selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries, such a "sheep-dipping." The Air Force will be asked to come up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide one or two aircraft for use in initial operations.

In connection with small boat operations, the Secretary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be established. It was pointed out there are no PT boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days.

4. Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel. He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should reflect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnel, bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that would exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also be studied immediately.

4. At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered to Cuba.

6. The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent.

7. It was agreed that the Group should give a status report to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general principles and guidelines.

Thomas A. Parrott

No distribution

SECRET



SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN 9

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. *See page 9 A-37*  
*7-4-75*

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Comments on CIA's Recommended Changes  
to the Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

CIA's proposed changes to paragraph 2 of the "Guidelines" paper are acceptable if the following changes are made (deletions are indicated by striking through the word(s) and additions are identified by underlining):

"The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming three months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on Cuba. Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within Cuba, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro and of centralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The JCS will carry-forward-the-necessary-planning continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention. At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program."

00214

*William H. Craig*  
WILLIAM H. CRAIG  
Brig General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

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REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10  
DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

14 March 1962

A-38

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions:

a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention.

b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitate and support it.

2. The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement with minimum losses in assets and U.S. prestige. The JCS will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure

Cy 1 of 10 Copies

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a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention. At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program.

3. In order to get the covert phase of this program in motion, it will be necessary at the outset to use U.S. personnel, bases and equipment for the support of operations inside the target area. However, the CIA will concurrently expedite the development of non-attributable resources in order to reduce or eliminate this dependence should it become necessary after the initial phase.

4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS. The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress.

Note: Mr. Johnson has copy number 2. CIA (Helms/Harvey) has copy number 3. General Lansdale has copy number 4. All other copies, except the ones filed herewith (1 and 5) have been destroyed.

*destroyed 4/14/65 - mrm*

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TOP SECRET

16 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE  
with the President

In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines.

M.D.T.

22 March 1962

This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines.

*Y. J. TAP*

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13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on  
Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara,  
Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale;  
Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey

1. The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some of this language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific proposals for approval to the Special Group, which involve policy considerations.

2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Institutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved. The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

3. The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions made:

a. Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation.

b. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be made to the Group. (This decision did not deal with the actual means of supply, which is covered in c below.)

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c. Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re-supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will be included in the Guidelines. General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next week. In the meantime preparations should be begun for the selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries, such a "sheep-dipping." The Air Force will be asked to come up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide one or two aircraft for use in initial operations.

In connection with small boat operations, the Secretary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be established. It was pointed out there are no PT boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days.

4. Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel. He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should reflect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnel, bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that would exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also be studied immediately.

4. At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered to Cuba.

6. The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent.

7. It was agreed that the Group should give a status report to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general principles and guidelines.

Thomas A. Parrott

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington 25, D.C.

13 March 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

Subject: Consolidated Status Report, DOD/JCS  
Representatives, Caribbean Survey Group,  
4 January - 9 March 1962

1. On 4 January 1962, Brig. General William H. Craig, USA, was designated as DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group (CSG). Four officers from J-5, Joint Staff, who had been working on the Cuba Project, were authorized to continue on a full-time basis.

2. On 18 January, Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, presented his program review to the SRG. As a result of this review, 10 tasks were assigned which were the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense. In order to accomplish these tasks, General Craig's Working Group was enlarged by the addition of full-time representatives of J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency and necessary office space and clerical personnel obtained. Also, full-time representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the four Military Services were designated to work with the Group. Tasks were assigned to members of the Group. Action, to date, on these tasks is as follows:

a. Task 1 - On 8 February, the JCS forwarded a proposed position paper defining the Stake and Role of DOD in the Cuba Project which generally subscribed to full Defense support in terms of personnel, materiel and bases. This position was approved by DepSecDef on 8 February, and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.

b. Task 29 - On 7 March, the JCS approved a planning paper which outlined the total involvement of the DOD in the Cuba Project and indicated specific situations which would require the use of US military force. This document is now being considered by the DepSecDef.

c. Task 29 (2) - Determine how to reduce CINCLANT's reaction time and yet provide adequate force to quickly take Cuba. CINCLANT and supporting commanders have reviewed CINCLANT's contingency plans and made study of prepositioning steps required if reaction time is to be drastically reduced. Although three initial and separate messages pertaining to reaction times were discussed and cleared by the JCS supported by only those personnel cleared for or a part of the CSG (WG), it has become necessary to place subject of time reduction factors in open channels in order to cover the myriad of recommendations, possibilities and required decisions with adequate staffing.

d. Task 29 (3) - Be prepared to brief DOD's immediate capability to respond to a request from insurgent Cubans for military assistance. Existing J-3 briefing on the JCS approved CINCLANT contingency plan is considered adequate for initial brief. Additionally, the concept of a proposed "Quick Reaction" Oplan together with an analysis of the availability of US forces with reactions times on an accelerated, piecemeal basis and with regard to the calculated risks involved is being developed.

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e. Task 31 - DOD Policy for Support of CIA and State - completed and approved by the JCS on 23 February. Signed by the Chairman, JCS, 27 February, and by the DepSecDef on 28 February. Letters were dispatched by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director, US Information Agency, stating that DOD would support fully on a high priority basis, requests for assistance received in writing and containing sufficient information to permit a determination of the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission.

f. Task 31 (1) - DOD Support for Caribbean Admission Center, Opa Locka, Florida - completed. DOD provided 26 military personnel as interrogators, report writers and supervisors in two increments in close coordination with CIA. Final increment completed CIA orientation and training course on 8 March and began infiltration into Miami area, 9 March. All personnel scheduled to be on board on 14 March and Center fully operational, 15 March 1962.

g. Task 32 - Defense to submit a plan for special operation: use of Cubans enlisted in the US Armed Forces. Recommendation that geographic restrictions on use of Cubans now in, or to be taken into, US Armed Forces forwarded by JCS to the Dep SecDef. Plan for use of these Cubans, under the assumption that the restrictive policy would be changed was also approved by JCS on 8 March and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, on 9 March 1962.

h. Task 33 a - Prayers for Cuba by Cubans in US Armed Forces - completed 2 February. Task as assigned visualized prayers being offered for Cuba by Chaplains in US Armed Forces units having Cubans enlisted with photographs being made of Cuban soldiers at prayers for publicity purposes. On recommendation of the JCS, no further action was taken by the Chief of Operations.

i. Task 33 b - Plan for Incapacitation of Sugar Workers - completed 2 February. Task as assigned was to develop a plan for incapacitating large segments of the sugar workers by the covert use of BW or CW agents. Study revealed the idea was infeasible and it was cancelled.

j. Task 33 c - Plan for a C&D Air-Sea exercise in the vicinity of Cuba.

Task 33 d - Alternate plan for C&D exercise.

Plans prepared using cover of scheduled exercises as proposed military C&D exercises. Both plans approved by JCS on 16 February, however, the advantageous position of Plan 33 c noted as opposed to the elements of risk inherent in the less desirable alternative Plan 33 d. Plans forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, on 19 February with JCS recommendation that only Plan 33 c be considered for ultimate possible execution.

3. On 12 February, General Lansdale requested a survey and evaluation of DOD Psychological Assets in the Caribbean area and a plan for improving their use. By proper sanitization of the request, the Joint Staff was requested to prepare the study with a deadline date of 10 March. The Joint Staff response was received on 9 March and the document is now being studied with a view of responding to General Lansdale by 15 March 1962.

00203

4. Additional actions to achieve the objective of the CSG, but not directly associated with any assigned task which have been accomplished to date include:

a. Preparation of detailed initial Essential Elements of Information (EEI) required for planning. These EEI were levied on the Intelligence Community through the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, on 15 February. First responses specifically identified with the EEI were received, 28 February 1962.

b. Preparation of a secure room in the JCS Restricted area for use as a Special Operation Room for the CSG. This room was completed on 23 February and is now available for such use as the CSG may desire to make of it.

c. On 22 February, received a request from CIA for use of Avon Park Bombing Range, a USAF facility in Florida, for use as an exercise area for training agents. Request was staffed, approved by the JCS on 7 March, sent to the DepSecDef on 7 March for policy approval, signed by the DepSecDef on 9 March, and CIA notified of approval on 9 March, provided it was National policy to train Cubans on US military bases.

d. This office has received and processed several other requests from CIA involving personnel, equipment and facilities of a minor nature. All specific CIA requests to date have been handled expeditiously by the Military Services.

e. Began preparation of a Civil Affairs/Military Government Plan for implementation on order. Also, a Communications Plan, in support of the CA/MIG Plan, based on the assumption that existing communication facilities would be destroyed or inoperable. Target date for completion, 15 March 1962.

f. Requested the Chief of Operations to levy a requirement on CIA for preparation of an estimate of the hostile resistance other than organized military forces which might be expected if military operations were conducted in Cuba and of the results of a truly free election if such were held.

g. Reviewed and commented informally on the Interrogation Guide: Cuba, a Joint CIA-DOD-State project, handled by CIA. Purpose of this Guide is to provide interrogators at Opa Locka with a starting point when interviewing refugees processed through the CAC. This Guide will be revised monthly or as found necessary by experience.

h. CIA submitted a request to DOD on 5 March 1962 for the use of certain personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities and bases including, but not limited to, aircraft, boats, submarines and landing ships dock (LSD's), plus the use of US Armed Forces to furnish Air and Sea Cover for CIA sponsored activities. The National policy decisions involved concerning the execution of this task are as follows:

(1) Whether a policy of non-attributability to the US Government will apply to all projects in connection with the activities of the CSG.

(2) Whether US bases and facilities should be utilized for the training of Cuban refugees.



*Jul. 1962 Ex. 12*  
*7-8-75*  
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 5, 1962

*A-44*

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

There will be a meeting of the Mongoose group next Wednesday afternoon at 2 o'clock in the Secretary of State's Conference Room (the hour being subject to adjustment in case the Secretary of State has to go to the White House). You will be asked to give a progress report at the outset of the meeting, after which the group will go into executive session.

The Special Group today decided to ask you to brief it bi-weekly on Mongoose and to furnish the members with weekly written reports in the style of the South Vietnam reports, that is, the participating departments and agencies would file with you separate reports and you would prepare for the principals a highlight summary along the lines of Secretary Harriman's reports on South Vietnam.

Sometime before the weekend, I want to talk to you about Mr. McCone's "liberation plan".

*Rowell*

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*Gilpatric Ex 13*  
*7-8-75*

13

12 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on  
Operation Mongoose, 12 April 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson,  
Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone

Mr. Bundy joined the Group later for a summation of  
the discussion.

1. The Group discussed the major points made at yesterday's  
meeting, particularly the views of the Secretaries of State and  
Defense.

2. Mr. McCone reiterated his belief that the operation as  
presently conceived may not accomplish the desired purpose. He said  
that activities in addition to intelligence (e.g., guerrilla warfare  
teams and sabotage), should be authorized in order to permit  
operations to move in the direction of the original objectives. He  
felt that if only intelligence is to be involved, then the present  
scale of CIA effort may be too large. Mr. McCone also urged that  
the U.S. be prepared to accept a greater degree of attributability  
than it perhaps now is.

3. Mr. Gilpatric felt it is necessary to achieve as high a  
posture of readiness as possible. For example, PT boats and other  
materiel necessary for more active operations should be acquired.  
In addition, more Cubans should be inducted into the U.S. Army.  
In this connection he pointed out that the restriction on service  
of such Cubans outside of this country has been lifted. The Attorney  
General concurred in Mr. Gilpatric's comments that a more imaginative  
approach toward enlistment of Cubans can be devised.

4. It was agreed that the guidelines do not require revision  
at this time. Instead the operation as presently conceived, with the  
stepping up indicated above, will be continued until August. At that  
time a review will be conducted of progress made and of the long-range  
objective. It was noted that the effect of any increased training  
connected with the new activities mentioned by Mr. McCone, would not  
be apparent before August.

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5. Mr. Gilpatric agreed to look into the status of the underwater reconnaissance operation which had been approved at the meeting of 13 March 1962, and which has apparently been the subject of some misunderstanding by the Joint Reconnaissance Center. General Taylor called the Group's attention to the JCS paper "Justification of U.S. Military Intervention," which most of them had not yet received. Mr. McCone said that he would probably make additional recommendations for action within the established time-phased schedule, and that he would also examine the effects on the motivation of agents, which might result from an extended period of activity within the current framework.

Thomas A. Parrott

No distribution, except  
General Lansdale - *by destroyed 4/9/63 - mm*

7-233



TOP SECRET-NOFORN  
SPECIAL HANDLING

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

14 June 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR EBBIN MARTIN, STATE  
GENERAL CRAIG, DEFENSE  
WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA  
DONALD WILSON, USIA

A-82  
MD2

SUBJECT: Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning

This confirms the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency planning.

The Defense operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S. -initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. U.S. actions are seen as including the use of U.S. military force.

The State operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open revolt in one or a few localities in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S. -initiated situation where the people in one Cuban locality (or several neighboring localities) openly defy the Communist regime, are being suppressed with force, and U.S. help is requested (by the Cuban revolvers or Latin American opinion).

All U.S. Departments and Agencies participating in Operation Mongoose will assist in the preparation of these plans, as required. Plans should include a description of the assumed contingency situation, specific actions to be taken and by whom, timing required, and an indication of post-action requirements.

Although current operations take priority, it is expected that working drafts of these contingency plans will be ready by 16 July. A working meeting of operational representatives will then ready these plans for submission to the Special Group (Augmented).

00382

*E. G. Hausdale*  
EDWARD G. LAUFBALE  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Chief of Operations

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SPECIAL HANDLING

SENSITIVE

→cc: General Taylor

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 July 1962

A-110

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

Subject: US Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have approved the attached plan prepared in response to your memorandum of 14 June 1962, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning".

2. This completes our action on the specific responsibility assigned. However, should the plan be approved by the Special Group (Augmented) and disseminated to task agencies, supporting plans will be required.

*Benjamin T. Harris*

BENJAMIN T. HARRIS  
Brig General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure:  
Plan

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DOES NOT APPLY

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 July 1962\*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

Subject: Questions Concerning United States  
Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. Pursuant to your informal notes the following is submitted:

a. Page 8 (b) Phase II - The policy referred to has not been established as yet. CINCLANT now has a State Department Political Advisor (POLAD) permanently attached to his staff. This is the present liaison link with State. In developing military plans it has been recognized by both CINCLANT and State that an additional POLAD will be assigned to the staff of Commander, Joint Task Force 122 during the initial assault. This latter POLAD and his assistants, if any, will shift to the staff of Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba during the ensuing ground operations and subsequent anticipated period of military occupation/government. It is considered that approval of United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S) by the Special Group and the assignment of the tasks delineated in the coordinating instructions of sub-paragraph 4.c. (page 15) would levy the requirement for the development of political policy upon the Department of State. This same approval would then require this policy to be included in the supporting plan to be developed in accordance with the instructions of sub-paragraph 4.d. (page 15).

b. Page 8, last 3 lines - The intention of the State Department to ultimately assume the responsibility for the civil administration of Cuba logically should also be a part of the State Department plan required in sub-paragraph 4.d. Recognizing the time that was required before State Department assumption of responsibility in Europe following World War II, the military is prepared to establish and maintain civil affairs through a US Military Government. The existing military contingency plans direct that the civil affairs units be

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DOES NOT APPLY

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prepared to retain this responsibility for at least 6 months. As it is known, however, that the US military cannot indefinitely support the indigenous Cuban population from military supplies, military contingency plans stipulate that State must be ready to assume responsibility for the humanitarian feeding of the population within 30 days following the commencement of hostilities. The question as to what Cuban government will ultimately be recognized by the State Department cannot be predicted, however, State's intention should also be included in the agency plan.

c. Page 10, para (5) - Again, this policy is dependent upon the development and issuance of a Department of State plan which would be required under the provisions of paragraph 4.d. (page 15).

d. Page 12, para (b) - The Cuban government discussed must be assumed to be one friendly to the United States. The paragraph itself is considered "compatible" in that the Department of State may or may not act as the middle-man in the actual turnover of government. It might be that pending the establishment of a new Cuban government acceptable both to the United States and the Cubans themselves, the US military might be required to retain operational responsibility for military government and civil administration; this civil administration, however, to be in consonance with State Department policy and the required coordination. In any event the turnover should be accomplished as rapidly as possible consistent with the Cuban capability to assume responsibility.

e. Page 13, para (2)(a) - Approval of the US Contingency Plan No. 2 would task USIA with the provision of the subject informational specialists and for inclusion of the planning therefor in the USIA Agency Plan. Since USIA has been created subsequent to any major combat operations involving US military forces, there is no past experience in this field. However, availability of these informational specialists to augment Defense Psywar units should not be overlooked.

f. Page 13, para (3)(a) - Again, approval of the subject contingency plan would assign the task outlined in this paragraph to USIA for development and

TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

inclusion in the USIA supporting plan. It is anticipated that the individual questions posed would be the subject of coordination between USIA, Defense, JCS, the Services, CINCLANT, and all of the other possible subordinate participants and contributors. Provision of the transmitting equipment should be included in the agency plan and if not available in on-hand stocks, can be obtained on the open market.

2. Although not noted as a question the comment outlining the "transmittal" is considered adequate distribution of the subject contingency plan.

*Benjamin T. Harris*

BENJAMIN T. HARRIS  
Brig General, USA  
DOD/JCS Representative  
Caribbean Survey Group

-3

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

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3 August 1962

DOD TASK # 69

Ideas to beef-up course of action B.

## DIPLOMATIC

1. Encourage Dom Rep to table its complaint on Cuban instigated subversion NOW -- to the UN later.
2. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission limited documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics.
3. Third state pressures should be encouraged - e.g., asylum.
4. State openly that Guantanamo will be used as a place of asylum for bonafide political refugees.

## ECONOMIC

1. Stop the transit of Cuban sugar by anyone through the Panama Canal.
2. Publication of contraband list of items which we will stop - remove from ships - if known to be going to Cuba (hard goods, war making potential).
3. Pressure the IMB, IMF, and GATT to restrict Cuban credits (\$), loans, etc. Insist that US Allies demand cash payment for goods - no barter.
4. Preemptive buying and dumping sugar on world markets.
5. Dump "soft" Cuban currency at discount prices.
6. Announce prohibitive tariffs on any items (tobacco primarily) of Cuban manufacture.
7. Announce fines and punishment for any importations of Cuban goods.
8. Introduce cheap marijuana into Cuba.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. More small joint exercises in the Latin America - Caribbean - southeastern US area with appropriate publicity.
2. Announce closure of Panama Canal to Cuban vessels or vessels berthing in Cuba.
3. Announce sea search of all vessels (actually selective and limited to Sino-Soviet and Cuban vessels) to stop "illegal" arms importation into Western Hemisphere.
4. Shut-off civilian employees in Guantanamo.
5. Announce a misfire of a missile in Atlantic Missile Range "near" Cuban waters.
6. Increased naval patrolling of the Windward Passage.
7. Step-up radio broadcasts - hit island from four sides simultaneously with clandestine broadcasts.
8. Drop para-dummies in selected areas.
9. Make high altitude passes over and violations of Cuban air space.
10. Explicit Dom Rep charges of Cuban intervention.
11. Increase publicity on Cuban narcotics trade in US, and other countries.
12. Provide open publicity on defection of Cubans to Guantanamo, and on harassment of the workers.

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INFORMATION

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*Cell file # 17  
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10-B

17

We believe Castro can be overthrown only by the use of considerable external military support. The objective of Operation Mongoose is the overthrow of the Castro regime.

If course of action B were pursued vigorously and the resistance elements in Cuba were stirred to action without US military support, then the assets presently in Cuba would probably be destroyed by Castro's effective means of repression.

If, however, course B is followed with the intention of providing US military support, when required, simply not telling the Cubans, the following things could be done: (Cubans would do better tho, if they knew).

Greatly increase VOA broadcasts to Cuba.

Supply more arms and equipment to Cuban guerrillas.

Exert all possible influence on Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Exert all possible influence on all friendly countries to stop all trade with Cuba.

Increase program of information to Latin American countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regime and threat to themselves.

Take all possible steps to assist other Latin American countries in economic progress, to increase contrast with Cuba.

Drift sanitized floating mines into Havana harbor.

Pay Cuban employees at Guantanamo Naval Base in pesos.

Disseminate Maribu seeds in agricultural areas to choke out beneficial products.

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Land more resistance-trained Cubans.

Encourage friendly nations to stop chartering ships to Bloc countries for trade with Cuba.

Intensify efforts to introduce damaging chemicals into petroleum shipments to Cuba.

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HARVEY # 5

*See page 4.18  
7-5-75*

MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on  
Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin,  
Mr. Hurwitch

White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General  
Lemnitzer, General Lansdale

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

1. Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro regime fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. McCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his personal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRBM base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB.

2. At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent papers. He then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase I, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of Berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping, etc. He suggested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans should be closely meshed. Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying that he did not believe limited retaliation of this kind would constitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide harrassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter.

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4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. He pointed out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S. interests no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen. However, should reasonably viable resistance develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at the moment the previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. He indicated that this of course may be temporary. He said that there has been some success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S., and that there have been some defections.

5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation would be created which would require intervention.

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view.

8. Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly "disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they could generate on their own.

9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15th.

Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale  
*delivered 4/9/63. mn.*

Attachment - Agenda for Meeting



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MONGOOSE  
\* (S)

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA  
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE  
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE  
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *Ed*

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

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Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

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*Gilpatrick Ex. 21 21*  
*7-8-75*

4 October 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on  
Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962

PRESENT: The Attorney General; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatrick, General  
Taylor, General Lansdale; Mr. McCone and General Carter;  
Mr. Wilson

1. The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General said that he wondered if a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage field. He urged that "massive activity" be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework. There was a good deal of discussion about this, and General Lansdale said that another attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones are in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson said that "massive activity" would have to appear to come from within. He also said that he hopes soon to be able to present to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand, with the full realization that this would give more visibility to their activities. On this latter point, Mr. McCone said that he reserves judgment as to the feasibility and desirability of such a program. (Mr. Johnson agreed that he has reservations as well.)

2. Mr. McCone then said that he gets the impression that high levels of the government want to get on with activity but still wish to retain a low noise level. He does not believe that this will be possible. Any sabotage would be blamed on the United States. In this connection, he cited the enormous number of telephone calls that had been directed at CIA at the time that the skin divers landed in Eastern Cuba and at the time Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house. He urged that responsible officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they want to get on with operations.

In partial rebuttal, the Attorney General said that the reasons people were so concerned at the times mentioned were: (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) that the student

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activity was irresponsible and foolish, and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the U.S. it would have been a great mistake. He went on to say responsible people do wish to get on with operations but want to relate the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking. He also questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether "more direct action" is not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed for accomplishing the overall objective.

3. Returning to Mr. Johnson's point about the necessity of massive activity coming from within, Mr. McCone pointed out that internal security missions are now so rigid that internal uprisings are sure to be brutally suppressed. It was agreed that the current guidelines do not call for inciting such an uprising.

4. Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts which are necessary to insure that an operation such as the sabotage one previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the U.S. After considerable discussion, the Group agreed that it is not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to guarantee non-attributability and that short cuts will be acceptable.

5. Mr. Gilpatric reported that Defense is now working hard on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits will be trained for four or five months and will then be on call for any future action.

6. General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various military contingency plans, based on a variety of possible situations. Such situations include: Soviet action against Berlin; presence of Bloc offensive weapons in Cuba; attack against Guantánamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere; and the establishment of a direct threat to the U.S.

7. The Group then turned to the subject of reconnaissance of Cuba. (Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley joined the Group for this part of the discussion.) It was pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using its high performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites. It was questioned whether this is a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly when the SAMs are almost certainly not operational.

Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described for the Group a spectrum of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken, ranging from low-level Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures.

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The result of this discussion was that it was agreed that DOD and CIA should get together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage and on recommendations as to how to achieve this coverage. A meeting was set for next Tuesday, at which time DOD and CIA should be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

8. There was some discussion of the desirability of mining Cuban waters. It was pointed out that non-U.S.-attributable mines, which appear to be homemade, are available and could be laid by small craft operated by Cubans.

9. It was agreed that the Attorney General should act as Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) at least for the time being.

10. It was agreed that four major points emerged from today's discussion:

- a. We ought to go all out for increased intelligence.
- b. There should be considerably more sabotage.
- c. Restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and other preparations can be subject to some short cuts.
- d. All efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

*Thomas A. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale  
*destroyed 4/9/63 - m*

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Operation MONGOOSE

26 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)  
on Operation MONGOOSE, 26 October 1962

PRESENT: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General  
Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General;  
Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr.  
Harvey; Mr. Wilson.

1. The meeting began with a discussion of the considerably-increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed to recall the three teams already on the way.

It was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get CIA into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be.

2. Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA and was not in response to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes.

In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated

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unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations might move under military control, but that such action is not indicated at this time.

3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dispatches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the event of invasion, a sizeable number of Cubans could be trained quickly.

4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level.

5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be established within the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with MONGOOSE affairs.

6. Mr. McNamara thought that MONGOOSE in the short-term should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion.

7. Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows:

a. CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery.

b. No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week.

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c. General Lansdale should develop further plans to "help the Cubans to help themselves." Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into this planning.

d. Political planning for the post-Castro period will be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs."

e. Establishment of USIA's new 50 KW transmitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited.

8. It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal point for all MONGOOSE activities, that he is charged with their overall management and that he should be kept informed of all significant plans and activities in connection with the project.

*Tap anst*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

The Attorney General  
Chairman, JCS  
DCI

General Lansdale - *Cy destroyed 4/9/63 - mm*

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 October 1962

SENSITIVE  
FOR THE RECORD

By Brig. Gen. Lansdale *SL*

Subject: Outline of Covert Operations

Last night, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric asked me to give him a brief outline, by this morning, of Operation Mongoose in the light of current US-USSR negotiations re Cuba. I was to cover present status of operations, resources, and sketch in future possibilities. I wrote the outline, based on current reports from the Mongoose operations team and my staff. Only two copies were typed.

I showed the outline to Mr. Gilpatric this morning as he rode out to the airport, to catch his flight to New York. I noted the exceptional sensitivity of the information in the outline. He acknowledged its sensitivity, said the outline was precisely what he had in mind, and that I should hold the paper rather than his taking it. He then asked me to show it to Secretary McNamara and to the Attorney General. I did so, today.

The outline was read by Mr. Frank Hand, Mr. Bruce Cheever, and by Lt-Col Patchell. I gave its general information to General Johnson. Cheever said that the figures were the same he had given me, for CIA operations; he noted that CIA intelligence reporting was spotty now, due to lack of mail deliveries from Cuba.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 October 1962

SENSITIVE

FOR THE RECORD

By Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Outline of Covert Operations

My other memorandum on this same subject today describes the tasking by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and the handling of this highly sensitive information. The acquisition of the information is noted in this present memorandum.

After Deputy Secretary Gilpatric gave me the requirement last night, I talked to Bruce Cheever (who was acting for Bill Harvey while Harvey was out of town). I sketched in the purpose, which was to get a fix for Gilpatric as one of the U.S. negotiators with the Soviets on whether or not all actions (sabotage, etc.) had come to a stop. I mentioned that this was a sensitive point brought up by Adlai Stevenson when he talked with the U.S. negotiators in New York; he didn't want the U.S. embarrassed and Gilpatric wanted to be sure of this. Cheever commented that he hoped my memorandum wasn't going to be shown to Stevenson; I reassured him that I was writing it as an "eyes only" for Gilpatric, but it must be correct.

I asked about covert operational assets both inside Cuba and outside, if they had stop orders on actions. Bruce said that they all had such orders, but pointed out that some of the Cubans were quite emotional about stopping actions against Castro and he wasn't certain that everyone would hold to the orders.

I then asked about assets inside Cuba, did they only have the two action teams there? How about any psychological operations? Bruce said he believed there were only the two teams and would check further to be sure. He knew the teams were supposed to be collecting intelligence. As for psychological operations, all CIA assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use. I asked about the balloon operation. He said that this was not in being yet.

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This morning I talked to Bruce again, checking the points in my memorandum. He said that there were only the two action teams, a small one (Central Cuba) and the big one (200-man in Western Cuba), but they definitely were on intelligence collection. I asked if all others were under control, no boats going out, etc. He said yes, but again pointed out that the Cubans were restive. I then asked if any independent groups were in motion. He said CIA couldn't guarantee any groups not under CIA control, but that the word had gotten around to stop actions at this time and none were known to CIA currently, although maybe there was one not known to CIA. I commented again that any action would embarrass the negotiations, which was why I was asking. Bruce said he understood.

I then checked with Don Wilson, USIA, who confirmed that all CIA psychological assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use and were being used as desired by the President. I checked with Bob Hurwitch, State, to see if he knew of any actions in preparation or on the way; he said no, everything appeared to be at a halt. I checked with General Johnson to see if any U.S. military activity might have a Cuban action group. He said no, there are firm orders holding such actions.

I then wrote the "eyes only" memorandum to show to Mr. Gilpatric, on "Outline of Covert Operations."

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3 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Talk with General Lansdale

1. On Friday afternoon General Lansdale came to see me at his request. He had three matters to discuss:

A. Frank Hand, his performance, and whether or not it was desirable for Lansdale to write a memorandum to the Director setting forth Hand's contribution to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I asked Lansdale to write the memorandum by all means.

B. General Lansdale told me that he was going on leave in Florida for a couple of weeks and wanted to be sure that it was not necessary that he meet General Walsh before departure. I told him that General Walsh was still involved in some indoctrination and training and that we could arrange the introduction after General Lansdale's return from leave.

C. General Lansdale said that he thought Operation Mongoose should be "wrapped up" and that it should be put out of business. He added that he had already taken steps to relieve General Charles Johnson of any duties in this regard and that he was simply awaiting an appropriate time to come over to the Agency for the purpose of tidying up the details here. (I don't know what he meant by this and did not ask.) He pointed out, however, that although he thought he ought to disengage from Operation Mongoose, "they had not permitted him to disengage at this time". I asked what he meant by "they", but he simply repeated his statement with a smile. I could only assume from this that the Attorney General or someone of comparable rank had told Lansdale that he was not to disengage from Operation Mongoose unless and until certain decisions were made.

2. General Lansdale during this conversation did not inform me of what I had recently learned from the Pentagon, i.e. that he was due to retire in February, that he had persuaded Mr. Gilpatric to write a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force arranging for

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him to be recalled to active duty following the retirement. I gather that this would mean that he would be made a Major General at the time he is recalled.

*mt*  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Exile Raids -- Extent of Knowledge Within Executive Branch

I refer to your interest in knowing the extent of knowledge within the Government about the exile raids in which the U.S. was involved. The following will give you a pretty good, general picture of the people who knew a little or a lot about the raids. A detailed list which indicates the names and numbers of all the players (including aides, secretaries, S/S types, etc.) and which indicates the extent of their knowledge, will take some time to run down. Are you interested in such a list?

1. White House -- The President, you, Tom Parrott, and I knew specifics about the raids.

2. State -- The Secretary, George Ball, Averill Harriman, Alexis Johnson, Ed Martin, Sterling Cottrell, John Crimmins, and Bill Bowdler (Crimmins' deputy) knew specifics about the raids. The head of the Miami Office, Harvey Summ, is cleared for this sort of information but was aware of our involvement only in the most general way.

Dick Phillips and Jim Greenfield in P, in preparation for press queries, were told for their own background that "we were interested" in the raids.

In INR, the liaison men with CIA, Joe Scott and Al Carter, knew about the raids. Presumably, Tom Hughes, George Denney (Tom's deputy) and John Plank also knew.

3. Defense -- Roswell Gilpatric knew details about the raids and, presumably, he told Secretary McNamara.


As a member of the Cuban Coordinating Committee, Cy Vance knew details about the raids; he probably told one or both of his two people who work on Cuba -- Joe Califano and Lt. Col. Al Haig.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

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1. CIA -- On the operating side, obviously, a number of people knew about the raids. Also, a few intelligence people were given general information so that the events would not be over-played in the intelligence reports. For the same reason, a few people in DIA had general information about the raids. Generally speaking, the intelligence people were told about the raids shortly before they occurred.

5. Miscellaneous -- The AG, Bromley, and other members of the Standing Group, not mentioned above, knew about the raids. Certain Navy elements in the operational area knew where the attack boats were going, but not the details of operation.

A great many people knew there was something special about these raids, although they did not know the details. For example, the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS had to be told to leave the "comings and goings" of the operation alone. Also, a very few people in DOD who had to procure special equipment, (e.g. cannons and mortars) for the group knew that some "hanky-panky" was going on somewhere. Finally, the intelligence watch officers on duty the night of the raids were told that we were aware of the raids; this prevented needless night-time phone calls.

6. CIA says that information about the raids is given to people who have a real "need to know"; furthermore, a person is given only as much detail as he needs to know. While Tom Parrott regards the above as a pretty tight control, I regard the apparent security of the two attacks as slightly short of miraculous in view of the extent of knowledge around the government. However, I confess that I don't know enough about the total security set-up to make a judgment as to whether or not it could be made significantly tighter.

GC

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

14 April 1967

B-32

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone

1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962 meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists.

2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room (Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in \_\_\_\_\_ were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase II of operation MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald). At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds.

3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on \_\_\_\_\_ personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair -- was under the operational control of \_\_\_\_\_

4. At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy.

5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government.

01116

  
John A. McCone

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10 AUGUST 1962 - STATE

McCONE

LANSDALE

HARVEY

DON WILSON

HURWITZ

ED MARTIN

PARROTT

GOODWIN

01117

TOP  
SECRET  
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

MONGOOSE DOCUMENTS

01118

SECRET  
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.
2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."
3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by \_\_\_\_\_ at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in \_\_\_\_\_ on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by \_\_\_\_\_ that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.
4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and ~~would participate in no~~ open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

01119

SECRET  
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SECRET  
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

*W. K. Harvey*

WILLIAM K. HARVEY  
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment


Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

01120

EYES ONLY

SECRET

GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification



TOP SECRET-NOFORN  
SPECIAL HANDLING

MONGOOSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA ←  
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE  
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE  
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *SL*

Subject: Alternate Course B

*High & Helms & Macgregor*

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

*Secretariat!*

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, ), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

01121

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10  
DOES NOT APPLY

*Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Macgregor  
Mr. Wilson  
Mr. Harris  
Mr. Hurwitch  
Mr. Harvey*

TOP SECRET-NOFORN

This document contains 3 pages.



TOP SECRET NOFORN  
SPECIAL HANDLING

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

01122

6 October 1961

E-7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 6 October 1961

PRESENT: General Taylor (items 1-5), Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dulles, General Lansdale. Mr. Gilpatric and General Lemnitzer were present for items 1 and 2.

2. Air Resupply - North Vietnam

Mr. Dulles reported that the plan to make the resupply drop into North Vietnam at dusk had proved to be unduly risky. He said that it is now proposed to fly the mission in the dark of the moon. The Group had no objection to this.

✓ 7. Cuba

For the benefit of the State and Defense members, Mr. Parrott recounted the discussion that General Somoza had had with General Taylor, including the request for advice on the proposition which had been made to Somoza for the use of Nicaraguan airfields in connection with sabotage raids over Cuba. It was noted that a proposition had been made to CIA for support of these projected operations and that it had been rejected. The Group agreed with General Taylor's advice to Somoza to avoid involvement at this time.


Mr. Parrott also told the Group that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba - the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1961



NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 100

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Cuba

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: The Secretary of Defense  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Mr. Richard Goodwin

cc: Mrs. Lincoln  
Mr. Bundy's Files  
Mr. Bromley Smith

TOP SECRET

C-O-P-Y

5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he would be heaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Wymberley Coerr, would have to take this project on.

I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him. I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the presence and positions of Raul and Che Guevara must be taken into account. We agreed that this was an exercise that should be under the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of this requirement.

Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right away. As to timing, I said that I did not understand that this was a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed. He then set Monday as a target date for a first draft.

I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President's interest in this matter, before General Taylor had told me he preferred this not be done. Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr, on the assumption that Mr. Woodward would have already told him. I asked that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture. He understood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an exercise emanating from his own office. I said I would leave this up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General Taylor.

On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be related to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement.

Thomas A. Parrott

100  
#2  
Tom  
5 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba

In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he would be leaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Henderson Coerr, would have to take this project on.

I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him. I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the presence and positions of Paul and the Georgia must be taken into account. We agreed that this was an exercise that should be in the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of this requirement.

Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right away. As to timing, I said that I did not understand that this was a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed. He then set Monday as a target date for a first draft.

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On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be related to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement.

THOMAS A. FARRETT

SECRET

4-1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

April 22, 1961

Dear General Taylor:

I am delighted that you have consented to serve as my advisor on a series of important problems, and I send this letter to indicate the range of the matters which I hope you will consider.

It is apparent that we need to take a close look at all our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity which fall short of outright war. I believe that we need to strengthen our work in this area. In the course of your study, I hope that you will give special attention to the lessons which can be learned from recent events in Cuba.

Since advice of the kind I am seeking relates to many parts of the Executive Branch, I hope that you will associate with yourself, as appropriate, senior officials from different areas. I have asked the following to be available to you in this fashion: Attorney General Robert Kennedy from the Cabinet, Admiral Arleigh Burke from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director Allen Dulles from the Central Intelligence Agency. I hope that each of them will have an opportunity to review and comment on your conclusions. But in the end what I want is your own report, drawing from past experience, to chart a path toward the future. I hope I may have a preliminary report by May 15th.

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
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JUL 7 1975

E. F. L.



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

I hereby authorize you to obtain from all officials of the Government any information or records which you may find pertinent to your work. While your appointment will be as a Consultant to me, on the White House staff, the Department of Defense will provide travel, funds and administrative support that you may require.

Sincerely,

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ELECTROSTATIC COPY



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4-141

July 21, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group, July 20, 1961.

PRESENT: General Taylor, Messrs, Johnson, Gilpatric, Dulles,  
Bundy (for items 1 and 2, and part of 3)

Mr. Barnes was present for items 1 through 3.

✓ \*3. Cuba - Covert Program

The DCI introduced discussion of this paper with the comment that the covert program must be keyed into over-all U. S. policy and that an aggressive set of clandestine actions should not be undertaken until it is clear what the general direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba is going to be. The Group agreed with this. Mr. Johnson expressed his understanding that essentially a stand-by attitude was in effect at the moment. In this connection, reference was made to the recent meeting of top-level authority with Dr. Miro Cardona, which evidently resulted in an understanding that the Revolutionary Council would continue to be supported, for the present at least.

Under Objectives, the Group accepted Mr. Dulles' suggestion to reword paragraph 2 a of the paper, to read as follows:

"a. The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S."

Regarding the question of propaganda, Mr. Dulles said that he thought CIA officials should sit down with USIA to coordinate plans to the extent possible; General Taylor agreed that this would be useful. Mr. Dulles cautioned, however, that USIA's appropriations for Latin America had been deeply cut and that, therefore, its capabilities were not very large.

General Taylor then raised a basic question as to where responsibility for approval actually lies, in the case of several possibilities cited under the paramilitary section. After some discussion, it was agreed that any major operations in this field would be subject to further approval by the Special Group.

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It was also agreed that sabotage operations, particularly, require a close policy look. In this connection, the second sentence on page 8 of the paper was changed to read: "Actual sabotage operations will be carried out only after policy approval by the Special Group."

There was then a lengthy discussion on guerrillas, the Group finally agreeing that over-all U.S. policy must be more sharply defined on this point. It was the opinion of the Group, however, that supply of existing guerrilla elements, to the extent necessary to avoid dispersion, would be in the U.S. interest. This was interpreted to include such items as ammunition, food and clothing. Mr. Dulles undertook to take a sharp look at the recommendations and plans for guerrillas, with a view to discussing this subject at next week's meeting.

The Special Group approved the budget as presented, with the following provisos: only 50% of each major item would be drawn down in the near future; the large item for boats, under Paramilitary, would be eliminated for the time being, before the 50% figure was applied; expenditures for sabotage and guerrilla operations would be deferred, and both activities would be subject to next week's discussion. The DCI said that the Agency would come back to the Special Group with a progress report, across the board, in less than six months, at which time further authorizations would be considered.

It was the consensus that this whole program should be discussed with highest level authority.

\*5. Dominican Republic - Political Action

This proposal was agreed on, with certain clarifications. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Johnson made it clear that there was no desire to overthrow the Balaguer government at this time, and the former suggested that the recommendation should refer to action in the Dominican Republic rather than against it.

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It was felt that the Group should reexamine the project in not more than three months. In the meantime, State and CIA are to coordinate closely in its implementation.

This matter was also scheduled for decision by higher-level authority.

62780

PROJECT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

22 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 22 November 1961

PRESENT: General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, ~~Mr. Gilpatrick~~,  
Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell

✓2. Cuba

General Taylor reported on the results of several recent meetings with higher authority on possible changes in the U.S. covert approach to the Cuban problem. He said it appears that all concerned have accepted the principle that the Special Group should serve as the main focus of policy guidance, and that any task force that might be established should not be so set up as to take over actual command of component parts of any agencies or departments. General Taylor added that he believed it had been agreed that the task force concept should be subject to a trial period of perhaps two weeks; this is particularly pertinent in view of demands for General Lansdale's services in another part of the world.

The Chairman concluded that the subject would be explored in further detail at the Special Group meeting of next week, to which the Attorney General and General Lansdale will be invited.

✓4. Covert Activities in Vietnam

At the outset of the discussion of the paper which had been circulated on the subject of the Clandestine Action Service (CAS), it was agreed that the abbreviation should be changed to CLAS in order to avoid obvious confusion.

In response to General Taylor's query, Mr. Bissell suggested that any reference in the paper to South Vietnam be struck out on the ground that activity in that part of the country should not be considered a primary mission of the CLAS or a reason for establishing it. The Group approved the paper, subject to this change. It was noted, however, that occasions might arise when, by mutual agreement among all parties concerned, CLAS could assist in anti-Viet Cong activities in the South.

Mr. Bissell then gave a summary of other activities under way or planned by the CIA for Vietnam. Mr. Johnson said that he wanted

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to discuss with the Secretary of State the proposed use of Chinese Nationalists as trainers and pilots, under general CIA direction, as well as Diem's proposal for using them in connection with the Civil Guard.

General Taylor then raised the subject of periodic reporting on all U.S. activities going on in Vietnam. After some discussion, it was agreed that CIA actions should be covered in an Agency annex to the Task Force reports. The Chairman urged that all reports emphasize the positive aspect rather than the negative, and Mr. Johnson suggested they should cover also what Diem is doing in response to our leadership.

✓ 6. Congo

The proposal to support Adoula and his associates was approved. The Group noted that Adoula is not a particularly outstanding leader but that he appears to be the best there is at the moment in the Congo. It was also noted that five or six other individuals at the next lower level are relatively competent. The Chairman said he would inform higher authority.

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,  
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

A-76

Subject: Cuba Project

Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for  
BrigGen W. H. Craig, USA, subj:  
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62

1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors:

a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during the meeting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

OC347

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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

00348

TOP SECRET  
16 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE  
with the President

In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines.

M.D.T.

22 March 1962

This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines.

*Y. J. TAP*  
TAP

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14 March 1962

A-38

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions:

a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention.

b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitate and support it.

2. The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement with minimum losses in assets and U.S. prestige. The JCS will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure

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a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention. At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program.

3. In order to get the covert phase of this program in motion, it will be necessary at the outset to use U.S. personnel, bases and equipment for the support of operations inside the target area. However, the CIA will concurrently expedite the development of non-attributable resources in order to reduce or eliminate this dependence should it become necessary after the initial phase.

4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS. The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress.

Note: Mr. Johnson has copy number 2. CIA (Helms/Harvey) has copy number 3. General Lansdale has copy number 4. All other copies, except the ones filed herewith (1 and 5) have been destroyed.

*destroyed 4/1/65 - mte*

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 5, 1962

A-44

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

There will be a meeting of the Mongoose group next Wednesday afternoon at 2 o'clock in the Secretary of State's Conference Room (the hour being subject to adjustment in case the Secretary of State has to go to the White House). You will be asked to give a progress report at the outset of the meeting, after which the group will go into executive session.

The Special Group today decided to ask you to brief it bi-weekly on Mongoose and to furnish the members with weekly written reports in the style of the South Vietnam reports, that is, the participating departments and agencies would file with you separate reports and you would prepare for the principals a highlight summary along the lines of Secretary Harriman's reports on South Vietnam.

Sometime before the weekend, I want to talk to you about Mr. McCone's "liberation plan".

*Rowell*

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13 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose

On April 13, General Taylor discussed with higher authority the Mongoose meetings of April 11 and 12, reporting the feeling of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that the Mongoose program should have no target date. Taylor pointed out the probable personnel problems which would arise if the schedule were completely indefinite.

Taylor was informed that we would have to live with the consequences of no date, doing the best we can to bolster motivation. Taylor commented that we can probably carry out the first phase as planned, with a review of the situation about August 1.

Higher authority favors a strong effort to recruit Cubans for the U. S. Army. He was told that a new look is being taken and that by lowering admission standards, we can do better than in the past.

Maxwell D. Taylor

No distribution

66660


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7 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Report of Progress to Higher Authority

I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. Harvey's briefing of the Special Group (Augmented) on 3 May 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate effectiveness of our program. I mentioned the Duque incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed that we would continue along the present lines until the terminal date of the present phase in August.

  
Maxwell D. Taylor

3 August 1962

DOD TASK # 69

Ideas to beef-up course of action B.

DIPLOMATIC

1. Encourage Dom Rep to table its complaint on Cuban instigated subversion NOW -- to the UN later.
2. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission limited documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics.
3. Third state pressures should be encouraged - e.g., asylum.
4. State openly that Guantanamo will be used as a place of asylum for bonafide political refugees.

ECONOMIC

1. Stop the transit of Cuban sugar by anyone through the Panama Canal.
2. Publication of contraband list of items which we will stop - remove from ships - if known to be going to Cuba (hard goods, war making potential).
3. Pressure the IMB, IMF, and GATT to restrict Cuban credits (\$), loans, etc. Insist that US Allies demand cash payment for goods - no barter.
4. Preemptive buying and dumping sugar on world markets.
5. Dump "soft" Cuban currency at discount prices.
6. Announce prohibitive tariffs on any items (tobacco primarily) of Cuban manufacture.
7. Announce fines and punishment for any importations of Cuban goods.
8. Introduce cheap marijuana into Cuba.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

1. More small joint exercises in the Latin America - Caribbean - southeastern US area with appropriate publicity.
2. Announce closure of Panama Canal to Cuban vessels or vessels berthing in Cuba.
3. Announce sea search of all vessels (actually selective and limited to Sino-Soviet and Cuban vessels) to stop "illegal" arms importation into Western Hemisphere.
4. Shut-off civilian employees in Guantanamo.
5. Announce a misfire of a missile in Atlantic Missile Range "near" Cuban waters.
6. Increased naval patrolling of the Windward Passage.
7. Step-up radio broadcasts - hit island from four sides simultaneously with clandestine broadcasts.
8. Drop para-dummies in selected areas.
9. Make high altitude passes over and violations of Cuban air space.
10. Explicit Dom Rep charges of Cuban intervention.
11. Increase publicity on Cuban narcotics trade in US, and other countries.
12. Provide open publicity on defection of Cubans to Guantanamo, and on harassment of the workers.

03072

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

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We believe Castro can be overthrown only by the use of considerable external military support. The objective of Operation Mongoose is the overthrow of the Castro regime.

If course of action B were pursued vigorously and the resistance elements in Cuba were stirred to action without US military support, then the assets presently in Cuba would probably be destroyed by Castro's effective means of repression.

If, however, course B is followed with the intention of providing US military support, when required, simply not telling the Cubans, the following things could be done: (Cubans would do better tho, if they knew).

Greatly increase VOA broadcasts to Cuba.

Supply more arms and equipment to Cuban guerrillas.

Exert all possible influence on Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Exert all possible influence on all friendly countries to stop all trade with Cuba.

Increase program of information to Latin American countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regime and threat to themselves.

Take all possible steps to assist other Latin American countries in economic progress, to increase contrast with Cuba.

Drift sanitized floating mines into Havana harbor.

Pay Cuban employees at Guantanamo Naval Base in pesos.

Disseminate Maribu seeds in agricultural areas to choke out beneficial products.

03073

Assassinate Castro and his handful of top men.

Land more resistance-trained Cubans.

Encourage friendly nations to stop chartering ships to Bloc countries for trade with Cuba.


Intensify efforts to introduce damaging chemicals into petroleum shipments to Cuba.

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SPECIAL HANDLING

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TOP SECRET

Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D. C.

August 9, 1962

A-118

General Maxwell Taylor  
The Executive Office Building  
Room #300  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Max:

In accordance with my conversation with you, I am in favor of a program on MONGCOSE of B+. I do not feel that we know yet what reaction would be created in Cuba of an intensified program. Therefore, I am in favor of pushing ahead rather than taking any step backward.

Sincerely,

*Robert F. Kennedy* (H)  
Robert F. Kennedy

(Dictated over the telephone by the Attorney General from the State of Washington.)

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SENSITIVE

- 2 -

- F. Each day CASTRO gets stronger and his removal becomes costlier.
- G. While most of the continent has broken with CASTRO, sooner or later ties with these countries will be re-established.
- H. Central America is "lost."
- I. Unless an action program is begun the CRC will disappear.

4. It was obvious during the meeting and in the statements Dr. MIRO made to the writer on the way back to his hotel that he is under great pressure by his colleagues in the Exile Community to launch a program of vigorous action against the Government of Cuba.

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HARVEY # 12

16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MONGOOSE Meeting with the Attorney General

1. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney General convened in his office a meeting on Operation MONGOOSE consisting of General Lansdale and Colonel Patchell, General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Hewson Ryan of USIA, and the undersigned.
2. The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Operation MONGOOSE. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem and again noted the small accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the President a year ago. The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he will hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson).
3. The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). He obviously did not like the earlier memorandum, since he felt it showed no "push" in getting on with the acts of sabotage.
4. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it aggressively. I pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation MONGOOSE would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans

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with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I related my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRE who pointed out that they were willing to commit their people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. I defined "sensible" in Cuban terminology these days as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other Latin countries, would bail them out militarily. My point was specifically echoed by Hewson Ryan. The Attorney General's rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done against Cuba. In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded.

5. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meeting each day, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetings might later be changed to every other day when and if he finds a daily get-together is not necessary. The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour.

*mt*  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Original - Mr. Elder for the DCI and DDCI  
1 cc - Chief, TRW  
1 cc - DD/P

01095

1. When the President, in his letter to Khrushchev of 27 October, gave "assurances against invasion of Cuba" in consideration of the Soviet removal of offensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision, Operation Mongoose was on its death bed. When the President stated in his letter of 28 October to Khrushchev, "I consider my letter to you of 27 October and your reply of today as a firm undertaking on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out" Operation Mongoose died.

2. If these agreements are carried out it seems clear that Cuba will be dealt with as another denied area in a manner differing not greatly from that in which CIA handles other denied areas. If the agreements are not carried out, military action cannot long be delayed. In either event the Mongoose structure as it has ~~now~~ existed in Government is through.

3. Looking back to the origins of Mongoose one finds the Attorney General and Mr. McNamara seeking primarily to remove the political stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure. Both the A. G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for political reasons that some action ~~have~~ <sup>XXXX</sup> be taken with respect to Cuba to insure the President's future. In a nutshell, they were out to dump Castro or to make him cooperate.

4. During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved, outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was Maxwell Taylor. Others like the Attorney General, McNamara, Gilpatrick, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly political light. Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it has to us, that a Chief of Operations (i. e. Lansdale) was never actually needed.

5. At present no senior U.S. Government official around town is interested in a future "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Bundy has already suggested the creation in State of an "Office of Cuban Exile Affairs" or "Free Cuban Affairs" which in itself is a move outside of the Mongoose structure. All clandestine activities on the part of

*Approved by my budget master Personal  
This was a stated budget -  
D. B. Wright - Personal  
15 April 75*

*Bot Pof*

*73-B-455*

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

TFW continue at a stand down. Significant steps have been taken by the Agency together with the military for contingency planning. USIA has moved into the propaganda field under State guidance without relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoose can only live again through "resurrection."

6. Given these circumstances and in the light of great pressures elsewhere in the world CIA, internally, should move with great rapidity to distance Task Force W from any external access. This would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TFW in order that this unique group which has been available to Lansdale as a "whipping boy" becomes a normal part of our monolithic Agency structure. By such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyone else could get at these resources without going through regular channels. Within CIA we would return Cuba to the Western Hemisphere and treat Cuba as a denied area and relate it to over-all WH problems. (Throughout Project Mongoose, this is precisely the manner in which State has handled the problem. As a result Lansdale never felt that he had troops in State as he did in CIA.)

7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a corporate one. We should not go through bankruptcy which would have to be announced, but rather pass TFW through an unpublicized receivership and reorganization. The need to realign manpower and assets for demands in other areas would be sufficient reason in itself. The current stand down is a perfect setting for such a change in structure.

8. Concurrently, the DCI should endorse Bundy's suggestion and he should encourage the immediate establishment of an Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA of one of the most annoying and insoluble problems we have faced. This would place problems of proposed Cuban Government structures, provisional governments, platforms, exile politics, and the like, right where they belong - in the Department of State.

9. Absolutely no attempt on our part should be made to unseat Lansdale. Remember that the Attorney General was fighting Lansdale's battle as recently as two weeks ago. Secondly, McNamara and Gilpatrick still look upon Lansdale as something of a mystic and are

on the defensive by virtue of his relationship with the Attorney General. Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that Lansdale has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor are not impressed with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously have his number as do we. With a political solution to the Cuban problem in hand reflecting great credit on the part of the President, the A. G. will drop Lansdale like a hot brick. Therefore, while awaiting the outcome of the Cuban talks, we must at once deny Lansdale direct access to TFW. Lansdale can have access as to all other CIA components through the DCI during the stand down period.

10. Lansdale's reaction to any reassignment is apt to be a violent one. He undoubtedly realizes that he never again will be in the position of a special advisor to the two most powerful men in the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CIA and put TFW beyond his reach without delay (except through the DCI) he might be able to inflict serious damage to CIA's standing before his eventual demise.

11. To summarize, the following action is required:

a. Internally, institutionalize TFW. Graft it into WH.  
(Defense will then look to DIA for intelligence and DIA to us.)

b. Push (through the DCI and Bundy) for the immediate establishment of the Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in the Department of State.

Groß H<sup>c</sup> Mann  
Nov 5 1962

13 March 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on  
Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara,  
Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale;  
Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey

1. The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some of this language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific proposals for approval to the Special Group, which involve policy considerations.

2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Institutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved. The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

3. The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions made:

a. Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation.

b. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be made to the Group. (This decision did not deal with the actual means of supply, which is covered in c below.)

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c. Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re-supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will be included in the Guidelines. General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next week. In the meantime preparations should be begun for the selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries, such a "sheep-dipping." The Air Force will be asked to come up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide one or two aircraft for use in initial operations.

In connection with small boat operations, the Secretary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be established. It was pointed out there are no PT boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days.

4. Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel. He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should reflect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnel, bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that would exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also be studied immediately.

4. At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered to Cuba.

6. The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent.

7. It was agreed that the Group should give a status report to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general principles and guidelines.

Thomas A. Parrott



TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Operation MONGOOSE

26 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)  
on Operation MONGOOSE, 26 October 1962

PRESENT: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General  
Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General;  
Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr.  
Harvey; Mr. Wilson.

1. The meeting began with a discussion of the considerably-increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed to recall the three teams already on the way.

It was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get CIA-into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c) USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be.

2. Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA and was not in response to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes.

In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated

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EYES ONLY

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unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cuban operations might move under military control, but that such action is not indicated at this time.

3. Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dispatches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the event of invasion, a sizeable number of Cubans could be trained quickly.

4. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level.

5. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be established within the government some sort of "Office of Free Cuban Affairs," which probably should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale's operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with MONGOOSE affairs.

6. Mr. McNamara thought that MONGOOSE in the short-term should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion.

7. Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows:

a. CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery.

b. No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week.

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TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

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c. General Lansdale should develop further plans to "help the Cubans to help themselves." Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into this planning.

d. Political planning for the post-Castro period will be assigned to the "Office for Free Cuban Affairs."

e. Establishment of USIA's new 50 KW transmitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited.

8. It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal point for all MONGOOSE activities, that he is charged with their overall management and that he should be kept informed of all significant plans and activities in connection with the project.

*Thomas A. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

The Attorney General

Chairman, JCS

DCI

General Lansdale - Cy destroyed 4/9/63 - mm

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TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

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1. When the President, in his letter to Khrushchev of 27 October, gave "assurances against invasion of Cuba" in consideration of the Soviet removal of offensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision, Operation Mongoose was on its death bed. When the President stated in his letter of 28 October to Khrushchev, "I consider my letter to you of 27 October and your reply of today as a firm undertaking on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out" Operation Mongoose died.

2. If these agreements are carried out it seems clear that Cuba will be dealt with as another denied area in a manner differing not greatly from that in which CIA handles other denied areas. If the agreements are not carried out, military action cannot long be delayed. In either event the Mongoose structure as it has ~~now~~ existed in Government is through.

3. Looking back to the origins of Mongoose one finds the Attorney General and Mr. McNamara seeking primarily to remove the political stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure. Both the A.G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for political reasons that some action ~~XXXX~~ be taken with respect to Cuba to insure the President's future. In a nutshell, they were out to dump Castro or to make him cooperate.

4. During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved, outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was Maxwell Taylor. Others like the Attorney General, McNamara, Gilpatrick, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly political light. Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it has to us, that a Chief of Operations (i. e. Lansdale) was never actually needed.

5. At present no senior U.S. Government official around town is interested in a future "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Bundy has already suggested the creation in State of an "Office of Cuban Exile Affairs" or "Free Cuban Affairs" which in itself is a move outside of the Mongoose structure. All clandestine activities on the part of

Removed from "mangled matter removal" D. B. Wright - removed  
This is a standard copy -  
any given 15-6-62

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73-B-435

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

TFW continue at a stand down. Significant steps have been taken by the Agency together with the military for contingency planning. USIA has moved into the propaganda field under State guidance without relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoose can only live again through "resurrection."

6. Given these circumstances and in the light of great pressures elsewhere in the world CIA, internally, should move with great rapidity to distance Task Force W from any external access. This would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TFW in order that this unique group which has been available to Lansdale as a "whipping boy" becomes a normal part of our monolithic Agency structure. By such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyone else could get at these resources without going through regular channels. Within CIA we would return Cuba to the Western Hemisphere and treat Cuba as a denied area and relate it to over-all WH problems. (Throughout Project Mongoose, this is precisely the manner in which State has handled the problem. As a result Lansdale never felt that he had troops in State as he did in CIA.)

7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a corporate one. We should not go through bankruptcy which would have to be announced, but rather pass TFW through an unpublicized receivership and reorganization. The need to realign manpower and assets for demands in other areas would be sufficient reason in itself. The current stand down is a perfect setting for such a change in structure.

8. Concurrently, the DCI should endorse Bundy's suggestion and he should encourage the immediate establishment of an Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA of one of the most annoying and insoluble problems we have faced. This would place problems of proposed Cuban Government structures, provisional governments, platforms, exile politics, and the like, right where they belong - in the Department of State.

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on the defensive by virtue of his relationship with the Attorney General. Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that Lansdale has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor are not impressed with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously have his number as do we. With a political solution to the Cuban problem in hand reflecting great credit on the part of the President, the A. G. will drop Lansdale like a hot brick. Therefore, while awaiting the outcome of the Cuban talks, we must at once deny Lansdale direct access to TFW. Lansdale can have access as to all other CIA components through the DCI during the stand down period.

10. Lansdale's reaction to any reassignment is apt to be a violent one. He undoubtedly realizes that he never again will be in the position of a special advisor to the two most powerful men in the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CIA and put TFW beyond his reach without delay (except through the DCI) he might be able to inflict serious damage to CIA's standing before his eventual demise.

11. To summarize, the following action is required:

a. Internally, institutionalize TFW. Graft it into WH. (Defense will then look to DIA for intelligence and DIA to us.)

b. Push (through the DCI and Bundy) for the immediate establishment of the Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in the Department of State.

*G. J. H. / M. M. M.  
Nov 5 1962*

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Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 2/63,  
April 23, 1963, 5:00 PM -- Cuba

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives."

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR on the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR and not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i. e. he did not

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stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

- a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2.
- b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months.
- c. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major importance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a statement of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it were no longer run by Castro or tied to Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

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Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows:

- a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing.
- b. Agree on military responses which we should make to contingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane.
- c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.
- d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.
- e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.
- f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.
- g. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba.

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR  
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
ASSOCIATION

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE  
CORPORATION

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

4/27/75

Dear John  
Many thanks for returning  
my call. I dictated a memo  
of our conversation to aid  
my failing memory and  
enclose a copy for your file.

When you next come to  
Washington, I hope we  
can have lunch or dinner  
together.

Best wishes,

Bar

June 25, 1975

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH JOHN McCONE

I explained to John that I would probably be called to testify before the Church Committee and that I understood the Committee would wish to question me about a meeting on August 10, 1962, of which I had no recollection. I stated that Mr. Belin, Counsel of the Rockefeller Commission, had informed me that:

a. A meeting had been held on August 10, 1962, attended by Messrs. Rusk, Taylor, McCone, Bundy, Murrow, and McNamara, among others.

b. The elimination of Castro had been discussed.

c. A CIA representative, Mr. Harvey, had indicated in a memorandum prepared after the meeting, that during the discussion I had raised a question regarding the elimination of Castro.

d. John McCone had discussed the elimination of Castro with me after the meeting, expressing his strong opposition to any such action and that I had strongly agreed with John McCone. [Although Belin did not say so, I had the impression that his knowledge of the conversation between McCone and myself had come from a memorandum and I was informed by another person that such a memorandum had been prepared in 1967.]

I asked John if he could add to my knowledge of what took place during or after the August 10 meeting. He replied that:

a. On August 10, 1962, a meeting of "54-12 Augmented" took place in Dean Rusk's Conference Room to consider reports of the movement into Cuba of Soviet nuclear missiles.

b. He remembers that the elimination of Castro was discussed during the course of the meeting, but he does not recall whether or not I raised the subject and he does not remember whether if I spoke in connection with it I was in favor of or in opposition to such a move. He does remember very clearly that when the subject was raised, first Ed Murrow and then he opposed further discussion of it.

c. Two days after the meeting, Mr. Harvey of CIA received a memorandum from General Lansdale referring to the elimination of Castro; Harvey called Lansdale to ask that the subject be eliminated from the Lansdale letter and McCone called me. (John indicated that in August 1962 Lansdale was nominally assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although he believes that following the Bay of Pigs, Lansdale had been staff director for a committee charged with considering ways to weaken the Cuban Government.)

d. When he raised the issue of the Lansdale letter with me, I had not seen the letter and was unaware of its existence, but when he explained that it referred to the elimination of Castro, an action which he (McCone) opposed, John reports that I shared his strong opposition to any such move.

e. In 1967, following a conversation with Jack Anderson held at Ted Kennedy's request, he prepared a memorandum of conversation which referred to some of the events surrounding the August 10, 1962 meeting, but that, contrary to the impression I had received from Belin and others, the memorandum did not refer to me -- he will send me a copy of the memorandum next Monday when he returns to his office in Los Angeles.

Robert S. McNamara

cc John Malone

INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

**SENSITIVE**

FILE:

Date: May 27, 1975

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW

Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton

Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America

Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late in 1965.

1. Assassinations:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro," someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

FILE:

"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reasonable even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only buttress his position in Latin America.

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was involved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be assassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the government was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that

FILE:

the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA.

## 2. CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congressional elections. On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.

FILE:

### 3. CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conservative Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were general statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democratic political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know how much. The figure of \$20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, however, the assertion that the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washington since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem so.

### 4. Changes during the Johnson Administration:

Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy-- Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American policy, although the President did become active in the two crises-- Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support



FILE:

for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated" in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was something different. A good deal of money was spent training police through AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support.

FILE:

In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Goodwin often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like. Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin America.

6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee, on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szulc. In response to a question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of that.

1 Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. Harvey was the man who had sort  
2 of action responsibility for Cuba in the CIA, is that correct?

3 Mr. McCone. He was at that time, yes sir.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And you had frequent contact with Mr.  
5 Harvey during this period of time?

6 Mr. McCone. Not frequent, but occasional.

7 Mr. Schwarz. On any of those occasions did Mr. Harvey  
8 tell you that he was engaged in efforts to assassinate Cuban  
9 leaders?

10 Mr. McCone. Not that I have any recollection of.

11 Mr. Schwarz. You stated that the Special Group  
12 considered and approved a variety of means under the Mongoose  
13 program for implementing the efforts -- would the correct word  
14 be overthrow of the Castro Regime, or was there some other  
15 objective?

16 Mr. McCone. Well, I think the ultimate objective was  
17 the overthrow. But I don't think that any of the particular  
18 operations that the Special Group Augmented considered or  
19 approved would accomplish that objective of more harassment  
20 and making trouble.

21 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do we know who chaired the  
22 Special Group Augmented?

23 Mr. Schwarz. Would you describe the membership of the  
24 Special Group Augmented, who chaired it and who staffed it,  
25 Mr. McCone?

1 Mr. McCone. The Attorney General chaired it.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Robert Kennedy?

3 Mr. McCone. Robert Kennedy. And he attended it quite  
4 often, but not always.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Who were the other members?

6 Mr. McCone. As I said, the Secretary of Defense.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McNamara?

8 Mr. McCone. Frequently represented by his Deputy, Mr.  
9 Gilpatric, Rosnell Gilpatric.

10 The Secretary of State --

11 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Rusk?

12 Mr. McCone. Mr. Rusk -- frequently represented by his  
13 Deputy, Alex Johnson.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Was General Taylor on that group?

15 Mr. McCone. I think he was, if I remember, as Chairman  
16 of the Joint Chiefs.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And did Mr. Parrott staff it?

18 Mr. McCone. Well, he participated in the staff rather  
19 as a secretary.

20 Mr. Schwarz. And was General Lansdale a member or  
21 participant for the entire period of the Mongoose operation,  
22 or only for some limited period of it?

23 Mr. McCone. For the entire period as far as I remember.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. McCone, did the Special  
25 Group Augmented keep minutes of the meetings?

1           Mr. Schwarz.    Let's go back to the August 1962 meeting,  
2 August 10. And the Committee has in their folders three  
3 documents dated August 13, August 14, 1962 and April 14, 1967,  
4 which deal with this subject. And the reporter has previously  
5 marked, and I would like him to hand to you, Mr. McCone, the three  
6 exhibits together. And I will just state for the record what  
7 they are.

8           McCone Exhibit No. 2 is an August 13, 1962 memorandum  
9 from Brigadier General Lansdale to four persons, including  
10 William Harvey, CIA, a man from State, a man from Defense, and  
11 a Man from USIA, subject: "Alternate Court B."

12           McCone Exhibit 3 is a memorandum dated August 14, 1962  
13 from William Harvey for Deputy Director of Plans, subject:  
14 "Operation Mongoose".

15           And McCone Exhibit 4 is a memorandum dated April 14, 1967  
16 from John A. McCone to the Director.

17           These memoranda, Mr. McCone -- you have had an opportunity  
18 to read those before this meeting, have you not?

19           Mr. McCone. Yes, sir.

20           Mr. Schwarz.    These memoranda all concern a meeting  
21 which took place on August 10 concerning operation Mongoose, is  
22 that right?

23           Mr. McCone. That is correct.

24           Mr. Schwarz. Was the subject of assassination or liqui-  
25 dation raised at that meeting?

1 First, was that a meeting of the special group augmented?

2 Mr. McCone. That is correct.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Who was there at this particular meeting?

4 Mr. McCone. This was a rather large meeting. As I have  
5 said earlier, it was called by me for the purpose of again  
6 expressing my concern about missiles in Cuba. But since at that  
7 time it had been decided to intensify the Mongoose program, it  
8 turned into a 54-12 augmented committee with several people  
9 there. And we discussed Operation Mongoose.

10 And we also discussed this question of missiles in  
11 Cuba.

12 Mr. Schwarz. During the portion that was discussing  
13 operation Mongoose who was present?

14 Mr. McCone. Well, Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara. Mr. Murrow.  
15 I was there. And two or three people of my staff were there.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey included?

17 Mr. McCone. Mr. Harvey was there.

18 It seems to me that there were others from State there,  
19 but I don't recall who they were. And it was quite a large meet-  
20 ing.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Was the Attorney General present at that  
22 meeting?

23 Mr. McCone. I can't say that from memory, but I have  
24 looked over the list in recent weeks. And if I recall properly,  
25 the Attorney General was not there.

**TOP SECRET**

31

1 Mr. Schwarz. He was not there?

2 Mr. McCone. That is right.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Now, there are minutes of that meeting,  
4 are there not?

5 Mr. McCone. Yes, I think there are. I think there is  
6 something in the form of a memorandum summarizing the meeting,  
7 yes, sir.

8 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to recount for the committee a  
9 matter which is procedurally troublesome, I am told by the  
10 White House it may not be substantively troublesome, but I would  
11 like to recount it for the committee.

12 Mr. McCone and I met yesterday evening to have an  
13 opportunity to go over these matters. And during the course  
14 of the meeting Mr. McCone referred to the minutes of the  
15 August 10 meeting, stating that he then believed that those  
16 minutes showed that there was opposition at the meeting  
17 to the subject of assassination.

18 Now, Mr. McCone, is it your current understanding that  
19 the minutes show that there was opposition to the subject of  
20 assassination?

21 Mr. McCone. I can't answer that. I haven't seen those  
22 minutes, and I don't know what is in them.

23 Senator Mondale. This may be out of order, I don't  
24 know. In the August 14 memo point 3 says: "The question of  
25 assassination, particularly of Castro, was brought up by

**TOP SECRET**

1 Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group  
2 Augmented in Rusk's office in August".

3 Do you see that sentence?

4 Mr. McCone. Yes.

5 Senator Mondale. Is that your recollection?

6 Mr. McCone. I am not sure that McNamara used the word  
7 "assassination". He could have used another word,  
8 elimination, or removal. And Mr. Harvey, in preparing this  
9 memorandum for Mr. Helms, who was then Deputy of Plans Informa-  
10 tion, used the word "assassination" rather loosely interpreting  
11 what Mr. McNamara said.

12 I cannot say, Senator, that Mr. McNamara actually brought  
13 up for discussion the question of assassination as such. He  
14 might have said elimination, which could mean many other  
15 things. I am not quite clear on that.

16 Mr. Schwarz. The written record uses the words  
17 liquidation of readers.

18 Senator Mondale. That is the Lansdale memo.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Yes. The words were blocked out in the  
20 Lansdale memo, but the Harvey memo, which is Exhibit 3, says  
21 those are the words.

22 The Chairman. And I might say that the memo of John McCone  
23 to the Director -- I take that to be a memo to yourself --  
24 or Helms had then become the Director.

25 It contains the following language:



1 "At one of these meetings, probably the meeting of the  
2 JCS group, I recalled a suggestion being made to liquidate  
3 top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took  
4 immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the  
5 subject was completely out of bounds as far as the U.S.  
6 Government and the CIA were concerned, and the idea should not  
7 be discussed, nor should it appear in any papers, as the U.S.  
8 Government could not consider such actions on moral or ethical  
9 grounds."

10 I take it, then, that according to your best recollec-  
11 tion the subject of liquidating Castro and possibly other top  
12 Cuban leaders did come up at this meeting, and you did take  
13 strong exception to it.

14 Mr. McCone. Yes.

15 I was not alone in that. Mr. Murrow took exception. I  
16 remember that very clearly.

17 Senator Mondale. Who made the suggestion to which you  
18 refer in your memo?

19 Mr. McCone. According to the record, it was Mr. McNamara,  
20 according to Mr. Harvey's record.

21 Senator Mondale. Do you recall who made the suggestion?

22 Mr. McCone. No, I can't recall from memory. I can only  
23 reconstruct it from the record.

24 Senator Schweiker. And who was chairing that meeting?  
25 Who chaired that meeting?

1 Mr. McCone. I think Mr. Rusk chaired the meeting. The  
2 Attorney General was not there.

3 Senator Schweiker. He normally would have chaired the  
4 meeting?

5 Mr. McCone. If the Attorney General had been there he  
6 would have chaired the meeting. But he was not there.

7 Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, the memorandum of August  
8 14, 1963, says that the question of assassination was brought  
9 up by Secretary McNamara. Was it brought up in the context  
10 of disapproval, or in the context of pursuing it further, or  
11 in the context of merely that it was something on an agenda that  
12 was being followed in the course of the meeting.

13 Mr. McCone. Well, as I say, Senator, the purpose of the  
14 meeting was to discuss a new phase of the Mongoose operation, an  
15 intensified activity -- and I presume it was -- in exploring  
16 the alternatives that were available.

17 Senator Mathias. In other words, it was brought up in the  
18 context that this was one of a number of operations that the  
19 group might consider?

20 Mr. McCone. I think that is right. And I immediately  
21 said, well, that is one thing that we can't consider, and  
22 wouldn't consider.

23 Senator Mathias. If my own memory of that time is at all  
24 accurate -- it may not be -- but this was about the time that  
25 Senator Keating was beginning to publish information about the

1 absence pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and  
2 stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a  
3 document. I advised Frank Hand that as far as the CIA was  
4 concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this, and  
5 would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly  
6 urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase  
7 in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those  
8 disseminated to State, Defense and USIA. Shortly thereafter,  
9 Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed, and  
10 that he had done so."

11 I cannot read those two paragraphs without concluding that  
12 the principal concern expressed by Mr. Harvey runs not to the  
13 question of whether or not assassination might form a part of  
14 an action plan, but runs rather to making certain that there  
15 is no written record that would establish that assassination  
16 might be any consideration or such a plan might be underway.

17 Do you read those two paragraphs the same way?

18 Mr. McCone. Yes, I don't think that -- you can't read  
19 them any other way, Senator. My action as I have reconstructed  
20 it is that immediately upon receiving the Lansdale memorandum  
21 of August 14 in which he -- there are several words deleted,  
22 and I have forgotten exactly what those words are.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Including liquidation of leaders.

24 Mr. McCone. Including liquidation of leaders.

25 I called Mr. McNamara and insisted that that memorandum

**TOP SECRET**

1 be withdrawn because no decision was made on this subject, and  
2 since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite out of  
3 order in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider  
4 that matter.

5 Now, the wording of Mr. Harvey's memorandum is subject to  
6 all kinds of interpretation, but you will have to ask Mr.  
7 Harvey about that.

8 The Chairman. Did Mr. McNamara agree that the memorandum,  
9 the Lansdale memorandum --

10 Mr. McCone. Most certainly.

11 The Chairman. -- should be withdrawn?

12 Mr. McCone. Most certainly.

13 The Chairman. And it was for the reason that you had  
14 given him or for any other reason?

15 Mr. McCone. Well, I cannot answer that, except that as  
16 I recall our conversation, he seemed highly disturbed that this  
17 matter should be initiated by General Lansdale and readily  
18 agreed that it be removed, because it was not a matter that  
19 was given consideration.

20 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman?

21 The Chairman. Yes, Senator Schweiker.

22 Senator Schweiker. Mr. McCone, in view of hindsight and  
23 what you know now, someone obviously made a decision to go  
24 forward and to exclude you. Who, in your judgment, from what  
25 you now know, made this decision and why did they exclude you?

t 15

1 Mr. McCone. I would like to explain for the record this  
2 memorandum of mine of April 14, 1967.

3 I came on here for a Committee meeting of some kind. I  
4 arrived rather late at night at the hotel, and received a call  
5 from Senator Kennedy who said that he had been informed that  
6 Jack Anderson was producing a column on this subject that  
7 implicated that both the President and the Attorney General,  
8 and he wondered if I would talk with Mr. Anderson. And I said  
9 I would, and within five minutes, Mr. Anderson called me on  
10 the telephone. I remember the call very well, because he  
11 engaged me for an hour and fifteen minutes and brought it to  
12 1:00 o'clock in the morning.

13 But I took the position with Mr. Anderson that the matter  
14 had come up and had been promptly withdrawn, and then being  
15 concerned about it, I went to the Director's office and  
16 dictated this memorandum.

17 Senator Mondale. Can you testify that it was not Secretary  
18 McNamara who made the assassination suggestion?

19 Mr. McCone. No.

20 Senator Mondale. So it could have been, you just don't  
21 know?

22 Mr. McCone. I don't know.

23 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman?

24 Mr. McCone, as you are well aware, recently General  
25 Lansdale suggested his authority to conduct these plans and/or

t 18

1 he had a very fine record he seemed to be kind of a loner to  
2 me and the CIA station in Saigon was a very big and very  
3 sensitive station, and I thought a man who was trained in that  
4 type of an operation should be the Chief of Station, and  
5 certainly that man should be selected by the organization and  
6 not by the Ambassador.

7 The Chairman. Mr. McCone, this Committee is going to call  
8 General Lansdale as a witness. Can you give us your opinion  
9 as to his credibility?

10 Mr. McCone. I think, Mr. Chairman, that for me to  
11 testify on the record concerning the credibility of another  
12 man, and particularly a distinguished man who is a retired  
13 Major General, would not be an appropriate thing for me to  
14 do.

15 If you want me to go off the record, if that is permissible,  
16 I would like to tell you --

17 The Chairman. Very well. We'll go off the record.

18 (Discussion off the record.)

19 The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.

20 Senator Schweiker. I have a question.

21 The Chairman. Yes, Senator Schweiker.

22 Senator Schweiker. Mr. McCone, in your April 14, 1967  
23 memo, you mentioned paragraph 3, Operation Mongoose, and you  
24 say it is an interdepartmental affair, under the operational  
25 control of DOD through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is

your wording on paragraph 3 of your April 14, '67 memo.

My question is, when you have an operation like this, would this have been set up by the Special Group Augmented, or where did the authority to set up Mongoose come from? Special Group Augmented?

Mr. McCone. No. I think the authority to set up Mongoose came from the National Security Council.

Senator Schweiker. Is it unusual in setting up an operation like this to have DOD have operational control of it, say as opposed to CIA or something or not?

Mr. McCone. Well, as I said earlier, Operation Mongoose involved several departments.

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

Mr. Cone. So it would have been rather wrong to have it a CIA operation. CIA participated and CIA people were seconded to General Lansdale. This memorandum of mine is wrong in one respect. I say "operational control of DOD through the JCS." I was advised by General Lemnitzer when I appeared before the Rockefeller Commission here a month or six weeks ago that the line of authority went from the Secretary of Defense through an assistant and on to Lansdale. It was not through the JCS.

Senator Schweiker. So it went from McNamara, or from the Secretary of Defense, to whom?

Mr. McCone. Through some assistant to Lansdale, who was

1 an assistant to an assistant to McNamara. I don't know who  
2 that was.

3 But the reason --

4 Senator Schweiker. Which was sort of an unusual set up  
5 in itself, I take it?

6 Mr. McCone. Well, he was a two star General, and I guess  
7 this was a proper way or a reasonable way to do it rather than  
8 to disassociate him from the Department of Defense, and put him  
9 someplace else.

10 The reason I had the impression it was through the JCS,  
11 we would have these meetings in the JCS conference rooms all  
12 the time. But General Lemnitzer corrected me, so this was  
13 in error.

14 Senator Schweiker. And it was under Secretary McNamara's  
15 direction basically then?

16 Mr. McCone. Quite removed, quite removed. I think he was  
17 housed there, but except for sitting in on the 54/12 Committee  
18 or being represented on the 54/12 Committee Augmented, I don't  
19 think Mr. McNamara exercised any direct control over General  
20 Lansdale, or in fact knew what he was doing.

21 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz?

23 Mr. Schwarz. I just want to pin down a couple of points  
24 on the Castro story and move on to Diem, and then I'm finished  
25 with what we have planned.



JOHN ALEX MC CONE  
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET  
LOS ANGELES 90017

Seattle, Washington  
June 25, 1975

Dear Bob:

Attached is a copy of the 1967 memorandum we discussed on the telephone this morning.

The circumstances are slightly different than I was able to recall for it appears from this memo that I actually called on you and we were in complete agreement that "Subject A" was not part of any program nor was it to be discussed in any meetings of groups directing policy.

I will be east for a meeting in New York on July 9th and am giving consideration to spending a day in Washington - perhaps July 10th - for the specific purpose of reviewing the transcript of my testimony before the Church Committee and possibly the Rockefeller Commission, if the latter is available. The rules of the Church Committee state that a witness can review his testimony for corrections, etc., as is usually the custom of committees on the Hill.

I will be in my office in Los Angeles on Monday, June 30th, and for the next several days can be reached at the residence of Justin Dart at Pebble Beach, telephone (408) 624-2097. Don't hesitate to call me if you wish to talk with me.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Enclosure

Honorable Robert S. McNamara  
International Bank for Reconstruction  
and Development  
701 19th Street  
Washington, D. C.

Los Angeles, California  
June 25, 1975  
bb

14 April 1967

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone


1. No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962 meeting; however, it is highly probable that one exists.

2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room (Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase II of operation MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald). At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds.

3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair -- was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS.

4. At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy.

5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government.



John A. McCone

JOHN ALEX MC CONE  
612 SOUTH FLOWER STREET  
LOS ANGELES 90017

Seattle, Washington  
June 25, 1975

Dear Bob:

Attached is a copy of the 1967 memorandum we discussed on the telephone this morning.

The circumstances are slightly different than I was able to recall for it appears from this memo that I actually called on you and we were in complete agreement that "Subject A" was not part of any program nor was it to be discussed in any meetings of groups directing policy.

I will be east for a meeting in New York on July 9th and am giving consideration to spending a day in Washington - perhaps July 10th - for the specific purpose of reviewing the transcript of my testimony before the Church Committee and possibly the Rockefeller Commission, if the latter is available. The rules of the Church Committee state that a witness can review his testimony for corrections, etc., as is usually the custom of committees on the Hill.

I will be in my office in Los Angeles on Monday, June 30th, and for the next several days can be reached at the residence of Justin Dart at Pebble Beach, telephone (408) 624-2097. Don't hesitate to call me if you wish to talk with me.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Enclosure

Honorable Robert S. McNamara  
International Bank for Reconstruction  
and Development  
701 19th Street  
Washington, D. C.

Los Angeles, California  
June 25, 1975  
bb

14 April 1967

TO: The Director

FROM: John A. McCone

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2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room (Pentagon) and August 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase II of operation MONGOOSE. This operation was under the direction of General Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald). At one of these meetings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room -- I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds.
3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an inter-departmental affair -- was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS.
4. At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy.
5. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro," "remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government.



John A. McCone

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

April 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM

RECEIVED BY  
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

TO : The File  
FROM : David W. Belin  
SUBJECT : Interview with Secretary Robert McNamara

Belin: Secretary McNamara, we've had a brief interview in your office on - late this afternoon - which is April 15, 1975, and I have asked you a number of questions and you have given me your best recollection for your answers, and I'd like to get a summary of our discussion on this tape and then send you a transcript for your editing, and then we will either prepare an affidavit or perhaps we will still ask you to come before the Commission, but I understand it is your preference not to testify formally before the Commission, because of the nature of your present job. Is that correct?

McNamara: That is correct. I wish to cooperate with the Commission in every way. If necessary, of course, I would testify before them, but I would much prefer to present whatever information I have in the form of an affidavit.

B: Fine. During the Administration of President Kennedy, you were Secretary of Defense. Is that correct?

M: That is correct.

B: And were you Secretary of Defense commencing at the time of the inauguration of President Kennedy?

M: Yes. Starting January 20, 1961.

B: And you were Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Administration. Is that right?

M: I was.

B: --and into the Administration of Lyndon Johnson.

M: until approximately March 1, 1968.

B: During that time you were personally close with both the President and his brother, Robert Kennedy, is that correct?

M: I was.

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B: And you also were close to McGeorge Bundy?

M: Yes.

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

B: As I understand it there was what I am going to call a "camaderie" in the relationship among some of the top people in the Kennedy Administration.

M: Yes. That is correct.

B: At any time during the Kennedy Administration did you hear any person ever discuss a plan known as an "executive action plan" which in substance was defined as a capability plan for possibly assassinating any foreign leader?

ever

M: I have no recollection of/hearing anyone discuss such a plan.

B: Did you ever hear anyone discuss any particular plan concerning the possible assassination of Castro in Cuba?

M: No. I have no recollection of such a discussion.

B: Did you ever serve in any group known as either the MONGOOSE group or the Special Group Augmented? Does that ring a bell with you?

M: No. You mentioned, if I may refer back to our previous conversation that I was present at least one or more meetings of the Special Operations Group, I believe you called it. I have no recollection of being present at the meeting. I'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no recollection of it. I do seem to recall that there was such a group, I doubt very much if I was a member of it.

B: You might have been a participant at one or more of these meetings?

M: I might have been a participant.

B: At any such meetings, did you ever hear anyone discuss as a possibility the question of possibly assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader?

M: No. I should interject here another point I made earlier, as I have no notes -- I did not take notes of any meetings I attended with rare exceptions, and I have no other basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those

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years is very bad. I'm not saying this to in any way qualify what I am saying except that it is a fact that my memory is poor in relation to the period.

B: I asked you whether or not Robert Kennedy ever had any such discussions with you and you indicated no, is that correct?

M: --indicated two things. First that I have no recollection whatsoever of him ever having discussed assassination of anybody with me--or whatever you called it--the executive --

B: executive action capability --

M: executive action capability. Moreover, it is inconceivable to me that he would have discussed such an action with me because I think he would have felt that it endangered the Presidency and I believe he would have had moral reasons for not supporting any such action by the Government of the United States, and I base both of those points on my appraisal of his evaluation of the Bay of Pigs and the extent to which it weakened the presidency and the ability of the President to govern and his behavior during the Cuban missile crisis when he strongly opposed action which he considered contrary to the moral traditions of this society.

B: Do you have any other comments with regard to this whole question of possibly assassinating foreign leaders? THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

M: You told me that you understand a plan to assassinate one or more foreign leaders was in existence for an extended period of time, during 1961-2-3. I said (a) I have no recollection of any such plan, (b) I find it very difficult to believe that if such a plan had existed its existence wouldn't have been known to the top officials of the CIA, and certainly if I had known of it I am positive I would have made my knowledge known to the President, Robert Kennedy, neither of whom obviously can testify now, but to Mac Bundy, to my deputy, Ros Gilpatrick, and probably to Dean Rusk, and I would strongly urge that you check those three individuals. In addition, Max Taylor was very close to Robert Kennedy at the time. He was brought in by President Kennedy to examine the decision-making process of the Government that could have led to such a failure as the Bay of Pigs. He was very--Max was very close to both Robert Kennedy and the President at the time. He was very close to the whole

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problem of Cuban relations. He played a major part in the Cuban missile crisis discussions because of his association with the Kennedys and his work with the Bay of Pigs follow-on. So I would urge you to talk to him about this as well. And if Mac didn't know about it, and Max doesn't know about it and Dean Rusk doesn't and Ros (Kilpatrick doesn't and I have no memory of it, I very much doubt that any such plan was known to the top officials of the Kennedy Administration.

B: Well, assume for the moment that one of those people did know about such a plan, and assume for the moment that the CIA documents show that such a plan might have been directed to be instituted by someone in the White House, who in the White House do you think would have had the authority to institute such a plan?

M: Well, I have said before that I felt the attacks on the CIA -- CIA's covert operations were unjustified insofar as they assessed the primary responsibilities for those operations against the senior officials in CIA and absolve the rest of the senior officials in the Government of responsibility. I said that because it was my experience that all major CIA operations were approved by a group that subsequently became known as the 303 Group. I don't know what it was called during its early period, which included representatives of the -- the highest level representatives -- of the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the President's Security Adviser.

B: That was Mr. Bundy.

M: That was Mr. Bundy, during the period you are talking about, so that I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated, which seems to me, as I say, extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been taken to move in that direction, it would have had to have received the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other officials at that same level, including my Deputy, I think, and my Deputy never would have approved anything like that without discussing it with me.

B: What you are saying--at least if it came through the White House, certainly Mr. Bundy would have known about it.

M: I think he would have both known about it, and I don't believe that he would have approved it by himself. I think it would have been discussed with Dean Rusk and me or my deputy and Dean Rusk's undersecretary.

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B: And if Mr. Bundy did not know about it, then the only other person in the White House that might have known about it, I assume, would have been the President. Is that a fair statement?

M: That's a fair statement but I think that's extremely unlikely. I can't imagine that anything relating to the CIA operation of this kind would be known to the President and not Mr. Bundy. I never knew of any such thing.

B: So if it would have been known to Mr. Bundy it would have been known to the President. And vice versa?

M: No, nono. I didn't say that. I said I couldn't imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was known to the President and was not known to Mr. Bundy. I can imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy, not known to the President either because they weren't that important or conceivably because it was thought desirable to protect the President from certain knowledge.

B: With regard to the --

M: If I may -- add one word to that. I can't imagine Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though to do so would by that action involve the President. I say I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader without the President's knowledge because it is the President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it ever became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest of us, the importance of protecting the Presidency as well as a particular president, and particularly protecting his ability to govern.

B: I want to correct one thing on the record. You referred to my statement about one or more assassination plans. The only particular plan of assassination that you and I discussed that I said I knew anything about as to be concrete affirmative plans involved just Castro. I said there might have been indirect involvement in one other area, but the only direct involvement thus far that I know of at this time and that I discussed with you pertained to Castro.

M: Yes, yes, you are quite right.

PROF. CASTRO  
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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B: Anything else you want to add-for the record?

M: No, except I'm horrified by the whole discussion, shocked by it and I just hope you will pursue all these leads some of which you may already have--I am saddened by it too.

B: As a citizen I am horrified by it and I am saddened by it, that my country which at one time became the land of the free and the home of the brave would be involved in situations of this kind, but we are trying to find out what the facts are and hopefully it will not happen again.

Thank you very much, Sir.

M: Thank you.

(END OF TAPE)

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B: Anything else you want to add for the record?

M: No, except I'm horrified by the whole discussion, shocked by it and I just hope you will pursue all these leads some of which you may already have-- *by it, too.* *and am saddened*

B: As a citizen I am horrified by it and I am saddened by it that my country which at one time became the land of the free and the home of the brave would be involved in situations of this kind, but we are trying to find out what the facts are and hopefully it will not happen again.

*P* Thank you very much, sir.

M: Thank you.

B: After completion of the interview as I was about to leave Secretary McNamara said that he wanted to do everything he could to show that President Kennedy was not aware of this.

(END OF TAPE)

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Chairman  
John T. Connor  
C. Douglas Dillon  
Erwin N. Griswold  
Lane Kirkland  
Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Ronald Reagan  
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,  
Executive Director

May 2, 1975

2-VI-7

Honorable Robert M. McNamara  
President  
The World Bank  
1818 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20433


Dear Mr. McNamara:

Enclosed is a transcript of the taping of our April 15 interview which my secretary has double-checked and which I have personally checked with the tape. Will you please review this for any changes or corrections that you may want to make for purposes of accuracy. I am enclosing a self-addressed, stamped envelope to mail this back to me with your corrections. The extra copy is for your own personal files, should you so desire.

I would appreciate your initialing each page of the transcript and signing the last page with the date of your signature. I may want to have a short affidavit prepared for you to sign with the copy of the transcript attached.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

  
David W. Belin  
Executive Director

Enclosure

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INDEX OF DOCUMENTS FOR ROBERT S. MCNAMARA

November 30, 1961, Memorandum from President to McNamara et al. (Tab 4 Lans. Book)

January 18, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to RFK re "Sensitive work". (Tab 8 Lans. Book)

January 27, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to RFK re "touchdown plays". (Tab 12 Lans. Book)

January 30, 1962, Memorandum from Gen Wm Craig to Lansdale re "Operation Bounty". (Tab 17 Lans. Book)

Minutes of SGA meeting of March 5, 1962, on Project Mongoose (attended by McNamara). (Tab 21 Lans. Book)

Memorandum for SGA from Lansdale March 12, 1962, re inter alia arming of Cuban guerrillas. (Tab 24 Lans. Book)

Memorandum for SGA from Lansdale March 13, 1962, re inter alia infiltrating agents with paramilitary skills and problem of controlling them once they are inside Cuba (00207). (Tab 25 Lans. Book)

Tab K Minutes of SGA meeting of March 13, 1962, with McNamara attending.

March 16, 1962, Memorandum for the Record of Taylor re SGA meeting with President on Taylor's March 14 Mongoose Guidelines. Contains March 22 amendment re "no authorization, either tacit or otherwise..." (Tab 27 Lans. Book)

April 11, 1962, Minutes of SGA. McNamara present. (Tab 30 Lans. Book)

August 10, 1962, Parrott Minutes of the SGA. McNamara present. (Tab 38(B) Lans. Book)

1967 IG Report re August 10, 1962, meeting (Tab 38 (C) Lans. Book)

August 13, 1962, Lansdale Memorandum to Harvey re "liquidation of leaders". (Tab 38(D) Lans. Book)

August 14, 1962, Harvey Memorandum to Helms re Lansdale "liquidation" memorandum. (Tab 38(F) Lans. Book)

TOP SECRET

August 17, 1962, Gilpatric Memorandum to Lansdale  
(Tab 39 Lans. Book)

August 23, 1962, National Security Action Memo  
No. 181 (Tab 41 Lans Book)

September 12, 1962, Memorandum from Lansdale to  
McNamara re Phase II Operation Mongoose (Tab 44  
Lans. Book)

Tab L October 26, 1962, Minutes of the SGA with McNamara  
in attendance.

Tab M November 5, 1962, Memorandum of George McManus  
referring to McNamara's view of Lansdale.

Tab N April 23, 1963, Summary Record of NSC meeting No.  
2/63. McNamara in attendance and spoke on Cuba:  
"elimination of the Castro regime was a require-  
ment."

April 14, 1967, Memorandum of John McCone to Helms  
re the August 10, 1962, meeting. (Tab 51 Lans. Book)

Tab O April 15, 1975, interview with McNamara by David  
Belin of the Rockefeller Commission.

Tab P May 27, 1975, Select Committee Interview with Richard  
Goodwin referring to McNamara's knowledge of "execu-  
tive action".

Tab Q June 6, 1975, testimony of John McCone before the  
Select Committee. (Only the portion that relates  
to McNamara.)

Tab R June 25, 1975, letter of John McCone to McNamara.

Tab S June 27, 1975, letter and memorandum of McNamara  
to John McCone.

TOP SECRET

## Chronology and Issues for Testimony of McGEORGE BUNDY

### Biographical Background

1953-61	Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvard University
1961-63	Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs
1963-66	Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs
1966-	
Present	President, Ford Foundation

### Chronology of Events

#### Summary Outline Re Castro

1. January 1961 - October 1961 -- Cuba Policy - Inauguration/Bay of Pigs to Mongoose (NSA/M 100 Plan re Removal of Castro)
2. November-January 1961 -- Conception and Approval of Mongoose
3. January - June 1962 -- Mongoose Phase One
4. June - December 1962 -- Mongoose Phase Two  
(August 10, 1962 Meeting and possible Discussion of Castro Assassination)
5. January - November 1963 -- Post-Mongoose Policy  
(Seeing pattern of discussion and papers on contingency of Castro death)
6. December 1963 - August 1964 -- Special Group Investigation of Mafia - Cuban Exile Castro Assassination Plot.

Issues and Questions1. Cuba Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin

Jan. 9-10, 1961 Bundy arrives in Washington (Source: Bundy Interview)

Jan. 20, 1961 Bundy Appointment. Kennedy Administration takes office. McGeorge Bundy appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Jan. 27, 1961 Bundy, Rostow and Bissell lunch at Hay Adams (Source: Bundy Interview) Calendar note.

April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs. Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs.

May 16, 1961 New U.S. Policy on Cuba. President Kennedy approved actions taken by the NSC at a May 5, 1961 meeting to establish U.S. policy toward Cuba. The NSC "agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro and that since the measures agreed below (CIA studies of weaknesses in Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to isolate Castro, improve relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action." Source: Record of Actions by NSC on May 5, 1961. (Tab B).

Oct. 5, 1961 NSAM 100. Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum No. 100 to the Secretary of State, subject: Contingency Planning for Cuba. The memorandum states in full: "In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba." There is no explanation of the nature of the "indicated contingency." Source NSAM No. 100, Oct. 5, 1961. (Tab C).

Was "Executive Action" discussed? Was Bissell instructed re "Executive Action"?

Was this basic context for later U.S. Policy?

Was "indicated contingency" related to "Executive Action"? Did JFK authorize NSAM 100? What was JFK instruction re NSAM 100? See next entries below.



Issues and Questions

Oct. 5, 1961

Taylor Instructions for Castro 'Removal' Contingence -- JFK interest NOT to be Revealed. On General Taylor's instructions, Parrott outlines to Mr. Coerr of State a requirement for a 'plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene.' Taylor tells Parrott not to indicate the President's interest in the plan.

Was this the "indicated contingency" in Bundy's NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961?

Oct. 6, 1961

Plan for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy not present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba -- the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations."

Is this plan the one referred to in Bundy's NSAM 100? Did it relate to a U.S. assassination plan?

Nov. 30, 1961

President Kennedy Decision to Begin Mongoose. A memorandum from President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, General Taylor, General Lansdale and Mr. Goodwin, which summarized "the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation." The memo stated: "(1) We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and departments of the Government." Source: Memorandum, November 30, 1961, (0069-70). (See Lansdale, Tab 4).

In a staff interview, Bundy recalls he probably wrote this memo. Memo shows JFK approval for Mongoose. What was JFK relationship with Lansdale and JFK interest in Mongoose?

Jan. 19, 1962

Phase One of Mongoose--Intelligence Collection, January-June 1962

RFK Urges Action. RFK tells Special Group (A) (Bundy not present) that solution of Cuban problem carries "the top priority in the U.S. Government--all else is secondary--no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared." Source: Memorandum, January 19, 1962, from McNamara to McCone. (See Lansdale, Tab 16).

Did RFK emphasis lead to assumption by CIA a Castro assassination plot had tacit authorization of higher authority?

Issues and Questions

If U.S. military intervention ruled out, must assassination be considered as only way to succeed?

March 5, 1962

Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose. General Taylor's memorandum proposes Operation MONGOOSE was to be developed on the following assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the target government /Cuba/ "the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive use of U.S. military intervention." Source: Memorandum by General Taylor, March 5, 1962, 00188. (See Lansdale, Tab 22).

March 5, 1962

Special Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines. The Special Group (A) including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General Taylor's guidelines for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information. Source: Minutes of Special Group (A) March 5, 1962, 00004. (See Lansdale, Tab 21).

Establishes Bundy was familiar with Mongoose guidelines.

March 16, 1962

President Receives Progress Briefing. "In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." The memo is footnoted with the following item dated March 22, 1962: "This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." Source: Memorandum, March 16, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008. (Tab E).

Why was it necessary to correct this memorandum? Is there a second level of plausible denial, allowing Special Group to deny a CIA action?

Issues and Questions

Does advantage of having action controlled counsel for consideration of assassination rather than sabotage?

April 11, 1962 Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANSDALE gave progress report. RUSK and McNAMARA suggested that the current target date for bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed. "Mr. BUNDY cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollable action internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S." Source: Minutes of Special Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1962, 00015-17. (Tab F).

August 7, 1962 Harvey submits Plan. In response to requests from the Special Group (Augmented), for a paper on "stepped-up Course B" William K. Harvey submits to General Lansdale a ten page plan of covert activities. (Source: Unsigned memo of August 7, 1962 from William K. Harvey) (Tab G).

Why did Special Group (Augmented) request a stepped-up plan? Note Harvey involvement.

August 8, 1962 Lansdale Transmits Plan to SG (A). Citing the "major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose" as "removing the restrictions in the 14 March policy guidelines which keep our actions 'short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area,'" General Lansdale sends the requested papers (from State, Defense, CIA, and USIA) to the SG(A). "The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped-up Course B." (Source: Unsigned memo of August 8, 1962 from Gen. Lansdale to SG(A) regarding stepped-up Course B). (See Lansdale, Tab 38).

August 10, 1962 Question of Assassination of Fidel Castro raised at SG(A) Meeting. At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Mr. Risk's office, at which, inter alia, Mr. McCone presented "an alternate plan (called... the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale," "the question of assassination particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara... It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. /Mr. Harvey took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Sources: Memorandum of August 14, 1962, for Deputy Director (Plans) from William K. Harvey, Chief, Task Force W, subject: Operation Mongoose; Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 10 August 1962, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott). (See Lansdale, Tab G, Lansdale Tab F).

(In his affidavit of April 25, 1975, prepared for the Rockefeller Commission, McGeorge Bundy states: "I don't have any recollection of where or how I heard about the poisoning possibility... Now, as to meetings where such things might have been discussed, the only one I have any recollection of -- and it is a refreshed recollection -- I would not have known about it a month ago -- is the one which we discussed yesterday on August 10, 1962 and I do NOT have any recollection of what specifically was said in that meeting.")

Aug. 12, 1962 Lansdale's memo is amended, Four words, "Including liquidation of leaders," are excised.  
General Lansdale distributes to Harvey (CIA); Hurwitch (State), Harris (Defense); and Wilson (USIA) a memorandum subject Alternate Course B.

The original memorandum contains the following language:

"Papers required from each of you for me Tuesday meeting:

"Mr. Harvey Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper."

When Harvey receives his copy, he calls Lansdale's office, points out how inadvisable the subsequently deleted language is, and the memorandum is thereupon recalled and the complained-of language deleted by General Lansdale. (Source: Lansdale's Memorandum of August 13, 1962, to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris and Wilson, Subject: Alternate Course B; Harvey's memorandum of August 14, 1962, supra. (See Lansdale, Tab D, Lansdale Tab F).

Aug. 14, 1962 Harvey memorializes Discussion of Assassination of Castro.  
Harvey writes for Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans, a memorandum "for your information." The memorandum records how the topic of assassinations "particularly of Fidel Castro," arose and how Harvey thereafter vigorously and quickly objected to Lansdale's having circulated reference to it in his memo of the preceding day, August 13, 1962. (See Lansdale, Tab F)

Paragraph 3 reads:

"The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

(Sources: Lansdale's memo of Aug. 13, supra; Harvey's memo, Aug 14, supra)

Does Bundy recall this discussion? He has said (at his interview with Committee staff on July 8, 1975) that he has no recollection, refreshed, revived, or independent of any such discussion by McNamara.

Aug. 23, 1962

Bundy writes National Security Action Memorandum #181 (NSAM #181). Bundy distributes a memorandum advising that the President has directed the following action be undertaken:

"4. The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action: General Taylor) )"

"8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense)." (Source: NSAM, No. 181, from McGeorge Bundy, August 23, 1962) (See *Lausdale, Tab 41*).

What prompted this NSAM? Did NSAM 181 result from the August 10 meeting?

Aug. 27, 1962

Note Harvey responsibility.

CIA Reports to Bundy on Progress in Complying with NSAM #181. Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, responds to NSAM #181 and informs Mr. Bundy that "Mr. William K. Harvey, or in his absence, Mr. Bruce B. Cheever" will be responsible for the line of activity projected for Operation Mongoose (and Plan B plus) as noted in NSAM #181. (Source: Memo of August 27, 1962 from Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Acting Director, DCI, to McGeorge Bundy, Subject: CIA Action in Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181) (Tab H).

Oct. 17, 1962

Bundy discusses with the President, Gen. Carter's memo for the Special Group Augmented of October 16, 1962.

Were other unwritten or unrecorded proposals discussed by Bundy to the President?

After discussion with President Kennedy, selected aspects of Gen. Carter's memo, subject, Operation MONGOOSE sabotage proposals, directed to the Special Group (Augmented) on Oct. 16, 1962, are approved. (Sources: Memo of October 16, 1962, from Marshall Carter, Acting DCI to Special Group (Augmented), subject Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals; Memorandum of October 17, 1962 from Thomas A. Parrott for the Special Group (Augmented) subject: Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Gen. Carter, dated 16 October 1962). (Tab I, Tab J)

January 4, 1963

Bundy Memo to President on New Cuban Policy. Bundy reports that, as instructed by JFK, he has met with an interagency group to work out new arrangement for handling "Cuban policy and action" in 1963. Time is ripe for this because the Bay of Pigs prisoners are out and Mongoose is at a dead end.

Base line for 1963 context, note Bundy proposes talks with Castro.

Bundy proposes a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department to replace the Mongoose office. On policy, Bundy lists problem areas (economic pressure, refugees, communicating with dissident members of Castro regime, "possibly including even Fidel himself," and a reduction of CIA's role) which require decision. (Source: Memo, January 4, 1963, Bundy to JFK; JFK Library file) (Tab K).

January 22, 1963

JFK Remarks to NSC. At NSC meeting, JFK points out "We must always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russia pressure against us in Berlin." (Source: Memorandum, no author or date, titled Remarks of President Kennedy to NSC Meeting January 22, 1963; JFK Library file.) (Tab L).

Role of Cuba in larger context.

April 3, 1963

JFK Meeting on Cuban Covert Action. On April 3, 1963, the President met with a number of advisers for a "meeting on Cuba": "The President said he does not object to exile raids if they really strike worthwhile targets rather than the "froth" which their acts to date have represented. The President was told by Mr. Bundy that sabotage operations are not now underway because "the special group had decided... that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it..."

In connection with sabotage operations, Mr. Fitzgerald "made the point that recent exfiltrates have said that there is now no organized resistance inside Cuba."

Robert Kennedy "asked whether it might not be useful to consider commando-type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men." Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed it would probably be impossible for them to survive for any length of time.... The Attorney General urged, in any case, that CIA survey all possibilities for aggressive action in Cuba over the next six months, assuming that the Agency could be given a free rein to proceed."

Does "All possibilities" include assassination?

The President summed up the meeting on Cuba by "directing the following: (a) The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future strength should be completed as soon as possible. (b) CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in the field of sabotage during the next six months. (c) A meeting should be held next week to review the proposed sabotage program." Source: Memorandum, April 3, 1963, "Meeting on Cuba," (02842-43). (Tel m).

President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase writes memorandum to Bundy proposing enticing Castro over to U. S. side. Chase states: "I understand that, in the near future, the President will be looking at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem." Source: Memorandum to Bundy, April 11, 1963, 4-130 (JFK Library file). (Tel N).

What is meant by "more violent solutions"?

April 11, 1963

Special Group Requests Destruction of Documents for Security Reasons. On April 11, 1963, the Special Group (Bundy present) requested that comments by the Coordinator of Cuban affairs dated April 11 on three papers being considered at today's meeting be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. /The meeting discussed the "entire question of sabotage" and thus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage operations. /

Why were documents destroyed?

The Special Group engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage..the group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken..to determine whether we wished to change the present policy..Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations..until an overall policy is made clear and steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro."

Note unclear policy towards Cuba.

It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should be made to higher authority and a paper would be prepared outlining "a proposed broad program for sabotage" examples of specific operations, the scale of activity and how such activity would fit into overall policy. Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, April 11, 1963 (02846-47). (Tel o).

April 18, 1963

Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18. The only reference to the subject matters of these papers was: "Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and of harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command.

"Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half."...Mr. Bundy was not sure whether "it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U. S. policy." Source: Special group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49). (T&R P).

April 23, 1963

Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet" Action on Castro. Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's request, comments on papers for meeting: "Assuming we are not out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way to get rid of him--a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or a combination of both.../blockade would be too long, thus/ "Generally speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate should be of the "short and sweet" variety." Source: Chase memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157. (T&R)

Does such "short and sweet action" refer to assassination?

April 23, 1963

RFK Proposes Study of U. S. Measures for Contingency of Castro Death. Discussion of Bundy paper titled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives," McNamara states the "elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement" and a U. S. program should arm to create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces..."

Does McNamara's hard view reflect JFK policy?



Bundy Interview - Dinner  
Hay - Adams Hotel

7/10

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Brother is prudent war,  
Bobby is the passionate "

RFK never gave me an  
order — He wouldn't  
order anyone w/o RFK's  
order

If Bobby did want C dead  
he would've left no doubt  
in the mind of the listener

FDB

July 16, 1975

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The Ford Foundation  
320 East 43rd Street  
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Bundy:

We greatly appreciate the time you have devoted to cooperating with the Committee's inquiry. The Chairman has asked me to levy one additional request upon you.

To complete the record on the events under consideration in your testimony of July 11 before the Committee, would you please prepare a notarized, sworn affidavit answering the following questions:

1. What recollections do you have concerning the subjects discussed at your meeting with Walt Rostow and Richard Bissell at the Hay-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961?
2. Do you recall or have a record of any other meetings, whether official or informal, between yourself and Richard Bissell between November 1, 1960 and March 1, 1961? Was there any discussion between yourself and Richard Bissell upon any of these occasions or in phone conversations during the same period that was related in any way to the establishment of a CIA project which included the capability to assassinate foreign leaders? What was the content of any such discussions?

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.  
Chief Counsel

MEMORANDUM

TO : Files

FROM : Bob Kelley

DATE : July 8, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH McGEORGE BUNDY

SUMMARY

On July 8, 1975, Mr. Bundy was interviewed at his office at the Ford Foundation in New York by Frederick Baron, Bob Kelley, and John Bayly of the Select Committee staff. The interview began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and continued virtually without interruption until 1:30 p.m. The interview was conducted in three parts:

1. A review by Mr. Bundy of the principal documents in the attached chronology.
2. Mr. Bundy was told of the chronology of events relating to the Executive action and ZRIFFLE program, and was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of these matters.
3. Mr. Bundy reviewed documents relating to the Trujillo matter, and was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of that matter.

In summary, Mr. Bundy said: (1) He did not recall any of the documents listed on the attached chronology relating to Castro, and it was his opinion, based on a reading of those documents at the interview, that they did not reflect any consideration by the White House or Cabinet level people in the Kennedy administration of a Castro assassination plan.

Mr. Bundy stated further that those documents relating to the contingency in the event of Castro's death and similar language did not relate to any Castro assassination plan, but rather to studies of what might be the situation in Cuba should Castro die or leave office unrelated to any U. S. effort; (2) With respect to the ZRIFLE program, Bundy stated that he was "astonished" that this could have been going on without the approval by the Special Group, that he knew of no authorization for such program, and that he never knew of a case where the Special Group process for authorizing covert actions was by-passed by Allen Dulles or Bissell to reach the President through another route. Mr. Bundy did state that he had a recollection of someone (he does not know whom) informing him of the "Executive action" capability, but it was his understanding that this was only a study of possible assassination methods, and was not targeted against any particular individual or country.

Set out below is a summary of Mr. Bundy's comments on the three areas outlined above:

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RE CASTRO ON ATTACHED CHRONOLOGY

NSAM 100 and related documents re "removal of Castro." Bundy had no recollection at all of NSAM 100 and did not know what the words "indicated contingency in Cuba" involved.\* When shown the Parrott memorandum for the record, dated October 5, 1961, which states that Woodward was asked by Parrott to prepare a contingency plan on General Tayler's instructions "against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene" and that General Tayler preferred that "the President's interest in this matter" not be told to Mr. Woodward,

\*NSAM 100 clearly reflects JFK's desires because Bundy would never write a NSAM without his approval, Bundy said. However, Bundy emphasized that JFK never asked him to look into or develop a plan for the assassination of Castro.

Mr. Bundy still did not recall NSAM 100 or its subject. Similarly, when shown the Special Group meeting minutes of October 6, 1961 where Mr. Parrott told the Group that there was in preparation "a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene," Mr. Bundy's recollection was also not refreshed. Bundy stated that his reading of these documents today makes him think that what was desired was only a plan of what might happen in a post-Castro Cuba, and did not relate to any attempt by the United States to cause Castro's removal. Bundy said he does not recall or know of any plan that Woodward or any other agency might have developed as a result of NSAM 100. Bundy suggested that General Taylor would be the best source for information as to why the Presidential interest in this plan should have been concealed from Mr. Woodward. Later in the interview, after reviewing for Mr. Bundy the chronology relating to the ZRIFFLE program, and pointing out that it was on November 15, 1961 that Bissell is alleged to have instructed Harvey to arrange the assassination of Castro - some forty days after NSAM 100 was issued - Bundy stated there was no relationship between NSAM 100 and the Bissell-Harvey orders of November 15.

President's memo, November 30, 1961, launching Mongoose. Bundy had no recollection of this memo, although reading it today he thinks he may have written it. Bundy noted that General Taylor ran the Special Group 54/12 meetings from June 1961 through October 1962, and Bundy merely attended to represent the Presidential interest.

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and Special Group approval, March 5, 1962. Bundy noted that the Mongoose guidelines "recognized that final success will require decisive U. S. military intervention."

It was suggested to Mr. Bundy that if an invasion was recognized as a requirement, yet was ruled out for political or diplomatic reasons, and it was also recognized that sabotage could not accomplish the overthrow of the Cuban regime, policy makers might have taken up consideration of a Castro assassination. Bundy said that today one could assume that there were "two forks": an invasion by U. S. forces, or a Castro assassination, but Bundy emphasized that the thinking in the JFK administration was focussed toward an invasion by U. S. forces. At other points in the interview, Bundy emphasized that JFK policy makers never considered the possibility of assassinating Castro. In positing the "two forks," Bundy did not appear to mean that these two possibilities were considered during the JFK years, but only that one might conceive of the situation today in those terms.

JFK briefing on Mongoose March 16, 1962. Bundy explained, although he had no recollection of this document, that this was the type of effort made to create plausible deniability." Thus, though the body of the document states that the Special Group augmented was given "tacit authorization to proceed." The footnote corrects that and states no authorization was given by higher authority. Bundy said this reflected an effort to protect the President from disclosure of covert actions and was a usual practice. Bundy said that generally he would speak on a one-to-one basis with President Kennedy and get a "clear signal" from him on a covert action proposal. The understanding was that the paper record would not reflect this signal. The President would give a clear signal to the members of the Special Group in informal conferences but rarely at a formal group meeting. Bundy said we wanted the President to hear what we were doing with respect to covert actions, and then we'd continue doing it; but his approval would not be recorded.

In response to a question, Bundy said that there was not another level of plausible deniability between the Special Group and the CIA. In other words, Bundy was asked whether with respect to assassinations, a paper record might be created that showed no approval by the Special Group even though they may have given oral authorization for an assassination, so that in later years, the chain of command would not rise above the CIA. Bundy said that there was no such lower level of deniability, "We would be explicit with the CIA either way on covert action approvals, and such approvals would be reflected in the paper record."

August-October 1962; August 10, 1962, Meeting

Mr. Bundy was shown selected documents pertaining to meetings of the Special Group Augmented and Operation Mongoose. All were taken from the latter half of 1962 and principally from the months of August, September and October. Although Mr. Bundy was able to identify most of the documents as either his own or as those he received from others he was unable to state that any of them revived his recollection of any discussion or proposal concerning assassinations. More directly, Mr. Bundy stated that he had no recollection, revived, refreshed, or independent, of any talk, proposal or discussion concerning assassinations during any Special Group Augmented meeting he attended during the months of August, September and October. Moreover, he has no recollection of hearing any reference to assassination made by any one, either seriously or jokingly, during that or any other period (Mr. Bundy contested that he was at a meeting on October 16, 1962, chaired by the Attorney General at which Operation Mongoose proposals were discussed. Review of pertinent documentation indicates that there were two meetings regarding Operation Mongoose on October 16, 1962. Mr. Bundy was apparently in attendance at the first, held in the morning; he was

evidently not in attendance at the second, held in the afternoon in the Attorney General's office for operational representatives. Mr. Helms' memo for files evidently records proceedings at the second meeting.)

#### 1963 Documents re Contingency of Castro's Death

Bundy explained that the January 4, 1963, memo from Bundy to the President, although he did not have a clear recollection of writing this memo, reflected the fact that Mongoose was not producing. Bundy said "RFK can huff and puff all he wanted to but Castro's house would not come down." Bundy pointed out that the whole Cuban environment had been transformed after the missile crisis. Kennedy was in a much stronger political position but there were still Republican critics who wanted continued strong action against Castro. The President recognized that he could not satisfy these critics completely but nevertheless, felt impelled to take some measures against Castro to show that he was aware of the problem and trying to do something about it. Bundy showed us an article from the New York Times by James Reston reflecting the President's opinions to this affect.

#### Gordon Chase Memo to Bundy re "Violent Solutions"

Bundy said that Chase was his personal assistant with the special responsibility for Cuban affairs. (Chase left the White House for the Lindsey administration in New York City and is now at the Harvard Medical School.) Chase did not have the type of position or responsibility on Bundy's staff that would involve him in covert action approvals or involvement in anything as serious as assassination discussion. Thus, Chase's references to a "short and sweet" approach have to do with actions



like sabotage, harassment or other covert actions far short of assassination.

#### Studies on Contingency of Castro's Death

The documents in the period April - September 1963 which discuss contingencies after the death of Castro were simply the type of study often commissioned on developments that might ensue after a foreign leader passes away. They were not prepared in connection with any consideration or discussion of a Castro assassination. For example the paper by Sherman Kent was "straight estimating" by CIA office of National Estimates. (It should be noted that a Select Committee Staff member who was a very senior ONE Officer believes that the Sherman Kent Paper was by no means a normal estimate. His experience tells him that this was a very closely held paper which would have been prepared by Kent personally at the request of the DCI and not circulated within the ONE board for comments.) In response to a question, Bundy could not recall why there was this seeming interest in the spring and summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death. Bundy said he tried to recall now whether there were reports of a decline in Castro's health or some other event that might have prompted these studies. He could not do so.

#### Documents on Non-Governmental Assassination Plot

Bundy commented on the Helms' memo of June 10, 1964: "a disingenuous memorandum given their earlier connection with the Cosa Nostra". However, Bundy said he had no affirmative recollection of these documents at all. He does not deny that he saw them but he simply has no recollection refreshed or otherwise. Bundy does not recall what RFK's reaction was when he was asked to have the Justice Department look into the plot as a matter

of law enforcement, or any other outcome with respect to the information received by the Special Group.

After reviewing these documents referring to assassinations, Bundy was asked if there might have been any connection between these documents and the developments they reflect and the October 5, 1961, NASM which asked for an indicated contingency, which, from subsequent documents, also seem to deal with "a removal of Castro from the Cuban scene one way or another". As he had done <sup>the first</sup> when documents were reviewed, Bundy again stated that JFK "never asked me to look into an assassination of Castro." Nor was his recollection refreshed as to the 1961 documents--he simply does not recall issuing NASM 100 or any discussion at that time with JFK or anyone else with respect to these documents.

#### Executive Action

Bundy recalls that he arrived in Washington around January 9 or 10. He was an old friend of Bissell. Bissell had been his teacher in college and he had worked with Bissell in the Marshall Plan and knew him at MIT as well. His calendar book reflects the fact that he had lunch on January 27 at the Hay Adams with Bissell and Rostow. He does not recollect this luncheon nor any discussion with Bissell about executive action capability. He does recall that someone informed him that there was such a capability but that no individual was targeted and no action would be taken without authorization. He thought it was unlikely that his lunch with Bissell related to executive action, but he has no recollection at all of that lunch. He said Bissell and he are frank and candid with each other when they speak and there is no reason to think that Bissell interpreted any conversation with Bundy as authorization to proceed with a Castro assassination plot.

"No one but the President himself had authority to give such an order in a valid way."

Bundy has no recollection of AMLASH. He does recall the reference to "poison" but as something that would be on a larger scale than an individual assassination. For example, if such poison would be used it would affect an entire restaurant and not be administered to a single individual. Bundy had heard of the ball point syringe but does not recall it in the context of Cuba. Nor does he recall any reference to high powered rifles.

#### Lansdale-RFK-JFK Relationship

Lansdale did have a direct personal relationship with RFK, but not to JFK. Bundy pointed out, however, that there is a great difference between "RFK beating up on people and saying 'go get poison'." It was in RFK's character to press the bureaucracy hard and want to "act aggressively" against enemies, but out of character to discuss poison or assassination. Any instructions that Bissell gave Harvey was a far cry from the "gung ho" suggestions that Bobby usually made.

Mongoose and Assassinations. Bundy said he cannot say there was no connection between the Mongoose three-man teams and any three-man teams for assassinations. He does know that there was no "witting authorization" of three-man assassination teams. He strongly disagrees with any suggestion (by Helms) that the atmosphere of the Special Group Augmented made it acceptable to plot Castro's assassination.

Special Group Approval and Assassination Plots. Bundy has no idea how the reported mafia-CIA plot could have gone on without approval by the Special Group. He is "astonished" if it did so. He said he never knew of

a case where the Special Group approval process was bypassed like men like Allan Dulles or Bissell or where they took a back route to the President around the Special Group. He said he would have to exclude the period before the inauguration on January 20, 1961, because he was not operating in the Special Group at that time.

Trujillo

Bundy had little to do with Dominican affairs. He did recall of being told of the January 12, 1961, decision to support Dominican dissidents and thought this was "o.k. if the dissidents succeed." He did not believe that support amounted to support for an assassination. Goodwin and Ralph Dungan would know about the Dominican Republic and Trujillo.

Memorandum  
To: FAO Schwarz, Smothers  
From: Robert Kelley

SHORT SUMMARY -- CUBA

McGEORGE BUNDY

McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy throughout the Kennedy Administration. Bundy chaired the Special Group until Maxwell Taylor took over that function in mid-1961, and Bundy resumed chairmanship of the Special Group after Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in late 1962.

Bundy and W. W. Rostow met Richard Bissell for lunch on January 27, 1961, although Bundy recalls no discussion of assassination or Executive Action capability at that meeting. Bundy attended the August 10, 1962 Mongoose meeting where a Castro assassination was reportedly suggested.

In October 1961, Bundy issued a National Security Action Memorandum referring to an "indicated contingency" which appears from other documents to have called for a plan in the event of Castro's removal. And in the Spring and Summer of 1963 Bundy and the Special Group considered papers dealing with the contingency of Castro's death.

Mr. Bundy's examination should encompass the following questions and areas:

A. In meeting with Richard Bissell in January 1961 was an Executive Action capability or a Castro assassination plan discussed?

B. Was NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961 related to a Castro assassination plot or capability?

C. Was the emphasis placed by President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy on the Mongoose Program such that the CIA may have assumed authorization, tacit or otherwise, for a Castro assassination.

D. What accounts for the seeming pattern of interest in the Spring and Summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death?

E. What were the Command and Control procedures for authorization of covert actions in the Kennedy Administration?

F. Was an assassination of Castro ever considered by the Kennedy Administration in the efforts to deal with the problem of Cuba?

G. If an assassination was not considered or authorized, what explanation is there for the CIA Castro assassination efforts during the Kennedy Administration?

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TO: Fritz Schwarz  
FROM: Frederick Baron

DATE: July 10, 1975

McGEORGE BUNDY

Testimony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ACTION

1. TAB S (pp. 48-54 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could have been BUNDY" (49) or ROSTOW (51) who asked him to do this. Bissell does not recall any specific conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are "the names of the two people from whom it /the request for such a capability/ is most likely to come from." (53).

2. TAB T (pp. 58-59 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW would have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request (58).

3. TAB U (pp. 80-83 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that the "urgings" for an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and representatives from STATE, CIA, and DEFENSE (81-82).

Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he would have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82). "When I reported to him /ROSTOW/ it would have gone to BUNDY as well." (82).

4. TAB V (pp. 16-19 -- 6/11/75)

IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of these ZR/RIFLE programs to Cuba. HARVEY says that Bissell instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate, and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO."

Bissell testified that he did not recall directing the reactivation of the project but, he said, "I think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY's responsibility for Project RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact." (19). Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact

had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it /the contact/ unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (19).

5. TAB W (pp. 42-53 -- 6/11/75)

Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (46). Bissell said he discussed "all aspects of the creation of the capability." (50). Bissell said it was "quite possible" that he discussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assassination targets. (50).

When asked a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he recalled discussing the assassination capability with ROSTOW and BUNDY, Bissell replied: "I am not sure about BUNDY, but I think ROSTOW, yes, sir." (52).

to estab EXEC ACTION

1. Cuba Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin

Bundy Chronology(draft) 1.  
RKelley 7/7/75

~~January 20, 1961~~

~~Bundy Appointment.~~ Kennedy Administration takes office.  
McGeorge Bundy appointed ~~Assistant to the President for Na-~~  
~~tional Security Affairs.~~

Late Jan - Early Feb  
Bissell asks Edwards  
JAN 25-6: Harvey  
meets with Gottlieb  
+ Silver

April 17, 1961

~~Bay of Pigs.~~ Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs.

May 16, 1961

New U. S. Policy on Cuba. President Kennedy approved ac-  
tions taken by the NSC at a May 5, 1961 meeting to establish  
U. S. policy toward Cuba. The NSC "agreed that U. S. policy  
~~toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro~~ and that  
since the measures agreed below (CIA studies of weaknesses  
in Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to isolate Castro, im-  
prove relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not likely to  
achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals  
with a view to further action." Source: Record of Actions  
by NSC on May 5, 1961.

July 21, 1961

Covert Action Program Proposed by CIA. At a Special Group  
meeting (Bundy not present), Mr. Dulles presents a paper on  
the covert action program for Cuba. The program's objective  
is "to provide support to a U. S. program to develop opposi-  
tion to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable  
to the U. S. Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting,  
July 21, 1960.

August 3, 1961

Special Group Approves Cuban Covert Action Program. The  
Special Group approved for consideration by higher authority  
a condensed set of recommendations summing up the proposed  
Cuban covert action program with certain reductions in the  
~~budget figures~~ presented by Mr. Bissell. Source: Minutes  
of Special Group meeting, August 3, 1960.

October 5, 1961

~~NSAM 100.~~ Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum  
No. 100 to the Secretary of State, subject: Contingency  
Planning for Cuba. The memorandum states in full: "In con-  
~~firmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secre-~~  
~~tary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated~~  
~~contingency in Cuba.~~" There is no explanation of the nature  
of the "indicated contingency." Source: NSAM No. 100,  
October 5, 1961.

TOP SECRET

October 6, 1961

Plan for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy) not present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba--the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961.

#### Concention and Approval of Mongoose

November 1961

New Appraisal of Cuba Situation Proposed. Undated, untitled memorandum states that "this group /perhaps reference to Special Group/ has been "struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community is a dangerously effective component of Communism and anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics."

The memorandum posited "only two ways to view this threat /the Castro Government/ "either to hope the time and internal discontent will eventually end it, or to take active measures to force its removal. ... "neither alternative is attractive, but no decision is, in effect, a choice of the first." The memo concluded: "It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic, and propaganda action against Castro." Source: Undated memorandum, (00081-82), no author listed.

November 3, 1961

Lansdale Assessment of Cuba Situation. In a ten-page memorandum, General Lansdale reviewed: (A) Present and projected clandestine operations against Cuba; (B) Possible future courses of action; (C) Possible results."

Nov. 15, 1961  
ZR/R/EIC found  
agrees with Castro

Possible courses of action included: (1) the improvement of our maritime capability, (2) preparations for air resupply operations when required, (3) selection or recruitment and training of a few American agents for infiltration into Cuba, (4) somewhat increased training of Cuban agent personnel. Regarding the proposed American agents, the memorandum noted: "These can be men of Latin racial origin and must, of course, be bilingual."

As to "possible results:" Lansdale concluded: "...there's much less than even chance of achieving by the means herein discussed the overthrow of the regime. Nevertheless there remains a significant possibility that this can be done. The possibility can be assessed only if the operations is continued at least to the point where a real effort has been made to build and organize resistance." Source: Lansdale memorandum, November 3, 1961, 00071-79.

November 30, 1961

President Kennedy Decision to Begin Mongoose. A memorandum from President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, General Taylor, General Lansdale and Mr. Goodwin, which summarized "the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation." The memo stated: "(1) We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and departments of the Government." Source: Memorandum, November 30, 1961, (00069-70).

December 1, 1961

REFS Informs Special Group of Mongoose. At a Special Group meeting (Bundy not present), the Attorney General reported "about a series of meetings which had been held recently with higher authority. Out of these had come a decision that higher priority should be given to Cuba." It was agreed that General Lansdale should develop a long-range program which would be reviewed by the Special Group and

presented for approval to higher authority. At that time, formal language would be proposed to record the decision to pursue a new or revised Cuba policy." Source: Special Group Minutes, December 1, 1961.

December 8, 1961

At a Special Group meeting (Bundy not present), General Lansdale presented the outline of a program designed to overthrow the Castro government. This program is centered around the selection and eventual introduction into Cuba of a nucleus of anti-Castro Cubans; once they are in the country and in a position to operate, then a number of collateral supporting actions would be undertaken." The special group agreed that the "immediate requirement" was to select a group that could agree on a platform for an eventual new government. When such a selection has been made "the program will be discussed further with higher authority." Source: Special Group Minutes, December 8, 1961.

Phase One of Mongoose--Intelligence Collection, January-June 1962

January 19, 1962

~~RFK Urges Action~~ RFK tells Special Group (A) (Bundy not present) that solution of Cuban problem carries "the top priority in the U. S. government--all else is secondary--no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared." Source: Memorandum, January 19, 1962, from McManus to McCone; see also Minutes of Special Group (A) Meeting, January 19, 1962: RFK tells Special Group (A) that President is concerned and "it is not only General Lansdale's job to put the tasks, but yours to carry out with every resource at your command."

January 25, 1962

President Informed of Progress. General Taylor reports to the President that Lansdale has developed a concept of operations directed at the overthrow of the Castro government by an internal revolt of the Cuban people and has assigned 32 initial tasks to State, Defense, CIA, and USIA." The President is told that this project involves the danger of setting of a premature or inadequate revolt which might



March 5, 1962

then require U. S. military intervention to prevent a Hungary-type repression. The President is told a review of progress in February would permit an assessment of the overall feasibility of the Cuba project and the SG(A) ready to recommend to the President whatever policy changes were necessary to carry it forward. Source: Memorandum, January 25, 1962, General Taylor to President Kennedy, 02806.

Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose. General Taylor's memorandum proposes Operation MONGOOSE was to be developed on the following assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the target government /Cuba/ "the U. S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive use of U. S. military intervention." "The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U. S. capability for intervention." "General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority." (00216) "General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman JCS." (00216) Source: Memorandum by General Taylor, March 5, 1962, 00188.

March 5, 1962

Special Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines. The Special Group (A), including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General Taylor's guidelines for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information. Source: Minutes of Special Group (A) March 5, 1962, 00004.

March 13, 1962

Special Group (A) Approves Guidelines. The Special Group (A) approved Mongoose guidelines. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting changes proposed by the DCI and DOD/JCS. Source: Special Group (A) Minutes, March 13, 1962. 00006.

March 16, 1962

April 11, 1962

SECRET

President Receives Progress Briefing. "In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONCOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." The memo is footnoted with the following item dated March 22, 1962: "This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." Source: Memorandum, March 16, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008.

Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANDSDALE gave progress report. MCCONE states reconnaissance reveals no significant increase in military support facilities in Cuba. McNAMARA suggests need to look for evidence of underground installations. HARVEY reports on the interrogation of recent exfiltrates. LEWITZER outlines Joint Chiefs view of Cuba as threat to U. S. MCCONE suggests that the current schedule of covert action should be speeded up even though this would entail increased dangers of attribution to the U. S. Re RUSK's question as to the adequacy of existing policy approvals, "GENERAL LANDSDALE said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than restricting them to intelligence missions." RUSK said at this time he could see no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be justified. RUSK and McNAMARA suggested that the current target date for bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed. Mr. BUNDY cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollable action internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be embarrassing or inconvenient for the U. S. Source: Minutes of Special Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1962, 00015-17.

TOP SECRET

June 30 - December 31, 1962 is contained in separate chronology  
prepared by John Bayle.

January 4, 1963

Bundy Memo to President on New Cuban Policy. Bundy reports that, as instructed by JFK, he has met with an interagency group to work out new arrangement for handling "Cuban policy and action" in 1963. Time is ripe for this because the Bay of Pigs prisoners are out and Nongoose is at a dead end.

Bundy proposes a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department to replace the Mongoose office. On policy, Bundy lists problem areas (economic pressure, refugees, communication with dissident members of Castro regime, possibly including even Fidel himself,) and a reduction of CIA's role which require decision. (Source: Memo, January 4, 1963, Bundy to JFK; JFK Library file)

January 22, 1963

JFK Remarks to NSC. At NSC meeting, JFK points out "We must always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russia pressure against us in Berlin." (Source: Memorandum, no author or date, titled Remarks of President Kennedy to NSC Meeting January 22, 1963; JFK Library file.)

April 3, 1963

JFK Meeting on Cuban Covert Action. On April 3, 1963, the President met with a number of advisers for a "meeting on Cuba": "The President said he does not object to exile raids if they really strike worthwhile targets rather than the 'froth' which their acts to date have represented. The President was told by Mr. Bundy that sabotage operations are not now underway because 'the special group had decided... that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it...'"

In connection with sabotage operations, Mr. Fitzgerald "made the point that recent exfiltrates have said that there is now no organized resistance inside Cuba."

Robert Kennedy "asked whether it might not be useful to consider commando-type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men. Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed it would probably be impossible for them to survive for any length of time.... The Attorney General urged, in any case, that CIA survey all possibilities for aggressive action in Cuba over the next six months, assuming that the Agency could be given a free rein to proceed."

The President summed up the meeting on Cuba by "directing the following: (a) The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future strength should be completed as soon as possible. (b) CMA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in the field of sabotage during the next six months. (c) A meeting should be held next week to review the proposed sabotage program." Source: Memorandum, April 3, 1963, "Meeting on Cuba," (02842-43).

President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase writes memorandum to Bundy proposing enticing Castro over to U. S. side. Chase states: "I understand that, in the near future, the President will be looking at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem." Source: Memorandum to Bundy, April 11, 1963, 4-130 (JFK Library file).

Special Group Requests Destruction of Documents for Security Reasons. On April 11, 1963, the Special Group (Bundy present) requested that comments by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated April 11 on three papers being considered at today's meeting be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. The meeting discussed the "entire question of sabotage" and thus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage operations.

The Special Group engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage..the group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken..to determine whether we wished to change the present policy..Mr. McGone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations..until an overall policy is made clear and steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro."

It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should be made to higher authority and a paper would be prepared outlining a proposed broad program for sabotage. Examples of specific operations, the scale of activity and how such activity would fit into overall policy. Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, April 11, 1963 (02846-47).

April 11, 1963

April 11, 1963

TOP SECRET

April 18, 1963

Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18. The only reference to the subject matters of these papers was: "Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and of harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command.

"Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half."...Mr. Bundy was not sure whether it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy." Source: Special group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49).

TOP SECRET  
April 23, 1963

Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet" Action on Castro. Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's request, comments on papers for meeting: "Assuming we are not out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way to get rid of him--a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or a combination of both.../blockade would be too long, thus/ "Generally speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate should be of the "short and sweet" variety." Source: Chase memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157.

April 23, 1963

RFK Proposes Study of U.S. Measures for Contingency of Castro Death. Discussion of Bundy paper titled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives," McNamara states the "elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement" and a U. S. program should aim to create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces..."

Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro," (2) "A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months." (Source: Memorandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record of NSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63...;" JFK Library file.)

Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group members, Bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects, "the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind are: ... (b) Possible death of Castro..."

Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file.

Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group meeting results in assignment of "examination of the possible developments in Cuba if Castro should disappear from the scene." This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent for Group discussion on May 14. Other assignments are for possible use of contingencies to achieve "wider political objectives," economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba. (Source: memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK Library file.)

Kent Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA) draft paper discusses "Developments in Cuba and Possible U. S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death." Under a heading "The U. S. Role" Kent states: "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes, the U. S. would be widely charged with complicity," even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963, (JFK Library file).

Paper on Castro Death Contingency. At the NSC Standing Group meeting, the Sherman Kent paper "Development in Cuba and Possible U. S. Actions in the event of Castro's Death" was not discussed for lack of time. Source: Summary Record Memorandum by Bromley Smith, of Meeting, May 14, 1963, JFK Library file.

April 30, 1963

TOP SECRET

April 29, 1963

May 13, 1963

May 14, 1963

May 28, 1963

Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency.  
Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28, "We should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event of Castro's death," and notes Sherman Kent will be present for this purpose.

Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive papers" dealing with "a list of possible actions under consideration at CIA" /not specified/ and Cuban oil supplies. Source: Memorandum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK Library File.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro. All members of the group agree that this is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret..it was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group in advance." Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963.

~~JFK Approves External Sabotage Program.~~ A meeting was held with "higher authority" (Bundy present) at which a program for "external sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest." Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, "Satotage Program Cuba".

June 19, 1963



August 15, 1963

Special Group Approves Non-Violent Action Against Cuban Trade.  
The Special Group approved a proposal dated August 12, 1963 apparently dealing with a "non-violent program to inhibit free world and neutral trade with Cuba." Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that to make this operations convincing, a "big bang" on a Cuban ship will be carried out before the Operation is implemented and that the reference in the paper to "real sabotage" applied to Cuban shipping only. Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, August 15, 1963.

September 20, 1963

Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro Suicide Preferable to Assassination. At Bundy's request, Chase summarizes State INR Paper entitled "Cuba: Possible Courses of Action." Chase's summary states: "...The present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom."

The INR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states: "Assassination of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro... and drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality." Source: (1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK Library File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G. Denney, Jr., of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Affairs.

October 3, 1963

Separate Minutes kept of Special Group Meeting. On October 3, 1963, the Special Group met and discussed infiltration operations and sabotage during September, as well as "the operations plans of commandos I". Page 1 of these minutes has an underscored item "see special minutes for additional items." There is no indication of what these additional items refer to. (Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatrick, and McCone present) Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 3, 1963.

*Ask Barrett*

November 5, 1963

Special Minutes kept of Special Group meeting - RFX Present.  
 Note that the minutes of the Special Group meeting on November 5, 1963 contain an underscored item on page 1 stating, "see special minutes for additional items." This item appears on page 1 under a discussion of Cuban sabotage and infiltration operations. (Bundy not present; attending were Robert Kennedy, Helms, Chiever, and Steakley.) Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting dated November 6, 1963.

*Per TAP*

November 6, 1963

Approach by Castro to U. S. Mr. Bundy told the Special Group that "it has come to the attention to the White House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about some arrangement with the U. S." To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U. S." After discussion, it was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time (as to an emissary to talk to Castro) but to study the problem for several days and to consider it again. Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting November 5, 1963.

November 6, 1963

JFK Disapproves Cuban Actions to November 12. On November 6, 1963, higher authority (PRESIDENT KENNEDY) "disapproved all Cuban Operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before November 12. Two operations dated November 8 and 10 are therefore disapproved." Source: Memorandum for Special Group dated November 6, 1963, entitled Cuban Operations.

November 12, 1963

John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara Briefed by CIA on Covert Actions in Cuba. On November 12, 1963, a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, McCone, Johnson, Kilpatrick, Vance, Helms, Fitzgerald, Chiever, and Steakley. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations in five areas: (1) covert collection, (2) sabotage and harassment, (3) propaganda, (4) military disaffection, and (5) economic denial.

On covert collection, Fitzgerald pointed out that CIA had three kinds of agents activities inside Cuba: (1) "Singleton" operations, (2) Collection nets, (3) agents involved in black net operations. Some 25 agents had been either captured or killed in the past year. There is increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces, accounting for the loss of agents.

? AMCLASH?

On sabotage and harrassment operations in Cuba, Fitzgerald described successful operations against four installations and the belief that these operations have raised the moral of the people in Cuba and continues to keep pressure on Castro adding to the growing economic problems facing the country.

On disaffections in the military in Cuba, Fitzgerald stated that while the military is loyal, there are indications that some leaders might break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. The principal aim of the U. S. is to "get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other."

AMCLASH?

In response to a question as to what decisions remain to be made, Fitzgerald stated that "we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabotage and harrassment." After outlining a number of large scale sabotage operations, "The consensus was that the CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January." Source: Memorandum for the Record, November 12, 1963, entitled Cuban Operations (Special Group File).

November 15, 1963

Special Group Approves Infiltration Operations--Keeps Special Minutes. The Special Group approved various infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba. An underscored statement in the notes stating: "See special minutes for additional items." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, November 14, 1963.

December 5, 1963 -  
January 2, 1964

LBJ Disapproves Sabotage Operation. In the period December 5, 1963 through January 2, 1964, the Special Group approved a number of infiltration, exfiltration and sabotage operations in Cuba. However, the sabotage operation was disapproved by higher authority (President Johnson) on December 20, 1963. Source: Minutes of Special Group meetings on December 5, 6, 19, and 20, 1963, and January 2, 1964.

January 9, 1964

Special Group to Seek LBJ Views on Sabotage in Cuba. On January 9, 1964, the Special Group agreed that "the views of higher authority (President Johnson) should be obtained on what is desired generally in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba." Source: Minutes of Special Group meetings on January 9, 1964.

February 14, 1964

Bundy Sees Dilemma in Cuban Covert Actions: High Risk Actions, Rewarding; Low Risk Actions, Unrewarding. The Special Group discussed covert action potential to weaken the Castro regime. "There was a consensus that the present level of operation was no longer effective in obtaining the basic objective of toppling Castro but harassment might keep the regime off balance." Mr. Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high risk, dangerous operations are the rewarding ones and the low noise, innocuous operations prove to be unrewarding." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, February 14, 1964.

April 2, 1964

Bundy to Submit Question of Cuban Covert Operations to LBJ. On April 2, 1964, the Special Group approved five infiltration operations and five caching operations in Cuba, but tabled five sabotage proposals. "Mr. Bundy...stated that the time was overdue for submitting to higher authority the entire question of covert operations against Cuba...It was hoped that definite policy lines could be determined for future covert activity against Castro." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting dated April 3, 1964.

June 10, 1964

Helms Memo to DCI on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo to the DCI, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U. S. would not condone the

AMC/BSH

Planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach on March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has offered to assassinate Castro for \$150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Che Guevara. "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy." Source: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110).

June 18, 1964

Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for Special Group (303 Meeting). Peter Jessup, assistant to Mr.

Bundy, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Bundy subject "303 Committee Cuban review." The memo stated the meeting "might serve to give us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the U.S. A. in the next 120 days." The memo asked: "How close track is the FBI et.al, keeping track of Frank Fiorini and persons of this ilk." The memorandum continued: "We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform Coup de Main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all impending adventures?" A memorandum attached was described as: "Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Leaders, 10 June 1964." Source: Memorandum, 18 June 1964, from Peter Jessup to McGeorge Bundy.

June 18, 1964

Bundy and Special Group (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro--Bundy to Inform Robert Kennedy as Law Enforcement Problem. The 303 Committee met to discuss "problems arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and general unrest and instability on the island." ... "A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he

*\* Explained  
That it had been  
beginning for  
very long*

would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement." Source: Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, 18 June 1964.

June 19, 1964

Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassination Report--Robert Kennedy told failure to prevent can be construed as condoning. On June 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303 Committee meeting of June 13. "In regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the matter." Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by Peter Jessup.

July 30, 1964

Special Group Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot. The 303/Special Group Committee "agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald meet with Mr. Sam Pappich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." Source: Memorandum for the record dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30, 1964.

August 19, 1964

Bundy Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile-Mafia Plot. John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons interviewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to the CIA. Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy, August 19, 1964.

TOP SECRET

TO: FILES  
FROM: FREDERICK BARON  
RE: BUNDY/ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY--RE ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS  
DATE: JULY 6, 1975

MC GEORGE BUNDY: TESTIMONY BEFORE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

(Volume 14, Page 1991, April 7, 1975)

January, 1961: BUNDY became Special Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs, "Principal Staff Officer" for matters under the Departments of State, Defense, CIA, NSA, and others, relevant to national security. (1993)

February, 1966: BUNDY left position of Special Assistant to the President. (1994)

BUNDY doesn't remember an "actual decision to go about" assassination of a foreign leader. (1994)

BUNDY does have a "vague recollection of the existence or the possible existence of contingency planning . . . and a contingency capability" for assassination (1994-5).

BUNDY said that he knew of no authorization or involvement by anyone on the White House staff or anyone else in assassination planning beyond the contingency stage. (1995)

BUNDY could not recall discussion of any plan to assassinate Cuban leaders connected with OPERATION MONGOOSE, although he could not exclude the possibility that such discussion might have taken place. (1996)

BUNDY said that he had no recollection of the discussion or development of an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability to carry out assassinations. (1996) "But I cannot exclude that I heard of that."

BUNDY "would have been surprised" if the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate a foreign leader without his approval, but he "could not exclude that there would be communication with the President by other channels." (1997)

BUNDY said that he would not have expected that, during his time in Washington, "the Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of a foreign leader without direct order from higher authority." (1998)

BUNDY said that he has no recollection of the meeting of August 10, 1962, other than his calendar notation that he was present. (2000)

TOP SECRET

BUNDY testified that the first time he heard of a possible CIA assassination plot for Cuban leaders in which the MAFIA might have been involved was in the newspapers in 1975. (2002)

BUNDY testified that he thought it "not unreasonable that there would have been at least speculative discussions of the possibility of going after the Cuban leadership" in the atmosphere of "all kinds of covert operations" against Cuba. (2002)

BUNDY said that he believes the President's authority as Commander In Chief, rather than the statutory language of the National Security Act of 1947, provides authority for covert operations even without a declaration of war. (2004)

BUNDY told the Rockefeller Commission that his "unaided memory is not very good," but if the Commission "had time to do a documentary search and then say here is what the documents suggest was happening in thus and such a period, what now what do you remember, you would probably find some sleeping cells back here, at least in my own case." (2031)



C-10 20 C

STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: ss

I, McGeorge Bundy, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state:

On April 7, 1975 I testified as a witness before the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Commission). As I reflected overnight about my answers to certain questions, my recollection was refreshed and the next morning I contacted the Executive Director of the Commission, David W. Belin, and stated that I wished to make some additions to the record. I conferred with Mr. Belin at the offices of the Commission at 712 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., and then Mr. Belin asked me a number of questions to which I gave answers which were recorded on tape. After receiving a transcript of the tape, I made certain additional corrections. The following are the questions and my answers, as I have corrected them. (There is one question and answer that I have stricken because it is a matter of pure speculation.)

Mr. Belin: This a memorandum of a conference with McGeorge Bundy on April 8, 1975. Mr. Bundy has refreshed his recollection following his testimony before the Commission on April 7 and wishes to make some additions to the record.

Mr. Bundy: You asked me yesterday whether I had any recollection of hearing the word "poison", or something to that effect--whether I had any recollection of that kind of activity or proposal in relation to the Castro regime and I think I said I did not, and I did not as of yesterday. But overnight I have had a vague recollection, which I cannot pinpoint in time, that there was discussion that I knew about at some time of a proposal or scheme or project that did involve poison, and the characteristic that sticks in my memory is that it would have involved a rather large-scale use of poison and, as I recollect it, it never came anywhere near approval. Proposals under the HONGOOSE scheme which did come from time to time (mostly not with respect to assassination) were reviewed in the first instance for practicability and only after that for wisdom or political rightness, and I recall NO proposal for liquidation that ever got past the first stage to the second.

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Mr. Belin: I also talked to you, Mr. Bundy, about whether or not there might have been any discussion in early 1961 or any other time with regard to a request from the White House to the CIA for the CIA to develop what was called an executive action capability, which was defined as a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required. Do you ever remember any discussions along those lines?

Mr. Bundy: Well, I recall the words "executive action capability" more clearly today than I did yesterday, and I think I said yesterday that they rang some sort of bell. But I do NOT have any recollection as to when I knew about that or who requested it or how much was done under it. I don't recall having any continuing interest in or information about that particular activity.

Mr. Belin: Do you recall that executive action capability was in substance discussed as a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations at that time--I'm not saying there was direction to undertake a plan but at least the development of the stand-by capability?

Mr. Bundy: I think it was something like that--a plan to have some kind of stand-by capability for action against individuals.

Mr. Belin: Now, I'm going to turn to the Summer of 1962. Before we started this transcribing of your remarks you indicated that you don't remember any specific plan pertaining to the attempted poisoning of any Cuban leader during 1961, but that you do remember some discussions that may have developed into this area sometime in 1962. Is that accurate?

Mr. Bundy: Well, I think perhaps a slightly more precise way of saying it is that you have described to me a broad outline of plans as you understand them that existed in January or February 1961 and I simply have no recollection of plans that meet that description. I believe my memory tells me in a more general way that my knowledge of a scheme or idea of using poison probably relates to the year 1962.

Mr. Belin: Do you remember any discussions at any meeting of the MONGOOSE group where this might have been discussed? Either the general plan of possible liquidation or the particular plan of poison?

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Mr. Bundy: I don't have any recollection of where or how I heard about the poisoning possibility. I do know that I never knew of any approval of such a plan. My recollection is the opposite--that it was a half-brained scheme that did not receive approval even on the ground of practicability as distinct from the question of whether you would make a final decision to go ahead. Now, as to meetings where such things might have been discussed, the only one I have any recollection of--and it is a refreshed recollection--I would not have known about it a month ago--is the one which we discussed yesterday on August 10, 1962 and I do NOT have any recollection of what specifically was said in that meeting.

Mr. Belin: Do you have any recollection that there was any direction NOT to undertake any such plans?

Mr. Bundy: I think there was a general attitude toward this matter in which those working on covert operations were sometimes permitted to produce proposals, although I recall nobody encouraging them to do so. As I said yesterday, I draw a sharp distinction between considering contingencies of this sort and actually giving them approval. That I think is the way in which the Kennedy Administration approached the matter. I do not think there was a flat general ban on considering such possibilities.

Mr. Belin: Earlier, before we started taping, you said that if there had been any specific discussion of that, that you were not a party to it and that it might have--

Mr. Bundy: A discussion of what?

Mr. Belin: --of a direction to carry out a plan, that you certainly were not a party to such a discussion. Is that what you said?

Mr. Bundy: I am absolutely certain that I never knew of or believed that there was any authorization to go ahead with an effort to liquidate Castro, or any other Cuban leader.

Next question and answer deleted

Mr. Belin: Is there anything else that you want to add so far as clarifying or correcting your testimony of April 7 before the Commission?

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McGEORGE BUNDY  
320 EAST 43<sup>RD</sup> STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

1975 JUL 11 PM 7:21

SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES  
July 8, 1975

Dear Mr. Baron:

You asked me today for a report of what my calendar shows of meetings with Richard Bissell during the early months of 1961. My calendar begins only on January 23 so I have had to start from there. I have no independent recollection of whether I saw Mr. Bissell before that time, though it is quite possible that I did.

We have listed both meetings where the notation shows Mr. Bissell's name and where the meeting was one of a group of which he was or could have been a member. The two groups with this characteristic are the so-called Planning Group and the Special Group, and some of the entries simply show the names of the group without the names of the participants. The enclosed list exactly copies the entries as they were made in my office.

We have not included meetings called by the President, because my calendar does not show who was at such meetings or even, usually, what the subject was. There were of course a number of such meetings at which both Mr. Bissell and I were present, on the subject of the Bay of Pigs.

Sincerely,

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Frederick Baron  
Room G-308  
Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C. 20510

*Young + att → Baron → Research Section  
cy → Admin  
cy → Blue Room  
cy → Clerk Room*

1961

January

" 27 Rostow and Bissell -- Hay Adams

February

" 11 (lunch) Nitze, Rostow, McGhee, Bissell

" 14 Special Group -- CIA

" 15 Nitze, Wiesner, Bissell -- Rusk's Office

" 17 McGhee, Nitze, Rostow, Bissell

" 22 Planning Group -- Metropolitan Club  
Nitze, Rowe, McGhee, Rostow, Hare, Amory, Bissell

" 23 (mtg. & lunch) Special Group -- Bowles, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell  
Murrow, Bell (joined for lunch)

March

" 1 Planning Group

" 2 Special Group -- Gilpatric, Dulles, Bissell

" 8 (lunch) Special Group

" 14 (lunch) Planning Group  
Bissell at CIA

" 16 (lunch) Special Group

" 21 (lunch) Planning Group

" 23 (lunch) Special Group

" 28 (lunch) Planning Group

" 30 (lunch) Special Group

April

"	4	Planning Group
"	6	Special Group
"	11	Planning Group
"	15	Rusk, Bissell, Bundy -- at State
"	18	Planning Group
"	20	Special Group
"	24 (lunch)	Planning Group
"	27	Special Group

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July 8, 1975

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"	27	Special Group

Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro", (2) "A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months." (Source: Memorandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record of NSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63...;" JFK Library file.) (T&S).

Why interest in Castro death?

April 29, 1963

Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group members, Bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects, "the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind are: ... (b) Possible death of Castro...."

Why interest in Castro death?

April 30, 1963

TOP SECRET

Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file. (T&S).

Does "disappearance" refer to Castro death?

Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group meeting results in assignment of "examination of the possible developments in Cuba if Castro should disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group discussion on May 14. Other assignments are for possible use of contingencies to achieve "wider political objectives," economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba. (Source: memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK Library file.) (T&S).

May 13, 1963

Kent Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA) draft paper discusses "Developments in Cuba and Possible U. S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death." Under a heading "The U. S. Role" Kent states: "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes, the U. S. would be widely charged with complicity," even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963, (JFK Library file.) (T&S).

Is Kent counseling against assassination?

May 28, 1963

Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency.  
Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28, "We should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event of Castro's death," and notes Sherman Kent will be present for this purpose.

Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive papers" dealing with "a list of possible actions under consideration at CIA" /not specified/ and Cuban oil supplies. Source: Memorandum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK Library File. (Tab v).

June 6, 1963

Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group discussed "various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro. All members of the group agree that this is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret.. It was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group in advance." Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963 (Tab w)

June 19, 1963

JFK Approves External Sabotage Program. A meeting was held with "higher authority" (Bundy present) at which a program for "external sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and manufacturing. "The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest." Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, "Satotage Program Cuba". (Tab x)

Did JFK decide against tal and in favor of harder sat tage approach?

September 20, 1963

Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro Suicide Preferable to Assassination. At Bundy's request, Chase summarizes State INR Paper entitled "Cuba: Possible Courses of Action." Chase's summary states: "...The present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom."

Why is it necessary to exclude assassination if it not being considered? Was Denney asked to consider assassination?

The INR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states: "Assassination of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro...and drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality." Source: (1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK Library File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G. Denney, Jr., of INR to Mr. C. Crummins, Coordinator of Cuba Affairs. (Tab 2B, Tab 2A)

1

June 10, 1964

Helm's Memo to DCI on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo to the DCI, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U. S. would not condone the

#### Issues and Questions

planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach on March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has offered to assassinate Castro for \$150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Ghe Guevera." "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy." Source: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110). (Tab 26)

June 18, 1964

**TOP SECRET**

Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for Special Group (303 Meeting). Peter Jessup, assistant to Mr. Bundy, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Bundy subject "303 Committee Cuban review." The memo stated the meeting "might serve to give us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the U. S. A. in the next 120 days." The memo asked: "How close track is the FBI et.al, keeping track of Frank Fiorini and persons of this ilk." The memorandum continued: "We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform Coup de Main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all impending adventures?" A memorandum attached was described as: "Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban leaders, 10 June 1964."

Note Bundy's view below that U.S. must prevent such plots.

June 18, 1964

Bundy and Special Group (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro--Bundy to Inform Robert Kennedy as Law Enforcement Problem. The 303 Committee met to discuss "problems arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and general unrest and instability on the island." ... "A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he



(McGeorge Bundy)

- 15 -

Issues and Questions

would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement." Source: Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, 18 June 1964. (Tab 2).

June 19, 1964

Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassination Report--Robert Kennedy told failure to prevent can be construed as condoning. On June 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303 Committee meeting of June 18. "In regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the matter." Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by Peter Jessup. (Tab 25)

What was RFK's action in response.

July 30, 1964

Special Group Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot. The 303/Special Group Committee "agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald meet with Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." Source: Memorandum for the record dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30, 1964. (Tab 24)

August 19, 1964

Bundy Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile-Mafia Plot. John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons interviewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to the CIA. Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy, August 19, 1964. (Tab 21)

Did Bundy feel compelled take any action?

(McGeorge Bundy)

-16-

SEPARATE DOCUMENTS

September 23, 1963

Bundy Warns Special Group on Security. Bundy points out to the Special Group that "unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the government who have to know a little or much about a U.S.-directed raid against Cuba." (Source: Memo, Sept 23, 1963, Bundy to Special Group. (Tol 25)

Oct 29, 1963

Bundy informs JFK of need for White House information on CIA communications. Bundy asks the President to order that the White House receive one copy of all important instructions from State and CIA to the field. Bundy states trouble has arisen from "difference of emphasis" in what we have sent to the field. (Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, Bundy to JFK.) (Tol 25)

Oct 29, 1963

Bundy on Lodge's movements. Bundy in a checklist discusses consequence for plausible denial for Amb Lodge's movements. (Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, title Checklist.) (Tol 25)

Oct 30, 1963

Bundy cables Lodge re Impending Coup. Bundy cables Lodge that "we cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or a coup."

Mr. Bundy: You asked me yesterday whether I had met Mr. William Harvey--I think that's his name--

Mr. Belin: Yes

Mr. Bundy: --and I said I recollected the name and that I thought I had seen him in large meetings. I can check my appointment calendar which is the only official document of record that I have from my Washington days and see whether I met him in smaller meetings or alone if that would be helpful to you.

Mr. Belin: It would. I'd like to have you do it, please.

Mr. Bundy: Fine.

Mr. Belin: OK. Well, thank you very much.

(END OF TAPE)

Following my return to New York I checked my appointment calendar and there is no entry of William Harvey's name. We did not make a habit of listing all the participants in large meetings, but the calendar would ordinarily show his name if he had come to see me alone or with only one or two others.

I have no further changes or corrections to make with regard to my testimony before the Commission.

Dated this 25<sup>th</sup> day of April, 1975

McGeorge Bundy  
McGeorge Bundy

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25<sup>th</sup> day of April, 1975

01386

Rose Scott  
Notary Public in and for New York, New York  
My commission expires on \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_

ROSE SCOTTO-  
NOTARY PUBLIC, State of New York  
No. 88-0800  
Qualified in Kings County  
Certificate filed in New York County  
Commission Expires March 30, 1976

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## General

- Extent to which CIA picks up on loose lang.
- To what extent ~~there~~ was the assass fork ~~even~~ contemplated, discussed, etc?
- Would "no-invasion pledge" leave U.S. in a position where assass. ~~is~~ is a viable alternative because overt sabotage/invasion is estopped?
- Extent of expectation by S G(A) that CIA will report in detail on any covert ops against Castro. E.G. any assass planning would ~~fall~~ require reporting?

7 July 75

BUNDY PHONE CONVERSATION:

Bundy said that the fact that the first operational meeting on Executive Action was placed at Jan.25-26 by Harvey's notes ~~indicates~~ confirms his own feeling that he was merely informed ~~of~~ of the project and not a moving force.

Bundy ~~thanked~~ said that we should question the people who were in before JANuary 20 (Ike administration) about authorization of the project.

He said he has only two personal papers that bear on our events:

1. a yellow sheet on NSAM-181, which he said is very general and doesn't help supplement the memo itself.
2. calendar notations on the 10 Aug.62 meeting which indicates who was present.

I explained that the meeting may take up to four hours, he said fine. His secretary indicated that his first appointment is not until 3:00.

August, 16, 1962: Alternate Course B is accepted by SG(A).  
BUNDY questions submarine activity, there is also question about sabotage. (Shows that there are reservations about vigorous plan)  
-Plans are "accepted in principle with the understanding that major actions under these general concepts would be approved by the SG(A)...it was emphasized that such approval should be obtained from the Group far enough in advance so as to obviate extensive preparations and planning for operation which might not actually receive policy approval." (Significance: Shows clear expectation that SG(A) should approve all major operations far in advance.)  
-New guidelines were to be approved by "higher authority".

Memo for Lansdale from Gilpatric (Aug. 17, 1962):

At McNamara's request and with Taylor's approval, a sentence was added to proposed MONGOOSE phase II to the effect that "every effort will be made to avoid attribution to the U.S. and to hold down the damage to our international Prestige". (SIGNIFICANCE: Shows that an operation like assassination, with high danger of damage to U.S. prestige and with reasonable chance of being attributed to the U.S. ~~was contrary to the policy being followed at the Special Group level.~~ The Gilpatric change shows great caution being exercised over operations that represent no more attributability potential than an assassination plot.)

Draft Memorandum FOR THE PRESIDENT, from TAYLOR-August 16, 1962

"While we believe that this new course of action will create added difficulties for the regime and will increase the visibility of its failures, there is no reason to hope that it will cause the overthrow of the regime from within."