**JFK Assassination System Identification Form**

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Dr Hiro Cardenas returned to my life this week. On Thursday Dick Goodwin asked me to come to his office to hear Hiro's account of the Berle-Schlesinger mission to New York before the invasion of Cuba. US News and World Report had reprinted a story claiming that the Poles had been assured of US military support. In a letter to US News, Stewart Alsop had denied this, saying that Schlesinger and Berle had informed Hiro of this and had assured him that he in turn had informed the Council. Hiro now claims to Goodwin and me that Berle in a dinner at his Georgetown house had promised that 15,000 US troops would be available to help the Cubans, and that he had made clear at the Century Club luncheon that nothing was happening at a speed to allow Hiro to go away from that lunch. The newswoman, he now says, convinced him, despite what the President had said at his press conference and despite what had been said to him then, the invasion would still get direct US military support.

This all seems fantasy to me, since I cannot imagine Berle making any such assurance (unless he supposed that, once the invasion started, the military would insist on the contrary). However, one memory suggests that there may have been a genuine misunderstanding. I can recall that Tracy Barnes called me the next day and asked whether Berle had said anything about 15,000 troops -- that Hiro had come away from the lunch with some impression that US troops might enter the picture. As I told Barnes at the time, my only recollection of such a figure was in connection with supplies -- that, once the beaches were established, Berle had said that for 15,000 men would be available. In any case, as I recollect, Barnes himself went to New York that day to clear up any remaining misunderstanding. I doubt that Hiro is engaged in intentional deception; but the experience shows the power of the retroactive imagination.

On Saturday, I went to another meeting with Hiro, in which he was presented with the terms on which the US proposed to continue its relationship with the CRC. The terms are described in the attached memorandum. When they were read to him, Hiro said, "I do not understand why you are pushing me to a new commitment," to engage in underground work and in sabotage unless I know definitely that these actions are leading to a clear definition of the commitment. I cannot go on as chairman of the Council unless there is a commitment that the US will participate in an eventual invasion of Cuba. I have been deluged with pleas from widows and families of those who took part in the April tragedy. My own son is in Castro's prison. The program you are presenting to me is a prologue and nothing more. There is no point in a prologue unless one is sure what the conclusion will be."

Goodwin: "I understand and sympathize with Hiro's position. We share his desire for an overthrow of the Castro regime. We have prepared a program of action that end, but we cannot commit the US government to something so far-reaching as an invasion of Cuba in the indefinite future. Military action in the future may or may not be necessary or possible or necessary, but, if we continue to work together -- and I hope we can -- it must be on the basis of the same goals and the same hopes. We must do all we can in the interests of the cause for which we fight. A commitment for the indefinite future under conditions which no one can be wise enough to foresee cannot be made at this time."

Hiro: "I understand your view -- you must understand mine. If there can be no commitment, I have no alternative but to prepare a letter to President Kennedy saying that I cannot continue as head of the Council. The program is inadequate both because of the lack of specific definitions of what is to take place and also because of lack of control over programs of propaganda and clandestine activity. The participation of groups not controlled by the CRC would be a handicap to the coordination necessary for success. Indications of such participation are already evident."

Goodwin: "I see no danger of problems; there is to coordinate as much as possible through the CRC since the provision for keeping you fully informed of all activities will be in place and directed. Propaganda programs..."
only ideas for discussion with the CNO. If there is anything unsatisfactory in the memorandum, we can discuss it. This memorandum represents an attempt to find faith to meet the points you have previously made to us.

MIRO: "I still feel that the arrangement for propaganda is unsatisfactory — that even if I could influence its broad mass orientation, it would still not be well prepared. Also I would have no control over a portion of the clandestine activities. Once other groups learn they can bypass the Council and get direct assistance from the US government, the result will be a proliferation of groups which will be damaging both to present operations and to the political future of Cuba. These things, on top of a lack of faith in the ultimate end, lead me to feel negative about proceeding on this basis. I have expressed my views. Now I will go to Baltimore to meditate my final decision. My letter will be courteous and respectful, but my present conviction is that my response must be a resignation."

GOODWIN: "There is no question that the fight will go on. The only question is whether we can conduct it with Dr. Miros indispensable cooperation."

MIRO: "If I resign from the JCC, I do not withdraw from the fight."

GOODWIN: "It is necessary to have all be very different without Dr. Miros leadership. Your leadership is necessary for both the clarification of purpose and the facilitation of the struggle. No one else can step into your place."

The meeting broke up on this note, with Miros letter, which was to be read to us, and Monday. Dick and I both feel that he will probably stay."
April: I have tried to broaden the base of the Revolutionary Council but have found great difficulty in doing so. One problem was the increased importance of the well-trained group. The section of this group split off and backed Price's candidacy for vice-president. This faction has stimulated a costly press campaign against the CRC. In the trade union group, a division occurred two days ago with leaders associated with the past [presumably with Fidel] replacing decent leaders. As for the students, it waited until October 10 to agree to join the CRC, and then did so with stipulations.

A reasonable observation could be that it is a suspicious coincidence that these groups which are supposed to enter the CRC have resisted doing so and in some cases have organized campaigns against the CRC. Nevertheless, all the main groups, except MST and CO, have now joined up. These two groups continue to receive direct CIA subsidies.

As for the new CIA liaison officer, I have had two long talks with him and have submitted an operational plan to him. In the talks held twelve days later, this man showed himself evasive and did not explain satisfactorily what had happened to the plans. [According to CIA, the plans headed towards a surrender to invasion and Col. Johnson accepted them only in order to establish support with KGB.] I am kept in complete ignorance about what is to happen inside Cuba. But I know that recruiting is going on among student and labor groups for training and infiltration — we know this from our own contacts and not from CIA. In addition, CIA sent a group to Brazil without checking with the CRC or seeking the Council's advice or instructions. Also, a CIA agent accompanied the Cruz group to the
trip to Cuba, but there was no word to the CCC. Nor have we been informed at all
about the planes which have been dropping propaganda in Cuba.

Herein, the CCC have neither area nor money nor propaganda nor anything with
which to conduct the fight for the liberation of our country. We are really no
more than a front for the CIA, and we will once again be the sacrificial victims
for those efforts. Radio Swan continues as a CIA operation. Sonjens is recruiting
peoples, freely offering arms and money. Naturally people go where they are offered
arms.

In sum, the past of September 2, which I was reluctant to agree to at the time,
has not been fulfilled. Still, I came to Washington on Sunday for a dinner at which
I was assured the CIA representative in Miami would be present. He was not there.
CIA continues to do what it wants without regard for the CCC. I don't think that
CIA has anything personal against me. It is just that they wish to run things as
they have done before. They are destroying the CCC by this attitude. Hence my deci-
sion—now irrevocable—to resign.

I can fight against Castro—against the corruption of the past—against Fidel—against Batista—but, if I have to fight the CIA, it
will only begin again tomorrow. The CIA will simply try to create a situation to
justify its past attitudes.

Goodwin: I understand that you will not announce your resignation until the
CCC meeting (discussing Peru's situation or Cuba) on Thursday.

Hiro: Yes.

Goodwin: Your resignation would be a tragedy. But, after so many disappointing
experiences, I will not offer you any more promises. But give me 24 hours to see
whether definite and positive arrangements cannot be made to improve this situation.
If necessary, I see to go to the Secretary or to the President.

Hiro: I have called a meeting for Thursday at 3 in Miami. I will either have to
give the CCC my resignation—or else have something concrete to offer them. I will
be glad to wait still then.

The 24 hour period was subsequently lengthened to a week, and Alexis Johnson
was assigned the job of bringing the CIA into line. We shall see what we shall see.
I have tried to create some sense of the revolutionary council's efforts to deal with the increased importance of the nationalist group. The assistance of this group split off and backed Pina's organization against the government. This situation has stimulated a costly press campaign against the CDR. In the trade union group, a division occurred two days ago with leaders associated with the past [presumably with Fidel] replacing decent leaders. As for the student group, it waited until October 10 to agree to join the CDR, and then did so with stipulations.

A reasonable observation could be that it is a suspicious coincidence that these groups, which are supposed to enter the CDR, have resented doing so and in some cases have organized campaigns against the CDR. Nevertheless all the main groups, except the PNP and CD, have now joined up. These two groups continue to receive direct CIA subsidy.

As for the new CIA liaison officer, I have had two long talks with him and have submitted operational plans to him. In a third talk held two days later, this man showed himself active and did not explain satisfactorily what had happened to the plans. [According to CIA, the plans were ahead of schedule and reverted to invasion training and Col. Johnson accepted, then only in order to establish rapport with Kiri]. I am kept in complete ignorance about what is to happen inside Cuba. But I know that recruiting is going on by student and labor groups for training and infiltration - we know this from our own contacts and not from CIA. In addition, CIA sent a group to Fidel without checking with the CDR or asking the Council's advice or instructions. Also as a CIA agent, accompanied the Croceo group to its