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ON THURSDAY DICK GOODWIN ASKED ME TO COME TO HIS OFFICE TO HEAR MIRO'S ACCOUNT OF THE BERLE-SCHLESINGER MISSION TO NEW YORK BEFORE THE INVASION OF CUBA. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT HAD REPRINTED A STORY CLAIMING THAT THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAD NEVER BEEN TOLD THERE WOULD BE NO US MILITARY SUPPORT. IN A LETTER TO US NEWS, STEWART ALSO HAD DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT SCHLESINGER AND BERLE HAD INFORMED MIRO OF THIS AND HAD ASSUMED THAT HE IN TURN HAD INFORMED THE COUNCIL, MIRO NOW CLAIMED TO GOODWIN AND ME THAT BERLE IN A DINNER AT HIS GEORGETOWN HOUSE HAD PROMISED THAT 15,000 US TROOPS WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO HELP THE CUBANS, AND THAT HE HAD MADE CLEAR AT THE CENTURY CLUB LUNCHEON THAT NOTHING WE WERE SAYING SUPERSEDED THAT PROMISE. MIRO ACCORDINGLY WENT AWAY FROM THAT LUNCHEON, HE NOW SAYS, CONVINCED THAT, DESPITE WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AND DESPITE WHAT WE HAD SAID TO HIM THEN, THE INVASION WOULD STILL GET DIRECT US MILITARY SUPPORT.

THIS ALL SEEMS FANTASY TO ME, SINCE I CANNOT IMAGINE BERLE MAKING ANY SUCH ASSURANCES (UNLESS HE SUPPOSED THAT, ONCE THE INVASION STARTED, THE MARINES WOULD BE DRAGGED IN, REGARDLESS OF ALL INTENTIONS TO THE CONTRARY). HOWEVER, ONE MEMORY SUGGESTS THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A GENUINE MISUNDERSTANDING. I CAN RECALL THAT TRACY BARNES CALLED ME THE NEXT DAY AND ASKED WHETHER BERLE HAD SAID ANYTHING ABOUT 15,000 TROOPS--THAT MIRO HAD COME AWAY FROM THE LUNCH WITH SOME IMPRESSION THAT US TROOPS MIGHT ENTER THE PICTURE. AS I TOLD BARNES AT THE TIME, MY ONLY RECOLLECTION OF SUCH A FIGURE WAS IN CONNECTION WITH SUPPLIES--THAT, ONCE THE BEACHHEAD WERE ESTABLISHED, BERLE HAD SAID THAT ARMS FOR 15,000 MEN WOULD BE

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EXPLICIT US COMMITMENT TO A NEW INVASION. "I CANNOT ASK MY PEOPLE," HE SAID, "TO ENGAGE IN UNDERGROUND WORK AND IN SABOTAGE UNLESS I KNOW DEFINITELY THAT THESE ACTIONS ARE LEADING TO CLEARLY DEFINED AND AGREED-ON CLIMAX. I CANNOT GO AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL UNLESS THERE IS A CLEAR COMMITMENT THAT THE US WILL PARTICIPATE IN AN EVENTUAL INVASION OF CUBA. I HAVE BEEN DELUGED WITH PLEAS FROM WIDOWS AND FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO TOOK PART IN THE APRIL TRAGEDY. MY OWN SON IS IN CASTRO'S PRISONS. THE PROGRAM YOU ARE PRESENTING TO ME IS A PROLOGUE AND NOTHING MORE. THERE IS NO POINT IN A PROLOGUE UNLESS ONE IS SURE WHAT THE CONCLUSION WILL BE."

GOODWIN: "WE UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHIZE WITH DR MIRO'S POSITION. WE SHARE HIS DESIRE FOR AN OVERTHROW OF THE CASTRO REGIME. WE HAVE PREPARED A PROGRAM OF ACTION TO THAT END. BUT WE CANNOT COMMIT THE US GOVERNMENT TO SOMETHING SO FAR-REACHING AS AN INVASION OF CUBA IN THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. MILITARY ACTION IN THE FUTURE MAY OR MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE OR NECESSARY. BUT, IF WE CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER---AND I HOPE WE CAN---IT MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME GOALS AND THE SAME HOPES. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN IN THE INTERESTS OF THE CAUSE FOR WHICH WE FIGHT. A COMMITMENT FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH NO ONE CAN BE WISE ENOUGH TO FORESEE CANNOT BE MADE AT THIS TIME)"

MIRO: "I UNDERSTAND YOUR VIEW---YOU MUST UNDERSTAND MINE. IF THERE CAN BE NO COMMITMENT. I HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PREPARE A LETTER TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY SAYING THAT I CANNOT CONTINUE AS HEAD OF THE COUNCIL. THE PROGRAM IS INADEQUATE BOTH BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF ULTIMATE DEFINITIONS OF WHAT IS TO TAKE PLACE AND ALSO BECAUSE OF LACK OF CONTROL OVER PROGRAMS OF PROPAGANDA AND

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PROPAGANDA PROGRAMS---ONLY IDEAS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE CRC.

IF THERE IS ANYTHING UNSATISFACTORY IN THE MEMORANDUM,  
WE CAN DISCUSS IT. THIS MEMORANDUM REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT  
IN GOOD FAITH TO MEET THE POINTS YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY  
MADE TO US."

MIRO: " I STILL FEEL THAT THE ARRANGEMENT FOR  
PROPAGANDA IS UNSATISFACTORY---THAT EVEN IF I COULD INFLUENCE  
ITS BROAD ORIENTATION, IT WOULD STILL NOT BE WELL  
PREPARED. ALSO I WOULD HAVE NO CONTROL OVER A PORTION OF  
THE CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. ONCE OTHER GROUPS LEARN THEY  
CAN BYPASS THE COUNCIL AND GET DIRECT ASSISTANCE FROM THE  
US GOVERNMENT, THE RESULT WILL BE A PROLIFERATION  
OF GROUPS WHICH WILL BE DAMAGING BOTH TO PRESENT OPERATIONS  
AND TO THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF CUBA. THESE THINGS, ON  
TOP OF A LACK OF FAITH IN THE ULTIMATE END, LEAD ME TO  
FEEL NEGATIVE ABOUT PROCEEDING ON THIS BASIS. I HAVE  
EXPRESSED MY VIEWS. NOW I WILL GO TO BALTIMORE TO MEDITATE  
MY FINAL DECISION. MY LETTER WILL BE COURTEOUS AND  
RESPECTFUL, BUT MY PRESENT CONVICTION IS THAT MY RESPONSE  
MUST BE A RESIGNATION."

GOODWIN: " THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE FIGHT WILL  
GO ON. THE ONLY QUESTION IS WHETHER WE CAN CONDUCT IT  
WITH DR MIRO'S INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION."

MIRO: " IF I RESIGN FROM THE CRC, I DO NOT WITHDRAW  
FROM THE FIGHT."

GOODWIN: "IT WILL ALL BE VERY DIFFERENT WITHOUT  
DR MIRO AS THE HEAD OF THE GROUP. YOUR LEADERSHIP IS  
NECESSARY FOR BOTH THE CLARIFICATION OF PURPOSE AND THE  
FACILITATION OF THE STRUGGLE. NO ONE ELSE CAN STEP INTO  
YOUR PLACE."

THE MEETING BROKE UP ON THIS NOTE, WITH MIRO TO LET  
US KNOW ON MONDAY. DICK AND I BOTH FEEL THAT HE WILL

IN DOING SO. ONE PROBLEM WAS THE SUDDEN INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF THE MAGISTRATES' GROUP. ONE SECTION OF THIS GROUP SPLIT OFF AND BACKED PRIO'S CANDIDATE FOR EXILE GOVERNMENT. THIS FACTION HAS STIMULATED A COSTLY PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CRC. IN THE TRADE UNION GROUP, A DIVISION OCCURRED TWO DAYS AGO WITH LEADERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PAST (PRESUMABLY WITH MUJAL) REPLACING DECENT LEADERS. AS FOR THE STUDENT GROUP, IT WAITED UNTIL OCTOBER 10 TO AGREE TO JOIN THE CRC, AND THEN DID SO WITH STIPULATIONS.

A REASONABLE OBSERVATION COULD BE THAT IT IS A SUSPICIOUS COINCIDENCE THAT, THESE GROUPS WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO ENTER THE CRC HAVE RESISTED DOING SO AND IN SOME CASES HAVE ORGANIZED CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE CRC. NEVERTHELESS ALL THE MAIN GROUPS, EXCEPT MRP AND UD, HAVE NOW JOINED UP. THESE TWO GROUPS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE DIRECT CIA SUBSIDY.

AS FOR THE NEW CIA LIAISON OFFICER, I HAVE HAD TWO LONG TALKS WITH HIM AND HAVE SUBMITTED OPERATIONAL PLANS TO HIM. IN A THIRD TALK, HELD TWELVE DAYS LATER, THIS MAN SHOWED HIMSELF EVASIVE AND DID NOT EXPLAIN SATISFACTORILY WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE PLANS. (ACCORDING TO CIA, THE PLANS REVERTED TO INVASION THINKING AND COLONEL JOHNSON ACCEPTED THEM ONLY IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT WITH MIRO.) I AM KEPT IN COMPLETE IGNORANCE ABOUT WHAT IS TO HAPPEN INSIDE CUBA. BUT I KNOW THAT RECRUITING IS GOING ON AMONG STUDENT AND LABOR GROUPS FOR TRAINING AND INFILTRATION--WE KNOW THIS FROM OUR OWN CONTACTS AND NOT FROM CIA. IN ADDITION, CIA SENT A GROUP TO BRAZIL WITHOUT CHECKING WITH THE CRC OR SEEKING THE COUNCIL'S ADVICE OR INSTRUCTIONS. ALSO A CIA AGENT ACCOMPANIED

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NOR ANYTHING WITH WHICH TO CONDUCT THE FIGHT FOR THE  
LIBERATION OF OUR COUNTRY. WE ARE REALLY NO MORE THAN A  
FRONT FOR THE CIA, AND WE WILL ONCE AGAIN BE THE SACRIFICIAL  
VICTIM FOR THEIR ERRORS. RADIO SWAN CONTINUES AS A CIA  
OPERATION. SANJENIS IS RECRUITING PEOPLE, FREELY OFFERING ARMS  
AND MONEY. NATURALLY PEOPLE GO WHERE THEY ARE OFFERED ARMS.

IN SUM, THE PAST OF SEPTEMBER 8, WHICH I WAS RELUCTANT  
TO AGREE TO AT THE TIME, HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED.  
STILL, I CAME TO WASHINGTON ON SUNDAY FOR A DINNER AT WHICH  
I WAS ASSURED THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE IN MIAMI WOULD BE PRESENT.  
HE WAS NOT THERE. CIA CONTINUES TO DO WHAT IT WANTS WITHOUT  
REGARD FOR THE CRC. I DON'T THINK THAT CIA HAS ANYTHING  
PERSONAL AGAINST ME. IT IS JUST THAT THEY WISH TO RUN THINGS  
AS THEY HAVE DONE BEFORE. THEY ARE DESTROYING THE CRC BY THIS  
ATTITUDE. HENCE MY DECISION-- NOW IRREVOCABLE -- TO RESIGN.

I CAN FIGHT AGAINST CASTRO -- AGAINST THE CORRUPTIONS OF  
THE PAST -- AGAINST PRIO -- AGAINST BATISTA - BUT, IF I  
HAVE TO FIGHT THE CIA ON TOP OF ALL THIS, I DECLARE MYSELF  
VANQUISHED. EVEN IF THE PRESENT SITUATION IS STRAIGHTENED OUT,  
IT WILL ALL BEGIN AGAIN TOMORROW. THE CIA WILL SIMPLY TRY TO  
CREATE A SITUATION TO JUSTIFY ITS PAST ATTITUDES.

GOODWIN: I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL NOT ANNOUNCE YOUR  
RESIGNATION UNTIL THE OAS MEETING (DISCUSSING PERUS' RESOLUTION  
ON CUBA) ON THURSDAY.

MIRO: YES.

GOODWIN: YOUR RESIGNATION WOULD BE A TRAGEDY. BUT, AFTER  
SO MANY DISAPPOINTING EXPERIENCE, I WILL NOT OFFER YOU  
ANY MORE PROMISES. BUT GIVE ME 24 HOURS TO SEE  
WHETHER DEFINITE AND POSITIVE ARRANGEMENTS CANNOT BE MADE  
TO IMPROVE THIS SITUATION. IF NECESSARY, I MEAN TO GO TO THE  
SECRETARY OR TO THE PRESIDENT.

~~SECRET~~  
RELATIONS WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

1. THE UNITED STATES REGARDS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AS THE CENTRAL POINT OF CONTACT IN ITS DEALING WITH THE CUBAN EXILE AND UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY. DR. MIRO CARDONA -- AS CHAIRMAN OF THAT COUNCIL -- HAS THE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE FOLLOWING IS A COMPLETE OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE OF OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE COUNCIL:

A. BUDGETARY - A BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET WILL BE ALLOCATED. THIS WILL BE SOMEWHERE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF ONE MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR. THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF THIS MONEY ALLOWED TO THE COUNCIL. DETAILED ADVANCE JUSTIFICATION WILL NOT BE REQUIRED, BUT COMPLETE ACCOUNTING FOR MONIES SPENT WILL BE ESSENTIAL.

ALL OTHER ALLOCATIONS OF MONEY WILL BE ON THE BASIS OF SPECIFIC PROJECTS SUBMITTED BY THE COUNCIL AND APPROVED BY THE UNITED STATES. IN THIS CATEGORY WILL FALL MOST OF THE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES AND ALL CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES WITHIN CUBA.

B. COMPOSITION OF COUNCIL - THE COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE TO BROADEN ITS BASE, ALLOWING ENTRY TO ALL SUBSTANTIAL EXILE GROUPS WHICH ARE NOT IDENTIFIED WITH BATISTS OR WITH COMMUNISM.

C. UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES -

1. ALL GROUPS WILLING TO WORK WITH THE COUNCIL IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES WILL BE DEALT WITH THROUGH DR. MIRO. THIS MEANS THAT THE OPERATING U.S. AGENCY WILL

NOTE: THIS MEMORANDUM WAS READ TO DR. MIRO CARDONA AS THE BASIS OF US-CRC RELATIONS

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3. IN ALL CONTACTS WITH UNDERGROUND GROUPS IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE NATURE OF THESE CONTACTS AND THE MATTERS DISCUSSED WILL BE HELD IN THE STRICTEST SECRECY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, DR. MIRO AND THE GROUP CONCERNED. IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT INFORMATION OF THIS SORT BE DISSEMINATED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. WHERE DR. MIRO IS INFORMED OF CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IT IS FOR HIS INFORMATION ONLY, OR THAT OF A SPECIALLY APPOINTED ASSISTANT FOR THESE MATTERS. IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD THAT IF HIS ARRANGEMENT PROVES INSECURE, I.E., IF INFORMATION IS NOT KEPT COMPLETELY SECRECY, IT WILL BE TERMINATED.

4. A CIA AGENT WILL DIIP IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH DR. MIRO.

D. COUNCIL RELATIONSHIPS

1. ALL PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL WILL BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE BUREAU OF ARA OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. HOWEVER, DR. MIRO WILL STILL RETAIN HIS CONTACT WITH THE WHITE HOUSE IN SUCH CASES WHERE HE CONSIDERS SUCH CONTACT TO BE URGENTLY NECESSARY.

**SECRET**

SEPTEMBER 9, 1961