OPERATION MONGOOSE  
PHASE I (CIA)  

ACTIVITY  

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS  

1. * Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.  

   Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.  

2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.  

   To collect intelligence.  

3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, ready to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.  

   To collect intelligence.  


PURPOSE  

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U. S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.  

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence, collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.  

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.  

CONSIDERATIONS  

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
ACTIVITY


5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

PURPOSE

4. To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

5. To update NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the center. (GIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for a current Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (GIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS


INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

6. To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

7. To collect intelligence.

16 - 31 March 1962

1.6.31 March 1962

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
16-31 March 1962 (cont.)

ACTIVITY

8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S. To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.


PURPOSE

To collect intelligence.

To ready agent operations.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. [SBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.]

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated in [ ]. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas, and Aruba. San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile, are being surveyed for possible centers. [CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.]

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Number of agents undetermined as yet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. 5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER OPERATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>None,</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Possible use for communications and support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER OPERATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>None,</td>
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<td>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. 3 legal resident agents in Cuba.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
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<td>* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Considerations</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana.</td>
<td>To collect intelligence.</td>
<td>&quot;Legal travel&quot; means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other Operations**

None.

**Intelligence Operations**

16 - 31 May 1962

20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.                      | To collect intelligence.    | Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. |
22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.                    | To collect intelligence.    | CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable. |
23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.                         | To collect intelligence.    |                                                                                |
24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents. | To ready agent operations. |                                                                                |

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
ACTIVITY

OTHER OPERATIONS

25. By 31 May, develop a plan for counterfeiting currency, which would not be implemented until a decision was made to debase the economy in Cuba.

PURPOSE

To debase the economy of Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

A counterfeiting program is being developed. Needs are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy decision to be made and to staff out a feasible distribution plan. It is expected that no decision to implement such a plan would be made immediately.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.

To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.

To ready agent operations.

29. * Collection of psychological material.

To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.

30. * Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.

To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

31. * By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.

To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
<table>
<thead>
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<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OTHER OPERATIONS</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>End of July 1962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32. Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.

To provide the Special Group (NSC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. military intervention.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (State)

ACTIVITY
Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

March - July 1962

PURPOSE
Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS
These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (Defense).

ACTIVITY

1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.

3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.

PURPOSE

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

Use of cozy near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (USIA)

ACTIVITY
- Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
March - July 1962

PURPOSE:
Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS:
These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.