

JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

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## Document Information

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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

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OBJECTIVE B: HARASS THE ECONOMY

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SPECIAL HANDLING

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

26. Encourage the Cuban people, as appropriate, to engage in minor acts of sabotage. (CIA).

To cause breakdowns of communications, power, and transport facilities; to reduce availability of raw materials; to encourage the spirit of resistance, even in a limited way.

"Minor acts of sabotage" include such actions as excessive use of electricity or short-circuiting of telephone equipment, immobilizing vehicles (stealing parts, puncturing tires, contaminating gas tanks), material spoilage, and crop burning.

All forms of media, non-US government attributable, will be used to get the message to the Cuban people; however, unless a method of mass distribution of leaflets is used, it is probable that this activity will be minor and spotty.

27. Conduct selected major sabotage operations against key Cuban industries and public utilities, with priority attention being given to transportation, communication, power plants, and utilities. (CIA)

To reduce available economic supplies and services.

Depending upon circumstances, the sabotage will be conducted either by especially trained, carefully selected commando/sabotage teams infiltrated especially for the operation and exfiltrated at the completion of the operation, or by internal assets if such can be developed with the necessary access to the target. The following are currently selected targets:

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ACTIVITY

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PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

27. (continued)

Matahambre Mine-Santa Lucia

Texaco Refinery-Santiago

Shell/Esso Refinery-Habana

Regla Steam Electric Plant-Habana

Matanzas Steam Electric Plant-Matanzas

Nicaró Nickel Plant

Moa Bay Nickel Plant

Paper Mill - Cardenas

Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.

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ACTIVITY

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PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

28. Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba as targets of opportunity, provided this does not unduly affect food and medical supplies, or the Cuban people, as such. (CIA).

To ~~disrupt~~ disrupt Cuban commerce and place strain upon regime security forces.

Things, not people, are the targets. This activity requires a capability to act quickly on spot intelligence. Targets are seen mostly as shipments of products into or from Cuba. Sabotage would be to cause undue delay of shipment, using additives to spoil a commodity, fire or water damage, etc. A recent example was reported, post-action, on a shipment to the USSR.

29. Inspire labor groups outside Cuba to obstruct free world trade with Cuba. (CIA and State).

To force the use of more Bloc resources, including shipping.

This is an activity mostly in third countries.

30. Discourage free world trade with Cuba. (State, supported by CIA).

To force the use of more Bloc resources, to deny Cuba hard currency earnings, and to hasten deterioration of Cuba's essentially free world equipped industrial plant.

Most free world trading nations are opposed to imposing necessary trade controls. Importers might be dissuaded from using Cuba as a source of supply, such as the example of Japan recently. Preclusive buying and other forms of economic warfare deserve hard consideration.

31. Encourage the OAS Special Committee to recommend further trade measures against Cuba by Latin American countries. (State).

To provide a basis for renewed pressures upon NATO to recommend trade controls to NATO members.

OAS Special Committee action should be geared to SCCS reports or other developments in the Hemisphere which might provide a good basis for Special Committee action.

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ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

32. Reduce production of export agricultural commodities in Cuba, by covert means. (CIA).

To cripple Cuban commerce vital to the regime's domestic economic program.

The main export commodities are sugar, tobacco, tropicals, and coffee. Activities would include encouraging destruction of crops by fire, chemicals, and weeds, hampering of harvests by work slow-downs, destruction of bags, cartons, and other shipping containers, sabotage of sugar mill machinery, etc.

33. Introduce damaging additives into petroleum shipments to Cuba. (CIA).

To sabotage Cuba's transportation and defense capability.

The operational difficulties in this activity are recognized. However, a priority alert for this is warranted.

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