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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

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### OBJECTIVE B: HARASS THE ECONOMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26. Encourage the Cuban people, as appropriate, to engage in minor acts of sabotage. (CIA)</td>
<td>To cause breakdowns of communications, power, and transport facilities; to reduce availability of raw materials; to encourage the spirit of resistance, even in a limited way.</td>
<td>&quot;Minor acts of sabotage&quot; include such actions as excessive use of electricity or short-circuiting of telephone equipment, immobilizing vehicles (stealing parts, puncturing tires, contaminating gas tanks), material spoilage, and crop burning. All forms of media, non-US government attributable, will be used to get the message to the Cuban people; however, unless a method of mass distribution of leaflets is used, it is probable that this activity will be minor and spotty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Conduct selected major sabotage operations against key Cuban industries and public utilities, with priority attention being given to transportation, communication, power plants, and utilities. (CIA)</td>
<td>To reduce available economic supplies and services.</td>
<td>Depending upon circumstances, the sabotage will be conducted either by especially trained, carefully selected commando/sabotage teams infiltrated especially for the operation and exfiltrated at the completion of the operation, or by internal assets if such can be developed with the necessary access to the target. The following are currently selected targets:</td>
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ACTIVITY

27. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matahambre Mine - Santa Lucia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texaco Refinery - Santiago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell / Esso Refinery - Habana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regla Steam Electric Plant - Habana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matanzas Steam Electric Plant - Matanzas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicalo Nickel Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moa Bay Nickel Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Mill - Cardenas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Microwave Towers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.
28. Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba as targets of opportunity, provided this does not unduly affect food and medical supplies, or the Cuban people, as such. (CIA).

29. Inspire labor groups outside Cuba to obstruct free world trade with Cuba. (CIA and State).

30. Discourage free world trade with Cuba. (State, supported by CIA).

31. Encourage the OAS Special Committee to recommend further trade measures against Cuba by Latin American countries. (State).

TO THE READER: This is not a document to be shared except with those directly responsible for the power of this nation. It is for the purpose of allowing each person to understand his own role in the overall strategy. As such, it should not be seen by others.

TOP SECRET-NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE

To disrupt Cuban commerce and place strain upon regime's security forces.

CONSIDERATIONS

Things, not people, are the targets. This activity requires a capability to act quickly on spot intelligence. Targets are seen mostly as shipments of products into or from Cuba. Sabotage would be to cause undue delay of shipment, using additives to spoil a commodity, fire or water damage, etc. A recent example was reported, post-action, on a shipment to the USSR.

This is an activity mostly in third countries.

Most free world trading nations are opposed to imposing necessary trade controls. Importers might be dissuaded from using Cuba as a source of supply, such as the example of Japan recently. Preclusive buying and other forms of economic warfare deserve hard consideration.

OAS Special Committee action should be geared to SCCS reports or other developments in the Hemisphere which might provide a good basis for Special Committee action.
ACTIVITY

32. Reduce production of export agricultural commodities in Cuba, by covert means. (CIA).

33. Introduce damaging additives into petroleum shipments to Cuba. (CIA).

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

PURPOSE:

To cripple Cuban commerce vital to the regime's domestic economic program.

To sabotage Cuba's transportation and defense capability.

CONSIDERATIONS:

The main export commodities are sugar, tobacco, tropics, and coffee. Activities would include encouraging destruction of crops by fire, chemicals, and weeds, hampering of harvests by work slow-downs, destruction of bags, cartons, and other shipping containers, sabotage of sugar mill machinery, etc.

The operational difficulties in this activity are recognized. However, a priority alert for this is warranted.