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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 6 June 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Dallas

Mr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated in the Special Group meeting for the first time.

1. Congo

Messrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the Congo. Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached). Mr. Dungan indicated that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out that the condition which prescribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his representative to the Leopoldville Government involved the danger Mr. Bundy felt that he could not approve this program without reference to higher authority.

Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.

2. Review of Political Action Projects

Mr. Bundy stated that because of the special sensitivity of programs involving higher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed Thursday or Friday, June 15th or 16th, for this purpose.

Mr. Bowles suggested that we might ask to have a general policy enunciated regarding this subject. Other members of the Group
suggested that a general policy statement might not be sufficiently flexible to take care of special situations which might arise.

Mr. Dulles noted that the pertinent NSC paper authorized programs such as that under discussion, but emphasized that he would only undertake this type of activity if it was fully supported by the Department of State and higher authority. He stated that he fully appreciated the sensitivity of this type of activity. Mr. Dulles said, however, that he felt the Special Group should have some latitude to make decisions on these matters within the general policy which might be laid down by higher authority without referral of each specific case for approval.

Mr. Bundy stated that he would like Mr. Dungan to work with our people in the preparation of the briefing to be given higher authority next week.

3. Release Procedures - Francis Gary Powers

Because of the contingency nature of this proposal and because of the crowded agenda, discussion of this matter was deferred to the next meeting.

4. STFOLLY Flight, Vietnam

This flight was approved with Chinh personnel. There was some discussion as to the desirability of having South Vietnamese conduct these missions but it was pointed out that they did not have the competence.

5. Covert Annex, Vietnam

This annex was approved. It was noted that a progress report had just been received and it was suggested that this report be distributed to members of the Group.

6. Covert Annex, Korea

Mr. Bundy reiterated the decision that covert annexes should not be processed through the NSC machinery. Because of the interest of higher authority in political action operations in friendly areas (see Item 2) and since this annex was written in rather broad terms, he would like to check it further.
7. TACKLE

Mr. Dulles stated that while he wanted to open discussion of this matter at this meeting, he did not expect a final decision to be made until the next meeting. Mr. Bundy noted the previous reservations of the State Department and the fact that this matter had been considered but not approved three times previously. Mr. G.K. Matric supported the need for current information which TACKLE would produce and suggested the possible use of U.S. personnel for the TACKLE mission. Mr. Dulles stated his opinion that the use of American personnel would raise serious problems in the event of an accident. The use of well qualified Cuban crews, in his opinion, would mitigate the risks involved. It was agreed that the proposal would be resubmitted later.

8. Nicaragua

Mr. Dulles outlined the nature and value of the equipment and of the need for negotiating with Somoza to effect its recovery. He indicated that some gold pre quo would probably be involved in achieving an agreement with Somoza. Mr. Bundy stated that this was a matter that should be negotiated between the Agency and the Department of State and need not be again referred to the Special Group.

9. Cuba

Mr. Dulles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at this meeting the problem of the Agency's relations with the exile groups, and the publications which the Agency has been supporting. He emphasized that these involved a considerable amount of money and that the matter should be resolved at an early date. It was agreed that the Agency should discuss this matter with Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales-Castan and submit a formal proposal to an early meeting of the Special Group.

10. Minutes of Special Group Meetings

Mr. Bundy requested that copies of the minutes of Special Group meetings be forwarded to members of the Group for approval and
retention. Mr. Gilpatric noted the very close relationship between his office and the Agency and felt that he could obtain all the information he needed without receiving a copy of the minutes. Mr. Dallas suggested that because of the sensitivity of these records and because some of the references contained therein involved the use of pseudonyms, the need of the Group might be satisfied by having copies of the minutes of each meeting made available at the subsequent meeting for approval. Messrs. Bundy and Dungan agreed to the submission of the minutes for approval at a subsequent meeting but stated that they might have a need for a complete record immediately at hand to answer any questions put to them by higher authority.

THOMAS P. SCHREYER