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**TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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**SECRET**  
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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS  
**NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

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COUNTRY: REPUBLIC OF CONGO	REPORT NO. TDCS -3/497,052
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF GENERAL MOBUTU CONCERNING THE THE PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OF CNA TROOPS TO THE UNOC MILITARY COMMAND IN KATANGA	DATE DISTR. 24 DECEMBER 1961 PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO. 22 DECEMBER 1961	REFERENCES IN 42850
PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (23 DECEMBER 1961)	FIELD REPORT NO. ACL-637
APPRAISAL 2. (DOCUMENTARY)	
THIS IS <b>UNEVALUATED</b> INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.	
SOURCE SENIOR GOC OFFICIAL (c).	

1. MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU, IN A LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER CYRILLE ADOULA DATED 22 DEC 1961, EXPRESSED THE FOLLOWING VIEWS REGARDING THE PROPOSED ATTACHMENT OF CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (CNA) TROOPS TO THE UNOC MILITARY COMMAND:

A. THE UN PROPOSITIONS FOR CNA PARTICIPATION IN KATANGA OPERATIONS DO NOT EXACTLY CORRESPOND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CONGO (GOC) PROPOSALS, THE PRINCIPAL PROPOSAL BEING THE PLACEMENT OF CNA TROOPS AT THE KAMINA BASE. (SOURCE COMMENT: MOBUTU CONSIDERS KAMINA THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC POINT IN KATANGA.) WITHOUT POSSESSION OF THIS STRATEGIC POINT, NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OF KATANGA (GOK) REPRESENTATIVES ARE USELESS. CNA OCCUPATION OF KAMINA WOULD

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PERMIT THE GOC TO:

NEUTRALIZE GOK TROOPS IN KANIAMA AND KABONDO;

ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHIEF KASONGO-NIEMBO;

AVOID THE DESTRUCTION THAT WOULD ENSUE TO PROPERTY BETWEEN LULUABOURG AND ELISABETHVILLE IF CNA TROOPS LAUNCHED A GROUND ATTACK IN KATANGA FROM LULUABOURG; AND

GIVE THE CNA A BASE FROM WHICH TO MOVE AGAINST SOUTH KATANGA VIA BUKWAMA AND KOLWEZI.

B. TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION, THE CNA CAN PROVIDE A BRIGADE COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING TROOPS: 3RD COMMANDO BATTALION, 8TH INFANTRY BATTALION, 13TH INFANTRY BATTALION, 2ND RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, HALF A COMPANY OF COMBAT ENGINEERS, AND THE 17TH INFANTRY BATTALION FOR GUARD DUTY, THE 2ND RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON AND THE 3RD COMMANDO BATTALION ARE STANDING BY IN LULUABOURG AND ARE READY TO DEPART IMMEDIATELY. THE REMAINING TROOPS CAN BE CONCENTRATED AT LULUABOURG ON 48 HOURS NOTICE.

C. THE MOVEMENT OF THESE TROOPS DEPENDS EXCLUSIVELY ON UNOC. MEANS OF COORDINATING THE GENERAL KATANGA OPERATION CAN BE DISCUSSED AFTER THE CNA TROOPS ARE AT KAMINA BASE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO WAIT FOR THE END OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS BEFORE TRANSPORTING THE TROOPS, WHICH MOVEMENT WOULD ITSELF STRONGLY INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNOC.

D. INsofar AS COMMAND OF THE OPERATION IS CONCERNED, THE

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GOC MUST BE PRUDENT IN ITS DEMANDS FOR THE MOMENT. THE UNOC PROPOSALS IMPLY A TOTAL ABANDONMENT OF GOC AUTHORITY OVER THE TROOPS PUT AT THE DISPOSAL OF UNOC AS THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN COULD DIFFER FROM THOSE OF THE GOC AND AS THE UN, UNDER THE PRESSURE OF CERTAIN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER STATES, COULD CEASE TO PROSECUTE THE KATANGAN OPERATION. THIS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE GOC TO OBTAIN FORMAL GUARANTEES FROM UNOC BEFORE AGREEING TO ITS PROPOSALS.

E. GENERAL MOBUTU DOES NOT BELIEVE INTEGRATION OF CNA TROOPS WITH UNOC TROOPS IS WISE. COORDINATION ONLY TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOC/UNOC OBJECTIVES WILL LEAVE THE GOC, IN THE EVENT DIFFERENCES ARISE WITH UNOC WITHOUT LIBERTY OF ACTION; UNOC CONTINGENTS PRESENTLY IN KATANGA HAD TO BE INTEGRATED IN ORDER TO ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, BUT THE CNA IS ON ITS OWN TERRITORY AND HAS EXISTING BASES AND LINES OF SUPPLY FOR MUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENT. INTEGRATION WOULD TAKE AWAY FROM THE CNA ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND WEAKEN THE GOC'S DIPLOMATIC POSTURE VIS A VIS THE UN AND FOREIGN POWERS.

F. THE ONLY IMPORTANT AND IMMEDIATE GOC REQUIREMENT IS AIR TRANSPORT FOR TAKING THE CNA TROOPS TO KAMINA. ALL OTHER ASSISTANCE CAN BE DECIDED THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH UNOC AFTER THE TROOPS HAVE ARRIVED. IN HELPING TRANSPORT CNA TROOPS TO KAMINA, UNOC WILL BE FURTHERING ITS OWN OBJECTIVE: THE DEFINITE ENDING OF KATANGA'S SECESSION.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT.

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