

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10337
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: William H. Brubeck
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : NLJFK
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record
DATE : 12/11/1962
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 382: Congo 12/62. Box 3.

7

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

11 December 1962

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM

**SUBJECT: Certain Consequences of the Withdrawal of UN Forces
from the Congo**

THE PROBLEM

To assess (a) the likely courses of Soviet action in the event of UN withdrawal from the Congo; and (b) the effect on other African situations as a result of a withdrawal.

1. The Soviet Union still regards the Congo as a potentially opportunity to enhance its position in Africa. At the same time, the USSR has come to appreciate the difficulties and uncertainties of effective political action in the Congo. Consequently, though the Soviets would applaud the US's exit as a setback for the West, the USSR itself would be wary of making new commitments in the Congo, fearing another trap reminiscent of that into which it fell in 1960.

SECRET

708

SECRET

2. In addition, the reluctance of most African states to see the re-introduction of the Cold War into the continent, and Soviet concern that its policies are not in accord with the mainstream of African opinion, would serve as important limitations on the scope and timing of Soviet action. Therefore, the USSR would probably seek first to enlist support for its policies from radical Africans who would hope to profit most in the Congo -- e.g., Hluthani and Ben Bella -- by providing them arms or logistic support such as troop airlifts.

3. Soviet response to UN withdrawal would also hinge on the political orientation of the Congolese government. UN withdrawal would probably precipitate Adoula's downfall. He would probably be succeeded by extremists sympathetic to African radicalism and ready to accept Soviet help. In the event of Adoula's demise, a more radical regime could expect to receive significant assistance from both African and Soviet sources. However, Soviet experience has demonstrated that radical leaders and groups cannot be counted on to respond consistently to Soviet advice, much less achieve political domination over the Congo.

4. Despite these hazards, it is almost certain that the USSR would offer military and economic assistance to any Congolese government in the wake of UN departure. However, given the confusion and uncertainties in the situation and logistic and other problems,

- 2 -
SECRET

SECRET

including the possibility of remaining US and Belgian influence, the Soviet effort is likely to be tentative and selective, without major commitments of men or materials. Soviet military assistance would probably take the form of arms and the provision of advisors and some technicians, they might even go so far as to provide a few pilots. The USSR's aim would probably be to build a more substantial presence through economic assistance and propaganda, and to maneuver for advantage without becoming committed to the success of the government or any faction, meanwhile hoping that some windfall would enable it to gain a position of decisive influence in the Congo.

(b) 5. African reaction to a withdrawal of the UN force in the Congo would be mixed. Some Africans see the UN presence as a moral obligation of the US and of the West in general, the fulfillment of which is essential to stability in the Congo and in surrounding areas. These Africans, most of whom represent conservative political attitudes, would resent the withdrawal and condemn the West for its unresponsiveness to Africa's needs and its own obligations. Other Africans -- the radicals and extremists, for the most part -- see the UN presence as an imposition and would welcome the opportunity to help their own brand of politics assume a dominant position in the Congo and exploit situations all around its periphery.

SECRET

6. The UN withdrawal, coupled with diminished Western prestige and a more effective USSR presence might result in stepped-up efforts by radicals and nationalists to liberate remaining colonial areas by violent means. The effect would probably be felt initially in Angola where the USSR has been seeking a means to assist the rebels. Increased violence in Angola and threats to the Rhodesias and Namibia would be countered by vigorous action by die-hard white settlers, increasing the danger of white-black confrontations much of Southern Africa.

7. If events following UN withdrawal produced both a reduction in the influence of the West and an increase in the role of the African extremists of which the Soviets were able to take advantage to increase their own role, the Congo would be likely to become a base from which revolution and instability flowed into surrounding territories. With greater Soviet freedom of action and more support from the government, the Congo would become a much more effective and dangerous staging base for Angolan rebels and might be used in the same way by disaffected and revolutionary elements from the Rhodesias, South Africa and other neighboring territories. Soviet use of the opportunities presented would reflect their decision as to how much advantage they could gain from sheer instability and terrorism and how much of it would be required to bring US intervention.

SECRET

3. We believe that the Soviets would be likely to move fairly slowly and that the reaction to the withdrawal of US troops would be drawn out. On balance, however, the US presence has represented a commitment of the West to order and stability in Central Africa and its withdrawal would be likely to encourage a general slide in the other direction.

- 5 -

SECRET