
Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10107-10127

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 003012

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/02/1977
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
CIA
SMITH, JOSEPH BURKHOLDER
JMWAVE
HUNT, E. HOWARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/17/1996

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CIA tabbed Box CIA 71-1. Box 71.

2 November 1977

003012

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

To: Gary Cornwell
From: Dan Hardway
Re: Supplement to form V of interview with Joseph B. Smith.

GAETON FONZI and I interviewed Mr. JOSEPH BURKHOLDER SMITH at his home in Jacksonville, Florida, on 19 October, 1977. SMITH is an ex-CIA agent who has published a book, Portrait of a Cold Warrior.

Mr. SMITH first explained how his book got by the CIA censors. He was living in Mexico when he contacted his editor, NED CHASE, who is also E. HOWARD HUNT's editor. CHASE checked SMITH out with HUNT and SMITH was contacted in this regard by HUNT. When SMITH returned to Mexico he was contacted by a [redacted] officer who asked if he was writing a book. He said that he was and that he would be glad to give the book to Langly, if they wanted it, before ~~it~~ publication. He did not hear from them about it again until after the book was printed and bound. The CIA contacted him and told him to retain a lawyer which he did. The CIA reluctantly allowed publication.

We next asked SMITH about what motivated CIA personnel. He said that it differed with people but that it was usually : 1) professional anti-communism; 2) super patriotism; 3) ideological/personal (exiles); 4) pay and excitement; or 5) a combination of any and/or all of the above.

SMITH said that the CIA was a coherent entity. (This was in response to a question about the tightness or looseness of the organization.) SMITH started talking about the agency response to crisis in general, and to investigations in particular. He said that the Agency response is predictable. They will set up a task force to "handle and contain" the crisis and/or investigation. The CIA will feel that they are successful if they appear frank and reveal nothing. SMITH used the Rockefeller Commission as an example of this. He does not have any direct knowledge of this response except in cases regarding PHILLIP AGEE's "defection" and the student infiltration revelations and investigation. Both of these were considered successful as were the Chuch Committee and the Rockefeller Commission.

SMITH said that CIA personnel are seldom bothered by the distasteful tasks they undertake (such as cover-ups) because of the "clandestine mentality" which is drummed into the officers until it becomes "instinctual". SMITH said: "When you are doing something essential for the country then everything is okay." It was clear that he meant the national interest as determined by the individual officer.

SMITH said he had never really believed that OSWALD had acted alone. He said that from his vantage point in Argentina that the story "just didn't ring true". At the time he suspected

the Texas right wing but he now wonders about the Cubans. He has no information about the CIA reaction to the assassination because he was in Argentina at the time. He doubted that the CIA was involved because KENNEDY was "backing and depending on the CIA." When asked if KENNEDY had support throughout the Agency, he said that the people involved in the Bay of Pigs were very angry with KENNEDY and "People like HUNT are strange people." He also thought that it was possible that KENNEDY's handling of the missile crisis was considered treasonous. Still speaking about the Agency's response to the assassination SMITH said that the Mexico City Station was very proud of finding the picture of OSWALD. He started to talk about a woman who worked for WIN SCOTT but he started to mumble and very quickly changed the subject to MARITA LORENZ. He said that he didn't believe her story but "didn't we subsidize them for so long, maybe she had to come up with the story to get money."

SMITH said that the JMWAVE operation was considered very important, so important, in fact, that DES FITZGERALD, brought in the CIA's best black operators, SHACKLEY and BILL HARVEY, from Europe to run it. He said that there was a certain amount of fanaticism among the officers at JMWAVE and the CASTRO was generally perceived as a "monster". The JMWAVE leaders wanted to do a crack job. They ran a lot of projects: "There was an awful lot of wheel spinnin' goin' on". In 1962 they were running nightly raids on Cuba. The problem was that, in spite of the wheel spinning and good intentions, they were ineffective.

In response to further questioning about the structure of the CIA Cuban operation, SMITH told us that DES FITZGERALD was brought in from the Far East Division to head up Task Force W in early 1962. (It was called WH 4 before the Bay of Pigs.) DES brought in ED LANSDALE and made WILLIAM HARVEY the head of JMWAVE station. HARVEY was later replaced by SHACKLEY.

Next we asked if the structure would have permitted running operations without the knowledge of high level officials. SMITH said that FITZGERALD and LANSDALE were "outside of channels whenever they wanted to be." SMITH said that it was possible that some JMWAVE operations originated with J. C. KING's Western Hemisphere Division. He said that KING would have ran it as a "hip-pocket" operation through an old friend/contact.

FONZI then directed the conversation to E. HOWARD HUNT. He said HUNT was "a real strange guy--conservative, bitter, and anti-KENNEDY". He said that the source of his story connecting HUNT and STURGIS before the Bay of Pigs was HUNT's book, Give Us This Day. FONZI then told him that HUNT had very carefully avoided that in his book. SMITH was very aware of the Rockefeller Commission. He seemed surprised by what FONZI said and said that he "was careful not to say anything that

hadn't already been published" about this. He said he was sure it was published and said it was in a magazine article by TAYLOR BRANCH which he had handy. FONZI said it wasn't in there either and a check of the article bore him out. In response to a question, SMITH said that DAVE PHILLIPS may have told him the story but he doubted it. At this point SMITH started to mumble and appeared nervous. He then said " I know I got that from something I read" and that as soon as he found it he would contact FONZI.

We then asked him generally about JAMES ANGELTON and how he operated. He said that ANGELTON and most of the Counter-Intelligence Staff (CIS) were rabid anti-communists: "they couldn't see the woods for the trees". This colored every thing they did. As to what they did: "God knows what he was doing but he had the complete confidence of ALLEN DULLES". He said that ANGELTON also often worked outside of channels. ANGELTON started out in the OSS's Italian operation and was soon hooked up with Israeli intelligence. ANGELTON was the head of the CIA CIS from its inception in 1948. As an example of ANGELTON's power, SMITH said that the Middle East Division did not have an Israeli desk until ANGELTON retired because he personally handled all Israeli matters.

FONZI mentioned HARVEY's duplicity in briefing his superiors on MONGOOSE operations but not on ZRRIFLE. SMITH said that this is an example of the rule not the exception.

FONZI then mentioned HELMS. SMITH volunteered that everyone from the CIA who has testified is guilty of perjury. This is because, in their view, their secrecy oath supersedes the witness oath. It is in the best interest of the country to commit perjury because these things should never be brought up, let alone revealed.

FONZI next asked him if he had any information on POSADA, CARSWELL, WERBELL, UNDERWOOD, HECTOR or EL INDIO. The response to the first four was immediately negative. He started ruminating about HECTOR and EL INDIO but he was soon mumbling and showing other signs of nervousness. He finally said that no, he didn't guess he had any information on them.

We then asked him about the way the CIA manipulated the name files. He said that to get all the information on an individual you would have to ask for all the information on him and all of his psuedonyms. There is a card "key" in the personnel (office?) files. SMITH then explained the difference between a vouchered and a unvouchered funded agent. He said that the usual procedure (above) would not apply to unvouchered, or deep cover, agents. He said that the Agency handled these agents' tax problems through a contact with IRS. He said that there was a special CIA/IRS hankling procedure and an office. This would be the only place where records pertaining to the particular agent would be kept under his real name.

We then asked him whether a 201 file is significant. He said it could mean anything from the fact that someone had an interest in the subject to being a file on an employee. He said that PHILLIP AGEE's description of the dual 201 files on employees was correct. SMITH said that a cross reference to the two parts does exist but only a couple of people would have access to it. He is not sure how the cross referencing works. But in any case he said that he doubted if we would ever see the second half of a 201 file simply because the Agency would not give them to us and would deny their existence. In response to the question: "You mean they would lie to Congress?" SMITH answered: "You represent the United States Congress but what the Hell is that to the CIA?" He said that we probably would not even get complete copies of the first half of a 201 file, or any of it, if it was on a particularly sensitive person.

He said that if we lucked out and learned a pseudonym and asked for the information filed under it, "it would be met with high suspicion" and any connection or file would be denied.

Mr. SMITH volunteered that an old friend, TOM FARMER, was heading up the President's CIA oversight committee and could probably help us if we contacted him. He also said that he would be glad to work for us if we needed any more investigators.