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ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978

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U.S. House of Representatives

John F. Kennedy Subcommittee
of the Select Committee on
Assassinations

Washington, D.C.

Deposition of

DAVID E. MURPHY

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room 3370,
Second and D Streets, Southwest, Washington, D.C., beginning
at 10:01 o'clock a.m., before Annabelle K. Short, a Notary
Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present
on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

KENNETH KLEIN, Senior Staff Counsel

For the Deponent:

(There was no representation by counsel.)
Mr. Klein. My name is Kenneth Klein and I am a senior staff counsel for the Select Committee on Assassinations. Actually I am Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel. The time is 10:01 on August 9, 1978.

Would you please state your name.

Mr. Murphy. My name is David E. Murphy.

Mr. Klein. And your address?

Mr. Murphy. [Address] McLean, Virginia.

(Whereupon Mr. Murphy was sworn by Ms Annabelle Short, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia.)

Mr. Klein. Are you certified to swear witnesses in Washington, D. C.?

Ms Short. Yes, I am.

Mr. Klein. Mr. Murphy, you have in front of you the Committee Rules and Resolutions. Have you had an opportunity to look through them?

Mr. Murphy. I have.

Mr. Klein. And, in particular, have you had an opportunity to read Rule 4?

Mr. Murphy. I have.

Mr. Klein. And you are aware that you have a right to have a lawyer present at any deposition, and are you aware of that?

Mr. Murphy. I am.

Mr. Klein. Are you here voluntarily?
Mr. Murphy. I am here voluntarily.

Mr. Klein. And you are not under subpoena to appear here at all? You have not been given any subpoena?

Mr. Murphy. Not that I know of.

Mr. Klein. As you can see, there is a stenographer taking stenographic notes of what is being said. These notes will be transcribed and a copy will be sent to you and you will be asked to read it, and if there are any errors in the accurate transcription of what you had to say, you are to inform us of that, and if it is correct, to sign it, send it back to us and we will then provide you, if you desire, with your own copy.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Klein. In 1962, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Yuri Nosenko made his first contact with the CIA; is that correct?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And he then defected to the United States in 1964. Would you tell us, beginning in 1962, in general, what your contact was with Nosenko.

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I understand my contact with Nosenko.

Mr. Klein. What your position was in the CIA.

Mr. Murphy. I follow you. In 1962, I was the Chief of the Eastern European Division of the then DDP, which included in its area of responsibility When Nosenko made contact with CIA in the then Chief of the Soviet
Russian Division advised me of this and gave me a general fill-in on the case.

In the fall of 1963, I became Chief of the Soviet Russian Division and was Chief of the Division when Nosenko defected.

Mr. Klein. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came to the United States, was he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. Murphy. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly sure of the legal -- I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts, he was in the custody of the IC.

Mr. Klein. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. The Soviet Russian Division.

Mr. Klein. Of which you were the Chief?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. Murphy. Beginning in 1968.

Mr. Klein. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the Spring of 1967.

Mr. Klein. The report by Bruce Soley began, or the investigation by Bruce Soley began at the end of 1967. At that
time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet Russia Division to another division?

Mr. Murphy. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which Soley was a member.

Mr. Klein. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko?

And when I say happened, where he was kept, what he was asked?

Mr. Murphy. I was responsible for the case.

Mr. Klein. Okay.

Mr. Murphy. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the Division.

Mr. Klein. But they would report to you?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And did you report to any specific individual on Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. I reported both to the DDP.

Mr. Klein. Who was that?

Mr. Murphy. Until '67, until he died in July of '67, it was Desmond Fitzgerald.

Initially the DDP was Dick Helms and then sometime in '65, I think it was, I am not sure of the date, '65, he became the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence "Dez" Fitzgerald became chief, the Director of the Operations Directorate. Then after his death, Tom Karamasines became the Director of the
Operations Directorate, he was still DDP and I reported through that chain of command and I reported to the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Klein. You stated that in the beginning you reported to Richard Helms?

Mr. Murphy. He was DDP.

Mr. Klein. That was in 1964?

Mr. Murphy. 1964.

Mr. Klein. When Nosenko defected?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Now, in the following years, when different people held that post of DDP, was Helms still involved in the Nosenko case?

Mr. Murphy. He was but I don't recall any specific pattern. It would depend I guess.

Mr. Klein. Can you tell us if you reported to the DDP?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. What did he do? If you, for example, went to the DDP, whoever it might have been, and said we have a decision to make with regard to Nosenko, and you gave him the alternatives, did you have any knowledge of whom he spoke to, what he did, or to whom he spoke?

Mr. Murphy. I can't give you a specific instance but the pattern of operations is that the DDP would then discuss it with the Director and Deputy Director. That would be his chain of command.
Or he would make the decision on his own.

Mr. Klein. So with regard to Helms, when he was DDP you
spoke to him directly. When he became Deputy Director or Direc-
tor, which eventually he did become, then the chain of command,
although you don't know of any specific instances, would have
him still involved in the decisions?

Mr. Murphy. It would. In order to be absolutely correct
about it, the DDP as one of the Deputy Directors for Operations,
made his own judgment as to what he would discuss with the
Director, what he would not discuss with the Director.

Mr. Klein. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe,
when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed in that
hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of
the question.

Mr. Klein. Well, elaborate.

Mr. Murphy. No, the previous pattern of voluntary discussion
of issues under consideration changed and Nosenko was not per-
mitted to evade questions or to decide when he would or would
not want to respond.

Mr. Klein. Could you describe for us what the pattern was
before as far as conditions and how it was changed?

Mr. Murphy. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much
permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted
his cooperation and we wanted to discuss these things in a
reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time, which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important aspect I think of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.

Mr. Klein. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. Murphy. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to depart? Other than that, in his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interrogation sessions, but just his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. Murphy. I don't think so. not that early. I don't remember that?

Mr. Klein. The decision to change the type of interrogations, who made the decision? What were the dynamics?

Mr. Murphy. The decision was, the recommendation was made to me, it was ---

Mr. Klein. Who made it to you?

Mr. Murphy. Bagley, the Chief of the group, because they felt they could not proceed because of the problems I have alluded to, and this was then discussed with both Angleton and the DDP.

Mr. Klein. The DDP was Helms?

Mr. Murphy. At that time, yes. And the decision to
proceed to confrontation rather than continue essentially a debriefing in which you permitted the person under debriefings, in this case Nosenko, to believe that he was being believed when it was considered the issues under consideration were sufficiently important and the inconsistencies seemed so glaring, so obvious, that it was thought by confrontation we could resolve the matter and bring it to conclusion. Whereas the other way, no, Nosenko would have rightly demanded full freedom, his regulation of his status, and an office in the building. That was the rationale at that time.

Mr. Klein. Who actually made the decision to go ahead with this new mode of interrogation?

You said that Bagley recommended it to you?

Mr. Murphy. I concurred.

Mr. Klein. You consulted with Helms?

Mr. Murphy. I passed it on up the line and our recommendation was agreed to, except with the proviso that Angleton did not believe that we should attempt at this stage to confront him, we ought to spin it out for a long period of time. There were practical and legal security difficulties in that. If you pretend to a person that he is okay then you have to be prepared to live with that pretence.

Mr. Klein. Did Helms concur with the decision?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Now, you told us sometimes the DDP would make
decisions on his own. Do you know if that was one of them?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know.

Mr. Klein. Helms made on his own?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know.

Mr. Klein. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that
Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia
Division?

Mr. Murphy. That is right.

Mr. Klein. And how were the particular sub-areas on which
he was interrogated chosen?

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas?

This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision
was made based on what the CIA people thought offered the best
opportunity to get an admission and to break on that. In other
words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral
on. By that I mean other information which said what this man
is saying is not the truth or this man does not know about this
and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. And so it was a fully
tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos-
session of information in the hands of the interrogators which
then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the
truth.

One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives
you other breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be
interrogated was essentially a factor of the tactics of the
briefing.
Mr. Klein. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr. Murphy. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the information was not considered acceptable.

Mr. Klein. And by the same token, when Nosenko was asked -- this is again all subsequent to April 4 -- when Nosenko was asked followup questions, say, on Monday he was asked questions and on Wednesday he was asked followup questions about the Monday's questions, would that again be determined by the fact that someone had made a decision that that area had potential for breaking him and, therefore, followup questions should be asked?

Mr. Murphy. I believe so.
Mr. Klein. As opposed to a desire to gain information of intelligence value, and that might be another reason why you would follow up?

Mr. Murphy. Well, the people at the time, I mean the judgment at the time was it would not have been of intelligence value because you couldn't put any trust in it. In my cases, information was sought to enlarge the base against which you could check things, not necessarily that you would use the information as valid intelligence.

Mr. Klein. But, basically, subsequent to April 4th, it was an operation designed to break?

Mr. Murphy. It was CI interrogation, it was not an informational acquisition exercise.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware that many if not all of the sessions with Nosenko were tape recorded?

Mr. Murphy. I know I thought most of them were after April.

Mr. Klein. And do you have any knowledge of how, if anybody, listened to these tapes or read the reports of the interrogators about each day's interrogation?

Mr. Murphy. Well, the daily take was read by the Chief of the CIA group, Pete Bagley by all the officers, and in reporting, periodic reporting which went to the DDP, extracts or excerpts from these tapes were included, all of which I saw.

Mr. Klein. How close were you to this operation?

Mr. Murphy. Well, because it was the kind of operation it
was, I had the forward and I did forward regular continuing periodic reporting, so I was aware of what was going on.

Mr. Klein. Were you involved in every major decision made at this time?

Mr. Murphy. Well, there were times when I wasn't there, obviously, but I don't recall any major decisions of which I would not have participated, at least in the discussion.

Mr. Klein. Basically what I am saying is, would anybody have had the authority to make any kind of a significant decision concerning Nosenko without coming to you and letting you know about it, would Bagley for example have had that authority?

Mr. Murphy. He would have had that authority if I weren't there.
Mr. Klein. You mean --

Mr. Murphy. If I were on TDY, I was away on TDY, a great deal on trips.

Mr. Klein. When you would return, would you be briefed on what went on?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, and I know, of course, since this never occurred to my knowledge, he must have kept both Angleton and Fitzgerald, DDP aware of what was going on, because they would have required regular reporting.

Mr. Klein. But I am more interested in your knowledge. Would it be fair to say that you were close enough to this that if a decision was made of my note you would know about it, if not when it took place, afterwards?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, I would become aware of it.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February or March.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall now the substance of it?

Mr. Murphy. No, not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the affair. There is more detail but I can't really pin it down.
Mr. Klein. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko, you personally.

Mr. Murphy. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it seeme to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand that Nosenko was much of what he said was true.

Mr. Klein. You are talking about other areas?

Mr. Murphy. Yes sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much relationship and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and all that sort of thing. That is what I mean.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall any other specifics about what bothered you about the Nosenko statements on Oswald? For example, what incidences bothered you?

Mr. Murphy. Well, I didn't remember this very well, but
the one when Oswald tried to commit suicide, Nosenko happened
to be on duty or something, and what is how he knew what
happened. This is very vague, in my mind, but that is one
other thing I recall.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall any other specifics about what
you could not accept in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, that they just -- this is part of the
first one -- no contact was ever made, that he went up to Minsk
and lived happily and well with no contact. The Soviet Union
with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person.
Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman,
what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive
debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It
didn't seem to be possible.

Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't consti-
tute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange.

Mr. Klein. Would you distinguish between first the fact
that nobody debriefed Oswald when he first came to the Soviet
Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew as a Marine, as
a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they decided
to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he
was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, they would be two different points. The
first point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply
a chap arriving with this background and no one taking the time
just from a military intelligence technical point of view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did the blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators handling operational traffic involving U-2s.

Mr. Klein. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although the KGB knew Oswald was a Marine, they did not bother to question him, and because of that never knew that he was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which the U-2s took off and landed?

Mr. Murphy. I think it would be strange.

My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the outfit that would want to be talking to any Marine. They will talk to a Marine about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a -- they would talk to him about his military affiliation just as we would.

I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think the Soviets are ten foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think they are very, very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is that
they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental
cOMPpetence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore,
we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border
Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a
private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated
to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the
Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully accessible to
the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he
wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell
all. I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of
the things that made, or many other aspects of the case, but
this is one of the things that created an atmosphere of dis-
belief that there must be something to this case that is
important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't
understand it.

Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was
very hard to believe.

Mr. Klein. Have you learned anything since then?

Mr. Murphy. No, I have learned nothing new that would
account for that, and I don't know whether he
said anything new. I presume what you are saying to me, it was
a hypothetical, was that a hypothetical?

Mr. Klein. Well, I wanted you to just comment on that
situation.

How many years have you been in intelligence work? How
many years did you work for the CIA?

Mr. Murphy. I joined CIA in 1948. Before that, I worked for two years for US Forces Intelligence Division, US Forces, Korea. Before the Korean War, from '47-48. So I would say before that, I was in Germany, a liaison officer with the Soviet forces.

Mr. Klein. Over 20 years?

Mr. Murphy. Almost thirty. Thirty years I would say.

Mr. Klein. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. And other things.

Mr. Klein. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?

Mr. Murphy. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is, thos officers concerned with this case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. Klein. During this interrogation period, beginning in April of 1964, would it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which you have just been
discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for
questioning and interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. Probably not.

Mr. Klein. Why would that have been?

Mr. Murphy. Because there were many other areas which
posed equally interesting aspects yet about which we knew much
more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral
knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the
Soviet Union.

Mr. Klein. Who in the Soviet Russia Division made the
decision as to who would question Nosenko, subsequent to
April 4th?

Mr. Murphy. Bagley, Chief of the Group.

Mr. Klein. And do you know of any criteria that he used
to pick his interrogators?

Mr. Murphy. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's
English was not good, the fact that he had been exposed. Well,
that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try
not to use too many people because you then lose. In the
first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy
who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union or return to the
other side, and so you don't want to propose too many officers,
plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of
people in. You have to have people who studied the case and
became in depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use
the officers that they had available and there were a variety of criteria.

Mr. Klein. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell us?

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. Klein. Two points --

Mr. Murphy. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was levelheaded, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.

Mr. Klein. But wouldn't --

Mr. Murphy. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't, what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don't know.

Mr. Klein. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical
situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not have, if not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough, from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think that was unusual, they didn't do that?

Mr. Murphy. I would certainly think so.

Mr. Klein. The second question, part of my question was the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, is that to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from all that, it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would that be --

Mr. Murphy. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people, relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad, might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't aquads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced interrogators.
Mr. Klein. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English, there was no Russian.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. My question is, was Nosenko, the questioning of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. Murphy. It was an important operation, an important case.

Mr. Klein. And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. Murphy. I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience. I mean Bagley himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald except what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing that we thought we were going to get through on, because we were weak in that area at that time.

Mr. Klein. You say at that time. Did you become stronger later?

Mr. Murphy. I think everybody became stronger later, so much has been said about it. That is what I meant.

One of the things that I am sure you are aware of is that the investigation, primary CIA contribution to the post-assassination investigative activities and background was coordinated by CI Staff and a lot of things that are spoken
about today everybody seems at awe about, the Mexico angle, we knew nothing about, particularly involved Cubans. If it involved one Russian case it was because of the coordination collection was done by CI Staff. They made information available to the Warren Commission and it was not lateral, that is what I meant by saying, I know more about it today than I knew then.

Mr. Klein. In 1967, the decision was made to allow Bruce Soley to in effect reinvestigate Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Murphy. Yes sir.

Mr. Klein. And eventually he wrote a report?

Mr. Murphy. Bruce had participated in every way in the case from the beginning. He monitored many of the debriefings or interrogations, I can't tell you exactly how many, because I don't know, but I know he was involved, I know I had many discussions with him about the case, and some of the other leads that developed from the case. So he was the logical man for the Office of Security and for CIS management to pick if they wanted another look taken of the case.

Mr. Klein. You say that you had many discussions with him?

Mr. Murphy. Well, naturally a dozen over the years.

Mr. Klein. What was his general viewpoint prior to 1967 when he got this assignment? What was his general viewpoint on Nosenko?
Mr. Murphy. He didn't know why Nosenko was saying the things he was saying, but some of the things he said he thought were true.

Mr. Klein. The first part you have elaborated?

Mr. Murphy. He didn't understand the motivation underlying the many contradictions which were evident in what Nosenko had to say and yet he said, some of the things he has told us are true, they are leads to people who have indeed been Soviet agents and who have been rolled up and arrested and, therefore, we should simply take it for what it is and as far as the basic resolution of the why, that is your problem.

Mr. Klein. How?

Mr. Murphy. I don't mean, I am not being sarcastic. He was concerned with leads which had to do with American security and there was a lot Nosenko had to say in those leads which was valid. The purpose of those leads, if you looked at it from the point of view of CI Staff and the CI Groups or Divisions, was that they were not leads which went anywhere because the people had already lost their access, they were already out of play, and that is what I mean when I said that the deeper underlying motivation, the pattern, for what Nosenko was saying, if there was a pattern, was up to CI Staff and the SR Division to figure out. They were the operational people. They were the DDP people. The Office of Security was interested in taking whatever he had to say. I don't mean
that just exactly as I said it.

Mr. Klein. Were you surprised that Soley was given the assignment that he was given in '67?

Mr. Murphy. No, I was not surprised at all. I thought that the fact, I was not surprised that the responsibility for the case was transferred to the Office of Security, as a practical matter, because I discussed with my deputy at the time, in the winter of '66, I mentioned this before, I said --

Mr. Klein. Who was your deputy?

Mr. Murphy. He wasn't there very long. He was replaced. He was deputy during, I think, part of '67, when Bagley went overseas; I don't remember the exact dates, that really isn't important. The thing that is important is I said this case is not going to be resolved and something has to be done to find a mechanism for dealing with it, and so the solution which was proposed, and I was not a part of the discussions, but I didn't have any great sense of -- I wasn't unhappy -- I also was anxiously thinking about getting overseas again myself, but I think the fact they gave it to the Office of Security and Bruce Soley became the leader of that reinvestigation made sense.

Mr. Klein. Were you surprised at his ultimate resolution of the matter, the fact that he found or concluded in his report that Nosenko was bona fide?

Mr. Murphy. Well, I never read his report and I have
never read it to this day. So I just don't —

Mr. Klein. The conclusion you do know?

Mr. Murphy. That he was totally bona fide, there were no
caveats? I mean, I just don't -- I would be surprised if that
were the case. I have not read it, I don't know. If the
statement were made this guy is absolutely bona fide from
every point. Bona fide doesn't mean he is not a dispatched
agent. It is a lousy term, frankly, bonda fide. It means
either personality problems, are there quirks, are there
aspects of the man's background which he has attempted to hide,
which, therefore, have produced contradictions? But on balance
we do not believe he was dispatched by KGB with a mission
against the United States. Those are the kind of conclusions
I would expect Bruce's report to have.

I don't think Bruce would ever end his report with the
conclusion he is fully bona fide. I haven't read it, but I
don't think that would be the case. I think there would be
some attempt to explain why some of these, you could blame,
I suppose you would have to deal with some of the strange
contradictions which were evident, quite apart from whether you
think he was dispatched or not, and those could be explained,
and in a conclusion I think by personality, I don't know.
I am just saying, I don't know what he said but I can't believe
it would be stated as baldly as that, as simply as that. I
think he would have to make some general conclusion about the
man, the personality, then come up with a final decision, which is the most important one, whatever the reasons for inconsistencies, discrepancies and contradictions.

If that is what you are saying, I would not be surprised with that conclusion.

Mr. Klein. Why wouldn't you be?

Mr. Murphy. Because we never were able to develop any hard legal proof which would support the fact he was a Soviet agent.

Mr. Klein. Let me ask you this. If you have a situation where you can't develop any hard proof that somebody is dispatched and at the same time --

Mr. Murphy. You have reservations.

Mr. Klein. You have reservations. Is there any kind of precedent or any kind of criteria for what the intelligence community or what the Agency would do in a situation like that?

Mr. Murphy. I cannot cite a specific case. It seems to me -- and this is on the basis of general background as opposed to a specific case -- that in similar cases but not nearly as spectacular, the level of the personal or the data, in many cases; the defectors have been talked to, there have been difficulties with them, there finally has been sort of an inconclusive determination, not sufficient to impede their stay in this country, but there would always be a residual
view, generally in the CI Staff, in the file, that certain aspects of this man's background were never resolved, we suspect this may have been the case. That is all you can do.

Mr. Klein. What would be your reaction to learning that the reservations which you and others had concerning what Nosenko had to say about Oswald, were not resolved in any way by Bruce Soley and yet he reached an opinion which, whether it is qualified or not, found Nosenko to be bona fide?

Mr. Murphy. I can't comment on that.

Mr. Klein. Well, do you think from your knowledge of the case, assuming that there was no additional information or investigation into the statements Nosenko made about Oswald, nothing new came up, say in 1968, that you didn't know about in '64, could this issue of whether he was bona fide be resolved without dealing with this Oswald question?

Mr. Murphy. It would certainly seem to me to be difficult to make a final judgment without dealing with that question. Because of the fundamental importance of that question itself, quite a part from its utility as a tactical interrogation device.

Mr. Klein. What would be your reaction to a scenario in which the only way that the Oswald matter was dealt with was to list three or four reasons why Nosenko would not have been sent to give false information about Oswald and then leave the subject without ever dealing with the substantive content
of what Nosenko says about Oswald and the difficulties which
you have discussed which arise from that?

Mr. Murphy. What do you mean by scenarios?

Mr. Klein. Everything else as far as the bona fide
question. In other words, you have a question of bona fides,
you determined that he is bona fide, be it possible with some
qualifications, that is the rest, anything else we have
been discussing, that question is faced by Bruce Soley, and
what would be your reaction to a situation where he faces that
question, comes to the conclusion that it is qualified, Nosenko
is bona fide and only deals with the Oswald issue by listing
three or four reasons why the Russians wouldn't send him to
mislead us about Oswald, but never goes into the substantive
content of what Nosenko said about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. It is very difficult for me to comment on
that. It is a technical professional matter. It seems to me
what is being confused here is the overall question of whether
Nosenko was sent by the KGB, for whatever purpose, and the
individual issue of whether part of or indeed thus the sole
reason for his having been sent or fed the information, or
whatever, related to the Oswald case, very difficult.

Mr. Klein. Can you pass on that question?

Mr. Murphy. That is all I can say, it is a tough one.

Mr. Klein. Okay.

Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Klein. Do you know who made the ultimate decision to reinvestigate the case in 1967?

Mr. Murphy. No, I do not. I assume the ultimate decision must have been made by the Director, but as I told you, this whole aspect was never discussed with me.

Mr. Klein. If it were proven that Nosenko lied in the facts that he gave about what happened to Oswald in the Soviet Union, if that could be proven, what significance would that have for you?

Mr. Murphy. Better wait a minute.

Mr. Klein. You want to go off the record?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

(Discussion off the record).

Mr. Klein. In the situation I have just give you, let me make it clear that when I say if it could be proven that he lied, I don't mean a situation where he himself admits I have lied, but where external facts prove that he lied in his statements about Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. Well, if such facts were to be found or were to exist, it would seem to me that at the very least some effort should be made to determine the true story, because on that would hinge extremely important considerations for both his own case, his bona fides, but indeed, the way the Soviets looked upon or their attitude toward the Kennedy assassination.
If, for example, Oswald, the Oswald story, were concocted by Nosenko to enhance his own importance, that would be one thing, and would have little significance in the context of what I just have spoken of.

On the other hand, if Nosenko had been given this information by some third person, in the KGB, even though he did not admit that he had been a dispatched agent, it would certainly be important for us to know in terms of the way in which the Soviets looked upon the assassination case.

Mr. Klein. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. Murphy. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Klein. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. Murphy. There were many, nay conversations all the time about various things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, to get him to talk, but as far as I know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use these, because none of them appeared to be likely to produce results and they all would be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results.

Mr. Klein. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in those years, is it your statement that if any drugs were given to him, to get him to tell the truth,
you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr. Murphy. That is correct.

Mr. Klein. Is there any doubt in your mind that somehow an order could have been given to give him drugs which never would have been transmitted to you?

Mr. Murphy. It would certainly surprise me.

Mr. Klein. Does the CIA have any procedures when it does administer drugs to subjects, record keeping procedures, for example?

Mr. Murphy. I assume so, but I have no personal knowledge of it?

Mr. Klein. Do you know?

Mr. Murphy. Because it would be done by the technical division.

Mr. Klein. What I am getting at --

Mr. Murphy. It wouldn't be -- the record keeping would not be done by us.

Mr. Klein. Is there some kind of procedure used by CIA whereby you could simply go to some records someplace and check the dates involved and you could know beyond a shadow of a doubt drugs were not administered since they are not in the record?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know that.

Mr. Klein. Would you dispute testimony given to this Committee, by Nosenko, to the effect that subsequent to April
4th and prior to the summer of 1967, he was drugged by the CIA?

Mr. Murphy. That is his perception.

Mr. Klein. Would you?

Mr. Murphy. I don't gree with him.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in '64, in April?

Mr. Murphy. Yes sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. Murphy. It indicated he was lying on several key points.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. Murphy. No.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware that he was given a secondly lie detector test in '66?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. Murphy. Same thing.

Mr. Klein. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. Murphy. No. I believe the operator gave him the test in '66 was the same operator who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. Klein. That is correct.
Had you worked with that operator prior, or not prior but any other times other than these two tests?

Mr. Murphy. I knew he was a fluent Russian speaker and that he was adept and flexible in his use of his machine, but I don't recall -- I knew his record, I think he had been in Germany, I don't recall that I worked with him on any case, I simply knew he was a good guy, appeared to be a good guy.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that in the second lie detector test there were numerous questions concerning Oswald?

Mr. Murphy. I don't remember.

Mr. Klein. Many more than, say, in the first lie detector test?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And I wondered if you knew of any reason why Oswald should have been given much greater emphasis in the second test?

Mr. Murphy. I don't recall the reasons for it.

Mr. Klein. Was there ever any discussion about these tests prior to giving them, that you took part in?

Mr. Murphy. The only thing that occurs to me is that the second test concentrated much more obviously than the first test on areas of greatest doubt, greatest suspicion, greatest areas of contradiction or inconsistency or what have you, and since, although as I said earlier, we knew less about the
Oswald case in the Soviet Union, it was surely one of the areas which would fit those criteria, it was not a topic which we believed he was telling the truth.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any statement that you would like to make at this time or anything you want to say?

Mr. Murphy. No.

Mr. Klein. The time is 11:14 and on behalf of the Committee, I would like to thank you very much for taking this time to come here and give us this deposition.

Mr. Murphy. Glad to do it.

(Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the deposition was concluded.)
CERTIFICAT OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Annabelle K. Short, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing depositions, was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by Robert A. Thomas, stenotype reporter, and thereafter reduced to typewriting by him or under his direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

[Signature]
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia

My Commission expires November 14, 1980
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I, Robert A. Thomas, stenotype reporter; do hereby certify that the testimony of the witness which appears in the foregoing deposition was taken by me in stenotype and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, or financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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