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1 telling Headquarters, for some reason, of the 9/27 contact.
 2 I do not mean to suggest that the reason is sinister or
 3 innocent, but according to cable traffic, the Mexico City
 4 station, anyway, is not telling you about it.

5 Mr. Scelso. Yes.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA number 211.

7 Mr. Scelso. What was the nature of that 9/27 contact?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. If you would like, you can review the
 9 transcript again. Essentially, it was a conversation between
 10 Soviet ^{v. y. A} Duran and Soviet Embassy, or consulate officials
 11 in respect to Oswald's obtaining a visa and the problem of
 12 obtaining a visa.

13 Reading through CIA number 211, can you identify that?

14 Mr. Scelso. I suppose this was [redacted]

15 [redacted]

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Correct.

17 Why do you think that, in paragraph 3, the person send-
 18 ing the cable considered the fact that [Litensor] was aware of
 19 Oswald's contact to be important? The fact that he was aware
 20 of it, and passing the information along would be important?

21 Mr. Scelso. You get into a psychological question. The
 22 Chief of Station is called in to speak to [redacted]

23 [redacted] There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador
 24 got there -- no, it wasn't that. It was a very peculiar situ-
 25 ation in Mexico whereby [redacted] contact



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1 with the U.S. government was through our Chief of Station
2 rather than through the Ambassadors.] This caused no great
3 problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Thomas Mann?

5 Mr. Scelso. Yes. He was a very fine guy and recognized
6 the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador,
7 Mr. Friedman, tried to cut Winn Scott out of contact with [the
8 [redacted] whereupon [redacted] called
9 in Winn Scott and said, I want you to send a cable to [the White
10 House] telling them I am not going to deal with this jackass,
11 I want to deal only with you.

12 So, the result was, eventually, Winston Scott and
13 Ambassador Friedman went to [the White House] and talked to
14 [President Johnson] and straightened the whole thing out in
15 favor of Winston Scott.

16 So Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that
17 the [redacted] is aware of our [redacted]

18 Mr. Goldsmith. He should have been since it was a
19 [redacted]

20 Mr. Scelso. Yes. But you do not always know whether
21 he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed.
22 It is just significant that the person calls you in and says,
23 here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 210. Would
25 you please read that?

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(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify this document?

Mr. Scelso. This is a cover sheet for the cable from the Mexico station.

Mr. Goldsmith. The cover sheet to the cable we just referred to?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Winn Scott here indicates, due memo of my meeting with [Litensor.]

Mr. Scelso. It is addressed to this person who is supposed to write a memo on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Scott? That is Scott's signature.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, he writes it back to himself and reminds himself to write a memo on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see the memo?

Mr. Scelso. I do not think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Scott about his meeting with [Litensor?]

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall having done so.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, by this time, the Mexico City station still had not informed Headquarters of the 9-27 contact?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA 213. Would you skim

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(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. This was all on the same day.

Mr. Goldsmith. The cable traffic was pretty heavy on that day, I would imagine.

Mr. Scelso. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. This cable is the first time that the Mexico City station informs Headquarters about Oswald's 9/27 contacts.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that there is any connection between the fact that this contact was recorded after the Mexico City station became aware of the fact that Litenscr knew about Oswald's contacts?

Mr. Scelso. I would imagine that there were probably many -- several Mexicans transcribing reels transcribing things and some got finished before others.

Mr. Goldsmith. This was months ago. The conversations have been transcribed and reviewed months earlier.

Mr. Scelso. What are the numbers of the various cables? They were all going out in a series. They may have had several analysts in the Mexico Station working on them. One said you take this one and write a cable and the other said you take that one and write a cable, and so on, and they went out and went into the COMM Center and the COMM Center sent them out in some order. Here.

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