

# THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

CIA files on these persons were requested and reviewed by HSCA staff members.

14-6  
[Redacted]  
X-101-A  
file  
Date: 11/15/69  
in several areas

One contact with the defector to the Agency. (<sup>butcher</sup> <sup>o'clocks</sup>) One file regr a former military person who defected <sup>contains a debriefing report</sup> conducted by Mil. Intel. [Redacted]  
One of the remaining 4 indirs. was

of the remaining indirs. who <sup>had</sup> ~~had~~ direct contact with the U.S. <sup>had</sup> ~~had~~

of the remaining 4 indirs. who <sup>had</sup> ~~had~~ direct contact with their ret. to the U.S., the

Webster:

The circumstances of the Agency's contact w/ the 4 remaining indirs. were diff. in each case. One of the defectors was [unwittingly] interviewed [by a CIA officer]

[Redacted] upon his departure from the S.U. en route to the U.S. While L's file indicates that the Agency considered for full & controlled debriefing by the CIA, FBI dc conducted in Angleton note to the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no evidence in L's 201 file nor any [Redacted] box which suggest further contact on the part of the CIA.

One of the individuals [Redacted] <sup>already reluctantly gave during</sup> who was interviewed by the CIA when he file reflects that he had actually been living in the USSR since 1933 & was <sup>returned to the</sup> U.S. in 1962. #

A secret debriefings were conducted of the other two defcs. Ptt. E. Webster, the highly expert with <sup>were defector effects</sup> plastic <sup>asbestos</sup>, the Read Rev. (app. in 1959) was highly publicized, was in

More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other 2 defcs. Ptt. E. Webster, a plastics expert with the Read Rev. (app. whose defection to the S.U. in 1959 was slightly publicized, ret. to the U.S. in 6/62. In was declassified by <sup>Sixty</sup> thereafter, components <sup>debriefed</sup> w/in the Agency conducted a joint <sup>asbestos</sup> debriefing of Webster in his home territory. Webster has been employed in the S.U. at the Kirovograd Strategic Inst. of Polythene Plastics

4  
BR

Donald Deasely  
worked

(This fact was corroborated by another CIA employee who worked in the FBI in the Sov. branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962 told the HSCA that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence info. regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, Deasely claims that, during the summer of 1962, he reviewed a contact report often <sup>interviewing</sup> <sup>from</sup> rep. of the CIA's [redacted] who interviewed a former Polish who had last worked at the Minsk Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This person who Deasely believes may have been Oswald had been living w/ his family in Minsk. Deasely advised the committee that the contact report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant which should be retrievable from the Selective Registry Branch which, in 1962, was a component of the DDCI.

<sup>made a request to</sup>  
<sup>the HSCA requested a</sup>  
to the CIA. The HSCA requested that the CIA provide the Committee ~~the~~ above-mentioned contact report & all vol. of materials concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. <sup>(admin/18 letters)</sup>  
<sup>the HSCA requested a</sup>  
The CIA provided a review of the docs. in the volume in the M.R.P. indicated that no such file existed regarding the M.R.P., but no contact report existed in that file. (Ode.). The file review did indicate that in 1975, Daniel Schorr had made a similar request <sup>to keep record for Deasely</sup> <sup>such report</sup> <sup>for Deasely</sup> & was informed by the CIA that no <sup>such report</sup> existed.

of the 29 persons requested, our office did not locate a file for the individual. In the case of 6 other individuals, the file review did not indicate that they were set.

22

to the U.S.

The HSCA reviewed

The HSCA reviewed <sup>the CIA</sup> After reviewing files on the 29<sup>th</sup> individual who fit the above-described criteria & were provided files on the 28<sup>th</sup> of the 29 28 individuals on whom they maintained records. All 20<sup>th</sup> files were reviewed as <sup>as any existing</sup> <sup>DDC files</sup> regarding those individuals. In the case of 6 individuals, there is no indication in their files that they were returned to the U.S. Even so, there were occasional reports from sources who observed or spoke w/ these persons while in the S.U., but there is no indication of direct contact w/ them by the CIA.

On regard to the other 22 defectors, <sup>the file review indicates that</sup> there is no record of direct CIA contact w/ 18 of them. Again, some of these files contain a report from a source who reported

It becomes clear from the review of files on these defs. that debriefing of defectors was in fact somewhat of a random occurrence. However, in the instances ~~where~~ <sup>in which</sup> the Ag. did choose to debrief returning Am. def., the Ag. <sup>was</sup> ~~appeared~~ <sup>was</sup> usually to be interested in ~~only~~ topics of general interest <sup>regarding</sup> life. Life is certain areas

of the Sov. U. In this regard, 90 — Where are you.

The persons who were debriefed were similar to D in that they left & ret. w/in the same general time period & had spent their time in the S. U. in areas of interest to the CIA.

More ext. deb. were conducted of the other 2 defs. E.L. W., a plastics expert w/f.R.C. whose def. to the S. U. in 1959 was highly publicized, ret. to the U.S. in 6/63.

W had been employed in the S. U. at the Sea. Scientific Inst. of Polytech. Plastics.

Shortly after his return, He was debriefed in his home territory <sup>U.S.S.R.</sup> from 00/6, 5/6/63 to the A.F. It was decided that a more ext. debriefing was in order in W's subseq. brought to the Washington where he was deb. for a period of 2 wks.

The deb. reports incl. a chron. of W's life & the CIA's access. of him as well as a log. of info. regarding life in the S. U., W's work there & being info. on persons he had met during his residence <sup>U.S.S.R.</sup>.

Ref. 7/59  
Ret. 6/25/63

Likewise, Vlado Cucaradze who had lived in the S. U. for nearly 4 yrs., was <sup>contacted</sup> for purposes of debriefing shortly after his ret. to the U.S. in late June of 1963. His initial debriefing included such subjs. as his motivation to defect to USSR as well as activities engaged in during Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev & general aspects of life such as residence costs & costs. While the Ag. felt that they would be interested in eliciting more info. <sup>on such topics</sup> re: life in the S. U. as cost of living, med. care, consumer goods, highway/highways, transport, restrictions w/in Kiev,

While the CIA felt it was unfeasible to debrief R more thoroughly due to the current status of trying to regain U.S. cit.

Ag. ftlt

1622-1125-B : Index cards

#1623-1125-C Dated 30 Oct. 1975

Discusses letters intercepted

States that copies of intercepted letters were passed to FBI in course of normal exchange of intelligence. Substance doesn't relate to JFL access.

"The records examined to date do not disclose whether or not this information was made avail. to the N.C. by the FBI or CIA."

Vol. 5 608-256-C

Copies of letters, <sup>written by LHO to requester</sup> forwarded to CIA by letter dated 17 March 1964

from J. Lee Parker, H.C. of N.C. & R. Helms, ADP

Ratio - questions

Gen. Backgd.

Attn: file on 1 HQ item

Index cards

HSCA question

Agency response

#1

I CIA statements to H.C. (#988-927-BD, #1038-405-B, CIA info. provided W.C. Insert for CIA Staff History  
#1063-964-B, #1073-964-L)

II CIA statements to ~~Senate~~ ( #961, 962, 969, 970 )

CIA statements to HSCA; N.C.

III T.B.C. memo & interviews (#435-173-A)  
[#3369]

IV Defectors

M.K. (#1004-400)  
S.O.P. - DCO

V G.R.B. request

#609  
#610

VI ~~Scope of A.D.M.~~ See #1188-1000 p.3

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#618-673

609-786

610-263

1188-1000

1004-400

1187-

Hock - Rock. Comm.