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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
TASK FORCE, ATLANTIC
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

COMJWTFAC CS

18 December 1962

HISTORICAL RECORD OF JWTFAC CUBAN OPERATION

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this report is to document activities of Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JWTFAC) during the CUBAN operations from 25 October 1962 through 1 December 1962.

2. GENERAL.

a. JWTFAC was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 25 October 1962 by direction of Commander in Chief, Atlantic with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Major General (then Brig Gen) William P. Yarborough, Commanding General, US Army Special Warfare Center was designated Commander, JWTFAC as an additional duty by CINCLANT with the concurrence of CG, USCOMAR.

b. CINCLANT component commanders, with the exception of CIAIANF activated JWTFAC component forces required under Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan 314/316-61 and passed operational control to JWTFAC on 26 October 1962. CIAJWTFAC was not activated during the emergency. OPCON of Naval forces listed in Appendix II was not passed to COMNAVJWTFAC. Naval forces were made available on an "as required" basis.

c. Planning and operations commenced on 26 October 1962 and continued through 1 December 1962.

3. MISSION.

a. The JWTFAC mission was to prepare, coordinate, and execute as directed by CINCLANT, a detailed country plan for the conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) operations in CUBA.

b. As stated in COMJWTFAC (Draft) OPLAN 314/316-62, COMJWTFAC would, when directed by CINCLANT, conduct unconventional warfare operations in CUBA in support of and in coordination with plans and objectives of CINCLANT component commanders to:

(1) Reduce the combat effectiveness and morale of the CASTRO Government.

(2) Provide U. S. military personnel and other selected individuals the means to remain free from enemy control in unfriendly territory.

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(3) Reduce the military, psychological and political potential of the CASTRO Government.

(4) Assist in establishing friendly political control in CUBA.

4. AUGMENTATION.

a. JWTFFA.

(1) Prior to the activation of JWTFFA, JWTFFA planning and functions were a responsibility of the Plans Division (J58) of CINCLANT. At activation, JWTFFA was organized in accordance with the joint Table of Distribution in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 and provided 26 officers and seven enlisted men. JWTFFA was augmented with additional personnel under authority contained Sub-section 5, Section 2, JCS Pub 2, dated November 1959, subject: Unified Action Armed Forces, (UNAAF).

(2) The initial staffing of JWTFFA was inadequate and required considerable personnel augmentation to provide internal and external security, communications and administrative support, liaison, and additional staff personnel to plan and conduct operations.

(3) Additional personnel and equipment were obtained from the Army and Air Force to provide essential communications on a twenty-four hour basis, provide adequate administrative and control procedures, and augment the staff to meet all operational requirements.

(4) Based on the augmentation needed to make JWTFFA fully operational, recommendations were submitted by COMJWTFFA letter, dated 26 November 1962, subject: "Organization for the Conduct of Unconventional Warfare in the Atlantic Command Area." This letter proposes a new Joint Table of Distribution providing for a full wartime complement, a planning staff, and the necessary staff augmentation to bring the planning staff to its full wartime complement.

b. ARJWTFFA.

(1) Colonel William Evans-Smith, Commanding Officer, 7th Special Forces Group Airborne, 1st Special Forces was designated Commander, Army Forces, JWTFFA (COMARJWTFFA) on 26 October 1962. A command and control element, Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB), was activated at Fort Bragg, and COMARJWTFFA was assigned operational control of Army Forces listed in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61, less the military police platoon, light truck company, and CIC detachment.

(2) Subsequently, CG, USA SPWAR Cen was directed by CINCANTANT to provide ARJWTFFA, from within U. S. Army Special Warfare Center resources, the psychological warfare, CIC, light truck and military police type support

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listed under Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61. Augmentation from outside U. S. Army Special Warfare Center resources was required to provide military police type support for both JUFWA and ARJUFWA security. Two officers and 66 enlisted men were attached to ARJUFWA as a substitute measure.

(3) In addition to the above augmentation, the SFOB was augmented to achieve a proper operational readiness status. Further, ARJUFWA operational planning and training exercises conducted indicated a requirement for additional SFOB augmentation and increased force tabs to properly undertake operations in CUBA. Recommendations for changes in the ARJUFWA troop list were forwarded to CINCLANT by 1st Indorsement, this headquarters, dated 3 December 1962, to letter, Headquarters, 7th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces, dated 26 November 1962, subject: Recommended Changes to Troop List in COMJUFWA OPLAN 314-61 (U).

c. ARJUFWA.

(1) Colonel Chester Jack, Commanding Officer, 1st Air Commando Group, was designated Commander, ARJUFWA (COMARJUFWA) on 26 October 1962. A command and control element from the 1st Air Commando Group was activated at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Number 9, FLORIDA, and COMARJUFWA was assigned operational control of Air Force Forces listed in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61.

(2) Augmentation to ARJUFWA forces listed, was not required.

d. NAVJUFWA.

(1) Captain I. J. Superfine, USN, was designated Commander, NAVJUFWA (COMNAVJUFWA) on 26 October 1962 with no assigned forces.

(2) Naval forces listed in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 were to be provided by CINCLANTFLT to COMNAVJUFWA for support of JUFWA operations as required.

(3) Two SEAL Team Detachments, one officer and five enlisted men each, were assigned to operational control of COMNAVJUFWA on 5 November 1962.

(4) COMSUBLANT provided two submarines for support of joint Special Forces - SEAL Team amphibious training (4-5 November and 16-17 November) and for support of Exercise DEVIL'S TRIDENT (30 Nov - 4 Dec).

(5) Augmentation to NAVJUFWA forces listed above was not required.

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e. CIA(PROV)JWTFEA.

(1) A CIA Liaison Officer was furnished to JWTFEA on 26 October 1962. The representation provided was of no real value in operational planning insofar as his functioning was primarily that of a liaison officer with CIALANT rather than an integral member of the JWTFEA staff. ✓

(2) The organization, resources and capabilities of CIAJWTFEA were unknown to JWTFEA throughout the operation. Consequently its augmentation needs were not determined. ✓

5. EXERCISES CONDUCTED: During the period 20 October 1962 through 4 December 1962, JWTFEA monitored and/or conducted the following exercises and training:

a. Amphibious Training Exercises:

(1) During the period 2-5 November 1962, ^{Underwater} twelve selected Special Forces personnel conducted Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) lock-out training from submarine USS SPIKEFISH, vicinity Norfolk, Virginia. Adverse weather and the inability of submarines to bottom because of external SONAR equipment precluded fulfillment of all training objectives. However, familiarization was accomplished in lock-out procedures and the techniques of lung swim drills, shipboard training, and infiltration from submarines. This training pointed out certain deficiencies in amphibious entry techniques. Further joint training is required to perfect and standardize Special Forces techniques in all phases of amphibious entry operations.

(2) During the period 3-4 November 1962, the two Special Forces "A" Detachments scheduled for infiltration from submarines participated in amphibious infiltration training vicinity Mayport, Florida. Utilizing submarines USS SEA CAT and USS TIRANTE, training was conducted in embarkation, debarkation, float cuts and towing, beach landing, and recovery operations. Considerable difficulty was encountered because the Special Forces Detachments lacked proper equipment, rubber landing boats, safety equipment, and water proofing material. In addition, the detachments had had no previous training in submarine operations. Results of training were unsatisfactory and additional training was requested, including the use of SEAL Team Detachments for beach reconnaissance, after receipt of proper equipment.

(3) A second submarine training exercise was conducted in the Florida Key area on 16-17 November 1962 by two Special Forces "A" Detachments and two SEAL Team Detachments, who embarked on the USS SEA CAT and USS TIRANTE from Key West, Florida. Ten-man rubber boats had been procured

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and the Special Forces Detachments had conducted inflatable boat training at OPA LOCKA. This training, the previous submarine training, the use of proper equipment and the use of SEAL Team Detachments, all contributed to a successful exercise. Problems encountered revealed a need for silent motors for Special Forces use, infra-red signalling equipment for Special Forces - SEAL Team use, better waterproofing material for equipment.

b. Joint Air-Ground Operations:

Throughout the month of November 1962 all Special Forces detachments scheduled for air infiltration conducted air drops and tactical exercises from 1st Air Commando Group C-47 and C-46 aircraft at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Instruction and training included the use of the CIA procured HRT-2 Homing Beacon and the commercially procured SKYCRAPPER VHF (AM) radio for air-ground communication. Results obtained on both items were marginal and the development of satisfactory equipment is required. The field exercise covered marshalling, infiltration, assembly, sterilization of DZ's, movement to safe areas, and establishing communication. While the above training was considered successful it was apparent that additional Special Forces - Air Forces training in unconventional warfare air operations is required to develop better techniques, coordination, and ability to conduct unconventional warfare air operations.

c. Exercise Devil's Trident:

This exercise was conducted, as approved and directed by CINCLANT, beginning with E-Day DEPCON stand down on 30 November 1962 and ending with exfiltration (D+3) on 4 December 1962. The purpose of the exercise was to test modified prepositioning, infiltration, and resupply phases of COMJMWTF A OPLAN 314/316-62, follow-on detachments were not played. Although the Sea infiltration was successful and all flights were flown, on schedule, training results were considered marginal because adverse weather precluded actual infiltration and resupply drops and adverse atmospheric conditions disrupted communications. However, JMWTF A planning for prepositioning, infiltration, and resupply phases was considered valid.

6. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

a. General: Problems were encountered in all the major JMWTF A functional areas. In some cases these problems were solved, in others unsolved because solution was beyond the capability of COMJMWTF A. The major problem areas are discussed in the body of this report. Others, less significant to effective performance are discussed in the separate inclosures and appendices.

b. Personnel and Administration:

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(1) No mobilization designee rosters were maintained for JMWTA in pre-alert planning. JMWTA was hastily manned with officers and enlisted men with, for the most part, no previous exposure to unconventional warfare and joint staff duty.

(2) The Mobilization JTD made no provision for headquarters support personnel: Comcenter, Supply, Adjutant General and Security. In consequence, no units or activities had been previously designated to provide this support. Personnel, when finally made available, were not properly qualified to perform their duties. Particular difficulty arose with respect to security clearances. The headquarters was manned by some key personnel who were not cleared for Top Secret material, and more serious, staff section chiefs not authorized access to sensitive intelligence which was prerequisite to valid planning.

(3) The procedures and policies for administration were completely lacking on activation of JMWTA. In consequence, diversion of effort and backtracking to correct errors occurred in the formative stage which were injurious to operations and planning.

c. Logistics:

(1) Logistical planning for guerrilla supplies had not progressed to the point of solid coordination of qualitative and quantitative requirements. Specific requirements, including packaging and rigging conformation, were not determined. force were the only supplies available throughout the operation. Pre-stock requirements to include storage and positioning are not fully met at this time.

(2) Advanced base reconnaissance and base support agreements were non-existent at the time of the alert. JMWTA support requirements were imposed as unprogrammed responsibilities of installation and activity commanders in consequence. This situation was equally applicable to air movement requirements for prepositioning and displacement and coordination of post-link up logistic support of JMWTA forces in CUBA. The latter two problem areas are the subject of coordination at this time.

d. Operations and Intelligence:

(1) The largest single impediment in the field of operations and intelligence was the almost complete gap which existed between the CIA and JMWTA. This single factor makes any confidence in the JMWTA plans evolved during the emergency an impossibility. The nature of unconventional warfare is such that there must be a continuity in operations and intelligence in the transition from a condition short of war to military operations. The lack of such continuity makes unconventional warfare

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operations in support of contingency operations by a JMWTF A movement planning exercise unrelated to the situation which exists in the target area.

(2) The complete and utter lack of current unconventional warfare estimates of the situation with resultant working intelligence requirements led to serious intelligence gaps which were never closed during the operation. This situation was aggravated by what can be considered a denial of available intelligence of a sensitive nature due to lack of prior establishment of the need for access and need-to-know for JMWTF A Headquarters in pre-emergency planning.

(3) The pre-emergency JMWTF A planning was premised on preparation of country plans by a subordinate element of COMJMWTF A when activated. This procedure delayed evolution of properly coordinated plans until the onset of the emergency and created a situation which was not conducive to planning an unconventional warfare operation.

(4) Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs planning was impeded by policy gaps, lack of discernible continuity of objectives and programming for Cuban operation and intelligence upon which viable planning could be based.

(5) Planning requirements completely unrelated to JMWTF A capabilities, unsupported by proper policy guidance as to national policy, without allocation of resources necessary for operations, and seemingly inconsistent with national intelligence estimates diverted from the effort to evolve a workable plan for support of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62. This was particularly serious in view of the limited unconventional warfare experience in the JMWTF A staff.

e. Communications:

(1) Pre-emergency planning gaps in frequency allocations, recognition signals and link up communications requirements were a cause of major concern in the first two weeks of planning.

(2) Cryptographic clearances and devices which were required for COMJMWTF A command and control denied JMWTF A headquarters direct communications with component forces and adjacent headquarters for the first week of operations.

(3) Pre-emergency planning gaps in communications equipment requirements and procurement lead times led to acquisition of equipment from JMWTF A component forces at the expense of their capability to support themselves in case of displacement to CUBA. This situation had not been corrected as of 1 December 1962.

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f. Funding.

Prior planning for funding was not in sufficient detail. No provision had been made prior to activation for financial arrangements which would provide the necessary funding for establishment of the headquarters or to obtain supplies and equipment on an emergency basis.

g. Force Tabs.

(1) The uni-service allocation of Special Forces assets without a positive control by JCS as to priorities aggravated by transitional reorganization associated with the Special Action Force concept found Special Forces with a dearth of area and linguistically qualified personnel.

(2) Incomplete pre-emergency planning failed to develop full requirements for Special Forces participation in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62. This was particularly apparent in liaison requirements.

h. Training.

(1) The operation demonstrated a need for Special Forces amphibious training in submarine infiltration techniques.

(2) Air ground training demonstrated the need for additional training of both Air Force personnel and Special Forces in the conduct of unconventional warfare air operations.

7. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

25 October 1962

JWTFB activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Headquarters opened, security and communications established, and skeleton staff reported for duty.

Major General (then Brig Gen) William P. Yarborough assumed command.

Two JWTFB liaison officers sent to HQ, CINCLANT.

26 October 1962

Remaining personnel listed in Appendix IV to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 reported for duty with the exception of CIA operations personnel, Navy Logistics Officer, and two Marine liaison officers.

JWTFB component forces headquarters activated, less CIA Forces, and commanders designated.

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26 October 1962
(continued)

Component forces activated and OPCON assigned commanders concerned, less Naval Forces listed in Appendix II to Annex Y, CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61.

Reconnaissance party dispatched to OPA LOCKA Air Base, Florida to determine suitability for JMWTF A Advance Staging and Recovery Base.

Area study of three UW areas, emphasizing Area I, initiated by ARJMWTF A.

CINCLANT authorized COMJMWTF A direct liaison with CINCLANT component commanders and requested CINCLANT component force commanders direct liaison with COMJMWTF A.

OPA LOCKA Air Base, Florida designated Advance Staging and Recovery Base.

JMWTF A issued warning order to ARJMWTF A to open, with AFJMWTF A, the Advance Staging and Recovery Base; prepared to receive, store, and secure 5,000-man CIA guerrilla warfare prepack in air delivery form, and to receive and restage Special Forces "A" Detachments for employment in CUBAN operational areas.

JMWTF A requested CINCLANT approval to develop own external assets for use in CUBAN operations.

Three COMCARIB Special Forces "A" Detachments reported and assigned to OPCON ARJMWTF A.

28 October 1962

JMWTF A issued AFJMWTF A Movement order to deploy initial cadre to joint Staging and Recovery Base at OPA LOCKA and on order, be prepared to move additional personnel, equipment and aircraft to achieve full operational status.

JMWTF A requested COMSUBLANT to preposition two submarines at KEY WEST, Florida for support of JMWTF A amphibious infiltration operations.

JMWTF A initiated movement

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28 October 1962
(continued)

JUNTA proposed CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS for support
CINCLANT OPLAN's 312 and 316 dispatched to CINCLANT.

JUNTA liaison with CINCLANT component task forces
confirmed by CINCLANTFLT.

29 October 1962

ARJUNTA and AFJUNTA elements closed [at Advance Staging
and Recovery Base OPA LOCKA]. Communications opened to
COMJUNTA and SPOB.

30 October 1962

JUNTA PLAN FOR EXECUTION of JUNTA CONCEPT OF OPERA-
TIONS dispatched to CINCLANT and JUNTA component
forces.

JUNTA informed CINCLANT that ARJUNTA would furnish
liaison detachment to TF 123, and Special Forces "B"
Detachment with TF 125 would accomplish ARJUNTA/
JUNTA liaison. Detachment at US NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO
for liaison with TG 129.7 and eventual liaison with
TG 129.2.

31 October 1962

1 November 1962

Two submarines on station at KEY WEST, Florida on
twelve hour standby for support of JUNTA operations.

JUNTA TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES for execution of
JUNTA CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS dispatched to CINCLANT and
JUNTA component forces.

2 November 1962

JUNTA designated Guerrilla Warfare Area IV in CURA for
planning purposes.

ARJUNTA directed, on order, to dispatch one liaison
officer to Landing Group West (TG 129.1) and one liaison
team (SP "B" Det) to landing Group East (TG 129.2) to
be prepositioned at GUANTANAMO Defense Group (TG 123.7).

SCUBA lockout training from submarine USS SPIKEFISH
commenced vicinity NORFOLK, Virginia.

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3 November 1962

CINCLANT approved [RECOVERY PLAN for recovery Special Forces] and other selected personnel from operational areas dispatched to JMWEEA component forces.

[REDACTED]

CINCLANT approved dispatch of liaison detachment to [COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO]

JMWEEA changed [boundaries of UW Areas I and II.]

Two Special Forces "A" Detachments, scheduled for infiltration from submarines, initiated training exercise from submarines USS SEA CAT and USS TIBANTE vicinity of MAYPORT, Florida.

4 November 1962

CINCLANT approved JMWEEA CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

Joint AFJMWEEA-ARJMWEEA [air operations commenced with instruction, training, and use of CIA procured HET-2 Homing Beacon.]

Submarine training completed and Special Forces Detachments returned to OPA LOCKA.

5 November 1962

Two SEAL Team detachments (one Officer, five EM each) prepositioned at KEY WEST for support JMWEEA infiltration and recovery operations.

CINCLANT notified by JMWEEA of [capability to provide 112 CUBAN NATIONALS for Marine Expeditionary Force use.]

SCUBA submarine lock-out training [vicinity NORFOLK, Virginia completed and personnel returned to FT BRAGG, N. C.]

6 November 1962

ARJMWEEA liaison detachment [(SF "B" Det) closed at] [US NAV BASE GUANTANAMO].

JMWEEA requested CINCLANT to procure activation [CIA-DOD Agreement so that JMWEEA could obtain access to CIA developed intelligence and external and internal assets.]

7 November 1962

COMARJMWEEA notified to plan for use of command and control detachment [in CUBA to exercise OPCON all] [committed Special Forces.]

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- 8 November 1962 JMWTF A dispatched to AFJMWTF A preliminary AIR MISSION REQUIREMENTS beginning E-day CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62.
- 9 November 1962 Planning and preparations for operations continued.
- 10 November 1962 DO
- 11 November 1962 DO
- 12 November 1962 COMJMWTF A requested two days submarine infiltration training in FLORIDA KEYS area for OPA LOCKA pre-positioned Special Forces "A" Detachments.
- 13 November 1962 Planning and preparation for operations continued.
- 14 November 1962 COMJMWTF A authorized ARJMWTF A to return OPA LOCKA prepositioned Special Forces "A" Detachments to Fort Bragg upon completion submarine training 16-17 November 1962.
- 15 November 1962 Two Special Forces "A" Detachments, two SEAL Team Detachments and CIA observers embarked on submarine USS SEA CAT and USS TIRANIE from KEY WEST, Florida for training in Florida Keys area.
- 16 November 1962 Planning and preparation for operations continued.
- 17 November 1962 JMWTF A dispatched COMMAND AND CONTROL PLAN for operations in CUBA, subsequent to D+2 for OPLAN 316-62, to JMWTF A component forces; JMWTF A JW staff to be integrated in JTF CUBA HQ and ARJMWTF A-AFJMWTF A command and control elements to establish Joint Command Post vicinity SAN ANTONIO DE LOS BARRIOS airfield for coordination air support operations.
- JMWTF A directed AFJMWTF A and ARJMWTF A to establish Joint Command Post at OPA LOCKA, Florida for coordination of infiltration, air support, and supply and resupply from or through OPA LOCKA.
- 18 November 1962 Planning and preparation for operations continued.
- 19 November 1962 DO
- 20 November 1962 DO

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- 21 November 1962 ARJUFWA submitted [weight and cube data for deployment of command and control element to CUBA.]
- 22 November 1962 Planning and preparation for operations continued.
- 23 November 1962 JUFWA dispatched warning order to component forces on EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT; implementation on stand-down to DEFCON 5 or CINCLANT order. Purpose to test [pre-positioning and infiltration phases of JUFWA OPLAN 314/316-62.]
- 24 November 1962 Planning and preparations for operations continued.
- 25 November 1962 DO
- 26 November 1962 JUFWA endorsed JUFWA Letter, subject: "Recommended Change to Troop List in COMJUFWA OPLAN 314/316-62" to CINCLANT. Distribution of DRAFT COMJUFWA Contingency OPLAN 314/316-62 made to CINCLANT, CINCLANT component headquarters, and JUFWA component forces for concurrence, comments, and recommendations.
- Proposed Joint Table of Distribution for JUFWA dispatched to CINCLANT outlining full wartime complement, planning staff, and augmentation to bring planning staff to full wartime complement.
- 27 November 1962 CINCLANT approved EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT for planning; implementation on CINCLANT approval within 72 hours after relaxation from DEFCON 3.
- ARJUFWA submitted [weight and cube data for deployment of command and control element to CUBA.]
- 28 November 1962 Planning and preparations for operations continued.
- 29 November 1962 ARJUFWA Liaison detachment [prepositioned at US NAVBASE GUANTANAMO] returned to FORT BRAGG, N. C.
- JUFWA informed CINCLANT that EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT would be three-day exercise; [air infiltration at FORT BRAGG and sea infiltration in FLORIDA KEYS AREA on D+1 and exercise completed on exfiltration D+2.]
- CINCLANT ordered execution EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT; E-day designated 30 November 1962.

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30 November 1962

CINCLANT confirmed JWTFB relaxation to modified DEFCON 5 with modifying instructions to follow.

EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT initiated.

1 December 1962

CINCLANT instructions for JWTFB stand-down to DEFCON 5 not yet clarified.

4 December 1962

EXERCISE DEVIL'S TRIDENT completed. Results marginal because of adverse weather and extreme atmospheric communication interference.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Enclosures

- A. Omitted
- B. Summary of J2 Activities
- C. Summary of J3 Activities
- D. Summary of J4 Activities
- E. Summary of J6 Activities

EVERETT R. MEERER
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

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