

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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SEP 62
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NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CIA
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.

h. General Carter urged that, in connection with [number 22 ¹ (submarine broadcasts)] General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. [Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in reeking the Cuban economy.

PERTINENT BACKGROUND

4. [The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 [redacted] sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of [redacted]

*State
specifications
6(1)(c)*

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of [Redacted] but that we must avoid external activities such as [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(1)(B)(C)
Sub
specimens
in blue
6(1)(C)

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

1, 2, 4, 5

6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other responsibilities beyond those envisaged in the MONCOSE program

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(4B)(c)

State
exposés
in blue
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