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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PRIORITY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE
21 MAY - 30 JUNE 1962

TASK

POLITICAL

1. Obtain some special and significant action within the OAS organization against the Castro-Communist regime.
   (STATE)

2. Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban workers, students, farmers, and freedom.
   (STATE)

PURPOSE

To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

Members of OAS need to be inspired to push some special action through. Current events offer a number of opportunities for exploitation through such OAS bodies as the Commission on Human Rights, the Peace Committee, the Council of Jurists, and the Children's Institute, as well as the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

Under the Ambassador's initiative, each Country Team by now has the means to generate more open and active commitment of Latin American political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, and military leaders. One significant action in each Latin American country, for hard impact on Cuba, is a minimum need.
To produce material for major psychological impact on Cuba, undermining the power and prestige of the hierarchy of the Castro regime.
4. Develop a suggested platform of Cuban political-economic objectives for possible adoption by Cubans in freeing their country. (STATE)

5. Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA)

For the guidance of Operation Mongoose personnel, particularly in the selection and readying of agents to ensure that they are committed to acceptable political beliefs before introduction into Cuba.

These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have purposeful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support the project.

There are a number of statements of Cuban political objectives, including drafts by State and CIA. What is needed now, and promptly, is a single working document for the guidance of U.S. operational staffs.

CIA and State both have had roles with the CRC and others. Cuban leaders also make contact at a number of high offices of the U.S. government. For the good of the U.S., the Cuban refugees, and our project, there must be coordinated management. The Director, Central Intelligence, should have this responsibility, particularly with leaders of the stature of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona.
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<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL</td>
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<td>6. Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (STATE)</td>
<td>To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public.</td>
<td>This has been a normal State-chaired working group. It needs to be sharply geared to the project's operations, including consideration of declassifying material for operational use. Defense should be added to the membership. It is possible that USIA should assume leadership.</td>
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<td>7. Make strong, repetitive theme on radio broadcasts to Cuba of the overwhelming disapproval throughout the Western Hemisphere of the Castro-Communist regime, along with sympathy for the captive Cubans. (USIA)</td>
<td>To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control over the Cuban people and the lower echelons of the regime's bureaucracy.</td>
<td>This is to make full use of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere.</td>
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8. Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors, as dramatic witness against the Castro-Communist regime. (USIA)

To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control and to build the tone for anti-Castro actions in the Western Hemisphere.

9. Ready the "Voice of Cuba" for radio broadcast. (CIA)

To provide a ready capability for giving a "voice" to encourage resistance elements inside Cuba and to undermine the morale of the Castro regime.

Note the inclusion of defectors in this task; it is still a CIA task to produce the defectors. Also, this task includes exploitation of Dr. Miro Cardona's intensely moving statement at the end of the Armstrong Circle Theater drama, "Anatomy of Betrayal."

Initially, this would be for brief news broadcasts of local events inside Cuba, simulating a location in Cuba, but actually located off-shore. A plan of how best to do this, with the proposed program format, is needed to obtain policy decision.
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<td><strong>10. Ready a propaganda action, for balloon delivery. (CIA)</strong></td>
<td>To provide a ready capability for low-risk propaganda dissemination inside Cuba.</td>
<td>A plan of how best to do this, including types of propaganda content (with thought given for delivery of symbolic gifts, such as scarce foods or medicines, as well as leaflets), is required for decision. It is noted that USIA has a brief recording of Castro's broadcasts, sharply contrasting his promises when he took power with what he said when he admitted his Communist affiliation; these could be put on cheap plastic discs and into leaflets.</td>
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<td><strong>11. Deliver copies of Time magazine, with Blas Roca cover story, into Cuba. (CIA)</strong></td>
<td>To make the truth available to the Cuban people about the Communist regime.</td>
<td>This is seen as smuggling in copies, for passing from hand-to-hand. The smuggling could be done by [c].</td>
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12. Intensify psychological effort at Guantanamo. (DEFENSE)

To make fullest possible use of the existing Cuban labor population on the base.

13. Create musical and visual symbols to express anti-regime sentiments. (USIA)

To provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime.

Activities include sports broadcasts, in Spanish, over the base radio station on ball games, news broadcasts using regular wire service news, and making Spanish-language periodicals and literature available for reading on base. USIA has a number of selected titles, published in Mexico and Rio, for stocking base libraries. Also, USIA has a number of VOA "backgrounder" and refugee interviews on tape which could be used for radio broadcasts to Cuban employees on the base.

New words to a favorite song, a new tune, a visual symbol for wall-painting, a hand symbol as easy to do as "V for Victory," are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call on CIA for assistance, since some thought has been given to this already.
PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued

14. Select a sabotage operation. (CIA)

To make a psychological impact upon the regime and public, which symbolizes popular resistance to the regime and which causes talk encouraging to resistance.

CONSIDERATIONS

CIA should select a feasible sabotage operation, a "showy" one against the regime, but not against the people, and present a specific proposal for approval.

INTELLIGENCE

15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA)

To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is adequate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions.

Feasibility depends on CIA's judgment, both operationally and for depth of intelligence required. The schedule was for 14 teams, 2 singleton agents, 14 b143 and 260 travellers by the end of May.
INTELLIGENCE - continued

16. Intensify use of collection for specific psychological information which can be exploited in propaganda. (CIA)

To provide material for operations putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage.

Really current "inside" news tips can do most to undermine the regime's morale and interest the Cuban public. Classification may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a priority.

17. Intensify the exploitation of the intelligence potential which exists on the base at Guantanamo. (DEFENSE)

To take the fullest possible advantage of this open U.S. "listening post" on Cuban soil.

ONI can call upon CIA for assistance. A communication link to Miami would permit use of extensive CIA background information available there and leads for further exploitation, not only for positive intelligence, but also for counter-intelligence. A number of further steps are possible.
18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA)

19. Develop a real dual-purpose capability of intelligence teams in building up the agent pool for infiltration. (CIA)

Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA mount such operations with Cuban or Latin American personnel, an acceptable means must be found promptly. CIA, with Defense assistance, as a priority will review feasible means of mounting these operations, and recommend the most practical method for a policy decision.

While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anticipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be trained for possible introduction in September, it is known that at least 3 months "lead time" is required for minimum selection and training. That means now. It is possible that Defense can be of far more help than called upon at present. Also, it is possible that further policy guidance might be required.

To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed.

To assure that skills needed for guerrilla operations are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made.
**TASKS**

**MILITARY** - continued

20. Induct Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces for training. (DEFENSE)

**ECONOMIC**

21. Tighten effect of sanctions by increased effort to enlist further participation by NATO nations, Mexico, Japan, and others. (STATE)

**PURPOSE**

20. To fulfill Cuban exile leadership desires and to build up a potential reserve for possible future military action inside Cuba.

21. To further restrict Cuba's economy.

22. To worsen Cuba's economic situation.

**CONSIDERATIONS**

For instance, gangster elements should offer a possible means to accomplish this task, particularly in Cuban cities. This could be a test mission for alleged resistance cells, without undue risk to "noise level."
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