

## Agency Information

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TO : CHAIRMAN, JCS  
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Subject:  
Memo w/attachment

DOCID	AGENCY NAME
24142739	
Sent TO:	Office of the Secretary of Defense <i>Declassified in full 11/7/2017</i>
Sent TO:	Central Intelligence Agency

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date 14 October 1963

To: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba

It is recommended that you approve, sign and forward the attached memorandum to the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs.

Declassified SECRET

Authority: AMJL (89)  
HPM/LSF Date 5/4/05

*V. H. Krulak*  
V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC

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*I concur in this recommendation.  
At the last Standing Group meeting,  
when I mentioned these possible  
measures for action in Cuba, CIA  
representative said that a plan was needed.*

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(A)

21 OCT 1963

DM-949-63

Regraded SECRET  
Authority: *RU 2189*  
By: *SPN/LSR Date 5/4/05*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE  
AGENT FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Covert Actions Against Cuba (TS)

*Orig + 1 to Secy State*

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose for consideration two forms of covert action; both possible of accomplishment at relatively small cost and both capable of contributing to the disruption of tranquility in Cuba. The actions contemplated are:

- a. The introduction of counterfeit currency, and
- b. The introduction of small arms and ammunition.

2. The widespread dissemination of well made, difficult-to-recognize counterfeit currency among the Cuban populace would serve to degrade the value of genuine currency and would generate serious problems for Cuban governmental authorities. They would be compelled either to call in and replace all currency in circulation, an expensive and troublesome procedure, or, alternatively, to impose penalties for possession of the illegal bills and accept the consequent enforcement problems. In either case, there would be an adverse effect upon the economic life of the country, and thus, upon its internal stability.

3. With respect to small arms, it is noted that one of Castro's early acts in 1959 was totally to disarm the private citizenry, thereby removing a critical threat to his totalitarian regime. Since that time he has had relatively little to fear from internal violence. If now we were covertly to introduce in many areas of Cuba quantities of small and simple weapons and ammunition, including pistols and disguised lethal devices easily concealed on the person, some would come into the possession of people who would have a willingness to use them, although it is recognized that many of the weapons so introduced would fall into the hands of the Castro Government. Nevertheless, as more individual Cubans gained possession of a weapon, the internal threat to functionaries of the Castro Government would grow, as would problems of investigation, enforcement and discipline. Incidents of assassination of oppressive officials and

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other armed action might be expected to increase. Castro would be faced with the requirement to buy up the arms or to engage in extensive enforcement activities, in which latter case conditions might reach such levels of severity as to alienate progressively greater segments of the citizenry. In either event, the net effect of introducing quantities of small arms would be to disturb internal tranquility and provide a growing base of discontent among the people.

4. Introduction of counterfeit currency should be accomplished gradually over an extended period by maritime infiltration, utilizing the available agent network. Random scattering of currency from the air, while feasible, would lessen the effectiveness of the operation, since the Castro Government would be immediately alerted and could take prompt countermeasures. Small weapons and ammunition, on the other hand, could best be distributed widely by means of aircraft, piloted by Cubans, which, in a series of aerial forays throughout Cuba, would drop quantities of individually packaged weapons attached to small parachutes. Weapons could also be introduced by sea.

5. These operations can be conducted in such a way as to be plausibly deniable by the United States. Cover would be provided by the widespread and highly publicized anti-Castro activities of refugee groups based in Latin America. In this regard, it has already been reported in the press that U.S. Treasury officials recently arrested certain Cuban refugees in this country who were engaged in printing counterfeit Cuban currency. This would support future denials by the U.S. of responsibility for any counterfeiting activity.

6. It is recommended that a program involving the actions described herein be developed in detail by the Central Intelligence Agency. It is further recommended that the results of the Agency analysis be forwarded to the appropriate inter-agency group for consideration as to the feasibility and desirability of early implementing actions.

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense 4 3

Prepared by: LtCol Smith - 15 Oct 63

CM File 4 9

File 0 4 10

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1-5 - SJCS  
1-6 - Krulek

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE AGENT  
FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba (TS)

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6. It is recommended that a program involving the actions described herein be <sup>developed in detail</sup> undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency. *It is further recommended that the results of the Agency analysis be forwarded to the appropriate inter-agency group for review as to the feasibility and desirability of early implementing actions.*  
cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense



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23 SEP 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Preliminary Planning on DOD Support of CIA Covert Operations Against Cuba (TS)

Reference: Secretary of the Army Memorandum, subject: DOD Support of Covert Operations Conducted by the CIA Against Cuba (TS), dated September 23, 1963

By reference memorandum I have requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the desirability of prearranging DOD air or surface support for the protection of CIA raiding craft in the event such craft are subjected to hot pursuit in international waters by Cuban aircraft or surface vessels. In the event an affirmative decision is subsequently made on this policy question, CIA may request DOD support for the sabotage operation approved by the Special Group on September 5, 1963, which provides for the sabotage of a lumber mill at Marabi in northern Oriente. This operation was originally scheduled for September 25, however, I am informed it will now be conducted on the night of September 28-29, 1963.

In view of the possibility that DOD will be directed to support this operation on short notice and since detailed preliminary planning and coordination with CIA is essential, I am convinced that we must initiate this planning today if we are to be prepared to provide support for this operation. The short span of time presently available already reduces our flexibility for providing effective support.

In order to get this planning underway without delay, may I suggest that appropriate representatives of the Joint Staff be designated to work with Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr. (extension 79235) in developing

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a support plan which can be implemented on short notice if directed. Mr. Callfano has advised General Krulak and his staff of the nature of this problem and CIA is prepared to meet with DOD representatives to accomplish necessary coordination.

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of the Army

REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

CONTROL NUMBER

DATE RECEIVED 6998  
23 Sept 63

RETURN TO: Office, Chairman, JCS  
Room 2-E 865, The Pentagon

**SENSITIVE TOP SECRET**

DOCUMENT NUMBER

Memo from Cyrus Vance,

COPY NUMBER

Orig + 2 (Cys 1-3)

CLASSIFICATION

DATE OF DOCUMENT

23 Sept 63

SUBJECT: Secretary of the Army

Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations Conducted by the  
Central Intelligence Agency Against Cuba (TS)

The above-described document has been received in this office. Circulation of this document will be limited to individuals indicated below. The document will be returned to the Administrative Office for record prior to dispatch to another office, or other disposition. *THIS FORM WILL NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.*

TO	NAME	INITIAL	REMARKS
	CHAIRMAN, JCS		Orig + 1 (cys 1-2) - SJCS for action
1	EXECUTIVE		
2	SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy)		
3	CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP <i>Smith</i>	<i>S</i>	
	MILITARY ASSISTANT (PA)		
	MILITARY ASSISTANT (L&L)		
	ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT		
	SECRETARY TO CHAIRMAN		

*File 0*  
*PK*

*m*

23 SEP 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations  
Conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency Against  
Cuba (TS)

A program of covert operations against Cuba conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with assets under their control was approved some time ago by highest authority. Externally launched operations already conducted under the program have not included Department of Defense (DOD) support during the actual operational phases nor is such support provided for under the approved program. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the CIA will in the immediate future raise the issue of prearranged DOD support, on a contingency basis, in the event CIA controlled raiding vessels are subjected to hot pursuit in international waters by either Cuban aircraft or surface vessels. Under existing Rules of Engagement, the prearrangement of DOD support of this type will require approval by the highest authority.

The presentation of a DOD position on this sensitive policy question will probably be required at the next meeting of the Special Group (NSC 5412/2) on September 25, 1963. As the DOD Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs, it would be most helpful to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this urgent matter by the close of business on September 24, 1963 so that these views can be fully considered in the development of the DOD position.

In consideration of this policy issue the limitations imposed by currently approved national policy should be adhered to as far as possible. First, there is a continuing requirement to prevent attributability in sabotage operations against Cuba. Second, the provision of DOD support on the contingency basis outlined, should be viewed

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within the scope and pace of the CIA program already approved and under way. Within these parameters, I would appreciate the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following specific questions:

a. Would it be desirable to prearrange DOD air or surface support for the protection of CIA raiding craft of U. S. registry in the event such craft are subjected to hot pursuit in international waters by Cuban aircraft or surface vessels?

b. Is such prearranged support desirable for CIA controlled raiding craft of foreign registry?

(Signed) Cyrus R. Vance

**Cyrus R. Vance**  
**Secretary of the Army**

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