
Agency Information

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510


August 29, 1975


The Honorable Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Buchen:

Pursuant to our understanding, we annex hereto quotations from various documents which may be used in a report on the assassinations allegations. If you have any questions, please contact our counsel.

Sincerely yours,


Frank Church
Chairman


John Tower
Vice Chairman

178-10004-10239

178-10004-10088

178-10003- 10339

178-10003-10105

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UNMARKED
MAY CONTAIN NATL SECURITY INFORMATION

1. 4/24/60 Memo, Sec. of State Herter to President Eisenhower
"the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor can be induced to take over with the assurance of U. S. political, economic, and -- if necessary -- military support."
2. 6/28/60 Memo, CIA to J. C. King
"c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"
3. 7/1/60 CIA memo
"Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end."
4. 10/3/60 CIA memo
"a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to secure cache on the South shore of the island, about 14 miles east of Ciudad Trujillo.
"b. Delivery, to the same cache described above, of an electronic detonating device with remote control features, which could be planted by the dissidents in such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo henchmen. This might necessitate training and introducing into the country by illegal entry a trained technician to set the bomb and detonator."
(Emphasis added)
5. 12/29/60 Special Group Minutes
"the proposed actions would not, of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."
6. 1/12/61 Special Group Minutes
"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project."

7. 1/12/61 Memo, Mann to Merchant
"Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply them with "hardware" of various types. This has included quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persistently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items and devices which they associate with revolutionary effort."
8. 1/12/61 Memo, Scott to Merchant
"agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo"
9. 1/31/61 Cable, Dearborn to Devine
"delighted" "exotic equipment."
10. 2/13/61 CIA memo
"the key to the success of the plot [to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo."
11. 2/16/61 CIA memo
"(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of Trujillo.
(b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire projectiles.
(c) A chemical that could be rubbed on the palm of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.
(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of several miles. (Id.)"
12. 3/16/61 CIA memo
". . . the members of our club are now prepared in their minds to have a picnic but do not have the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have developed a plan for the picnic, which just might work if they could find the proper food. They have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples for a party in the near future but I could remember nothing in my instructions that would allow me to contribute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to the area by another club."

13. 3/24/61 Cable, Headquarters to Station
- ". . . we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition groups and HQS are better prepared to support [assassination]*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with aftermath."
14. 4/11/61 CIA memo for the record
- "especially on the insistence of the [dissidents] that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 .45 caliber SMGs)."
15. 4/7/61 Pouch restriction waiver
- "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issue to a small action group to be used for self-protection."
16. 2/14/61 Special Group Minutes
- "(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."
17. 5/13/61 Berle memo of conversation
- "On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wanted to know what the policy should be.
- "I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert said he felt the same way."
18. 5/4/61 Special Group Minutes
- "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not, and asked what is the status of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point is covered in a Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very near future."

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19. 5/18/61

Special Group Minutes

"Gen. Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U. S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Special Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." (Emphasis supplied)

20.

State Department Document, Select Committee No. 313

- "1. The USG should not lend itself to direct political assassination.
2. US moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world.
3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen.
4. So far we have seen no real evidence of action capability. Should we entrust ourselves and our reputation to this extent in the absence thereof?
5. Can we afford a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons?"

21. 5/15/61

Memo, Battle to Bundy

"at their own initiative and on their own responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance from the U. S. will be promptly and favorably answered."

22. 5/17/61

Cable, Headquarters to Station

"armed assistance"

23. 5/21/61

Cable, Dearborn to State

"too late to consider whether United States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo."

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24. 5/24/61 Cable, Headquarters to Station (not sent)
- "(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
- "(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.
- "former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter."
25. 5/24/61 Memo, Achilles to Bowles
- "for Bundy to present tomorrow morning."
26. 5/26/61 Memo, Bowles to Bundy
- "Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans."
27. 5/26/61 Cable, Smith & Clifton to Bundy & O'Donnell
- ". . . we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation." "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position."
28. 5/20/61 Cable, Station to Headquarters
- "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn."

29. 7/22/60 Cable, Havana to Director
"calculated risk"
30. 5/14/62 Memo, Edwards to Kennedy
"At the time of the incident neither the Agency nor the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation."
31. 5/14/62 Memo, Edwards to Kennedy
"Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that Phyllis McGuire might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friend of McGuire's."
32. 5/14/62 Memo, Edwards to Kennedy
"Approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba."
33. 8/1/62 Contact Report, Case Officer 1
"could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba."
34. 8/7-10/62 Contact Report, Case Officer 1
"It was not the act that he objected to, but merely the choice of the word used to describe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable."
35. 8/16/63 Cable, Station to Headquarters
"Have no intention give AMLASH-physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative."
36. 11/18/63 Memo, Case Officer 2
"C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMLASH-1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include...high powered rifles with scopes..."

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37. 4/4/62

Memo for record, Edwards

"any prosecution in the matter would endanger sensitive sources and methods used in a duly authorized intelligence project and would not be in the national interest."

38. 4/26/62

Memo, Houston to Edwards

"no major difficulty in stopping action for prosecution."

"doubted if we would want to give the full story to anyone else in the Department."

"operational details."

"on grounds of security."

39. 5/14/62

Memo for record, Edwards

"conducted during the period approximately August 1960 to May 1961."

"After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through Maheu to Roselli to call off the operation and Roselli was told to tell his principal that the proposal to pay \$150,000 for completion of the operation had been definitely withdrawn."

39a. 5/14/62

Memo for record, Edwards

"On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject (Roselli) for the future."

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40. 8/13/62 Memo, Lansdale to Harvey
- "liquidation of leaders."
- "In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission."
- "I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the heading of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military."
41. 8/13/62 Memo, Lansdale to Harvey
- "Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, [words deleted], Economic, (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary." (Lansdale, Ex. 15, p. 1).
42. 8/14/62 Memo, Harvey to Helms
- "including liquidation of leaders."
43. 8/14/62 Memo, Harvey to Helms
- "The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Lansdale Ex. 16).
44. 8/14/62 Memo, Harvey to Helms
- "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document."
- "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it."
45. 8/14/62 Memo, Harvey to Helms
- "a matter of official record."
- "is not expecting any written comments or study on this point."

46. 8/10/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"stepped-up Course B"
47. 8/8/62 Memo for Special Group Augmented
"exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military."
48. 8/10/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists."
49. 8/10/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion."
50. 8/10/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall objective [of Mongoose] from one of overthrowing the Castro regime."
51. 8/10/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"old-line Communists."
52. 8/10/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split." (August Memorandum, p. 2).

* * *

"Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15." (August 10 Memorandum, p. 3).

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53. 8/13/62

Memo, Lansdale to Harvey

"in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B. Indeed, pursuant to the August 10 decision to adopt McCone's proposal for a more limited plan that assumed Castro's continuation in power, Lansdale's memorandum stated that a CIA paper titled "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort) will be used as the starting basis."

54. 8/10/62

Minutes, Special Group Augmented

"will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary type blood bath if unsupported."

"emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of military force."

"would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising."

55. 4/14/67

Memo, McCone

"I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro."

"I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG (U.S. Government) and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds." (McCone Ex. 4).

"At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy." (McCone, Ex. 4).

"Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because Operation Mongoose--an inter-departmental affair--was under the operational control of (the Defense Department)... (McCone Ex. 4).

56. 8/14/62

Memo, Harvey to Lansdale

"the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point."

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57. 6/24/66 Memo, Osborn to Helms
"the DCI was briefed and gave his approval."
(6/24/66)
58. 5/14/62 Memo for record, Edwards
"then briefed the proper senior officials of [the] Agency."
"duly orally approved."
"knowledge."
"kept to a total of six persons."
59. 5/14/62 Memo for record, Edwards
"cautioned him [Harvey] that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence."
60. 11/3/60 Minutes, Special Group
"Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities."
61. 4/26/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
["field trip to Miami upon his return."]
62. 8/16/63 Memo, Helms to McCone
"vaguely aware."
"I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment."

63. 4/22/61 Letter, President Kennedy to Taylor
- "our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fall short of outright war."
64. 6/13/61 Memo No. 4, Report to the President
- "We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics."
- * * *
- "It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro."
65. 7/21/61 Memo for record, Special Group Meeting
- "is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S."
66. 10/5/61 NSAM 100
- "In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency."
67. 10/6/61 Minutes, Special Group
- "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene."
68. 10/6/61 Memo for record, Special Group Meeting
- "a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene."
69. 10/5/61 Memo for record, Parrott
- "what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene."

70. 10/5/61 Memo for record, Parrott
"the presence and positions of Raul (Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account."
71. 10/5/61 Memo for record, Parrott
"the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned."
72. 10/5/61 Memo for record, Parrott
"on the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned."
73. 10/5/61 Memo for record, Parrott
"contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the Cuban scene."
74. 1961 "The Situation and Prospect in Cuba," CIA Board of National Estimates.
"His (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime... (i)ts principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a common danger."
"some sort of power struggle would almost certainly develop eventually."
"significantly."
75. Cover letter to CIA Estimate Report, Lansdale
"seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your project."
76. 1961 Report, CIA Board of National Estimates
"it is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising ...could be fomented."
77. Cover letter to CIA Estimate Report, Lansdale
"conclusion of fact quite outside the area of intelligence."
78. 11/15/61 Memo, Lansdale to Kennedy
"picture of the situation has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba."

79. 11/30/61 Memo, White House to Secretary of State, et al.
 "use our available assets...to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime."
80. 1/19/62 Memo, McManus
 "Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible."
 "...a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov[ernment]. No time, money, effort -- or manpower is to be spared."
 "'Yesterday...the President had indicated to him' that final chapter had not been written -- its got to be done and will be done."
81. 1/20/62 Memo, Lansdale
 "demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command."
82. 1/30/62 Minutes, Special Group
 "policy determination."
83. 2/20/62 "Program Review of Cuba Project," Lansdale
 "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime."
 "Resistance."
 "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders."
 "This should be a 'Special Target' operation...Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police -- G2 [intelligence] officials."
 (Id., p. 151.)
84. 1/30/62 Memo, Craig to Lansdale
 "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban Communist hierarchy."
 "system of financial regards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists."
 "informer."
 "government officials."
 "2c"

85. 11/30/62 Memo, President Kennedy
"kept closely informed."
86. 3/2/62 Memo, Lansdale
"popular revolution."
87. 3/5/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"...any actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the Special Group for resolution."
88. 3/5/62 "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose."
"The Special Group (5412 Augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the (Mongoose) project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress."
89. 3/5/62 Memo, Lansdale to Helms
"for each week as far into the next twelve months as possible ...the members and type of agents you will establish inside Cuba...(and) brief descriptions...of actions contemplated."
90. 4/11/62 Memo, Lansdale
"be submitted to the Special Group for decision, ad hoc."
91. 4/10/62 Memo, Harvey to McCone
"To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying."
92. 9/14/62 Memo, Special Group Augmented Meeting
"...made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis."

93. 3/5/62 Minutes, Special Group Meeting
"preliminary actions...involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents."
"keep its hand tightly."
"that many of the agents infiltrated would be of an all-purpose type; that is, they would be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although every effort will be made to attempt such control."
94. 10/16/62 Memo, Helms
"pointed out that (Mongoose) had been underway for a year ...that there had been no acts of sabotage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice."
95. 11/5/62 Memo, McManus to Helms
"During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals."
96. 4/11/62 Memo, Lansdale
"essentially an intelligence collection."
97. 3/14/62 "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose."
"immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts in the coming months."
"short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt."
98. 3/2/62 Memo, Lansdale
"must be inconspicuous."
99. 8/8/62 Memo, Lansdale for Special Group Augmented
"stepped-up Course B plus."
100. 8/10/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"CIA variant."
"old-line Communists."

101. 10/4/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented Meeting
"is concerned about progress on the Mongoose program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations."
"considerably more sabotage."
"all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime."
102. 8/23/62 NSAM 100
"in light of evidence of new Bloc activity in Cuba."
"with all possible speed."
103. 10/4/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented
"for the time being."
104. 10.16.62 Memo, Helms
"more personal attention."
105. 9/9/62 Minutes, Special Group Augmented Meeting
"It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered."
106. 8/31/62 Memo, Lansdale to Special Group Augmented
"to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions."
107. 9/12/62 Memo, Lansdale to Taylor, Rusk, and McNamara
"emphasizing such activity."
"cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel."
"considerations will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel."
108. 4/19/62 Memo, Lansdale to Special Group
"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific information on the status of agent training and operations should be made available."

109. 4/26/62 Memo, Lansdale to Special Group [Augmented]
"initiating a new series of agent infiltrations."
110. 4/26/62 Memo for record, McCone
"attend the next meeting and report on agent activities."
111. 4/27/62 Memo, Elder to Harvey
"immediately on your return to discuss the Task Force activities."
112. 5/3/62 Memo, Harvey on Special Group Augmented Meeting
"agent teams."
"general field of intelligence."
113. 4/14/67 Memo, McCone to Helms
"dispose of Castro."
"knock off Castro."
"the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba."

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114. 1/13/60 Memo, Special Group Meeting
"the CIA did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro"
115. 3/14/60 Special Group Minutes
"there was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevera should disappear simultaneously."
116. 11/3/60 Special Group Minutes
"whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara"
"that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities."
117. 3/14/60 Special Group Minutes
"Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger they might move into control."