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SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy

Washington, D.C.

Monday, July 17, 1978

Deposition of

RAYMOND G. ROCCA

called for examination by counsel for the subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee
on Assassinations, Room 3501, House Annex No. 2, Second and D
Streets, S.W., Washington, D.C., beginning at 9:50 o'clock,
A.M., when were present:

For the subcommittee:

Michael Goldsmith, Staff Counsel

Charles Berk, Staff Counsel,

Elizabeth Berning, Notary.

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Ms. Berning. What is the witness' name?

Mr. Goldsmith. Raymond Rocca.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Rocca, would you stand please, and
raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to
give is true and correct?

Mr. Rocca. I do.

Ms. Berning. Thank you.
Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state your name and address for the record, sir?

Mr. Rocca. Raymond G. Rocca. R-O-C-C-A.

The address is 400 Linden -- L-I-N-D-E-N -- Lane, Falls Church, Virginia. The zip is 22042.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here today voluntarily?

Mr. Rocca. I am, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here without the need to resort to a subpoena on the part of the committee?

Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, do you understand that you have a right to have counsel present today?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. And do you waive that right?

Mr. Rocca. I waive that right.

Mr. Goldsmith. At least for now.

Mr. Rocca. Yep. I expect that I will be able to judge in terms of the caveats indicated here where to ask your indulgence and just set aside and proceed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. No problem.

Have you received a copy of the committee rules and House Resolutions 222, 433, and 760?

Mr. Rocca. I have -- for retention.
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Have you had an opportunity to read Rule Number 4.

Mr. Rocca. I have, indeed. I mean, I've read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it as well?

Mr. Rocca. I understand it to the extent that it's possible under these circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any questions about it now?

Mr. Rocca. I have no questions about it now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under the committee rules, Mr. Rocca, a witness has a right to receive a copy of a deposition transcript. In other words, whenever a witness gives a deposition statement, he has a right to receive a copy of the transcript.

However, the Central Intelligence Agency has asked the committee to request of present and former Agency employees to waive their right actually to receive a copy of the transcript. The Agency is concerned that the transcript has classified information in it and would not want the transcript to leave the committee's secure areas.

So, for that reason, I would like to ask you whether you are willing to waive your right to receive a copy of the transcript. By doing so, however, you would still have the full right to review the transcript for accuracy and to make any necessary corrections. So, all you are waiving is your right to receive a copy.

Mr. Rocca. I do.
Let me say that membership in the Agency has long since comported the waiving of constitutional rights in various respects. This is simply another --

Mr. Goldsmith. I won't be asking you to waive any more rights, I hope.

I would like you to know that the Court Reporter will be asked to certify the transcript as a complete, accurate, and true record of all the testimony given.

Mr. Rocca. Will there be an opportunity to correct it? There are mis-speaking and that kind of thing, whatever that word means. It has just been coined in the last year or so, "I mis-spoke."

Mr. Goldsmith. You will be given an opportunity to review the transcript for accuracy. If, in your opinion, it is not accurate, there is a procedure for rectifying those types of problems.

Now, are you retired from the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Rocca. I am.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of Acting Director Carlucci's 23 March, 1978 letter which, for the record, corresponds with JFK exhibit number 94?

Mr. Rocca. 23 March, 1978 -- I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the letter that specifically discusses the question of secrecy agreements and authorizes Agency employees to respond to relevant questions made by this...
Mr. Rocca. Yes.

It also contains caveats which protect the continued interest in sources and in methods, which I regard as adequate under the circumstances, and therefore I accept this, and I understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. You understand that letter?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. He wants me to tell you all you need to know in order to get your job done.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

I believe the letter indicates that so long as questions relevant to the committee's mandate are addressed to the witness, the Agency is authorizing you to answer those questions.

I would like to have this marked and offered as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Rocca Exhibit Number 1.)

Mr. Rocca. I judge that this is the standard type of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I will indicate for the record that this exhibit is one that we have used for every witness that the committee either knew worked for the Central
Intelligence Agency or thought might have worked for the
Central Intelligence Agency. We have, at times, given the
letter to witnesses who had no connection with the Agency.

How many years were you employed with the CIA?
Mr. Rocca. From its inception in 1937 to the 31st of
December, 1974.
Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold when you
retired in 1974?
Mr. Rocca. I was Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence
staff.
Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold in 1963, at
the time of President Kennedy's assassination?
Mr. Rocca. I was Chief of the Research and Analysis
Division of the CI staff, the Counter Intelligence staff.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is that known as CI/R&A?
Mr. Rocca. That is. Correct.
Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibility, if any, did you
have with regard to the CIA's investigation of the assassination
in 1963?
Mr. Rocca. My responsibilities, in my own words, were
to serve as the working level point of contact and facilitation
to the Warren Commission staff, the working level point of
contact and facilitation.
That was initiated some time in January. There is a
memorandum of record which represented the results of
conversations at about that time, which informed me of this decision. In other words, it was not a thing that I sought.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we go into your responsibilities in more detail, would you describe for the record what the Counter Intelligence Research and Analysis staff did in 1963? In other words, what was the purpose of that unit?

Mr. Rocca. The unit was designed to bring to bear analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant all source, all overt source comprehension: a study of cases that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is, closed cases; to maintain the ongoing record of overall quality and quantity of counter intelligence being performed by the entire DDP operational component; to -- operational component -- the Deputy Director for Plans.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's just in caps -- DDP.

Mr. Rocca. DDP -- I have listed now three functions, broadly speaking. To keep the community informed on the organization's structure and operational potential, that is, the threat of all intelligence services throughout the world, that is, by supervising the writing of an encyclopedic publication, which was called the NIS Section 56 at that time. This was a specific responsibility of the component.

In other words, it was a research support for operational components. The final major function, and this is important, is training. We were responsible for the supervision and
performance of CI training.

So, we kept the CI indicators, the overall record of CI organization throughout the world -- that is, the adversary services -- we worked on cases when they had ceased to be of direct concern to the operational components, and tried to make relationships between cases.

We were concerned, obviously, on the training side in working with other parts of the intelligence community, as well as training inside, and so forth.

I think that those five broad topics -- I could narrow them down --

Mr. Goldsmith. No, that's fine.

Mr. Rocca. I think this is sufficient to get us started.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was in charge of the CIA's investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no formal provision for investigation. The investigation was the FBI's -- not CIA's responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Within CIA, isn't it fair to say that initially Jack Whitten was given responsibility for conducting the investigation?

Mr. Rocca. I don't want to nit-pick your language, but that was not an investigative responsibility, as I understood it.

The GP Floor phase, which he headed up --
Mr. Goldsmith. The GP Floor?

Mr. Rocca. Floor phase.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you define for the record what GP Floor is?

Mr. Rocca. GP Floor was the code name assigned by the DDP, by Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamissines and the desks, to characterize cable traffic during the initial phase of the Agency's relationship with the various authorities and with its own organizations or components overseas. This is a code facilitation, a telegram or telegraphic consideration. And, during that phase, it was indeed Mr. Whitten's responsibility. I think he did an extremely good job.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, GP Floor was a code name which was assigned to cable traffic pertaining to the Kennedy assassination, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, during the period of November through January, and then it was phased out.

Mr. Goldsmith. And Mr. Whitten initially had responsibility for --

Mr. Rocca. Coordinating traffic, for working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world, as far as I know. This was before I got into it.

Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. Whitten no longer had responsibility in that area, who took over the responsibility for coordinating the Agency's investigation?
Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no further cryptonym assigned to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Nevertheless, without a cryptonym being assigned to it—

Mr. Rocca. And therefore cables would go to the DDP, would go to Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamissines, the various desks. In other words, it became a decentralized responsibility.

In other words, there wasn't, as far as I can make out, a formal placement of an investigative responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Informally, who—

Mr. Rocca. I became--or the CI staff and I for the staff became then—because by that time a commission had been formed—had become the point of contact for the commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, informally, the CI staff was responsible for coordinating the CIA's investigation?

Mr. Rocca. This is where I wonder about the use of the term—that is, whatever we had done, whatever we were to do or did to assist the Warren Commission focused in the staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the CI staff.

Mr. Rocca. In the CI staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time, who was in charge of the CI staff?

Mr. Rocca. Mr. Angleton, and Mr. Hunt was his deputy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. E. Howard Hunt?
Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, who is Mr. Hunt?

Mr. Rocca. Mr. Hunt was Mr. James Hunt, a totally different person.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the responsibility for providing information to the Warren Commission was given to the CI staff as opposed to Mr. Whitten?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

I would judge -- and I am guessing now, this is purely a guess -- I never discussed it with him -- that as Chief of the Mexican Desk, which was his former job, the whole parameter of the case had shifted from its initial phase of October and November, where traces came up involving his files and his handling of the initial leads that developed out of the Mexican resources, and that he no longer regarded it as really his primary responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any conflict between Mr. Angleton and Mr. Whitten regarding the manner in which the investigation was to be conducted?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was none, and I did not hear of any at the time -- or since.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that initially Mr. Whitten was given responsibility for the investigation and that Mr. Angleton in some manner interceded in the investigation being conducted by Mr. Whitten?
Mr. Rocca. If so, I do not know this and cannot sustain that allegation, by any information direct or indirect. I have never heard it even as hearsay.

By the whole line of questioning, I judge that you have your own interests.

Really, Mr. Whitten sat here (indicating) in a small desk in WH for the Mexican area. He was in a position to develop through the assets of the Mexico station extremely interesting material, which at the time was not recognized, obviously, as pertaining to anything like what came out of it in October or late September, and that was entirely appropriate to the WH division and area, and functional division.

Mr. Goldsmith. WH stands for Western Hemisphere?

Mr. Rocca. Western Hemisphere -- not White House -- underline that, please, because this is another of the canards.

As I say, it was entirely appropriate in the GP Floor phase that he would have that. But the minute you had a commission set up outside the line obviously had to be the Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions. Here you had Mr. Whitten being asked to sign off on cables that had to do with Netherlands, with U.K., with Australia, and it would have seemed to me utterly administratively simply a hybrid monster.

So, in effect, the concentration of supervisory
authority on the assistance being given the Warren Commission once they got underway was something, as I understand it, negotiated between the Commission itself and Mr. Helms. Mr. Angleton was present. I may have been present at the meeting which decided that R & A would be the point of reference. I cannot recall.

But there is a memorandum -- off the record -- there and you should have it.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is a memorandum for the record which indicates --

Mr. Rocca. In January, which indicates how that thing got off. And it dispells, I think, any idea that there was some kind of internal machination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that memorandum for the record be found -- because we have reviewed many files and have not come across that particular memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it should be found in the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it be in the Oswald file?

Mr. Rocca. It would be in the Oswald file, and it should be around January.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who is the author of that memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. The author of that memorandum must have been Mr. Helms himself, or Mr. Karamissines. It reflected conversations that tookplace with Mr. Rankin. It may be a Warren Commission memorandum.
But that memorandum exists. And, as I say, the memorandum, to me, represented a logical evolution of what had gone on in the development of the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be able to locate that memorandum for the committee?

In other words, do you still have a relationship with the Agency which would permit you to obtain that memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. Well, if you could arrange it for me to go out there, I would.

Can we have a little bit of a diversion now and perhaps go off the record? I want to ask about a number of other people who helped, who would know this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Let's go off the record for a moment. But I don't want to go off the record a whole lot in this deposition.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Rocca. I have no formal knowledge of it by direction or indirection, or hearsay.

Mr. Goldsmith. By "it" you are referring to --

Mr. Rocca. Of such a thing having happened.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have to understand, Mr. Rocca, that we went off the record. So, for the record, by "it," what are you referring to?

Mr. Rocca. The shift of the responsibility for overall
coordination of what the Agency was doing, from WH, Mr. Whitten, to the staff. This was an utterly logical and completely what I would call inevitable in terms of cost effectiveness and everything else.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the shift take place right at the time that the Warren Commission was established?

Mr. Rocca. I have in memory the date 12 January, and this is something that just comes now right out of my head.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. So, it was pursuant to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was the responsibility for the investigation -- I am using that now in an informal sense, because I think you feel more comfortable with that -- why was the responsibility given to CI staff as opposed to some other staff within the DDP?

Mr. Rocca. Because that's our business. CI has the business of dealing with activity involving espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, and the whole works. It is spelled out in I-1, Chapter 5. You will find that absolutely stated formally.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, of all the units within the CIA in 1963, the CI staff, you are saying, was best suited to be responsible for this?

Mr. Rocca. That's right, yes, because, in addition, the staff had the responsibility for the DDP, for maintaining the
relations, the liaison relations, with the office of security within the Agency itself, the office of security, and with the FBI and other agencies. This was by directive 1-1, Chapter 5. I underline the importance of 1-1, Chapter 5.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the CI staff charter?

Mr. Rocca. Charter -- and this shift was precisely directly in line with the implications of that charter. This is my reading now in retrospect.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the line of reporting within the CIA with regard to information that was relevant to the assassination? By line of reporting I mean once information was received, who did it go to?

I am talking now about the time the CI staff was responsible for the investigation.

Mr. Rocca. There were -- this is where you are going off, because the CI staff never displaced Mr. Helms in his direct relations with the Commission. The CI staff never displaced the direct relations between the Soviet Division, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Bagley, with the Commission. The CI staff never displaced the direct relations between Mr. Whitten -- even after it had taken over. In other words, it was a decentralized approach.

Now the material that did come through of a substantive nature developed by these components, and particularly the Soviet division, were brought down in the normal flow of day
to day work. They were reviewed by me or by the assistants I had, and they were Mr. Tom Hall, Mr. Thomas Hall, Ph.D., University of Chicago, in Slavic Studies, and our Russian expert: Mr. Paul Hartman, who was a general research and search man for the whole of the community and its resources; and Mr. Arthur Dooley -- D-O-O-L-E-Y -- a former member of the FBI who had transferred to the Agency many years before.

Now these people actually were dealing with the actual working level in the various divisions, or the various divisional elements, particularly in SB, would be working with me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's see if we can clarify this for a moment.

Overall responsibility was in the hands of Mr. Helms.

Mr. Rocca. That's correct. Now you're talking -- and that never changed.

Mr. Goldsmith. That never changed from the very beginning?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I am concerned, Mr. Helms was in charge, and Mr. Karamissines, his deputy, when he was not there. For sensitive aspects, Mr. Angleton and these two were in charge, or the division people.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton heavily involved in the investigation, other than occasional sensitive matters that arose?

Mr. Rocca. I think not. I think this is a correct
appraisal of his role at that time. He attended the general meetings.

Let me give you an example of what I have in mind.

Though I was the working level point of contact with the committee, that is, I knew Mr. Slawson in particular, and worked, I believe, closely and profitably with him, and without reservation, there was another historian. In any event, I was not cleared for the Nosenko case. So, I did not attend any of the discussions that took place on that matter, and that, too, is a matter of formal record.

You should find that record to back that up -- if you have not found it.

In other words, if you are looking for a fixed point of investigation here, you have to keep in mind that again, you had access to sources and methods and compartmentation was observed, notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level point of contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Nosenko case would be an example of a situation where Mr. Angleton would have been involved.

Mr. Rocca. It was Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton involved as well?

Mr. Rocca. I don't think he was at the meeting that concerned it over at the Warren Commission, because I had the delicious experience of being asked to leave at a certain
stage. I know he wasn't there.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would be an example of a sensitive situation that would prompt Mr. Angleton to have been involved in the investigation?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, he would have known all of that. Whatever else, I have no similar story to tell about him. I have the one to tell about myself and the Nosenko case, which I was not cleared for.

Mr. Goldsmith. But earlier you said that other than sensitive matters, Mr. Angleton basically was not involved in the investigation. I am wondering if you can give an example of a sensitive matter.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would imagine all of the matters involving the intercept of correspondence, of Oswald's correspondence -- which I saw in 1975.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1963, when you were working on this case, you did not see the correspondence, the cable traffic from Mexico City to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact?

Mr. Rocca. Very definitely that is not the case and that is not what I said. I'm talking about the correspondence intercepted.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which intercept are you talking about?

Mr. Rocca. I am talking about the intercepted mail correspondence.
Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

You are talking about the HDLINGUAL program?

Mr. Rocca. I'm talking about that material. He would have handled that.

And indeed, when I read it in 1975, it was clear that Mr. Papich had come over on Saturday morning and had taken all of the material on that file. But that was the first time I knew that that part of -- in other words, there was very strict compartmentation utilized within the whole group in order to protect sources and methods at the time that we were attempting to help this body. That's the point that I'm trying to make.

Mr. Angleton's role would have been, I would have imagined, in that connection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton's role peripheral or central to the investigation?

Mr. Rocca. How can you say with an asset like that that it could be peripheral? I don't know, because I was not privy to the materials. But I could guess that it must have been important for him to put that material of Papich's to use immediately.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how much material was generated by the HDLINGUAL program?

Mr. Rocca. I have no way of really recalling. It was a substantial file and I see no reason why you shouldn't have it.
Then you can answer the question yourself.

Mr. Goldsmith. I want to explain to you, Mr. Rocca, that the mere fact that --

Mr. Rocca. I don't mean to be impertinent.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- files and documents are made available to us doesn't necessarily mean that the files and documents are accurate. One of the reason for taking deposition statements is because files and statements are not always accurate. In fact, one of the purposes of this committee is to verify the accuracy of the Agency's own files.

Mr. Rocca. I take your point on that. Let me say that in one respect, for that reason, the Oswald file, which was the file that R & A kept, that is, the material pertaining to the 201 file -- you can be sure is the file because it was computerized, and you can't change the computer order without leaving a record. Therefore you can be sure that everything that went into it is still in it.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the HO-LINGUAL file, you indicated before, I believe, that the file was a thick one. Is that true?

Mr. Rocca. No, not thick. It must have contained seven or eight letters or so. But the man who would know exactly is Mr. Birch O'Neill. He headed the project.

Mr. Goldsmith. We've spoken to Mr. Birch O'Neill.

Mr. Rocca. I mean, he must know this exactly, then.
He must know this exactly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, the fact that we have talked to other people does not mean that we do not want information from you, if you have that information.

Mr. Rocca. Of course not.

Mr. Goldsmith. To the best of your recollection, how many Oswald intercepts were there in the ESPLINGUAL program?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, this would be -- if you have to -- as I say, I read it in 1975 at the moment the Rockefeller Commission was coming in. I'm sure they looked at the whole thing -- Mr. Ford, or whatever is the name of the individual who was concerned. I went through it cursorily with Mrs. Matson. She is the person who handed me the file. There must have been five, or six, or seven. But this is pure guess. There may be twelve, there may be three -- I can't say.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there more than one?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, there was more than one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Getting back to the question of organization, I think I understand from your testimony --

Mr. Rocca. When I say more than one, it involves both ends, that is, materials going out from Mrs. Oswald and material coming in from him. I don't know what the proportion is or even if there were things coming in, or if it was confined solely to things going out. As I say, this is something
not a part of my bag.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand.

Getting back to the question of organization, I think you have indicated --

Mr. Rocca. So, you have very clearly in mind now that in two areas that were of significance, I was completely cut out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca, I'm sorry to have to ask you this again, but you are going to have to listen to my questions, and please try not to interrupt me.

Finally, getting back to the question of organization, for purposes of clarification, now, I think you've indicated very clearly that in terms of overall responsibility, it was in the hands of Mr. Helms.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, I think you have indicated that the investigation was decentralized to some extent in that different area divisions, primarily Western Hemisphere and Soviet Europe were sending information upstream to headquarters -- and there may have been other divisions as well sending information, but primarily it was Western Hemisphere and Soviet Russia -- is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.
Mr. Helms held weekly meetings at which these
generalizations were spread and which division chiefs complied
with.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, all of the information that the
division chiefs were sending upstream at one time or another,
I believe, went through the CI/R&A staff, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. I can't say that all of them did. Those
that are marked plainly on the record as having been were -- if
they are all, I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I realize that you can't state
that all were. But, as a matter of your best recollection now

Mr. Rocca. Mr. Helms indicated that all material
bearing on anything that could be of assistance to the
Warren Commission should be seen by CI staff and R & A and
marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded
indications -- they were verbal insofar as I know -- that we
were to leave no stone unturned.

Mr. Goldsmith. And were Mr. Helms' orders generally
followed?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, they were followed to the
letter, by all that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, if you were asking different
divisions to send to CI/R & A information pertinent to the
investigation, can we assume safely that most of that
information did, in fact, go to CI/R&A?
Mr. Rocca. Your question turns on most of it. There is no way that I can judge whether most of it did or not. That which struck some division chief or his assistant would have come forward, and much did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming that Mr. Helms' orders were followed?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, assuming that they were followed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Could you indicate for the record how the overall responsibility for the investigation was divided between the FBI and the CIA?

I understand that both organizations have different charters and different purposes. What was your understanding of the CIA's responsibilities for the investigation, as opposed to the FBI's?

Mr. Rocca. Well, as you have already detected, I object, I think, in principle to the use of the word "investigation," to apply to the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how would you like me to phrase the question? I would be glad to do that.

Mr. Rocca. CIA made its entire worldwide resources available to the Commission to assist it in gathering all information within the powers of its operatives and its operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying, then, that the CIA
provided information but it did not conduct an investigation?

Mr. Rocca. But at times it made use of investigative techniques. But I have read enough Bureau reports to know that on a matter of this kind, the primary investigative responsibilities were in the domestic authorities, and that investigations done abroad, even those, were repeated by the Bureau.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Bureau, in effect, was conducting an investigation overseas?

Mr. Rocca. The Bureau was the primary investigative authority.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that point -- which is exactly the point I was trying to make in terms of trying to determine what the different areas of responsibilities were between the Bureau and CIA -- in light of that point, what was the responsibility of the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. The CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that information given directly to the Warren Commission or directly to the Bureau?

Mr. Rocca. It was given to both in many cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, even though the FBI isn't technically authorized to conduct investigations overseas, are you saying that in effect the Bureau was the agency...
primarily responsible for overseas investigations pertaining to the assassination?

Mr. Rocca. On matters that were of substantive interest, I think that is accurate. That is certainly the case in Mexico, where your statement that they are not technically --

Mr. Goldsmith. Authorized.

Mr. Rocca -- authorized, I think is in a grey area, and where it was never contested that they had primary responsibility -- and therefore they repeated investigations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the role of Mr. McConne?

Mr. Rocca. I had no meetings with him during that period that I can recall, at all.

I have nothing to say that would bear on this.

I am sure he authorized complete support.

Mr. Goldsmith. But in terms of actual involvement in the CIA's work in this area, do you know what his responsibilities were?

Mr. Rocca. No. I can't speak to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like now for you to refer to a document which I will call CIA number 1876. For the record I will indicate that the Agency has provided documents to the committee. The Agency, for security reasons, has numbered those documents so that the Agency can insure later on that all of the documents have been returned.
For my purposes I refer to these numbers so that they can be used for the record. So, the Agency's number, that they use for security purposes, we use for reference purposes here.

I would like to refer you to CIA number 1875 and ask you to read the first question and the answer to yourself.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you done so?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. I wrote it after talking with (Don.).

Mr. Goldsmith. This is a memo for the record dated 1 April, 1975, which I believe you say that you wrote.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That is correct. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I only have a few questions concerning that first paragraph.

Mr. Rocca. Well, the multilevel -- you see, I used the word "multilevel" there -- that is the word that I now here refer to as decentralized.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Rocca. I am glad there is some concordance.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question that I have for you -- in this first paragraph you say that CI had own defector input. What did you mean by that, if you remember?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I remember it exactly, because I handled it.
This was Golitzin.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, Golitzin giving information to the CIA which --

Mr. Rocca. Giving it to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Giving it to you.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which you would then forward on to the proper authorities.

Mr. Rocca. Yes. It is the basis of the report -- it is the basis of the report which you must have, I'm sure, because it's been released. I have gotten a copy and I use it over in the DIS course that I am giving, the seminar, on Soviet intelligence. It is called the "Uses of Assassination and Executive Action by Soviet Intelligence."

It's a memo, it's a combined memo, done by Mr. Wigren and SB -- Mr. Wigren was Mr. Murphy's research and analysis person, so we worked very closely together. Mr. Wigren actually was the supervisor of Mr. Brasko, who was the person who found the Minsk photograph, which is the only substantively new thing that was produced in the whole case. And, in his memo, this material of Golitzin was incorporated on the basis of my debriefing.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, how do you spell Golitzin?

Mr. Rocca. G-O-L-I-T-Z-I-N.
Mr. Goldsmith. Now, earlier you referred in this paragraph and in your testimony to the Minsk photograph.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, which photograph are you referring to now?

Mr. Rocca. Ah.

This is the photograph that shows Oswald in the checkered shirt, and it had been either found down in that lady, that Quaker lady's materials, or whatever it is. SB division assigned an individual, Brasko, to look over every photograph in the DDI file in another part of the agency for here, and that man, working lunch hours -- and I say this with some heat because I still think this is one of the significant contributions that has been unrecognized -- by looking at photographs submitted by the Los Angeles office of CIA, done by two ladies --

Mr. Goldsmith. Cramer and Namen.

Mr. Rocca. -- he saw that shirt, that's all he saw. It was an incredible shirt of houndstooth checks. That was it. Here we had positive proof that he was in Minsk and we didn't have to go on any kind of -- I personally -- that was one of the working level things that I handed over to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that the photograph that shows Oswald with a group of other Pussians?
Mr. Rocca. And a car.

Mr. Goldsmith. In a car or and a car?

Mr. Rocca. And a car -- because anywhere an American car went --- well, this I think may have been a Volkswagen, it may have been a German car -- there were groups, and this was right in the plaza at Minsk, the main plaza.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the photograph that was provided by two American tourists?

Mr. Rocca. That's right. But if you notice, the Bureau redid the whole investigation and there is no indication in the report that it came from CIA.

But that's how it did it, and Mr. Brasko deserves highest praise.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you spell his name now?

Mr. Rocca. B-R-A-S-K-O.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why that photograph would have been taken by the domestic contacts division people, or whomever contacted those two women who took the photograph in the first place?

Mr. Rocca. Sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the photograph was obtained prior to the assassination.

Mr. Rocca. Many years.

Mr. Goldsmith. Many years prior to the assassination —
well, a year or so prior to the assassination.

Mr. Rocca. A year or two.

Mr. Goldsmith. And at that time there was no particular
interest in Oswald, I take it.

So, do you know how that -- rather why that photograph
was taken by the CIA officials involved?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

It was one of a series of pictures turned in by these
two ladies in the normal course of what is the authorized
mission of contacts division, at that time located in the DDI,
of turning up useful foreign intelligence on -- by Americans,
who volunteer. That picture, on the extreme left, had a
crane in it, an industrial item, in which we were specifically
interested. That was the way the photograph had been selected.
That crane was cropped out when the picture was published.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

That clarifies an important issue for us.

Did the CIA's effort to support the Warren Commission
by providing the Commission with relevant information reflect
any working hypotheses? In other words, did the Agency say
that certain areas were to receive primary emphasis?

Mr. Rocca. I can't speak for all of these other
authorities that were in touch. I can speak only for what
came across.

Our primary interest was in following up Soviet leads
on the assumption that a person who spends four years in the
Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific
interest to Soviet state security and their collateral authorities.
As a consequence, we favored very strongly that the questions
that were to be delivered to the Soviet Union for response
should include very specific inquiries with respect to what
he did -- not just this hospital record, as it turned out,
135 pages of it -- but just exactly what he did. And, as far
as I know, these were excellent questions. They, too, have
been released. I have not reviewed them. They would still
be useful questions to answer.

The Reporter. Excuse me, but did you say they have
or have not been released?

Mr. Rocca. They have been released, so far as I know.
I am not sure of that.

There were three pages.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay, let's not talk about those questions.
My question is a general one.

Which areas received emphasis?

Mr. Rocca. The areas that we concentrated or tended
to concentrate on were the Soviet areas because the people he
was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as
KGB people. They were there under consular cover and obviously
could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular
job in those earlier contacts.
But the whole picture read in the context of that portion of KGB use of assassination, particularly the Golitzin part, which was not specifically indicated to him, but which is the part stating that all U.S. military defectors are reviewed specifically by Department 13, which is now Department B -- that part is Golitzin. He spoke from knowledge. I got it from him and I put it in the paper and we delivered it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Department 13 the assassinations branch?

Mr. Rocca. That is correct; but it has other things to do, too, including sabotage and the preparation for sabotage. So, the assassination thing should not be highlighted.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Rocca. I mean, I think this is, of course, when you get off the beam, when you start assuming that it has to be --

Mr. Goldsmith. You made the point very clear and we understand.

What other areas, if any, received emphasis?

(Pause) .

Mr. Rocca. Other defectors that had gone to the Soviet Union and had been processed in particular ways, his documentation, his ability to travel and avoid internal controls which were exceptional under the circumstances, reviews of books that were coming out.
Mr. Goldsmith. But again, the overall focus was on the Soviet connection?

Mr. Rocca. I would say, on balance, that was, as it came out on our side of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I have another question, before I forget to ask you it, in reference to CIA number 1876.

That first paragraph says, "In addition, on sensitive matters of concern to the investigation, Dick Helms and Murphy also dealt directly with the Commission."

Mr. Rocca. Which was, of course, in the central.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Were there any other sensitive matters that you can think of?

Mr. Rocca. That's the only one that I know of. No. Let me say that this was a very hastily put together memorandum and I did it really in order to have something on the record. I am delighted I did, too. I have no regrets. But it could have been more ample.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Warren Commission give the Agency input as to what kind of information it wanted, what types of leads should be pursued?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes.

That was what I was coming to when you asked the other things that were done.
For example, they wanted detailed information with respect to how he could have travelled. This was worked out by SB division. There must have been other questions of that kind that others at this stage -- if I had had comprehension of what you were going to ask me, I could have done some of my own homework. But it is right off the top of my head now.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no need for specifics at this point.

Mr. Rocca. I'm embarrassed that I can't think of many other things that we did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the Warren Commission go to Mr. Helms requesting the information, or would they go directly to you?

Mr. Rocca. In some instances Mr. Rankin would go directly to Mr. Helms. In other instances, Mr. Slawson would come right in on the horn and he was authorized to talk with Mr. Hall or anybody in R & A about these matters.

There were other people -- there were other people in the staff that had the same privilege. I can't remember whether Liebler was one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Helms, as a matter of routine, pass on to you the Warren Commission requests for information?

Mr. Rocca. Where it concerned us, I'm sure he did. The record should reflect it, because these things were invited in pieces of paper.
For example, the whole matter of records and record keeping regarding assassination suspects was something that was arranged at the Helms level, and which then I received, either by telephone call or by memorandum. And we were able to set them up for an entire review of how the Oswald file had been machined, recorded, and how intelligence pertaining to operations was being computerized and how literally this should be the way the rest of the community should function. So that, a whole portion of that report which reflects recommendations regarding the mechanization of records, really came out of what they saw over there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which report are you referring to now?

Mr. Rocca. The Warren Commission report, over here (indicating).

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand what you are pointing to, but the record needs to know.

Do you feel that you were given by your superiors at the CIA all relevant information concerning the assassination which would have insured that the CIA could provide the Warren Commission with all the necessary information that it, in turn, needed?

Mr. Rocca. I think so -- to the limit that they were informed and to the limit of my need to know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you informed --

Mr. Rocca. Incidentally -- if I may break in -- another
point directly involved in the Commission was the question of the eighth man -- you know, this photograph of the man --

Mr. Goldsmith. The Mexico mystery man?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, the Mexico mystery man.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will get into that photograph later on.

Mr. Rocca. That was handled directly, too, and I arranged it, I think, with WH people present.

Mr. Goldsmith. We'll get into that issue in a little while.

Were you ever told during the time that you were working as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission about the Agency's anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. A moment ago I asked you whether you had been provided with all relevant information by your superiors and I believe you indicated that you thought that you had.

In your opinion, was the fact that the Agency had conducted anti-Castro assassination plots relevant to the Agency's -- relevant to the Warren Commission's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Rocca. This certainly was not staff responsibility. This was a responsibility of another part of the staff -- of
another part of the DDP. I was not even aware of the Harker article having come out until much later.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this you're saying the anti-Castro assassination plots had nothing to do with CI staff?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. How can I judge my superiors on the basis of information that I had no need to know?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, the question really is, did you have a need to know that information?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I was not investigating the thing. I was a point of contact for the committee on matters that would facilitate their investigation. You can argue, therefore, that I should have known everything. But that's --

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, please don't misunderstand me. I'm not suggesting that you should have known.

Mr. Rocca. But you were pointing out that I had contradicted myself. I don't think I had.

Within my limitations and need to know, I think I had what I had.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I didn't even mean to suggest that you had contradicted yourself.

Mr. Rocca. I withdraw that, then.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am only trying to clarify the record here.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. After you indicated that you said you
had received all the relevant information, my question was do you think that the anti-Castro assassination plots were relevant to the Warren Commission's investigation?

Mr. Rocca. My feeling is -- my answer to that question is that this is a political diversion and that no political action -- I am now speaking with 20-20 hindsight -- that no political action undertaken of the kind that has been described -- and it has been described in various ways -- in any case would have justified action against the President. That I have to regard, therefore, as a totally different set of facts.

If the Warren Commission had had it, I don't know what they could have done with it beyond what they did, and they may have known about it. There is indication, at least press references, that Warren did indeed know and had been told about these things.

I can never say that Mr. Dulles, who was aboard when the Cuban thing started but had left it, didn't talk about it on a personal basis. But in any case, I consider it a political diversion.

In other words, attempting -- anything that was being attempted against Castro through low level agents and all the rest doesn't justify this kind of activity of --

Mr. Goldsmith. Assassinating President Kennedy.

Mr. Rocca. -- assassinating President Kennedy. I think the whole thought is outrageous.
Mr. Goldsmith. So, your position, then, is that even though the Agency may have been attempting to assassinate Premier Castro through low level agents, that would not justify a retaliation attempt?

Mr. Rocca. Retaliation -- absolutely, absolutely, absolutely.

Now, mind you, the Marker interview is a very clear indication -- there is no question about it --

Mr. Goldsmith. Indication of what, sir?

Mr. Rocca. That there were political -- that there were terminal risks involved in persisting in attempts to use Cuban exiles. My understanding is, though, that that interview was considered by those people who were engaged in this kind of activity in the Agency and in the community. But I was not privy to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Had you known about the anti-Castro assassination plots, would you have given more focus, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Cuban responsibility for the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Rocca. I would have done it anyway, in view of the fact that he was in touch with the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, earlier when we asked you --

Mr. Rocca. It would have simply intensified that interest. The answer to your question is yes.

But certainly there was all kinds of interest in the
Cuban possibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection.

Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President?

Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side.

The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely within -- it was an enigma at the time. They were just getting started. This was WH's area. This was Win Scott's area of proficiency. So the defectors had only begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban defectors.

So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given
greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the Agency provide --

Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly didn't do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R & A.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not --

Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all. This was something left to the people who were concerned specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information pertinent to the assassination was to go through your office, correct?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent to the assassination went through your office, I take you or Mr.
Helms would decide what information would be relevant for the Warren Commission to see.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. Well --

Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew?

Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the position, it would seem, to know what information was being generated in the field that was going to the Warren Commission.

Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area.

Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's continue.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this. This was the great concern.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. There are different --

Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to 'WH: do you have
anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in this
kind of thing.

There was extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised
to try to clarify that side.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility of
an assassination plot by Castro against the President was
adequately investigated?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hindsight, I
could say probably not. But at the time it seems to me that
they gave due attention to it -- within the information that
I had at my disposal.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I also think that you indicated
that had you known about the anti-Castro assassination plots,
the effort would have been intensified.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would have -- certainly I think
it would have been intensified. Everything would have been
intensified.

I think in the light of what has happened, a completely
different procedural approach probably would and should have
been taken. I mean, there are any number of things that you
can say in the light of history.

What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately
or otherwise ignored.
Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. There were rumors of these activities in the mid and late '60's.

The first significant indication that I had that there was Castro appreciation of an actual plot was the reference to the Harker article in the Mexico City case log, which we had accessioned for the file sometime in the late '50's, after Win Scott's death, when Mexico City shipped its documentation up here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with Book 5 of the Senate Report?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of the assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will defer that till later on, then.

Mr. Rocca. I got the Harker report myself and studied it at the Library of Congress in the course of the work that I did for the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, again, for the record, I would like to be clear on this.

Is it your position that the Agency itself did not conduct an investigation, per se, into the assassination of President Kennedy, but simply was providing information to the
Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I think our role was basically the provision of intelligence information, not an investigation. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to be more specific at all as to what effort was made to examine the question of Castro's possible responsibility for the assassination?

Mr. Rocca. No, I am not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to read CIA numbers 1904 and 1905, which is a letter dated April 15, 1975 to Mr. E. Henry Knoche -- K-N-O-C-H-E -- from David W. Belin, Executive Director of the Rockefeller Commission.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, do you know whether this letter was ever referred to you for action? By action, I mean for response.

Mr. Rocca. I do not, though I know I responded to it directly to Mr. Belin in conversation -- that is, the substance of it.

There was some other kind of letter which Mr. Belin wrote that was referred to me. It is much shorter than this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now review CIA number 1934.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Now you're talking here.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, according to CIA number 1934, which you have just read, I believe it indicates that you,
in fact, responded to the letter of April 15, 1975.

Mr. Rocca. I indeed remember responding to this.

But this thing seemed utterly --

Mr. Goldsmith. But you weren't sure if you had done
so orally or in writing?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, no. This is -- if I wrote this (indicating), I must have had this (indicating).

So, I accept. I withdraw my previous statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

In light of having read CIA number 1934.

Mr. Rocca. This is what I recall.

But there is still another memo. You see, I wrote
two memos for him. Are you aware of that?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I wrote two memos for Mr. Belin. Each
had a letter which enjoined me, actually, to do it. They were
from him.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I know there was a second memo.

The memos are complementary, but concern different
aspects of the subject.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were they written at the same time?

Mr. Rocca. They were written in succession and
grew out of his interest in the Cuban connection.

So, my vagueness about this probably grows out of the
fact that there was a succession of memos. This one seems
longer than the one that I had. But if I refer to it, I
accept it, obviously.

Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to paragraph
number two, would you respond to the questions that are raised
in that paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. I would say that as far as I know, the
answers are negative. I certainly didn't -- because I didn't
know.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, because you didn't know
of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Rocca. I couldn't have told them. I couldn't have
told them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it your position that the questions
posed in paragraph number two are answered in the negative?

Mr. Rocca. These have to be answered by others who
were in the chain of command and who would have had the
information.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now let's take a look at 1934, CIA
number 1934.

According to that document, it indicates that you
are responding to the questions raised in paragraph number three

Do you recall ever being asked to respond to the
questions in paragraphs number two and four?
(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. No, nor one.

The only one that I had any possibility of responding to on the basis of my knowledge or the possibilities that I had in research was this: and this is where the -- of course, this is the Barker followup of the public speech.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you first learn from an Agency source, if ever, that the Agency had been involved in anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Rocca. Very late. I can't attach an exact date to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know of the anti-Castro assassination plots at the time that this letter was reviewed by you -- in other words, in April of 1975?

Mr. Rocca. No. No. I still don't know of them.

I read, as I recall, Des Fitzgerald's report of his visit to Paris when I delivered the report.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you delivered which report?

Mr. Rocca. One of the two that I am talking about now.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memos?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Now, that had just been found at the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you say you retired from the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. In 1974. I was on contract at this time.
Mr. Goldsmith. So, during the time that you were working with the Rockefeller Commission for the Agency, you were on contract?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Are we clear on that?

Mr. Goldsmith. And at that time --

Mr. Rocca. Des Fitzgerald's letter, which is the key -- I went to Paris, I talked with --

Mr. Goldsmith. AMLASH.

Mr. Rocca. AMLASH, exactly. AMLASH.

This letter turned up. It was found by a WH researcher, a WH man at that time. This was 1975.

And so you were asking me earlier how could I be sure that everything had been delivered to the staff. You see, I mean, it's just not possible to take the responsibility. Of course it wasn't. That letter had never been seen by me.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was just another example of anti-Castro plot information that was not brought to your attention?

Mr. Rocca. Des Fitzgerald, it is well known, very closely associated with the Kennedys in political action and there is no question but that he had total legitimacy in undertaking what he was doing.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not questioning the legitimacy. I am only questioning whether you had the information.
Mr. Rocca. I am using "legitimacy" in quotes, too.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it your position that --

Mr. Rocca. I remember this little detail, which is important. So I am able to respond. I think it was after the 15th.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the information available to you today, are you able to respond to the questions posed in paragraphs two and four?

Mr. Rocca. Not for myself.

For myself, I can say no to all of them.

Well, let me read them first. I think that would be a good idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are referring, for the record, to CIA 1904.

Mr. Rocca. Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of the --

Mr. Goldsmith. No. Read paragraph two only.

Mr. Rocca. "There is evidence that Castro, prior to 22nd February, '63, knew about the existence of such plans and the possible involvement of the U.S. Government, and that the CIA at any time prior to the completion of the Warren" -- "have any documents or other information indicating that Castro may have known about such plans. If the answer is yes, would you please furnish us with copies of all such documents and details of any such information."
I would have to answer negatively. I do not know this.

Mr. Goldsmith. And now, paragraph number four.

Mr. Rocca. "Prior to November 22, 1963, several months prior to the assassination" --

Mr. Goldsmith. No. Mr. Rocca, please read paragraph number four now. You are on three.

Mr. Rocca. "Would you please advise us if there is any information that would seem to indicate that at any time prior to November any foreign governments or any foreign group was considering the possible assassination of any American leaders. If so, would you please advise us of all the details."

I would answer no. I know nothing about that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, you have indicated that this letter was given to you to respond to -- I take it in 1975. And, in fact, a memo was prepared by you responding to --

Mr. Rocca. One paragraph.

Mr. Goldsmith. One paragraph.

Mr. Rocca. But, as I say, I have the impression that these topics were outside of my area of knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency respond to the questions that were posed by Mr. Belin?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, I cannot -- as far as I know. I did not. They may have.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think that you --
Mr. Rocca. Belin was in touch with everybody, so he could have.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, do you think that you were given a letter and asked to respond just to one paragraph in it?

Mr. Rocca. Or to respond more generally to the question of the background of Cuban knowledge. They were not so specific as this, because if I had received this as a basis, as a brief, I would have had to research it. You see, I would have had to go, then, and ask people. This would have been not only presumptuous, but it would have taken years.

Mr. Goldsmith. That problem now that appears in the record is that there was a letter that was given to you to respond to, and we have the responses to paragraph number three of that letter. It would appear that you were asked to respond to a letter that you did not have all of the complete information with which to make a proper response as to the entire letter.

Mr. Rocca. Yes. But my answer doesn't say that I had the original letter. It says that it responds to a paragraph of it. I may have been shown it and used it as a point of reference.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. With Mr. Belin, I had hours of conversations across the desk in the most amicable fashion in which he understood precisely my feelings and how they had matured over
the years with respect to these needs. And the first thing
I would have told him would have been that to answer those
questions would have taken original research, and the people he
had to go to were the people who were in it.

Anyway, that is the best of my recollection at this
moment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1940 and
read Section B, which continues to the next page.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you like to identify the entire
document that you are looking at, starting with CIA number 1936?

Mr. Rocca. Ah, yes.

This is the response that I wrote for him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, there again, just a moment, in
CIA number 1936, the reference is to the Belin letter dated
15 April, 1975. Again, that suggested, in fact, that you saw
the letter, does it not?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it would be in the file out there
if it is. But certainly the letter consists of much more than
I could respond to. Thank God I am still talking about
paragraph three -- right?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Let's take a look --

Mr. Rocca. In other words, I'm sticking pretty closely
to what I know, or to what I think I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA number 1940, the page
that I referred you to earlier, Section 5, on page CIA number 1941.

You indicate that --

Mr. Rocca. This is the nuances.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicate that the Warren Commission Report should have left a wider window for this contingency, and I believe you were making reference to --

Mr. Rocca. Foreign conspiracy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. Foreign conspiracy.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

What did you mean by that, and why?

Mr. Rocca. It would take literally a whole day to go into this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't you try to summarize it, if possible.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I don't want to appear impertinent, but as Mr. Helms said in his deposition, the case will never be closed, and I regard that as really being the key, the logic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be willing to prepare for the committee a statement as to what you meant by that sentence in CIA number 1941?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would prefer to tell you, to talk to you about it, rather than to prepare a document.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would prefer to listen to you discuss it now. But if it is going to take an entire day, we can't do...
that right now.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it would take longer than that to write it, so I think we ought to just discuss it -- though I'm not adverse to the other, it would really require the preparation of a monograph.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Please, as best you can, realizing the time constraints, briefly summarize what you meant by that sentence.

Mr. Rocca. First of all, let me say that to Mr. Belin personally in the talks I made it perfectly clear that I regarded the theory that Oswald was a mandated assassin by any foreign intelligence or any other intelligence service to be false and that there was no credible evidence to sustain that view that he was a mandated assassin, that this could not be done on the basis of the available evidence, or as I refer to it here, credible evidence. Indeed, I regarded it as very dangerous and counterproductive -- if I can use that term -- to indulge in public conversation along those lines, because it leads inevitably to political consequences which are absolutely impossible to control.

So, I don't believe, in other words, in my personal view of the case, in the position that I held in which I operated with the Commission that he was sent to kill Kennedy.

However, I do believe that he had contacts with the Soviet intelligence, or I think the evidence is stronger and certainly
worth following up, that he had contacts with the KGB, both inside and probably outside. I'm not saying in the United States, necessarily, but before his arrival, with the KGB, first.

Second, that the Soviets did not furnish us all of the relevant documentation pertaining to his stay in the Soviet Union and that the contradictions, therefore, between what they served up through the Swiss and what we have derived from people who have come out of the KGB, who are experts on this -- I don't care whether you call them, whether they are Nosenko, or Deriabin or Golitzin, whoever -- the people in the other service there -- there is a manifest contradiction between the amount of material that they furnished and what would have been normally his experience in that country in respect to that service, and in particular with regard to the element of contract and debriefing by the "Spetsotdel", but the 13th Department, by the Special Department.

The questions that were furnished the Commission along those lines were not delivered by the State Department, or whatever happened. Therefore, we got no answers. And, they served to deepen, therefore, the importance and the occasions of what I've just said.

In the third place, the people, fortunately or unfortunately, casually or otherwise, that he was in touch with in Mexico City during his trip, were KGB, according to
the traces held by us and by the FBI and other services.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall which people these were?

Mr. Rocca. I can't -- I could probably get them out of my mind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please proceed.

Mr. Rocca. It is absolutely patent that these people could have been dealing with him and possibly were dealing with him. I give, in other words, full faith and credit to all these theories, and I'm talking now in a counter intelligence laboratory sense, not in a public sense. His whole comportment as an individual in the United States after his arrival I find very peculiar for its implicit and explicit evidences of clandestinity.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give examples.

Mr. Rocca. The utilization of aliases in boarding houses, incomplete details to his own wife, the whole matter of the "Walker" and what she says, and Marina is a whole other story that has to be, I think, readjusted to this scenario.

On the other hand, I see flaws in his clandestine, in his trade craft, let's put it that way. It makes me believe that he may not have been at the time that he was operating in Dallas and in the other area an actual, even in touch with them, because I regard not giving his wife his alias at the boarding house so that when she phoned she blew him as just one of those things.
But I have gone over all of this in great detail with Belin. So, I see these things, I see these things as building a picture of much more detailed knowledge about him, and evaluation, and, of course, debriefing, because there is no question in my mind that he had U-2 information on exact type of flight.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about on the Cuban side of the picture?

Mr. Rocca. And, on the Cuban side, from Delgado we know he was a pro-Cuban from the beginning, and the Delgado information is critical -- I think quite undeveloped in its implications.

So, it is this kind of thing that lies behind leaving the window open. In other words, there would be information relevant to an assessment of this man's motives as a self activated killer in an incredible conjunction which finds him in a building which is going to be passed by by Connally, against whom he has a personal quarrel, going back to the whole matter of his Navy career, and this whole business of what he could have read in the "Times Picayune" about the Harker interview, the warning, and so forth.

I regard this, in other words, this man, as a self generated killer, who could very well have done this. But that doesn't mean that there isn't information, not only in Moscow, but also in Havana. But, as I said, this is a thing
that I would have loved to have known more about in 1963
in the way that I know, or was beginning to know -- even at
that time I was no expert. I don't say I am now, but the KGB,
we would certainly have had that Rezidentura down in Mexico,
or Cuba, the DGI Rezidentura, better (pegged) and have been
in the position to have perhaps gotten Silvia Duran in a
situation where she would have had to answer.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm sorry. I didn't understand
exactly what you said.

Mr. Rocca. But these --

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, if I may interrupt you for a
minute, what did you say you would have tried to have had
better pegged in Havana?

Mr. Rocca. The organization of Cuban intelligence --

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. -- as a personal matter. I mean, after
all, these are matters of personal expertise. In this paper
I am speaking entirely as an independent expert.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this paper you are referring to
CIA number 1934?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, what you are talking about.

And in the transmission memo, the Agency makes that
very clear.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. So please, let's make this point.
Mr. Goldsmith. Were Oswald's contacts --

Mr. Rocca. You know, in other words, this is right off the top of my head.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the Agency gave you a, asked you to respond to Mr. Belin's letter which requested certain information and the Agency's position was that your response was off the top of your head?

Mr. Rocca. They said that this did not necessarily reflect the Agency's views. There is another piece of paper that says that, and I'm sorry, I don't think that that is a proper qualification of it.

There is a transmission memo which says that we don't necessary -- it's been released, I think.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency put you on contract to work with the Rockefeller Commission.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. No, they didn't. I was under contract as a part of my normal phasing out and this came up as a part of that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Rocca. Simply to make myself useful, I suppose. But this was not the specific reason that the contract was given.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.
Mr. Rocca. This is what I'm trying to clarify.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you the Agency's point of contact with the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

As far as I know I wasn't. They were in touch with the legal (counsel) -- I mean, the Inspector General. They sat there. They came to the staff to get the material. They had the entire file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if Oswald had any contacts with the DGI element in Mexico City?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you see, these are questions that you should ask the WH experts.

My answer, completely uninformed, is that he was in, his argument with the consul took place in the very offices that the DGI occupied and that the DGI chief of the component must have been within hearing range. I have forgotten his name. But that area, in other words, was a part of it.

Azcue -- is that --

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. -- the consul. Now I will think -- the DGI chief at that time, he later went -- well --

Mr. Goldsmith. We'll defer that line of inquiry until later.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I am trying to clarify what I meant here. It is that I felt, and still feel, that many answers
with respect to Oswald's motivation, his background, his
techniques will be found in Moscow and Cuba and not here.
That's all. That's what I had in mind when I said the window
should have been left open, a wider window.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you given information in 1963
pertaining to Oswald's possible contacts with DGI?

Mr. Rocca. No. Not as far as I know.

Not as far as I can remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any dealing at all with
the Nosenko case in 1964?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I was excluded from the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1964, you didn't know what
information Nosenko had given on the Oswald case?

Mr. Rocca. I knew it -- I knew it by hearsay, by
simply listening to accounts and meetings that were very
limited and designed to satisfy need to know and so forth.
So I knew it only in very general terms.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what Nosenko has said
about the KGB's contact or lack of contact with Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. In general.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what is that?

Mr. Rocca. In general, his story was that he had had
the file in his hands sometime between the first and the
second contacts, that is, between '62 and '64, when he
defected; that the file did not exist in Moscow at the time of the assassination; it had to be sent up; it has to be sent for to Minsk, where Oswald had been resettled; and that he had not been a recruited KGB source.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Nosenko indicate --

Mr. Rocca. I mean, I don't know whether this is a true reflection.

Mr. Goldsmith. You had no direct knowledge one way or the other?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, I had no direct knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Then let's not get into that area.

Mr. Rocca. I mean, these are things that obviously work out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Mr. Angleton about the Nosenko case?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, we talked about it many times, but always, it's always the generalization and not the specific thing. I mean, there is a difference between reading what the man says and what he said on a polygraph. A polygraph is critical and I have not read that material because he had a number of them and these tend to be very important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Has Mr. Angleton ever indicated to you what his opinion was regarding the validity of what Nosenko said about Oswald?
Mr. Rocca. I hesitate to speak for him, but I judge that he regards Nosenko's statement about Oswald to be unreliable, to be truthful about it. I may be wrong.

I may say in that connection, if it doesn't again interrupt this -- I am trying to help --

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Rocca. -- that the people who made the determination at that time were principally in the division, not in the staff. In other words, they were Mr. Murphy and Mr. Bagley, and the superiors.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether all information pertinent to the Warren Commission's work was promptly communicated to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. All of the material that I had, as far as, or that came within my camp, and that included the prime version, was given.

I know of none on the outside that did not go to them in one form or the other.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, any information that went through your desk, through your staff --

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith -- would have gone to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Rocca. Would have gone to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. And how long did it usually take
for such information to get from your desk to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. Less than a week, I would say.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any information touching upon sensitive sources and methods that was not promptly given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. None that I know of, in one form or other.

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by "one form or other?"

Mr. Rocca. Well, you see, when I read it in 1975, the LINGUAL materials, they did not go through me. They went directly to the FBI. So, I mean, this is what I have to exclude. I mean, I can't take on my back the total responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. But other than the HILINGUAL program, everything else that went through your office --

Mr. Rocca. To the best of my knowledge, there was nothing that my office handled that was backstopped, that was shortstopped or not given, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Allen Dulles play any special role on the Warren Commission, insofar as the CIA was concerned?

Mr. Rocca. If so, I don't know.

I was in no position to really be -- I was not in a position to really have that degree of intimacy.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he in any way attempted to represent the interest of the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. It would have been unusual for him to have done that, although he was certainly used as a channel by the Chief Justice on matters--

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give us some examples?

Mr. Rocca.--of specific interest to the Commission, growing out of their own discussions. I would say that there is in the file a memorandum written by Mr. Murphy, Chief SB, reflecting conversation at Mr. Dulles' house on some matter that Mr. Dulles had been asked to probe or to get information on. I recall that and it should be available in the record.

Well, the executive sessions of the Commission show that they used Mr. Dulles as a kind of backboard for all kinds of extraordinary hypothetical, I think.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, are you able to give any examples of those types of situations, to your personal knowledge?

Mr. Rocca. From my personal knowledge, no. I mean, I have read the executive session records and they are pertinent. But not to my personal knowledge. In other words, Mr. Dulles never discussed this with me nor was I ever present at any of those discussions on such points.

Mr. Goldsmith. It has been alleged in the press that
President Ford, former President Ford, in a sense "leaked information to the FBI."

The same allegation has been made of Mr. Dulles leaking information to the CIA.

Are you able to make any comment upon that?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Again, I may make the collateral comment, that a review of the record -- this looks the record assembled after the Rockefeller Commission, the material that you have on this desk. I am talking about the actual record in the Oswald file from January to February and to March, piece by piece.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. That is what should be looked at.

Mr. Goldsmith. That file has been examined, Mr. Rocca.

Mr. Rocca. Well, then that answers my point.

Mr. Goldsmith. How frequently were, rather was the Agency in contact with Mr. Dulles during this period?

Mr. Rocca. I can't -- I have no way of judging that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have personal contact with him during the period?

Mr. Rocca. On matters of the Warren -- during the Warren Commission, on Warren Commission matters -- I must have had contact with him on one occasion, which is the one
that Mr. Murphy went down to see him on. I was present on
another matter, unrelated entirely, and must have bumped into
him.

But I have no recollection of talking with Mr. Dulles
about any matters relating to the Warren Commission at that
time of a substantive nature. I can't simply -- I would have
to say I really can't remember.

If I did, incidentally, there would be a memorandum
of record, so you can refresh my memory.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please review CIA number
2071.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify that document?

Mr. Rocca. Surely. It's mine. I sent it to Mr.
Helms for his information.

The purpose that I went down there for was entirely
different.

Mr. Goldsmith. First, let's identify the document.

Mr. Rocca. Yes. It's just an informal notation to
my Chief of a thing that I thought was significant at the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did it pertain to a meeting with Mr.
Dulles?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is my memorandum and it stands on the
record. I accept full responsibility for it. It bears out, I think, in essence, what I said earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

What I am asking you now is --

Mr. Rocca. I am delighted I wrote it.

Mr. Goldsmith -- does it pertain to a meeting that you had with Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed. But it was not on the purpose of the memorandum. It was on the purpose of a totally different -- of a TV presentation of a defector, and inasmuch as the question was how the defector should be photographed, all the rest, this was the topic now entirely collateral -- and incidentally, this other thing came up which, of course, was one of Mr. Dulles' things. He had these and he called this to my attention.

He wrote the answer, declining, and I reported it.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this other thing, we are now talking about the question of the Warren Commission being concerned with the issue of Oswald having been a CIA agent.

Mr. Rocca. The press, the press had had it.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Warren Commission wanted to resolve that issue. They had asked Dulles to serve as a contact with the Agency as a means of expediting the resolution of this issue.

Is that correct?
Mr. Rocca. I couldn't imagine. I would not attach
great granitic quality to this prose. I mean, the thing to do
is to get the letter from Rankin which bears on it. That
will tell you precisely what it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, you should not assume that we
have not necessarily done that.

Mr. Rocca. Ask for it. I mean, my God; this is a
lead.

I'm sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. All I'm saying is that you should not
assume that that has not been done as yet.

We will return to this document later.

What role, if any, did the Mexico City station have
in providing CIA headquarters with information relevant to
the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. It had a key role. It produced information
before the fact and it conducted a whole series of followup
activities on the material that it had provided, plus other
material that came in in the course of dealing with people
who were in touch with the embassy and facilitating the FBI.
So, they were important. They were one of the most significant
parts.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question.

Relative to other stations, was the role played by
the Mexico City station a major one?
Mr. Rocca. I would say it was, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And that is because Oswald spent time in Mexico City prior to the assassination?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have occasion to review the cable and dispatch traffic that flowed between the Mexico City station and headquarters that was relevant to the assassination?

Mr. Rocca. I reviewed -- this is another body of information that I reviewed for Mr. Belin, in which I commented on these cables.

Mr. Goldsmith. And in 1963, did you have occasion to review all of the cable traffic?

Mr. Rocca. In 1963, these cables just came across one at a time. Mr. Whitten handled them at the moment. I did not see them until later on, when R & A came into the case.

So, the original action --

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, I understand. I didn't mean to suggest that when the cables were actually sent, certainly prior to and immediately after the assassination. You wouldn't have seen then because you weren't involved in the case at that point.

However, when CI/R&A came into the picture, did you have occasion to review the cable traffic that flowed between
the Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

I think it was among the material we facilitated in passing to the Warren Commission and also we facilitated their direct examination of the materials in the Agency itself.

They came out to verify it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy and Consulates?

Mr. Rocca. They did, as far as these cables indicate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall, generally, what types of surveillance operations there were?

Mr. Rocca. They must have been telephone and photographic.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a result of these surveillance operations, was information pertaining to Oswald obtained?

Mr. Rocca. Information pertaining to an unidentified American was obtained and subsequently it was ascertained that that unidentified American was Oswald. And, eventually, it became associated with the body of the assassination case.

Mr. Goldsmith. That information was obtained as a result of which surveillance operation?

Mr. Rocca. It was obtained only through the telephone taps.

Mr. Goldsmith. And, in fact, the telephone --
Mr. Rocca. There was no photographic coverage, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. That picked up Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. The telephone tap operation in fact did identify that someone who identified himself as Oswald had been involved in a telephone call.

Do you recall that?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you are now going well beyond my capacity to remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. The only reason I raise that question is because you indicated that the information simply referred to an unidentified American, and our record indicates that, in fact, at least one of the transcripts contain Oswald identifying himself, or whomever was in on the conversation identified himself as Oswald.

Mr. Rocca. That was a subsequent telegram.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't I just show you the transcript to refresh your memory, if I can find it.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1863, which is a copy of a transcript of a telephone conversation that took place on 1 October, 1963 at approximately 9:55 or 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Ah, Kostikov, that's one of the names.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read that page?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

This is the one where he identified himself.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in other words, the surveillance operation picked up more than just an unidentified American. At least at some point it picked up a reference to Lee Oswald.

Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when specifically the Warren Commission was told about the fact that Oswald had made telephonic contact with the Soviet embassy and, in fact, that the calls came from the Cuban embassy?

Mr. Rocca. I have no idea of the time. They must have been told very early because the whole community was told on October 10, or October 3, or whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, that's when the community was told. However, the community was not necessarily told that there was a telephone tap operation. They were just told about the contact.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. My impression is a very narrow one.

When was the Warren Commission specifically told that Oswald had been in telephonic contact?
Mr. Rocca. Oh, I think they were told that immediately, that the material went over in such a form that this could not be disguised, and it had to be.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you are saying that the Warren Commission was told about the telephone surveillance operation?

Mr. Rocca. They were given the transcripts.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when they were given the transcripts?

Mr. Rocca. It must have been in January or before Mr. Whitten ended his tenure. There was no question of disguising that fact. It could not be hidden. And, of course, as you know, they literally went down and observed and surveyed the place.

I mean, this was a part of -- obviously the sources and methods were supposed to be protected. But my feeling is that they had to know this from the start.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Oswald ever observed by the CIA to have been in contact with the Soviet officials in Mexico City?

Mr. Rocca. You mean, actually seen?

Mr. Goldsmith. Observed. Seen.

Mr. Rocca. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you now to read CIA number 1979, which is a member from Coleman - Slawson
of the Warren Commission staff.

Please skim very quickly through the first two pages
until you get to paragraph number three. Read paragraph
number three carefully and stop there.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I have read this.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you want to place this here
(indicating), we can both look at it.

Mr. Rocca. It is, of course, totally erroneous.

This statement is erroneous.

I can't account for it or understand why he did not --

Mr. Goldsmith. This memo is dated 1 April, 1964.

The statement in the memo indicates that the CIA has reported
to the Commission that Oswald was observed in mid-morning
in the office of the Soviet military attache in Mexico City.

I'm not suggesting that the statement is accurate.
But the reason that we are concerned about it is because in
fact it appears to suggest that this is what the Commission
staff was told.

Do you know anything about that?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, is it possible that the
Commission staff was given the information about Mexico City,
the Oswald contact, without being specifically told about
the telephonic surveillance operation?

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Mr. Rocca. I think not. I don't think so at all.

I mean, Mr. Slawson was given the actual text of that earlier telegram. The intercept, as I recall, was from the Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy. Oswald -- this was a Saturday -- Oswald had gone over and so forth.

So, this word, this is a mis-speaking again -- "observed." "Observed" is the wrong word. He had been reported by, to have been in the office.

This is a conclusion from the intercept. No one can draw any conclusion further than that.

Mr. Goldsmith. If we go and study this paragraph carefully, it is apparent that the information that they are relying upon here is the information that came directly from the telephonic intercept.

Mr. Rocca. Which was rendered in its entirety --

Mr. Goldsmith. To the Commission staff?

Mr. Rocca. -- to the Commission staff.

That's my best recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. You can tell from the way that the author approaches this issue that he is talking about visual observation. Here he is concerned, in the rest of the paragraph he is concerned about the possibility that this agency may have picked Oswald up under photographic surveillance.

Is it clear to you that he is referring to visual observation?
Mr. Rocca. I think what Mr. Slauson has done, what
David has done, is just mixed up the eight man stuff and the
photographs and the intercept on the telephone, and it came
out that way. It was simply a mistake.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand your opinion as to
what he may have done.

But, is it clear to you, nevertheless, that his
impression was that Oswald had been visually observed?

Mr. Rocca. That's what he says here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr. Rocca. To be observed would be to be visually
observed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me for a moment.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you like to break for lunch or
continue for a moment longer. We will be here effectively
all day, I think.

Mr. Rocca. I think we can continue for another hour
and eat later.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. It is no problem to us.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any concern about disclosing
a sensitive telephonic surveillance operation to the Warren
Commission staff?

Mr. Rocca. I think there was inevitably, under the
sources and methods concepts that prevailed at the time. But
the nature of the evidence precluded absolutely disguising it
in any way.

As far as I know, there was never any attempt to
mislead with respect to the nature of the access, and in
dealing with Slawson, or with Belin, or with Lieber, it
was perfectly clear that they understood that this was an
intercept on a telephone, on a camera, and, moreover, they
went down and actually saw the installations—this is my
conclusion—and reviewed them.

And, we eventually ended up by doing the translation
from Spanish, or from whatever language was involved, in some
of them for them. So, they had to have the exact knowledge
of that aspect.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer now to CIA number 177.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify for the record
what that document is?

Mr. Rocca. It is a telegram from the Mexico City
station which refers to an earlier telegram. It uses the
cryptonym, I guess for the operation that produced the material—

Mr. Goldsmith. LIENVY.

Mr. Rocca. -- LIENVY.

And, I think we've already seen it.

It says that they have photographic coverage which

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they believe may be the man.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you say that this refers to an earlier cable.

Which cable is the earlier one that's being referred to?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I assume that Kostikov and Byedikov are the same two people that we saw earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was in the transcript.

Mr. Rocca. In the transcript, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. We saw a transcript earlier. But we didn't see a cable earlier, did we?

Mr. Rocca. Well, my impression is that that thing came in earlier. I would have to reproduce the materials here in order.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you like to --

Mr. Rocca. Is it important?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, it's not. But you just raised a question on the record and I would like to clarify it. I don't see a reference in this cable to an earlier cable.

Mr. Rocca. In other words, this is the first cable that came in?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the first cable, according to the record, reporting Oswald's contact.

Mr. Rocca. You see, in that other, in the report I did for Belin, I had set them out in actual order, the cables,
so that we knew what came in at what date. So this is, then, the first cable reporting what they had heard, presumably.

Mr. Goldsmith. The date of this cable is --

Mr. Rocca. 9 October.

Mr. Goldsmith. 1963.

Mr. Rocca. It is my impression that there were earlier cables, that there was an earlier cable. But I can't, from this documentation --

Mr. Goldsmith. And what was the substance of that earlier cable?

Mr. Rocca -- I can't -- that there was someone down there who wanted to go to Cuba. I can't -- without having the entire run of that traffic, I can't reproduce it here. I can't reproduce it without getting into more need for explanation. It simply utilizes time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, Mr. Rocca --

Mr. Rocca. What's the point here?

Mr. Goldsmith. -- it would become important to the committee if your memory is that there was an earlier cable and we haven't seen it. It would become important to resolve that question.

So, to the best of your recollection, was there an earlier cable?

Mr. Rocca. I -- well, if this is the first cable, this is it.
Mr. Goldsmith. Well, this is the first that we were informed of.

It is possible that there was an earlier cable that you saw and that we didn't, and that's my question.

Was there an earlier cable to your knowledge?

Mr. Rocca. Probably not, if this is the only one that you've got on the record. I can't conceive that there would be any question of fuzzing up the record on cables.

You see, it's a question of getting the dates.

The 27th to the 2nd -- I'm sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my first question.

If Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy telephonically on 1 October, why would it have taken eight days for the cable reporting that contact to be sent to headquarters?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. An American male who spoke broken Russian -- well, the answer to the question is not difficult to comprehend. There is a lead time in the processing of material. There are a lot of leads coming in that have to be selected -- spotted, selected, translated, evaluated, and then cabled. But what disturbs me here is the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. What specifically about the time disturbs you?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it seems to me too late, that communication began earlier from Mexico City. But I can't
prove it. I don't have these materials. And yet, I know in this thing I did, I had every one of these things laid out from beginning to end. And at the same time I am conscious of the fact that here I am raising a thing that could cause embarrassment. I am obviously in the middle here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. And unintentionally. Obviously no one wants under the Marcucci thing to create problems.

Could I ask you a question? Do you have the outgoing cable to the community, the date of the outgoing cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. The dissemination cable.

Mr. Rocca. The dissemination cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I have that for you to review.

Mr. Rocca. You see, Jack Whitten handled this. He handled it by the book, as I see it. I think he did an excellent job in doing it, so that this would remove the -- that would clarify it.

Mr. Goldsmith. You asked for the dissemination cable. I am going to show it to you now.

It is CIA document number 2140.

Here it is.

Mr. Rocca. Well, this must be the first one, then. What I see in here really reflects what is in this, plus --

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be more specific for the

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record as to why you think that the cable, that is, CIA number 177, must have been the first one reporting an Oswald contact?

Mr. Rocca. Because it uses identical language here, "American male."

Mr. Goldsmith. But that doesn't mean that a cable couldn't have been sent up earlier reporting the contact of Oswald with the embassy on 1 October.

Mr. Rocca. Well, responding to that, I can't say that it doesn't -- of course it doesn't. But I've not seen it. That's the point.

My impression was that there was a shorter gap here between the two. Here is the ninth. I think this was on the eighth, sent on the eighth (indicating).

Mr. Goldsmith. This was sent on the eighth, that's correct.

Mr. Rocca. That's correct. So, that's narrowing it. This went out on the tenth. This is Whitten, immediately acting.

So, this is the first cable, yes.

The reason that it has taken so long is essentially the reason that is associated with the mechanics and the handling of mechanics.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, would it have taken some time to translate the tape from Russian into English?
Mr. Rocca. Well, it would have to have been screened. It would have then to have been reviewed and spotted. It would have had to have been prepared as a suggestion for the chief of station, who reviewed all of these, as I understand it, to send up.

So, that would take about three or four days, five days maybe, depending on the amount of traffic that is involved.

So, this is correct. It's this date (indicating) that is really important, not that one (indicating.)

That's when they really started to work on it down there.

Mr. Goldsmith. By this date, for the record, which date are you referring to?

Mr. Rocca. The seventh of October.

Mr. Goldsmith. And that is written in in script on the bottom of CIA number 177, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That's right, yes.

So, that gives the point of reference to the Mexican thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting away from CIA number 177 for a moment, please read CIA number 2007 through paragraph one, ending on -- paragraph two, ending on CIA number 2009.

(Pause)

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that?
Mr. Rocca. I've forgotten where I was supposed to stop.

Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph two on page 2009. Read through there, please.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify what CIA number 2007 is?

Mr. Rocca. This was one of the -- this was, I guess, the grand-daddy piece that we sent over at the very outset of the relationship, which summarized the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. What's the date on that?

Mr. Rocca. It's the 31st, January.

Mr. Goldsmith. 1964.

Mr. Rocca. I think it was prepared by me in CI/R&A presumably. I've forgotten who actually worked on it. It may have been Mr. Hall, and I certainly reviewed it. It summarized the initial information in some of the cables, or in the cables.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does this document make specific reference to any telephonic intercept of an Oswald conversation?

For example, on page CIA number 2008, it reports the Oswald contact, but does not give the nature of the contact, does it?
Mr. Rocca. No.

I think that this, again, was something that Mr. Helms covered in his cover note. "The compromise of the material in its present form would lead directly to the destruction of current sources and methods of this agency in Mexico and elsewhere," and that it was considered to be therefore "within the legitimate interest in protecting those sources not to state what the reliable and proven source was."

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, earlier we referred to a memo that had been written by Slawson in which he apparently was confused and thought that Oswald had been observed at the --

Mr. Rocca. He wrote that in March or April. This was in January. Between January and April they had been over and had actually seen the intercepts.

Mr. Goldsmith. No. The trip to Mexico City was in the middle of April.

Mr. Rocca. Yes, but they had been over to the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Oh, they had been to the Agency and had seen the intercepts.

Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, sometime after January 31 --

Mr. Rocca. They were actually shown.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- they were told.

Mr. Rocca. I think they were told at the very time that this was written, what we were talking about. Reliable
and proven sources --- this was telephonic.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, is your testimony then that despite the fact that the document itself makes no reference to a telephonic intercept, orally this information was communicated.

Mr. Rocca. That this was communicated without possibility of misunderstanding.

Mr. Goldsmith. And who made that communication?

Mr. Rocca. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you do it personally?

Mr. Rocca. I'm sure that I referred to it in my own talks with Slawson, but whether it was on January or later, I don't know. But it's perfectly clear from the start that this material had to be from a very sensitive direct source.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to point out also an error here. It indicates that in 9 October --

Mr. Rocca. I take your point. I take your point.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. For the record I will have to finish making the point, which is that according to this, the document indicates that Oswald's contact was on October 9, his contact with the Soviet Embassy. In fact, we know that it was October first, and several other times around that as well, but not as late as October 9.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. I think that the mistake here was that
on 9th of October, CIA headquarters was informed, was what
was intended, rather than Mexico City, and it just didn't
come out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I wanted to clear that up
for the record.

Mr. Rocca. I noted that when I read it.

These are the terrible gaps that come out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to CIA number 177, which
you had occasion to review, paragraph one, I believe, reports
a contact between Oswald and the Soviet Embassy. I take it
that by referring to the crypt LIENVOY, the person receiving
the cable would know that this was a telephonic intercept.

Mr. Rocca. Exactly.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the second paragraph it indicates
"Have a photo."

I will read it.

"Have photos. Male appears be American entering
Soviet Embassy twelve- sixteen hours, leaving twelve-twenty-
two on 1 October. Apparently age 35, athletic build, circa
six feet. Receding hairline. Balding top. Wore khakis and
sports shirt. Source, LIEMPTY."

Mr. Rocca. That's the photographic operation,
presumably.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Do you know why this cable contains an incorrect
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description of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. It doesn't, I would say.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please clarify.

It doesn't contain an incorrect description of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. No. It contains a correct description of a totally different person.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Then my question is why did the description of a totally different person get linked to the information contained in the first paragraph on Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. I think that this, of course, lies in the whole area of zeal, investigative zeal that involves simply taking assets that you have and attempting to make matches. The question is one that I would address to, if he were alive, I would address to Win Scott, because it was his, this was his particular bias at the time, and not only did he state it here, but he repeated it in one of the later telegrams, even after he had been told the correct description.

Mr. Goldsmith. Scott repeated it in a later telegram.

Mr. Rocca. in a later telegram.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when that was? Was it pre-assassination?

Mr. Rocca. He didn't repeat the description. He repeated the reference to it, and then he sent the photo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.
Mr. Rocca. So, that -- correct that. I mean, he did not repeat in a telegram. But he was given -- my recollection was that he was given a correct description in about the middle of the month, though the Navy never did respond with a photograph.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Do you know how the incorrect description, or the description of one person was tied in to Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. You see, this was simply the analyst's -- this was simply Win Scott, the FBI senior official, running the case, and he was making a match, and it was wrong.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, Mr. Scott wasn't the person who selected the photograph. Someone else presumably selected the photograph.

Mr. Rocca. Well, someone showed it to him. And he felt that there was enough of a -- I judge, this is totally a hypothetical; I never discussed it with him, as far as I can recall, nor did he ever write it up in a memorandum or record -- but this was a mixing up of two totally unrelated things.

Mr. Goldsmith. You see, the first paragraph makes reference to a telephonic contact on 1 October --

Mr. Rocca. A telephonic contact?

Mr. Goldsmith. Between Oswald and the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Rocca. Which had taken a number of days to process.
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. That telephonic contact makes no reference to Oswald going to the Soviet Embassy. So, in light of the absence of any reference by Oswald that he was going to be at the Embassy that day, why would Scott or anyone else at the Mexico City station have selected a photograph of someone who was at the Embassy on 1 October?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you don't raise the question as to why they were selecting 1 October for scanning?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I presume that they --

Mr. Rocca. They're using 1 October as a baseline, and anything that came through that looked like an American was a viable lead, he thought or would have thought. And this was the only one, and he jammed it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know for a fact that this was the only one?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know it is. The rest of the coverage shows no one else that was even an American. They were all Latins.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you reviewed the coverage?

Mr. Rocca. Only what came out during the course of the Rockefeller thing. There were a series of photographs take in front of -- what -- the Cuban Embassy, was it, or the Cuban and Soviet Embassies. And none of them appeared to be Americans. I think that was what he was using as his baseline. There were others that were Latins.
But you can look at all the photos yourself.

I think you have to put yourself in his position, trying to find any kind of --

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me, Mr. Rocca.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. You have to put yourself in his position and consider the problem of trying to find any lead, and that's what he did.

I think, of course, it is unmercifully --

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca. It has unmercifully complicated the case because it introduced a whole new lead --

Mr. Goldsmith. The possibility of someone --

Mr. Rocca. -- as far as I'm concerned. This is my reading of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, one lead that it introduces is the possibility of someone else impersonating Oswald.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I mean -- it's totally open-ended, totally open-ended. It could be quite the reverse. It could be just some ordinary person who was there on personal business. It's impossible to discuss it rationally, it seems to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever learn the identity of the person who was described in paragraph two?

Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know. Not up to the time
I left.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission first told about this picture?

Mr. Rocca. I think they were told in the whole span of time between January and March, when they were working on it. They actually came over and viewed them.

I think the first time they had, they got the --

Mr. Goldsmith. Isn't it true that the Warren Commission--

Mr. Rocca -- they got a cropped photograph. That was the thing that had started it. It started down in Dallas and worked its way up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Isn't it true that the Warren Commission did not know about this photograph until Marguerite Oswald testified before the Commission in February and made reference to a photograph that she had been shown which she alleged depicted Jack Ruby, and that prior to that time, the Warren Commission had not been told about this photograph?

Mr. Rocca. Well, they were told about it when this thing went over to them -- did it not? Was it omitted at that time?

I cannot answer that. I can't say one way or the other whether they did or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a desire on the part of anyone at the CIA to wait out the Commission on the question of this photograph -- in other words, not tell the Commission
about the surveillance operation and not tell them about this photograph?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no such conscious desire.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission specifically told about the connection between this picture and the Oswald contact?

By that I mean when was the Warren Commission specifically told about Oswald having contacted the Soviet Embassy on 1 October and this photograph mistakenly being linked to him?

Mr. Rocca. They must have gotten it in its original form when they read the cables.

Mr. Goldsmith. And when were they given the cables?

Mr. Rocca. Those cables must have been given to them some time after that January memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record at the Agency as to when they would have been shown these specific cables?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I would hope so, but I couldn't be sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you the person that showed them the cables?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I can't say that I was, though I may have been. But I have an impression that they were so important that they would have been handled by someone higher up.
But this is simply a matter of conjecture at this time. In other words, it is possible.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the photograph that had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service; shortly after the assassination it was sent up to Dallas from Mexico City. Do you recall that?

Mr. Rocca. The photograph had gotten into the hands of the FBI office in Dallas as a consequence of Mr. Scott's feeling the afternoon that the assassination took place that this photograph, though it had been impeached already by a cable from Whitten as not being Oswald, and he had seen Oswald's photograph on TV, he still persisted in believing that this could have had some relationship. As far as I know, there is no reason to believe that. It simply came up in his photographic coverage. He had the Air Attache or the Naval Attache -- the Naval Attache -- fly it up to Dallas. And I think the Bureau -- this was done in coordination with the Bureau representative in Mexico City, and there was a transmission to the Bureau office in Dallas. It was at that point that the photo was taken by the Bureau and shown to Mrs. Oswald. They cropped it in a particular way, and when later on the picture was shown to her, it had been cropped in a different fashion by the Bureau office here. This was the basis of her objection, in part, I judge, and so that started it.
But my impression is that the Warren Commission certainly knew about that photograph before her testimony -- going back to your question.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is not consistent with the Warren Commission records.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it may well be.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 2139. Would you please read that.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Is there an internal memorandum? Is there a memorandum that went to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm sorry, Mr. Rocca.

Mr. Rocca. Is there a memorandum that actually went to the Warren Commission on the basis of this? This undoubtedly, this reflects conversation with regard to the handling of material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service. But the Secret Service is not --

Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph refers to the Oswald photographs.

Mr. Rocca. It refers to the photograph. It says, "We are going to pass the material in substance in response" -- "or the items refer to aborted leads."

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. Now, for example, the famous six photographs which were not of Oswald -- in other words, these were not
considered pertinent.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

It is fair to say, however, that according to some of the language in CIA number 2139 there was a desire on the part of Agency officials to wait out the Warren Commission specifically with regard to showing the Commission these photographs?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you're using exactly the language here that I used in this memo and which I simply had not recollected, which is on the record.

I can't see that these photographs are what they were talking about up here.

"The levy of our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since 23rd of November" referred probably to the whole file, not just to these people, these photographs.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay. We'll get back to that point later on.

Mr. Rocca. I can't decide or really ascertain at the moment.

I think the point behind it was that they should go to the Secret Service and get it, ask them for it.

Mr. Goldsmith. It appears that the Agency there again is concerned about revealing to the Warren Commission a sensitive source of method of operation.
Mr. Rocca. I can't see that in the second paragraph, where it says these are all things that have been given to the or are redundant, as far as the investigation is concerned. At least at the time it seemed that way.

Mr. Goldsmith. The fact that material may have been given to the Warren Commission in substance is something (a) first of all that was determined by the CIA, not by the Warren Commission; and secondly, if it was given in substance and not verbatim, that reflects a desire, does it not, on the part of the Agency to withhold sensitive source or method of operation from the Warren Commission?

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I think this was the general preoccupation that prevailed.

Mr. Goldsmith. So then, if there was information that touched upon sensitive sources and methods, the Agency, in fact, was very concerned about it.

Mr. Rocca. It was concerned about it, but certainly not so concerned that it would not either at that time give the substance of the information or eventually give the entire technique.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will return to this question in a little while, after we obtain Mr. Rankin's letter which, after you've seen it, I think you will realize that he was concerned about the photographs in particular. Perhaps
we can clarify that issue at that time.

Excuse me for a moment.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. With respect to the photographs, I recall the Commission coming over, Slawson coming over and actually looking at them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he did that?

Mr. Rocca. I don't remember the date of it. But he made a trip over and he brought somebody with him. There was certainly more than one of them. They actually looked at it. These were the ones that showed the background of the gate, of the iron gate, and so forth. So there was, at that stage anyway, certainly no question of not showing him the actual photographic evidence so that he could examine for himself whether or not this man was Oswald and determine whether or not it was relevant to the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think the record is clear that, in fact, the Warren Commission was allowed to view the photograph, or photographs.

However, the question that I am focusing on right now is when the Commission staff was given access to this material, and, in fact, if that material was made promptly available.

Mr. Rocca. Is there any record as to when they came over? I mean, that would give at least a time, a point of reference. These small memoranda really reflect the kind
of day to day ephemeral flow.

Mr. Goldsmith. We'll have to check into that record. I don't have any record of their visits to the Agency with me now.

Mr. Rocca. A large determination has to be based on the whole rather than a reading of a small part.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please read now CIA number 2033.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we discuss 2033, I would like to go back for a moment to 2007 and establish for the record that 2007 was a memorandum that you prepared on January 31, 1964.

Is that true?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Let's get back now to 2033.

Mr. Rocca. Pardon me while I look this over.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This memorandum was prepared by Mr. Dooley.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of the memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. 23rd of July.

Mr. Goldsmith. 1964.
Mr. Rocca. This was at the point where the Commission was preparing for their report, and it was a question of what should be included and what should not be.

Mr. Goldsmith. Understood.

Now, from the text of this memorandum, which, although it was prepared by Mr. Dooley, I believe it is signed by Mr. Helms, and it's a memo to Mr. Rankin -- from the text of this memorandum, is it fair to say that the Agency was extremely concerned about the sensitive nature of the photosurveillance operation?

Mr. Rocca. Without a question. I mean, this was a statutory responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. No one is questioning the legitimacy of that concern.

I want to be very clear about that. The fact that the Agency was concerned about sensitive sources and methods is not something that I am questioning the validity of.

You look puzzled. Are you?

Mr. Rocca. I will reserve. I will reserve on this point.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am just trying to establish for the record that there was that concern.

Mr. Rocca. Basically, I think Win just -- if we could go off for a minute --

Mr. Goldsmith. I prefer not to go off.
Mr. Rocca. All right, forget it, then. We can talk at lunch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the second paragraph of this letter, or this memo, indicates that the Agency recommends that the photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved, who, as far as the Agency is aware, had no connection with Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy."

Does that language suggest to you that in fact the Agency knew who the individual involved was?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

It simply suggests the total hypothesis that has to be taken into account when you are dealing with anybody's rights in a matter of this kind. I'm sure that he had no knowledge of it. It was just a possibility.

As far as I know, that individual has never been identified in any fashion, nor was he ever connected in any way with any operation of interest of any kind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he made more than one visit to the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot answer that. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 179.

(Pause)
Mr. Rocca. This is our friend Henry.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Now, this is Mexico. This is Jack Whitten's outgoing --

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify what this cable is?

Mr. Rocca. This is a response to Mexico's cable, which we had already considered, incorporating the traces that had been developed on the basis of the available file materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of this response?

Mr. Rocca. The eleventh -- or the tenth of October. I'm sorry, I mis-spoke. It's the tenth.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before discussing this cable in further detail, at the time of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in October, 1963 -- in other words, prior to the assassination -- was any particular significance attached to the fact of this contact?

Mr. Rocca. No. Not as far as I know.

The ultimate of the significance could only have been that he was a defector who was about to redefect, or intended to, or was somehow or other involved in that. I can't say that there was even that conclusion drawn in the earlier material.

Mr. Goldsmith. When the Mexico City station first
learned of the Oswald contact, was any significance attached to that in particular?

Mr. Rocca. I would say not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though a cable was used to communicate this information to headquarters, rather than a dispatch, for example?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I think you would find many other --- I think you would find examples to show that this was a standard order of procedure in connection with Americans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mexico City routinely notify headquarters of every American whom it identified as having been in contact with a Soviet or Cuban Embassy?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you used the word "routinely." I can't answer on that. It did notify headquarters with respect to Americans, as all stations do. I don't know, in other words, what prompted Min Scott in this instance. But it would be a part of the function of the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. To report the contact by an American with a foreign embassy?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, to report that. And, it would be by cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, I note in the first paragraph of CIA number 17, which you have correctly identified as the headquarters response to the Mexico City station cable, that there is a correct description of Oswald, or a more
accurate description of Oswald contained in that paragraph.

Mr. Rocca. That is the correct description of Oswald, as I know it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that information have been obtained?

Mr. Rocca. I have no knowledge of that.

Does that strike you as being difficult?

Mr. Goldsmith. No. It does not necessarily strike me as being difficult just because I asked the question.

Mr. Rocca. You see, the file had been opened on him by Mrs. Eggerter.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you would have obtained the information from the 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. She had the original State Department list which named the defectors, and this kind of thing is really information that you could probably have gotten over a telephone -- I don't know. They would be in a position to say exactly where they got it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, the first paragraph refers to Oswald's 201 file and it is likely that she received that description from this file or from information contained in this file.

Mr. Rocca. Well, the file would have been fairly slim at that stage, though. You know, it would have been really the opening action. Indeed, it contained
this incredible error.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which incredible error are you referring to?

Mr. Rocca. Henry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the file have been opened under the name "Lee Henry Oswald?"

Mr. Rocca. This I have never been able satisfactorily to explain. Betty had retired well before I got into this thing, when I noted it myself -- I hadn't at the time -- in dealing with Belin. But there was some cause for this, that had to do with the opening action.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not sure that I understand that. You say that there was some cause. What do you mean?

Mr. Rocca. There was some analytical error that caused this, either on her part or on the part of the copyist who actually opened the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Miss Edgerter actually opened the file.

Mr. Rocca. You mean, her action?

Mr. Goldsmith. Her signature appears on it.

Mr. Rocca. Well, then, she made the error. But she could have gotten it from the original source of information which was the State Department list.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at that list right now.

Mr. Rocca. Whatever it is, I mean, this, of course,
is one of the warts that you have to live with.

I mean, it is (straight.) And then, the thing I prepared for Belin, I wonder why you haven't seen that, because it is the one that I argued fairly hotly about. Again, quite personally, off the top of my head --

Mr. Goldsmith. Which list are you referring to now, that you prepared for Belin?

Mr. Rocca. This is a survey of all of the materials that had come in since the case had, since the Warren Commission had pronounced, had issued its report, that on the file seemed to have possible interest to a continuing investigation. It's broken down into large sections. It has had a documentary appendix in which each telegram in order, each intercept was listed.

I pointed out a number of these errors at that time and said these are the inevitable results of people working under large stress and short time. I remember I used this -- you have to take them, with warts and all, in discussing this. But I have no real explanation for this. In fact, I was not aware of it myself until fairly late.

Mr. Goldsmith. I wanted to establish for the record that according to CIA number 824, which was a list of American defectors that was given to the Agency, Oswald's name appears with the correct middle name, so that the source of the information would not have been responsible for the incorrect...
middle name.

Mr. Rocca. Yes. So, it is not my impression that
the actual opening, file opening was done by her. She could
have instructed it to have been done.

Did she write Henry?

Mr. Goldsmith. We'll look at that document later.

Mr. Rocca. Because that would then, then she would
be in a position to explain it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Actually, I have the document right
in front of me so we will look at it very briefly. It is
CIA number 788.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is my comment here (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you wrote in a notation that
the middle name is "Harvey," and that was done --

Mr. Rocca. 34-75.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- April, 1975.

Mr. Rocca. So, she did it. She is going to have to--
well, they have to live with it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I should point out for your information
that Mrs. Egerter has reviewed this document and she has
 testified -- at least that is my recollection anyway -- that
"Henry" was not written in by her, but by someone else.

Mr. Rocca. That, to me, makes sense. That is, it
seems to me that in the process there is a gap between Mrs.
Edgerter and the actual opening, which is down somewhere in the RI section, and that this is an error at that level, which then was never picked up and corrected. It just got done that way.

Now I've talked at length with Mr. Hartman about it, and his suggestion was that that's the way it happened, that it was the opening, the actual formal opening was not done by Mrs. Edgerter, who was an extremely careful analyst.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why wouldn't she have written in the middle name at the time that she opened the file?

Mr. Rocca. Why?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. She had that information.

Mr. Rocca. It's right here on the form.

Well, you showed it to me a little while ago.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why wouldn't she have written it in?

Mr. Rocca. You're going to have to ask the people in RI on this. There is an actual book that says how these things happen, and there could have been a slippage at that point in time.

In any case, I think her handwriting, which is this handwriting, I would judge (indicating), is not this handwriting (indicating).

This is printing, and it's not hers.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think that someone wrote
in the entire name "Lee Henry Oswald?"

Mr. Rocca. That's right.

I think that this was done by another person who made a mistake.

So, her testimony, in other words, is probably right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Returning to CIA number 179, which contains a correct description of Oswald and the incorrect middle name, this cable also gives background information on Oswald having been a defector to the Soviet Union. Would that in any way have escalated the importance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Rocca. Only in the sense that it would suggest that he was considering defection, which we later determined he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. And would that have made the contact a significant one?

Mr. Rocca. I think so. I think so. For Mexico it would have. It would have given it meaning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer to the last paragraph of this cable.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that request additional information if such information becomes available?

Mr. Rocca. It does.

Mr. Goldsmith. Had the Mexico City station prior
to the assassination known of Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy, should the Mexico City station have communicated that information to headquarters?

Mr. Rocca. It may not have processed it by that time. It was a different set of materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Rocca. I understand the thrust of what you are getting at.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that you wouldn't have the information as to whether they, in fact, knew. But I'm saying that if, in fact, they knew and had processed that information, should it have been sent to headquarters?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed -- if it had been processed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I understand.

Mr. Rocca. My impression is that they simply went back over a lot of tapes and gathered that information then. In other words, there was so much of it that it didn't just sort of come up automatically, and therefore that they sent what they had or what they recognized. But they were certainly in no position to immediately correlate inasmuch as everything had to be based on manual observation and translation and selection at that time.

So, I would not hold them at fault in this at all. In other words, you cannot credit them with handling more than --
Mr. Goldsmith. Well, my question was phrased very narrowly.

I am saying assuming that the Mexico City station had, in fact, known of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy and that prior to the assassination this information had been processed, should that information have been sent to headquarters?

Mr. Rocca. And it would have been. Yes. The answer to your question is yes, and I think it would have been.

My personal impression is that they processed it later, and therefore the flow of information was not as direct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever ask anyone in the Mexico City station whether they had that information prior to the assassination?

Mr. Rocca. Prior to the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

I am asking you whether --

Mr. Rocca. I had no knowledge of any of this prior to the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not asking you whether you asked the question prior to the assassination. I'm asking you whether at some time you asked anyone at the Mexico City station whether the Mexico City station prior to the assassination knew that Oswald had been in contact with the Cuban Embassy and Consulate.

Mr. Rocca. No, I had not. I would assume that that
had been reported.

Mr. Goldsmith. But you never asked anyone?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Now turning to CIA number 181, which is the last page of this cable, I note that Thomas Karamissines is the releasing officer.

What does the releasing officer do to a cable do? What is the function of the releasing officer?

Mr. Rocca. He was simply substituting for Mr. Helms, whose signature would have been there as releasing officer on this matter, as it has been on others.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the organization as Mr. Karamissines or Mr. Helms be a releasing officer to a cable?

Mr. Rocca. I think that you are coming now to the whole matter of defection and redefection. You are beginning to get people -- (not) J.C. Kane actually, but a division chief here now -- this is no longer a Whitten -- the whole matter of the American and what his former relationships to the armed forces were are coming through. This makes it a matter of considerable concern. You have also people in CI concerned. The matter has become a little bit more important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.
I don't think you answered the question I posed just a bit earlier.

What is the function of a releasing officer, for the record.

Mr. Rocca. Well, you know, you have to have a releasing officer on cable. Presumably they represent the final review authority with respect to what is being said in the cable. He is the ultimate bureaucratic end of the line on a cable, according to the procedure which is established in the manual. He doesn't have to be the DDP.

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me a minute.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. The releasing officer doesn't have to be the DDP or the ADDP. That's all I'm getting at.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now refer to CIA number 2140.

Mr. Rocca. You see, it's quite clear. You have four other authorities involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm sorry, you were just making a point?

Mr. Rocca. I mean, the content. I think the answer to your question is implicit in the content. You have four other authorities involved that are outside of the Agency. These are all other agencies (indicating) DNB was the FBI.
Mr. Goldsmith. One was the State Department.

Mr. Rocca. One was probably Secret Service and the other would be something. Under those circumstances you would want to go to the boss.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Secret Service have been contacted?

Mr. Rocca. As a defector -- I don't know whether he is or not. This is -- my God, why did I say this. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's slow down and just move back for a moment.

You are referring now to CIA number 181, fifth paragraph, which indicates that this information was disseminated to other agencies. My recollection is that they were State, FBI, Immigration, and I don't know what the other crypt stands for. I don't think it's Secret Service.

Mr. Rocca. That's where I bow out.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's why I wanted to clarify that.

Mr. Rocca. I will bow out of that.

I don't recognize it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that because this information --

Mr. Rocca. Yes. Looking it over I can see very definitely why Mr. Kane would want his superior to know.

After all, he is the division chief and normally he would
be the releasing officer for anything. But if you have this kind of interdepartmental concern, very definitely you want the DDP or his assistant to know. It seems to me that this is — now the answer is still to why the releasing officer and what are his functions. He has to be sufficiently high up the channel of command to be able to take care of whatever emerges now as a consequence and be informed of it so that if something happens, one of these could call him up and ask.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the fact that Karamissines signed off on this as releasing officer indicate that the contact of Oswald with the embassy at this time was considered to be significant?

Mr. Rocca. Not per se, but in an interdepartmental sense it would be, and he would have to know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2140.

Mr. Rocca. By George, you guys are beautifully thorough.

2121.

Mr. Goldsmith. It's 2140.

Mr. Rocca. That was the one I already had.

Mr. Goldsmith. Oh, okay.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. It is a different copy of it, though, and it has a margin note which I don't understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you identify this document?
Mr. Rocca. This document goes to the community.

I would have to look at the earlier documents, the earlier dissemination to the community to distinguish what this does that the other didn't. It seems to go over the same ground.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, you think that there was another dissemination cable to the community?

Mr. Rocca. Well, maybe I'm just mixing that up with the one that --

Mr. Goldsmith. There was a dissemination cable that was sent by --

Mr. Rocca. Mexico.

Mr. Goldsmith -- Mexico City station locally. That could be what you are confusing it with.

Mr. Rocca. That's what I'm probably remembering.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of this cable?

Mr. Rocca. This is the tenth.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the cable that was sent, I believe, to the rest of the intelligence community.

Mr. Rocca. This was the first one, yes. It must be the first one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this cable reports the contact on 1 October by Lee Oswald. Do you know why this cable contained an incorrect description of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Because it reproduced the incorrect
material that had been previously sent.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, the same person who sent
the cable to Mexico City that gave the correct description
of Oswald sent this cable.

Mr. Rocca. But the correct description went out at a
different time, did it not?

Mr. Goldsmith. They went out effectively simultaneously.

Mr. Rocca. My impression is that there is a time
difference which showed some degree of appreciation.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes, this incorporates that incorrect
information.

Mr. Goldsmith. This time is given in "zed" on CIA
number 179. I'm not sure that you'll be able to correlate
the time.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Well, we will have to find out what the
times are.

This is 12 "zed" (Indicating) and what is this?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I associate this with being a later
dissemination than this. It is very important. It is important
I would say in looking back at it to know who did the
actual drafting.

These were among the errors made. As I say, they
have to be marked as such and I think they were.

Mr. Goldsmith. In this case the drafts were prepared
by Eggerter and Charlotte Bustos.

Mr. Rocca. Yes. My impression is that it was Miss
Bustos--whom I don't know, but the name I remember now that
you mention it--but they were obviously not tracking.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, do you have an explanation
for why the--

Mr. Rocca. I think that they wrote these in total
good faith on the basis of what they had before them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though one cable went back to
the México City station that gave a correct description?

Mr. Rocca. Not if that went later.

Mr. Goldsmith. Not if that, referring to CIA number
179?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. If that went later, then it means
that somewhere in between the two perception, true perception
developed, and that is my assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. We can easily check the record to
see the time.

Mr. Rocca. I have never really pursued it, but I
recall that this came up when I went through this exercise
for Belin, and it was as clear as--you know--there were
errors made in the way these things were sent. But they are
minor. They are minor things, though.
Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I would like to say for the record that because of the quality of the Xerox, which in general is good, you cannot make out the time with reliable accuracy. For that reason, what we will do is simply check the Agency's records to see the time sequence with which these cables were sent.

Mr. Rocca. The "Z" time sequence can be compared. In any case, the two ladies can be -- well, I'm not going to tell you how to do your work.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't we take a break for lunch now.

(Whereupon, at 1:21 o'clock, p.m., the deposition recessed, to resume at 2:15 o'clock, p.m., the same day.)
Whereupon, at 2:30 o'clock, p.m., the taking of the deposition of Raymond G. Rocca continued.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that this morning we discussed the question of whether the Agency was giving the Warren Commission the complete information on the telephone tap operation of the Mexico City station. I believe that your testimony was that that information was made available to the Commission.

Mr. Rocca. The substance, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was your testimony also to the effect that the Warren Commission specifically was told about the telephone tap operation?

Mr. Rocca. At what time? At any time during the whole thing?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when, to the best of your recollection, were they told about that?

Mr. Rocca. In my opinion, it could not have sat very long without Mr. Dulles having told them himself as a member of the Commission. I don't know the exact date that they were informed of the materials.

It had to be very early because everyone understood that this material was of a highly sensitive nature which had to be protected. It originated with a telephone tap. You could just talk with Slawson and your eyes would be bugging out as he understood everything.
So, whether it's in January or March -- at a certain stage certainly there was no question because they did the actual taps, and they were asking them where are the originals and stuff of that kind. We had to explain why there were no originals, that they had been erased, and that kind of thing. But as far as I know, this was not done in writing. It was done verbally, in conversations.

But what the exact date was I cannot pin down.

Mr. Goldsmith. We saw, for example, the Slawson-Coleman memo that you examined this morning which suggested that as of 1 April, 1964 Slawson and Coleman did not know of the telephone operation; either that or they were affirmatively misinformed about the Agency having "observed Oswald."

I would like to show you CIA number 2144.

Please examine this document.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is one of the very early pieces.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you the question and you will get a chance to explain that.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I can't explain it, obviously.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you identify this document for the record? Simply, what is it?

Mr. Rocca. This is an outgoing cable in the GP Floor phase. At the time the Western Hemisphere Division was responsible for the general coordination, outgoing materials.
I judge that it was prepared by Mr. Whitten. The
date of it is 20 December, 1963. And Mr. Whitten signed it,
presumably by authority of Mr. Helms, who was the DDP.

Mr. Goldsmith. What's the date on this? 20 December,
1963?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to the first paragraph, it
indicates that the Agency's present plan in passing information
to Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone
taps in order to protect their continuing operations.
"Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran," et cetera,
et cetera.

Can you explain this first paragraph in any way?

Mr. Rocca. Well, Mr. Whitten has to explain it.
It is certainly, in any case, by the time January came around
and the Warren Commission began to operate, this had long
since been superseded.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, this was not the operating policy
by the time the Warren Commission was in full gear?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I'm concerned, this was not.
This was one of those early representations of sources and
methods and their protection, which was simply unrealistic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that this document
is another example of the Agency's concern to protect sources
and methods as authorized by -- well, not necessarily as

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authorized by law, but in the Agency's interpretation of how
it was authorized by law?

Mr. Rocca. As it was interpreted in those times.

I think that the interpretation has changed, probably as a
result of this episode.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Did the CIA ever obtain a tape recording of Lee
Harvey Oswald's voice?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no tape recording
ever preserved.

It was erased, in other words; the telephone taps.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question is did the Agency ever
obtain a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Rocca. The answer to the question is yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Now you anticipated me quite correctly.

At the time of the assassination, did the Agency have
in existence a tape recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Rocca. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. When had the tape recording of Oswald's
voice been obtained?

Mr. Goldsmith. Some time in the earlier period
which we have reviewed this morning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Between September 27, 1963 and October
first or second, roughly?
Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

And, it had been erased sometime during the period -- during the subsequent period, and before the whole episode generated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the tape recording was erased?

Mr. Rocca. This was by standard order of procedure, according to the people on the spot and in charge of the operation, who are in a better position to testify to this matter than I am.

In particular, the man who has written a book --

Mr. Goldsmith. David Phillips.

Mr. Rocca. -- David Phillips. When I was working on behalf of Mr. Belin's interest in compiling those two papers, let me add that the whole matter of the time lapse did come up in my discussion with Phillips in trying to account for why did it take until the seventh -- did we discuss this this morning? I recalled at lunch that this was a matter that I had seized on myself. And therefore, he was division chief at that time -- strike the therefore -- when I talked with him in '75. I had a number of discussions with him on points relative to the technique that was used in the handling of the tapes, because he was there at the time.

Now whether he was in a position to give testimony of his own knowledge or whether it was his belief, I cannot say.
But his statement to me, at the time, as I asked him the specific question, what happened to the voices — it was erased and it was normal that that be done within a cycle of five to six days. That is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the purpose of erasing the tape simply be so that the tape could be reused?

Mr. Rocca. Exactly. They had a large traffic which they had to accommodate.

There is in addition to Mr. Phillips his chief of office at that time who also was there and who would know the answer to that question.

Mr. Goldsmith. That would be Herb Mannel?

Mr. Rocca. No. It's a fellow with a Latin name.

Mr. Goldsmith. In charge of which operation in Mexico City?

Mr. Rocca. He was Chief of Ops when Mr. Phillips was chief of WH in 1975.

Mr. Goldsmith. Oh, in 1975.

Mr. Rocca. He later went out to become chief of station. Well, you can create the entire order of that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you another document dated November 23, 1963, addressed to James J. Rowley, who was Chief of the U.S. Secret Service at that time, from J. Edgar Hoover.

The document deals with the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, November 22, 1963.

I will have this marked as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Rocca Exhibit number 2.)

Mr. Goldsmith. If I wanted to substitute a better copy of that at some later time, is there any problem in doing that?

The Reporter. Not that I know of, so long as they are identical.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Turning to page 4 of this document, I would like to ask you to read the paragraph that starts at the bottom of the page and continues on to the next page.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read that paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. That paragraph, I believe, makes reference to a tape recording that was provided to the FBI by the CIA and Mr. Hoover is indicating that some agents of the FBI had reviewed that tape recording which, although it was purported to contain a recording of Oswald's voice, the agents were of the opinion that it was not, in fact, Oswald.

Do you know anything about that tape recording?
Mr. Rocca. I regard this as a total mixup of various leads, inaccurate, and reflecting at the moment -- 23rd November -- no one had sorted out anything. I think this collapses of its own weight on the basis of the evidence.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever have a tape recording of someone whom it thought to be Oswald, and it turned out that the tape recording was, in fact, not of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge directly or indirectly. I have never heard of such, because this was one of the things that I tried very hard to establish -- that is, was there any corpus of evidence that could be associated directly with Oswald in the original things. I always drew a blank.

Mr. Goldsmith. What did you do to try to establish this?

Mr. Rocca. Asking people about it, whether it existed or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you talk to Win Scott about that in Mexico City?

Mr. Rocca. No, no. I never talked to Win Scott during the period at all. He was down there. After all, I was not in a position to, and I have no recollection of having done it later on when he visited. But it may very well have come up in the '65 or later visits that he had.

But in any event, in my opinion, this is simply a mixup.
Again, it's the photograph -- I would say you are going
to have to sort this kind of thing out very carefully before
giving it evidential value.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 197,
specifically paragraph number two.

For the record, this is a cable dated 23 November, 1963
to headquarters from Mexico City.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that
paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. Paragraph three?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, two.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

It bears out what I was saying earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. The paragraph indicates in relevant
part that the station was unable to compare voice, Oswald's
voice, as the first tape had been erased prior to the receipt
of the second call.

My question is as follows. Is it reasonable to infer
from that that in fact, on November 23, 1963, one of the tapes
was still in existence because the author of the cable doesn't
say "station unable to compare voice as tapes have been
erased." Rather, he indicates, "Unable to compare voice
as first tape had been erased prior to receipt of second call,"
suggesting that in fact one of the tapes was still in existence.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I think that is a strained construction. It could be that both had been erased, and that's what the meaning was, as far as I can see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever reviewed this cable before?

Mr. Rocca. This was one of the cables that I included in a batch of materials that I assembled in going over the thing for Mr. Belin. I come back to my statement that all of the efforts that I made to try to pin down extant tapes produced nothing with respect to Oswald, and it was possible only to get the tapes after the 23rd preserved. And, to my knowledge, they are still preserved, but I am not certain of it.

But I did not draw the inference you did, let's put it that way.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you read this paragraph, did it occur to you possibly that that would be a reasonable inference to draw?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

I certainly don't want to get into any kind of personal difference here on it. I would not have drawn that inference.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. In the light of what I'd been assured.

Mr. Goldsmith. I want you to understand that I
don't intend to force any inference upon you and I purposely phrased the question in the sense that is it a reasonable inference, and you have given your answer.

Let's take a look at CIA --

Mr. Rocca. Let me look at it again. I mean, after all, it's been a while.

Again, this goes back to the people on the spot and what they remember, not what I feel or thing about it, though I recognize that if I should have spotted it, I should have. But basically the people engaged at the time can answer, and their statement is that these things were scratched, were rubbed, were removed, and they were not extant. And it was only after the 23rd, after the assassination, you will preserve all the material. I think that went out in a cable that came out of headquarters.

"In view Oswald in Soviet Union, in fact he claimed on 1 October, LIENVOY to have visited" -- "station unable to compare voice" --

Frankly, I think that this is again a very -- my feeling is that this is again an example of the kind of loose language that is written and that you see on other parts of the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. This, while it is possible that what you say is so, my feeling is that this, in effect, says that they
were unable to make any comparison.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's review now CIA number 205, which is a cable from Mexico City to the director, also dated 23 November, 1963.

Would you please read paragraph number four.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now paragraph number four indicates that the transcriber of the conversations involved stated that Oswald was identical with the person who had called from the Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy prior to October first.

Is it reasonable to infer from paragraph number four on CIA number 205 that the transcriber made a voice comparison?

Mr. Rocca. Out of his head.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you indicating that --

Mr. Rocca. And they are good. I would have no question that he is right. But he didn't make any comparison. I don't know him. I don't know his talent. But that would be my statement operationally.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, someone reading this paragraph who does not have knowledge of Agency operating procedures or the manner in which transcribers operate or are trained might, reading this in a straightforward manner, think that a voice comparison had been made.

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Is that correct? Are you shaking your head yes?
We'll go ahead and let you verify it.
Mr. Rocca. If I answer yes, this is a purely hypoth-
etical case.
Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.
Mr. Rocca. As I say, it is like many other things
that occur in the record which can be interpreted hypothetically
as indicating intent or knowledge.
Mr. Goldsmith. I am purposely qualifying the question
to say that if someone doesn't have any knowledge of Agency
procedures or the talent and training that goes into the
making of a good transcriber, he might thing that a voice
comparison has been made from reading paragraph number four.
Do you have an explanation for this paragraph?
I think you gave one but I would like to hear it again.
Mr. Rocca. Yes.
The explanation is that this represents the typical
function of a transcriber in recalling what you would call
"eyeballing", but this is "earballing"; what he hears.
Mr. Goldsmith. So, effectively, seven weeks after
Oswald had contacted the embassy, the Cuban Embassy and the
Soviet Embassy, without having a chance to listen to the tape
and compare voices, you are indicating that the transcriber
could still have memory of that and make a valid comparison?
Mr. Rocca. Yes, and he would probably be able to do it
today.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Did the Agency station in Mexico City ever obtain a photograph of Oswald as a result of its photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy and Consulate?

Mr. Rocca. To my knowledge, it did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's examine CIA number 248.

Would you please read this memo.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, this is a memo that was passed to Mr. Papich of the FBI with information on the photo coverage of the embassies in Mexico City. The memo is dated 27 November, 1963.

Is it accurate to say that according to this memo, the photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City was continuous in nature?

Mr. Rocca. No, it is not accurate.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your interpretation of the memo, Mr. Rocca?

Mr. Rocca. Well, in the first place, I have no competence to judge this memo because I have had no service in Mexico City and must therefore rely on what has been given to me in the course of experience over the years by people who were.
One of the points that I explored, again in that thing that I did for Mr. Belin, was why there was no photographic coverage on Friday.

Mr. Phillip told me that the machine was down on Friday, therefore this is not right. But I don't know whether it is or not. You see, I am in a bind here. I am telling you what I do know.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Nevertheless, according to your answer on the record — Mr. Rocca. On the record it's wrong.

Mr. Goldsmith. I didn't ask you about the accuracy of what the memo says. I only asked you if according to the memo the coverage was continuous in nature. I am not asking you whether the memo was right or wrong. I am simply asking you whether according to the memo the coverage was continuous in nature.

Mr. Rocca. That's what the memo says.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I will also indicate for the record that the memo continues to say, "However, weather conditions and other factors affecting any photographic efforts required of the coverage not be considered as total or complete."

Mr. Rocca. Again, my researches in 1975 showed that there were large lapses and very grave difficulties because of the operational situations that prevailed in the
various quarters.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the reason that you discovered
for why the photosurveillance unit did not obtain a photograph
of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Because -- I think the question was directly
raised by Mr. Belin. How come you didn't get a picture of him?

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the reason that you gave
Mr. Belin?

Mr. Rocca. That the machine was down.

Mr. Goldsmith. For how many days was the machine
down?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot answer that. It was down on
Friday, and perhaps on Saturday.

As I say, this is noted in the memo that I wrote in
'75 and it's based on a conversation with Mr. Phillips and
with his people.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when that memo was
written?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I don't know whether I have a note on the
date.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you retain a copy of the memo?

Mr. Rocca. I did not retain a copy of the memo. I
do not have a copy.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the reason that was.
given by Mr. Phillips or Mexico City station was that, at least according to your knowledge, the photo mechanism was not working on that day.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That's right, and that doesn't assume that there might not have been some other reason for not getting the coverage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, if we were to reconstruct Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Russian Embassies --

Mr. Rocca. That's what I did in that memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, we're going to get a hold of that memo, I assure you. The Agency, at this time, for some reason, has not made it available to us.

But if we were to reconstruct his visits, we would see that he made visits not only to the Soviet Embassy, but to the Cuban Embassy as well. So, did Mr. Phillips or whomever gave you the explanation indicate that both cameras were down?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot recall that detail. But that, too, would be taken care of -- and bear in mind that these were different implantations; these were different, and they had different problems in management. As I say, I am telling you only what I know by hearsay. The people who were there are the ones who will have to explain.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did it strike you as unusual that
Oswald was able to visit the Embassies a total of at least five to six times without ever being photographed?

Mr. Rocca. No, not one bit. Not one bit.

I have been in the field -- I was in the field 20 years, and anyone who trusts machines and machine coverage is just placing his reliance on a false device.

Let me say another thing. Saturday coverage was not undertaken. So this was another thing.

You see, there are a number of things here, there are a number of substantive details that you don't have.

Saturday, now I recall-- and this was recorded in the memo -- Saturday coverage was not -- the coverage was stopped because the embassy was closed presumably on that day.

So, it would be, generally speaking, beneficial to get a hold of that, because I tried to go over some of these points as best as I could.

I must say that I don't have the information I thought I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever consider it to be unusual that Oswald was able to gain admittance to the Cuban Embassy on a Saturday when the embassy was closed?

Mr. Rocca. No. All you had to do was press a button and there was a guard, and he let you in. But inasmuch as it was a closed day, coverage was not extended to that period at that time. They did it afterward. As I recall, that was
started.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the Agency's records indicate that by the entrance to the Cuban Consulate there was an impulse camera that was activated automatically and that that camera was in operation on September 27, which was the first day that Oswald made a visit to the Cuban Embassy, would you think that a photograph of Oswald would have been obtained?

Mr. Rocca. There are two many hypotheses. This is a cascade of hypotheses, and I would really, before answering in any way that would affect your questions to others, want to know very, very clearly what the mechanics were, which is something that I don't know now.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not in a position by virtue of my agreement with the Agency to go into detail with you now on the nature of the photo coverage. So, I will withdraw the question.

Mr. Rocca. Again, let me say that these lapses in coverage are absolutely a built-in part of the hazards of the business.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever criticized for failing to obtain a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Critized -- was the Mexico City station criticized?

Mr. Rocca. No. I saw nothing to that effect in any
of the outgoing material or in any of the discussions.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, even though Oswald visited the embassies, you are not surprised by the absence of a photograph?

Mr. Rocca. I was not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the FBI had any independent telephonic surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban Embassy and Consulate?

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. I am.

This is a cryptonym for a Cuban defector, who is unknown to me, but who at a certain stage provided material that was given to the Warren Commission by the staff, or directly, or both.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever meet with AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that AMMUG provided the CIA with information relevant to the assassination sometime in 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I can't judge that. I do not know. I can't really appreciate the thrust of his material.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you have occasion to review the material that AMMUG had provided to the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. I actually never went over it, except to
the extent that it's in the Oswald file. I am not trying to be evasive. I simply cannot remember what the thrust of this information was.

My impression was that he provided the first really significant, hard information on the DGI chief. Now his name, I was struggling for it this morning, it must have been ("Rodriguez.")

Mr. Goldsmith. R-O-G-E-L-I-O Lopez?

Mr. Rocca. That's the man.

As a consequence, this was of significance. But it came in later, after, 1964 or some time. Is that correct? Well, I'm asking you.

Mr. Goldsmith. I will show you some documents which will refresh your memory in a moment.

Mr. Rocca. Anyway, this was considered very sensitive and was being handled by a case officer, appropriately equipped with AMMUG. I had no direct cognizance of that, for example, as I had with the Golitzin material on the Russian side.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know about AMMUG in 1964?

Mr. Rocca. The name and that he had information I had heard, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know that he was a former DGI agent or case officer?

Mr. Rocca. The question is where.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca. Where he was. I mean, he was not in Mexico, as I recall, was he?

I think he was somewhere else.

Yes. The answer to your question is yes. He was a DGI defector. But I thought he came out of Paris or London or something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. We'll show you some documents that will refresh your memory on him in a moment.

Mr. Rocca. This is, again, a part that I am not really expert on in any way. But I am perfectly willing to be used as a backboard for anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Helms or Mr. Angleton ever express any concern about AMMUG being disclosed to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. Not as far as I know. As far as I know, they disclosed him to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about AMMUG being a DGI employee?

Mr. Rocca. That's my impression. I may be totally wrong about this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information, if any, AMMUG provided to the CIA in reference to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Rocca. As I said, I think he provided the
first inside information on the DGI's aspect of the Rezidentura
in Mexico City. But precisely what he said with respect to
who was where in Mexico City at the time I cannot say at
this moment because I don't have it in my memory.

Just a second, now. Let me try to work it out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, for your sake and the
purpose of refreshing your memory somewhat, I would like to
show you some CIA documents pertaining to AMMUG which, I think,
after they are reviewed, you may have a somewhat better
recollection of this particular individual.

I am going to give you CIA number 1879 and would like
to ask you to skim that through CIA 1892 -- no, CIA 1894.
That would probably take you ten minutes or so.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Well, I haven't read it in detail, but
certainly I recall this. The case officer was Swensen and
we did provide the questions that he was able to elaborate.
What can we talk about?

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there another case officer who
debriefed AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, no. I mean, Swensen
was the individual who was in charge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether a CIA case
officer, whose last name was Langash or Langosh ever debriefed
AMMUG?
Mr. Rocca. No. "Langash" -- I remember no such name.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to a memo dated 5 May, 1964, CIA number 1879, the first paragraph indicates that prior to October, 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during, and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with DGI, specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel (Dega) Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

Mr. Rocca. Who was the chief.

Mr. Goldsmith. Rodriguez was the chief?

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that he was the chief.

That's why AMMUG gave us the first real information on the organization of this Rezidentura.

Mr. Goldsmith. What followup was done on Oswald's apparent contact with DGI?

Mr. Rocca. Well, there was no followup, quite apart from just this information. I mean, these are the people -- there was nothing to be done. Luisa Calderon was one of the people that we had gotten a telephone tap on. She is one of the persons who made a very peculiar comment in the course of it, as I recall. These other people are simply on the spot. It is not possible to get any additional information if the station doesn't develop the assets.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did AMMUG give any information as to whether Silvia Duran was a DGI employee or agent?
Mr. Rocca. I do not know, unless it's stated here. She was the receptionist, serving a mixed bag, there, of people.

So I don't know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Luisa Calderon was a DGI agent?

Mr. Rocca. No, not except for this, which says that she is.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this information all given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know -- all of the AMMUG information was given.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Luisa Calderon was ever employed in any capacity by the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. No. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1892 and 1893, starting with this paragraph (indicating). Just read this paragraph through to here (indicating.).

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I have no comment on this.

As far as I know, there were no traces that sustain this allegation.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, the allegation in that document is that Calderon was or may have been connected to the CIA.

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Is that correct?

When I say "is that correct," I'm saying is that what the allegation is.

Mr. Rocca. Yes, that is the allegation. But this involves almost three levels of hearsay.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I don't want you to infer anything as to the committee's view on this particular issue.

Mr. Rocca. I'm not going to underwrite that at all. I just don't believe it.

Mr. Goldsmith. We're not asking you to underwrite it. We're simply asking you whether you have any information that would either rebut or verify that allegation.

Mr. Rocca. I understand that. Ultimately the question really ought to go to the people in WH division, Mexico-Cuban, who have the records and are in a position to verify this. They forwarded no information bearing on such a thing. I assume, therefore, that the thing is not so.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you read this memo at the time that you were working on this issue for the Rockefeller Commission, were you concerned by the allegation that Calderon was a CIA agent?

Mr. Rocca. No, no, no. It didn't come to my mind at that time. I don't remember where in that memo I gave it any attention, either.
Mr. Goldsmith. Apart now from that allegation which
I understand to be hearsay --

Mr. Rocca. Well, Piniero, the head of the CIA, did
not agree. Piniero is the chief of the service.

Mr. Goldsmith. He is head of the DGI service?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. I mean, he is a very important man.

You know, this is -- we are really spinning things out
here. If there is no factual support for this, then we
shouldn’t tarry and try to give it evidential or factual
significance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, no one is attempting to
attach evidential significance to these documents. The
purpose of this session is to address questions to you that
would help us shed light on the documents. I don’t want you
to think that we infer from the documents that everything
contained in the documents is accurate.

In fact, that’s the reason we are going over the
documents. The record does not speak for itself.

Mr. Rocca. That’s very good. As I said, I don’t want
to get into a position of hostility here, because that is not
my purpose.

On the other hand, as you stated yourself, certain
of these paragraphs read in completely legalistic fashion
by individuals who really have not been exposed to the
operational vicissitudes -- let’s put it that way -- will draw
conclusions that simply aren't correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reason that I am deposing you today and have deposed many other Agency employees is to attempt to clarify questions that are raised by the record. That perhaps gets back to one of the first points that was made earlier in the deposition, where you made reference to the record and I indicated that the record needs to be examined and we can't rely exclusively upon it.

Mr. Rocca. She's a mysterious character anyway. As far as I know, that has never been clarified. There are subsequent reports about her, as I recall, travelling around and being set up by the DGI. So, you can just keep that in the back of your head. You are going to have a continual problem with her.

Mr. Goldsmith. These memos also mention that as well.

Mr. Rocca. There is a whole stage of receding mirrors that you can't really ever get to the bottom of, without ever getting her into this kind of proceeding, settling down and questioning her.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, CIA number 1903 is a memo dated 5 May, 1974, which basically consists of the results of the debriefing of AMMUG. It lists a series of questions that were presented to AMMUG and the answers to it.

I show you that only for reference purposes now.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that these questions
were very carefully thought out by members of the staff, members of my group, and that we made the thing fully available to the Warren Commission, which is really the thing that concerned me more than anything else.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Please listen to the question that I have for you now.

I just showed you a document that was dated May 5, 1964. On May 6, 1964, according to document number 1898, some followup questions were presented for the purpose of having them be addressed to AMMUG. So, we have a second set of questions.

Now, the memo dated 8 May, 1964, which is CIA number 1891, was prepared by case officer Harold F. Swensen. That is the one I would like you to examine now in a bit more detail.

It appears that what Mr. Swensen did, unlike his earlier report where he specifically mentioned or listed the question that was addressed and gave AMMUG's response, here he simply summarized the briefing session.

I am wondering if you noticed that when you examined this document for the first time?

Furthermore, why did Mr. Swensen depart from the earlier procedure?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it gave us relevant information.

I think that is what probably what we were primarily concerned
with.

Frankly, I would not have held to this format. This is the format you were referring to in the earlier question.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. The sixth of May.

Coming back on the eighth, he is giving us the results really in capsule, I would judge, rather than setting them down, and that would anticipate that this thing would simply be written up more formally somewhere.

Is there such a sort of wrap-up report where the things are?

Mr. Goldsmith. No.

Mr. Rocca. Well, this may be all he did, then, on the thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you don't have an explanation, then, on the departure from the form that was given to Mr. Swensen to address to AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. Here again, it would be a question of consulting with Mr. Dooley or Mr. Pratt-- I think that Mr. Pratt had joined us by this time -- to find out exactly what had transpired between them and Swensen -- one or the other or both -- to determine whether there was any kind of --

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Swenson's position at that time?
Mr. Rocca. He was the case officer for AMMUG.

Mr. Goldsmith. He was simply a case officer?

Mr. Rocca. Yes. He was handling him. Presumably he was very keen, as the memo reflects, on keeping the man safe and out of the public eye.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you satisfied with the completeness of Swenson's report?

Mr. Rocca. I certainly didn't raise anything at the time. It seemed to me to tell us a lot of new information that bore directly on the question on the Cuban side of it for the first time, which, you remember, as I said this morning, was a part of the whole situation there, from the CI point of view, that I know least about. The KGB Rezidentura was clear but what we really didn't understand was the Cuban setup. For the first time we were beginning to get information.

But mind you, this man did not have direct information about it. He had heard it from people.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say "this man", you are referring to AMMUG?

Mr. Rocca. AMMUG.

In other words, he is not a Golitzin or a Derjabin or that kind, that is, who can tell you directly.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you indicate who Golitzin and Derjabin were?

Mr. Rocca. These were Soviet defectors who had come out.
Deriabin is a Soviet defector who defected in Vienna in 1953-1954, and Mr. Golitzin defected in 1961. They are KGB officers.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was all of the information contained in the AMMUG memos prepared by Mr. Swensen given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know in what form --

Mr. Rocca. That's what I don't know at the present moment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it given in memorandum form or in briefing form?

Mr. Rocca. I would judge that it should have been -- I have actually -- I have almost the conviction or feeling that we promoted a meeting between members of the staff of the Warren Commission and the case officer. In other words, they were allowed to confabulate. They were encouraged to.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think there was a conference between the case officer and --

Mr. Rocca. And the Warren Commission staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff members were involved?

Mr. Rocca. That I couldn't say.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly there would have to be a record of that meeting at the Agency.

Mr. Rocca. There would have to be a record at the
Warren Commission, too, if it happened. Now I am not saying that it did happen. I have the impression, however, that there was certainly no intent to deny the Commission full access to the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission was given the information that AMMUG provided with reference to Luisa Calderon?

Mr. Rocca. I'm almost certain they had to have it because there was an intercept on it, and this bound down one aspect of the intercept, which was a very peculiar phrase that she used -- "He got what he deserved" -- or something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will get to that intercept momentarily.

Mr. Rocca. So, I must say that this Calderon thing must have gone to them.

Is there not a memo by Mr. Dooley there which says that the information went to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am going to show you now what the Agency has indicated to us was made available to the Warren Commission.

In response to your question, there is no particular memo from Mr. Dooley indicating what went to the Warren Commission.

I would like you to examine CIA number 1929 through
CIA number 1933.

This is a document that was made available to Mr. Rankin on May 15, 1964 in reference to the information that had been provided to the Agency by AMMUG.

I would like you to review the document and then specifically to review the actual information that was made available to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Rocca. Do you mean that Mr. Rankin is not a member of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I didn't mean to differentiate between Mr. Rankin and the Warren Commission.

Basically, what I was saying is that the document number 1929-1930 is the memorandum, the transmittal memorandum, that indicates what information is going to be provided, and the source of the information. And then, what you'll see in pages CIA number 1932 and 1933 is the actual information that was made available.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review those materials?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do those materials make any reference to Luisa Calderon?

Mr. Rocca. I see it -- and I say that they do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, AMMUG provided information on --

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Mr. Rocca. I don't see it -- here, anyway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, AMMUG provided information on
Manuel (Vega) Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez and Luisa
Calderon and the memo that you're studying now refers only
to (Vega) Perez and Rodriguez Lopez.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. And Duran.

Mr. Goldsmith. And Duran, yes. But there is no
reference to Luisa Calderon, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. There is none.

But, as I say, I cannot explain -- Mr. Hall, who did
this, certainly did not include that on it. But I cannot
accept that that material did not get to the Commission
somehow in some way.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me review another document
with you.

Mr. Rocca. That is, my impression is that Mr. Dooley
passed all of the information to them.

There certainly would have been no reason to omit
her.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this point to review
CIA number 1907, which is a brief for presentation to the
President's Commission on the Assassination of President

I would like to ask you to review specifically CIA
C O N F I D E N T I A L
number 1927 and indicate to me whether there is any reference to Calderon specifically or any of the other DGI individuals.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. There are no specifics worked out. There is simply the generalization that a source is being debriefed and the Commission staff is in the course of being briefed on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who actually gave this briefing?

Mr. Rocca. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that have been Mr. Helms or Mr. McCon?

Mr. Rocca. I judge Mr. Helms, but I can't be certain. I would rather imagine Mr. Helms.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1906.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. My question pertains to this document right now. Let's identify it first.

Would you identify for the record what this is?

Mr. Rocca. It's an internal memorandum from Mr. Angleton to me indicating that the DDP, Mr. Helms, has been scheduled to go before the Commission and he wants a short, but comprehensive, memorandum which highlights the basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency and its dealings with the Commissions.

In other words, that's presumably what came out of it.
Mr. Goldsmith. Now, this is dated 12 May, 1964, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo for you from Mr. Angleton is dated 12 May, 1964.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say from the text of this memo that the Agency was extremely concerned about the sensitive source, AMMUG? In other words, here was an example of the Agency being concerned about a sensitive source?

Mr. Rocca. Well, there is always this sensitivity.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm asking you to look only at CIA 1906.

Mr. Rocca. But you've already shown me the brief.

That's what I was looking at.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay. You'd like to look through the brief again?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I was only going to point out that the very first paragraph of the brief refers to the sensitive source, which is AMMUG -- somewhere along here -- it's one of the tabs, Tab E, I guess.

So, there was within the limits of the prescription comprehensive and at the same time extensive information, Mexican and Cuban phases. In other words, is the point that we weren't mentioning it -- because we did mention it?
Mr. Goldsmith. There are a variety of points and I really am not able to indicate to you right now what all the points are, Mr. Rocca.

My concern here with document number 1906 simply is whether the Agency was concerned about the sensitivity of AMMUG and therefore wanted to protect him as a sensitive source.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that it wasn't any greater than anything else that was coming along.

Mr. Goldsmith. The AMMUG defection was no greater than anything else that was coming along?

Mr. Rocca. Than any of the other techniques, sources, and methods that we had been concerned with.

In other words, I'm trying to -- you were asking me whether this qualitatively was of greater significance than anything else that we were engaged in protecting, and I can't remember that it was.

Mr. Swensen considered it as very important from the standpoint of his own security and the security of his agent. But I don't recall any draconian impositions, "Don't say anything about AMMUG."

Mr. Goldsmith. What did Mr. Angleton have in mind when he said the following to you in the memo: "I informed him" -- that is, Mr. Helms -- "that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission; that it
should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of its implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning."

Mr. Rocca. (Nods negatively)

I haven't the faintest notion at this time of what was involved in that.

Mr. Goldsmith. You'll have to speak up a bit, Mr. Rocca.

Mr. Rocca. I mean, it doesn't bring to mind a particular series of considerations unless they would relate directly to the handling of the individual, who he was, what position he had, and all the rest -- in other words, involve the actual surfacing of the source.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to this memo, it also indicates that the DDP, Mr. Helms, stated that he would review this carefully and make a decision as to the question of timing.

Was the Agency concerned about the question of timing in terms of when material would be made available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I think it refers to timing with respect to this particular matter, in view of the fact that AMMUG had just come out.

Overall I would say that they were not concerned with the question of timing.
Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 1950 through 1954. This is an excerpt from a memo that was prepared by you on 23 May 1975 in response to the letter of April 15, 1975, from Mr. Belin.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to review those pages now, Mr. Rocca?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

This is the memo I wrote for Mr. Belin.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, were there any other memos that you prepared for the Rockefeller Commission?

I believe, for example, you indicated earlier that you --

Mr. Rocca. Yes, there was another memo. There were two memos that I prepared.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then there is one other one.

Mr. Rocca. There is another one, and it had a total documentary appendix which won't tell you anything you don't know. But it simply sets it out in what I consider to be the necessary way to try to make any sense about anything.

This is not that memo.

Now it's very clear here that I have evolved in my views with respect to the importance of Calderon.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you tell us for the record...
what the subject matter of CIA number 1950 to 1954 is?

In other words, you've just reviewed several pages.

They've pertained to Luisa Calderon.

What is the nature of the relevance of Luisa Calderon to this case?

Mr. Rocca. The relevance is that if she is a DGI agent, then the intercept becomes important. But this was not something that I recognized in 1963. I recognized it in 1975, because at that time I read the whole case.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, what is the substance of the telephone intercept that you are referring to?

What does Luisa Calderon say?

Mr. Rocca. She doesn't say a thing. That's why it is totally nuance, and I would never go public on a matter of this kind.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the nuance to which you are referring?

Mr. Rocca. The nuance is that she is -- she phrases what possibly had happened to Kennedy as "what barbarians." I mean, it indicates an emotional setup, an emotional attitude toward what had happened.

Mr. Goldsmith. More fundamentally, doesn't her statement suggest the possibility of foreknowledge on her part?
Mr. Rocca. I used the word. I used that word and you used it just now. But I'm not going to go into a court and say that it does because I have no evidence that that indicates foreknowledge. In and of itself it could indicate anything, because we don't know enough from the intercept about it. That's why I said this was nuance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

Now, at first glance, on reading that transcription, it would not necessarily take on any particular significance standing alone. I believe the way you refer to it is possibly boastful self-indulgence or hyperbole on the part of an individual.

However, does it not to you take on added significance in light of Luisa Calderon's alleged connection with DGI?

Mr. Rocca. If we could prove it. All the evidence is against it.

Piniero denies it.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, no, no.

Piniero denies that she was CIA. He does not deny that she was DGI.

We can refer back to that memo if you would like to clarify that.

Mr. Rocca. No. I think you're right, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have AMMUG making a statement that --
Mr. Rocca. I mean, AMMUG is our source, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And AMMUG says she is DGI.

Mr. Rocca. I'm obviously going under here. I'm beginning to lose the track.

Well, you're at the very point I was, to be utterly frank with you, in compiling that memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to make is if she were DGI, that statement would take on added significance.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. That was the reason I put it in. But I would, in any event, make it a cause for state intervention or that kind of thing. It's another one of these things -- it's what I call the laboratory level of counter intelligence, where you consider evidence, really, the way you consider it, say, at a moot court, in a law school, that kind of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever given a transcription of the conversation involving Luisa --

Mr. Rocca. Without question I would say that.

Without question.

They had the Calderon followup. They had the Dorticos followup. They had the whole works. Not only did they have it here, but they had it also when they were down at the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 1928.
Mr. Rocca. It just becomes incredible to see these formalistic indications that they were not informed about these things because I know they were.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. It is just one page.

Mr. Rocca. The fact that there is no reference to Calderon doesn't mean that there was no transmission. It means that this simply covered other materials.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be another record of the Calderon transcription having been given to the Warren Commission, and if so, where would it be?

Mr. Rocca. It has to be in this very record. This is the first I have heard which even suggested that the Calderon intercept had not been passed on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me just go back and review this document with you briefly.

Mr. Rocca. As I say, this is not an exclusionary document. This simply covers what it covers.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

This is CIA document number 1928. This document is dated 10 April, 1964. It has the heading, "Material from P-8593, Station Oswald File Shown to Warren Commission."

I take it that's the Mexico City station's Oswald file. Then the document lists the translations of calls
made by Oswald that were given to the Commission. It also
refers to two other conversations that were given to the
Commission.

Mr. Rocca. But they already had had it in Washington.
This only refers to presumably what happened in Mexico City.
It may not be the full record of what they gave them down
there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station make
the Calderon transcript, at least according to this memo,
available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I can't say that, not from this memo.
It doesn't state that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo makes no reference at all
to Calderon, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. It does not.

That does not affect the Commission's knowledge because
it simply doesn't make any sense that they wouldn't know of
the Calderon aspect, in my opinion, at this stage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would we be able to find a
formal record of the transcriptions that had been made
available to the Warren Commission staff?

Mr. Rocca. They should be in the formal record of the
material transmitted to the Warren Commission and in their
own records and logs.

(Pause)
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, assuming that the committee would be able to get clearance for you with the Agency, do you think that you might be able to find the record of this transcription having been given to the Warren Commission?

I think you can understand the importance of the issue.

Mr. Rocca. Of course.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

We will attempt to arrange that to see if you can help us on this point.

Mr. Rocca. That would include, obviously, going to WH area?

Mr. Goldsmith. Whatever is necessary for you to help us verify this particular issue or resolve this particular issue.

Mr. Rocca. The thing that would be of greatest use would be if you could get the other memo.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will also make an effort to obtain that memo, I assure you.

Mr. Rocca. Because, it had, as I say, a selection of documents which represented in a sense the only education that the Inspector General had had on the case, and they kept it in their file.

I had intended it to be used as a basis for the selection of materials to be given to the Rockefeller
Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

We will make an effort to obtain these materials and to review them.

Do you know whether --

Mr. Rocca. That is absolutely -- I find it absolutely impossible to believe that this was not among the papers that were given to you, and I would want to assemble my troops and damn well ask them about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency had any penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy in 1963?

Mr. Rocca. In Mexico City?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's refer to CIA number 1977.

Please read paragraph number 5.

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

This is Ambassador Mann.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's Ambassador Thomas Mann?

Mr. Rocca. Uh-huh.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, CIA number 1977 is part of a cable that was written, in effect, by Ambassador Mann.

Paragraph five indicates that Ambassador Mann wanted Luisa Calderon arrested.

Do you know why Ambassador Mann wanted Luisa Calderon
arrested?

Mr. Rocca. Because of the implications of her involvement, possible involvement, as a consequence of the intercept, I would assume. It's 27 November. The intercept had taken place on the 23rd, the afternoon of the 23rd. The Dorticos thing had been on the 24th or the 25th. So, the only basis that they would have had for any such action would have been those materials. They had them in the field.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Azcue?

Mr. Rocca. He was presumably present and had the altercation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would that be a basis for arresting the man?

Mr. Rocca. To find out what he knew about it. The general tenor of this suggestion was pretty much (scarehead) anyway, so you immediately arrest anybody that had any possible relationship to the man who did the killing -- is the way I would have interpreted it.

So, they are all related -- in other words, co-related, in the documentary materials which had been assembled by that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a recess briefly.

Would you like a 10 minute break or so?

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, are you generally familiar
with the allegations that were made after the assassination by the Nicaraguan named Alverado?

Mr. Rocca. It's one of the cases that I wrote up in the memorandum I think I gave to Belin.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you summarize generally for the record what the allegation was?

Mr. Rocca. I think my summary probably wouldn't be worth the paper it's written on.

But, in essence, Alverado walked in the Embassy on Christmas Day or something and said that he had been in the Cuban Embassy or in the courtyard and had seen a red-headed Negro pass money to a young man he identified or who in his view was Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

The gist of the allegation was essentially that Alverado saw --

Mr. Rocca. The money was $5,000 or something.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- a Cuban, a red-headed Latin American pass money to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate and that there was some discussion which could have pertained to a possible assassination.

Does that strike you as a fair summary of the gist of the allegation, without going through the entire record?

Mr. Rocca. Well, yes.

He was discredited, of course, as a source, eventually,
by the polygraph.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

When were these allegations by Alverado resolved by
the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. I judge some time in February, March,
or April. I cannot recall exactly when, but they are a part
of the record, certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the allegations by Alverado
resolved at such time as he took the polygraph and failed it?

Mr. Rocca. My feeling was that everyone regarded this
as the best thing since Pepsi Cola until that happened.
And then it just went down the drain.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me give you a document, CIA number
2099, dated 10 December, 1963, which is the summary of the
Alverado polygraph test that had been given to him.

Would you please briefly skim through these three
pages.

Mr. Rocca. Please recall that I have not read this
document at all, earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the first time you are
seeing it?

Mr. Rocca. This will be my first reading.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.
Mr. Goldsmith. According to that polygraph result, Alverado did not pass the polygraph, and after being told that he did not pass the exam, he essentially said, "The machine doesn't lie."

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say or appropriate to say that based upon that, the Alverado allegation had been resolved, so far as the Agency was concerned -- if you know?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you were involved in the Agency's investigation for the Warren Commission, at the time that you were involved in providing information to the Warren Commission for the Agency, was the Alverado issue still a live one?

Mr. Rocca. I believe so -- and it continued alive until sometime after this date. That is my recollection. That is, into January of 1964.

I can't account for this thing here (indicating) because it is definitive, and that time lapse that I recall. But it certainly continued and there were people on the Commission who were interested in the Alverado who were dealing with people in Mr. Whitten's group on the details of the case, is my recollection, and continued.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, even though Alverado had failed
to pass the polygraph prior to December 10, the issue was still a live one at the time you became involved in the investigation?

Mr. Rocca. It was still being mooted, yes, discussed. It was still being discussed.

I would say that it had come to its end, though, sometime around the end of January, or that time. But these are just terribly impressionistic judgments.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I believe you discussed this this morning, but again, for my purposes, when did you become involved in the CIA's relationship with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. On or about the twelfth of January, from that point on. You get the evidence of it, I think, by the 31st, very clearly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, in CIA number 2100, it indicates that he, Alverado, stated that he wanted to protest his unjust treatment and the fact that he was given money, since he does not believe in negotiating over death.

Do you know anything about this allegation --

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith -- by Alverado that he was given money?

Mr. Rocca. No.

He was an informer, of course, of the Nicaraguan

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service and had been for some time. They had busted him out, or he had been blown, or something, and was moved to Mexico City and this thing developed. So, he could well have been referring to that kind of termination pay that is normal or whatever.

But, as I say, this is my first reading of it and I cannot comment to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, were you told in 1963 that Alverado had made a statement about being offered money?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

I was told solely that he had failed the polygraph and that upon told that he was being deceptive that he had agreed -- is basically the story I heard. This is hearsay, now.

But it's not -- it's not too far off what that says, I see now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether his allegation that he was offered money by someone was ever examined?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that. I do not know that.

But this should be followed up with the station people or the people who were in the station at the time, or who handled the case.

You could probably find the man who actually handled Alverado and question him about that, that aspect.
The interesting thing -- if we're finished with that and if I may just interject --

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Rocca. -- is the fact that he talked about this red-headed Negro, because the red-headed Negro then comes into the story told by a woman.

Mr. Goldsmith. Elena Garro de Paz?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Elena de Paz -- D-E-- new word -- P-A-Z.

So, if you believe in stream of consciousness in the way things happen, here they go. But my explanation for that is that she read it in the Warren Commission report or in some of the newspaper coverage, and that's the way it came out.

But I still took note of it in the memo that I put together for Belin as to those elements that suggested nuance, because she was very persistent in repeating her story. But she also happened to be a personal enemy of one of the other people involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. Silvia Duran?

Mr. Rocca. Silvia Duran. So, there is a question of conflict of interest.

But there were people in the embassy who believed her and continued to report, and there is at least one State Department man who reported right up to the very moment
of his retirement.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you --

Mr. Rocca. On this detail.

Mr. Goldsmith. --CIA number 1983, which is dated April 15, 1964.

It's a memo to Mr. Rankin from Mr. Coleman and Slawson in reference to progress in their area, which was Oswald's foreign travels. Specifically, on page 6 of that memo, on paragraph number 7, it indicates that the Warren Commission at that point had not yet been given a complete report of the Alverado story from the CIA.

I wonder if you could respond to that?

Mr. Rocca. I can't.

I have no response to it because this has been long since --

Mr. Goldsmith. That's paragraph number 7.

Mr. Rocca. What is the date of it?

Mr. Goldsmith. April 15, 1964.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. This is following their trip there and undoubtedly reflects their conversation on the spot. I think their note that we "know informally and through highly digested written reports that the allegations have been thoroughly investigated in establishing beyond a reasonable doubt as false" has really taken care of it.
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, although it would seem that the allegation had been resolved several months earlier, and it is now the middle of April and they haven't received a complete report as yet. That's what I'm focusing on right now.

Mr. Rocca. Well, as I say, I think they got this as a result of being restimulated by their Mexican trip -- if I am correct in the timing. Obviously, if they wanted a final wrap-up report, they were certainly entitled to it. But they had the gist of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever send them a final wrap-up report?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, I do not recall such.

Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph eight refers to additional information of a confidential nature. Do you know what they are referring to there?

Mr. Rocca. With respect to your previous question, let me say that they did discuss this in their report.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the Warren Commission report.

Mr. Rocca. In the Warren Commission report.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am aware of that.

Mr. Rocca. And it seems to me impossible that they could have written what they did without having a complete and thorough knowledge of what had gone on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the FBI participate at all in the
investigation of the Alverado story?

Mr. Rocca. To my knowledge, they did. But I have not read their reporting.

Mr. Dooley would have read that. That was one of his functions, reading those.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Turning to paragraph eight, would you indicate if you know what the additional information of a confidential nature is that is being referred to there?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I haven't the vaguest notion.

Could I look at the rest of the memorandum to see what the other topics are, because that's the only way. It may be a reference to the working out of the schedule in Helsinki. It could be a matter of the gun, the weaponry. It could be a matter of the Minsk business.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would just assume that you not look at the rest of the memo at this time, simply because it's very long. If it becomes necessary to show it to you in the future, we'll certainly make it available to you again.

Mr. Rocca. I can't guess at it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. While Mr. Berk is checking something for me, let me show you CIA number 2088.
This is an information report on an individual; the individual specifically is Luisa Rodriguez Calderon. It's dated 26 April, 1965.

The source apparently was AMMUG.

Mr. Rocca. 1965?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

The document contains a statement to the following effect: "It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency."

I am wondering what would be their reason.

Mr. Rocca. That would be routine. This is a dissemination.

Mr. Goldsmith. That does not indicate to whom the report is being disseminated.

Mr. Rocca. Well, there is a letter and the letter is simply not reproduced here. But normally this would have gone to all agencies in the intelligence community that had a counter intelligence interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

What would the purpose have been of the qualifying or restrictive language in that paragraph?

Mr. Rocca. The caveat.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. I would say that it represents the normal
practice in dealing with a live source of this quality and sensitivity and represents inter-agency practice.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I mean, this is simply a question of keeping other people from getting into the source, without letting you know that they are doing it or getting on to the development of the leads.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would all disseminations to other agencies contain restrictive language like that?

Mr. Rocca. I can't say that all do, but I have written many of them myself and I have read many of them myself --

Mr. Goldsmith. And it is not at all uncommon for them.

Mr. Rocca -- that is it exactly. I wish I had stated it that way. It is not uncommon.

In fact, it is quite common.

Then again, it is designed to keep the channels --

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 1991, which is a memo dated 1 June, 1964 in reference to Alverado. The memo is to Mr. Rankin from Mr. Helms. Specifically refer to paragraph four of that memo.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren
Commission ever received a copy of the Alverado polygraph report?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record of that fact, had the report been given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. Mr. Hall prepared this. He was a very careful operator -- he has passed on.

It strikes me that somewhere there must be another memo that goes along with this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a record of the polygraph report having been transmitted to the Warren Commission if, in fact, it was?

Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. There might have been a memo saying we regret or something of that kind. But, as I say, I can't say one way or the other.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Agency never compiled a list of materials that had been provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. In a single log?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, no. This I regret, to be utterly frank with you.

In other words, this is the final report that they were talking about.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not sure I'm following you.

Mr. Rocca. This is the wrap-up report that Messers
Coleman and Slawson were complaining -- well, not complaining, strike that -- that they were saying had not been received.

Now I dealt with both of them in a very friendly way.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that report was made available to them on 1 June, 1964?

Mr. Rocca. Which follows very closely after their report and we were struggling to get some of these things done, and it took time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission was ever told about Alverado making the allegation that he had been offered money?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot say that at all. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. If he had --

Mr. Rocca. I read it for the first time in that statement that you gave me.

Mr. Goldsmith. And the Warren Commission makes no reference to that.

Mr. Rocca. Well, the reference is enigmatic, as I see it. It could refer to a lot of aspects that might not be directly relevant to what was going on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

Nevertheless, had the information been given to the Warren Commission -- I am not saying one way or another whether or not it was -- but had it been given to the
Commission, it is conceivable that the Commission would have wanted to examine that point further.

Are you familiar with the allegations that were made by a Mexican citizen named Gutierrez?

Mr. Rocca. You would have to tell me more about Gutierrez, because I don't recognize it from that name, though it may again be one of the things that I took up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Gutierrez was the Mexican citizen who said that he saw an individual whom he later recognized to be Oswald leaving the Cuban Consulate with another individual and that the individuals were discussing something sinister. Gutierrez may have further alleged that he saw money change hands as well.

Please read number 1979, which will adequately refresh your recollection, I think, on his statement.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Oh, this is the famous "observed in mid morning."

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I would simply have to restudy the whole thing. It just doesn't register with me. I mean, I would have to go over the report. I think this is another matter that they did discuss, the Gutierrez lead.

The real question that comes up in my mind there is whether this might not have been done more or less in

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the FBI line. It certainly doesn't ring any bell to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Essentially, to refresh your memory, Gutierrez alleged that he saw Oswald and someone else leaving the Cuban Consulate, that the individuals got off in a car, took off in a car. He overheard a conversation that was, at least to him, sinister in nature and made an allegation that a payoff was supposed to have occurred, possibly in that car.

Does that --

Mr. Rocca. This is something that, as I say, I have no recollection of, and my feeling is that the Bureau did whatever was followed up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the Bureau have investigated this matter as opposed to the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. Their jurisdictional authorities, I mean, were de facto in Mexico and they ran over everything.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Bureau investigate Alverado?

There, it seems, that the Agency was responsible for resolving that issue.

Mr. Rocca. That might have been some kind of local, private treaty. But de Paz, for example, they did the initial work and discredited her as a source. It was we, that is, Win and the Embassy man, who continued the interest in it, with the Bureau's knowledge.

But my feeling is that they would not have accepted our investigation in a matter of that kind. They would have

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gone over it themselves, and they did. They spent hundreds and hundreds of hours just going around Mexico City checking up on Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, your impression, then, is that the Bureau, rather than the Agency, investigated this issue?

Mr. Rocca. Could have. I mean, I'm trying to explain why I don't remember anything about it. That certainly doesn't strike a bell.

Now, it may strike a bell with Whitten or somebody else that actually was vested with this area.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever attempt to determine whether it had obtained a photograph of Gutiérrez outside the Cuban Consulate or Embassy?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot respond to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Gutiérrez was ever polygraphed?

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

You see, I draw a complete blank on this one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

If you don't remember, I'm not going to press you on it, Mr. Rocca. We are certainly not here to attempt to simply create testimony. So, if you don't remember, I am just going to withdraw.

Mr. Rocca. Well, you will find people who will remember, I am sure.
Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2020, and read that document.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I know of no followup or anything of that kind, as a matter of fact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify the document for the record.

Mr. Rocca. It is a cable to the intelligence, the counter intelligence community -- White House, Department of State, and the FBI from the Agency on Oswald on the 26th of November, stipulating or setting forth information from Mexico regarding an alleged relationship between Oswald and Arnesto Rodriguez, who lives in New Orleans -- Arnesto Rodriguez -- and runs a Spanish language school, and is anti-Castro.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the cable also make reference to a tape recording?

Mr. Rocca. According to Maria Rodriguez de Lopez, her son-in-law has a taped conversation with Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this allegation, either of Oswald's connection with Arnesto Rodriguez or the fact of a possible tape recording was ever investigated by the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. No -- and it would not have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reason for that would have been

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what, sir?

Mr. Rocca. This is strictly within the investigative responsibilities of the Bureau.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Bureau ever pursued this lead?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

This is not a matter -- in other words, this cable, in its entirely, is not anything regarding which I have any background information. I don't know, therefore, whether this was investigated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. I assume, however, that it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now earlier, Mr. Rocca, you made reference to an allegation by a woman named Elena Garro de Paz.

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state generally for the record what that allegation was.

Mr. Rocca. Well, again, I would prefer to answer the question having the benefit of a re-reading of the summary that I gave for Mr. Belin. But not having it at this moment, it was she who came in around Christmas Day, not Alverado.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Alverado came in shortly after the assassination.
Mr. Rocca. So, I correct that part. It was she.

She had become involved -- she is a highly controversial right wing personality, (a poet), and had become involved in a situation with the secretary or the receptionist at the Cuban Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Silvia Duran?

Mr. Rocca. Silvia Duran -- was a relative.

They were hostile to each other. There was a long, apparently, background to that effect.

But she came in with a story which concerned essentially the passage of money by a red-headed Negro at the Cuban Embassy. But I cannot recall what her evidential -- what the crux of her evidence was in this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether she was referring to having seen this red-headed Negro at the Cuban Embassy or rather at a party that was being thrown by Horatio Duran?

Mr. Rocca. You're quite right. It was at a party.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether this allegation was ever investigated by the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. My feeling is from just reading the record -- and this came after, when I was working on the thing, reading the file in connection with Mr. Belin's request -- that Mr. Scott pursued it very thoroughly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, you indicated that
Mrs. de Paz went to the Embassy around Christmas Day.

Do you recall what year that was?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes.

It was the end of '63, early '64. And, if it wasn't Christmas Day, it was New Year's Day or the weekend, because there was -- her story was that her life was in danger. She had reported her information to the Minister of Interior or to the Gobernacion. They had put her up in a hotel. I mean, there was an entire scenario which she read.

There were very few probative and evidential details to sustain her story.

According to the record, as I remember it, the FBI representative regarded it as simply not so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she was given a polygraph?

Mr. Rocca. No, I don't think she ever -- I remember nothing in the record that shows that she was polygraphed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why she was not polygraphed whereas Alverado was polygraphed?

Mr. Rocca. Was she?

Mr. Goldsmith. I'll rephrase the question.

Do you know why she would not have been polygraphed when someone such as Alverado was polygraphed?

Mr. Rocca. No, I can't answer that.

I think that probably it was because of the --
certain couldn't -- I certainly can't answer for the people who were making the operational decisions on the spot. I can guess that her story was simply not believed or there was sufficient disbelief not to warrant that extent of imposition on her personality.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain that Elena Garro de Paz went into the embassy in December of 1963 or January of 1964?

Mr. Rocca. No, I'm not. I mean, I'm guessing entirely.

Could it have been a year later?

Ah.

Of course. It was the next year that she walked in. It was the end of '64 or the beginning of '65. I recall now that this gives the link, because the Warren Commission had already issued its report which had mentioned the red-headed Negro and the lead, and therefore in reading her story, there always occurred the virus that she had simply taken advantage of an evidential detail which was already in the public domain.

This is now my recollection.

This is after the Warren Commission had completed its work.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, according to CIA number 1957, which is part of the lengthy memo that you
prepared for Mr. Belin, you indicate that the first reference
to Elena Garro de Paz, or the first time she formally made
an allegation on the record, was on 12 October, 1964.

Mr. Rocca. And the Warren Commission came out on the
first of October.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please read through CIA
number 1957 through 1959, those three pages.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed. This was my writeup of
the case, retrospectively, as one of those elements
that had happened after the Warren Commission had looked
after this, that suggested the possibility of Cuban involvement
or that something further could be and should be done about
the Cuban aspect, should be undertaken.

Mr. Goldsmith. That document makes reference to an
individual named Carvillo, who allegedly detained Elena Garro
de Paz at the Vermont Hotel in Mexico.

Do you know whether Carvillo ever had any connection
with the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about June Cobb? Do you know
whether she ever had any connection with the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

She is a -- I thought you were going to say DGI.

Doesn't she come in in some kind of --
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she ever had any connection with DGI?

Mr. Rocca. This is what has been alleged in the record, but I can't accept that as evidence.

As far as I know, there is no investigative substratum for that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether anyone ever approached Carvillo and asked him--

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- why he detained Elena Garro de Paz?

Mr. Rocca. No, I do not.

Certainly that part of it entered into the period of '63, if she was telling the truth. Of course, we don't know whether she is telling the truth because she told her story for the first time, as far as the record is concerned, in '64, at the end of the year.

For that reason I inserted this into the record of episodes that struck me as being at least interesting from the standpoint of re-reviewing the file, from the Cuban point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2055.

Mr. Rocca. Where would that be? Are we using this number (indicating)?

Oh, I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you review that item?
(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify that document?

Mr. Rocca. This is a response by Mr. Helms to -- a memorandum by Mr. Helms to Mr. Rankin, General Counsel of the Warren Commission, regarding allegations pertaining to an intelligence training school in Minsk, U.S.S.R.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of the document?

Mr. Rocca. I'm trying to find it up here. Maybe you can help me.

Mr. Goldsmith. The document appears to be undated, so we'll just have to refer to it again as CIA number 2055.

It is possibly 5 June, 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I would say that that's close enough, inasmuch as Tom Hall, again the analyst who worked on Soviet matters in R & A, prepared it.

The allegations -- what would you like me to say about this?

Mr. Goldsmith. According to that document, there was no reliable information indicating that there was a training school, an intelligence training school in Minsk, is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether subsequent to the time that this document was written any information was obtained indicating that, in fact, there was a training school
of an intelligence nature in Minsk?

Mr. Rocca. As far as -- to my knowledge, there was no such.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I think that this might be an appropriate time to break for the day.

I have, I would say, no more than two hours of questions remaining.

I would ask you to refrain from discussing or disclosing any of the testimony that you have given today to anyone else.

May I have your assurance on that point?

Mr. Rocca. You may count on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

The reason I make that point is because the committee, when it takes a deposition, does not have the same effective authority as it does when it conducts a hearing in Executive Session.

Mr. Rocca. I note that from your ground rules.

But you may rest assured.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I didn't want you to infer from the fact that I was asking that that I consider that a risk in this particular case. That is a question or a statement that I routinely make.

In any event, I think that we will resume questioning...
tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock.

Thank you for your time today.

Mr. Rocca. All right.

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock, p.m., the taking of
the deposition of Raymond G. Rocca recessed, to recommence
on Tuesday, July 18, 1978, at 10:00 o'clock, a.m.)
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Washington, D. C.

Tuesday, July 18, 1978

Continuation of the Deposition of

RAYMOND G. ROCCA,

called for examination by counsel for the Subcommittee, pursuant to recess from the preceding day, in the offices of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Room 3370, House Annex Number 2, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., beginning at 10:20 o'clock, a.m., when were present:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, COUNSEL
CHARLES BERK, STAFF MEMBER.

(The witness, Raymond G. Rocca, having been previously sworn, was called and testified as follows:)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I would like to thank you for being here today.

I would like to remind you that you are still under oath.

Before we get started on the actual substance of the deposition, I would like to ask you whether you discussed the substance of yesterday's deposition with anyone?

Mr. Rocca. I did not.
Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I believe yesterday we finished the session with a brief discussion of whether there was an intelligence training school in the city of Minsk, and you indicated that in 1963 there was no reliable information indicating that, in fact, there was such a school in Minsk.

Do you have any other information that pertains to that point?

Mr. Rocca. I think you have summarized exactly what I said, that there was no confirmation available that there had been or was during the time that Oswald was in Minsk a training school of the service in that city.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive any indication subsequent to 1964 that, in fact, there was no such school in Minsk?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there has never been any confirmation or indication.

Mr. Goldsmith. One way or another?

Mr. Rocca. One way or other.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. We're talking now about the KGB central headquarters, the people who would be actually responsible for the training.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

Mr. Rocca. I know nothing about what local schools
or local provisions might be made by the White Russian -- this is the White Russian -- SSR -- republic. As far as I know, they have no school training there either.

Mr. Goldsmith. So far as you know, the Warren Commission was given all of the information that was available on that point --

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- and there has not been any additional information since 1964 that touches upon it?

Mr. Rocca. That's correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area, now, would you indicate for the record what a 201 file is?

Mr. Rocca. A 201 file is a jargon expression that grew up, I suppose, out of the old army system, 201 files in World War II. It was applied when our files, CIA files, were set up in 1947. I am speaking now out of hearsay. The phrase applies to files created on personalities, for dossiers on personalities. They are referred to, in other words, broadly speaking, as 201 files.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, a 201 file essentially is a personality file?

Mr. Rocca. (Nods affirmatively.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Does a 201 file contain information of operational significance?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, it can. It depends on how the
material has been selected and put together.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the criterion for the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. These are specified exactly in a handbook which is written and to which I refer you. The criteria have changed, or were changed, over the years, at the beginning to apply to individuals who were either agents or suspect agents of adversary services, all adversary services, intelligence, counter intelligence, sabotage interest, our own agents, collaborators, and others, at the determination, again in terms of criteria, who fell within the mission of the Agency.

These categories are specified and I refer you, then, to that publication. It's at the Records Integration Center.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to open a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. Personally?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. No.

I always would indicate this and have other people do it. As far as I know, I have not ever done the process, except perhaps as a part at one point of my formal training or other. But I have no recollection of having opened a file.

Mr. Goldsmith. On those occasions when someone from the CI staff opened a 201 file on an individual, would the
primary purpose of such an opening be to obtain information on a person who was of potential counter intelligence significance?

Mr. Rocca. It could be that.

It could be of purely passive interest. It is to serve as a repository for the accession of additional information of whatever kind, overt, covert, or whatever.

So, it does not necessarily indicate any kind of aggressive interest at all.

It simply serves as the receptacle or repository for the retention of information, and recovery of information.

Mr. Goldsmith. If an individual is perceived as a counter intelligence threat, would a 201 file normally be opened?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

At the time that the file was opened on Mr. Oswald, which would be 1958 or 1959, my impression is that U.S. defectors were not in the list of individuals on whom files would be opened automatically by the Records Integration Division, which actually could do this and did it as a matter of formal duty.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, there are categories, categories of individuals, which automatically result in the opening of a 201 file, whereas in some cases you are saying that the opening of a file is discretionary.

Is that accurate?
Mr. Rocca. It's an analyst's choice.

Mr. Goldsmith. But in some cases it might be mandatory, and in some cases it would be discretionary?

Mr. Rocca. Well, according to the handbook it would be mandatory. Whether it would be done or not would depend upon the analyst's capacity to judge whether this fell within the mandate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 796.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that document?

Mr. Rocca. This is a State Department document.

Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that document?

Mr. Rocca. October 31, 1959.

Mr. Goldsmith. That document indicates in substance, does it not, that Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the American Embassy in Russia to renounce his American citizenship? It indicates that he had applied for Soviet citizenship. It indicates, among other things, that his attitude was arrogant, aggressive, he had recently been discharged from the Marine Corps, and it says he has offered the Soviets any information he has acquired as an enlisted radar operator.

Now, would the information contained in this State
Department telegram, which was routed to the CIA and which we have obtained from the Office of Security at the CIA -- would the information contained in this telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. It depends on where it went in the Agency. If it went to the Office of Security, they would have opened their own file on it. But if a copy did not go to the DDP at that time, the Deputy Director for Plans, there would be no way of knowing about it.

So, I cannot respond.

But normally, that would have been actionable, I would say retrospectively. And I have no knowledge whether or not it ever did come into our hands at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

We will get into that momentarily.

Mr. Rocca. As a matter of fact, I think the substance of this cable was reported in the newspapers.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any formal communication channel between the Office of Security and DDP which would serve the purpose of having communications of this kind be passed to the appropriate office for action?

Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. There obviously should be. But if the people in the Office of Security will receive this, inasmuch as it concerns an American, and it was presumably relevant to their interest in Americans, and possible
security interests from the defensive security point of view of CIA itself, they might not do it, in which case the normal liaison, which would be via a liaison officer or simply a routing slip from the chief of the Office of Security would not take place.

Mr. Goldsmith. More specifically, then, is there any link between the Office of Security and the CI staff which would serve the purpose of passing information of this kind to the CI staff, as it would seem that the information contained in this memo is relevant to the CI staff in particular, rather than any of the divisions within DDP?

Mr. Rocca. Well, you are again looking at it with 20-20 hindsight. There certainly were all the channels that one could expect in an organization, as I indicated on the chart yesterday, for the passages of such a piece of material. In point of fact, State should have routed it to the DDP.

It is in that kind of routing and selection that you could get slippage.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, if I understand your testimony, it is that, in fact, there was a communication channel between Office of Security and CI staff which would serve the purpose of passing along this type of information. Whether or not the information in fact was passed along is another question. But there was a channel.
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Mr. Rocca. Oh, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review a document that is known as Warren Commission Exhibit 917.

I might note for the record that at the bottom of the exhibit there is an indication that the document was routed to the CIA, although there is no indication specifically which office at CIA received this document.

Warren Commission Exhibit 917, for the record, is a confidential message from the Navy to the Chief of Naval Operations.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review that document?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. We just might note for the record that this document is somewhat briefer than the earlier one you just reviewed, the State Department cable dated 10-31-59. This one also states that Oswald was in the Marine Corps as a radar operator and has offered to furnish the Soviets information he possesses in U.S. radar.

Again, would the information contained in this type of communication normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. In the DDP. At that time, as I say, it was not automatic.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. Your testimony is CONFIDENTIAL.
very clear on that. It would have been something discretionary.

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Defectors was added as a mandatory category as a consequence of this whole case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out that --

Mr. Rocca. So, if I were reviewing this thing and it had come across my desk, I would certainly expect it to go to a 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. But there would be other 201 files, or other files, that ought to receive it, too, including the Office of Security.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is CI/SIG?

Mr. Rocca. CI/SIG is Counter Intelligence, Special Investigations Group.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the purpose of that group was in 1959 to 1960?

Mr. Rocca. Well, this group was set up originally when the staff was set up and before I joined it. So, are you limiting your question only to that time or to its general functions?

Mr. Goldsmith. My question was focusing on the period 1959 to 1960.

(Pause)
Mr. Rocca. The point is that it was set up to handle especially sensitive cases in the area of security of personnel and in particular, cases involving security of personnel who were also of operational interest, as were operators.

In other words, it was an interface with the Office of Security.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, when you say security of personnel, you are referring now to CIA --

Mr. Rocca. DDP personnel, and Agency personnel to the extent that they might affect the DDP's interests.

This was the channel to the Office of Security.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, is it fair to say here that the purpose of the CI/SIG unit was to insure that DDP was not being penetrated by a foreign intelligence service?

Mr. Rocca. That, I think, would probably be one of the sensitive kinds of cases that they would be interested in.

Mr. Goldsmith. What other types of sensitive types of cases would they be interested in?

Mr. Rocca. I think they would probably have been interested in any kind of case involving security of DDP personnel, or operations like the LINGUAL operation, which was placed within its purview. That involved, in other words, sensitive work against the Soviets designed to produce information, again bearing chiefly on the security of personnel and of operations.
Mr. Goldsmith. When would someone within the CI/SIG unit have occasion to open a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. I would imagine that they would have had that occasion whenever a question arose that concerned people that came within the purview of the mission that I have described, namely, the penetration of our operations or the advancement of our particular interests with respect to the security of those operations. These now become very difficult questions to answer without some thought, because I would have to think of, really, general trains of operations, and in that area I was not, of course, briefed. But I think in substance what I have said covers what I know about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

You just made a reference to --

Mr. Rocca. I mean, there were many sensitive areas that involved aspects, that involved sources and access to materials that were of higher classification than what you have shown me.

Mr. Goldsmith. You just made reference to having been briefed.

Would you clarify for the record what you mean by having been briefed.

Mr. Rocca. Did I say -- I did not say that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think that you did, and what I suspect you referred to was during your time in the Agency
things that you may have been briefed upon.

   Mr. Rocca. Oh, yes. I mean, I was not briefed

on the entire range of their operations.

   Mr. Goldsmith. You were not briefed by the Agency

for this deposition, were you?

   Mr. Rocca. I was not.

   Mr. Goldsmith. You weren't briefed by anyone of the

staff prior to taking the deposition?

   Mr. Rocca. Indeed not. I have had no contacts

whatsoever about this.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

   I just wanted to clarify that.

   (Pause)

   Mr. Rocca. The specific purpose that lay behind

the creation of this office I think grew out of the penetrations

of OSS by the Soviets.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

   Getting back to the concept of a 201 file, will a

201 file always indicate whether the individual involved

had a relationship of some kind with the Agency, either as

an agent, a source, a contract employee, whatever? By looking

at a 201 file, will you always know whether, in fact, the

person had a relationship with the Agency?

   Mr. Rocca. One of the categories for opening a file,

for opening a 201 file, was the contractual or fiduciary

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relationship, and if that was the case, if the file had been opened in that instance, it would either be manifest in the file or there would be an indication in it directing whoever had the file to go to whatever place had the responsibility for the fiduciary relationship.

Now, as I stated, this is only one category in the list of criteria for the opening of files, and as far as I know, the 201 file that was opened on Oswald was opened by Mrs. Edgerter pursuant not to that, but to the potential interest that she, as an analyst, felt lodged in the fact that he had been a defector and it figured on that list.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think that you are anticipating my questions, and we will get to the Oswald 201 file in particular momentarily.

Let's get back to the question that I asked a moment ago.

Will the 201 file always indicate the fact of a relationship with the CIA, if there was such a relationship?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it would.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, if someone were an agent, source, or --

Mr. Rocca. The whole purpose of the file, and the opening of that file, would be to prevent others from recruiting the same agent, from making use of the same agent, for other agencies who perhaps had been in contact to do that,
and therefore it would have to appear in some way or other on the face of the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then the next step in the analysis is the following one.

From the absence of any indication in the file, in the 201 file, that someone had a relationship with the Agency, either as an asset, agent, source, contract employee, whatever -- from the absence of such an indication, can one safely infer that, in fact, there was no such relationship?

Mr. Rocca. I would say so, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are documents ever removed from 201 files?

Mr. Rocca. They should not be removed from the files. That was, of course, part of the standard order of procedure.

The fact is, however, the file itself passed through many hands in the course of dealing with it, and it would be technically possible to do so.

I cannot deny this. I mean, this is something that exists on the face, as I see it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in theory, no documents should be removed from a 201 file, but it is possible to remove documents from a 201 file?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it could have been -- it could have been done.
Mr. Goldsmith. When someone removes a document from a 201 file, is it required to indicate on the file that a document has been removed?

Mr. Rocca. Well, of course -- and the purpose, and it would have to be signed for.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. Now this is the advantage of using the machine.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which machine are you referring to, sir?

Mr. Rocca. The computer.

Mr. Goldsmith. What purpose does the computer serve?

Mr. Rocca. The computer serves to give a permanent record to a title, and the removal of that title cannot take place without creating a record, and therefore it is always traceable. This represented, therefore, as these questions were being discussed during the '50's, the answer to either arbitrary or inadvertent removal. At least it always seemed to be that way and a lot of other people agreed.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Let me say, in addition, on that point that the system employed, as I recall it, a numbering device which worked from the first paper, which was number one, up, so that any paper that had been removed lower than the top
paper would, unless it had been replaced by another, or if the entire numbering system had not been altered, have appeared immediately as absent. This was the device for internal control that functioned during the first years of the system.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally, in a 201 file, are the documents filed chronologically? By that, I mean the earliest document, the first document to go into the file, which might be the field personality file request form that led to the opening of the file, that would be the first document, and then the next document in time would go immediately on top of it, and so on, so that effectively documents are in the file in the same sequence in which they were made available to the file.

Mr. Rocca. But the 201 would not be the repository for a personal history questionnaire, and that kind of thing; that is, the key documents in establishing a fiduciary relationship would not be in the 201. They would be in a separate file held by the desk and whoever was handling the individual.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's a separate question.

Aside from that, however, would the documents normally go into the file in chronological order?

Mr. Rocca. Let me assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that there are people who are far better informed on this topic than I am, and therefore whatever I say should be taken cum
grano sale, as they say, with a grain of salt.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally in a 201 file, will the documents be filed sequentially?

Mr. Rocca. And I want that to be very well understood. The whole matter of records, in other words, is a matter for which people are paid very high salaries, and they have been in charge in this area from the very beginning. But changes and modifications to the system have taken place. But I would defer to their statements with respect to a number of the questions that you have asked.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had occasion to review any 201 files?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, I've read many, many of them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Hundreds of them?

Mr. Rocca. Not hundreds, I would say. I can't -- a figure like that -- but I have read many of them.

Mr. Goldsmith. To the best of your recollection, did the files that you read contain their documents in the chronological order in which the documents arrived? In other words, I am asking you to respond to the question that I raised earlier.

As a matter of routine, are the documents filed in the 201 file in sequential or chronological order, so that the earliest document would be on the bottom and the last document would be on top?
Mr. Rocca. Normally that would be the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now you mentioned the PRQ's, the personal record questionnaires. You indicated that they would not be in the 201 file.

Where, to your knowledge, would they be located?

Mr. Rocca. They would be located in particular files held by the desk responsible for the agent.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would they be located in an operations or projects file?

Mr. Rocca. I think that probably is the correct term, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please examine CIA number 788, which is the field personality file request form that was used in the case of Mr. Oswald.

I think you had occasion to review that yesterday.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I see nothing different here from what I saw yesterday.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

I hope that you don't see anything different from what you saw yesterday since it's been in the safe all evening.

According to that document, when was a 201 file opened for Lee Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. Nine December, 1960, is the date for the request.
Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Is there anything unusual about the Oswald 201 file being opened over a year after the Agency was initially informed of Oswald's defection and the fact that he was alleged to have offered information to the Soviets?

Mr. Rocca. I find that not unusual in view of the flow of work and the pressure of work. I couldn't explain that gap in terms of anything, except just the normal flow of business, in view of what I know about the opening of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you think the normal flow of business might account for a delay of over a year?

Mr. Rocca. Well, it depends on what was the date of the material that we got from State.

Mr. Goldsmith. Rather than reviewing all that now, I will just indicate that the material from State started to arrive in late October or early November of 1960.

Mr. Rocca. So, the flow is correct, I would say, in terms of what was going on. There was an obvious interest in this kind of material.

Mrs. Edgerter exercised an analyst's choice in opening the file.

I think there is nothing in the time lapse that would indicate anything, except the flow of work.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now Mrs. Edgerter was a member of the CI/SIG unit, is that correct?
Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it unusual for the CI/SIG unit, which was involved in very sensitive operations -- not operations, investigations pertaining to possible penetrations of DDP personnel -- was it unusual for this unit to open a 201 file on someone like Oswald?

I guess the gist of my question is I don't see how Oswald is relevant to the primary purpose of CI/SIG.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would disagree with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please explain.

Mr. Rocca. I would consider this to be fully within the competence of this unit, especially in view of the large number of defectors that had accumulated by this time. There were others, Americans, in many instances, people that, it is my recollection, we regarded as more serious, potentially, losses. I can remember one who had the specifications of a nozzle that prepared plastic in a particular fashion. There was press stuff in the interim, two clippings that had come out. Patricia Blake had written her articles.

In other words, there was an accumulation of material which concerned Americans, and a gathering interest at that time, 1959 and 1960, in the KGB, ultimately confirmed by Golitzin, as I reported yesterday, that no defector from the American armed forces -- and that list that we had from...
State consisted of at least two or three other military defectors from West Germany, and I would have considered it a dereliction not to have opened a 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I certainly agree that a 201 should have been opened at that time, and it would also seem that the appropriate unit within the Agency to open the file would have been the CI staff.

My question is more narrowly focused in why would CI/SIG in particular have been opening the file.

Mr. Rocca. Because of their concern, basically, with the problem of Americans and they were the recipient of the materials, probably from the Office of Security, if not the actual copy of that material, certainly the chit chat. Bruce Solie was -- B-R-U-C-E S-O-L-I-E -- constantly in touch with Mr. O'Neill and with Mrs. Edgerter, I am sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. But from the face of it, it does not appear that Oswald posed any sort of a counter intelligence threat in terms of the penetration of DDP personnel.

Mr. Rocca. Of the U.S. security interest. At a very high level, though, he did, involving other departments and agencies of the government.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand, and I am not suggesting that a file should not have been opened by the CI staff. I am just trying to determine why CI/SIG in particular, which was concerned about DDP penetrations, would have been opening
the file.

Mr. Rocca. Let me go back and open a little parenthesis about this. What I regard now, in the light of what you said, is probably a too narrow view of what SIG was interested in.

They were also concerned with Americans as a security threat in a community wide sense, and they dealt with FBI cases, with the Office of Security cases, and with other cases on the same level, as they dealt with our own, basically.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would the function of CI/SIG --

Mr. Rocca. At least, that's as I would represent it. But again, Mr. O'Neill would be the person to judge exactly and I would defer to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would the function of CI/SIG in that case be different from in the Office of Security, in general?

Mr. Rocca. It would be with respect to where and what had happened to DDP materials with respect to a defection in any of these places.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, though, Oswald had nothing to do with DDP at this time, at least apparently.

Mr. Rocca. I'm not saying that. You said it.

Let me take the Dunlap case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I'm not familiar with that case.

Mr. Rocca. If we can get off of this, because I
don't want any misinterpretation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Neither do I.

Mr. Rocca. This is an NSA case. A defector, a Soviet agent, has committed suicide and subsequently it was determined that by finding the materials in his house he had actually stashed away a large number of reports coming from the DDP, and indeed coming from Soviet defectors that had provided the material.

That case, and the handling of the relations with NSA on Dunlap, was a matter handled by SIG and by Ops jointly. They worked together on that. It illustrates, therefore, in another area the community wide aspect to security and security problems, on the assumption that against the KGB you've got to work together in cases involving security and penetration or you are going to be had separately.

This concept is, I think, very definitely an authorization for the opening by SIG of the file in these circumstances. And indeed, I would say that to test it, one should look at whether or not files were opened on the other names in the State Department list.

If you find that that is the case -- and it is my belief that that is the case, although I have no way of proving it because it has never actually ever been put to the point where it was necessary to do this as a test -- I think that the question you are getting at is answered.
It is a formal part of their responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Turning to CIA number 788, again, I would like to
direct your attention to the box that is labeled "other
identification." In that box there is a number one, next to
which someone wrote in the letters "AG."

Do you know what those letters would stand for?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the bottom of the page, at the
bottom of this document, it indicates that Oswald's file is
a restricted file.

Do you know why the file would have been restricted?

Mr. Rocca. My impression would be that this would
have been restricted in order to assure knowledge in SIG
in this as one of a category of files involving American
defectors, that they would want to know about in the event
that anyone else developed information or expressed an
interest of any kind.

For example, the Lee Harvey Oswald file was restricted
when it was taken over by R & A, when it was given to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that, if anyone --

Mr. Rocca. So that, if anyone came in and checked
that file --

Mr. Goldsmith. You would know about it.

Mr. Rocca. -- I would know immediately who he was.
I would be asked, "Can this person look at the file," and obviously I would permit that.

So, in other words, it is a subsidiary form of control which permits some kind of internal order in the processing of the material.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please examine CIA number 943, which is a Xerox copy of three file cards. Please confine your attention simply to the top two file cards, both of which pertain to Lee Harvey Oswald.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review this document?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning your attention to the top card, which as I indicated refers to Lee Harvey Oswald, in the upper right hand corner of that card there is an indication which says "CI Project/RE, 9 November, 1959."

Do you know what "CI Project/RE" refers to?

Mr. Rocca. The CI Project refers to -- I don't know what the RE is at this point, but I may figure it out by the time I finish talking, answering the first part of the question -- CI Project is simply a name of convenience which was used to describe the HTLINGUAL or HDDLINGUAL, or whatever it was. But the RE may be a name or initials of...
people. I can't associate that.

This is the first time I have seen these cards, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. But the term "CI Project" to the best of your knowledge refers to the HDLINGUAL program?

Mr. Rocca. To the mail intercept program, and that was the convenient form, that was the phrase that Mr. O'Neill used when he talked about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, this suggests that Oswald may have been the subject of this mail intercept program or one of the subjects.

Mr. Rocca. It suggests that there was something in it that was actually accessioned, or that they were given this as a warning to be on the alert for it in their screening of the materials. I cannot determine that from this.

In other words, it may have been a watch list card that flowed naturally out of the opening.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Ah -- RE means Rueben Efron.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you spell that for the record.

Mr. Rocca. This is my guess, now, as I say.

R-U-E-B-E-N E-F-R-O-N.

And he was a translator on the project.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that suggests that there was a mail
intercept that --

Mr. Rocca. No. It suggests only that there was a
warning that there should be an alert for it.

Mr. Goldsmith. To him?

Mr. Rocca. Well, to whomever was using
that watch list because it would be used by people surveying
the materials.

You can readily answer your own question by just
going through the materials and spotting them, as far as
the contents are concerned.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review a document
marked CIA number 2035. This is a document dated 20 February,
1964, and it's a memo to you, Chief of the CI/R & A unit.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Who gave it to me?

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read this
document?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

The machine's listing of documents officially
recorded as being -- was requested and is attached. The
actual -- of this type was begun in '63. A few items of
previous dates were also recorded. A comparison of the
documents physically available and the 201 file, and those
reports as being as shown -- 37 documents that should be
in the 201 file are not available." This total is made up
of two dispatches, seven memorandum from the FBI, one CSCI, two State Department documents, and 25 cables."

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember receiving this memorandum?

Mr. Rocca. No. But it's not of any particular import. These materials had been simply displaced for separate handling on the 201, and I judge that this was something that Mr. Hartman prepared or had prepared for me, which I handled through him.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo doesn't have a signature attached to it.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it has to be written by someone who knows, who has access to the material. He and the RID people are those ones.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for those memos not to contain signatures of the authors of the memos?

Mr. Rocca. It depends on how rapidly they are written. This I think is his signature, is his writing (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. By that you are referring to the script notation?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now why do you say that this is of no particular import?

Mr. Rocca. Because we know that there are two dispatches. We know that there are seven memoranda which
were being probably read by Mr. Dooley and therefore were not in the file. We know that there is a CSCI and therefore all of these are accountable pieces of paper. In other words, they haven't disappeared. The 25 cables were probably in the materials that went back to the GP Floor period.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how do we know, in fact, that the materials have not disappeared?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would say that we know that by simply going back and looking at the file at the present time, to begin with. This was not, in other words, an attempt to trace materials that had disappeared from the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now this document makes reference to an attachment of the missing --

Mr. Rocca. It says that they should be in the 201 but they are not in it. But that doesn't mean that they are not present.

Mr. Goldsmith. The document makes reference to an attachment which contains a list, a more detailed list, of the specific documents that are not in the file. The committee staff has been unable to locate that attachment in the Oswald 201 file.

What would be the best way to determine whether, in fact, the documents that were unavailable on this date had, in fact, been returned to the file?

Mr. Rocca. Ask Mr. Hartman to do it and he will
give you the answer to it. I obviously asked for this, and as I say, my recollection is I would have asked him for it pursuant to an attempt to get a grasp over exactly what should have been -- what should be in the file when we machined it.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the document is of no particular import at all, why is it marked "Secret, Eyes Only?"

Mr. Rocca. Everything is marked "Secret, Eyes Only."

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say "everything," you --

Mr. Rocca. This is an occupational disease. So that does not give me great trauma.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you suggesting that the documents in the Oswald file commonly contain the sensitivity indicator known as "Secret, Eyes Only?"

Mr. Rocca. Well, most of them do, I would say.

Or, a good number of them do. I think the point is academic. I mean, the classification was one applied by a secretary, whoever typed the memo.

In other words, these papers are not -- this is not a list of papers that have been removed from the file permanently. And, I don't recall the circumstances under which at this time this request was made. But I think the person who worked on it is a person who probably could shed some light on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I should indicate for the record that the staff's review of the Oswald file has uncovered extremely
few documents with the specific notation "Secret, Eyes Only," which is one of the reasons that we focused on this particular memo, as it suggests that there are materials that are not in the file, which should be, and particularly because the attachment referred to is not available in the file itself.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Where do you find the reference to the attachment? This is what I can't find.

"It is attached," is that it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, in the first sentence.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Well, as I have stated, I have no recollection of the episode. My best recollection on the basis of the handling of the time was that this was an effort to make sure that we had everything together. We requested this kind of review. This answer came back. I have no way of explaining why it was "Secret, Eyes Only." I don't regard it necessarily as of any great significance, per se. The person who did it would have to explain it.

But I am certain that the next step that I would take would have been to say to get these items into the file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of course, we don't know which items specifically they are.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean -- two dispatches, seven memoranda from the FBI, one CSCI -- I mean, the file at this
stage, this is February, 1964, the machine file was in the process of being accumulated. The file itself was in use. We were right at the beginning, in other words, of assembling the machine record which eventually we would show and did show to the Warren Commission later on that year. In other words, I would characterize this document as an interim summary, a status report, on the attempt to create the final mechanized record of the file. I in no way would attribute to this language the fact that these actual materials were missing.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have indicated that the handwriting in the lower lefthand corner of the page is Mr. Hartman's.

Mr. Rocca. That would be my guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read for the record what that script writing indicates.

Mr. Rocca. "Please keep loosely in the last volume of Oswald's 201" and it's scratched out. It is X'd out. I don't know what this is (indicating.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I can't make that handwriting out either.

Mr. Rocca. Well, if it isn't Mr. Hartman's handwriting, he could help identify it. That's the point.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be any reason to keep this document in the last volume of Oswald's 201?

Mr. Rocca. Well, the last file means it is the last
one that's been opened, I mean, in the serial performance, in a looseleaf sense. In other words, it would be the most recent one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr. Rocca. Last in the sense of the most recent one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2075, which is the second page of a memorandum to the Director of the FBI dated 30 January, 1964. The subject matter is Jack Ruby.

My question is a very narrow one.

This page contains some cross references indicating which files received a copy of this memorandum, and among other listings it indicates that a copy went into a file that is referred to as a dummy file. This parenthetically indicates a dummy -- "CI/R&A(Dummy)".

What is a dummy file?

Mr. Rocca. Whoever wrote this kept dummy files, which would be a file for his own purposes of what he had sent to us.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is a dummy file then simply a soft file?

Mr. Rocca. A soft file or whatever you want to call it. It would be eventually destroyed, I suppose.

It would be for his reference in checking off what had been sent.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.
Mr. Rocca. That would be my best guess under the circumstance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any basis today for thinking that Oswald may have been an agent of the KGB?

Mr. Rocca. I would have to say what I stated yesterday, that there is no credible evidence at this moment, at this time, on the basis of the records that we have that he was a KGB agent in the United States.

If you are asking me as a counter intelligence specialist, generally what my feelings are on balance regarding his relationship to the KGB, I would answer that there is no question that he was debriefed in detail by at least two echelons of Soviet authorities, one of which, if not both of which, were KGB, and if there are indeed two, one was the Thirteenth Department. I am relying now on defector information for that judgment.

He himself in his statement, which you have reminded me of, indicated that he felt free to give that information. I think it is now ascertained beyond reasonable doubt that he knew from direct observation enough about U-2 to give that as a most significant item of information to the Soviets, and that he himself, as he said, felt free to give radar information. So, placing together the contact at the camp in California, the Marine Camp, going back to the Delgado testimony, the rapidity of his release from the Marine Corps, presumably on
compassionate reasons which turned out to be a trip to the Soviet Union and all the rest, I would say there is no question, therefore, about the debriefing and his cooperation.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would the other eschelon have been that debriefed Oswald?

Mr. Rocca. It would have been one of the screening units connected with the journalistic apparatus or foreigner apparatus of the fourth -- of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate group of the Internal Group which, however, defers on matters of military specialties -- I understood this from a defector; I think this is sustained by others -- to the Special Department.

So, there is no question in my mind that he was, therefore, in their hands.

At that point, it becomes purely speculative, except that there is much more circumstantial evidence involved in his handling and treatment in the U.S.S.R. that can be more pertinently commented to, and was in part pertinently commented to, in the memoranda submitted to the Warren Commission, but can be I think more fully and pertinently commented to by the defectors available today, which show highly specialized and favorable treatment.

There is also the fact -- and this is just pure -- are we on the record?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
Mr. Rocca. This is just pure counter intelligence lab work, and as I say, it's absolutely impossible to talk about these things in public, but Minktenbaugh, a confessed Soviet spy -- M-I-N-K-T-E-N-B-A-U-G-H -- another who went to the Soviet Union in 1959 and 1960 -- he was connected with Johnson, the Sergeant Johnson case -- was assessed, trained, and returned to the United States on a separate mission. He had made his contact in Berlin, as had Johnson.

The interesting thing is that they presented him to a woman who was to come to the United States with him as a wife, under the guise of a wife. He is a homo, and so the thing did not work, though they tried. But the M-0, if you put the Marine business together, is close to exactness on the methodology, that is, the setting up of a couple, but the timing is what is interesting -- 1960.

These are just things that keep you thinking in the middle of the night. Was the case officer who handled Minktenbaugh and who we know by his own confession and polygraph--now he is out and serving time and he has, as I judge, told his story completely -- was he part of the same -- here, Minktenbaugh is an Army defector, or Air Force, whatever. Think about the problem of recruitment in a gross sense that the Soviets would have. Note these associations in time and space.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about
this defector, Minktenbaugh?

Mr. Rocca. This has all been developed since then.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did the Minktenbaugh case break?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, it broke after 1964 - 1965.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the woman companion to Minktenbaugh was a willing collaborator to the plot?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, she was, indeed.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Now I trust you understand that I am not
stressing this. I am simply stating it as a fact on the table
in a laboratory sense, which counter intelligence people are
supposed to be dealing with. It is not for publication.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the allegation
that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did this allegation first arise?

Mr. Rocca. It came out almost immediately. It was
in the press immediately, as I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the allegation ever brought to your
personal attention?

Mr. Rocca. No, not for any action.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever directed to conduct an
investigation into this?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I certainly sent Mr. Hartman around to ask people

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whether there were any traces in all of the files of the agencies
to which we had access to ascertain whether there was ever any
contact with this man.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did you do that?

Mr. Rocca. Because it disturbs me greatly that the
thing could even be suggested.

Mr. Goldsmith. And when did you send Mr. Hartman
around to conduct this?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, it was in that period and later.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the result of Mr. Hartman's
investigation?

Mr. Rocca. There was no indication that was ever
produced that Lee Harvey Oswald was ever in any kind of
fiduciary relationship.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what Mr. Hartman's
investigation entailed?

Mr. Rocca. No, I don't.

I mean, he went around simply asking people in the
various desks, in the various components, in the Contacts
Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he submit to you in 1963 or 1964
the results of his investigation?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot recall that.

He certainly did verbally, which was that there was no
substance to the claim.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the issue is sufficiently important to have warranted a written report to you in 1963 or 1964?

Mr. Rocca. Well, if there was no substance to it, I think not.

We were not investigating this. I mean, this was a matter actually of pertinence to the Office of Security, to the Director, to Mr. Helms, and the others, and if there were to be a formal investigation, I would have said they would have done it.

Certainly in the staff meetings this question was raised at the highest level -- has this man ever been in touch? So, this was not one of the, in other words, one of the questions that I was given formally to work on. It was a matter of personal interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. Helms ever asked you to examine this question?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, he never asked me, no.

Nor did Mr. Angleton.

That is the best of my recollection at this moment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA number 201 through 208.

This is a memorandum for the Chief of the CI staff dated 18 September, 1975, subject matter is the allegations of Lee Harvey Oswald's connection with the Agency.
Mr. Rocca. 1975?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. Your question referred to the earlier period.

Mr. Goldsmith. I know.

Now, in 1975, you were no longer Chief of the CI staff, were you?

Mr. Rocca. I never was the Chief of the CI staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

I stand corrected.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Hah -- he did remember it.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Well, I find this -- I'm glad it exists. It bears out my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr. Rocca. But bear in mind that this was something that I did out of absolute deep, deep personal animus. Well, that's the wrong word -- that is, the suggestion that to me I still find greatly offensive. This is the last man in the world who could have ever been -- who would have ever met our criteria for recruitment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be more specific in the reason for that?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean, his whole background, his
psychiatric record, his conduct -- this is now on the basis
of what we learn from the record, and it just seemed to me
just so incongruous and vicious that -- I lose my temper,
I'm sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are most of the agents that work with
CIA case officers necessarily stable individuals?

For example --

Mr. Rocca. There are some very definite rules
governing the psychological stability of agents, and these
rules break down into about, among others -- one is their
background record in terms of family and associations;
second, their innate qualifications on testing; third, whether
they have told you everything about themselves, whether you
know everything about them; and finally, whether they are
psychologically stable.

So, you have a whole series of qualifications that he
would fail.

Mr. Goldsmith. The criteria that you are referring to
now which pertained to whether someone would meet the Agency's
requisite for serving with the Agency as an agent, are these
criteria formally adopted in any Agency regulations or
documents of some kind?

Mr. Rocca. They're in a handbook.

Mr. Goldsmith. And was the handbook in existence in
1959?
Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, it would be very easy, for example, simply to --

Mr. Rocca. This was a part of the training. The CI staff wrote the handbook. I wrote it, or edited it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the title of the handbook?

Mr. Rocca. It's called "Criteria for Double Agents." In this case it would have been a person in touch with two services.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the same criteria apply to someone who is not necessarily a double agent?

Mr. Rocca. It would apply to all agents. They apply to all agents.

Mr. Goldsmith. And such a handbook was in effect in 1959?

Mr. Rocca. That handbook was in existence and was a part of the formal training program I referred to in R & A. It was a part of the job of R & A to draw up these criteria, which had not been previously drawn up in the OSS history.

So, on my record of observation of individuals, the study of the background and history of the entire topic -- and we covered it in detail, that is, reading the background -- this man would have been rejected out of hand. He would never have been considered.

Now I have the suspicion that maybe the Soviets got
to the same point with him.

But this is off the record -- this is not off the record. I mean, this is just a joke.

Mr. Goldsmith. Referring again to 201, to CIA number 201, this is a memo that was prepared apparently by Mr. Hartman.

Do you know at whose request Mr. Hartman would have prepared this memo dated in 1975?

Mr. Rocca. He prepared it at my request, I think.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, this memo -- well, you were no longer with the Agency formally in 1975. Would he have prepared this memo for you in 1975?

Mr. Rocca. I was still on contract with him, and this was still, this was certainly pertinent to what the Rockefeller Commission was doing. It is my recollection, inasmuch as I have already recalled it in part -- you see, when I mentioned that your previous question had referred to 1963, well, I recall that part where he did refer to 1963.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1975, you asked --

Mr. Rocca. I simply asked him to do this because I recalled that we had at my instance undertaken within the staff on my own responsibility this kind of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of your asking him to prepare this memo in 1975?

Mr. Rocca. To get on the record his recollections of
what had happened in 1963 with respect to this gross allegation.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, by asking him to do that, were you recognizing that Mr. Hartman had not gotten on the record in 1963 when he conducted the initial investigation?

Mr. Rocca. No, no.

At that time he did this and reported to me. It was a purely internal matter. But by 1975, it seemed to me worthy of putting down on the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. But in 1963 it was not put in the record?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, it was not.

Let me say that we were, of course, hamstrung by allegations in the record which we informally checked out in that fashion. So, I mean, this was perfectly, I think, normal.

Mr. Goldsmith. I note that the 1975 memorandum goes into very great detail as to all the steps that Mr. Hartman took to determine whether Oswald had any connection with the Agency.

Does this extensive detail strike you as somewhat unusual for a memorandum written twelve years after the investigation was actually conducted?

Mr. Rocca. No.

I told him to simply put down everything he could recall
about where he had gone.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, I notice that in CIA number 2106, letter E, he indicates that through the Security Research Section of the Office of Security, he had the security files checked. There was no record of Oswald.

Now, in fact, the Security Office did have a record on Oswald in 1963. Did that strike you as an incongruous --

Mr. Rocca. I don't think that view is referring to -- that that was referring necessarily to the topic of the interest, namely that there was any kind of a relationship with him that involved the Agency, or else they simply didn't tell him. It certainly would be incongruous if they had a file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, we have seen several Office of Security documents pertaining to Oswald, preassassination.

Mr. Rocca. That's right, and you have to know which office in the Office of Security you are talking to. I can't judge this one at all, except in terms of these two elements:

(a) that it may have been a part of the Office of Security that literally didn't have a file; or that the file that they showed him was totally derivative, consisting of press and other well known items, and therefore he did not consider it really new information or significant information within the terms of the memorandum.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, on CIA number 2108, he indicates
that there are five documents which had been sent to the Agency before the assassination. "Two of the documents have been sent to us" -- referring to the Agency -- "by the FBI, two by the Department of State, and one by the U.S. Navy."

So, in other words, Mr. Hartman felt that prior to the assassination there were five documents from other agencies in Oswald's 201 file.

Mr. Rocca. Well, some of them you have actually shown me, or I thought so -- I mean, they seem to have been in the file.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Rocca. Is the point whether it is five or one?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Burke is attempting to locate the document that I was going to refer you to at this point. The specific one I have in mind is a --

Mr. Rocca. Well, I can check this record against the actual records in the files. I assume that this represented his best statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, that statement contradicts the listing of documents that was given to the Warren Commission by Mr. Helms in 1964. Mr. Helms indicated that there were, or at least his list indicated that there were more than five documents received from other agencies.
Mr. Rocca. Well, Mr. Hartman erred, then, or at least I would assume on this, unless he actually had some kind of consultation with the record, which he could have had, inasmuch as these materials were at hand. I would say that there is no doubt that -- in other words, there is no definitive significance to be attached to that expression. On recounting he may find six, or he may find four. He was not, I think, in putting this memorandum together --

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what a DBA is?

Mr. Rocca. DBA, I would judge, is a bureau, is a bureau indicator.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to that memorandum by Mr. Helms, there were substantially more than five documents in the file. I am wondering what the reason for the inconsistency is between the Helms record and the Hartman memo.

Mr. Rocca. I think that you could undoubtedly work it out and it would turn out to be something completely (excusable) because the DBA memo -- this is a cryptonym for bureau material.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Burke has located the document.

According to this document, which is CIA number 2038, prior to the assassination, included in Oswald's 201 file were seven documents from the FBI, ten from the Department of State, two from the Department of Navy, one from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and then there were...
internal CIA documents and newspaper clippings.

Mr. Rocca. So, he is just wrong.

His talley is in error.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, at the bottom of 2038 there is a notation which I would like you to review. In parentheses it indicates "inventory of documents contained in file attached for all but addressee."

Let me bring that to your attention and see if you can explain that to me.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, we did not attach the actual documents to anybody but the addressee. We gave them just a list of those documents, apparently. That would be my reading of this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Rocca. I mean, it would have required a large scale reproduction.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would a file search conducted by Mr. Hartman in 1963 definitely have resolved the question of whether Oswald was ever connected with the Agency in any way?

Mr. Rocca. As far as I'm concerned it would have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming things were done in the ordinary course of business.

Mr. Rocca. Assuming that he had checked all the places that he had said he checked and that we knew about, that would...
have been definitive.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, you indicated earlier that you did not regard it unusual that Oswald's 201 file was opened over a year after the first indication of his giving information to the Soviets was obtained by the Agency.

Mr. Rocca. But only within a few months of the receipt of the first information regarding this, as I understood it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, the information was initially received in October of 1959. The file was opened in December of 1960, over a year after the initial receipt of the information.

In October or November of 1960, the State Department sent information and it was sometime after the State Department communicated to you and Oswald that the file was opened.

Mr. Rocca. In other words, we're arguing here the stimulus and how close to the action the stimulus was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Exactly.

Mr. Rocca. I'm saying that the stimulus -- speaking for Miss Edgerter, I don't know what prompted her to do this, or the timing, because it was not my component. I had no knowledge that the action even was being done. In fact, I was pleasantly surprised on the 23rd, which was a Friday, to know that we -- and I learned this on Saturday morning when I went into the office -- that we even had a 201 on

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him.

So, I'm simply giving you my best guess, Mr. Goldsmith. And I don't regard it as unusual.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you regard the fact that the Agency never debriefed Oswald or that there is no record of such a debriefing upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union as unusual in any way?

Mr. Rocca. No, not at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Rocca. Because under the delimitations agreement, he was strictly the Navy's baby, and the FBI's baby, and that is it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though he may have had information of --

Mr. Rocca. I'm going to Indian wrestle with you on this one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I want to indicate to you that, again, you should not infer from my line of questioning that we --

Mr. Rocca. I'm not. I'm joking. I'm joking.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- are predisposed in any way towards the resolution of this issue. And, I don't want to arm wrestle with you.

Mr. Rocca. Well, you are aware of the delimitations agreement and the specifications that it sets out with respect
to the approaches to and the responsibilities for the security of members of the Armed Forces, former members of the Armed Forces. It's a very, very strictly adhered to code that Mr. Over and the members of the domestic community drew up in 1940, and which we respected very, very carefully. This is a decentralized approach to security. It has its disadvantages and any kind of cooperation that you get has to come from -- on cases, has to come from mutually arrived at agreement.

And this man, as a Navy man, a Marine, was strictly their baby. And that would be my answer to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the formal name given to this agreement between --

Mr. Rocca. It is called the Delimitations Agreement. It is a primary document in trying to understand the very grave difficulties we have in working against an integrated adversary.

Mr. Goldsmith. And this agreement was promulgated in 1940, roughly?

Mr. Rocca. 1940, and revised at various times periodically. It still exists and it governs and lays down the ground rules.

And, if anyone asked me in R & A at that time whether or not we should debrief this man, the first thing that would have come to my mind was stay away from it, it's a Navy
matter, a Marine matter, and a Bureau matter, and they should have priority.

No one did, incidentally.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald may have had information of a positive intelligence nature, in other words, not only did Oswald pose an interest to the American intelligence community because he may have been a counter intelligence security threat, but he also had access to information on the Soviet Union that might have been of positive intelligence significance, is your position still that no component within the Agency would have had an interest in debriefing him?

Mr. Rocca. Would not have had a legitimate interest on its own to have done this. It would have had to coordinate with the Navy or with whatever component had the responsibility under the Delimitations Agreement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Despite the fact that Oswald may have had positive intelligence information?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA number 2137, which is a memo for Mr. Rankin dated 1 July, 1964, specifically dealing with the question of how Oswald was able to make the trip on a direct flight from London to Helsinki on October 10, 1959 and arrive at his downtown hotel in Helsinki by midnight of the same day, when the only flight
leaving London was a PinAir flight that would have arrived in Helsinki at 11:30, a time that would not have permitted Oswald to have cleared customs and made the trip to the hotel.

This has been an issue that has received some attention recently. I am wondering whether the Agency was ever able fully to resolve this question.

Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, they were not. They gave up — there was a time schedule worked out and passed to this Commission. This was a report done by Mr. Murphy's people, that Mr. Wigren, who I mentioned yesterday, worked on. I cannot judge its relevance without reading it. But I do agree that there is a — he did move fairly fast. But that may be just traveller's luck.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I can add nothing to this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Agency ever able to resolve the question of how Oswald was able to obtain a visa to enter the Soviet Union as quickly as he did?

Mr. Rocca. This, too, was a matter prepared by the appropriate component. I cannot recall its specific details or really judge it in terms of its definitive quality. I think probably we did the best job we could on it.

You see, on the memo that you have just shown me,
which 2137, Duncan was the researcher in SB Division, who worked on the problem and prepared the memorandum.

I certainly am not qualified to challenge conclusions they reached.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not asking you to challenge their conclusions.

I am asking you whether any additional information ever came to your attention pertaining to this issue.

Mr. Rocca. Ah, that's another matter. I'm sorry, I didn't understand that.

No.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to CIA number 2047, which I will read to you in relevant part, it indicates that an Agency source stated that there was no record that there was any request for a U.S.S.R. visa processed through normal channels for Oswald at any time during 1959, and the source indicated it was difficult to explain how Oswald might have received his visa in two days without going through normal channels. "The only conclusion which can be drawn is that Oswald must have received his visa directly from the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, which occasionally has done special cases." But the source has no evidence to confirm this assumption.

Do you know whether the Agency was ever able to resolve the question of how Oswald was able to obtain his
visa so expeditiously?

Mr. Rocca. No. I do not believe that they were able to do that. This is, however, one of the open questions that should be worked on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest in your mind that Oswald may have had an intelligence connection of some kind?

Mr. Rocca. Indeed.

Let me -- strike that. It would suggest that if indeed it turns out that he did have facilitation in his visa of that kind--in other words, that visa facilitation would tend to suggest that and not the other way around, as I originally indicated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would Mr. Hartman's investigation into the question of whether Oswald was connected with the Agency also have led him to determine whether Oswald was an agent of some other U.S. intelligence agency?

Mr. Rocca. I think probably not.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that --

Mr. Rocca. Though I reserve. If he mentions in his memorandum the Inter-Agency Source Defector List, which I think he should have checked, there should have been a reference there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that conclusively indicate whether Oswald was an agent of another agency?

Mr. Rocca. If all of the provisions that were -- and I
misstated the list -- this is the Inter-Agency Source Register, not the Inter-Agency Defector List -- the Inter-Agency Source Register -- and I believe he did check it. If the provisions governing coordinating had been carried out, there would have been a drop card in there.

So, the answer to your question would be yes, at least as a start.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether the Warren Commission was at all particularly concerned with regard to the question of whether Oswald was an agent of the CIA?

Mr. Rocca. No questions of that kind, as far as I can recall, were directed through this working level association that I had with Slawson and Coleman and others on this point, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Although apparently there was a meeting with Mr. Dulles that you attended where Dulles indicated to you that the Warren Commission had asked him to investigate this question.

Mr. Rocca. The meeting with Mr. Dulles, as you kindly noted yesterday, was for another purpose, and he simply brought that in as a matter of collateral, reading the memorandum, as he tended to do, of course. This was a matter that had come up.

So, there was, apparently, an interest to the extent that Rankin talked to him about it.
But I was not brought in on that phase.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was Mr. Dulles disinclined to
get involved in this issue?

Mr. Rocca. I think it was -- I'm simply guessing,
now -- I would say that it would involve a whole matter of
conflict of interest; that is, as a member of the Commission,
he should be objective in these matters. That would be my
guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would you evaluate the significance
of Oswald's early discharge and relatively expeditious
discharge from the military?

Mr. Rocca. I think it shows palpable and manifest
bad faith on his part and I can't go beyond that because
I don't know any more facts.

Mr. Goldsmith. Bad faith in the sense that he was
getting a hardship discharge and then took off for the Soviet
Union?

Mr. Rocca. That's right.

Yes. Is that the correct word to use, when a person
gives an excuse that is not sustained by his subsequent
actions?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, does the fact that he obtained
this early discharge suggest to you that Oswald may have had
intelligence associations of some kind?

Mr. Rocca. Not necessarily. People would have
done this -- lots of people get out of the armed forces for various reasons. I don't think that alone can really stand the weight of the interpretation that you have suggested here, taken together with the meeting with presumably the Cuban, whoever it was, that Delgado describes, the Schweitzer correspondence, which apparently should be looked at again in terms of whether or not it was really a screen, because if it was, then it shows a degree of deliberateness which associates itself with the request for compassionate departure from the Marine Corps. It tends then to accumulate points on a line that this was a deliberate course of action.

But even when you put all of that together, you are far from anything that would exclude any contrary hypotheses, and that is what you are trying to get out of analysis.

For that reason, as I said yesterday, you have to be very, very careful in drawing conclusions.

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated yesterday that you did not have any memory of the Gutierrez allegation.

Mr. Rocca. I was unable to do any kind of reading in the report, or in the depositions to the Warren Report last night, so it still is a vague and hazy affair.

(Pause)
Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any responsibility with regard to the CIA's handling of the Nosenko issue?

Mr. Rocca. During the time of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Rocca. None at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which unit was responsible for Nosenko at that time?

Mr. Rocca. The handling responsibility was SB Division.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that stand for Soviet Branch?

Mr. Rocca. Soviet Branch, Soviet Division -- Mr. Murphy. In the staff which would have had an interest, the components concerned would have been Ops, the Ops component, it would have been Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Goldsmith. What's Mr. Hunt's first name?

Mr. Rocca. James Hunt - not Howard Hunt.

And, perhaps even Mr. O'Neill and SIG, although I cannot say on this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any involvement in the Nosenko case?

Mr. Rocca. Later.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?


Mr. Goldsmith. What was your role at that time?

Mr. Rocca. If it's relevant to your interest, I mean ---
Mr. Goldsmith. The reason that it would be relevant is because of the manner in which Mr. Nosenko was handled by the Agency vis-a-vis the information that was given about him to the Warren Commission. It requires the committee to look into both his treatment in 1964 as well as years subsequent to that time.

Mr. Rocca. My entry into the Nosenko case -- I am perfectly willing to discuss this -- I think it enters into certainly Mr. Marcucci's indication -- was in connection with the review and appraisal of the final report prepared, or the first draft final report prepared by the Soviet Division on the case, and their proposed recommendations for the handling of the case which, as I say, took place in '65, '66, or '67.

I was asked -- by that time, in other words, the case had reached a concrete stage of, a pile of, a report that was nearly a foot high. I was asked to read it and to comment upon it and its recommendations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your assessment of that report?

Mr. Rocca. My assessment of the report was -- and this is on the record, and there is a report, and I defer all of my remarks here to that paper, because the question is a complex one--that the report should be cut down by at least half; that it was too long; and that the overall diversity of the report, which included a lot of other elements that
were not related to the Nosenko case, concerned other aspects, like the Golitzin case, be cut out of it, because they simply encumbered it; that overall, the appraisal that was made that he was a dispatch defector -- and that certain action should be taken by the FBI to confirm this or to review it and to take further action with respect to his stay in the United States -- should be looked at with great care because he had rights under the circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the actual decision to detain Nosenko under hostile conditions during the period in which he was in CIA custody?

Mr. Rocca. The Chief of SB Division, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. What input did Mr. Angleton have on that?

Mr. Rocca. I think he was opposed to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Mr. Angleton's suggestion for the way that Mr. Nosenko should be treated?

Mr. Rocca. This is not within my competence to answer because I don't know the thing. It concerns -- in other words, you are asking me questions that deal with the period that was antecedent to the time that I came into the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever discuss that with you?
Mr. Rocca. On the basis of hearsay, then, discussions, Mr. Angleton would have wanted a much longer period of interrogation based on the actual materials that had been accumulated before anything like hostile interrogation was undertaken, if at all. In other words, to my recollection, in my recollection, there was a significant difference on this point. But it was ex post facto; the decision had already been taken and made and that was irreversible at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what role Mr. Helms had in making that decision?

Mr. Rocca. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to discuss with you briefly a hypothetical, and I am aware of the Agency's position regarding Nosenko today.

Hypothetically, if it could be established without any doubt that the story that Nosenko gave to the FBI and the CIA regarding the manner in which Oswald was handled in the Soviet Union -- if it could be established that that story was completely untrue or completely unbelievable, what significance would that have on the question of whether Nosenko was a bona fide or a dispatched defector?

Mr. Rocca. It might have no significance, or it might have much significance.

He could be a bona fide defector who had been fed

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these materials on the basis of some kind of preknowledge
that it was his intent to go and that he is therefore an
unwitting bearer of a version of the case. Or, on the
other hand, it could indicate that he is a controlled channel
of communication.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, your opinion is --

Mr. Rocca. And there are shades of in between
these two.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your opinion is that that doesn't cut
either way, then, in terms of the accuracy of his --

Mr. Rocca. No, it doesn't. It cuts both ways.

I mean, this is the point. It doesn't resolve it to the
exclusion of any other hypothesis, which is what I was
talking about is the nature of the evidence that you need
here, and until you get it, you've damn well got to keep it
out of the press, it seems to me, because you create problems,
then, at the human level that are really irresolvable. That
is what is, of course, dangerous.

I thought you were going to ask a totally different
question, which is how would it affect the whole hypothesis
of Oswald in the KDB, which would strike me as being a
much more relevant question to ask.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, Mr. Rocca, I'm afraid that you
anticipated my next question.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I'm sorry.
Mr. Goldsmith. Why don't you answer that one now.

Mr. Rocca. Well, I would have to do it the same way, Mr. Goldsmith.

It would take, in other words -- it would take very, very hard evidence either of an agent character or of a cipher breakthrough to convince me that he was a mandated killer to begin with, because the nature of the crime, his conduct and association with the deed are such that this responds entirely to what I would consider a self-motivated act.

So, even if, in other words, he were in touch with the KGB and an agent--and that would be the implication if you drew the evidence on Nosenko as being a phony agent, right -- coming back to your question -- I still believe you would be far from the point of being able to go into the World Court or the United Nations or into a diplomatic demarche or indeed into something even more serious and state this to have been the causative act.

Is that being fair on the evidence?

It seems to me this is what is required in a case of this seriousness.

Mr. Goldsmith. I just have one more question to ask you prior to taking a brief recess.

Mr. Rocca. Let me add, however, what I said yesterday, that notwithstanding that question, there is no question in
my mind that there is additional information in both Havana and in Moscow that bears on this motivation and conduct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please review CIA number 2041, which is a cable dated 6 January, 1964, dealing with an individual named Mohammed Reggab.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Let's see. This is a person in Berlin. I don't know that I have reviewed this.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Reggab was an individual who came forward and indicated that at one time he had been a boyfriend of Marine Oswald, and he gave the authorities on her background that differed from the story that Marina herself gave.

I am wondering if you are familiar with Mr. Reggab's story?

Mr. Rocca. No.

Mr. Eisenstedt, who originated this, is still present.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Reggab ever worked for the Agency?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memo suggests the possibility that he was going to start working for the Agency.

Do you know whether that was ever pursued?

Mr. Rocca. I do not know that.

I simply am not cognizant of the facts here.
Mr. Rocca. Incidentally, are you still talking hypothetically?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, if you would like to discuss something hypothetically, I am open for it.

Mr. Rocca. I want to revert to the Minktenbaugh analogy and the woman and the case, the MO.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Rocca. These things, identities in time and space and method, are significant, at least at the laboratory level, so that the kind of thing that the Soviets might have had in mind for Oswald and Marina—if that is her true name, whatever her identify is, and if we do know all about her, and my great regret is that she was not polygraphed, as Ruby was -- I think this is very definitely a portion -- because she certainly to Patricia Blake said things that I had not heard on the record before about her past.

The Walker thing fits better into the pattern of a special kind of operational thing, if you, indeed, can believe that Walker was a part of Oswald's interest, as she claims it was.

So, you have, in other words, coming back to the hypothesis, that element of taint with Oswald on the part of the KGB. But I do feel that however you press it on the basis of the present "evidence" -- in quotes -- it still falls short of suggesting that he was a mandated killer in
this instance.

I want to make that perfectly clear.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Let's take a brief recess at this time.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you, Mr. Rocca, having just taken this brief recess, that I have had occasion to review some additional documents that were provided to me by the Agency.

Yesterday you made reference to a second memorandum that you had prepared with regard to the work of the Rockefeller Commission and that document has now been made available to us.

Mr. Rocca. In its entirety?

Mr. Goldsmith. So far as I know, in its entirety, so that many of the points that were raised yesterday, where you made reference to the memorandum, will be pursued by my staff and myself. But I just wanted to clarify that because there was some suggestion that there was a memorandum that was missing and, in fact, it has turned up.

Mr. Rocca. Good.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to address to you. Basically they are of a wrap-up nature, followup questions based upon our review of yesterday's discussion.

First, dealing with Luisa Calderon, the suspected
DCI agent who may have had contact with Mr. Oswald, I would like you to refer to CIA number 1843, which is a cover page to a transcript. The transcript is the one that contains the conversation in which Luisa Calderon makes her cryptic reference to the Kennedy assassination and suggests that she may have had foreknowledge.

I am not going to go into any detail with regard to the transcript itself as you and I have already discussed the substance.

I would simply ask you to read 1843 and tell me if you can identify whose handwriting appears on that page.

Mr. Rocca. Oh, you are not asking me to read this. We talked about this yesterday.

I'm afraid I cannot recognize it, I'm sorry to say. It just makes no impression. It looks like a woman's handwriting, but these are just guesses.

Mr. Goldsmith. The handwriting indicates that a transcript is to be sent to someone named Galbond--

Do you know who those individuals were?

Mr. Rocca. I do not. My guess would be that this has to do with the Warren Commission and their receipt of the material.

Mr. Goldsmith. The notation, the handwritten notation, also indicates the following comment: "Nothing to Buro" --
and Buro is spelled B-U-R-O— "yet."

Do you know whether this transcript was ever given to the FBI?

Mr. Rocca. No. Whether that transcript was or not, I cannot say. They already knew the substance of it, of course, from the earlier transmissions. My guess is that this was the translation from Spanish that was done for the Commission by the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the FBI was specifically informed about the conversation that Luisa Calderon had in which she made the reference to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Rocca. I'm certain of it — that is, I can't prove it by the papers that were shown to me yesterday. But I would be certain of it in my own mind.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. As I say, it is my recollection that these things were translated for the Commission by the Agency. They would be done by people in WH Division who had the competence in the language, and therefore there would be different components involved and different routings, obviously.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever seeing any cable traffic that made specific reference to Luisa Calderon and this conversation?
Mr. Rocca. No. I would not exclude that there had been such, though. But I don't remember any.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you indicate that the Bureau received via transmission this conversation?

Mr. Rocca. Oh, I am certain of it.

Mr. Scott would have taken it up directly with his Bureau colleague at a certain point, when it was indicated that there should be lateral transmission.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to refer now to CIA number 2206, which is a summary of events that took place during the visit by Warren Commission staff to the Agency station in Mexico City in 1963. Paragraph seven of this document specifically indicates the information that was unavailable for review by the Warren Commission staff.

Would you please review paragraph seven of this document.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. I have reviewed this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Is there any reference in that document, specifically in paragraph seven, to the Warren Commission staff being given access to a transcript of Luisa Calderon's conversation?

Mr. Rocca. There is no reference. There is no specification that among the items listed is that piece.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now yesterday we discussed this issue and I asked you whether you would be willing to assist the CONFIDENTIAL
in trying to resolve it. I recall your response as affirmative.

Mr. Rocca. I will always volunteer for anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will attempt to make arrangements with the Agency to give you access to some of these materials so that we can determine conclusively whether or not this information was given to the Warren Commission staff.

Mr. Rocca. At what point or --

Mr. Goldsmith. We are interested in whether the information was given to the Warren Commission and when.

Mr. Rocca. Ever -- ah.

This memorandum is Win Scott's summary memorandum. Again, things can be omitted from memoranda, and I would assume that that's the case in this instance.

He was so firmly committed -- Win was, personally -- to the fact of Cuban involvement. In fact, he went far beyond what I would regard as publicly discussible, inferential judgments in that regard, in his discussions with me that I can't believe absolutely that he would ever withhold it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give us a summary now of what Mr. Scott's theories were with regard to the possibility of Cuban involvement.

Mr. Rocca. He felt that there was very definitely the possibility of Cuban involvement with Oswald, but he could not arrive at any definite information. And frankly, I don't remember getting down to details that would be of
really significant use to you in your own investigation here, beyond the statement that he also had this conviction. He also felt that way about the Soviets, of course.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, yesterday we also discussed the photograph that had been taken of the individual who has been referred to by the press as "The Mexico Mystery Man," and I showed you a document labeled CIA number 2138, which is a memo dated 12 May, '64, from Mr. Angleton to you, in which a statement is made to the effect that the Agency might consider waiting out the Commission with regard to this issue.

I'm sorry, I referred to the incorrect document. In fact, it is number 2139, and the date is 5 March, '64. The memo is from you, Mr. Rocca, to Richard Helms, and you indicate that Mr. Angleton does not desire to respond directly to the request from Mr. Rankin for some materials.

In the second paragraph you indicate that Mr. Angleton would prefer to wait out the Commission in the matter covered by paragraph 2.

Would you please review this at this time.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when the Warren Commission was given the full story on the photographic surveillance operation in Mexico City, and specifically the relationship between that operation and the Mexico mystery man?
Mr. Rocca. Could I ask a question here as a matter of information?

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly, please do.

Mr. Rocca. "This is responsive to paragraph three of Rankin's letter, see reference tab" -- is that here?

Mr. Goldsmith. No.

In fact, the letter was not attached to the document, although it is indicated that it was.

Mr. Rocca. "J does not desire to respond directly to paragraph two of that letter which made a levy for our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since 23rd of November. We found that except for three telegrams all that the Secret Service had was material we had sent to McGeorge Bundy at the White House. Apparently he had simply passed it to the Secret Service as a matter of internal information. Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph two, which is a levy for our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since the 23rd of November and which has previously been described. If they come back on the point, he feels that you or someone from here should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the materials rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally none of these items" -- is --"of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance
to the Commission in response to earlier (levies) or the items refer to aborted leads — for example, the famous six photographs which were not of Oswald (and) the passenger manifest of an airline which also did not pertain to Oswald.

If you desire to take note of the levy in paragraph two, we would recommend that you indicate on the attached" and so forth.

Well, we don't have the Rankin thing. But my recollection is that very shortly thereafter this —

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, for the record, I just want to indicate that we've reviewed the Rankin letter and it is unclear specifically what it is referring to. That's why I haven't bothered to show it to you.

Mr. Rocca. Well, it's very clear that this is unclear, too, because it refers to something unclear, it seems to me.

In other words, it sounds like something that had been gotten to Rankin in a kind of vague and hazy way, that was really not substantively new, that he made an issue of, and that this refers to simply avoiding duplicating needlessly a paper that had already been disposed of, or taken care of, or was in the process of being taken care of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now nevertheless, there is language to the effect there that Mr. Angleton was concerned with waiting out the Commission.

Mr. Rocca. Well, in other words, if he could show
that this material was not of any new substantive interest
and that it was already being taken care of, it would avoid
a needless stage of reproduction and of discussion -- I think
is the intent behind this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you when the Warren Commission staff
was told about the Mexico City photograph?

Mr. Rocca. I cannot recall the date of it, but they
came over and received the photograph and looked at it from
my very hands. I had in my hand an envelope containing the
entire run of the photographs that had been submitted to me
by the desk, the WH desk, Mr. Whitten, as of that time.

What date that was -- it could be May, it could be
April, it could be March. I think it was later -- it was
sooner rather than later.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you a document labeled
24 March, 1964. The subject is Mexico City, CIA dissemination
of information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The document, rather,
is labeled March 26, 1964, and it is an internal memo,
Warren Commission staff, CIA number 2221 and 2222. In 2222,
the author of the memo indicates as follows: "As you know,
we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph
which the FBI showed Marguerita Oswald soon after the
assassination. I hope that paragraph four of the memo of
March 24, 1964, sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer
which the CIA intends to give us to this inquiry."
Would you please review that.

Mr. Rocca. Could I ask you again what paper this is? Is it from the Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. It's a Commission internal memorandum -- Slawson - Coleman, to Rankin.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. Do we have paragraph four of the memorandum of March 24?

Mr. Goldsmith. That letter, unfortunately, is not available. The Agency did not send that to us.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that whatever this confabulation implies, that at some particular point -- and I don't remember the date, it was either at the end of March or April -- they came over and I showed them personally--

Mr. Goldsmith. You would certainly agree that by the end of March, that on this day, the --

Mr. Rocca. As of this day it sounds as if they don't have it.

Mr. Goldsmith. --the explanation given was not satisfactory?

Mr. Rocca. Well, I mean, they may have -- one thing that came out of my reflections on our talks yesterday and also today is the fact that these are all bricks assembled in a particular fashion.

What appears to be lacking is a sense of the operational
relationship with which these bricks were handled at the time.

In this particular case, while they may not have had the final explanation or even an explanation that we ourselves were satisfied with inasmuch as we were dependent on reports from Mexico City, they certainly were aware of the fact that the thing was being worked on and that the issue existed. In other words, there was no question of withholding -- and this took place at the conversational level and was obviously unrecorded in any way. I find myself impossible here to fill in the proper cement on the operational level that would make some of these bricks more plausible than they would seem, as they are taken out and just held up.

But I have an absolute recollection of giving them these photographs, and in the memorandum that you've gotten today, you will see that it turned out that there were even more photographs in the file -- not of the particular eight men, but of others in the coverage which they provided in '75. Now this comes out of the desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you agree, nevertheless, that the author of this memo was not satisfied with the explanation that the Agency had provided with regard to the photographs as of that day?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, yes.

He was certainly reflecting that in his internal memorandum -- memoranda.
Mr. Goldsmith. Was there ever any effort on the part of the CIA to coordinate testimony given to the Warren Commission with the FBI?

Mr. Rocca. None that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Goldsmith. What efforts, if any, were made to prep Mr. McCone prior to any briefings that Mr. McCone gave to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. I'm afraid I have to refer to whatever is in the record, if any, on that, because I did not deal personally with Mr. McCone on these matters.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there ever a concern evinced by Mr. Angleton or yourself or Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone gave consistent testimony, either testimony or statements, to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rocca. The thought would never have crossed my mind and, therefore, speaking for myself, the answer is negative. I have never -- I have not heard of anything involving either Mr. Helms or Mr. Angleton in that respect, to the best of my knowledge or recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Reading from CIA number 2138, which is a memo for Mr. Rocca from Mr. Angleton dated 12 May, 1964, it indicates as follows: "The DDP wishes to have from you a short but comprehensive memorandum which highlights the
basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its dealings with the Commission. For example, Rankin indicated that the Commission would wish to hear the Director's views as to how improvements might be made in protecting the President's life. Further, they will probably ask questions regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed. Such general questioning certainly necessitates that the DCI be made aware of the positions taken during previous interviews."

That language suggests that there was some concern for --

Mr. Rocca. Well, this was a concern for a briefing paper, as to what the main lines of response should be. This is a perfectly normal and regular procedure, followed in the Agency before and since and in other agencies, and I think we saw yesterday the briefing paper that went up, that was the product of, a combined product. But how the paper was used by Mr. Helms is something that I can't respond to.

You asked me whether or not --

Mr. Goldsmith. Either Mr. Helms or Mr. McConne apparently--

Mr. Rocca. You asked me about Mr. McConne.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, and apparently the briefing --

Mr. Rocca. So, I have no way of knowing what Mr. Helms did with the paper, with Mr. McConne, or whether it was used at all. It would seem to me that as you read their
depositions before the Commission, they had obviously read the paper or it had been reviewed. However, what they said was far less substantial than what was indicated there. So I can't say anything on the basis of a simple analysis at all at that point.

But this is a routine request for preparing material for the boss.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any concern that the boss would start making inconsistent statements?

Mr. Rocca. Why, I can't believe it. That wasn't what prompted it. It was that he would have a formal basis for saying whatever he had to say that would be responsive to the Commission's needs.

Mr. Goldsmith. During its review of the Agency's Oswald file and related files, the staff of this committee has come across transcripts of telephone conversations involving, for example, Mr. McConne, Mr. Whitten. My question to you is whether as a matter of routine telephone conversations were either taped or transcribed by the use of a stenographer listening to the conversations?

Do you have any knowledge of this taking place in 1963 and 1964?

Mr. Rocca. I have no knowledge that this took place as far as CI is concerned at any time, which is what I can seek to. That it was a practice of the Director to have these
conversations recorded is something I think that came out of the Watergate matter and is therefore a matter of record for his own use.

But whether any of that was done in 1963, now, is simply -- this is the first I've heard of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you a transcript of a telephone conversation between Mr. McConr and Mr. Hoover dated 26 November, 1963. It is CIA document number 2134.

Does that appear to the a transcript of a telephone conversation?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, it does.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read the middle paragraph, which makes reference to an FBI informant.

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. That's LIENVOY. That's their material with the Mexican authorities, because we ran that whole operation with the Mexicans.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would --

Mr. Rocca. I would interpret it that way. I have never read this piece of paper that I recall. That would be my reaction.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, let's get this clear.

The Director of the FBI, Mr. Hoover, is making reference to an informant that the FBI had in Mexico City, and he is indicating that the informant has informed the Bureau as to
the contents of Oswald's conversations in Mexico City.

   From your answer, I take it that you assume that Mr. Hoover is referring to the LIENVOY operation.

   Mr. Rocca. And he is subtly letting Mr. McConne know that Mr. McConne's resources down there were not unique, that they, too, had access to the Mexican operation.

   Mr. Goldsmith. LIENVOY was an operation that was run by the CIA and the Mexican Government?

   Mr. Rocca. It was a joint operation with the Mexicans, is my impression, yes.

   Mr. Goldsmith. It was a liaison operation with the Mexicans and the CIA?

   Mr. Rocca. Yes.

   Mr. Goldsmith. So, how would Hoover have had access to this information?

   Mr. Rocca. By the 26th, or by after the event, he would have been able to get from the Mexicans I think everything. I think they just rushed to give him everything.

   Mr. Goldsmith. So, he would have had a Mexican informant, do you think, that might have given him this information?

   Mr. Rocca. I think that that terminology is sort of standard terminology that he would have used to cover and sort of mythologize their coverage down there, and that what he is referring to are Mexican resources that the Bureau would
have independently developed on the case by that time. I
would defer, obviously, to a Bureau man in reading it. But
I think that this is the correct line of interpretation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Anne Goodpasture?

Mr. Rocca. The name is familiar and I must have met
her.

Mr. Goldsmith. She was a case officer in Mexico City
working with Win Scott.

Mr. Rocca. She wrote that wonderful summary --

Mr. Goldsmith. Which summary are you referring to?

Mr. Rocca. -- of the case, of all the file. It's
a thick collection which summarizes every document in the
Mexican file.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the Mexican Oswald file?

Mr. Rocca. Yes, in the Mexican Oswald file. I
don't know. I mean, it may well be, but I certainly have
not dealt with her -- well, I hesitate to use the word
"intimately," but in the sense of this case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Do you know Mr. Scott Breckenridge?

Mr. Rocca. Only in terms of the formality of concern
of the Inspector General.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he was ever
involved in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know at all.
The individual over there who was involved was Lieder, John Lieder at the time I left.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, I have no further questions to ask you.

I would like to thank you for making yourself available to the committee staff for the past day and a half. You've been very patient and you've been very generous with your time.

I would like to ask for your assurance that you will not disclose your testimony nor the questions that were asked of you to anyone else.

Mr. Rocca. I give you that assurance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

We will be in contact with you in an effort to resolve some of the questions that arose by virtue of this deposition.

Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Rocca. Not at all.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Berk.

Mr. Berk. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 1:27 o'clock, p.m., the taking of the deposition of Raymond G. Rocca concluded.)

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