
Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10004

RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014718

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : [Restricted]
TO :

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 07/17/1978
PAGES : 198

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA, METHODOLOGY
MEXICO CITY
[Restricted]
[Restricted]
[Restricted]
WC

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Two duplicates follow and are included in Box 2 in four folders.Box 1.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy

Washington, D. C.

Monday, July 17, 1978

Deposition of

RAYMOND G. ROCCA

called for examination by counsel for the subcommittee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Room 3501, House Annex No. 2, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., beginning at 9:50 o'clock, a.m., when were present:

For the subcommittee:

Michael Goldsmith, Staff Counsel

Charles Berk, Staff Counsel,

Elizabeth Berning, Notary.

- - -

Ms. Berning. What is the witness' name?

Mr. Goldsmith. Raymond Rocca.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Rocca, would you stand please, and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give is true and correct?

Mr. Rocca. I do.

Ms. Berning. Thank you.

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state your name and address
2 for the record, sir?

3 Mr. Rocca. Raymond G. Rocca. R-O-C-C-A.

4 The address is 400 Linden -- L-I-N-D-E-N -- Lane,
5 Falls Church, Virginia. The zip is 22042.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here today voluntarily?

7 Mr. Rocca. I am, indeed.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here without the need to resort
9 to a subpoena on the part of the committee?

10 Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Off the record.

12 (Discussion off the record)

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Rocca, do you understand that you
14 have a right to have counsel present today?

15 Mr. Rocca. Yes, indeed.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. And do you waive that right?

17 Mr. Rocca. I waive that right.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. At least for now.

19 Mr. Rocca. Yep. I expect that I will be able to judge
20 in terms of the caveats indicated here where to ask your
21 indulgence and just set aside and proceed.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. No problem.

23 Have you received a copy of the committee rules and
24 House Resolutions 222, 433, and 760?

25 Mr. Rocca. I have -- for retention.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

2 Have you had an opportunity to read Rule Number 4.

3 Mr. Rocca. I have, indeed. I mean, I've read it.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it as well?

5 Mr. Rocca. I understand it to the extent that it's
6 possible under these circumstances.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any questions about it now?

8 Mr. Rocca. I have no questions about it now.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Under the committee rules, Mr. Rocca, a
10 witness has a right to receive a copy of a deposition transcript.
11 In other words, whenever a witness gives a deposition statement,
12 he has a right to receive a copy of the transcript.

13 However, the Central Intelligence Agency has asked the
14 committee to request of present and former Agency employees to
15 waive their right actually to receive a copy of the transcript.
16 The Agency is concerned that the transcript has classified
17 information in it and would not want the transcript to leave
18 the committee's secure areas.

19 So, for that reason, I would like to ask you whether
20 you are willing to waive your right to receive a copy of the
21 transcript. By doing so, however, you would still have the
22 full right to review the transcript for accuracy and to make
23 any necessary corrections. So, all you are waiving is your
24 right to receive a copy.

25 Mr. Rocca. I do.

1 Let me say that membership in the Agency has long since
2 comported the waiving of constitutional rights in various
3 respects. This is simply another --

4 Mr. Goldsmith. I won't be asking you to waive any more
5 rights, I hope.

6 I would like you to know that the Court Reporter will
7 be asked to certify the transcript as a complete, accurate,
8 and true record of all the testimony given.

9 Mr. Rocca. Will there be an opportunity to correct it?
10 There are mis-speakings and that kind of thing, whatever that
11 word means. It has just been coined in the last year or so,
12 "I mis-spoke."

13 Mr. Goldsmith. You will be given an opportunity to review
14 the transcript for accuracy. If, in your opinion, it is not
15 accurate, there is a procedure for rectifying those types of
16 problems.

17 Now, are you retired from the Central Intelligence Agency?

18 Mr. Rocca. I am.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of Acting
20 Director Carlucci's 23 March, 1978 letter which, for the
21 record, corresponds with JFK exhibit number 94?

22 Mr. Rocca. 23 March, 1978 -- I have.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the letter that specifically
24 discusses the question of secrecy agreements and authorizes
25 Agency employees to respond to relevant questions made by this

1 committee.

2 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

3 It also contains caveats which protect the continued
4 interest in sources and in methods, which I regard as adequate
5 under the circumstances, and therefore I accept this, and I
6 understand.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. You understand that letter?

8 Mr. Rocca. Yes. He wants me to tell you all you need
9 to know in order to get your job done.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

11 I believe the letter indicates that so long as questions
12 relevant to the committee's mandate are addressed to the
13 witness, the Agency is authorizing you to answer those questions.

14 I would like to have this marked and offered as an
15 exhibit.

16 (The document referred to was marked Rocca Exhibit
17 Number 1.)

18 Mr. Rocca. I judge that this is the standard type
19 of thing.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

21 Off the record.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I will indicate for the record that
24 this exhibit is one that we have used for every witness
25 that the committee either knew worked for the Central

1 Intelligence Agency or thought might have worked for the
2 Central Intelligence Agency. We have, at times, given the
3 letter to witnesses who had no connection with the Agency.

4 How many years were you employed with the CIA?

5 Mr. Rocca. From its inception in 1937 to the 31st of
6 December, 1974.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold when you
8 retired in 1974?

9 Mr. Rocca. I was Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence
10 staff.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you hold in 1963, at
12 the time of President Kennedy's assassination?

13 Mr. Rocca. I was Chief of the Research and Analysis
14 Division of the CI staff, the Counter Intelligence staff.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Is that known as CI/R&A?

16 Mr. Rocca. That is. Correct.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibility, if any, did you
18 have with regard to the CIA's investigation of the assassination
19 in 1963?

20 Mr. Rocca. My responsibilities, in my own words, were
21 to serve as the working level point of contact and facilitation
22 to the Warren Commission staff, the working level point of
23 contact and facilitation.

24 That was initiated some time in January. There is a
25 memorandum of record which represented the results of

1 conversations at about that time, which informed me of this
2 decision. In other words, it was not a thing that I sought.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Before we go into your responsibilities
4 in more detail, would you describe for the record what the
5 Counter Intelligence Research and Analysis staff did in 1963?
6 In other words, what was the purpose of that unit?

7 Mr. Rocca. The unit was designed to bring to bear
8 analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant
9 all source, all overt source comprehension; a study of cases
10 that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is,
11 closed cases; to maintain the ongoing record of overall
12 quality and quantity of counter intelligence being performed
13 by the entire DDP operational component; to -- operational
14 component -- the Deputy Director for Plans.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. That's just in caps -- DDP.

16 Mr. Rocca. DDP -- I have listed now three functions,
17 broadly speaking. To keep the community informed on the
18 organization's structure and operational potential, that is,
19 the threat of all intelligence services throughout the world,
20 that is, by supervising the writing of an encyclopedic
21 publication, which was called the NIS Section 56 at that time.
22 This was a specific responsibility of the component.

23 In other words, it was a research support for operational
24 components. The final major function, and this is important,
25 is training. We were responsible for the supervision and

1 performance of CI training.

2 So, we kept the CI indicators, the overall record of
3 CI organization throughout the world -- that is, the adversary
4 services -- we worked on cases when they had ceased to be of
5 direct concern to the operational components, and tried to make
6 relationships between cases.

7 We were concerned, obviously, on the training side in
8 working with other parts of the intelligence community, as
9 well as training inside, and so forth.

10 I think that those five broad topics -- I could narrow
11 them down --

12 Mr. Goldsmith. No, that's fine.

13 Mr. Rocca. I think this is sufficient to get us started.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Who was in charge of the CIA's investigation
15 into the assassination of President Kennedy?

16 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no formal
17 provision for investigation. The investigation was the FBI's --
18 not CIA's responsibility.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Within CIA, isn't it fair to say that
20 initially Jack Whitten was given responsibility for conducting
21 the investigation?

22 Mr. Rocca. I don't want to nit-pick your language, but
23 that was not an investigative responsibility, as I understood
24 it.

25 The GP Floor phase, which he headed up --

1 Mr. Goldsmith. The GP Floor?

2 Mr. Rocca. Floor phase.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you define for the record what
4 GP Floor is?

5 Mr. Rocca. GP Floor was the code name assigned by the
6 * DDP, by Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamissines and the desks, to
7 characterize cable traffic during the initial phase of the
8 Agency's relationship with the various authorities and with
9 its own organizations or components overseas. This is a
10 code facilitation, a telegram or telegraphic consideration.
11 And, during that phase, it was indeed Mr. Whitten's respon-
12 sibility. I think he did an extremely good job.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. So, GP Floor was a code name which was
14 assigned to cable traffic pertaining to the Kennedy assassination,
15 is that correct?

16 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, during the period of
17 November through January, and then it was phased out.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. And Mr. Whitten initially had
19 responsibility for --

20 Mr. Rocca. Coordinating traffic, for working with the
21 DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world,
22 as far as I know. This was before I got into it.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. Whitten no longer had
24 responsibility in that area, who took over the responsibility
25 for coordinating the Agency's investigation?

1 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was no further
2 cryptonym assigned to it.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Nevertheless, without a cryptonym being
4 assigned to it--

5 Mr. Rocca. And therefore cables would go to the DDP,
*6 would go to Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamissines^e, the various desks.
7 In other words, it became a decentralized responsibility.

8 In other words, there wasn't, as far as I can make
9 out, a formal placement of an investigative responsibility.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Informally, who --

11 Mr. Rocca. I became -- or the CI staff and I for the
12 staff became then -- because by that time a commission had
13 been formed -- had become the point of contact for the
14 commission.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. So, informally, the CI staff was
16 responsible for coordinating the CIA's investigation?

17 Mr. Rocca. This is where I wonder about the use of the
18 term -- that is, whatever we had done, whatever we were to do
19 or did to assist the Warren Commission focused in the staff.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. In the CI staff.

21 Mr. Rocca. In the CI staff.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time, who was in charge of the
23 CI staff?

24 Mr. Rocca. Mr. Angleton, and Mr. Hunt was his deputy.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. E. Howard Hunt?

1 Mr. Rocca. No.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, who is Mr. Hunt?

3 Mr. Rocca. Mr. Hunt was Mr. James Hunt, a totally
4 different person.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the responsibility for
6 providing information to the Warren Commission was given to
7 the CI staff as opposed to Mr. Whitten?

8 Mr. Rocca. I do not.

9 I would judge -- and I am guessing now, this is purely
10 a guess -- I never discussed it with him -- that as Chief of
11 the Mexican Desk, which was his former job, the whole parameter
12 of the case had shifted from its initial phase of October and
13 November, where traces came up involving his files and his
14 handling of the initial leads that developed out of the
15 Mexican resources, and that he no longer regarded it as
16 really his primary responsibility.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any conflict between
18 Mr. Angleton and Mr. Whitten regarding the manner in which the
19 investigation was to be conducted?

20 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, there was none, and I
21 did not hear of any at the time -- or since.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that initially Mr. Whitten
23 was given responsibility for the investigation and that
24 Mr. Angleton in some manner interceded in the investigation
25 being conducted by Mr. Whitten?

1 Mr. Rocca. If so, I do not know this and cannot
2 sustain that allegation, by any information direct or indirect.
3 I have never heard it even as hearsay.

4 By the whole line of questioning, I judge that you
5 have your own interests.

6 Really, Mr. Whitten sat here (indicating) in a small
7 desk in WH for the Mexican area. He was in a position
8 to develop through the assets of the Mexico station extremely
9 interesting material, which at the time was not recognized,
10 obviously, as pertaining to anything like what came out of it
11 in October or late September, and that was entirely appropriate
12 to the WH division and area, and functional division.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. WH stands for Western Hemisphere?

14 Mr. Rocca. Western Hemisphere -- not White House --
15 underline that, please, because this is another of the canards.

16 As I say, it was entirely appropriate in the GP Floor
17 phase that he would have that. But the minute you had a
18 commission set up outside the line obviously had to be the
19 Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations
20 overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions.
21 Here you had Mr. Whitten being asked to sign off on cables
22 that had to do with Netherlands, with U.K., with Australia,
23 and it would have seemed to me utterly administratively simply a
24 hybrid monster.

25 So, in effect, the concentration of supervisory

1 authority on the assistance being given the Warren Commission
2 once they got underway was something, as I understand it,
3 negotiated between the Commission itself and Mr. Helms.
4 Mr. Angleton was present. I may have been present at the
5 meeting which decided that R & A would be the point of reference.
6 I cannot recall.

7 But there is a memorandum -- off the record -- there
8 and you should have it.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. There is a memorandum for the record
10 which indicates --

11 Mr. Rocca. In January, which indicates how that thing
12 got off. And it dispells, I think, any idea that there was
13 some kind of internal machination.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that memorandum for the
15 record be found -- because we have reviewed many files and
16 have not come across that particular memorandum?

17 Mr. Rocca. Well, it should be found in the file.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it be in the Oswald file?

19 Mr. Rocca. It would be in the Oswald file, and it
20 should be around January.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Who is the author of that memorandum?

22 Mr. Rocca. The author of that memorandum must have
23 been Mr. Helms himself, or Mr. Karamissines. It reflected
24 conversations that tookplace with Mr. Rankin. It may be a
25 Warren Commission memorandum.

1 But that memorandum exists. And, as I say, the
2 memorandum, to me, represented a logical evolution of what
3 had gone on in the development of the case.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you be able to locate that
5 memorandum for the committee?

6 In other words, do you still have a relationship with
7 the Agency which would permit you to obtain that memorandum?

8 Mr. Rocca. Well, if you could arrange it for me to go
9 out there, I would.

10 Can we have a little bit of a diversion now and perhaps
11 go off the record? I want to ask about a number of other
12 people who helped, who would know this.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Let's go off the record for a
14 moment. But I don't want to go off the record a whole lot
15 in this deposition.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go back on the record.

18 Mr. Rocca. I have no formal knowledge of it by
19 direction or indirection, or hearsay.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. By "it" you are referring to --

21 Mr. Rocca. Of such a thing having happened.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. You have to understand, Mr. Rocca, that
23 we went off the record. So, for the record, by "it," what
24 are you referring to?

25 Mr. Rocca. The shift of the responsibility for overall

1 coordination of what the Agency was doing, from WH, Mr. Whitten,
2 to the staff. This was an utterly logical and completely
3 what I would call inevitable in terms of cost effectiveness and
4 everything else.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the shift take place right at the
6 time that the Warren Commission was established?

7 Mr. Rocca. I have in memory the date 12 January, and
8 this is something that just comes now right out of my head.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

10 Mr. Rocca. So, it was pursuant to that.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Why was the responsibility for the
12 investigation -- I am using that now in an informal sense,
13 because I think you feel more comfortable with that -- why was
14 the responsibility given to CI staff as opposed to some other
15 staff within the DDP?

16 Mr. Rocca. Because that's our business. CI has
17 the business of dealing with activity involving espionage,
18 sabotage, subversion, terrorism, and the whole works. It is
19 spelled out in 1-1, Chapter 5. You will find that absolutely
20 stated formally.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. So, of all the units within the CIA
22 in 1963, the CI staff, you are saying, was best suited to be
23 responsible for this?

24 Mr. Rocca. That's right, yes, because, in addition, th
25 staff had the responsibility for the DDP, for maintaining the

1 relations, the liaison relations, with the office of security
2 within the Agency itself, the office of security, and with the
3 FBI and other agencies. This was by directive 1-1, Chapter 5.
4 I underline the importance of 1-1, Chapter 5.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the CI staff charter?

6 Mr. Rocca. Charter -- and this shift was precisely
7 directly in line with the implications of that charter. This
8 is my reading now in retrospect.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the line of reporting within
10 the CIA with regard to information that was relevant to the
11 assassination? By line of reporting I mean once information
12 was received, who did it go to?

13 I am talking now about the time the CI staff was
14 responsible for the investigation.

15 Mr. Rocca. There were -- this is where you are going
16 off, because the CI staff never displaced Mr. Helms in his
17 direct relations with the Commission. The CI staff never
18 displaced the direct relations between the Soviet Division,
19 Mr. Murphy, Mr. Bagley, with the Commission. The CI staff
20 never displaced the direct relations between Mr. Whitten --
21 even after it had taken over. In other words, it was a
22 decentralized approach.

23 Now the material that did come through of a substantive
24 nature developed by these components, and particularly the
25 Soviet division, were brought down in the normal flow of day

1 to day work. They were reviewed by me or by the assistants
2 I had, and they were Mr. Tom Hall, Mr. Thomas Hall, Ph.D.,
3 University of Chicago, in Slavic Studies, and our Russian
4 expert: Mr. Paul Hartman, who was a general research and search
5 man for the whole of the community and its resources; and
6 Mr. Arthur Dooley -- D-O-O-L-E-Y -- a former member of the
7 FBI who had transferred to the Agency many years before.

8 Now these people actually were dealing with the actual
9 working level in the various divisions, or the various
10 divisional elements, particularly in SB, would be working
11 with me.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's see if we can clarify this for
13 a moment.

14 Overall responsibility was in the hands of Mr. Helms.

15 Mr. Rocca. That's correct. Now you're talking -- and
16 that never changed.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. That never changed from the very beginning?

18 Mr. Rocca. As far as I am concerned, Mr. Helms was in
19 charge, and Mr. Karamissines, his deputy, when he was not there.
20 For sensitive aspects, Mr. Angleton and these two were in
21 charge, or the division people.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton heavily involved in
23 the investigation, other than occasional sensitive matters
24 that arose?

25 Mr. Rocca. I think not. I think this is a correct

1 appraisal of his role at that time. He attended the general
2 meetings.

3 Let me give you an example of what I have in mind.

4 Though I was the working level point of contact
5 with the committee, that is, I knew Mr. Slawson in particular,
6 and worked, I believe, closely and profitably with him, and
7 without reservation, there was another historian. In any
8 event, I was not cleared for the Nosenko case. So, I did not
9 attend any of the discussions that took place on that matter,
10 and that, too, is a matter of formal record.

11 You should find that record to back that up -- if you
12 have not found it.

13 In other words, if you are looking for a fixed point of
14 investigation here, you have to keep in mind that again, you
15 had access to sources and methods and compartmentation was
16 observed, notwithstanding the fact that I was the working
17 level point of contact.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. So, the Nosenko case would be an
19 example of a situation where Mr. Angleton would have been
20 involved.

21 Mr. Rocca. It was Mr. Murphy.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton involved as well?

23 Mr. Rocca. I don't think he was at the meeting that
24 concerned it over at the Warren Commission, because I had the
25 delicious experience of being asked to leave at a certain

1 stage. I know he wasn't there.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be an example of a sensitive
3 situation that would prompt Mr. Angleton to have been involved
4 in the investigation?

5 Mr. Rocca. Oh, he would have known all of that.
6 Whatever else, I have no similar story to tell about him.
7 I have the one to tell about myself and the Nosenko case, which
8 I was not cleared for.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. But earlier you said that other than
10 sensitive matters, Mr. Angleton basically was not involved
11 in the investigation. I am wondering if you can give an
12 example of a sensitive matter.

13 Mr. Rocca. Well, I would imagine all of the matters
14 involving the intercept of correspondence, of Oswald's
15 correspondence -- which I saw in 1975.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. So, in 1963, when you were working on
17 this case, you did not see the correspondence, the cable traffic,
18 from Mexico City to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's
19 contact?

20 Mr. Rocca. Very definitely that is not the case and
21 that is not what I said.

22 I'm talking about the correspondence intercepted.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Which intercept are you talking about?

24 Mr. Rocca. I am talking about the intercepted mail
25 correspondence.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

* 2 You are talking about the HDLINGUAL program?

3 Mr. Rocca. I'm talking about that material. He would
4 have handled that.

5 And indeed, when I read it in 1975, it was clear that
6 Mr. Papich had come over on Saturday morning and had taken
7 all of the material on that file. But that was the first time
8 I knew that that part of -- in other words, there was very
9 strict compartmentation utilized within the whole group in
10 order to protect sources and methods at the time that we were
11 attempting to help this body. That's the point that I'm
12 trying to make.

13 Mr. Angleton's role would have been, I would have
14 imagined, in that connection.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Angleton's role peripheral or
16 central to the investigation?

17 Mr. Rocca. How can you say with an asset like that
18 that it could be peripheral? I don't know, because I was not
19 privy to the materials. But I could guess that it must have
20 been important for him to put that material of Papich's to use
21 immediately.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how much material was generated
* 23 by the HDLINGUAL program?

24 Mr. Rocca. I have no way of really recalling. It was
25 a substantial file and I see no reason why you shouldn't have it.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 Then you can answer the question yourself.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I want to explain to you, Mr. Rocca,
3 that the mere fact that --

4 Mr. Rocca. I don't mean to be impertinent.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. -- files and documents are made available
6 to us doesn't necessarily mean that the files and documents
7 are accurate. One of the reason for taking deposition statements
8 is because files and statements are not always accurate. In
9 fact, one of the purposes of this committee is to verify the
10 accuracy of the Agency's own files.

11 Mr. Rocca. I take your point on that. Let me say that
12 in one respect, for that reason, the Oswald file, which was
13 the file that R & A kept, that is, the material pertaining
14 to the 201 file -- you can be sure is the file because it
15 was computerized, and you can't change the computer order
16 without leaving a record. Therefore you can be sure that
17 everything that went into it is still in it.

18 * Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the ^THDLINGUAL file, you
19 indicated before, I believe, that the file was a thick one.
20 Is that true?

21 Mr. Rocca. No, not thick. It must have contained
22 seven or eight letters or so. But the man who would know
23 exactly is Mr. Birch O'Neill. He headed the project.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. We've spoken to Mr. Birch O'Neill.

25 Mr. Rocca. I mean, he must know this exactly, then.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345



1 He must know this exactly.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Again, the fact that we have talked to
3 other people does not mean that we do not want information from
4 you, if you have that information.

5 Mr. Rocca. Of course not.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. To the best of your recollection, how
7 many Oswald intercepts were there in the ^THDLINGUAL program?


8 Mr. Rocca. Oh, this would be -- if you have to --
9 as I say, I read it in 1975 at the moment the Rockefeller
10 Commission was coming in. I'm sure they looked at the whole
11 thing -- Mr. Ford, or whatever is the name of the individual
12 who was concerned. I went through it cursorily with Mrs. Matson.
13 She is the person who handed me the file. There must have
14 been five, or six, or seven. But this is pure guess. There may
15 be twelve, there may be three -- I can't say.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there more than one?

17 Mr. Rocca. Oh, there was more than one.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

19 Getting back to the question of organization, I think
20 I understand from your testimony --



21 Mr. Rocca. When I say more than one, it involves both
22 ends, that is, materials going out from Mrs. Oswald and material
23 coming in from him. I don't know what the proportion is or
24 even if there were things coming in, or if it was confined
25 solely to things going out. As I say, this is something

1 not a part of my bag.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I understand.

3 Getting back to the question of organization, I think
4 you have indicated --

5 Mr. Rocca. So, you have very clearly in mind now that
6 in two areas that were of significance, I was completely cut
7 out.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

9 Mr. Rocca, I'm sorry to have to ask you this again, but
10 you are going to have to listen to my questions, and please try
11 not to interrupt me.

12 Finally, getting back to the question of organization,
13 for purposes of clarification, now, I think you've indicated
14 very clearly that in terms of overall responsibility, it was
15 in the hands of Mr. Helms.

16 Is that correct?

17 Mr. Rocca. That is correct.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, I think you have
19 indicated that the investigation was decentralized to some
20 extent in that different area divisions, primarily Western
21 Hemisphere and Soviet Europe were sending information upstream
22 to headquarters -- and there may have been other divisions
23 as well sending information, but primarily it was Western
24 Hemisphere and Soviet Russia -- is that correct?

25 Mr. Rocca. Yes.

300 7TH STREET, S.W. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

1 Mr. Helms held weekly meetings at which these
2 generalizations were spread and which division chiefs complied
3 with.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, all of the information that the
5 division chiefs were sending upstream at one time or another,
6 I believe, went through the CI/R&A staff, is that correct?

7 Mr. Rocca. I can't say that all of them did. Those
8 that are marked plainly on the record as having been were -- if
9 they are all, I don't know.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. I realize that you can't state
11 that all were. But, as a matter of your best recollection now --

12 Mr. Rocca. Mr. Helms indicated that all material
13 bearing on anything that could be of assistance to the
14 Warren Commission should be seen by CI staff and R & A and
15 marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded
16 indications -- they were verbal insofar as I know -- that we
17 were to leave no stone unturned.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. And were Mr. Helms' orders generally
19 followed?

20 Mr. Rocca. As far as I know, they were followed to the
21 letter, by all that I know of.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. So, if you were asking different
23 divisions to send to CI/R & A information pertinent to the
24 investigation, can we assume safely that most of that
25 information did, in fact, go to CI/R&A?

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

1 Mr. Rocca. Your question turns on most of it. There
2 is no way that I can judge whether most of it did or not.
3 That which struck some division chief or his assistant
4 would have come forward, and much did.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming that Mr. Helms' orders were
6 followed?

7 Mr. Rocca. Yes, assuming that they were followed.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

9 Could you indicate for the record how the overall
10 responsibility for the investigation was divided between the
11 FBI and the CIA?

12 I understand that both organizations have different
13 charters and different purposes. What was your understanding
14 of the CIA's responsibilities for the investigation, as opposed
15 to the FBI's?

16 Mr. Rocca. Well, as you have already detected, I
17 object, I think, in principle to the use of the word
18 "investigation," to apply to the CIA.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, how would you like me to phrase
20 the question? I would be glad to do that.

21 Mr. Rocca. CIA made its entire worldwide resources
22 available to the Commission to assist it in gathering all
23 information within the powers of its operatives and its
24 operations.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying, then, that the CIA

