
Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10005

RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014719

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : [Restricted]
TO :

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 08/09/1978
PAGES : 198

SUBJECTS :
CIA, METHODOLOGY
OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
RUSSIA
[Restricted]
[Restricted]
WC

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Two duplicates follow in next two folders and Box 3.Box 2.

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3 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978
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6 U.S. House of Representatives,
7 Subcommittee on Assassination
8 of John F. Kennedy of the
9 Select Committee on Assassina-
10 tions,

11 Washington, D.C.

12 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m. in
13 room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer
14 (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

15 Present: Representatives Preyer, Burke, Dodd, Devine and
16 Sawyer.

17 Also present: E. Berning; L. Svendsen; C. Berk; M. Gold-
18 smith; B. Genzman; J. Blackmer; J. McDonald; G. R. Blakey;
19 O. Wagner; B. Wolf; W. H. Cross.

20 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will come to order.

21 The Chair recognizes the Clerk of the Committee to read
22 those who are officially designated to be on the Subcommittee
23 today.

24 The Clerk. You, Mrs. Burke, Mr. Sawyer and Mr. Thone are
25 regular members of the Kennedy Subcommittee. Mr. Devine will
26 be substituting for Mr. Dodd.

27 Mr. Preyer. The Chair at this time will entertain a motion
28 that today's hearings and one subsequent day of hearings be held

1 in Executive Session since, on the basis of information obtained
2 by the Committee, the Committee believes that the evidence or
3 testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate people
4 and consequently Section 2(k)(5) of Rule 11 of the Committee
5 rules would apply.

6 Mrs. Burke. I so move.

7 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

8 You have heard the motion. All those in favor will answer
9 as the roll is called.

10 The Clerk. Mr. Preyer?

11 Mr. Preyer. Aye.

12 The Clerk. Mr. Devine?

13 Mr. Devine. Aye.

14 The Clerk. Mr. Thone?

15 (No response)

16 The Clerk. Mrs. Burke?

17 Mrs. Burke. Aye.

18 The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer?

19 (No response)

20 The Clerk. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman.

21 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

22 The Committee will go into Executive Session at this time
and we will ask all those who are not members of the Committee,
all witnesses to please leave the room at this time.

(Pause)

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Mr. Preyer. We will now proceed in Executive Session.

The Chair will ask the witness if he will be sworn at this time.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Helms. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. You may be seated.

As we do to all witnesses, the Chair will give a brief statement concerning the subject of the investigation.

House Resolution 222 mandates the Committee to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy including determining whether the existing laws of the United States concerning the investigation of the President and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforcement and there is full disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and departments of the United States government, and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency or department would have been in assistance in investigating the assassination, and why such information was not provided by such agency or department; and to make recommendations to the House, if the Select Committee deems it appropriate, for amendment of existing legislation or the

1 enactment of new legislation.

2 Mr. Helms, are you represented by counsel?

3 Mr. Helms. Yes. I have with me, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gregory
4 B. Craig who is my counsel on this occasion.

5 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

6 Mr. Craig. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

7 Mr. Preyer. The Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith at this
8 time to begin the questioning.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

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1 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, for the record will you
3 state your name and address?

4 Mr. Helms. My name is Richard McGarrah Helms, and for
5 the benefit of the Reporter, the middle name is spelled
6 M-c G-a-r-r-a-h.

7 I live at 4649 Garfield Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
8 20007.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you previously served as the Director
10 of the Central Intelligence?

11 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you serve in that
13 capacity?

14 Mr. Helms. I served from 1966 to 1973.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to that time, how many years have
16 you been associated with the CIA?

17 Mr. Helms. Since the doors opened in 1947.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. As a part of your association with the CIA,
19 were you required to execute a secret^{oath}~~seal~~?

20 Mr. Helms. I was.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time I would like, Mr. Ambassador,
22 to present what has been marked as JFK Exhibit No. 94.

23 Mr. Helms. I have it in front of me. I have identified
24 it as a document that I read earlier.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, Mr. Chairman, JFK Exhibit

1 No. 94 is a letter from Acting Director Carlucci to the
2 Chairman of this Committee which was written for the purpose
3 of authorizing present and former agency employees to testify
4 fully and truthfully before this Committee and to respond to
5 questions that are within the scope of the Committee's mandate.

6 At this time, I would like the Ambassador to be given a
7 letter, or a copy of a letter, from Mr. Carlucci to the
8 Ambassador dated July 27, 1978. I would request that this
9 item be introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 125, JFK
10 Exhibit 125.

11 (The document referred
12 to was marked JFK Exhibit
13 No. 125 for identification.)

14 Mr. Helms. I would identify this letter as one I received
15 in the mail.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of this
17 letter and the previous letter that you were shown, JFK No.
18 94?

19 Mr. Helms. I believe I do.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. In addition, Mr. Ambassador, I would like you
21 to examine JFK Exhibit 126, which is a letter dated 8 August
22 1978 to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director of this
23 Committee.

24 Part of that exhibit consists of a letter from Mr. Scott
25 Breckinridge of the CIA and another consists of a letter to

1 Mr. Blakey sent by Mr. Anthony Lampvan, General Counsel of
2 the CIA.

3 I request that ^(this) be introduced into evidence as JFK Exhibit
4 126.

5 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

6 (The document referred to
7 was marked JFK Exhibit No.
8 126 for identification.)

9 Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I read this letter before
10 the meeting started this morning.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of that
12 letter

13 Mr. Helms. I do.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Finally, I have one more letter to intro-
15 duce in the record, a letter from Mr. Blakey to Mr. Breckin-
16 ridge dated 4 August 1978 which was sent to Mr. Breckinridge
17 at the request of Mr. Gregory Craig, counsel for the Ambassador.

18 At this time, I request that that letter be introduced
19 into the record as Exhibit 127.

20 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have seen this letter on another
21 occasion.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, I request that this letter
23 be introduced into the record as JFK No. 127.

24 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

1 (The document referred
2 to was marked JKF Exhibit
3 No. 127 for identification.)

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what was your position in
5 1963 when you were with the CIA?

6 Mr. Helms. In 1963, I had the title Deputy Director for
7 Plans.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what
9 the organization^{al} function of the Deputy Director for Plans was
10 in 1963?

11 Mr. Helms. In 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans was
12 the Deputy Director who was in charge of -- I guess the simplest
13 term is overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received
14 its mandate from two documents, one known as MSC No. 5 and
15 the other CID/2 or M-12.

16 In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to
17 conduct espionage and counter-espionage and covert action out-
18 side the continental limits of the United States.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you describe generally what your
20 responsibilities were as head of that unit?

21 Mr. Helms. I was, in fact, in charge of the unit. In
22 other words, I was under the aegis of the Director of Central
23 Intelligence, to whom I reported. I was in charge of overseas
24 operations.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did the CIA have in the

1 investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

2 Mr. Helms. After this tragedy occurred and the Warren
3 Commission was formed, there was every effort made in the
4 Central Intelligence Agency to be as responsive as possible
5 to request from the FBI who was conducting the investigation
6 or a major portion of it, and the staff and members of the
7 Warren Commission.

8 I would like to take this occasion to say we were all, I
9 think, in this country equally struck with the tragic circum-
10 stances and we all felt, in the Agency, that we should do what
11 we could to be as supportive as we possibly could of these
12 other entities that had the lead in this investigation.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Am I correct in assuming that -- and under-
14 stand, your testimony to be -- that the basic role of the Agency
15 at that time was to lend support to the FBI and to the Warren
16 Commission?

17 Mr. Helms. Yes.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Functioning in that capacity, how was the
19 CIA's investigation organized?

20 Mr. Helms. This is a long time ago that these events took
21 place. I guess it is all of 15 years.

22 I do not recall that, at the outset, that there was any
23 formal organizational change made to accommodate this investi-
24 gation. My recollection is that we figured that most of our
25 contribution would focus on what had occurred in Mexico City --

1 in other words, Oswald's activity prior to the assassination
2 in Mexico City.

3 It is my recollection that the individual who was sort of
4 designated to help out from the Headquarters standpoint was
5 the man who had the desk there in Mexico City. My recollection,
6 his name was Whitten.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Jack Whitten?

8 Mr. Helms. I think so. That is my recollection.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with regard
10 to the investigation that was undertaken by the Agency?

11 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that I felt my responsibility
12 to be as responsive to whatever requests came from the FBI or
13 the Warren Commission as we could. I, therefore, tried to see
14 to it that these requests were fulfilled and that we made the
15 requisite inquiry or whatever else would be required under the
16 circumstances.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Who, if anyone, was primarily responsible
18 for coordinating the flow of information within the CIA to you
19 and then from you to the Warren Commission?

20 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall, at this late
21 date, anyway, any particular flow of information. An inquiry
22 would come over. We would attempt to satisfy it and we would
23 attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual
24 bits and pieces or as individual items, and my recollection
25 would be that it would be hard to describe this flow of

1 material. Each individual item that came along we took care
2 of as best as we could.

3 As the weeks turned into months, we found that we were
4 looking into matters overseas in Europe and various places,
5 trying to run down individuals, identify bits and pieces
6 that the Warren Commission was trying to clarify, and as a
7 result of this, it was necessary to deal through all the area
8 divisions of the so-called Operations Director, or Plans
9 Director, at that time.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff or unit, if any, within the
11 CIA was given primary responsibility for coordinating the
12 investigation?

13 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that after the Warren
14 Commission was established and it got its work underway that
15 this was put into the counter-intelligence staff.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what
17 the organizational function or purpose of the counter-intelli-
18 gence staff was?

19 Mr. Helms. Under the National Security Council intelli-
20 gence directive, NSCID No. 5, there was a provision, a special
21 provision in that document which dealt with counter-intelligence.
22 I say a special provision, because in the area of positive
23 intelligence the Agency's charter was to collect raw informa-
24 tion and then pass it to the various other interested agencies
25 of government.

1 Whereas, in the counter-intelligence field, it had a
2 mandate to maintain counter-intelligence files and also to do
3 counter-intelligence evaluations.

4 To be more specific about this, if there was an allegation
5 from the FBI that a spy at the United Nations had been trans-
6 ferred to some unit in Paris and it was the Agency's job, then,
7 to try to see what that agent was up to. It was also the
8 Agency's job to make an evaluation of whether he, indeed,
9 was working for the Russians or the French or whatever the
10 case might be.

11 Therefore, the counter-intelligence staff did have an
12 evaluation function which the foreign intelligence staff, or
13 the positive intelligence staff, did not.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Is that why the CI staff was given primary
15 responsibility for coordinating the investigation?

16 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall any longer what
17 considerations went into giving this job to the counter-
18 intelligence staff. I think it is logical to agree with what
19 you say, but I do not recall any longer as it having been
20 or what the controlling reasons were.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Jack Whitten
22 who originally was given responsibility to coordinating aspects
23 of the investigation. Do you recall how long he retained this
24 responsibility?

25 Mr. Helms. It is not only my recollection but in an effort

1 to clear my mind in preparation for this hearing, I did some
2 checking with some former colleagues, and my recollection is
3 that he sort of had the labor for only a couple of months;
4 after that, the job was turned over to the Counter-Intelligence
5 Staff.

6 Do you recall why the transition was made from Whitten to
7 the CI staff?

8 Mr. Helms. I think, if recollection serves, that we could
9 see that this investigation was broadening far beyond Mexico
10 City and it did not make much sense to have it in the hands
11 of a man who was running the Mexico City desk.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Whitten was originally given the
13 responsibility for coordinating the investigation, was he ever
14 told by you that he would have exclusive control of the
15 investigation?

16 Mr. Helms. I have no such recollection. I would see no
17 reason to give him -- in fact, I could not see why it would
18 have occurred to me to want to say that to him.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. Whitten ever
20 discussed with you problems that he was having with Mr. Angle-
21 ton's in some way interfering with the investigation?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I do not recall this. He might have. Today,
23 I do not recall this.

24 If you could identify what the troubles were, it might
25 refresh my memory.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten has testified before the
2 Committee in a deposition, and at that time he indicated that
3 he was initially given responsibility for the investigation and
4 was told more or less that he would be given free rein as to
5 coordinating the information, and, I guess, sending it to the
6 Warren Commission.

7 He indicated to us that Mr. Angleton was in some way inter-
8 fering with his function as coordinator of the investigation
9 and that at some time the investigation was turned over from
10 Whitten to Angleton. Does that refresh your memory at all?

11 Mr. Helms. It does not, and may I say, I do not mean
12 to add to the questions I have not been asked, but I cannot
13 imagine giving anybody the kinds of assurances which Mr. Whit-
14 ten claims that he was given. We did not operate that way.
15 Nobody had those assurances for anything, including me.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Your position would be that the primary
17 reason, as you recall it, for the investigation's being taken
18 from Whitten, in a sense, and given to the CI staff was because
19 the investigation began to undertake broader tones than was
20 initially anticipated?

21 Mr. Helms. Yes. That is not only my recollection, but
22 also it would seem to be in the year 1978, to have been a
23 rather sensible thing to have done under the circumstances.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten also testified before the
25 Committee that Mr. Angleton was talking to the FBI without

1 receiving authorization from anyone. Do you recall whether
2 or not that was a problem at any time?

3 Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Angleton was responsible for the
4 liaison of the Plans Director for the FBI and consequently he
5 talked to the FBI liaison man and other FBI people every day
6 of the week and probably several times a day.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. He was never, after the assassination,
8 instructed not to talk to the FBI while Mr. Whitten was coordi-
9 nating the investigation?

10 Mr. Helms. Certainly not. We were doing our best to be
11 as supportive and helpful as we could to the FBI.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you serve as a point of contact between
13 the Commission and the Agency, or was that responsibility given
14 to someone else?

15 Mr. Helms. I do not know that anyone in the Agency was
16 ever designated as point of contact. I had dealings with the
17 Commission because I had the part of the Agency that was doing
18 most of the work for the Commission. This was a situation
19 indicated by the display of forces and activity rather than by
20 anything else. I do not recall having been designated as a
21 particular point of contact. I do not recall anyone else's
22 having been designated as a point of contact.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what responsibilities, if
24 any, were given to Mr. Raymond Rocca?

25 Mr. Helms. I think in the counter-intelligence staff when

1 they took over this responsibility, if you want to call it
2 that, I believe he was the man in the counter-intelligence
3 staff that was responsible for pulling things together there.

4 In other words, these Warren Commission queries would go
5 to his desk, and the replies would come back from his desk.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone have
7 in the investigation?

8 Mr. Helms. As the Director of the Agency, he had a very
9 important role. Everything we did was on his say-so and there
10 was a constant traffic between him and me about what we were
11 doing with the Warren Commission, how we were handling these
12 various matters. I believe Mr. McCone testified at the
13 Warren Commission at one time. We would have had to brief
14 him in preparation for his testimony and prepare the papers
15 and so forth. He had a very real role.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. He was actually apprised of the develop-
17 ments and what was being given to the Warren Commission?

18 Mr. Helms. Literally not on a day to day basis, but he
19 was kept informed in general terms and specific terms if
20 necessary.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how many times a week you
22 would meet with Mr. McCone and discuss with ^{him} them the develop-
23 ments with regard to the investigation of the assassination?

24 Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I do not. In the Agency procedure,
25 there was a morning meeting with the Director every day, five

1 days a week, and I was at those meetings. What transpired at
2 those meetings plus what transpired in his office in private
3 meetings, I could not conceivably give you any idea.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you would say that Mr. McCone
5 was actively apprised and was not on the periphery of the
6 developments?

7 Mr. Helm. Certainly not. He was actively apprised. He
8 was very much interested, and we were all very much interested.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to the division of
10 responsibility in essence between the FBI and the CIA with
11 regard to the investigation. Would you go into somewhat more
12 detail as to the relationship between the CIA and FBI at that
13 time?

14 Mr. Helms. This crime was committed on United States soil.
15 Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the
16 primary investigating agency would have been the Federal
17 Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of
18 the CIA would have been entirely supportive and it would have
19 been supportive in the sense of what material we are able
20 to acquire outside the continental limits of the United States
21 with reference to the investigation.

22 This was the division of labor between the FBI and the CIA.
23 The CIA's mandate started at the ocean front. Or, to put it
24 another way, the FBI's mandate started as soon as you crossed
25 into the continental limits of the United States. For

1 investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role
2 inside the United States at all. So when I used here the
3 word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the
4 term. We are trying to support the FBI and support the
5 Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we
6 were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my
7 recollection, were we ever asked to.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, was that division of
9 responsibility satisfactory?

10 Mr. Helms. It was law. It was not a question of whether
11 it was satisfactory or not; it was law.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. One of the purposes
13 of this investigation is to examine the state of the law at
14 that time and the manner in which the Agency has gone about
15 investigating the death of the President. So, at this time,
16 I am asking you whether in your opinion that statement of
17 facts was satisfactory towards conducting the investigation
18 that was involved?

19 Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith, whether on such
20 short notice I would want to make such a serious judgment as
21 that. It does seem to me in any investigation that one
22 organization has to have the primary role, otherwise you have
23 a great deal of confusion. I think it was proper that the
24 FBI should have the primary role in this case. I do not
25 recall ever having felt disadvantaged in any way in the CIA

1 by the position we had of supporting these efforts, and that
2 is the best answer I can give you on such short notice.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there were any
4 problems between the Agency and the Bureau in conducting the
5 investigation?

6 Mr. Helms. The only matter that comes readily to mind was
7 the difference in the evaluation of the material of the
8 Soviet defector named Nosenko gave. My recollection is that
9 what this man had to say when he arrived in the United States
10 around the time of the assassination was passed by the FBI
11 to the Warren Commission exactly as he said it.

12 The CIA was responsible for handling defectors after they
13 came to the United States and did not feel that the bona fides
14 or the good faith and credibility of this defector had been
15 established at this stage of the game, and the Central
16 Intelligence Agency felt it necessary to make that known to
17 the Warren Commission.

18 There, indeed, there was a difference between the two
19 agencies.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Aside from that substantive disagreement
21 in the day-to-day relationship of the Bureau, can you recall
22 whether there were problems in terms of coordinating the
23 investigation?

24 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any other problems.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was information freely passed between the

1 CIA and the FBI? By that, I mean the way the scenario is
2 right now, the CIA is acting in a support function to the FBI.
3 Was the FBI giving information to the CIA?

4 Mr. Helms. My best recollection is that there were not
5 difficulties between the two agencies over this. As I said
6 at the outset, we were doing our best to be supportive. We
7 were passing along, I believe, everything that was relative.

8 I do recall when we got into certain sensitive areas a
9 couple of times during the investigation, if we felt we could
10 not pass a piece of paper to the Warren Commission, for
11 example, we would go down and talk to the staff man to try
12 to apprise them orally of what our predicament was.

13 In other words, I assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that the whole
14 thrust of the Agency was to be as helpful as we possibly could
15 and to go over the edge, if necessary.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. In this case, my question
17 was whether the FBI was also sending information to the Agency?
18 In other words, was the FBI sharing information for your pur-
19 poses?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any complaints on those grounds.
21 Maybe they were and maybe they were not. It is a little bit
22 difficult, sometimes, to know whether you are getting something
23 the existence of which you have never heard.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency's investigation reflect any
25 working hypotheses? By that, did the Agency give any particular

1 emphasis to ^{any} the particular areas, geographic areas?

2 Mr. Helms. I think that the entire United States govern-
3 ment, not only the CIA, was very concerned as to whether there
4 would be evidence of some foreign conspiracy to assassinate
5 President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets
6 were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubans
7 were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may
8 have been involved in it.

9 I think we were all preoccupied with this. There is hardly
10 any question there was more discussed during those days as to
11 who was behind Lee Harvey Oswald, if indeed he was the man who
12 was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done
13 the things he had done, and so forth.

14 So there was a great deal of conjecturing going on. If
15 think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, I would like
16 to make a comment about the various investigations into the
17 assassination of President Kennedy based on the long years I
18 have spent in the intelligence business, and that is, until the
19 day that the KGB in Moscow or the Cuban intelligence in Havana
20 is prepared to turn over their files to the U.S. as to what
21 their relationships to these various people were, it is going
22 to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally,
23 and conclusively.

24 A great deal of investigation can be done, and has been
25 done. It has been done conscientiously. I think people have

1 tried over the years their very best to resolve a host of
2 differences. I recognize also that allegations have been made
3 that certain areas have not been as aggressively investigated
4 as they might have been. That all may be true.

5 But it really does not make any difference what is done in
6 this connection until you can get those governments to lay
7 before you their records of how they dealt with Lee Harvey
8 Oswald, or anybody else who is relevant in this case.

9 And, based on past experience, I doubt very much whether
10 you are going to get the compliance of the Soviets or the
11 Cuban government.

12 But I want to make this comment, because it is extremely
13 important and very relevant, that these cases are untidy. It
14 is only in books that they end up with all the little things
15 worked out at the end and tied off neatly.

16 This aura of suspicion and all the rest of it hangs in the
17 air. Undoubtedly that is why this Committee was formed, so
18 undoubtedly this could be put to rest. I promise you, there
19 is this one last step and until it can be taken, this is never
20 going to be laid to rest.

21 Mr. Devine. Do you agree, Mr. Helms, that the likelihood
22 of that happening is remote?

23 Mr. Helms. Remote. Yes, sir, I agree with that.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I believe my question was --

25 Mr. Helms. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith. I did not mean to

1 digress. I thought that I would like to get this off my chest.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

3 My question was, what areas received primary emphasis. I
4 think your answer, in part, was the area of foreign conspiracy.

5 Are you able to give any more detail on what aspects of
6 the foreign conspiracy question were investigated?

7 Mr. Helms. I think we were very concerned about the Soviet
8 aspects of this, primarily. Why? Because Lee Harvey Oswald
9 had spent time in the Soviet Union, time which never had been
10 satisfactorily explained as far as we knew.

11 Nosenko arrives as a defector. There were a lot of very
12 suspicious circumstances surrounding the whole way and timing
13 of his defection. So that there were several areas there
14 that seemed to require not only investigation but thought and
15 analysis and everything else that could be given to it.

16 I would like to say here that when a tragedy of the magni-
17 tude of President Kennedy's assassination occurs in this
18 country, it is at this point that in our international relations
19 we have to suddenly become very careful, because accusing a
20 foreign government of having been responsible for this act
21 is tearing the veil about as nastily as one can, and this can
22 lead to a whole series of counter-actions which might be very
23 unpleasant.

24 I think all of us were keenly aware of this. It was not
25 only true of the Soviet Union, but also true of Cuba, that

