EXECUTIVE SESSION

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1978

U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy of the Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 3370, House Annex No. 2, 2nd and D Streets, N.W.

Present: Michael Goldsmith and Dan Hardway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Miss Reporter, will you please swear in the witness?

The Reporter. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Scelso. I do.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN SCELSO

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please state your name for the record?

Mr. Scelso. John Scelso.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you spell Scelso?

Mr. Scelso. S-c-e-l-s-o.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your present occupation, Mr. Scelso?

Mr. Scelso. I am retired.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where do you live?

Mr. Scelso. Abroad.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso, are you here testifying before the Committee voluntarily and without subpoena?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you been given a copy of the Committee rules and the Committee resolutions?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had an opportunity to read Rule Number 4?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that rule?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that you have a right to have counsel present here today?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you waive that right?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I am an attorney myself.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the Committee's rules that you have a right to receive a copy of the transcript of the deposition statement that you are about to give today?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you willing to waive that right?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I waive that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I gave you, a few minutes ago, a copy of a letter written by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Carlucci, to this Committee. It is in the Committee's record as Exhibit 94, JFK Exhibit 94.

Have you had a chance to read that letter?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it?

Mr. Scelso. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of the record, I would like to explain to you that the Committee's mandate is to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy in terms of who killed the President. Was there a conspiracy? What was the performance of the investigative agencies, including the FBI and the CIA? Also to evaluate the work of the Warren Commission. Do you understand that?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso, is it true that you were
formerly employed by the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. For how many years were you so employed?

Mr. Scelso. Twenty-three years.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what capacity?

Mr. Scelso. I was an intelligence officer in the clandestine operations side of the organization.

Mr. Goldsmith. For all twenty-three years?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, all twenty-three years.

Mr. Goldsmith. What position did you have with the Agency at the time you retired?

Mr. Scelso. At the time I retired, I was on the foreign intelligence staff in charge of the operations branch responsible for reviewing almost all of the foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence operations of the Agency and of formulating doctrine with the conduct of such operations.

I was also a member of a panel which reviewed the total programs of the Agency abroad and evaluated them.

Of course, at the time of the Kennedy assassination, I had quite another job.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question. What was your position?

Mr. Scelso. At the time of the Kennedy assassination, I was the chief of a branch responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America, down to and including Panama.
Mr. Goldsmith. Which branch was that?

Mr. Scelso. I think it was called WH-3, Western Hemisphere 3. The designations change from time to time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you discussed with anyone from the Agency the testimony you are going to be giving here today?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I was acquainted, very briefly, with the general thrust of the Committee's investigation, which is as you have summarized it to me today.

I was made aware of the Nosenko case, and I borrowed Mr. Epstein's book and read it over the week-end. That is all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any involvement in the Nosenko case?

Mr. Scelso. No. I knew of the Nosenko case in a very sketchy way. I knew that Nosenko had defected and that he had said that Oswald was not a Soviet agent.

I later heard that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level. That is all. That information was imparted to me by officers I do not recall in no more than three sentences on the first occasion and two sentences on the second occasion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any particular reason, then, that you read the Nosenko book this week-end?

Mr. Scelso. Just that I am very much interested in the Kennedy assassination investigation and it seemed to present a
lot of new angles.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you think that you might be asked
questions about the Nosenko case?

Mr. Scelso. I suspected that I might.

Incidentally, the book did raise several points in my
mind which I would like to discuss with you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we do that, other than the general
briefing that the Agency gave you on the work of our Committee,
did anyone in the Agency suggest to you that you should not
not cooperate with us?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did anyone inform you about the substance
of other interviews or statements made under oath by Agency
employees to staff of this Committee?

Mr. Scelso. No, except that I was told in a discussion
of the Nosenko case that certain people in the Agency had
 testified along one side or the other of the Nosenko case.

Mr. Goldsmith. You were not informed about the substance
of any statements made by any CIA person to this Committee?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we proceed, you indicated that
you would like to give us some background information or com-
ments on the Nosenko case from the book you have read. Why
do you not take this opportunity to do that now?

Mr. Scelso. Well, several points struck me. As you know,
I was in charge of the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy for the clandestine services of CIA, of which Mr. Helms was then the Chief for the first one or two months, and I learned a lot about the case at that time, read hundreds of papers and a summary report, before I was relieved of this responsibility.

In reading the book, the Epstein book, I noted a couple of things. One is that the Embassy officer in Moscow who talked to Oswald when he arrived there and wanted to renounce his citizenship, a man named Schneider, was stated to be an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency.

If this is true, I did not know it at the time of my investigation and must conclude that the information was withheld from me, because I discussed the Oswald case with members of the Soviet Branch at that time, in the presence of an officer who had been in Moscow at the time of the Oswald defection.

In this conversation where I was reading the State Department reports written by the officer who had seen Oswald, I was not told that this man was a CIA agent, CIA officer, or whatever he was.

I do not know that he was. I only know that the book said that he was.

Secondly, the book states that Oswald had been in touch in Dallas or Houston or someplace with the CIA Office of
Operations Officer, Contacts Branch, named Moore — M-o-o-r-e.

Mr. Goldsmith. J. Walter Moore?

Mr. Scelso. Something like that.

J. Walton Moore was in touch with deMohrenschielt. It asserts that deMohrenschielt claimed Moore had asked him to stay in touch with Oswald.

As I recall, I did not know that Moore had, any officer of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Texas area, had been in touch with Lee Harvey Oswald at any time.

Mr. Goldsmith. My recollection differs somewhat. My recollection of the book was that it said that Moore had been in touch with deMohrenschielt. I do not think it went into any detail that Moore had been in touch with Oswald.

Mr. Scelso. I read the book very hurriedly, and I thought they were the same party, however, I cannot swear to that. I just wanted to say that I did not know that there had ever been any involvement between the domestic branch of the Central Intelligence Agency that was then called the Office of Operations and their offices around the states, who interviewed American servicemen going abroad or returning from abroad, was called the Contacts Branch. I did not know that anyone in that branch had ever been in contact with the Oswald case, whether with him personally or by requesting people to elicit information from him, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that surprise you?
Mr. Scelso. Yes, because that should have shown up in
the traces and it was, of course, a vital factor in the inves-
tigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. When I say does that surprise you, does
the fact that no officer from the domestic contacts division,
or domestic contacts service, ever contacted Oswald? Does the
fact of the absence of such a contact surprise you?

Mr. Scelso. No, it would not have surprised me, because
Oswald was a security suspect and was a proper subject for
handling by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, not with the Central Intelligence
Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying, then, that it would not
be standard operating procedure for the Agency to attempt to
debrief a returning defector?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know, really, because the operations
of the Soviet Branch was something that was very, very exclu-
sively held which I, in my later positions, when I had to
review all of the operations in the world and so on, very
rarely found out anything about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would like to state
that Dan Hardway has just walked into the room.

Dan, this is Mr. Scelso.

Mr. Scelso. I know that positively I did not know that
Schneider was a CIA man, if he were; and as far as I recall --
and I have never read any of the files since I was relieved
back in early 1964 of the responsibility for the investigation --
I do not recall anything about Moore or any CIA direct or
indirect contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Oswald was in Russia, he worked at
a radio factory for quite some time. Would that fact have
made the Agency more interested in interviewing him upon his
return?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, it should have, normally -- and I am
just conjecturing now; I do not actually know what the policy
of the Office of Operations was about interviewing security
suspects in the United States, an obvious suspect like an ex-
defector.

Mr. Goldsmith. Should there be a statement in Oswald's
file that the reason he is not being interviewed or debriefed
is that he would fall into the proper jurisdiction of Office
of Naval Intelligence or the FBI?

Mr. Scelso. On the basic of logic you would think so,
but I do not know anything at all about standard operating
procedures of the Office of Operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Office of Operations --

Mr. Scelso. -- was a branch of the Central Intelligence
Agency which maintained offices around the United States and
briefed and debriefed Americans going abroad and returning
from abroad.
Mr. Goldsmith. That was now called the Domestic Contacts Service?

Mr. Scelso. Something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that you were present at a conversation where there was a CIA officer present who was in Moscow when Oswald was there?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was that officer?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. Hugh Montgomery.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did this conversation take place?

Mr. Scelso. I presume it was sometime within two months after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Montgomery ever had any contact with Oswald in Moscow?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know that, no. When I talked to him, he wondered whether he might not have been present at one of the interviews.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which interview are you referring to?

Mr. Scelso. The interview of the State Department officer who wrote these reports we were going over with Lee Harvey Oswald, and then he reflected on this a minute and said no, he was not, because there were other defectors at the time, you know, before or afterwards.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Montgomery make any other comments about the Oswald case?
Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that you had no knowledge whether or not Mr. Schneider was a CIA officer; if he was would his file reflect that?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that his file would not indicate his active employment with the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. His files in the State Department?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's talk first about his files with the CIA.

Mr. Scelso. I do not know whether we would have a file at the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me run this hypothetical with you. Assume that a man works for the Central Intelligence Agency, 1949 for a year, and he leaves and joins the Foreign Service, becomes a Foreign Service Officer. Eventually he gets assigned to work in the Soviet Union as a consular officer.

His CIA file, let's assume that during this time that the man is working State Department cover but he is also CIA. Would the CIA file necessarily reflect the fact that he is still working for the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. Oh, sure. There would be a file in the Office of Personnel that would show his entire CIA record and the fact that he was put under State Department cover.
That file would probably be very closely held, even more closely held than ordinary files.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that indication that he is under State Department cover, but still with the Agency, would that be in the subject's main personnel file, or is it possible that it would be in some other file?

Mr. Scelso. I really cannot answer that authoritatively, because I never saw the file of any officer who was stationed in Moscow. The assignment of CIA officers to Moscow was something that was very elaborately prepared, planned in advance, and very closely held.

For example, I was once stationed in an Embassy abroad where there was an officer, CIA officer, who was just in to go to Moscow as his next assignment. I did not know that this man was a CIA officer at all, even though I was, for a considerable period, Acting Chief of the station.

I did not know that this man, whom I saw occasionally and who often I had occasion to deal with, he was a State Department Security Officer. I did not know he was a CIA man, until he got thrown out of Moscow later on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this Mr. Angelli?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I think that was his name.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible for the Agency to work with an officer overseas without there being any notation in the officer's personnel file at CIA Headquarters -- in other words,
a personnel file would indicate, for example, that the 
employee retired back, say, in 1955. No connection whatsoever 
with the Agency after 1955, and for only a handful of people 
to know that actually the person is still CIA?

Mr. Scelso. Certainly it is possible. As I say, I do 
not really know the mechanics and the administrative proce-
dures that accompanies such an assignment.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any aspect of the Oswald case 
that struck you as unusual when you first had an opportunity 
to first read through the file?

Mr. Scelso. Do you mean after the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Did you read the file any time before 
the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then after the assassination.

Mr. Scelso. We only had a scan file on Oswald until he 
was involved in the assassination, merely the fact that he 
had been in the Marine Corps and had deserted, and we learned 
about this in reports from the Navy and State Department, and 
we had made a record, I think, a think file of the communica-
tions on him from other government agencies.

And of course it was the information that had come up 
from Mexico City a few weeks before the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand the file was limited in 
nature, but even in light of what little material that was in
it, was there anything in there that you found unusual?

Mr. Scelso. Not to me, because, for many years, I had been dealing with cases like this and people like this and, to me, it was just a typical defection case.

You see, one of the other things I was in the Agency, early on, I was the first polygraph operator in the Agency and had polygraphed some hundreds of security suspects. I also had been a prisoner of war interrogator in World War II and interrogated some tens of thousands of Germans; and I also had been the counterespionage officer for the European Division back in the '50's and dealt with dozens of defection cases and things like that.

So Oswald just seemed to me to be a small potatoes defector.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the Agency's standard operating procedure with dealing with a defector that returns into the country?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know. By the time that defectors started coming back, I was no longer in a position to know that kind of thing. People like that were handled, of course, primarily by the FBI or, if there were military defectors, also by their branch of service. And I was overseas for many years, from '52 to '62 -- wait a minute; '55 to '62 -- and no case like that had ever come to my attention.

I was not in a position where things came across my desk.
Mr. Goldsmith. Oswald defected to the Soviet Union in October, 1959, and early November of '59, the CIA received a cable or a copy of a cable from either the Office of Naval Intelligence or from the Department of State, I do not recall exactly which.

The substance of the cable reported Oswald's visits to the American Embassy in Moscow and indicated that Oswald said that he was going to defect and also that Oswald was going to offer military-related information to the Soviets.

As I said, that cable came in at the beginning of November, 1959. Under normal operating procedure, should that cable have triggered the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Scelso. Again, I really cannot authoritatively speak about procedures. I would imagine so.

Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, would it be unusual for Oswald's 201 file to have been opened over a year after the arrival of that cable? In other words, the file actually was not opened until December, 1960, over a year after the defection.

Would you regard that as unusual?

Mr. Scelso. I cannot tell. I never concerned myself with procedures like that. When I came back from overseas, I was put into running a great big branch with revolutions going day and night, and I had a large staff of extremely capable people who concerned themselves with things like that.
Mr. Goldsmith. We will get back to your work on this case after the assassination in a while. What I would like to do now is go over a series of cables and transcripts pertaining to the period before the assassination.

For the record, I would like to say that all of my questions pertain to the time period of late 1963.

In 1963, you were Chief of the Division known as WH-3?

Mr. Scelso. Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Branch known as WH-3?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what connection, if any, did you have with the Mexico City Station at that time?

Mr. Scelso. The Mexico City Station was directly under my branch. I had a branch and a series of desks under that. One of them was the Mexico desk.

I was, first in 1962, I was Chief of the Mexico desk itself and then, a year later, I became Chief of the Branch which included Mexico and several other countries.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the Chief of Station, Mexico City, for example, be a subordinate of yours?

Mr. Scelso. In a sense, yes, although he reported directly to the Division Chief and to the Director, and so on. Every one of the Station Chiefs abroad has three or four different roles.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the manner in which he reported
consistent with the manner in which other station chiefs reported to headquarters?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. As a matter of fact, Mexico was an absolutely outstandingly managed station and its reporting and conformance to procedures, and so on, was exemplary.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the Chief of Station, Mexico City?

Mr. Scelso. Winston Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. I guess you have sort of done it, but would -- indirectly -- but could you give us your impression of Winn Scott's competence as a Station Chief?

Mr. Scelso. Winn Scott was, at that time -- probably, in view of my later experience surveying all of the stations in the world, as good a Station Chief as we had, and you could fairly say that he had the best station in the world.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would you say that he had the best in the world?

Mr. Scelso. Because of the breadth and depth of their operations, both in the counter-intelligence field and the political action field, and in the espionage field.

Mr. Goldsmith. What kind of personal relationship, if any, did you have with Mr. Scott?

Mr. Scelso. A fine relationship. He was a great deal older than I was -- not a great deal, but enough, and I had...
the greatest respect for him, and he also treated me with the greatest respect.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you and Mr. Scott ever disagree?

Mr. Scelso. During the course of the investigation, when letters and cables were flying thick and fast, there were a few professional points on which we disagreed, but they were never personal in matters. They were merely differences of judgment and opinion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Herb Minnell?

Mr. Scelso. The name is familiar to me, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe Mr. Minnell was case officer in Mexico City, at that time, who was in charge of Soviet Operations.

Mr. Scelso. That's right, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know him?

Mr. Scelso. I do know him, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you give us your opinion of his competence?

Mr. Scelso. I am looking back here now fifteen years and since I have retired in 1970, I have had next to no contact with anybody in the Agency, especially abroad. I remember Mr. Minnell was picked for this job as a very capable and experienced Soviet Operations officer.

However -- in fact, he was personally approved by me, I believe -- but the standard by which you judged Soviet
operations officers was an extremely controversial matter.

It was like asking Jerry Ford what he thinks of President Carter, all prejudices aside, what do you think of President Carter? It is a very difficult question to answer.

He was certainly not an incompetent, but he was very well thought of and he was the best man for the job.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any opinion as to his honesty and trustworthiness?

Mr. Scelso. I had never had any reason at all to doubt anything about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Mr. Robert Shaw?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. Robert Shaw was in the Mexico station. I recall him. He had been chief of a base up north, I believe.

And Shaw was a man whose honesty and loyalty I never could question, although he and I disagreed on a number of professional things. I do not recall Mr. Shaw as a particularly solid individual.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did any of your disagreements with Mr. Shaw pertain to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. To the handling of the investigation by the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelso. No. I do not think I ever discussed that with him, or with the other gentleman that you mentioned.
Mr. Goldsmith. How about Mr. David Phillips?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. David Phillips, who has since become related to me by marrying a relative of mine, was regarded by me, long before this marriage, as one of the absolutely outstanding officers of the Agency after I visited Mexico City and reviewed his operations soon after I took over the Mexico desk. I regard this man as one of the most brilliant, capable officers that I have ever known, and nothing has happened since then that has changed my judgment.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about your impression of his honesty, integrity?

Mr. Scelso. Well, having known him through thick and thin in the Mexico station and when he was later head of Cuban operations, I would give him the highest marks. I have never known any man of greater integrity, and few equal, based on my experience.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you known Mr. Phillips in his capacity as a propaganda officer ever sent out disinformation or misinformation concerning the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Scelso. No, but I can conceive that it might have happened in the Mexico station. Perhaps they did, in their propaganda efforts which were going full-blast all the time, put in newspaper articles and so on to discredit somebody, some foreign power, in connection with the operation. I do not believe that it was ever a policy to do so, but they were
pretty much independent in formulating their propaganda.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know a woman named Ann Goodpasture?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, but not intimately, not well. I knew
her when I visited the Mexico station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what her responsibilities were
in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelso. She was sort of the personal assistant to
Winn Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any opinion as to her?

Mr. Scelso. She was very capable, extremely hardworking.
A very loyal person. As far as I know, she has the highest
reputation -- recognizing the fact, of course, that there
were people in the Mexico station who did not like the Station
Chief and did not like any part of his hierarchy, because
Winn Scott was a very hard taskmaster.

The one point on which I used to disagree with Winn
Scott was his overworking his personnel and low-rating them
on their fitness reports.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Scott maintained
an accurate and thorough system of files in the Mexico City
station?

Mr. Scelso. His file system was legendary. It was a
thing of his own creation and did not really conform to the
system which the Agency had devised. It was really much more
intensive and his officers had to spend an awful lot of time
keeping it up.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have heard it said by several that Mr. Scott never even threw out any piece of paper. Everything was filed in the Mexico City Station.

Do you think that is an accurate statement?

Mr. Scelso. I think that would be a figure of speech. I think people would say, meaning that he never discarded any information that came in, that he attempted to have everything incorporated in the files, but it is inevitable in the intelligence business that you really cannot do this 100 percent.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would have happened to Mr. Scott's files after his death, to the Mexico City station's files after Mr. Scott's death? For example, would the files have been brought back?

Mr. Scelso. His personal files?

Mr. Goldsmith. Not his personal files. The files of the Mexico City station. He had this enormous record-keeping system and I would imagine -- I have no direct knowledge of this because I think -- I retired before he did. I am not sure of that, and I have no knowledge of that. Ordinarily, his retirement or death would have had no effect on it.

However, files overseas may be purged from time to time because of lack of space. Often they are sorted out, and a lot of them sent home. That could have been. I have no
no knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Mr. Winn Scott's personal files? What would have happened to them?

Mr. Scelso. I have no direct knowledge of that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any indirect knowledge?

Mr. Scelso. No, I never heard a word about it. I only know -- I heard that Mr. Scott retired and that he went into business of some kind in Mexico and he died of a heart attack.

Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963 when you were working in Headquarters, I take it that you frequently received communications from the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what form did those communications take?

Mr. Scelso. Cables and dispatches.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever in contact with the Mexico City station by telephone?

Mr. Scelso. Rarely, extremely rarely. The division was very frequently in touch with him by telephone. The division chief and the deputy chief, over my violent objections.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the Division Chief?

Mr. Scelso. Colonel J. C. King.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Deputy Chief?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. Rayford Herbert.
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Herbert is Deputy Chief of what?

Mr. Scelso. Western Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Goldsmith. On what occasion did they contact Mr. Scott by telephone?

Mr. Scelso. In times of crisis where particularly important operations were going on, where defectors were coming out or where there was some kind of a crisis with the Mexican government. It used to make my hair stand on end.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was that?

Mr. Scelso. Because it was grossly insecure.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicate you received communications in the form of a cable or dispatch.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under what circumstances would the Mexico City Station send a cable instead of a dispatch? In other words, more specifically, what would be the criteria for sending a cable? What would be the criteria for sending a dispatch?

Mr. Scelso. Cables were sent if the information was of such a nature that it had to be acted on within a day or a day and a half or two days. Dispatches took so long that you really could not take any kind of operational action predicated on dispatch. You could take administrative action.
Thought pieces were sent out in dispatches. Progress reports describing the course of an operation over a month's period.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that a cable normally suggested that something was of the highest priority?

Mr. Scelso. Cables were usually reporting operational events that required headquarters decisions. Of course, there were also cables that transmitted intelligence information for dissemination to the community.

Mr. Goldsmith. Cables can be broken down into two categories.

Mr. Scelso. Operational cables and reports cables.

Mr. Goldsmith. The reports cables would be the intelligence information cables?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any exceptions to the principal that you just outlined in terms of when cables would be used?

Mr. Scelso. It was a very flexible matter. In the case of Soviet operations, cables were used much more than in other operations. Everything Soviet was of high priority. Cuban operations, a lot of cables were sent.

Mr. Goldsmith. Once a cable was received in headquarters, whose responsibility would it be to respond to the cable?

Mr. Scelso. A cable would come into the communications
center and they would, according to the code words which were
at the top, would assign the action to a certain desk branch
or division and that component's name would be at the top in
a certain position that indicated to everyone that that was
the action addressee and the others were information addressees.

This was based on the code names which the sender of the
telegram affixed to the top.

Mr. Goldsmith. In part, the standard would determine
would would receive and respond to a cable?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the person receiving the cable
in Headquarters make an independent decision, perhaps, that
the cable should go to someone higher up in the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. Yes, he could, or he could try to
get the action assigned to some different component if he
felt he should not have action.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under what circumstances would the cable
go to someone of a higher authority?

Mr. Scelso. Most cables did go on a reading board for
higher authority anyway. That is, on the reading boards of
the staff chiefs, the Counterintelligence Staff and Foreign
Intelligence Staff, and also the Director of the Office of
Operations and his Deputy, almost all cables went to them
as an informational matter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under what circumstances would the DDO or
his Deputy respond to the cables?

Mr. Scelso. Intervene or exercise direction, and so on?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelso. If it were a matter of great importance, they might immediately call the Division or Branch and say get over here, I want to talk to you about this. Frequently that happened. Or, if it were a matter of great importance, an important difference of opinion with the station, the Division or Branch would make sure that the DDO or his Deputy -- I am using the present terminology; it was not in effect then -- would sign off on the cable, to make sure that he approved the action.

That very often happened with Mexico, because we were dealing with all kinds of important matters involving American defectors, American security suspects, risky operations and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference before to a reading board. What is a reading board?

Mr. Scelso. The reading board of the DDO and his assistant, we get a stack of cables every morning about this high [Indicating] from all over the world, which he would simply get, his assistants read those. He had a couple of administrative assistants who were really medium grade intelligence officers with broad experience who would screen these
things for him and bring things up for him.

Then he was bombarded with telephone calls from the divisions all the time about this or that cable. I had the same thing when I was the Chief of Foreign Intelligence Operations. I used to read a stack of cables that high [Indicating] every morning. That is why I can read these things so fast.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is what you referred to as a reading board?

Mr. Scelso. Reading board, yes.

Now, the strange thing is that dispatches were not similarly distributed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Scelso. Because it would have been impossible to read them. It was completely up to the desk officers who received dispatches whether they would write it on to senior people, or the matters in them taken up by any senior people. That is, the Branch Chief was responsible for seeing that important dispatches -- sometimes things came in with elaborate discussions of policy recommendations for new priorities and so on, and I would then take this up with the senior officers in the division.

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, how many branches were there in the Western Hemisphere Division in 1963?

Mr. Scelso. I think there were five or six. I am not
sure. Then there was Cuba, which was a separate task force, as I learned from the Senate Committee; I had forgotten it. And later, Cuba came into the Division.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to Lee Harvey Oswald, when did he first come to your attention?

Mr. Scelso. I first learned of Lee Harvey Oswald on the day of the assassination when his name was mentioned on the radio and two minutes later an officer of my branch came running in and said, with the telegrams on Lee Harvey Oswald which we had sent, those telegrams which had gone out some weeks before the assassination.

I had not noticed. I do not know whether -- I probably saw them, but I did not recollect them at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. When the name Oswald first came to your attention after the assassination, what action, if any, did you take?

Mr. Scelso. When it came in, I was not sitting in my office. I was up in the Division front offices. I happened to be up there on another matter when the thing came in over the radio and within minutes, people from my office were up there with the cables. And I do not know exactly what we did, but within minutes we had notified the Division Chief and the DDP -- that is, the DDO.

Mr. Goldsmith. How soon after the assassination did this officer come on with the Oswald cables?
Mr. Scelso. This was in the mid-afternoon of that day and I think that the assassination was on the radio, someone had a little transistor radio going on with the news on it, and suddenly it came over and then in about a half hour after the assassination or fifteen minutes later, then we were all listening to this.

I do not know how long after the actual shooting it was that Oswald's name became known, perhaps an hour, hour and a half. Within minutes after that, they were out with the cables in their hands.

Mr. Goldsmith. Within minutes of the name Oswald being on the radio, an officer came in with the Oswald cables?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was that officer?

Mr. Scelso. I believe it was Mrs. Charlotte Bustos who was the, sort of the Major Domo of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ask her how she was able to obtain the Oswald cables so quickly?

Mr. Scelso. No, I know where she would have gotten them. We have copies of them right in our Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. At that time, did she also have a photo-
Mr. Scelso. No, I do not think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Charlotte Bustos ever discovered a photograph of Oswald at CIA headquarters?

Mr. Scelso. I do not think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether she ever discovered a photograph of someone whom she thought was Oswald?

Mr. Scelso. If you are talking about -- are you talking about the surveillance photo that was taken in front of the Embassy, the Russian Embassy?

Mr. Goldsmith. We are going to get into that photograph.

Mr. Scelso. I do not remember any photograph of Oswald at that time, the day of the assassination, or even later. I do not recall that there ever was a photo of Oswald found in Agency files. I do remember our asking -- we had to ask ONI for a photo, and so on. As far as I recall, they never sent us one.

It could be that later on, she found one, but I don't recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. We are now going to start going through a series of cables and other materials that the Agency has provided for us, and for reference purposes, I am going to be referring to each piece of paper in the stack that I am holding before me, I am going to be referring to it by the particular number that is stamped on it. The numbers are assigned to each particular page by the CIA. These are all
CIA documents and, as a means of allowing the Agency to monitor what they gave us and to make sure that everything that they gave us will be given back to them, they have number-stamped each page. That is also an appropriate way for us to refer to each page, for purposes of our record, because eventually everything will be returned to the Agency.

In the future, if somebody is trying to reconstruct what we are looking at, they just need to turn to the appropriate page.

At this time, I would like to refer to CIA-177, and I will ask you to read that.

(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I remember this cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. That cable is dated when?

Mr. Scelso. 9 October 1963.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that you remember that cable?

Mr. Scelso. I remember having seen it two years ago with the Senate investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. On the upper left-hand corner of the cable, it says WH-8.

Mr. Scelso. That means eight copies went to WH.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would one copy of this have gone to you?
Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In October of '63 when the cable was sent out?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. Went to Charlotte Bustos.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated it went to Bustos by writing indication on the top of the page. Is that correct?

Mr. Scelso. Well, it came to our desk, you see. It is from Mexico City so we automatically got the action on it and the information copies went to counterintelligence staff, FI staff, Soviet Division. I guess that is Registry. I do not know what "BR" is.

Mr. Goldsmith. On the bottom right-hand corner of the page, it says 201-289248.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What does that refer to?

Mr. Scelso. Probably it refers to Oswald's 201.

Mr. Goldsmith. I noted in the left-hand corner of the page, left-hand side of the page, there is a notation that says D-200-5-41. Do you know what that means?

Mr. Scelso. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when that indication would have been put there?

Mr. Scelso. No. That could be a subject file, referring to the Kennedy assassination, or something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph of this cable makes
reference to a photograph.

    Mr. Scelso. Yes.

    Mr. Goldsmith. Was that photograph sent to headquarters prior to the assassination?

    Mr. Scelso. No, I do not believe it was. It was sent afterwards.

    Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether that photograph depicted Lee Harvey Oswald?

    Mr. Scelso. No, I do not. This was the famous photograph that was shown to Oswald's mother, and so on, which she thought was Jack Ruby.

    Mr. Goldsmith. That is correct. That is the photograph in question.

    Do you have any explanation for the photograph which is commonly referred to as the "Mexico mystery man" photograph? Do you have any explanation for that?

    Mr. Scelso. They looked at the photographs that they had for the period when the telephone call was made. This was the only one that could have conceivably been him. So they said, they conjectured, concluded, that if we do have a photograph of the man, this is it.

    Mr. Goldsmith. On what do you base that explanation?

    Mr. Scelso. My knowledge of the photography operation and talks with station officers before and afterward. They did not get pictures of everyone who entered and exited the
Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. The photograph of the Mexico mystery man, let's back up for a minute.

The Mexico mystery man was a non-Latin. Is that correct?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was his picture the only picture of a non-Latin taken during that time period?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know. I never saw all of the pictures that were taken during that period.

Mr. Goldsmith. If there were pictures of other non-Latins taken during that period of time, what reason would the Mexico City station have had for sending that particular picture?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know, if there were other pictures of non-Latins. I do not know what other pictures there were at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the case officers that you spoke to down there pertaining to this particular photograph?

Mr. Scelso. Dave Phillips. Winn Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Phillips tell you that he was actually down in Mexico City at the time during this particular incident with the Mexico mystery man?

Mr. Scelso. These discussions were after the assassination, probably a good deal after the assassination. I do not recall anybody from Mexico coming up soon after the
assassination. There was a great deal of cables back and forth on this whole business.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you recall anything else that Winn Scott might have said in reference to this photograph?

Mr. Scelso. No.

We conjectured that Mexico City, and we conjectured that it was a Mexican seaman.

Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph of this cable contains an accurate description of Oswald. Is that a fair statement?

(Pause)

Mr. Selso. The description would not apply to Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Selso. Because Oswald was not that old. He was not of athletic build. He was not six feet tall. He did have a receding hairline, and he could have worn anything. But the description itself is too old, the build is wrong and the height is wrong.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether at any time the Mexico City station obtained a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Selso. No, I never heard that they did. They may have been sent one from Washington, but they did not photograph him locally, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is what I meant.
Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look, now, at CIA-179.
Would you please read through that?

(Pause)

Have you ever seen this particular cable before?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

Mr. Scelso. Probably the day it was written.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does your name appear anywhere in that cable?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where is that?

Mr. Scelso. Right here [indicating].

Mr. Goldsmith. At the bottom of CIA 181?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of this cable?

Mr. Scelso. 10 October 1963.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that you acted as the coordinating officer with regards to this cable.

Mr. Scelso. I was what was called the authenticating officer, since it went out of my Branch, you see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does it not indicate here that J.C. King is the authenticating officer?

Mr. Scelso. That is right. It was released by ADTOADP.
Mr. Goldsmith. Thomas Karamessinas?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you the coordinating officer?

Mr. Scelso. They called me coordinating officer because there is no other place for it. But they came out of my Branch, you see. It was written in my Branch, so I have to sign it before it can even leave the Branch, so I am really an authenticating officer.

Mr. Goldsmith. What does the term "authenticating officer" mean?

Mr. Scelso. An authenticating officer is responsible for the content of the cable. He approves the content of it and the coordinating officers certify that they have no objection to it and approve the general tenor of it, but they are not responsible for its content.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say responsible for its content, you mean responsible for its accuracy?

Mr. Scelso. For its accuracy, and the propriety of its recommendations, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about a releasing officer? What is his responsibility?

Mr. Scelso. The releasing officer approves the briefing, all of the policy and the factual content.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the purpose of having so many people review a cable?
In this particular case, we have had four people. We have had the originating officer. We have an authenticating officer, a coordinating officer, and then the releasing officer.

Mr. Scelso. Well, it went up to Mr. Karamessinas because it involved disseminating information on an American citizen to other U.S. government agencies, you see. At that time -- probably still -- the CIA did not investigate or pass around information on American citizens unless it were requested to by another government agency, either in that particular case or by some standard operating procedure.

In other words, the CIA, seeing an American abroad, observing an American abroad, engaging in some skullduggery, would inform the responsible U.S. agency here and sit and wait for instructions before doing anything further.

In this case, we were passing on information to other U.S. government agencies in Mexico City and this probably went to other places in Washington as well.

Mr. Goldsmith. This particular information was disseminated to other agencies without the request of any other such agency. Is that correct?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. This fit into the other category of cases where disseminations were made?

Mr. Scelso. Disseminations would be made to other
interested agencies, and any information we came across
had action taken to follow up to take further investigative
steps. Dissemination would only be taken if another agency
requested it, either specifically in that case, or unless it
were a part of standard operating procedure, which would
have been agreed upon with another agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was any follow-up action contemplated
by this cable?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. Please keep headquarters advised of
any further contacts or for positive identification of
Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. That would be considered a follow-up.

Mr. Scelo. Yes. They were instructed to stay alert
and report any further evidence of this man's presence.
Therefore, Mr. Karamessinas had to sign off on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Karamessinas had to sign off on it
because follow-up action was contemplated?

Mr. Scelo. With regard to a U.S. citizen abroad.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, I think
you said that there were two situations where Mr. Karamessinas
would have to sign off. One would be where another agency
requested the dissemination?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. No -- not the question of the dissemina-
tion. It is a question of operational action being taken.

Mr. Goldsmith. A request for operational action. What
is the second example?

Mr. Scelo. Well --

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the Agency itself decide to take operational action?

Mr. Scelo. Ordinarily, operational action in an ordinary case would not require Mr. Karamessinas's approval at all. It was only because an American citizen was involved. That interest in an American citizen might come about because of a specific statement of interest about this individual from another U.S. government agency or it might come about because of a standard operating procedure.

For example, we had an agreement with the FBI that we would follow up leads on any American citizen in Mexico City who appeared around the Soviet Embassies, and so on, or anybody who was down there appearing to defect, which we might learn through our telephone intercepts.

We could just as well have sent this cable out without Mr. Karamessinas releasing it. I do not know why we did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, you pointed to something which I was going to ask you about. I was wondering why somebody as high up in the Agency as Mr. Karamessinas was the releasing officer.

Mr. Scelo. It would have been because of the U.S. citizen aspect, because so many other U.S. government agencies were involved, State Department, FBI and the Navy.
I suppose one of these things is the Navy. One of them could be the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me attempt to summarize again. Karamessinas would be responsible for signing off on this because operational action pertaining to an American was being taken?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Either pursuant to the request of another government agency or pursuant to some standard operating procedure of the Agency itself.

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any other reason that you can think of?

Mr. Scelo. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe you indicated that there was an arrangement, or an agreement, with the FBI that any activities by Americans around the Soviet Embassy or Cuban Embassy would be reported and followed up on by the Agency. Was that agreement in writing?

Mr. Scelo. I do not know. It probably was in writing somewhere, it antedated my tenure, and the agreement was not in the files. It would have been in the files of the DDP or of the CI staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there have been a similar arrangement with military intelligence?

Mr. Scelo. Yes, but probably not formalized. We had
worked on a number of cases in Mexico involving military defectors. As you know, they had been detected, arrested and taken back to the United States and convicted.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this cable, I believe that it contains a correct description of Mr. Oswald in the first paragraph. Is that not true?

Mr. Scelo. Well, I would not think he was 165 pounds.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that?

Mr. Scelo. I would say it is accurate. I do not know the color of his eyes.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is apparent from paragraph one of this cable that there is some variation in description between this cable and the one which was sent from the Mexico City Station?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you or anyone else at Headquarters ever receive any response from the Mexico City station with regard to the discrepancy in the description of the Oswald person.

Mr. Scelo. Of the person in the photograph?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelo. I am sure we did, but I do not know what form it was in. Do you have all the cables, or just some of them.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have seen what the Agency has told us
is all of the cable traffic. I am confining my question now to the period before the assassination.

Prior to the assassination, did the Mexico City station ever respond to this cable, specifically with regards to this question of the man who was identified as Oswald?

Mr. Scelo. I do not recall that it did.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated a few moments ago that the Mexico City Station sometimes did respond?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

Mr. Scelo. After the assassination. I do not remember what form it was in. It could have been in one of the phone calls.

Mr. Goldsmith. Telephone calls after the assassination?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. I am sure that there were a lot of telephone calls made after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was that? Why were telephone calls made instead of cables being sent?

Mr. Scelo. It was the propensity of senior division officers to call over the Western Hemisphere by telephone to the Station Chiefs which was a terrible practice.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall if you ever?

Mr. Scelo. I think I did on one or two occasions.

Mr. Goldsmith. For what purpose?

Mr. Scelo. I think probably at the time of Presidential
trips to Mexico and to Costa Rica, maybe Panama. There were times when things came in and we telephoned — I think I was ordered to telephone. This was at a time when, of course, President Kennedy was flying to Mexico City and a million telephone calls were going back and forth from government agents and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about immediately after the assassination?

Mr. Scelo. I do not think I made any telephone calls although I cannot exclude it. I remember in the course of heavy debates with the station about the reports of this Nicaraguan fabricator, instead of going over to flash cables rather than make telephone calls.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turn to paragraph 5 of this cable. It indicates: "Please keep headquarters advised of any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald."

Do you recall whether the Mexico City station ever kept headquarters advised in the matter requested?

Mr. Scelo. I do not recall and I assume that they did not pick up any further information about him although they did, did they not?

Mr. Goldsmith. They did, yes.

Mr. Scelo. It just comes to me they did.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will go into that in a little while.

Mr. Scelo. I do not recall whether they sent any further
cables. As I say, although I did sign off on these cables the day of the assassination, I had no recollection of the name Oswald, although I have a very, very good memory. You can imagine. Thousands of names were crossing my desk every month.

Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustos remembered.

Mr. Scelo. She remembered, and so did other people, the girls who typed the things and so on remembered this and immediately pounced upon it in our files.

Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustos probably came across as many names as you did. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. She was concerned only with Mexico and I had five or six other countries to work with as well. She has a fantastic memory.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your impression of Charlotte Bustos as far as competence and integrity?

Mr. Scelo. Charlotte Bustos in her job as the manager of records, traces and files, in this Mexico desk, was an outstanding officer to whom I gave, in one of her fitness reports, the highest evaluation, outstanding, number 6 and so on, that can be given, that was very rarely given at that time.

Her work was pretty near flawless and she also was an outstanding trainer of new employees.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that this cable refers to Oswald
as "Lee Henry Oswald" in the first paragraph of that cable. Is there any way that you can explain that error in terms of the incorrect name?

Mr. Scelo. I have heard after the fact that, in some book of records, that this was a mistake in the 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever check that yourself?

Mr. Scelo. No. It was straightened out immediately in the next cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Charlotte Bustos have been the originated officer of this cable?

Mr. Scelo. Because she wrote it. The person who actually composed the wording of the cable wrote his name up there, and she was, on an important case like this, complicated, she frequently did the tracing and so on herself. Lesser matters may be handled by any number of other analysts.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was this an important case?

Mr. Scelo. Because it involved an American security suspect.

Mr. Goldsmith. The fact of Oswald's appearance at the Soviet Embassy in Moscow would not have been considered an insignificant matter?

Mr. Scelo. No. But, as I say, what went on in the Soviet Union and what the CIA officers in the Soviet Union did, is something that completely escaped my knowledge and scope and view at that time.
As a matter of fact, in an Agency like ours, at that time, you heard all kinds of scuttlebut from all over the place, but you just did not hear anything about who was in Moscow or what they were doing there. You did not hear anything.

Even when I was in my later positions where I saw everything in the world, I did not see that. It is one of the reasons I retired, because they refused to give me access. They gave me the responsibility for evaluating operations worldwide and no insight into our Soviet and satellite recruitments.

Mr. Goldsmith. Staying with Oswald's appearance at the Embassies in Mexico City, the fact that Oswald was an American defector and showed up at these embassies was considered by the Agency as being significant?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Stepping back for a moment, at the time that Oswald made the appearance at the embassies would the Mexico City station have considered his contact with the embassies to be significant?

Mr. Scelo. Oh, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though they did not necessarily know that he had been a defector, they just knew that Oswald had contacted the embassies?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. The fact that he was an American
contacting the Cubans and the Russians, especially in the context of which they knew it, because they had details of the telephone conversations, signalling this to them, that this was a very important case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were Americans frequently contacting either the Soviet or Cuban Embassy?

Mr. Scelo. I do not know about the Cuban Embassy. Not many cases like -- of course they were. On the Soviet Embassy, a significant number of American military people involved in sensitive, highly-classified military activities in the southwestern United States attempted to defect to the Russians in order to pass information to them and were detected by our surveillance means and were apprehended. That had happened before this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Every time that an American contacts one of these embassies, would a cable be sent?

Mr. Scelo. If you were identified, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. A cable would be sent instead of a dispatch, because the matter would be considered important?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I presume, then, if we were to review all of the Mexico City cable traffic for, let's say, half a year prior to the assassination, we would come across other contacts by Americans who were identified, Americans who would have visited these embassies?
Mr. Scelo. I do not want to imply that these contacts were detected every week or every month.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Scelo. They were detected enough so that J. Edgar Hoover used to glow every time that he thought of the Mexico station. This was one of our outstanding areas of cooperation with the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if we can reconstruct this somewhat. Oswald's initial contact to the embassies in Mexico City would, in the eyes of the Mexico City station, be considered significant because it was a contact by an American?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then the Mexico City station receives information that Oswald was a defector, had been a defector?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure if this made reference to his offering to give military secrets or not.

Mr. Scelo. I think he did.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, it does not.

(Pause)

In any event, they know he is an American contacting the Soviet and Cuban embassies and they know that he is a former defector, so that would elevate the significance of his contact. Is that correct?
Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Now, why did they not report everything they found out?

Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question.

Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by principally Mexican supervision of an American, or Mexican-American. These people were just inundated with information and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to Washington.

The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on, which only were divulged after the assassination. It is an enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest and most active telephone intercept operations in the whole world and the job of processing this material is just impossible.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step, although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going to modify the line of inquiry somewhat.

Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet.

Mr. Scelo. I think there are about 30 lines being tapped altogether. That is just the number that sticks in my mind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thirty meaning a total of thirty from both the Soviet and the Cuban?

Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects.
Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related
to the Soviet or Cuban?

Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists
living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J.
Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines how many, at your
best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans?

Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they
had.

Mr. Goldsmith. You think just about every outside
phone?

Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines.

Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you?

Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based on my recollection,
going back 15 years.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was
that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City
was one of the most extensive in the world?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great
deal which they could not exploit. They could not later
listen to it; they did not have time. They used to listen
to it sort of spottily, you see, and attempt then to exploit
what was the most important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as
to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the
headquarters prior to the assassination. I think that the
fact that Oswald's other telephonic contact with the Embassy
was not known is that an accurate summary?

Mr. Scelo. I think they did have other information on
this later telephonic --

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was it not reported?

Mr. Scelo. A question of too much material to process
and too many important priorities. And possibly they would
have gotten around to doing it, you see. They have a backlog.
They would have gotten around to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have already established a few things.
One, Winn Scott is a very demanding and competent station
chief.

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have established that Oswald's
contact was initially important and the importance became
somewhat elevated when they found out that he had been a
defector?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which suggests not only he had been a
defector but formerly had served in the Marines?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is possible that his contacts with
the embassies was for the purpose of attempting to defect
again, and yet there is no communication from the Mexico City
station to headquarters concerning any of Oswald's other contacts.

Mr. Scelo. You see, they had reels and reels of tape to go over. The monitors would monitor certain lines and record other lines and when they had time, they had to scan the other lines to see who was calling what, and they could have missed it. And, of course, maybe they just had a backlog which they were going to process later.

I do not remember when his latest contacts were. They were right in the same period or within a few days, were they not?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelo. When was he first in Mexico City anyway?

What was the time of that?

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe, according to the Warren Commission, he arrived in Mexico City on September 26th or 27th?

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me for a moment.

(Pause)

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelo, I am going to show you some transcripts to review in a minute. Before I do so, though, I would like to ask you to read CIA No. 162, 161, specifically the section marked "Liaison Coverage."
(Pause)

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on that. This refers to the envoy operation that was the joint operation conducted by the Mexicans and the Americans and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lines, in fact, connected at one time, so that your early testimony was, in all likelihood, accurate.

I am going to have to ask you also to read the section marked number 3, Oswald coverage.

Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is taken from the 1977 Inspector General Report.

Mr. Scelo. I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162.

(Pause)

On page 161, the section where it says: "Oswald Coverage. In mid-62, the Mexican officer in charge of the envoy, the joint tap operation, asked the American officer at the envoy listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible coverage."

The question I have for you is as follows. It would seem, from the earlier paragraph, that the liaison operation
was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary for the Mexican officer in charge to ask the American officer for the telephone numbers?

Mr. Scelo. The Mexicans were probably tapping other things at that time, not these targets. They were tapping other Mexicans, and so on. We had our own unilateral tap operations.--

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Scelo. -- on those important targets.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior to 1962 the liaison operations with the Mexicans did not cover the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies?

Mr. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really recall. That would have been in mid-62. That was just about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk. And I do not recall what the previous status was.

I do recall that they certainly did ask -- they suddenly disclosed the intent to tap certain lines which we were tapping unilaterally.

Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that the liaison operation had taps on 30 lines. If it was not the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have been.

Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or
five Mexican Communist Parties.

They were also tapping the phone of previous Presidents of Mexico, political rivals and so on.

However, I cannot swear that this statement is correct. I do not know that the July envoy was not previously tapping some of the phones which are indicated here.

You see, Mexico City, at that time, had the most comprehensive, extensive telephone tap facilities and surveillance facilities of any station in the world; and although Mexico was a big, and very well-run station, it is in the nature of things -- they had far more material to deal with than they could possibly handle.

This is something which everyone in the intelligence business knew, you see, but no one ever said it in writing. You did not like to go before your bosses or put on the record the fact that you have far more, like ten times, work to do than you can possibly do, especially when you consider that the Agency has a counter-espionage responsibility for the United States government abroad and that the FBI had no business in these operations at all in Mexico City, but they were doing so well that nobody tampered with it.

In vast parts of the world, the agency was unable to even lay a hand on the counter-espionage task, because they did not have the personnel. In African countries which were being taken over in front of our eyes by Communist groups,
mainly Russia, even Red China, we would have a two-man station --
two officers and a secretary -- so that Mexico was regarded
as an outstanding station because in some discernible way, and
in a number of important critical cases, it performed the
task.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Scelo. To say we were doing it comprehensively would
have meant that we would have had an organization there pro-
portionately as big as the FBI in Washington.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the transcripts, I would like
you to look at CIA number 13, which is the transcript of
October 1, 1963, and that apparently is a transcript in which
Oswald identifies himself, and it is a transcript where the
contact with the Soviet Embassy that triggered the cable
from the Mexico City station.

(Pause)

Now, the transcript, or the translator, indicates in
brackets that this was the same person who phoned a day or
so ago and spoke in broken Russian. And Oswald also indicates --
if, in fact, this was Oswald -- "I was at your place last
Saturday."

October 1st, for the record, was a Tuesday.

Then we have the next transcript that appears in CIA
Number 14, Oswald's contact on Saturday, September 28th.

Have you read through this?
Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When would this transcript have come to the attention of the personnel of the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelo. That, I do not know. As you noted from the other writings, when Russian was involved it had to go to a Russian transcriber who often had a backlog of a week.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is right.

Mr. Scelo. It might have been a week or more before they saw this.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, Oswald indicates in the conversation on the 1st that he had been at the Embassy on the previous Saturday and the translator also indicates the same person who phoned a day or so ago, so there is some sort of clue that this person, that there had been a previous contact?

Mr. Scelo. That is right.

Of course, he might not have identified himself in that previous contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, in this contact of 9-28-63, there was no identification by him?

Mr. Scelo. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. There were two other contacts on September 27, 1963. One at 4:05 in the afternoon and one at 4:26 in the afternoon. In neither of those two contacts does Oswald identify himself.
But my question is, did the Mexico City station inform you of Oswald's -- of any of these other contacts prior to the assassination?

Mr. Scelo. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think they should have?

Mr. Scelo. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Scelo. The gist of all the conversations was the same, that the man was trying to get a Cuban visa to go to Cuba in order to get a Russian visa, and there was no other significant information.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know from the October 1st cable or the October 9th cable that arrived in Headquarters that Oswald was trying to get a visa?

Mr. Scelo. I do not remember. Whatever the cable says.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at the cable for a moment.

Mr. Scelo. In other words, in the dynamics of the security business --

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to CIA 177, does that make any reference to Oswald's visiting the Cuban Embassy or to the fact that he was trying to obtain a visa?

Mr. Scelo. No. No indication about the Cubans and nothing about a visa.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that information should have been communicated to Headquarters?
Mr. Scelso. Yes. Of course, it was processed differently, you see. It was being processed by other people and the Spanish-speaking, or the non-Russian material, you see, was not processed this fast.

Mr. Goldsmith. Nevertheless, all of this material was before the Mexico City station certainly within two weeks of Oswald's contact on October 1st?

Mr. Scelso. It was someplace in the pipeline in the station. You do not know whether the tapes were transcribed, you see. You don't know whether these Mexicans in the intercept stations had even listened to the tapes, let alone transcribed them. They may have just stacked them up -- taken them off the recorders and stacked them up.

Mr. Goldsmith. My questions are asking you to testify about things that you do not have direct knowledge about. Assuming that the employees from the Mexico City station who were responsible for these transcripts have testified before this Committee that the transcripts were reviewed in chronological order -- in fact, the transcripts were linked to Oswald prior to the assassination.

Should that information have been sent to Headquarters?

Mr. Scelso. Ideally, yes, but I again state, in view of the tremendous work overload of the station which again, especially in the counterintelligence field, the outstanding station we had in the entire world. Their performance really
was not open to professional criticism at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald, as you indicated before, was a significant case?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, a significant case, but really, a one-time defector who came back and wanted to defect again, you see, is not really an important matter. In other words, there would have been no grounds for us to intervene administratively with the Mexicans and have them arrested.

Certainly, even if J. Edgar Hoover had said, have the man arrested by the Americans and we will send a military plane down and have him put him on it and we will take him back. This was done with military defectors, but I do not think that the Agency would have done it. They would not have had a shred of legal right to do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Another possibility, aside from the fact that he may have been trying to redefect, another possibility was that Oswald, when he returned to the states, was actually a Soviet spy. Another possibility, and he was making contact.

Mr. Scelso. That makes it of interest, that is correct. It still would not have warranted his arrest because there was no evidence that he was a Soviet spy, even today.

Mr. Goldsmith. Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have
been handled in any different manner?

Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how would the dissemination have been treated differently?

Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the Mexico City station for failure to send this information?

Mr. Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.

We were running, at that time, a vast political action program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded. I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program there at the time -- absolutely enormous.

We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of
the station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and satellite people.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall seeing any other transcripts pertaining to Oswald in addition to the ones I have shown you today?

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall seeing any additional ones. I know that there were several additional transcripts that came through later in cable form. Those cables are in here, I believe.

Mr. Goldsmith. Pertaining to?

Mr. Scelso. Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies, and his telephone conversations.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying that, in cable form --

Mr. Scelso. After the assassination, more came in.

Mr. Goldsmith. More transcripts came in? What I am saying is that these transcripts reflect a total of four contacts by Oswald to the various embassies.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, were there any additional contacts by Oswald to the embassies?

Mr. Scelso. I would like to say first, I do not recall you say there were four. I do not recall exactly how many there were.

Mr. Goldsmith. We can count these.

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any additional ones.
No. Nor can I swear that this file contains all the informa-
tion we got. I cannot swear that my memory is not that good.

I know that we got additional information on several
other telephone conversations and trips to these embassies
after the assassination. We got the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. That information you received may have
been the same, exactly the same, as these transcripts here?

Mr. Scelso. That's right.

Mr. Goldsmith. You don't know that there was a fifth
transcript --

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. -- of a fifth contact?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA Number 185.

Would you identify that document?

Mr. Scelso. That is a request from the Mexico City
station to Headquarters to send a photo of Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith Do you know why they requested that photo?

Mr. Scelso. They wanted to compare it with all the
photos that they may have had of people entering the Cuban
and Soviet embassies.

Mr. Goldsmith. How do you know that?

Mr. Scelso. Deduction.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was a photo ever sent by headquarters
to the Mexico City station?
Mr. Scelso. I do not think so. We requested the Office of Naval Intelligence for one, and I do not think they ever gave us one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why they never gave it to you?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the middle of the page here, there is a line that says C/S COMINT and then it gives a description.

Mr. Scelso. That is the cable center. There is an intelligence duty officer down in the cable center who, for the senior officer who read the board, read the cable board, and do not have all of these references at hand, write a phrase here to explain to senior people what this cryptic sentence means, and he made a mistake.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is my next question. In attempts of Lee Harvey Oswald and wife to re-enter --

Mr. Scelso. He quickly looked at the reference and misread it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the reference here? Mexico City 6534?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 193. Would you please read that, and identify it for the record?

Mr. Scelso. This is a cable that I wrote and sent to
Mexico on November 23rd. Was that the day after the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelso. Asking them to send a staff officer to Headquarters carrying the photos of Oswald -- meaning the photos of what they believed to be Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive those photos?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, we did. We got them some way. There was only one photo. It was a photo of the unknown man. I do not know whether it came that way, or whether we got them from the FBI. I think an FBI officer returned to Headquarters carrying them.

Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates, "Call Mr. Whitten, 652-6827."

Mr. Scelso. That was my home phone. So if he came in the middle of the night to the airfield, I would go pick him up and take him to headquarters. I think by that time, Mr. Helms had appointed me and put me in charge of the whole thing.

This was when I requisitioned an electric typewriter, you see. A person in my grade could not operate a typewriter. I am a good typist, so, by using my priorities, I got an IBM electric typewriter and I wrote most of these cables myself, hundreds of cables.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look now at Number 194. Would you please read that cable and identify it?
(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal was an officer of the CI staff which was in charge of the Special Investigation Section and he, too, was working on this case and asked Mexico to review all of the tapes, to see if there was other information about Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Special Investigation Section of the CI staff?

Mr. Scelso. The Special Investigation Section of the CI staff was a section, for once with the title indicating what it was supposed to do -- special investigations. That was CIA counterintelligence investigations which were so sensitive or of such a general super-regional nature that they should not be handled by one of the area divisions.

And this, in particular, applied to investigations of CIA employees who were suspected for working for foreign intelligence organizations or where you had to work abroad.

Of course, the Office of Security was mixed up with this, too.

For instance, a Soviet defector comes out and says, as in the case of Nosenko or Solzenitsyn, a high-level spy, this section would have had to have done all of the leg work.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the abbreviation for that?

Would it be CI/SIG?

Mr. Scelso. It is up here someplace.

Mr. Goldsmith. They were together with us, to a certain
degree. For instance, this was the outfit that had access to the letter intercepts and I think it was at the time of the assassination that I was first briefed on the letter intercepts, you know, which later became such a scandal, although they did not tell me they were intercepting the letters in the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, would this outfit be responsible for opening up the 201 file on a defector?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Scelso. On an American who had defected abroad?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelso. I do not know. They could have been assigned it. Perhaps they were assigned that responsibility. I do not know that they followed American defectors, or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not saying they were, or that they did not, but I am wondering, as a matter of routine, CI/SIG would --

Mr. Scelso. I do not know that. I did not have any insight into their charter. I just happened to have enough contact with them on a few cases where they questioned me about people that I knew, and so on, on different cases, and then in this case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be anywhere at Headquarters...
a charter, as you put it, written rules and regulations as
to what the responsibilities of the CI/SIG section or branch
were?

Mr. Scoleso. There should have been. There are such
operational plans, as they are called. I think they are
called that, which you write at the time that you put in your
budget that tells everything, and then usually each staff has
a charter written and approved and so on -- solemnized, and
then buried away and forgotten.

However, this came under Angleton and everything that
Angleton did was so secret -- several times in my career I
was appointed by Helms or by Karamessinas to investigate or
handle or look into investigations where Angleton was running.
This always caused bitter feelings, the most bitter feelings.

Mr. Goldsmith. For what purpose would they ask you to
look into Angleton's operations?

Mr. Scoleso. Because Helms or Karamessinas suddenly found
out about one of Angleton's operations and did not like the
looks of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would you go about looking into that
without Mr. Angleton's finding out about it?

Mr. Scoleso. He knew it. They always told him. And
then they said, now, you go tell Angleton you are going to do
this. I used to go in fingering my insurance policy, notify-
ing my next of kin. This happened many times over the years.
The first time I was a polygraph operator and then, later on, when I was in Headquarters, they put me, right out of the blue. Karamessinas, you see. Helms never forgot my work as a polygraph operator from 1948 on for a few years.

I was the first polygraph operator and I went to Europe, and I only ran the polygraph as a sideline. I was a case officer handling agents. And, of course, I had been a prisoner of war interrogator. And I was immediately given all your really nutsy cases to go over, and I cracked one of them after another. Helms never forgot this.

When various big cases came up, he used to assign me, like the disappearance of the head of the West German Security Service in 1954, Helms immediately gave me that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever asked to review the polygraph results of the Nosenko polygraph tests?

Mr. Scelso. By that time I was out of the polygraph business. The Office of Security nudged me out of it and took it over and thereafter tried to prevent me from running any other polygraph cases. But when I retired, Mr. Helms personally gave me a medal and he said he was giving it to me principally for having successfully introduced the polygraph into the agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. To summarize, before we proceed analyzing this cable here, which was originally by Birch O'Neal, which was CI/SIG, which O'Neal -- was he head?
Mr. Scelso. Yes, he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. CI/SIG was sort of a super --

Mr. Scelso. Special investigations group.

Mr. Goldsmith. Confined to sensitive counterintelligence operations?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Mr. O'Neal would have sent out this particular cable?

Mr. Scelso. He was probably writing this cable just before or after the meeting that Helms called and put me in charge of everything.

You see, Angleton immediately went into action to do all of the investigating and Helms called a meeting which Angleton and a lot of others were present and told everybody that I was in charge and that everybody should report everything to me and that no one should have any conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present, which was violated from the word go by Angleton, who dealt with the Bureau and the Warren Commission and John Foster Dulles himself.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there communication on a more or less ex parte basis between the CIA and Dulles?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, between Angleton and Dulles.

Mr. Goldsmith. How do you know that?

Mr. Scelso. From Angleton.
Mr. Goldsmith. He told you that?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, on one or two occasions I went to talk to him about the case, or he called me in. It was a very strange situation.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way?

Mr. Scelso. Well, Angleton ignored Helms' orders that no one was to discuss the case with anyone without my being present. He ignored that.

I tried to get Helms to make him obey and Helms said, you go tell him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was not Angleton reprimanded, or even dismissed, for failing to obey that order?

Mr. Scelso. None of the senior officials at the Agency were ever able to cope with him. He had enormously influential contacts with J. Edgar Hoover. He had his own direct ties to the Director at various times he was -- I believe he and his staff were intimately tied in with the House Subversive Affairs, or whatever it is, Committee. And Angleton was a very formidable person to deal with.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what kind of information Angleton gave to Dulles ex parte?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know of any improper action by Angleton?

Mr. Scelso. No, except that he violated Helms'
instructions. In view of the fact that he got away with it, he probably figured it was condoned.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this first paragraph of the cable in CIA 194, it indicates: "It is important that you review all envoy tapes and transcripts from 27 September."

My question, do you know why September 27th was picked out?

Mr. Scelso. That date appears on one of the other cables, does it not?

Mr. Goldsmith. That date appears on the other transcripts. In other words that Oswald had been at the Cuban Embassy on the 27th of September and there were two phonecall intercepts pertaining to Oswald? There is no traffic that indicates that Headquarters knew about the 27th of September contact.

Mr. Scelso. I do not know. What is this cable?

6453. Is that the original cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Mexico 6453 was the very first one that I showed you.

Mr. Scelso. Are we sure that nothing came in in the meantime in any of those follow-up cables by Mexico City and he just referred to the original cable and not to the follow up cables?

Mr. Goldsmith. Really, you are in a position where you more or less have to take our word for it. We are relying
upon what the Agency has given us. We have reviewed all the
cable traffic and assembled it, and one of the reasons we
are asking you the question is we have not been able to find
any intervening cables referring to the contact by Oswald
on September 27th, and that is why we wondered how September
27th happened to be picked out.

Is it possible that there was telephonic communication?

Mr. Scelso. There could well be.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, you have no explanation?

Mr. Scelso. Or it could be the FBI set up information,
you see, that they got this from the FBI. The CI staff was
in very close touch with the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. The third paragraph of this letter asks,
this cable asks, whether the original tapes were available.

What was the response to that?

Mr. Scelso. I do not remember. Well, the response was
they sent in a lot of transcripts. I do not know whether --
they probably transcribed them then.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were they able to locate the original
tapes?

Mr. Scelso. I think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what was done with those
tapes?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever --
Mr. Scelso. I never heard them.

Mr. Goldsmith. You never heard them?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. On what basis do you say that the original tapes were found?

Mr. Scelso. I had the impression that after the assassination they did a lot of transcribing. I may be wrong.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say, "they did a lot of transcribing," who are you referring to?

Mr. Scelso. Both the staff of the envoy and our Soviet transcriber, our Russian transcriber. However, I am not at all sure of that. I was not looking for things like this at this time. We were rushing ahead, being flooded with cables from all over the world.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 208. Paragraph four there, which indicates that the person who did the transcript, and says, "Oswald is identical with the person in an earlier paragraph who spoke broken Russian and called on 28 September."

That indicates that some sort of a voice comparison was made.

Mr. Scelso. Yes. Tapes were probably still in existence.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 196. Would you please read that?

(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates "FBI says photos of man entering Soviet Embassy," et cetera, et cetera.

Was that the first time that you and Headquarters learned that the photograph that had been taken in the Mexico City station of the man that they thought was Oswald in fact was not Oswald?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA number 197. Would you please read the first paragraph?

(Pause)

Actually, please read the first two paragraphs.

(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have two questions for you. The first is here the station in Mexico City is reporting only the 9/23 contact and is not reporting the 9/27 contact. We still have an inconsistency here between what headquarters apparently knows and what the Mexico City station is sending up.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any way that you can explain that?

Mr. Scelso. It could have been -- what were they speaking here, English or what? You see, it depends. Maybe one was being transcribed by one transcriber and the other by another transcriber. One got finished first.
Mr. Goldsmith. My impression is that the Spanish conversations were only transcribed, they were not translated, and the Russian ones had to be translated.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, this was well down the line. This conversation was from September 28th. By then, everything would have been transcribed — translated and/or transcribed.

Mr. Scelso. Not necessarily. They might just not have gotten around to it. The backlog might have been greater. There was only talk of an average backlog.

Mr. Goldsmith. Understood. The information that the Committee has received has been to the effect that the Spanish transcription was received at the station within about three days of the call, and the Russian translations came in about a week within the receipt of the call, and this was November 23rd, so we are talking about a period of between seven and eight weeks after the receipt of the call.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any way you can explain this discrepancy?

Mr. Scelso. Not everything they transcribed was sent to Headquarters, of course.

Mr. Goldsmith. It seems that Headquarters already knew about the 9/27 contact by virtue of the earlier cable.
Mr. Scelso. It could have been through the FBI, particularly since Birch O'Neal sent that other cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why because of Birch O'Neal's --

Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal was in the counter-intelligence staff which had direct liaison with the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, I am informed by my researcher that the Spanish transcriptions were usually received by the station within one day of the receipt of the call, the Russian within two days.

Mr. Scelso. If the conversation were transcribed. They were not all transcribed, you see? Only interesting conversations. It could be that they did not even transcribe this one.

Mr. Goldsmith. This was a conversation involving an American.

Mr. Scelso. That is true. Still, they may not have transcribed it.

Mr. Goldsmith. A conversation involving an American would be interesting.

Mr. Scelso. Except the people handling the tapes were Mexicans. They could have slipped up.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sure they were informed.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. If an American comes along, that is high interest.
Mr. Scelso. That is true. They still may have delayed transcribing, or put it aside.

Mr. Goldsmith. As I indicated before, the testimony we have already received is that everything had been transcribed well before the assassination and had been reviewed well before the assassination.

Mr. Scelso. It could be they had just not sent it in.

Mr. Goldsmith. Headquarters apparently knew about the 9/27 contact by Oswald by virtue of this earlier cable.

Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal's cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal may have found that out after the assassination, you see. The FBI could well have sent up a summary cable based on the information they were getting hour by hour from us, and they may have come over, or phoned over, because they have a gray line you know, and told the CI staff this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the second paragraph now, that suggests that one of the tapes had been erased, does it not?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that, in any way, aid your memory as to whether any tapes of Oswald's voice were obtained after the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. Sent up from Mexico?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Whether the Mexico City had onhand any tapes of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Scelso. I just do not recall whether they did or not. I am sure if they had had, we would have wanted to hear them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your initial answer before was they did.

Now you are saying you do not know?

Mr. Scelso. I am groping. I thought at the time that they were transcribing some of these things down here. They still had the original tapes after the assassination. In other words. I do not recall their ever saying that they had erased all tapes with Oswald's voice.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event here, thus far, the only contacts by Oswald that have been reported by the Mexico City station to Headquarters are contact of September 28th and the contact of October 1st. So, according to the cable traffic, anyway, Headquarters did not know about the 9/27 contacts.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at number 204, CIA number 204.

(Pause)

This cable contains the transcripts from Oswald's 9/28 contact and 10/1 contact. You might want to skim through that.

(Pause)

Again, it would seem the Mexico City station is not
telling Headquarters, for some reason, of the 9/27 contact. I do not mean to suggest that the reason is sinister or innocent, but according to cable traffic, the Mexico City station, anyway, is not telling you about it.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA number 211.

Mr. Scelso. What was the nature of that 9/27 contact?

Mr. Goldsmith. If you would like, you can review the transcript again. Essentially, it was a conversation between Soviet Duran and Soviet Embassy, or consulate officials in respect to Oswald's obtaining a visa and the problem of obtaining a visa.

Reading through CIA number 211, can you identify that?

Mr. Scelso. I suppose this was the President of Mexico?

Mr. Goldsmith. Correct.

Why do you think that, in paragraph 3, the person sending the cable considered the fact that Litensor was aware of Oswald's contact to be important? The fact that he was aware of it, and passing the information along would be important?

Mr. Scelso. You get into a psychological question. The Chief of Station is called in to speak to the President of Mexico. There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador got there -- no, it wasn't that. It was a very peculiar situation in Mexico whereby the Mexican President's primary contact
with the U.S. government was through our Chief of Station rather than through the Ambassadors. This caused no great problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thomas Mann?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. He was a very fine guy and recognized the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador, Mr. Friedman, tried to cut Winn Scott out of contact with the President of Mexico, whereupon the President of Mexico called in Winn Scott and said, I want you to send a cable to the White House telling them I am not going to deal with this jackass, I want to deal only with you.

So, the result was, eventually, Winston Scott and Ambassador Friedman went to the White House and talked to President Johnson and straightened the whole thing out in favor of Winston Scott.

So Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that the President of Mexico is aware of our telephone operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. He should have been since it was a liaison operation?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. But you do not always know whether he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed.

It is just significant that the person calls you in and says, here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 210. Would you please read that?
(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify this document?

Mr. Scelso. This is a cover sheet for the cable from the Mexico station.

Mr. Goldsmith. The cover sheet to the cable we just referred to?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Winn Scott here indicates, due memo of my meeting with Litensor.

Mr. Scelso. It is addressed to this person who is supposed to write a memo on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Scott? That is Scott's signature.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, he writes it back to himself and reminds himself to write a memo on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see the memo?

Mr. Scelso. I do not think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Scott about his meeting with Litensor?

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall having done so.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, by this time, the Mexico City station still had not informed Headquarters of the 9-27 contact?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA 213. Would you skim...
(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. This was all on the same day.

Mr. Goldsmith. The cable traffic was pretty heavy on that day, I would imagine.

Mr. Scelso. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. This cable is the first time that the Mexico City station informs Headquarters about Oswald's 9/27 contacts.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that there is any connection between the fact that this contact was recorded after the Mexico City station became aware of the fact that Litensor knew about Oswald's contacts?

Mr. Scelso. I would imagine that there were probably many -- several Mexicans transcribing reels, transcribing things and some got finished before others.

Mr. Goldsmith. This was months ago. The conversations have been transcribed and reviewed months earlier.

Mr. Scelso. What are the numbers of the various cables? They were all going out in a series. They may have had several analysts in the Mexico Station working on them. One said you take this one and write a cable and the other said you take that one and write a cable, and so on, and they went out and went into the COMM Center and the COMM Center sent them out in some order. Here.
Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware of any dissension within the Mexico City station concerning the amount of information that should be sent from Mexico City to Headquarters?

Mr. Scelso. No, not then, or at any later time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA number 217, Winn Scott, this document, has written something in the margin. Could you possibly read that into the record?

Mr. Scelso. "I had a call from Washington, Jack Whitten at 620 hours on 23rd November. Scott. I told Jack Whitten at that at 1620 or 30 hours, our time, on 23rd November, that this would be enroute to him soon."

Mr. Goldsmith. By "this," what is he referring to? Is he referring to the cable?

Mr. Scelso. To the cable of the 27th?

Mr. Goldsmith. The cable --

Mr. Scelso. About the meeting, Oswald's meeting, on the 27th.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. The document, CIA number 217 indicates a telephone conversation between you and Scott. Do you remember the purpose of that conversation?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Apparently you called him for some reason?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I do not have any idea why. I may have been ordered to call him on any number of things.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember the substance of the conversation in any way?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember being upset at receiving this information about Oswald's 9-27 contact a little bit late?

Mr. Scelso. It was the day after the assassination at 4:00-something in the afternoon and I did not feel the least bit bad about it. We were getting the stuff in hot and heavy.

In fact, the overall performance of the Agency in this thing was the only bright light in the U.S. government. It really was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say that?

Mr. Scelso. Because we had had advance information that we had disseminated on Oswald's activities which we had properly disseminated to the other U.S. government agencies which might have led them to act other than they had.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that they would have paid more attention to Oswald if they had received additional information, his Cuban contact as well?

Mr. Scelso. Conceivably, yes. In the light of the way the Bureau acted in it, though, I am not sure they would have. After all, we notified them. He was in touch with the Soviet intelligence officer.
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

What is your impression, turning to another area now, of the manner in which the Agency handled the Ugarte issue? Ugarte was a Nicaruvian national who came in and reported having seen Oswald with some other people at the Cuban Embassy?

Mr. Scelso. I think in the overall handling of it, it was proper, especially since I was the architect of that handling.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way were you the architect?

Mr. Scelso. I wrote almost all the cables that went out of Headquarters and decided what they should say. There were some, in the heat of reporting Mexico City did overlook certain things that they might have told us. For instance, they did not give us certain background. There was some information, a statement, Lee Oswald saying he was getting $3,000 or $6,000 or some such amount for doing the job on Kennedy or doing the job on somebody, and the Mexico station indicated that there were reports that Lee Harvey Oswald had a savings account in this amount in Dallas.

What they did not tell us, for which I later chided them, was that this rumor had been on the radio in Mexico City and everybody in Mexico City believed it. It was not on the radio up here and we did not know what the origin of this rumor was, nor were we therefore alert to the fact that this Ugarte could have heard it on the radio.
You know, I might have called him to get information about this 27th thing, because we might have learned it from the Bureau in the meantime.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would the Bureau have heard it?

Mr. Scelso. From the Mexico station. They were getting briefings, and so on, right along the line, because the Mexico FBI office was doing very extensive investigations in Mexico with the police through which Oswald's movements in Mexico were traced.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any evidence that Ugarte may have been a CIA agent?

Mr. Scelso. Not in the sense that we call a person a CIA agent. I think he was a Nicaraguan intelligence agency being run by somebody in the Nicaraguan Embassy in Mexico City and I think, if my memory is not tricking me, that we may have been in touch with the Nicaraguan who was handling him.

We may have been, at that time or in the past, or perhaps our Nicaraguan station was indirectly monitoring their activities. But my memory on this was very weak. He was never an agent of ours in the sense that he was directly handled by us or that he was handled according to instructions which we were passing.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is possible that if his Nicaraguan case officer was cooperating with you in some way, he may have been using Ugarte, this would have been without your knowledge?
Mr. Scelso. I am not sure about that. It could be that we had known in the past that Ugarte was a Nicaraguan agent working against the Cubans. It seems to me that I think we did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that Ugarte's Nicaraguan case officer was considered by the Agency to be a trusted asset?

Mr. Scelso. As I recall, he was either an agent of ours or liaison contact that we used as an asset.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was his impression of Ugarte's reliability?

Mr. Scelso. As I remember, Ugarte had not been a very productive agent. He had not accomplished much at all and was evaluated accordingly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at number 241. Would you please that cable.

(Pause)

Does that statement accurately reflect the scope of the photosurveillance coverage, referring to the first two paragraphs?

Mr. Scelso. There is nothing in here.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry.

Does that paragraph accurately indicate the hours of the Embassies?

Mr. Scelso. I have no recollection of those hours at 001872
all. I would say it is probably correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware of the hours in which the
Soviet and Cuban Embassies were under photo-surveillance?

Mr. Scelso. During the daylight hours, but the coverage
was by no means complete. It never is, in cases ofphoto-
surveillance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say that?

Mr. Scelso. Well, the cameras are manually operated
and it is just impossible to find operatives which will be
so dutiful as to snap every person coming and going.

Mr. Goldsmith. My understanding was that Scott was an
extremely demanding man and ran a very efficient station.

Mr. Scelso. That is true, but, if you have a couple --
a man is away a part of the time and the wife is away and she
has to go into the kitchen to prepare meals or she has to
go to the bathroom, it is simply impossible day in and day
out, in a practical sense, to get total coverage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if there was coverage on
week-ends?

Mr. Scelso. No, I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at --

Mr. Scelso. This is based on my experience with eval-
ating these things worldwide.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at CIA 249. Would
you please take a look at the first two paragraphs.
(Pause)

Mr. Scelso. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. This indicates that the photographic coverage was of a continuous nature during daylight hours and also, as you indicated, it does not indicate that that does not mean that everybody is picked up, necessarily.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. You stated a moment ago that, your experience, based upon your knowledge of worldwide operations was not everyone would be picked up.

Mr. Scelso. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What percentage of people would be picked up?

Mr. Scelso. I would like to say first that the operators come to recognize the regular Embassy staff and visitors who frequently come and go and do not attempt to photograph them every time. Otherwise, they attempt to get pictures of new visitors. Even this is not practical. It just does not work, and that is because it is extremely difficult to get people to do this kind of work at all. It is a deadening, boring and to get people who are clearable to do it, is very, very difficul-

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, what percentage of people do you think you would manage to get?

Mr. Scelso. I would have to make a wild guess if I were
to answer that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would not mind taking a wild guess
from you, Mr. Scelso.

Mr. Scelso. I would think you would get at least half
of the people, or even more.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly if it got less than half it
would seem to me that the operation would not be at all worth-
while, if you got one quarter or one fifth.

Mr. Scelso. You have to crank into this the fact that
the many people entering and leaving these installations
deliberately conceal their faces, and that they approach
the installations so they would not be photographical from
any vantage point.

Mr. Goldsmith. My next question is sort of a difficult
one. The Agency's records document that Oswald made an
appearance at the Cuban Embassy and Russian Embassy, or Consu-
late, a total of six times, five or six times. Yet, having
made five or six visits somehow he managed to escape the
surveillance coverage, even though those five or six visits
were spread over three different days -- really, definitely
two days, possibly three days.

Is there any way that that can be explained?

Mr. Scelso. Simply the fact that these photo-operations
are not set up, really, primarily to photograph and identify
unknown people entering and leaving the Embassy. They are set
primarily to get good photos, recognition photos, of the
Soviet personnel or Cuban personnel in the place so that this
can be shown to our surveillance teams, you see, and to other
people of operational interest to us.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, it would not seem that you would
require a constant surveillance operation if you were just
interested in the personnel of the particular government.

Mr. Scelso. You also get visitors. You are able, for
example, to identify visiting Cuban or Soviet intelligence
personnel.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you regard it unusual, nevertheless,
that Oswald managed to avoid being photographed?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I do. And the possibility is that
he was extremely furtive. After all, he was not a novice at
this sort of thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. It I could just use your wild guess,
as you put it, and I want to have you understand that I am
not holding you to that estimate, but assuming for the moment
the camera gets one-half the people that enter and say he
makes five visits and not six, the chances of a person missing
being photographed, making five visits, if the coverage catches
half of the people, would be $1/2^5$, so it is $1/32$. And yet,
Oswald is our one case in 32. He managed to avoid being
photographed.

Are you certain that the Mexico City station never
obtained any photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Scelso. I never heard that they did. I never heard of their concealing it, nor could I conceive that they would have concealed it.

The thought that they might have gotten it, that the Agency or the station might have suppressed it deliberately to cover up their omission to send it to Headquarters, or something like that is to me, that is inconceivable. I never heard it. And in view, of course, of some of the disclosures that have been made in the Senate investigation of what the Bureau did with Oswald's threatening letter, you can conceive of anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is why we are here today.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

I never heard it. In view of the fact that Winn Scott in his own station was not a noncontroversial figure, there were plenty of people in the station who hated his guts, it would have probably had leaked out.

Oswald, being a defector and so on and leading a sort of conspiratorial life, he was perfectly capable of so approaching the Cuban Embassy or the Soviet Embassy that his face could not be photographed. In other words, if this is the Soviet Embassy and our vantagepoint is over here, he can walk under the window and walk straight across the street.

Mr. Goldsmith. You would have to know.
Mr. Scelso. You can figure where it is. It can only be in a certain number of places.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to the question of Ugarte for a moment, I will ask the question, to your knowledge, was he employed in any way by the CIA?

Mr. Scelso. No. He was not carried by us as an agent, as far as I recall. I think we did have knowledge, or our Nicaragua station did have knowledge that he existed and was being used against the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying he had no relationship whatsoever to the CIA?

Mr. Scelso. Of course, in the laws of agency, you know, he was somewhere out on the end of the line, like the agents of all the liaison services that we liaise with, and help train, and whose operations we systematically monitor, either superficially or intensely.

I do not recall that we were in any way giving him instructions indirectly, or that we placed any importance on the operation. But we count as agents of ours people who are responsible to our guidance on a day to day basis.

Mr. Goldsmith. In that sense, as you define it, was he an agent?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was he an asset or a source?

Mr. Scelso. Not of ours, but of the Nicaraguan service.
Mr. Goldsmith. What control did the Agency have over the Nicaraguan service?

Mr. Scelso. Almost none. We did not attempt to direct their operations anywhere in the world. Our relations with Nicaragua, our political relations and U.S. political relations and ours as an agency was to talk to them, attempt to improve their political posture in their own country, to ameliorate their brutality and their repressive tactics. We had no charter to overthrow Somoza, so we kept in contact with him on a local basis so that we could monitor what they were doing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware of Somoza's support of the anti-Castro Cubans?

Mr. Scelso. Where or when?

Mr. Goldsmith. 1963.

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any specific operations of his supporting anti-Castro Cubans, but I could well conceive of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about support given to anti-Castro Cubans by the Nicaraguan intelligence people?

Mr. Scelso. What do you mean, financial support?

Mr. Goldsmith. Financial support, military.

Mr. Scelso. To Cuban exile groups that were anti-Castro?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall having known of any such
thing because it would have been, to us, a trivial matter.

What we were concerned about with Somoza were his activities inside of his home country, principally.

Mr. Goldsmith. If he had been giving support to anti-Castro Cubans, you would have considered that as trivial?

Mr. Scelso. Sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why?

Mr. Scelso. Not a matter -- in other words, we would not have predicated any operations based on it. We would not have attempted to recruit agents to monitor his support of anti-Cuban operations, anti-Castro groups or anything like that.

We would have received and disseminated any information which came our way.

Mr. Goldsmith. It would seem to me that it would be in the interests of the United States to become aware of all the anti-Castro activities.

Mr. Scelso. Oh, sure. I say our station would have known it if it had been going on, and our Headquarters, but I just do not recall it. You see, Somoza was active against Costa Rica. His diplomats were engaging in smuggling money for the U.S. Mafia. He was assassinating people, brutalizing the population, conducting guerrilla warfare.

He was at odds with the government of Honduras which harbored anti-Somoza groups and so on.
If he was also in left field supporting anti-Castro groups, this was one facet of his operations and would not have been of any significance to us. We would have disseminated it to the State Department.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware that J. C. King supported anti-Castro groups out of Division funds?

Mr. Scelso. Sure, through Miami, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware that that was done separately from SAS or from Task Force W?

Mr. Scelso. Well, let me think. The various stations had contact with anti-Castro groups at various stations in Latin America and may have financed them. Whether J.C. King may have done this -- I would not have put it past him. He did all sorts of personal operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that have been unauthorized?

Mr. Scelso. He could authorize it himself as Division Chief.

Mr. Goldsmith. Might he have done that with the groups in Nicaragua, the anti-Castro groups in Nicaragua?

Mr. Scelso. Sure he might have. It seems -- well, noting is too farfetched for him to have done. He went personally into Columbia, or someplace, and went up into the hills and personally met the leader of some great guerrilla organization that had been murdering people right and left when he was Division Chief.
Mr. Goldsmith. What was the nature of the types of
groups that J. C. King was supporting?

Mr. Scelso. As I can say, I do not know he ran any
personal operations supporting any groups outside of this fram-
work of division operations run through the stations and
branches.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is conceivable to me that he was,
but you have no direct knowledge.

Mr. Scelso. No direct knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he is still alive today?

Mr. Scelso. No, I do not. When I was here a year ago
on vacation I heard that he was dying, or he was very senile.

Mr. Goldsmith. How about Mr. Herbert, who you mentioned
before.

Mr. Scelso. Yes?

Mr. Goldsmith. Is he alive today?

Mr. Scelso. As far as I know. He was in Argentina.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think he would know about J. C.
King's operations?

Mr. Scelso. Very probably. Mr. Herbert was in Argen-
tina. You are not at a loss as to his whereabouts, are you?

Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency will make him available to
us. Excuse me for a moment.

(Pause)

Did Headquarters station ever criticize, in any way,
the manner in which they handled the Oswald case prior to the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. Not that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. Not that I know of.

You pointed out that they admitted to doing certain things. My position has been that they did, of course, fail to disclose the contact with the Cuban Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Also the fact that Oswald was applying for a visa.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have another line of questioning to go through with you. I do not know how long it will take me. If you would like to break for lunch, you may do so.

Mr. Scelso. I leave it up to you. I can stay all day long.

(Whereupon at 12:30 the Executive Session recessed to reconvene at 1:30 p.m.)

I think you probably could argue that the record of the questions and the questions to correspond about this is just as a finding of the United States without an opinion in a similar manner all of the documents and it was an opinion.

To have any opposition that you can think of the

timetable on the part of the Senate. ——
AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:40 p.m.)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN SCELSE -- Resumed

Mr. Goldsmith. Two general questions pertaining to this morning. I think you could probably sense from the thrust of the questions that the Committee is disturbed about what it sees as a failure by the Mexico City station to communicate in a timely manner all of the information that it had to Headquarters.

Is there any explanation that you can think of for that failure on the part of the Mexico City station?
Mr. Scelso. I can hypothesize an explanation. Mr.
Phillips -- you have talked to Dave Phillips?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelso. He should know. He was down there. But to
me, it would seem that in screening the information, they did
not attach any importance to the added information. In other
words, it was not earthquaking.

Mr. Goldsmith. We agreed that it was important, in fact,
it was sufficiently important to warrant sending a cable
instead of a dispatch.

Mr. Scelso. Almost always things like that were cabled
in, but the added information gained from the other meetings,
from the monitoring of the other telephone calls and Oswald's
other visits, it was not regarded as sufficiently important
to warrant dissemination.

In other words, here you have a kook, you see -- to
follow the line of thinking, a kook -- who had defected once
and had come back and now wanted to defect again. You see,
possibly, this is not -- in the scale of values, you see,
was not then of any great significance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though this particular kook hap-
pened to go not just to the Soviet Embassy but also to the
Cuban Embassy?

Mr. Scelso. Well, the contact was obvious, you see.
He wanted to get a visa and, from there, to Russia.
Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any reason at all why the Mexico City Station did not communicate in a timely manner Oswald's contacts with the Embassies on September 27th?

Mr. Scelso. Overwork.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of the assassination, the Mexico City station was sending materials pertaining to the contact on September 28th and October 1st.

Mr. Scelso. They sent the one on the 27th in last.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is right.

Mr. Scelso. In the rush of events, you see, they came across that transcript somewhere in the stack and sent it. I do not think they were suppressing it for any reason. I cannot conceive why they would have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the Agency had a taperecording of Oswald's voice, where would it be today?

Mr. Scelso. In Registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which Registry?

Mr. Scelso. The central Registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the name it goes by, the Central Registry?

Mr. Scelso. That is what it used to be called.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the Central Registry used for?

Mr. Scelso. That is where all our records are deposited.

Mr. Goldsmith. With the 201 files contained in the
Central Registry?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I thought the 201 file was the file that was maintained by DDO?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, but there are 201 files in the Registry, too. Some of them are maintained on the desk and other ones are in the Registry.

I would assume, since the Oswald case is a defunct case, you see, that his 201 would be in the Registry now. As long as it were active, it would be on the desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many copies are there of a particular 201 file?

Mr. Scelso. There might be one in Central Registry and another one on the desk where the case is active.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would these files be duplicative, completely, of each other?

Mr. Scelso. Not necessarily. The Registry would put in only the documents which they get, you see, and the desk might have additional inter-office memorandum, and so on, which they would keep.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that that 201 file contains only biographical information?

Mr. Scelso. I think it could contain operational information, too.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the routine manner in which
information is maintained in files?

Mr. Scelso. It is usually kept in project files. Our systemized activity abroad is done under the name of projects for budgeting and management purposes and to keep an operational, work in an operational file.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you wanted to find out which operations that particular agent had been involved in, and you did not know the names of the operations, how would you go about making that determination?

Mr. Scelso. Usually an agent is in a project, you see, and his cryptonym, like LIENVOY and LITENSOR will indicate the project he is in, so all the information he is in is in that project.

In addition, you can trace his name through Central Registry and get back all the references which might be in other files.

Mr. Goldsmith. So Central Registry will indicate what projects he has been involved in?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. They would send you a list of items, cables and dispatches, referring to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. There could be hundreds, though.

Mr. Scelso. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the most expeditious way to find out what operations an agent has been involved in?

Mr. Scelso. Go to the desk and ask them.
Mr. Goldsmith. Which desk, now?

Mr. Scelso. The area desk that was responsible for him.

If he is still in the Division, they will have a complete file on him on the desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would that file be the 201 file, or some other kind of file?

Mr. Scelso. It probably would be a project file. If he is a security suspect, you see, it would be a 201 file. If he is an agent of ours, he would be in a project file.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us say that, over a ten-year period, an agent has been involved in a dozen operations. How would you find out which operations he had been involved in?

Mr. Scelso. He has a cryptonym, you see, and there is a file on that cryptonym and in that would be all correspondence, dispatches and câbles relating to that cryptonym.

So all of his activity would be reflected in that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Agents do not keep the same cryptonym over the years, do they?

Mr. Scelso. That is right. Then you might have to look in several different projects.

Mr. Goldsmith. You would not know which registry to look into unless you knew the cryptonym in advance?

Mr. Scelso. Well, his file would indicate if there was a change of cryptonym.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which file, the 201 file?
Mr. Scelso. The 201 file and the project file, as well. Agents rarely change cryptonyms unless the old cryptonym has been compromised.

Mr. Goldsmith. My understanding is the cryptonym is given to an agent at the beginning of his involvement in a particular project.

For example, let's take AMLASH, and the "AM" would pertain to the particular project, would it not?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. That would mean Cuban.

Mr. Goldsmith. Say he starts working on a project in a completely different area, Czechoslovakia. Would he still retain the cryptonym AMLASH?

Mr. Scelso. He would ordinarily keep the same cryptonym. Cuban agents worldwide have the AM cryptonym even though they may be stationed in Poland, or something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, you are saying that the most expeditious manner to find out what files an agent has been involved in would be to go to his 201 file, determine what his cryptonym is, and from there look up his cryptonym and bring your references, I guess in a particular index of cryptonyms. That would give you a reference to the projects he has been involved in, or all correspondence pertaining.

Mr. Scelso. From the cryptonym, you could tell which branch he worked under, each nation, each nationality has the two letters which designates the nationality. You can go to
the desk and ask them.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would they know?

Mr. Scelso. They would have a file on that.

Mr. Goldsmith. On that cryptonym?

Mr. Scelso. That cryptonym.

If it were active, it would be in Registry. Sometimes it does take a lot of research. They will wheel out sometimes in a cart, like a supermarket cart, only it's two-storeys, this many, twice as many files.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a rule, the information, operational information pertaining to an agent will be contained in the project files?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true CIA case officers do not have crypotonyms?

Mr. Scelso. Well, staff case officers who are staff employees like I was a staff employee, just has pseudonyms. Agents have crypotonyms.

Mr. Goldsmith. An agent is not somebody who you would consider to be a CIA employee?

Mr. Scelso. That is right. He is in a contractual relationship of some kind. This is a myth, of course, because there is not any contract, really, but there is an agreement.

There are certain types of high-level agents who are staff agents, who have staff status, but they are not employees.
For instance, if I had been sent abroad under cover as a private individual, leaving the office in McLean, going abroad as a businessman or something like that, I would have become a staff agent and I would still have a pseudonym.

We have what we call principal agents abroad who work for us full-time who have pseudonyms and others who have cryptonyms. When a man gets into something approaching an employee relationship with the U.S. government and has survivorship rights, pension rights, he usually gets a pseudonym so that he can sign papers, vouchers and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. A pseudonym is distinguishable from an operational alias, is it not?

Mr. Scelso. It is different, but it is not distinguishable by looking at it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Understood.

Mr. Scelso. It is different.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the case officer has a pseudonym he uses for correspondence, that is not a name you would use as an operational alias dealing with the agents?

Mr. Scelso. A case officer -- I used to use a different name with every agent I ran.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would you remember which name to use?

Mr. Scelso. I had a pretty good memory. I would look at the file. I might be running twelve agents in the station.
I had no trouble remembering it. In later years I did when
I ran into some of these people on the street.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know any CIA case officer whose
name is Maurice Bishop?

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any such person.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Dave Phillips ever
used the name Maurice Bishop as an operational alias or a
pseudonym?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning now to the post-assassination
period, what responsibilities, if any, did you have with
regard to the CIA's investigation of the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. I think it was the day after the assassina-
tion, Mr. Helms called a meeting of a lot of important people,
including Angleton; the Chief of our Division, Mr. Karamessinas;
I think somebody from the Cuban show, and told them that I
was in charge of the investigation and gave me broad powers
and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did he pick you?

Mr. Scelso. He picked me primarily because it fell into
my balliwick anyway and because he had known me for years as
a polygraph operator and as a man who had successfully inves-
tigated a number of very, very big operations and security
problems.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say it fell into your balliwick
anyway, for the record, what was that balliwick?

   Mr. Scelso. I had a Branch then that included Mexico, and the Central American countries and Panama. Because Oswald had been in Mexico, he gave it to me.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Oswald had also been to Soviet Russia.

   Mr. Scelso. That is right.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Any reason why that person was not chosen?

   Mr. Scelso. Helms had a way of doing things like this, particularly in my case. I had investigated the disappearance of the Chief of the West German Security Service in 1964 and I had investigated a number of other giant operations of absolutely critical importance for him over the years, and had come up, you know, with the right answers.

   Mr. Goldsmith. What was Helms' attitude towards the man on which the investigation was to be conducted?

   Mr. Scelso. Helms wanted everything done right that -- he did not give me any detailed instructions.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever push you one way or another towards finding conspiracy or no conspiracy?

   Mr. Scelso. No.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Did he ever pressure you, in any way, to get the job done within certain time limitations?

   Mr. Scelso. No.

   What happened was -- as I say, Angleton kept on seeing
the FBI and he also saw members of the Warren Commission, which
was in direct violation of Helms' instructions. Helms
refused to make him stop doing this. Angleton would not
invite me to these meetings. I called this to Mr. Helms'
attention.

So I worked as fast as I could with the material that
I had and prepared a summary report of the events in Mexico
and other things we knew about Oswald, which was, in light
of later events, very sketchy.

Then, after a number of weeks -- I think it was around
Christmas, but it may have been in mid-January, Nicholas
Katzenbach notified us that the Bureau's report had been
given to him and asked the Agency to send people over to read
it. So Birch O'Neal and I went over and read it and it con-
tained vast amounts of information which we had not known.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was Birch O'Neal still involved in
this?

Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal was still involved in it
because the CI staff was helping with the investigation.

It had answers, for example, to the letter intercepts
that went various places. They were the repository of letter
intercepts.

Mr. Goldsmith. You said that the FBI report contained a
lot of information that you did not know about?

Mr. Scelso. That is right. Just a lot of vital information

001895
that they had not disseminated to us.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give some examples of that?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Details of Oswald's political activity in the United States; the pro-Cuban activity; the fact that he had shot at General Walker; the fact that diaries and biographical sketches, autobiographical sketches of himself had been found among his effects; and so on.

And so, in just about everything, the Bureau had deluged us with hundreds, if not thousands, of reports of people giving fragmentary bits of information, you see, and kept us busy tracing the names and researching it, and so on; but these vital things had never been communicated to me. Maybe they were communicated to Angleton, but not to me.

It so happened that my report, my initial report — actually I wrote an initial report about two days after the assassination, which Mr. Helms took to President Johnson, the gist of which was, as far as we could see, Oswald was the assassin and there was no indication that we had that there were other participants in the assassination; and there was no indication, visible indication, that he was a Soviet or a Cuban agent, even though the possibility could not be excluded. And my later report was more comprehensive, but was obviously, completely irrelevant in view of all of this Bureau information.
Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a tension between the Agency and the Bureau by virtue of the Bureau having a much more complete report than yours, and apparently not having given you all the information that had existed?

Mr. Scelso. I did not see any. I did not see any tension. Everybody felt that this was the Bureau's case because they were in charge of watching over Oswald. That was their responsibility, not ours, and therefore we are not going to harrass them, or anything like that.

I personally felt a little put out when I discovered that they had all of this information and had not passed it to me. Knowing the Bureau, I did not get upset about this. I was glad to have all of this information and just at the time that my report was submitted, I had circulated it to the important people, including Angleton, and a meeting was called and everybody was to discuss this case, discuss my report.

I think that the day of the meeting, or the day before the meeting, I had read the Bureau's report in Katzenbach's office and made a few notes and came back and said my report is irrelevant; in view of all the added information, this thing now takes on an entirely different dimension. Whereupon, Helms -- Angleton started to criticize my report terribly -- without pointing out any inaccuracies, it was so full of wrong things, we could not possibly send it to the Bureau, and
I just sat there and I did not say a word. This was a typical Angleton performance. I had invited him to comment on the report and he had withheld all of his comments until he got to the meeting whereupon Helms turned the operation, the investigation, over to Angleton's staff.

Meantime, I was up to my neck in Panama demonstrations and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the name Ann Egerton familiar to you?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, it is. I've heard the name.

Mr. Goldsmith. She was a woman who was a CIA analyst.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, sir, on Angleton's staff in Mexico.

Mr. Goldsmith. With Birth O'Neal?

Mr. Scelso. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. She was the woman who opened up Oswald's 201 file. Did she have any involvement in the investigation of the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. I suppose she did in Birch O'Neal's office, probably kept the books for him and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, you have no information about that?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Charlotte Bustos? What involvement did she have?

Mr. Scelso. Charlotte Bustos supported me in handling all the details of the investigation, running traces on all...
the people that came up, and keeping track of the files, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. We have been told -- the Committee has been told by two different sources formerly with the Agency that shortly after the assassination Charlotte Bustos found a photograph thought to be of Oswald. Do you know whether, in fact, such a photo was found?

Mr. Scelos. I do not recall any such thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. If she had found it, would you have been the person she would have shown it to?

Mr. Scelos. Absolutely.

Mr. Goldsmith. You never saw such a photograph?

Mr. Scelos. Not that I recall. You are reasonably sure that it is not the unknown man?

Mr. Goldsmith. That is correct. I will qualify my answer and say I am not reasonably sure of anything. I am basing my question upon testimony we have received from other individuals.

Mr. Scelos. It is possible that she found a photograph of him, that the ONI may have sent later. I do not think there was anyone in our files. I do not recall one being found.

Mr. Goldsmith. You said shortly after the assassination you wrote a report that was submitted to the President and the report, in substance, said Oswald did it alone and we have
nothing to indicate to the contrary.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it was premature a point
to be issuing a report of that kind?

Mr. Scelso. No, because the President wanted it. He
wanted a rundown on what we had and thought. The thing was
couched in such terms, we hedged.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is a copy of that report still available
in Headquarters?

Mr. Scelso. It should be someplace. I gather that
the Church Committee did not find it either. It should have
been in Helms' files, or something.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it uncommon for reports to get lost
at Headquarters?

Mr. Scelso. Memoranda of this kind -- this was a
memorandum, you see, about a page and a half, or two or
three pages long. I frequently had to write things like this
to go to the White House. Either J. C. King took them or
Helms took them -- with my new electric typewriter.

They wanted to know -- the President wanted something.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Is it common for things like that to get lost?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, it would be very uncommon. I had a
file on the case, my own file in my own safe and it should
be in there. And it should be in Helms' files.
Mr. Goldsmith. That leads me right into another question that I was going to address to you. Specifically, whenever an agency employee writes a memorandum of some sort, or sends out correspondence, would a copy of that memorandum or correspondence go into his own file?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would it go?

Mr. Scelso. It depends on what it was. If it is a dispatch, you see, going to the field, it goes into a chronofile where everything is numbered, you see; a copy of each dispatch that goes out, and it also goes into the project file. And, if it was not associated with the project, it goes in any number of subject files. If it were a personnel memorandum or a policy memorandum or liaison and general communications, it would go in an appropriate file in the branch.

Also, it would be filed and sent to Registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that, for example, something might go into one of Mr. Helms' files.

Mr. Scelso. Yes. Helms kept files of memoranda which were addressed to him or went through him.

Mr. Goldsmith. It must have been voluminous files.

Mr. Scelso. Sure.

These were things that were not routine Agency correspondence.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did his files include correspondence,
copies of correspondence that he sent to other people?

Mr. Scelso. I would think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that you had maintained a file on your desk or in your safe, rather?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that be today?

Mr. Scelso. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, would you take that material with you, or did you leave it at the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. I left it in the Branch. It probably was torn to pieces and everything that was duplicated was destroyed and the unique memoranda was sent to Registry when I left.

I did not take any files with me, except some personnel things that I had on myself.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was any consideration ever given by you during your investigation, or after your investigation, that Oswald may have been a CIA agent?

Mr. Scelso. Well, we immediately retraced him. We traced him before; we retraced him. Then, for members of the Warren Commission in their presence, we retraced him again.

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by "retraced him?"

Mr. Scelso. This is a procedure whereby you go down to Central Registry and hand them a trace request with the 201 number on it and all his complete name and so on and date on him. They then, using their computers and so on, run through
the thing and get a machine run of all references to him. They did this in the presence of a Warren Commission man so he could see could see how it worked.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that done specifically using Oswald's name?

Mr. Scelso. Oswald's name, that is right, to show him exactly how we were able disgorge whatever we had on Oswald.

Now, we knew right from the start that Oswald had never been an agent of the Agency, as far as the records show, and everybody concerned with it knew, or believed, that he had never been an agent of the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did you know that?

Mr. Scelso. Because all agents of the Agency are indicated in Registry, you see, under a cryptonym or with reference to another desk, with reference to a certain desk with an instruction, go to a certain desk and ask them. This is done with extremely sensitive cases and also done with security suspects of great importance. Oswald did not show up in any such contracts.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who checked that, did you?

Mr. Scelso. Charlotte Bustos, and it was later checked by the CI staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustos, was she on your staff?

Mr. Scelso. My branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Western Hemisphere?
Mr. Scelso. She was primarily the Mexican desk, although later she may have had branch-wide responsibilities. I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was Oswald ever an agent of the CIA?

Mr. Scelso. Never in any sense.

Mr. Goldsmith. If an agent has a 201 file and I would like to indicate to you that I understand that the fact that there is a 201 file, that someone is not an agent -- if an agent has a 201 file, would the papers maintained in that file be maintained there in chronological order?

Mr. Scelso. I think the 201 file has a number of different parts to it. There is biographic information, administrative information and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would each different part be maintained in a different file?

Mr. Scelso. It is usually in the same folder.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the same folder.

Mr. Scelso. Unless it is a giant file, then it may be subdivided.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, would it be in chronological order, so the first paper would come from the bottom, the next one and the next one?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the file is not in chronological order,
would that suggest that the file had been tampered with in any way?

Mr. Scelso. It might have been reorganized, conceivably when it was put together, you see, it may have been put together in disparate pieces of paper gathered from all around, and the person who put the file, created the file, out of nothing, may have put them in some other order rather than chronological order.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are there any written criteria or regulations covering the manner in which 201 files have to be maintained?

Mr. Scelso. There may be, I do not know. You know, I never went to Central Registry the entire time I was in Washington, for eight years -- I did once. It was what we called a Registry tour, which was a one-week briefing on Registry and I never took it.

Not only that, after my initial training course of four weeks -- it was a six-week course, but I came in two weeks late -- in 1947, I never took a training course in my entire career. I am about the only officer that never did. Helms would never let me take time to take training courses.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that Oswald may have been an FBI informant?

Mr. Scelso. No. He was in touch -- the FBI was in touch with him. You know that, of course.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that Oswald may have been an agent of the Department of Defense Intelligence?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. If he had been, would you have known about it?

Mr. Scelso. No, not necessarily. They could have concealed it from us. Technically, under Presidential order, they should have coordinated the operation with the Central Intelligence Agency at some point, if Oswald was a source of theirs overseas. But compliance with that Presidential directive was spotty.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know a man by the name of John McVickar?

Mr. Scelso. It does not ring a bell. It barely rings a bell in the distance.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that you just read the book, "Legend." In that book, a woman by the name of Priscilla Johnson is mentioned. She was a newspaper reporter who interviewed Oswald when he was in Russian.

Do you have any reason to believe that Priscilla Johnson MacMillan may have been an Agency employee?

Mr. Scelso. I never heard it. The way things developed a lot of things happened that I did not know or I did not find out.
Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of the record, I should ask you, if possible please try to let me finish my questions, because otherwise, the record will look as though I am asking a question and you are most of the time anticipating what I am getting at, but you are answering me very quickly, so the record will look chopped up if you do not let me finish my question.

What about a woman named Aileen Mosby, also a correspondent in Moscow. Do you have any reason to believe that she would have been an employee of the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. I had known nothing about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. A newspaper correspondent called A. I. Korengold, the last name is Korengold.

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. How about Goldberg, A. I. Goldberg?

Mr. Scelso. No. I might say that I did not know. I am pretty sure I never knew the names of any American journalist that we might have used in Russia. Although I once did a survey of all of our journalist operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that CIA's Moscow station was run somewhat differently than other stations.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you summarize for us again why and how it was run differently?

Mr. Scelso. Well, Soviet and satellite operations, in
general were very, very highly compartmented. Successful
recruitments of Soviet or satellite officials were handled
with special cryptonyms and did not come to the attention of
other divisions or branches unless it were absolutely neces-
sary -- for instance, had they recruited somebody like that
in Mexico City, I would have known about the operation.

However, if a Soviet agent of ours had been transferred
from Paris to Mexico City, I might not have learned of it.

Even when I was later Chief of Foreign Intelligence operations,
my purview did not include those successful Soviet and satel-
lite operations which were in being. It did include a survey
of our efforts to make such recruitments and stations all
around the world.

My authority did not cover the Moscow station at any
time. That was entirely separate. I never was told who was
there or what they were doing.

Mr. Goldsmith. You might normally know which Agency employ-
ees were at another station.

Mr. SceIso. Yes. Almost always I could find that
out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Moscow?

Mr. SceIso. Moscow was never discussed with any of the
panels which I sat on, nor were there projects submitted to
me for approval.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that the Moscow station
would have had a Chief of Station?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, but I doubt it. I would doubt it. I always thought that there was only one man in Moscow, and now there were probably more than one.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would there be relatively few people assigned to the Moscow station?

Mr. Scelso. I don't know. It would be hard to get them in. It would be hard to find a seasoned officer -- there is no sense sending an novice -- a seasoned officer who was not blown, as they say, whose cover had not been compromised.

However, it appears that it did not make much difference because some of the people they sent there must have been compromised.

In general, the chiefs of the Soviet effort were extremely jealous of their prerogatives and found it much easier to cooperate without anybody critiquing their work.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that, by virtue of the secrecy in which Soviet operations were run and specifically in secrecy with which the Moscow station tended to operate that Oswald may have been recruited as a CIA agent and that no record would have been maintained of it?

Mr. Scelso. A record would have been maintained of it. The Soviet Division had records, definitely, and they had to brief important people about the operations, particularly the Director. But there were operations, for example, a number of
operations in the clandestine services that neither the DDO
nor the ADDO knew.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, here is a problem that
the Committee is confronted with.

We recently introduced an employee who, as I mentioned
earlier today, indicated that looking at his records, every
indication on that record would be that he had retired from
the Agency in the mid-50's when actually he had been with the
Agency throughout and had continued one way or the other,
whether it was to be paid by the Agency or by the State Depart-
ment, he was still working for the Agency. There was no
record of his Agency connection at Langley.

Mr. Sceiso. He may say that, but I do not believe it
is true. There would certainly be files on him in the opera-
tional branches which were concerned with his work. He may
have been purged from the normal personnel records, and so
on, but he would have been continued in operational files
which may have existed in only one file in the Branch where
he was managed.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that it is possible that the
personnel file would be purged in some manner, or would be
written up in a manner to indicate that he was no longer with
the Agency? And it is possible that there would be just
one operational file which indicates that, in fact, he was
still with the Agency and unless you knew this man's cryptonym

001910
and went to that project file, you would never know.

Mr. Scelso. Sure. Very probably yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible, taking it a step further, that the person would not even have a personnel file?

Mr. Scelso. You mean in the Office of Personnel? The Office of Personnel has files on all staff members.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Scelso. His retirement file would have been taken out to a depo in Virginia. He would have been still in a card file, however, in Personnel. A card file would show that he is a former employee.

Anything is possible, whether Oswald was a CIA agent, but it certainly was concealed from me if he were. I will say that Oswald was a person of a type who would never have been recruited by the Agency to work behind the Iron Curtain; or anywhere else.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Scelso. Because his personality and background completely disqualified him for clandestine work or for work as an agent to carry out the instructions of the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you go into more detail? This is really an important area, if you would care to elaborate a bit.

Mr. Scelso. When the Agency hires an agent, engages someone to do our work and gives him a certain amount of training and places him under our guidance, whether we pay him or not
or whether he signs an agreement or not, he has to meet certain standards, he has to go through a security check, a file check. And the Counterintelligence Staff has to examine his personality and his background and evaluate his reliability.

If he gets more than $15,000 a year, if he got more than $15,000, if the operation called for more than $15,000 a year, back in those days it would have gone through my branch. If he had been recruited in the Soviet Union, he would not have gone through my Branch.

Well, Oswald, by virtue of his background and so on, would miserably fail to meet our minimum qualifications. Oswald would have been debriefed had he walked in and volunteered information, you see. However, he would not have been given any mission to perform.

He might have been given instructions, you see, which would tend to neutralize him and make him less of a nuisance and danger than he otherwise would be, like go away and do not contact us anymore.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about the flip side of all of this? Is there any reason to think that Oswald was recruited by the KGB?

Mr. Scelso. Indeed, he certainly must have been debriefed by the KGB. I would think they would have debriefed him on his military information. I do not think that the KGB would have recruited him to be their agent after he left Russia.
Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Scelso. Because they were intimately acquainted with his ways and his habits and his background and would not have regarded him as a reliable collaborator.

Mr. Goldsmith. Unless both, in the case of the KGB or CIA, as Epstein says in his book, Oswald's background is simply a legend, fictional. It does not accurately portray his true characteristics.

Mr. Scelso. If Oswald, you mean, in his teens had been briefed to act like an unreliable kook and build up a legend like that. However, the Russians are just as careful, or more careful, about this kind of thing than we are and I just do not think -- Oswald's whole pattern of life was that of a very badly, emotionally unbalanced young man.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's get into the area of the CIA's investigation of the assassination in more detail. First, can you tell us how the investigation was organized?

Mr. Scelso. Well, practically my whole Branch participated in the thing. We dropped almost everything else and I put a lot of my officers to work on tracing names, analyzing files.

We were flooded with cable traffic, with reports, suggestions, allegations from all over the world, and these things had to be checked out. We were checking out just dozens and dozens of people all of the time.
Mr. Goldsmith. Was the information routinely passed around to the FBI?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. Everything that appeared to be relevant. A vast amount of fabrication came in.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any structure in the manner in which this was organized? You were the man in charge. How were things organized below you?

Mr. Scelso. Well, I ran the whole thing and I used my staff to help me.

Mr. Goldsmith. How big was your staff?

Mr. Scelso. I had about 30 officers and about 30 clerical help. Not all of the officers do this, but a great many of them did.

Mr. Goldsmith. What instructions, if any, were given to the field stations as to investigating the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. The only station that was directly involved was Mexico. The possible involvement of our Miami station did not emerge, as I recall it, until we read the Bureau report and a few of Oswald's pro-Castro activities in the United States.

Just around this time I was relieved of responsibility for the investigation, so that -- well, we cabled Nicaragua to find out about Ugarte. We were in correspondence with Melbourne and God knows what about reports which were coming in from anonymous or published sources, and so on. In those
areas, they were all fabrications, bizarre fabrications.

Mr. Goldsmith. Essentially, however, there was really only one field station actively involved in this?

Mr. Scelso. Well, there was a certain amount of traffic that was Scandinavian about Oswald's trip. There was correspondence with the British about the possibility that he had been there -- I think he had been there-- and so on, traces coming in from them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the field stations specifically instructed to pursue this case in any manner, and pass along all leads?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that, in fact, all of the stations are involved, or were instructed to participate in the investigation?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know whether any general guidance went out to the whole world, but the whole world was alerted to it, and the key stations were receiving tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out any instructions saying everybody participate in the investigation of the Kennedy case.

Oswald's name was public knowledge, you see. It was in all the newspapers in the world.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the various field stations ordered
to contact their various sources for information of potential leads?

Mr. Scelso. I do not think they were. This kind of thing is routine, you see.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying they would have done it without being ordered to?

Mr. Scelso. Sure, they should have. That was not the problem. The problem is that they were sending in too much information, which was fabricated.

Mr. Goldsmith. How was the information which came in from the field evaluated?

Mr. Scelso. Traces were done on the people concerned. The information was passed to the Warren Commission and to the FBI and to whatever government agencies were concerned. It was evaluated by us, queries were sent out, comments, requests for follow-up.

Actually, very little information came from anywhere — information that was worth anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. With the exception of Mexico City?

Mr. Scelso. Mexico City and Nicaragua and the Ugarte case, a few cables on that. That is about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is also one from, as I recall it, other Scandinavian countries or Czechoslovakia involving a statement made by a Cuban Embassy officer. Do you recall that one?
Mr. Scelso. Vaguely, yes. There was a vast amount of fabrication that came in. We were deluged with it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Once a report came in, what steps would you go through to determine whether or not it was accurate?

Mr. Scelso. We would trace the names first and we would compare it with what we already knew about the case and with Oswald's movements, and so on. Then we had to use our judgment. We passed along a lot of things that we knew were untrue, just on their face.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say pass them along, what do you mean?

Mr. Scelso. Pass them along to the FBI and the Warren Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. With any evaluation as to their accuracy?

Mr. Scelso. Usually with some. As I say, there was a lot of traffic, but most of it was just weirdo stuff. A particular one from Australia which tried to place the blame on the Poles, I believe.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to the question of organization, your staff was not the CI staff?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your staff was Western Hemisphere?

Mr. Scelso. Just the geographical staff, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did CI staff get involved in the investigation?
Mr. Scleso. Finally, Helms turned the entire thing over to them.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was this?

Mr. Scleso. As I recall, my recollection was that it was around Christmastime, but I think Mr. Rock said it was in January. I do not remember. You should be able to establish it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Helms tell you why the investigation was being turned over to Angleton and his crew?

Mr. Scleso. No. The turnover was made in this final meeting when I suggested that it be turned over because of the Soviet angle that had now been discovered, the disclosure about his biographic information about his stay in the Soviet Russia, which was obviously very important.

Mr. Goldsmith. You knew that he had been in Soviet Russia before.

Mr. Scleso. That is true, but almost no information about what he had done there.

Now, suddenly, here are biographical sketches, plus the Bureau's information from Marina Oswald which we had never had.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to Book 5 of the Senate Report, the Agency tended to focus more on the Soviet aspect of the case than the Cuban aspect of the case. Is that an accurate conclusion?
Mr. Scelso. I think after Angleton took it over, that was the case, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In retrospect, was that the way in which the investigation should have been conducted?

Mr. Scelso. I think both aspects were equally important. Had I known -- as you know, I did not know anything about the assassination plans of the CIA against Castro. This was not disclosed to me.

Had I known that, my investigation would have been entirely different.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way would it have been different?

Mr. Scelso. We would have gone down to principally our Miami station and had them kick off the full investigation. As it was, they were getting all kinds of leads, but we would have been putting much more emphasis in that direction, particularly in our analysis of the case.

My present feeling about the case is that Oswald was a genuine pro-Castro nut and he was excited about what he read in the papers about our attempts to knock off Castro. I, too, read these things in the paper and I thought, of course, that what Castro was referring to were the armed teams we were landing from time to time on the Cuban beaches. I did not know he might have been talking about general attempts to kill him personally as distinguished from overthrowing his government.
The emphasis on the Soviet Union particularly came after Nosenko came out -- when did he come out?

Mr. Goldsmith. March of '64.

Mr. Scelso. Within a couple of months after I turned the case over.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any resentment on your part towards having to turn the case over to Angleton?

Mr. Scelso. No. There was a resentment towards Angleton, which was chronic, but I was rather blunt, in view of the vast amount of documentation that the Bureau had produced and the vast amount of information, the great amount of written material on Oswald's stay in Russia which the Soviet Division was qualified to judge and analyze. I was not at all up-to-date on conditions in Soviet Russia, and they were plus the statements of Marine Oswald, and so on. This thing was entirely out of my depth. Plus the fact that I did have a Division Branch of six red-hot countries.

In January '64 came the big uprisings and demonstrations in Panama. Although Helms had relieved me of the responsibility for all of that, he had not given it to anybody else.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that, at some point, Winn Scott attempted to have you removed from your position?

Mr. Scelso. Possibly, I never heard.

Mr. Goldsmith. For that reason, you actually had some-what negative feelings towards Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scelso. I never had negative feelings to Scott, no. I still admire Scott as a great nonconformist and a very fine and decent guy. I know he worked his staff so hard that a lot of them hated them, and he could not have gotten me relieved anyway. There is nothing he could have said.

If you will excuse my saying so, when I did try to get out of the Division a couple of years later, I had a heck of a time getting out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yet Mr. Scott, despite his concern for competence and high performance, apparently did not dismiss any of his photosurveillance people after the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. That is correct. But, you see, photosurveillance is a highly controversial thing. The value of photosurveillance is a thing that a lot of people argue about. It is something that you have to have. It costs a lot in effort and money and it really does not produce anything sensational, in most cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. In this case, it produced our mystery man.

Mr. Scelso. Yes. We have photosurveillance a lot of places. What it produced was really good photos of the intelligence officers who worked in and out of the Embassy, which were very valuable for our surveillance teams. They could then recognize the people under all circumstances and never really produce very much else.
I remember occasions in Latin American where we had
photo-surveillance of secret hideouts of terrorist groups and
photographed all the terrorists who went in and out, at close
range, and this was very valuable and we were able to identify
a lot of terrorists. I remember sending a report, with
pictures, to President Johnson -- even to President Kennedy.

But photo-surveillance, the performance of the Mexico
City support apparatus, as we call surveillance, photo-surveil-
ance, phone taps and so forth, was unequalled in the world.
There is nothing like it anywhere else in the world.

Of course, it is just like the intelligence business --
it is a real dicey thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you leave your position as
head of Western Hemisphere-3?

Mr. Scelso. I left it in 1955. I relinquished the
Mexican desk in 1964, that was made a separate branch, and
I retained Central America and got the entire Caribbean
thrown in, except for Cuba.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you actually left the
Agency in 1970, were any of these surveillance operations in
Mexico City that you knew about, from 1963 and '64 still in
effect?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I think all of them were. I used to
review them every year; in my later capacity I reviewed all of
those things worldwide.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's operations one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. It was then. That is, the variety and number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other technical operations is exposed by Agee in his book. That exceeds anywhere else that we had in the world by a lot. There is no other station in the world that has that good operations.

Then came Caracas. That got to be real good. Nothing like it in Europe.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to a cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me. The cable is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he indicated and said the arrest of Sylvia Deran would jeopardize U.S. freedom of action.

Do you remember that cable?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why it was sent?

Mr. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that Oswald might not have been a Cuban agent, and the arrest of a foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under international law.

Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe, nevertheless, I did not think -- Karamessinas may not have
known that at the time, and simply felt that this breach of international law, violation of her immunity, might have made it awkward for the United States, if we wanted to let out a roar of outrage if we discovered that Castro had been behind the assassination.

In other words, Karamessinas feared that this whole thing might be laid at the United States' doorstep. In retrospect, he did not have to worry so much.

Mr. Goldsmith. What knowledge, if any, did you have of the AMLASH operation at the time of the assassination of the President?

Mr. Scelso. What is that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Cubella.

Mr. Scelso. None.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the first time that that came to your attention?

Mr. Scelso. During the Senate interrogation of me.

Mr. Goldsmith. You learned about it for the first time while you were testifying?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. They were leading around to it by a million different questions. I did not know what they were driving at. I had never heard of the operation before and I did not know of any of these attempts to assassinate Castro.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why you were not informed about them?
Mr. Scelso. Well, I was not informed about them before the assassination because I had no need to know, and Cuban operations were highly compartmented, very securely handled.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was head of Cuban operations?

Mr. Scelso. As I learned during that hearing -- they refreshed my memory -- it was Mr. Fitzgerald.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about William Harvey?

Mr. Scelso. Harvey, I don't know whether Harvey -- I think he was Chief later or earlier. I don't remember. Later, I think. I know both of these gentlemen very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Mr. Harvey like?

Mr. Scelso. Well, he is dead now. Harvey was a really hard-boiled, unsubtle, ruthless guy who was, in my opinion, a very dangerous man. I had run-ins with him several times. I also had to investigate one of his big cases and although I was always on friendly terms with him -- we never slugged it out with each other -- he never liked me and I never liked him.

Mr. Goldsmith. What types of cases did you investigate?

Mr. Scelso. I investigated cases of the apprehension of satellite intelligence officers when he was the Chief of the Berlin base, and when I feared that we had exceeded our authority in arresting these people, it turned out that we really had not.

I also investigated the case where a Berlin girl, an
agent of ours, turned on us and photographed a lot of people
in the station from a cardboard box in the basket of a bicycle.
This turned out to be a real problem. I had to investigate
that.

Then I investigated a famous communications intelligence
case that Harvey was mixed up in when he was the Chief of
the Communications Intelligence, the Deciphering Staff, and
so on. This turned out to be one of the biggest hoaxes in
our history.

Mr. Goldsmith. What happened there?

Mr. Scelso. For a number of years, the Agency had been
running a source in Austria who was to procure for us the
Soviet codes, and so on, Soviet intelligence, say for instance.
And I, as a polygraph operator, had to polygraph this guy a
couple of times.

By that time, we had spent a fortune on the operation
and they have never been able to crack this guy. He was
interrogated at length. He was on drugs, on hypnosis, under
the polygraph by the Blue Bird team and he beat them cold.
And then they gave him to me to interrogate for the second
time and I cracked him and made him admit that it was a hoax,
which made them all look bad.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Harvey had any
negative feelings towards the Kennedys?

Mr. Scelso. I only heard that he was sore at Bobby
Kennedy. Bobby Kennedy fired him because Harvey was a three-martini lunch man -- not because of the expense involved.

Harvey became --

Mr. Goldsmith. Fired him from what position?

Mr. Scelso. Relieved him as Chief of the Cuban Operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Sent to where?

Mr. Scelso. I do not remember. I do not know what happened to him. Maybe he went to Rome.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Harvey was running any operations outside the ordinary course of business?

Mr. Scelso. I did not know at that time. I just heard about this assassin he had on the payrolls and so on. To me, knowing nothing except that the man was a criminal, the assassin that he had on the payroll, and Harvey's nature, all I can say -- I would like to say first, among officers of my grade -- and I was a super-grade, and I had as broad a view as anybody of agency operations, -- the thought of our engaging in assassinations as distinguished from guerrilla warfare or coup d'etats, and so on, setting out by stealth and surprise to kill an important foreign person was abhorrent to the standards of the clandestine service and the fact that the way -- you know, what the response was in the Lumumba case. They refused to carry out the order, but they were guilty of conspiracy to commit homicide.
I think they ought to chisle that in the marble walls in McLean instead of some of the other stuff that they had. In discussions of assassinations which would always come out because the Russians were doing it all the time and had departments for doing it. We were constantly catching their agents who had assassinated people where these people would turn themselves in. The consensus of officers, including the greatest cynics, was that we would never do anything like that, as indeed we did not, as far as I know.

The very thought of Helms entrusting Harvey to hire a criminal to have the capacity to kill somebody violates every operational precept, every bit of operational experience, every ethical consideration. And the fact that he chose Harvey -- Harvey could keep a secret, you see. Harvey could keep a secret. This was one way to make sure that nobody ever found out about it.

I just cannot understand Helms doing this?

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to him about it?

Mr. Scelso. No. I did not even know anything about it until I had been retired for some years and I was back here in '76. I had been retired for six years and I found it out and I have never seen Helms since then, fortunately.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier that there was a meeting on November 23rd involving a lot of higher-ups.
Mr. Scelso. I think it was November 23rd.

Mr. Goldsmith. Roughly that time period?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. That someone from Cuban operations was there?

Mr. Scelso. I believe that. I was asked that by the Senate Committee and I believe that somebody from Cuban operations was there. I do not know who it was. It could have been Mr. Fitzgerald if he was in town, or one of his staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Mr. Harvey's reaction after the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. I had no contact with him about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the last time you saw the man?

Mr. Scelso. I saw him in Berlin in 1967 on a temporary duty. I may have seen him when he got back from Rome. I may have seen him in the halls. He cracked up in Rome.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way?

Mr. Scelso. He became practically paranoid, turned on his officers, threatened to have them ruined. One of his very best officers came home and was going to join my staff and told me the whole story. I do not remember the man's name. An outstanding operations officer who asked for a transfer. He could not stand Harvey anymore and asked for a transfer. When Harvey refused to give him one, he said he was going to give him a bad fitness report and have him fired.
and so on.

Later on, Desmond Fitzgerald came out on the TDY and heard some of these stories and relieved Harvey. Harvey went completely — which happens in the Agency. The strain is tremendous. But Harvey, in my opinion, the whole thought of Helms' appointing Harvey, the very thought of using a former criminal for anything, let alone to assassinate people or to be on a standby basis to assassinate people -- here Helms cannot turn around, you see, after establishing standards and training officers and maintaining standards in the conduct of operations and low rating people for deviating from certain principles, and so on, he cannot turn around, just because he is the DCI, and appoint a thug like Harvey to hire some criminal to commit assassinations.

The best thing you can say was he was a buffoon for doing it, or perhaps he never intended to use it and just would be able to say that he had the capacity. That is the kind of interpretation I can put on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. You just characterized Mr. Harvey as a thug.

Mr. Scelso. I do not like to speak that way of him, but Harvey --

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Harvey is the central figure in the Committee's concern here. I would like you to be as candid as you can be.
Mr. Scelso. Harvey was not the kind of personality who appeals to me and I certainly was not the kind of personality that appeals to him. I have wondered -- I wonder if the government has ever looked into the possibility that Harvey did not knock of Giancomo. He lived in the same area, when he was retired. He was a great one with guns.

I read it in the newspaper. I was overseas and I said to myself, I wondered if they look into Bill Harvey.

Mr. Goldsmith. This question may come to you out of right field, but do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Harvey himself may have been involved in the President's assassination?

Mr. Scelso. I do not have any reason to believe it.

Harvey was a great gun fanatic. I remember going to a meeting out at Walt Whitman High School where the gun law was being debated and a whole bunch of red-necked riflemen from Baltimore County and Arundel County, Baltimore City, were there, packing the place and haranguing and threatening the speakers, and so on. And Harvey came in.

I said, Bill, what are you doing in this bunch, crazy bunch? And he looked at me. He was wearing some kind of a tie pin that was in the shape of a gun.

Mr. Goldsmith. How does a guy like Mr. Harvey get this high up in the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. Harvey was an experienced FBI man who had
worked on Soviet operations in the United States during World 
War II and had lectured on them at the FBI academy. He had a 
fantastic memory. He is, I say, a man without sentiment, 
considerable stamina, great determination, high-skilled. 
Surrounded himself wherever he was with a group of people 
compatible with his personality and worked very purposefully 
towards certain ends.

He dug the Berlin Tunnel, you see. Too bad the Russians 
knew about it the whole time, as we know now.

Harvey was also, earlier in his career when he was in 
the Agency was on the CI staff. He was the head of the CIA 
staff and was palsy-walsy with Burgess, McLean and Philby and 
they were great drinkers together and carousers together and 
Burgess or McLean, or both of them, you know, were queers 
and Harvey was not queer. He was out of it, not queer.

They were all kinds of nasty scenes. Burgess or McLean 
drawing pornographic pictures of Harvey's wife during a party, 
and so on. Harvey was inclined to disclose too many things 
to the British, which may have cost us the Popoff operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Harvey instructed his wife that after 
his own death his wife should burn all of his papers. Do 
you have any idea what would be in those papers that Mr. 
Harvey would be so interested to conceal?

Mr. Scoles. He was too young to have assassinated 
McKinley and Lincoln. It could have been anything.
His wife, by the way, I always thought was a very fine person. She was a remarkable woman. I am probably doing Harvey an injustice, but I think Harvey was a man who did great damage to the Agency.

I told the Senate Committee -- I went out of my way to tell them in my emphasis that assassinations and things like that are something really abhorrent to all the rank and file of Agency officers. It is unthinkable.

I told them of the case where we refused to carry out such an order, in the case of the Dominican crisis. You might have read that in my testimony.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe you indicated to the Senate that there was a feeling in the CIA that the FBI may have been derelict in its handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What reason do you have?

Mr. Scelso. They asked me why we ran an investigation at all, I think, and I said there was a feeling that perhaps the Bureau would not be completely objective in its conduct of the investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Scelso. Because they had been watching Oswald and had not watched him closely enough. I do not say this in a way of anything critical for the Bureau, because they have an inhuman workload.
I think my suspicion was borne out, in view of the destroyed note, which is a red flag. Also, I think, in retrospect, since I testified before the Senate Committee, I think that the Secret Service was derelict. They did not follow their own operational standards.

The Chief of the White House detailed Jerry Beame, who I know from the Presidential trips, to Central America, was not on the Dallas trip. The Secret Service did not follow its standard operating procedure in making sure that every apartment in every office, every floor of every building on the parade route, that there was a selected man of confidence who would be charged with the responsibility of seeing that no one not known to him was in that office or apartment or on a floor of that building, and that nobody did anything but wave flags, possibly throw confetti.

That is standard operating procedure and was not done.

To me, reading about some of the scandals that are coming out of the White House and reading some of the things that a terribly overworked Secret Service had to do, like smuggling girls up and down the back steps -- if indeed that be true -- you can imagine how this would affect the morale of these people. Here are men who are supposed to kill themselves and work themselves to death in the service of protecting the President, which they do, and then have to do things like that. They cannot possibly keep their motivation up.
under these circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is an interesting point.

Mr. Scelso. They did not do what they teach, and what we teach. We trained a lot of bodyguards too, the business of having somebody on every floor, and so on.

Lee Harvey Oswald certainly did not qualify as the look-out on that floor.

I would like to add something to my remarks about Harvey.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Scelso. I said some unkind things about Harvey, because I was really shocked when I read that Helms had appointed him to create this assassination capability. To me, this is an absolutely shocking and abhorrent thing and I am sure it must have outraged all the other case officers in the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso. No. I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, is there any other information that Helms may have withheld from the Warren
Commission pertaining to the assassination?

Mr. Scelsio. Nothing that I can recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard --

Mr. Scelsio. Incidentally, I think that Helms withheld the information because he realized it would have cost him his job and would have precipitated a crisis for the Agency, which could have had very adverse effects on the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. As well as an international crisis, I would think. Is that a possibility?

Mr. Scelsio. I think that the outrage, or even more, the laughter that would have accompanied that disclosure would have been more than drowned out by the grief over Kennedy's death, because, after all, really, these assassination attempts on Castro were largely ludicrous -- but no less reprehensible.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the surveillance operations in Mexico City, I think the record is clear that the Agency was not forthcoming, at least initially, as to the nature of those surveillance operations, given the fact that a picture of someone whom they thought to be Oswald had been taken.

Is there any way that you can explain that?

Mr. Scelsio. How do you mean that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Specifically, the Agency did not inform the Warren Commission until sometime in late February or March that a picture had been taken of someone in Mexico City whom, at that time, they believed to be Oswald. The first
time the Warren Commission found out about that photograph was when Marguerite Oswald testified before the Commission and made reference to the photograph that had been shown to her.

Mr. Scelso. That would be a dereliction that could be laid squarely at my doorstep, and I cannot believe that the Warren Commission did not know that. Did it really say that? The Bureau had the picture. It was in the Bureau's report. I just can't believe that.

Of course, we knew at that time that the man was not Oswald and had nothing to do with it. It might have been considered of minor importance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why do we not take a brief recess here? I will see if I can find my chronology and I can go the exact facts with you and you might be able to comment upon them.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read to you a portion of a chronology that was prepared by our staff.

November 24, 1963: CIA prepares a summary of relevant information on Oswald. Summary states that first information on Oswald came from Mexico City Station on October 9th. It says that the Mexico mystery man photo was found in a search of Mexico Station files.

Oswald then went to Mexico 9-27, probably by car. It
sets forth Oswald's visits to the Soviet Union and Cuba and Mexico City.

There is no mention of the 10-10 cable description or a name discrepancy. I see no indication that this document was ever sent to the Warren Commission or that they were ever made aware of it.

Mr. Scelso. What was the date of that?


Mr. Scelso. That was the one that I wrote that went to the White House, I think.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then, on February 10th, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified about the photograph but was not shown the photograph for identification purposes -- Howard Willin, staff counsel for the Warren Commission, spoke to Thomas Karamessinas about the photograph.

On the 11th, the FBI delivered a crop copy of the photograph to the Warren Commission after receiving a call from the Warren Commission about it, and at that time, the Warren Commission drafted a letter concerning this photograph.

Mr. Scelso. That was March, you say?

Mr. Goldsmith. We are now into February. The letter requested an explanation of circumstances, the tainting and the identity of the Mexico mystery man photograph.

Then, on March 5th, there is a CIA internal memo. I would like to indicate to you that I know that this quotation

SECRET

001938
I am about to read to you is somewhat out of context. We have a problem here for your determination.

"Staff officer does not desire to respond directly to paragraph 2 of the letter which may levy foreign material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service on 23 November. Unless you feel otherwise, staff officer would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph two."

The remainder of the memorandum goes on to say, however, the press will get together and give them an oral briefing and the substance of this pertains to the photograph, which is why this Committee is so concerned about this photograph.

On March 16, 1964, the Warren Commission requests a copy of the 10-10 cable from the CIA so, as you can see, the Warren Commission is having trouble putting together this photograph with the cable—and there is the absence of completely forthright communication from the CIA.

On March 24th, the CIA reveals the link between the Mexico mystery man photograph and Mexico City. The 10-10 cable is provided.

It goes on to say here, however, that even here the Agency does not make the connection between the photograph and the cable explicit.

So we have a situation here where it appears that the Agency was not completely forthcoming with the information. My
question is why?

Mr. Scelso. We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photo-surveillance because the November photo we had was not of Oswald. Therefore, it did not mean anything, you see?

Mr. Goldsmith. There were a lot of other possibilities that the Commission may have wanted to pursue. For example, it turned out that this was not a photograph of Oswald, but it is possible that the person whose picture was taken was at the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Oswald. In other words, perhaps he was an Oswald imposter.

So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Scelso. Right. We were not authorized, at first, to reveal all of our technical operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What kind of arrangement did you have with the Warren Commission as to the information that would be given to them?

Mr. Scelso. We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all of our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Sylvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts.
Mr. Goldsmith. You were aware that this photograph was not being provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Scelso. I probably was, but I do not remember. I am surprised to find that it was not passed.

For example, the Senate Committee asked me why we had not told the Warren Commission -- the Warren Commission claimed that we did not tell them that we had telephone taps, when I remember discussing this detail with their lawyers -- not with the Commission itself, but the lawyers that they had working for them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where did you have this discussion?

Mr. Scelso. In their offices.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you go into all of the details of the nature of the taps?

Mr. Scelso. I said we had telephone taps on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and we intercepted Mr. Oswald's telephone calls and told them what the nature of it was and said this is completely covered, the same material, by Sylvia Duran's interrogation, you see, which confirms the content of these telephone calls.

So they said then we do not have to put the telephone calls on the record. We want to protect our source.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand the need to protect the source.

(Pause)
At the same time, it seems, though, that the Commission was not being given all of the relevant information. On what basis did the Agency determine that the person on the line actually was Oswald?

Mr. Scelso. The fact that he said he was Oswald. That is about all.

I do not know whether Sylvia Duran identified pictures of him or not. I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me read to you another section of our chronology from March 26, 1964 -- and this is Mr. Coleman, one of the senior counsel from the Commission.

"I hope that the complete answer will give us the additional information that we requested. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of 3-24-64 sent to Mr. Raikin by the CIA is not the answer is not the answer that the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry."

Mr. Scelso. That, of course, was after my regime.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, I understand that. In other words, you are getting the picture here that the Commission is concerned that they are not receiving this photograph.

I am not sure I have a satisfactory answer as to why not.

Mr. Scelso. To give them the photograph and explain it to them would have been to compromise their photosurveillance, and I suppose they did not want to do that at that time. I do
not know why that was resolved that way in my regime. I presume we thought it was irrelevant.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the position taken by the CIA that if something was going to compromise a sensitive source or method, information would not be turned over to the Commission?

Mr. Scelso. If it had been something vital, really relevant to the investigation, clearly relevant to say, your position that this might have been a man impersonating Oswald, of course, is a pretty far-out chance. Of course, any of the people who went in and out could have been impersonating Oswald, not just the man in that photograph.

Mr. Goldsmith. The point is an avenue of investigation was opened to the Warren Commission that was not pursued.

Mr. Scelso. It should have been given to them, I grant you that. We could have done it just as well at the outset as later, but the problem was, we were feeling our way into our relations with the Warren Commission and wondering whether divulging this to them might not unnecessarily compromise forever our capability.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did President Johnson instruct the Agency to provide the Commission with all information pertaining to the assassination?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, but we are supposed to do this anyway, but we still protect our sources.

Mr. Goldsmith. This situation was really different from
the typical situation where the Agency is trying to protect
its sources and methods from the legislative branch, for
example. But here, you have the Warren Commission was more
closely aligned to the Executive Branch.

Mr. Scelso. What we were worrying about was protecting
them from public disclosure, you see. The minute you start
giving information to other agencies and so on, you have to
make sure that it is going to people that will keep it secure.

Of course, all that has flown out of the window in
recent years, as you know -- as I hear at the Agency and as
I know from Europe, it has caused the Agency terrible damage
which is going to take decades to make good, unfortunately.
I certainly do not level that charge at either the Senate
or the House Committee. It was inconceivable to us that some-
one would have been impersonating Oswald -- for what purpose,
you see?

Mr. Goldsmith. There certainly were a lot of reasons
why someone might want to impersonate Oswald. Oswald could
have been the patsy he claimed to be; someone may have just
been setting him up.

Certainly, if the Warren Commission had received a cable
that reported Oswald's contact and then also reported that
a picture had been taken and the Warren Commission had seen
that the picture did not look like Oswald, they would have
looked into the imposter theory. At the very least, they would
have done that.

I am not saying -- perhaps they did anyway. But recent books have been written about the second Oswald theory and all sorts of imposter theories. Had the Commission been given the information promptly, they might have pursued that avenue more thoroughly.

Mr. Scelso. But there was no nefarious reason for our not giving it to them. It was simply that we did not consider it vitally relevant and we wanted to protect our source.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, to your knowledge, did anyone at the Agency ever discuss, to your knowledge, withholding of information from the Warren Commission?

Mr. Scelso. Only in the context that we did not initially divulge to them our operational methods in all cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other examples besides the one I just referred to with the photograph that you can think of?

Mr. Scelso. Not that I know of. Nothing. As a matter of fact, we were sure to give them everything when we thought we could do that without revealing how, exactly, we got the information we did. So, for instance, in the case of the telephone taps, we relied on the interrogations of Sylvia Duran. We said the same thing, but then we told them about the telephone taps.

Mr. Goldsmith. Once Angleton and his staff took over
the investigation, did you have any involvement at all?

Mr. Scelso. From time to time Ray Rocca would call me up and I would go down and see them and we would discuss certain aspects of the case. Particularly when Garrison, in New Orleans, started his fandango. Rocca could not believe that there had not been any information in the initial reports about Clay Shaw and all of the other oddballs whom Garrison dragged in the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, did the CIA monitor closely the Garrison investigation of the Kennedy assassination.

Mr. Scelso. Rocca paid attention to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why he did?

Mr. Scelso. Well, there were angles where Garrison was trying to involve the Agency, were there not? Of course, a lot of people were trying to involve the Agency at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Clay Shaw was a CIA agent?

Mr. Scelso. I never checked his name during my period because his name did not come up in that era, but not to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Rocca ever give you the impression that Garrison's investigation was touching upon Agency sources, assets, employees?

Mr. Scelso. No, he never told me that, or indicated
that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he ever indicate to you that the Agency might have been infiltrating the Garrison investigation?

Mr. Scelso: No. If he had known it, he would not have told me.

Mr. Goldsmith. So other than occasional meetings with Rocca --

Mr. Scelso. I do not think that there were any other occasions. My main contact -- it could have been that people asked me things from time to time. I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, once Angleton took over, you and your staff were essentially out of the investiga-

Mr. Scelso. Yes. We continued to see traffic that came in from Mexico, but Rocca had the action on those things.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when your investigative efforts were discontinued?

Mr. Scelso. Not clearly. I thought it was around Christmas when we -- when I saw the Katzenback report, and Rocca says he thinks it was mid-January. He could be right, because the Panama riots were already going on when I was with the Agency and they did not happen until the 4th of January.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any criticisms of the manner in which the Agency conducted its investigation?
Mr. Scelso. Well, I think we could have done better.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what ways?

Mr. Scelso. We could have circulated to all stations and asked them to follow up all leads. I do not think it was really necessary in a case like that, but we could have done that.

We could have put the Miami station onto the case, which we did anyway, later on.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your specific reason for not putting them on in the first place?

Mr. Scelso. Oswald's involvement with the pro-Castro movement in the United States was not at all surface to us in the first weeks of the investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there anything else that you would have done differently?

Mr. Scelso. Well, if Helms had disclosed the Cuban assassination plots, we would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operatives security had to see if he had a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on.

I would have had all our Cuban sources queried about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting into another area briefly -- we may come back to this question of the investigation in a little...
while. Getting back to another area, briefly, what is your assessment of Mr. Angleton?

Mr. Scelso. Mr. Angleton, as an operations officer in the Agency, I have been acquainted with for many years, having polygraphed some of his greatest agents in the past, much to his grief. And I find Mr. Angleton to be an extremely complicated individual, very highly motivated.

I do not, in any way, question his ethics or morals or anything like that, but whose view and understanding of human nature and what makes people do things and the dynamics of intelligence operations, I find to be bizarre. I find that Mr. Angleton's appreciation of intelligence situations to be colored by a sense of dread of foreign conspiracies, and an over-suspiciousness.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yet, Mr. Angleton did not find any conspiracy in the Oswald case.

Mr. Scelso. At first, until Nosenko came along -- which I only know from the book -- unless the book is a hoax too.

Mr. Goldsmith. A hoax by whom?

Mr. Scelso. I mean Epstein maybe fabricated the book. But according to the book, which I read last week-end, Angleton was very concerned about the Nosenko aspect.

Mr. Goldsmith. Not necessarily from the perspective of Nosenko being surface to the United States for the purpose of concealing Oswald's links to the KGB. Angleton's fundamental
concern was Nosenko might have been designed to infiltrate
the American intelligence community to protect other KGB
agents, and that this Oswald connection was just a convenient
way to get him in.

I did not get an impression that Angleton ever came down
and said that there was a conspiracy.

Mr. Goldsmith. You know what Angleton really said, and
I do not.

Mr. Scelso. No, this is -- I am giving you my impres-

I have investigated a few cases which Angleton was
involved with, and I have found his understanding of human
nature, and so on, his evaluation of people, to be a very
precarious thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that
Agleton might have had ties to organized crime?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

I have heard that he did operational --

Mr. Goldsmith. Through whom?

Mr. Scelso. Back when I was a Branch Chief. The
Department of Justice, Mr. Hunley, who was working against
organized crime, asked people from the Agency to come over
and asked us if we could find out the true names of holders
of numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was
depositing money there, cash money skimmed off the top in
Las Vegas. And we were, indeed, in an excellent position to do this and told them so, whereupon, Mr. Angleton vetoed it and said that is the Bureau's business.

If the Bureau has to request us to do that -- not Hunley. Unless the Bureau requests us to do it, we are not going to do it, so we did not do it. And I told J.C. King this and he smiled a foxy smile and said well, he said, that's Angleton's excuse. The real reason is that Angleton himself has ties to the Mafia and he would not want to double cross them, or something like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. King able to be more specific?

Mr. Scelso. I did not ask him any more.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have more specific information linking Angleton into the Mafia, into organized crime?

Mr. Scelso. I do believe that I have heard that Angleton was one of those several people in the Agency who were trying to use the Mafia in Cuban operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. How about Angleton's connection with the FBI? What kind of relationship did he have with them?

Mr. Scelso. Well, he was very close to the FBI, had a very fine working relationship with them which was of great help to us over many, many years. He was extremely protective of the FBI, would not allow any criticism of them or any kind of rivalry, and so on. Very careful to protect their interests.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe we discussed this next question
a bit this morning. I would just like to go into somewhat
more detail again.

I think you testified that Helms asked you to investigate
some of Angleton's activities. What would the reason for that
have been and could you give us some examples?

Mr. Scelso. Helms, or Karamessinas?

Way back before Angleton was Chief of the CI staff, he
was head of the Israeli desk and he had an agent in Italy,
a quintuple, double agent; a man who was working for us against
five different foreign intelligence services, one of Angleton's
great operations, and it got to be so hairy that nobody could
make heads or tails of it.

So I was back on leave and was instructed to polygraph
this man who had been polygraphed unsuccessfully by the Office
of Security. So I polygraphed the man and got him to make a
series of damning admissions. In the structure, in this
pentagon structure, Angleton was supposedly guiding this man,
like the man fishing for trout, as someone characterized,
against these other services, inserting questions and stimuli
here and having reactions coming out there, and so on.

And all of this was done with the most carefully
measured doses of stimulus, crafty analysis, sort of billiard-
like ricochet and so on. And the upshot of the thing
was -- I got the man very sensitive. I polygraphed him for
five days and the upshot of it was that his singular success
in working against all of these other services was due to
the fact that he had disclosed to them that he was working
for the Central Intelligence Agency, which was not part of
Angleton's formula.

And then the human judgment thing -- then our Agency
psychologist tested this man, who was the heir of a wealth
Midwestern family who had come to Western Europe to study and
had cultivated the company of all kinds of obscure artists
and poets and talking about nothing but these people, dropping
names right and left, and making you feel like an ignoramus
because you never heard of them.

The psychological testing of this man showed that he
was a man of very low intelligence, way below average intelli-
genue, who had early on realized that he really could not
make it -- he was a homosexual among other things -- and
therefore started cultivating knowledge and acquiring knowledge
of fringe groups in the art field, so he could fool people
into thinking he was an intellectual, and he had fooled his
way all the way through the University of Minnesota. This
is the way he had gotten a degree, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever asked to investigate any
of Mr. Angleton's investigations pertaining to the Kennedy
assassination?

Mr. Scelso. No. I do not want to give you the idea
that I think poorly of Angleton, because I really do not know
what he did. He must have done a lot of good things. His
staff turned out absolutely outstanding analytical work. It
is true that, under his term as the Chief of Counterintelli-
gence, Counterintelligence did better than it had ever done
before.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Angleton's staff
would have had access to electronic surveillance equipment?

Mr. Scelso. In Washington?

Mr. Goldsmith. For use just about anywhere.

Mr. Scelso. I am sure they would have.

Mr. Goldsmith. How closely is that type of equipment
monitored by the Agency to make sure that it is being properly
used?

Mr. Scelso. Well, I do not know how they would monitor
Angleton, if he used it. I do not know of any case where he
ever did. But he certainly could have gotten it, just like
any Division could get it for use in Washington in safe
houses, or things like that.

And you tell him what you want to use it for. Of
course, you might be able to go and use it for something
completely different.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever coming across a
report in December of '63 indicating that this CIA agent
may have had contact with Oswald in Cuba?

Mr. Scelso. I seem to vaguely recall a report alleging
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how that allegation was resolved?

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall, but I think that it was proved to be factually untrue. That is a very vague recollection. Dozens of people were claiming that they had seen Oswald here, there and everywhere in all kinds of conspiratorial circumstances, from the North Pole to the Congo.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know Mr. Papich of the FBI?

Mr. Scelso. Slightly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any type of working relationship with him?

Mr. Scelso. On occasion, I sat in on conferences with him and other people on the CIA staff, other than Angleton.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever discuss the Kennedy case with Mr. Papich?

Mr. Scelso. Casually and on certain details now and again. Yes, we did indeed. Birch O'Neal and I.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is all in the post-assassination period?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. When they levied certain requirements on us -- they used to like that term, levying requirements.

Then that meant that the guillotine was going to drop if we did not do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In general, did you comply with the
request for information?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. Sometimes reluctantly, because I had a lot else to do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you always comply with the FBI's requests for information?

Mr. Scelso. I think so, yes. This particular request was for a transcription, an analysis of the intercepted telephone call to the President of Mexico, or something with their Ambassador -- President of Cuba -- with their Ambassador to Mexico.

I took my time analyzing that. In other words, that was something that they could have analyzed just as well themselves.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA have any penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy in 1963?

Mr. Scelso. I do not think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way, if any, did you attempt to find out what their reaction was?

Mr. Scelso. We had audio operations. I do not think they were working at that time. We installed a number of microphones.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you get any indications at all as to what the reaction of the Cuban government was at all to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Scelso. From this intercepted telephone call.
Mr. Goldsmith. What was the nature of their reaction?

Mr. Scelso. One was outrage of the arrest of Sylvia Duran.

Mr. Goldsmith. More than outrage, were they also concerned?

Mr. Scelso. I gathered it was just genuine outrage.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there not a concern voiced by the President of Cuba in the conversation over whether Duran was being asked about having given Oswald money?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I think there was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether that particular issue was ever pursued?

Mr. Scelso. Well, she was asked that when she was interrogated.

Mr. Goldsmith. The fact that the President of Cuba may have been concerned about Duran's having given —

Mr. Scelso. That is because stories to that effect, which appeared in Mexican newspapers and the radio alleging that Oswald had gotten a lot of money from the Cubans to do the assassinations in the yellow press in Mexico.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me refresh your memory a bit more. It is difficult to do that without the transcripts here.

My recollection of the transcript is that the Ambassador in Mexico City felt that the President's concern was that the Americans were driving Duran to make a statement of some
In fact, what the Cuban's President concern was that no, the Americans were asking Duran about having received money from Oswald, this kind of thing, and he seemed to be concerned about that -- the inference being that if he were concerned about that, maybe there was a basis for his being concerned about it, because the Cubans may have been involved.

Mr. Scelso. Yes, and I think that our knowledge at the time was that he had heard this when it had been reported on the newspapers and radios, so they assumed that they would be asking Sylvia Duran.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Sylvia Duran was beaten or tortured by the Mexican police?

Mr. Scelso. No. I do not think she was either beaten or tortured. She was really pushed around a little bit. She had bruises on her arm -- probably grabbed by the arm like that, you know, pushed into an office. Some people bruise easily.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was any American official involved in the interrogation of Duran?

Mr. Scelso. I believe not.

Mr. Goldsmith. How about the interrogation of Ugarte?

Mr. Scelso. He was polygraphed by one of your operators.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to that time?

Mr. Scelso. His interrogation, I think, was done at that time by a very senior Mexican police officer.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that the Mexican police officials were known for their brutality?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, really, if a person giving a statement to the Mexican police, as a statement might be given under stress, the statement might not necessarily be a reliable and accurate one?

Mr. Scelso. That is possible, sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. What I am getting at here is that Ugarte's retraction of his statement may not have been freely given.

Mr. Scelso. Indeed. But he retracted his retraction, as you know, after he got out and said it is true anyway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever study the results of his polygraph?

Mr. Scelso. No. Security does not show these things.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that his original story was an accurate one?

Mr. Scelso. I am convinced it was a fabrication.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give us the reasons why?

Mr. Scelso. Well, it had all the earmarks of fabrication: the red-headed Negro, the whole atmosphere of people talking about this in public, in the courtyard of the Embassy, and so on, was unrealistic. The fact that he did not report this at the time it happened, but only after the assassination, typical of fabricators.
In other words, after he had heard of this incident, he didn't go to his case officer and tell them that. He told them that a number of weeks later, after the assassination.

The money sum that he mentioned was the money sum which had been mentioned on the radio in Mexico before then. The FBI established that Oswald had not been in Mexico on that day, but in New Orleans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever look into the story or allegation made by a man named Gautorez to the fact that he had seen Oswald with an official from the Cuban Embassy and that Oswald and the Cuban got into a light-colored Renault vehicle and drove away. The car may have been subsequently linked to Mr. Duran, Sylvia's husband.

Mr. Scelso. I vaguely remember something like that. I do not know how it was resolved.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Jack Ruby had any connections to organized crime?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know that. I have read in books that he did. I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. Goldsmith. I will ask this question again. You filed two reports, did you not?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where they would be today?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Those reports would not have been destroyed?
Mr. Scelso. No, they should not have been. It may have been that my files were turned over to the CI staff as an aid to Rocca to help his investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you go over Oswald's itinerary in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Scelso. Only superficially, because we did not know a good deal.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it would have been unusual for Oswald to obtain a visa to enter into the Soviet Union within 48 hours of applying for it?

Mr. Scelso. I have no knowledge of how long it took to get Soviet visas in those days.

Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming that it took, on the average, about a week to get a Soviet visa, would it have been unusual for Oswald?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever examine that particular issue?

Mr. Scelso. I do not think that I knew at that time how long it had taken him to get a visa. I do not think that we had that precise information.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know that by the end of December, the manner in which Oswald had travelled from the United States to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Scelso. ... We know something about it. We knew how
he got to England.

Mr. Goldsmith. From England to Moscow, apparently, there is no commercial flight that would have delivered Oswald -- not from England to Moscow, England to Helsinki -- no commercial flight that would have delivered him there at the time stated on his passport or his travel papers?

Mr. Scelso. I do not think we went into that. We do not have information on it. You see, at that time, the Bureau had passed us next to no information.

Mr. Goldsmith. This would have been of an overseas nature that would have fallen more in the scope of the CIA?

Mr. Scelso. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Oswald travelled by means of a noncommercial flight from England to Helsinki?

Mr. Scelso. I have no idea. We were not really going heavily into Oswald's past at that time. We were working only on the present leads, the fresh leads.

Mr. Goldsmith. That might have pertained to a Soviet connection of some kind, I think.

Mr. Scelso. It would have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. The manner in which, as a very young man, he was able to get into the Soviet Union so easily. There was a cable that was sent from Headquarters to the Mexico City station in December of '63 which stated that the CIA's investigation was dictated, to a certain extent, by the facts
of Oswald's life, as reported in another Headquarters cable
to the Mexico City station.

Do you recall sending a cable like that?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way would the Agency's investi-
gation have been --

Mr. Scelso. I think they are referring to his background
as a defector and his stay in Soviet Russia.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the event the Committee has any
further questions to ask of you, Mr. Scelso, what would be
the best way to address those questions to you?

Mr. Scelso. Well, you can send them to me in writing
through the station in Vienna, if you want to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that a satisfactory way to handle
it for you?

Mr. Scelso. Yes. I was not exactly happy the way they
contacted me, by simply calling me up from the Embassy. I
would not have done that.

I will send you the answers in writing. I cannot imagine
that you would have any reason to call me back here again.

Mr. Goldsmith. As I mentioned to you earlier, part of
our problem is that we only realized very recently that your
participation in this case went beyond the cable traffic that
we initially reviewed, but that you also handled the investi-
gation, at least initially.
Of course, we did not know that, because from reading
Book 5 you are not mentioned in there specifically, so we
thought it would have been another Western Hemisphere Branch
Officer.

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

I would like to tell you something which might help you
evaluate Nosenko, something in the psychology of defectors, a
sort of parallel case.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please do.

Mr. Scelso. Do you remember the Soviet defector,
Galyapin? He has been interrogated at some time in this
case. Galyapin was a Soviet intelligence officer who defected
to Vienna in the spring of 1964. He was a security officer
responsible for the security and loyalty of Soviet officials
in Vienna, and he got fed up and defected.

A couple of months after he defected, the Chief of the
West German Security Service disappeared into East Berlin under
very mysterious circumstances. This was a gigantic flop.

Galyapin had previously in Moscow been the Deputy Chief
of the German Desk of the KGB and could have been expected to
know of Otto Young were, as many people alleged, a Soviet
agent.

On the day that Otto Young's disappearance hit the
newspapers in Washington, Galyapin was living in a safe house
in Georgetown and he picked up the telephone -- he read the

001964
newspapers carefully which told who Otto Young was and what
his background was and what his job was, and Galyapin very
thoughtfully picked up the telephone, telephoned his case
officer, turned on the reflecting pool where we then were and
said, this man Young whose picture is in the paper, I have
read the article and I just wanted to tell you, he was not
one of ours. In fact, I have never heard of him.

Then we had Galyapin interrogated in detail at this
point and the upshot was that he had never heard of Otto
Young or any man like that who was the head of the German
Security and so on. A complete blank. He volunteered this
because he knew it was important to us.

A year and a half later he wrote an article for Life
Magazine, and he has written books, this story that Otto
Young, who was well-known as a member of the German Resistance
against Hitler -- in fact, played a key role in it -- had
actually been a Gestapo stool pigeon and that the Russians
after the war had captured Gestapo records proving this and,
using these records, blackmailed Young into working for them.

And he told this and a lot of people believed this.
Complete fabrication. In the first place, there was no
indication in Young's background that he had ever been a
Soviet agent, really, and Galyapin's initial reaction, a
perfectly spontaneous reaction, was he never heard of the
guy.
This is a typical defector syndrome. It is typically for defectors, who might otherwise be reasonably well-balanced people, do things like this to make themselves feel important, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few more questions to get into with you before we are finished for the day.

Mr. Scelso. I say that because of the Nosenko case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I appreciate that. Although I am not handling that matter, I will definitely pass that information on to the appropriate individual.

Did you conduct an investigation in reference to a flight from Mexico to Cuba that took place on November 27, 1963, involving a Cuban-American?

Mr. Scelso. This report baffles me. I was asked by the Senate Committee about this. I have discussed it since with Mr. Phillips.

As I recall it, Headquarters sent a cable to Mexico telling me this, and it is not clear where we got this information. I am now convinced that we got it from the FBI because the FBI was observing the Mexico Airport, just like we were, and they were getting reports from the Mexican authorities. They probably told us this and we informed Mexico, who already knew it, and attached no importance to it because, as Phillips now tells me, because, as we all knew, things like this happened all the time.
Mr. Goldsmith, What do you mean, things like this happened all the time?

Mr. Scelso. Planes were held for travellers who would otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate this particular matter?

Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there was nothing left to investigate. The plane was gone. The man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left.

We had very complete coverage of the Mexico City Airport and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes happened that an important Cuban official would come late, he would go directly to the plane without going through travel controls.

At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture of him. Nobody looked at his passport. Period.

Mr. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban employees in the Airport about the man?

Mr. Scelso. We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had Mexican police.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of them questioned about him?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, this was a routine thing. We had a whole reporting set up there with that, two of them, who watched things like this. But the report from them was that the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know who
he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. He was identified as a Cuban-American, not just a Cuban.

Mr. Scelso. I do not know how that identification was made. Maybe they looked at his passport. Maybe they saw that he had an American passport or something like that, or he spoke with a Cuban accent.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am really afraid I cannot tell you what I have asked other witnesses by virtue of the Committee's rules.

Mr. Scelso. He is the man who knows all about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Apparently, Headquarters received a dispatch stating that the Cuban-American had been reported as looking suspicious and, in March of '64, a cable was sent from the Monterey base to the effect that a local agent with Mexican Federal Police had information on a man who generally fit the description of the Cuban American. That man supposedly was involved in the Kennedy assassination.

Apparently, the Mexico City station sent a report that was consistent with that, a report from the Monterey base.

Do you recall that particular incident?

Mr. Scelso. I do not recall the latter. It sounds like feedback from police. You see, a query would go out to the Mexican police saying who could this have been, and they come up and say it is someone like our security suspect.
Mr. Goldsmith. I should point out that we are talking about two different flights here. One occurred November 22nd, allegedly involving a flight that was delayed until the arrival of some other individuals; the other was a flight November 27th.

In any event, you do not recall any specific investigation that was done concerning those two flights?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Those are all of the questions that I have.

Let me just review this other stack here for a moment.

(Pause)

Do you have any information as to the manner in which the Domestic Contacts Division selects photographs taken by tourists for retention by the CIA?

Mr. Scelso. No. I have never heard anything about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Alexis Davidson, who at one time, was an Embassy doctor in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was a CIA employee?

Mr. Scelso. Never heard of him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever heard of a man named William Gaudet?

Mr. Scelso. Not that I recall. It is a very faintly familiar name.
Mr. Goldsmith. It was a man issued a Mexican tourist card immediately before Oswald and it turned out he had at one time worked for the Agency.

Mr. Scelso. When was that discovered?

Mr. Goldsmith. That was initially withheld, as a matter of fact, from public disclosure and was just recently discovered inadvertently, when it was inadvertently released.

In any event, my question was whether Gaudet, to your knowledge, had any connection with the Agency in '63?

Mr. Scelso. Not that I know of. I do not know where I have heard the name.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you remember the name, would you get in touch with us?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Is that all that you know about, whether he worked for the Agency and so on? That might trigger off something.

Mr. Goldsmith. Gaudet was sort of a journalist that assisted the Agency in propaganda-related matters.

Mr. Scelso. In Mexico?

Mr. Goldsmith. South America, Latin America. He published a newspaper.

Mr. Scelso. From where?

Mr. Goldsmith. He is from New Orleans and Mississippi.

Mr. Scelso. That certainly seems significant. I do not think it was uncovered during my regime. I do not remember
that we had those lists at all, of who else was on the bus
and who was driving with Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. I should say that this man was not
necessarily driving with Oswald, but he was issued a Mexican
tourist card immediately preceding Oswald.

Mr. Scelso. You get them at the border, do you not?

Mr. Goldsmith. I think you obtain them -- I thought
Oswald obtained his in New Orleans, but I am not sure.

What about the name Louis Hopkins, who arranged Oswald's
trip from New Orleans to Europe?

Mr. Scelso. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he had any Agency
connections?

Mr. Scelso. I never heard of him.

Mr. Goldsmith. There was another defector whose name
was Robert Edward Webster who defected at the same time as
Oswald. Do you know whether he, in fact, was a CIA agent?

Mr. Scelso. I never heard that he was. I read his
name in Epstein's book. I have never heard of him otherwise.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it ever a matter of procedure for
the Agency to use someone who pretends to be a defector as
an agent?

Mr. Scelso. I have never known of such an operation,
but I can conceive that it was done. It would never have
happened in any Branch or Department where I was employed.
Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Scelso. I was never involved with Soviet operations in the field, I handled a lot of things, but I was never in the Soviet Branch, or anything like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether George de Mohrenschildt had any connection with the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. Not to my knowledge, except for the allegation that I read in the book, that he was in contact with a man named Moore who worked for us.

De Mohrenschildt was a puzzle to me, and after reading Epstein's book, it makes me wonder whether he was not a source of the FBI or one of the military intelligence services. With all his Nazi associations and his Leftist associations ricocheting all over the place.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Oswald ever spent any time in a CIA safe house?

Mr. Scelso. Not that I have ever heard.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Oswald's cousin Marilyn Dorothy Leary ever worked for the CIA?

Mr. Scelso. Not that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that Oswald may have been debriefed by the CIA indirectly on his return to the United States; for example, the International Rescue Committee may have contacted Oswald and, by contacting him, could the representative of the International Rescue Committee have been acting for
the CIA?

Mr. Scelso. I do not know that the International Rescue Committee was affiliated with us. You may, but I do not. I would not know.

Somehow, the name sounds vaguely familiar to me. I think it was mentioned in Epstein's book.

Wait a minute. The International Rescue Committee, is that not a Russian emigre organization?

Mr. Goldsmith. My impression is that it is not limited to assisting Russian emigrés.

(Pause)

Would it have been Agency practice to have attempted to insulate itself, the Agency from Oswald, by getting an intermediary to debrief them?

Mr. Scelso: It could have been. I have no knowledge, really, of any attempt by the Agency to contact Oswald, either directly or through a front organization when he got back to the United States. Nothing like that ever came to my attention. It was not revealed in any traces.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever heard the name Spass T. Raikin?

Mr. Scelso. No, except in the book.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he had any Agency connection?

Mr. Scelso. What was he?
Mr. Goldsmith. He was a man who met with Oswald upon Oswald's return to the United States, met him at the boat.

Mr. Scelso. I wonder about that, but I have never heard of the name.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have nothing further. I would like to thank you very much for your time and the great inconvenience that you have been put here to by coming to visit with us.

Normally, when a witness testifies before a hearing, the procedure at the end is to give the witness an opportunity to make a statement. If you would like the opportunity to make a statement at this time, feel free.

Mr. Scelso. I would just like to congratulate you gentlemen on the thoroughness and motivation with which you are going at this problem and wish you every success.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much.

Mr. Scelso, as you are not in the United States, are you willing to waive the requirement of a signature to this deposition?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, I am.

(Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m. the Executive Session ceased.)
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Rosemary C. Tascione, the officer before whom the
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition
was duly sworn by the Notary; that the testimony of said
witness was taken by myself, stenomask reporter, and there-
after reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and
further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney
or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Rosemary C. Tascione
REPORTER